



Creating a New Historical Perspective: EU and the Wider World

CLIOHWORLD READERS V

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Perspectives on European Integration and European Union History

A CLIOHWORLD Reader

edited by
Ann Katherine Isaacs with Ewald Hiebl, Luisa Trindade

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Preface

We are pleased to present *Perspectives on European Integration and European Union History. A CLIOHWORLD Reader*. The Reader comprises a number of chapters based on recent research results obtained by CLIOHRES, a Sixth Framework Programme Network of Excellence. It has been organised according to the findings of the CLIOHWORLD Network's Work Group 1, dedicated to European Integration and European Union History.

CLIOHWORLD is an Erasmus Academic Network, now in its third year, dedicated to improving History learning and teaching in a Lifelong Learning framework.

Over the last two and a half years, its Work Group 1 has mapped the offer of European Integration and European Union History across Europe, and has developed a number of criteria for good and interesting practice to be taken into consideration when developing in Degree Programmes and single course units or modules. The complete criteria, guidelines and reference points are in course of publication and will soon be available on-line and in book form from the CLIOHWORLD Network.

In synthesis, CLIOHWORLD recommends that course units and degree programmes in the field be placed in a perspective that includes the period before 1945; that elements of cultural and social history be treated alongside the more usual institutional aspects of EU history; that 'integration' be presented as a complex non-linear process, which comprises phenomena of 'disaggregation' as well as 'integration'; that an interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary approach be implemented and that knowledge of other countries besides that of the learner and their relationship with the European Union be built up. In fact, the Work Group has observed that very frequently, too frequently, EU History is presented from the point of view of the country in which the course is taught.

This is an unsatisfactory way to approach the complex and dynamic reality of Europe. Today's Union is a unique polity which merits being studied on its own terms. Its most remarkable peculiarity is being built by – and on the foundations of – a large number of nation-states, each having its own strong and consolidated identities, language or languages, historical narratives and political system. The Union cannot be understood without investigating its interaction, both ideal and concrete, with respect to each of the states that compose it.

The European Union is a structure both imagined and realised as an assortment of states in which agreement must be found at least on the actions to be undertaken. It is essential, although often difficult, for it to attain a coherent orientation internally and externally, so that it can display common attitudes or policies towards its own member states as well as towards other states and macro-regions.

Outside Europe we have found that programmes in European Studies are usually defective in that they do not take into adequate account the separate and very diverse histories of the various member states. It seems to be difficult for non-Europeans to imagine the range of the differences – in population, economy, culture, language and politics – that distinguish EU members. This makes it difficult for non-Europeans to prepare their students for the careers they hope to build in diplomacy, journalism, European law or economics: one cannot understand the structure, the imperatives and the constraints in which Europe operates without deep knowledge of its many states, and their many histories.

But we Europeans too have some very large blind spots. Almost without exception, current course units or modules and programmes on European integration and European Union history deal with general issues, largely institutional, and look closely above all at the relations between the country where the courses are being held and the Union.

This Reader has been designed to address this challenge. This is a second edition, slightly expanded to take into account the input of the students who used it in a course in History of International Institutions, dedicated to the European Union, and held by Professors Alessandro Polsi and Ann Katherine Isaacs at the History Department of the University of Pisa in the academic year 2010-2011. The first part of the course was general in character, and gave basic information about how and when the various stages of European integration took place. The second part was a participatory seminar, based on the Reader. Novel and rather surprising new research results on current understandings of citizenship in different parts of the Union, form the initial chapters. The new final section, on Hungary, Belgium and Spain, shows how history and different understandings of it continue to influence interpretations of who 'belongs' to the national community. The rest of the Reader is organised as groups of chapters each of which can lead to deeper insight into the workings of the Union: in this case from the points of view of Latvia, Estonia and Slovenia and its neighbours. A number of other relevant materials, on various parts of the Union, are available online.

We thank the leaders and all the members of the CLIOHWORLD Work Group 1 for their hard but productive work in investigating current parameters and suggesting improvements. The Work Group includes Ewald Hiebl, University of Salzburg; Luisa Trindade, University of Coimbra (leaders); David Brown, Strathclyde University, Glasgow; Attila G. Hunyadi, University of Babeş-Bolyai, Cluj-Napoca; Ann Katherine Isaacs, University of Pisa (CLIOHWORLD Coordinator); Manfredi Merluzzi, Rome3 University; Amélia Andrade, University Nova, Lisbon; Ausma Cimdiņa, University of Latvia, Riga; and Blanka Řichová, Charles University, Prague.

We also thank the CLIOHRES researchers who produced the chapters and look forward to a new and fruitful phase in learning, teaching and research on the history of European Integration and the European Union.

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Constructing Europe

ANDREAS GÉMES (EDITOR)

SIEGFRIED BEER

ANN KATHERINE ISAACS

REIGO LOKK

EERO MEDIJAINEN

ABSTRACT

Rather than tracing the development of the 'idea' of Europe or examining its 'images', this chapter – in line with the general theme addressed by TWG1 and the approach followed in this volume – highlights the institutional, political and legal elements that have connected large parts of what we understand today as constituting our continent. Emphasis is on the 20th century, particularly on analysing the forces inside and outside Europe that promoted the integration process, encouraging citizens to look at the European option with interest. The first part of the chapter discusses some of the elements in the European legal and institutional heritage from ancient times on that have made it possible to see the continent as a single, albeit diversified, political space; the following sections examine the integration process during the interwar period and particularly since World War II, as the integration process gained momentum, becoming an institutional reality.

'Europe' – and especially the new meaning this geographic entity acquired as a consequence of the peaceful unification of the continent after World War II – has become a vast, dynamic, and fascinating field of study. Political scientists, legal experts, historians, economists, sociologists and linguists have all studied the topic. The question of 'Europe' is also (and should be) of paramount importance when analysing states, legislation, and institutions from an historical perspective. Indeed, this is just what Thematic Work Group 1 has been doing for the last four years. Since a single chapter cannot possibly aspire to approach the question of 'Europe' over the centuries (a topic which now fills libraries!) in a holistic manner, TWG1 has made use of the fact that CLIOHRES.net brings experts from different European countries working on different time periods and subjects to one table. Six members of TWG1 from Austria, Estonia, and Italy, working on different time periods (especially early modern and contemporary history), have joined to take a fresh look at 'Europe'. Instead of trying to cover "28 centuries of Europe" (Denis de

Rougemont) this chapter relies on the expertise of the members of the group to highlight specific aspects of our topic.

It is clear that historical reconstructions of the ‘idea’ of Europe are far from unusual, and they implicitly or explicitly underlie debates such as those regarding the European Constitution, or the membership of Turkey in the Union. The meanings attributed to Europe in terms of its extension and its characteristics are usually founded on historical explanations of “European-ness”. These are instructive in part, because they help to evaluate some of the elements that distinguish European history (or bits of it), and they allow us to understand the trajectory for the future of Europe that the writer proposes or supports. In this chapter our intention is different; we wish to trace some key coordinates for a *longue durée* overview of “States, Institutions and Legislation” with regard to Europe. We wish to emphasise, alongside the evolution of the ‘idea’ (or ideas) of Europe, those institutional, political and/or legal elements that have affected and connected large parts of what we today understand by that term.

This approach is dictated by the fact noted elsewhere in this book that ‘community’ can be defined as a larger or smaller group of people who recognise and share common norms and institutions, although they may contest them and interpret them differently, or attempt to change them as societal perceptions of needs and values change. It is reasonable to say that recognition of norms and institutions is always dynamic, selective, and layered. Laws and institutions change, as do boundaries of jurisdictions or effective government exercised by states. At the same time, much of their authority depends on maintaining the fiction that they are constant, permanent and rooted in the past. It is the job of rhetoric and politics to provide convincing explanations for why certain laws and institutions should be changed. One of the historian’s most important tasks is thus to sort out the various strands of the complex interaction of rhetoric and the exercise of power.

While the idea of European unity is an old one, European integration (or in other words the ‘construction’ of Europe in an institutional sense) is a relatively new phenomenon, which only commenced at the end of World War II. Even if the vision of a united continent and unifying trends can be traced all the way back to antiquity, it was only the special geopolitical environment at the end of World War II which gave the impetus for the process of European integration and took the idea to a new and unprecedented level. Therefore, in this chapter a clear focus has been placed on the integration process in the 20th century, albeit without forgetting to point to the historic roots which go all the way back to ancient times. After all, today’s European Union and its special nature not only constitute an organization *sui generis* in legal terms, but also builds upon specific European historic experiences.

To this end, Ann Katherine Isaacs, with Aleksandra Smirnov-Brkić, sketches in some of the underlying elements that connected European states and legal cultures in previous

centuries. Eero Medijainen from the University of Tartu in Estonia examines the discussion on 'Europe' in the early 20th century and focuses on the interwar period, which reveals a lot about the ambiguities of the European integration process. Siegfried Beer, from the University of Graz in Austria, takes a look at American sentiments and Washington's decisive backing of European integration after World War II. Andreas Gémes, also from the University of Graz, addresses the role of a single European institution, the European Parliament, in the 1970s and 1980s, and discusses the oft-cited 'democratic deficit' of the European integration process. Reigo Lokk, from the University of Tartu, closes the chapter with his analysis on Estonia's 'return' to Europe in 2004.

FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO MODERN TIMES

The origins of the name of our continent are to be found in a many layered ancient myth. The first mention of "Europe" is found in Greek mythology and literature, where the word referred either to the Phoenician princess whom Zeus took by force to the island of Crete, as recorded in an etymological myth by Herodotus¹ in his histories of the Greco-Persian wars; or, according to one Homeric hymn², first to central Greece as opposed to Peloponnesus and the islands³; and later to the known part of today's European continent. Some linguists associate Europa's name with roots indicating darkness, shadow or the setting sun: i.e. the west. This is consonant with the fact that the legendary Europa left the Phoenician coast for Crete, travelling towards the setting sun. For the Greeks, Europe seems to have had several meanings: in general everything that lay to the west of Asia minor; but more specifically the areas settled by Greeks. The word was used in a way somewhat analogous to our use of the expression 'the west', sometimes meaning everything that is not 'oriental' and other times meaning more specific areas on both sides or even on the far side of the Atlantic⁴.

Classical and even Hellenistic Greeks were only vaguely aware of the lands of western and northern Europe, and most probably considered the boundary with Asia to be on the river Don. But since they distinguished between Europe, Asia and Africa, we might say that their generic definition of Europe in its most capacious form could include what we consider Europe today. Definitions of continents are always changing, redrawn by every generation on the basis of criteria which seem decisive at the time. The idea of Europe, what it is and where is it (and what it is not, and where it is not), has been debated and remodelled in every generation. Even in decades close to us, "Europe" has been delimited in ways that today seem quaint. The mapping proposed by Americans during the Cold War saw a Middle East that included all of north Africa, and a western Europe quite separate from an eastern Europe and Soviet Union, which became a kind of continent defined by the Warsaw pact⁵.

In these pages we do not propose to search for the 'right' definition of Europe, or to discuss which traits are 'European' and which not. We wish to present a number of ways

of looking at Europe that highlight institutional and political connections in different periods, mentioning some of the common or connecting factors with regard to state institutions and legal organisation that have linked at least a substantial part of what today we call Europe.

Definitions of Europe and ideas about its specificity have long been associated with political and institutional structures as well as various cultural and often religious factors. Classical Greeks developed a variety of theories, some of which based on the idea that their civilisation was characterised by human beings who were politically more highly evolved than other peoples. This idea was linked to a perception of a particular relationship to the law, whether *nomos* or *physis*, to the *polis*, as in the case of Athenian democracy ruled not by subjects but by self-governing citizens⁶. This was the essence of the distinction made with the Persian empire, presented as despotic, foreign to Greek urban life, and particularly to Athenian democracy.

The Roman polity, and its remarkable creation, the Roman Empire, was built by a city, and by means largely of an extension and multiplication of urban society. Civilisation, in the Roman sense too, meant living in cities having certain characteristics, including a degree of self government by urban elites and the admission of these to Roman citizenship. The highly developed and effective administrative and legal system unified, not linguistically but legally, much of today's Europe as well as the entire Mediterranean area. After the 'fall' of the western part of the empire, much remained: habits of municipal government, territorial administrative circumscriptions, a highly developed legal system and a language for government (the Empire had two widely spoken and written languages suitable for governing complex political systems, Latin and Greek), and a state Church. The eastern half of the empire did not 'fall' until much later, in what are, historically speaking, quite recent times, and although its linguistic and administrative history differed in many respects from the western part, it built upon a shared heritage. Collecting and readapting that heritage, the "Byzantine" Empire gave to western Europe the systematisation and codification of the Roman legal system promoted by Justinian in the 6th century, in the *Corpus Iuris Civilis*, which included the so-called Digest, the Institutes, the Codex and subsequently the *Novellae*. This was in essence a systematic gathering, collation and systematisation of the legal texts, laws and jurisprudential commentary which had accumulated in the previous millennium, and its collection according to various criteria, which was given force of law.

In the ongoing struggles for political dominion between Byzantium and the 'barbarian' kingdoms of the west, it is worth remembering that extended areas continued to be directly subjected to the Roman legal system as it had developed from earliest times and been systematised under Justinian. In the west, the kingdoms set up by Visigoths, Ostrogoths, Longobards and Franks represented not necessarily an obliteration of the former civilisation, but in many respects an attempt to become 'Roman', in terms of law, organisation, language, and even political iconography and ceremony. The coins

of new Germanic kingdoms tell us that the model of authority was Rome. The barbarian law codes were certainly simplified and relatively unsophisticated in comparison to the complex materials bequeathed by the ancient world, and contained important elements from Germanic custom, but nonetheless can be seen as attempts to adapt and exploit a system based on written law such as that of the Romans (east and west)⁷.

Paulus Orosius in a striking passage tells us that Ataulf first wanted to replace *Romania* with *Gothia*, becoming its Caesar, but

having discovered from long experience that the Goths, because of their unbridled barbarism, were utterly incapable of obeying laws, and yet believing that the state ought not to be deprived of laws without which a state is not a state, he chose to seek for himself at least the glory of restoring and increasing the renown of the Roman name by the power of the Goths, wishing to be looked upon by posterity as the restorer of the Roman Empire, since he could not be its transformer⁸.

Writing down the law in itself was an important action, imitative of the Roman legal culture. Historiographical debates on the continuity (or lack of it) between the new kingdoms which culminated in the Carolingian Empire, usually tell us more about the national aspirations or inclinations of the historians who enter the lists than they do about the realities of the 6th, 7th or 8th century AD, but it is hard not to read the Latin texts of the 'barbarian' law codes without concluding that a legal system with written laws was valued and that there was a model at hand for reference.

Linguists, historians, demographers and geneticists have long debated whether barbarian 'invasions' in western Europe meant the entry of restricted elites or migrations of peoples so vast as to eclipse or replace existing populations. Although certainly situations were different in different areas, the survival of Latin-based languages in most of the lands of the Roman empire that did not convert to Islam – and even a part of those that did, including much of Spain, Portugal, Sicily and Malta – suggests a relevant degree of continuity.

In any case, the Roman Empire and Roman law continued to exert an influence through the Roman Church, whose diocesan system was built on Roman administrative circumscriptions. That in the 4th-century Christianity became the state religion of the empire had numerous consequences, both for the evolution of the Church and its relation to the faithful, as it became a centralised, hierarchical and territorially based organisation; and for the continuity of institutional patterns and sources of legitimacy, even after the end of the empire as a single polity⁹. The territorial organisation the Roman empire bequeathed through the ecclesiastic organisation has been seen as a factor of modernity with respect to the organisation, based on personal bonds, of feudal monarchy¹⁰. Paradoxically, the highest religious office in ancient Rome was that of the *Pontifex maximus*, a title relinquished by the emperor Gratian as incompatible with Christianity but subsequently used by the Pope. Although the study and use of Roman legislation certainly diminished in the early Middle Ages, the conditions for its revitalisation were there¹¹.

A 6th-century manuscript of the Digest or Pandects (*πανδέκτης*), a part of the *Corpus Iuris Civilis*, the so called *Littera florentina*, was preserved first in Amalfi and then in Pisa, where it was used and studied and where it remained until it was taken to Florence in 1406. With the rapid development of western legal scholarship in the 12th and 13th centuries, universities, including the most famous centre of legal studies, Bologna, became focal points for the study of Roman and canon law, and students travelled all over Europe seeking the intellectual and practical tools that could be acquired by a prolonged concentration on the study of legal texts. This meant that technicians of law learned the patterns of reasoning, the *ratio*, associated with the Roman system of civil law, and also with Canon law, which developed particularly during the 12th century, in a complex synergy with Roman civil law. Roman law was studied, re-elaborated and used in much of western Europe, and influenced local customary systems profoundly¹².

Even such a seemingly different system as English common law, an example of jurisprudential law based on precedent, in apparent contrast to the *ius commune* of continental Europe, shared important roots with Roman law systems, although it branched off from Norman feudal law, before Roman civil law had been thoroughly reabsorbed into western European juridical culture. Paradoxically, English common law, as jurisprudential law, was closer typologically to Roman law as it developed from the 8th century BC until the 6th century AD than were Justinian's codifications. And even in England, some courts, such as the Admiralty court, used Roman-based law¹³.

In the areas controlled by Byzantium, Roman texts continued to hold sway, although soon the usual language of law and bureaucracy again came to be Greek, and by the time of the emperor Leo III (8th century AD) the *Ecloga* emerged as the central legal text¹⁴. Other laws, such as the so-called 'farmer's law' (*nomos georgikos*) or the Sea laws (*nomos nautikos*) were also in use and were observed or utilised with some variations across the Mediterranean for commerce and navigation. Even though Byzantine legal documents were adapted to the needs of the evolving state and translated into Greek, the Justinian codification remained an unchanging element in Byzantine legal history, and hence in the history of territories under Byzantine hegemony¹⁵.

A significant example of preservation and reuse of Roman law is to be found in medieval Serbian state¹⁶, which emerged on the border area between the eastern and the western parts of the Empire¹⁷. Through Byzantine legal texts Roman law found its way into the Serbian state when it was ruled by the dynasty of prince Vlastimir (9th century), under whose son, Mutimir, the Serbs converted to Christianity. Missionaries, the most important being St. Methodius, translated the essential Byzantine ecclesiastical and legal texts to assist in organising the new Christian archbishopric in Sirmium (modern Sremska Mitrovica)¹⁸. Along with religious texts, the Serbs received their first legal text: the *liber Sclavorum qui dicitur Methodius*¹⁹ which comprised St. Methodius's translation of John Scholasticus's *Nomocanon*²⁰ (6th century) accompanied by the civil laws, including excerpts from Leo III's *Ecloga*. Both texts were based on Roman law, especially the first

collection of ecclesiastical law, the elements of which were borrowed from secular and Canon law, including laws from Justinian's *Novellae* as extracts.

At the beginning of the 13th century, the son of Serbian Grand Prince Nemanja, the monk Sava (later St. Sava) arranged for the Byzantine *Nomocanon* with commentaries to be translated in order to meet the needs of the Serbian church as well as of the Serbian feudal state. The canonical part was based on the *Synopsis* of Stephen of Ephesus (6th century) with amendments and commentaries by Alexius Aristinus (12th century), and the *Canon Syntagma* with interpretations by John Zonaras (12th century). However, this code was not entirely ecclesiastical: it also comprised the *Prohironos*, a compendium of Byzantine civil and criminal law and procedures as practiced between 870 and 879²¹. Furthermore, Sava's *Nomocanon* (in Serbian: *Крмчија*) was included in the most significant legal code of medieval Serbia, the *Душанов законик* [Law of Emperor Dušan] (14th century). The latter was complemented by excerpts from the *Basilica*, and Justinian's Code, and all these elements must be taken into account in analysing Serbian feudal law²². Nevertheless, in 19th-century Serbia the process of codification was based on two legal texts – St. Sava's *Nomocanon* and the Austrian Civil Code (the *Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch*, 1811): both in the final analysis derive from the process of reception of Roman law although by very different paths²³.

As these examples show, the link between religious and administrative organisation was such that we can say that the legal systems used in the Orthodox Byzantine and later Russian and Slavic east were built on the legacy of the ancient world, as were those in the Catholic world of the west. As a result there is an underlying commonality between the two halves of 'Europe' that we can identify in the Graeco-Roman bases of their legal culture.

In the west, Catholicism expanded well beyond the reaches of the Roman Empire, with the conversions of the Germanic, Irish, Scandinavian and Baltic populations, and a part of the Slavic peoples. This meant that in the parts of Europe beyond the Danube and the Rhine, Canon law, again with Latin bases, came to be accepted and used, thus influencing legal thought and practice. Political legitimacy in the east as well continued to be built around ideas of continuity with the empire of antiquity. The grand-dukes of Muscovy and the Russian tsars developed the idea that Moscow was a third Rome, the remaining hope for Christianity; in the west too, the empire itself was considered to have survived or been revived, although in the Carolingian interpretation its centre had been conveyed northward at the time of Charlemagne. Until the mid 16th century, the emperor-elect was designated King of the Romans, and would become emperor only after being crowned by the pope, theoretically in Rome – or in the case of Charles V of Habsburg, by the pope in Bologna. Kings tried to show that they enjoyed power analogous to that of the Holy Roman emperor, although only over their own kingdoms. Throughout the later Middle Ages and the early modern period the memory, and periodically the reality, of the empire continued to exist and to influence political

thinking. Although only occasionally were emperors strong enough to have their power recognised over large areas and/or to exert real jurisdictional and administrative power – as in the case for example of Charlemagne, of Frederick II and, in the 16th century, of Charles V – the ‘Holy Roman Empire’ continued to represent a principle of legitimacy, which could be used by those who, for example, found it useful to have their own power recognised by a higher authority.

Many people thought that, similar to monotheism in the religious sphere, political well-being could be best implemented by having a single ruler over the world, a true “monarch”. In the early 14th century, Dante, in his *De monarchia*, invoked imperial power, the perfect form of government, true ‘monarchy’ as a remedy to political division in Italy – in the hope that he himself, in exile from Florence, would be able to return to his city with the help of the emperor. Marsilius of Padua wrote his violently anti-papal *Defensor pacis* to attack papal power and uphold the emperor and ‘monarchy’ as bringing justice and order to human society. Some have seen as a specific characteristic of Europe the fact that there were two theoretically universal powers: pope and emperor, who because of their rivalry allowed the complex and articulated political and religious organisation of modern western Europe to develop²⁴.

Political organisation in medieval and early modern Europe remained strikingly diversified and complex, however imperial or royal rhetoric presented reality. Monarchy, in the universalist sense that Dante or Marsilius understood it, did not emerge. Nonetheless, Charles V, who united in his person the heritage of the Spanish monarchs and of the houses of Burgundy and Habsburg, had the means to ensure that the Empire would once again become something more than a byword and a seal on purchased privileges. But now, visibly, the empire was something new. The addition of Spain and the New World to the medieval empire made it into the first great modern administrative structure, something that went well beyond the example of antiquity. Charles’s motto, “plus ultra”, could be understood to mean that his empire extended farther than any before, as indeed was the case. Defending the unity of the empire, and of the Catholic religion in Europe, became Charles’s life’s task, to be carried out in the saddle, on the battlefield and in his courts and councils. Once again, the empire seemed to have been revived and offered new prospects of peace and justice, Charles’s power was supported by the language and rhetoric of Rome, and a new imperial law code, the ‘Carolina’, was designed, to supplement and unify the existing legal tools. Formally, it was at this time that the German part of the empire officially ‘received’ Roman law.

Ultimately too large to be governable, the Habsburg heritage was split, Spain, Italy and the New World going to Charles V’s son Philip, and the imperial title to the Austrian Habsburgs, descended from Charles’s brother, Ferdinand. The Reformation – against which Charles struggled – eventually led not to the break-up of the Empire along confessional lines, but to the development of a religious divide in what had been Catholic Europe. Nonetheless, early modern political institutions continued to share many

affinities and commonalities. *Ancien Régime* Europe continued to share a rhetoric of unification under monarchs with a reality of extreme jurisdictional and administrative articulation. Princes and nobles, citizens of cities – great and small – had their own jurisdictions; kingdoms and counties, cities and fiefs, republics and even single villages in many parts of Europe had their own statutes and norms, although within recognisable general frameworks. Courts and elites were connected by similar codes of behaviour and diplomatic ceremony, and may be considered parts of a connected political space, which – with European expansion to other continents – could increasingly be seen as a centre, formed by rival but dynastically connected and complicit monarchies.

During the Enlightenment a common culture of government can be said to have linked such autocratic governments as those of Austria, Prussia and Russia. Each employed its own unique imperial rhetoric, but all shared in the political and intellectual developments of the age, experimenting with new ‘enlightened’ models of government and ways to deal with change in perceptions of justice, and the increasing fiscal requirements of states. The Enlightenment ushered in the age of codification, as many states attempted to systematise their legal systems. Rationally organised law codes were promulgated in Bavaria, Prussia and Saxony; both Maria Theresa and Joseph II gave their names to codifications in Austria, preparing the way for the Austrian Civil Code of 1811. The Grand Duchy of Tuscany with its enlightened penal code of 1786, the “Codice Leopoldino”, became the first state to abolish torture and the death penalty, legislating according to Cesare Beccaria’s novel empathetic ideas²⁵.

Old Regime Europe was swept away, for a time at least, as a consequence of the French Revolution, which eventually united both consenting and dissenting peoples across continental Europe into a single political system, the Empire of Napoleon I. It was not of course, by chance that the rhetoric of imperial Rome was once again revived, although reinterpreted in the most autocratic way possible. Napoleon placed the imperial crown on his own head. He required neither the Roman Senate, nor the Roman armies, the pope nor imperial electors to confirm his power. And it was not by chance that the “*Code Napoléon*” (1804) became the best known although not the first codification of a national corpus of law. After Napoleon and the hypothesis of a politically and dynastically unified continental Europe had been defeated, a still intense and profound shared experience united many of the European elites. A style of government, a connected political discourse, the intensification of common planning, and the creation of infrastructures could hardly end without leaving a trace. The post-Napoleonic Restoration was marked by a return to the political hegemony of the monarchical and imperial European powers, and their courts and administrations depended on their military efficacy; but at the same time, the energies revealed by the revolts that supported or resisted the revolutionary armies were not forgotten.

From a political point of view, there were conflicting understandings of how the various empires resuscitated after the Napoleonic wars were to be linked. On the one hand

conservative men of government, such as Metternich and Castlereagh, believed that Europe should and did consist of a concert of rulers, whose duty was to maintain a balance to ensure their continuing power; on the other hand the Romantic movement and the revolutionary experience gave birth to anti-imperial ideas of freedom and nationhood. The European 'powers' attempted to control political life through agreements negotiated amongst themselves, succeeding for the moment in restoring monarchy. But at the same time, revolutionary, democratic and republican movements emerged, some of which envisaged a future concert of the peoples of Europe after they had thrown off the yoke of the 'empires'. Such was Giuseppe Mazzini's Young Europe (*Giovine Europa*), which connected reformers around Europe, from the new Greek state, to those of the other Balkan countries and the newly unified Italy²⁶. In Mazzini's view, each nation had a mission which it must carry out; together the free peoples of Europe would be able to build a new and better kind of polity. With the development of Socialism, connections between reformers and revolutionaries cut across national boundaries, although their ideal was international rather than specifically pan-European.

From the point of view of legal institutions, the medieval and early modern periods witnessed a multistranded and complex process of reception, revitalisation, creation and rationalisation of legal materials, that had its origins in ancient law and that led to the codifications of the late 18th and early 19th century. This was a necessary condition for the emergence of the modern rule of law, the idea that not one person or a group of individuals, but rather law itself should regulate the relations between people. The effects of the developments we have cursorily traced were not limited to Europe: most countries in the world today have law codes and legal systems related genetically to one or more of the systems that emerged in Europe. Italy, France, Spain and Spanish America modelled their modern systems on the *Code Napoléon*; the Ottoman empire during the period of Tanzimat reform, promulgated civil and penal codes as well as implementing administrative reform on the French model²⁷; Germany, Austria and Switzerland, Turkey, China, Japan and South Korea built on the German *Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch* (1900); the United States and the countries belonging to the British empire or commonwealth have systems deriving from English common law, with some exceptions. In the present context, rather than emphasizing differences between these systems, which exist and are relevant, it seems important to emphasize common roots, albeit with diversified forms of reception, and significant common developments, which have created the basis for a shared understanding of legality and legitimacy that goes beyond Europe in today's world.

After World War I, the idea of the unification of the continent was not only pursued by isolated authors and intellectuals. It also began to be championed by militant movements, influential intellectuals and leading politicians. Between the two World Wars, an organized movement came into being which laid the theoretical foundations upon which the unification of Europe was later built. Three main motivations in favour of a

united continent can be found when one analyses the discourse of the inter-war period: the necessity of union as a consequence of (1) economic and technical changes, (2) of a potential threat (civil war or the purported Bolshevik danger) and (3), a hegemony to be safeguarded. For smaller states, it was especially the security question which turned people into Europhiles. The sections that follow will investigate the developments of the 20th century and how the present day European Union was created, in which contexts and due to which forces. Finally, plans for federation will be discussed, even if they have not been realised in the way hoped for by their promoters.

SMALL STATES AND THE PAN-EUROPEAN MOVEMENT: THE CASE OF ESTONIA

The first half of the 20th century gave rise to broad visions of a new, federal and united Europe. One may find ideas for a united Europe from the extreme right to far left thinkers. Following the collapse of the four empires (Ottoman, Habsburg, Hohenzollern and Romanov) the political structure of postwar Europe was on everyone's mind. World War I had destroyed the old order and the construction of a new Europe from scratch seemed possible. In the 1920s, especially, a wide range of different ideas, plans, and visions circulated. Many groups or institutions that sought to promote a united Europe reflected at the same time the distinctive identities and needs of different states. Many of these groups focused on economic divisions in Europe and in particular on the problems posed by multiple borders and tariff barriers.

As new ideas emerged, old ones were also modernized. For example, Pan-Germanism, a movement which sought to unite all German-speaking and ethnic-German peoples, had existed since the French Revolution. The Pan-German League, which existed from 1890 to 1914, was an example of an organization founded to agitate for extreme nationalism. It aimed to transform Germany into a true *Nationalstaat*, in which minorities were to be entirely disregarded²⁸. In 1915, Friedrich Naumann outlined his famous vision in his book *Mitteleuropa*. His idea of a new Central Europe was not that of a league of equal nationalities but of a cultural and economic unit dominated by Germans. The Pan-German movement emerged simultaneously with comparable activities among the Slavic peoples²⁹. Eastern and southern Europe witnessed efforts to protect and organize Slavic culture, which had become more politicized after 1848. Nationalist expansionism gave rise to similar movements to unify all Slavic peoples under Russian aegis. Finally, during World War I, and especially in 1918/19, Russian Bolshevik leaders appealed for a new, united and socialist Europe under the dominance of left radicals. Adhering to the same ideas, the Comintern was established in Moscow in January 1919 as a concurrent institution to the Paris Peace conference and the League of Nations.

The Czech nationalist leader, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, believed that Europe consisted of four parts. Between the influential West (Germany) and East (Russia) he saw a zone of small nations which had been the target of expansionism by the West, the East and

the South (Turkey). He divided this zone into two parts: the Danubian group (Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia), which developed later into the so called Little Entente in 1919-21, and the Baltic group (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland), which attempted to create its own political, economic and defensive union or even to establish a wider federation of states around the Baltic Sea³⁰.

The new discourse on a league of nations as the framework of a new Europe was developed by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in his first book entitled *Pan-Europa*, published in 1923. Thanks to this and other efforts, the Pan-European idea began to spread in politically influential and intellectual circles. The movement held its first Congress in Vienna in 1926 and the French foreign minister, Aristide Briand, became the honorary president of the Pan-European Union in 1927. However, this was only one of many such groups created in the mid-1920s. French and German businessmen, industrialists, and bankers promoted either closer Franco-German economic ties or a more general European solution. Others searched for those common elements of European culture and civilization on which to build a United States of Europe, as French Prime Minister Édouard Herriot expressed it publicly in 1925. The German foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann, even raised the possibility of a common currency in September 1929³¹.

The emerging vision of a federal Europe also revealed differences in the great powers' understanding of security in Europe. Some, mainly British, politicians continued to search for ways to strengthen the League of Nations' security system. Others, such as Aristide Briand, championed alternative directions for European diplomacy, focusing on the unification of the continent. Briand publicly called for a federal Europe on 5 September 1929 in a speech on European economic and political integration at the League of Nations' assembly session³². Briand's motivations for this plea have been interpreted in different ways. One common opinion is that Briand's activity was the first step toward the federal idea and the present European Community. Yet it is also believed that Briand's motivations, like the idea itself, were obscure and ill-defined, and that at the same time Briand was trying to regain the diplomatic initiative for France in a phase in which French foreign and security policy had become defensive, at the end of the 1920s. It is also surmised that he tried to engage Germany in a tighter European community than the League of Nations could provide. A third explanation highlights French economic motives. In this light, Briand's initiative is seen as an effort to exercise some form of control over Germany's industrial potential. French circles were without a doubt equally looking for opportunities to foster political and economic co-operation in Europe by constructing some kind of barrier against American economic domination.

The reactions of British and German politicians and diplomats following Briand's initiative were subdued. His German counterpart Stresemann, for example, was cautious and pointed to the possible political damage to the League of Nations. The British Foreign Office criticized the proposal's anti-American (and anti-Soviet) direction. The

Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, was openly dismissive. The French foreign ministry was thus called upon to produce a more detailed memorandum. Issued in the spring of 1930, it again advocated a European federal union, and stressed the need for a European system of arbitration, security, and Locarno-like guarantees prior to the establishment of a common market and economic policies. The federation it envisioned, while based on a moral union between the European states, foresaw new institutions, including an executive committee and secretariat. While this new European Union would be independent of the League of Nations, it was meant to work closely with it.

The response to this memorandum was again hesitant, as many believed it to be utopian and impractical. Qualified support came only from the smaller nations, including a surprisingly warm expression in its favor from Estonia³³. Coudenhove-Kalergi had asked the Estonian foreign minister Kaarel Robert Pusta to create an Estonian section of the Pan-European Union in 1924. Pusta was well known to his countrymen and women as one of the founders of Estonian diplomacy. Serving in Paris as envoy since 1918, he was very close to French culture and policy. He became foreign minister in 1924 and after a short term continued his career again in France up to 1932³⁴. Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-European Manifesto was published in the Estonian press in January 1924, only shortly after it had appeared in Austria and other countries. The introduction of his *Pan-Europa* came out several months after that. Two leaflets, *Paneuroopa liit* [Pan-European Union] and *Pan-Euroope ABC*, were translated into Estonian and distributed for free among the members of local Pan-European society³⁵.

In promoting the idea of a Pan-European Union, Pusta collaborated closely with Ants Piip, a politician and diplomat who later became professor of international law at the University of Tartu. They turned to politicians, the intelligentsia, and businessmen of the two biggest cities in Estonia (Tallinn and Tartu) and asked them to join together to found the Estonian Society of the Pan-European Union. The first call was accepted by some twenty people, who were mostly politicians, although the organizers had originally hoped for support from individuals in business and technology.

On 14 August 1929, the inaugural committee for an Estonian Pan-European Society organized a meeting in Tallinn. This time around one hundred persons participated. According to the Estonian press the meeting attracted attention because the movement was relatively new and strange. Both Pusta and Piip delivered speeches and saw the meeting as the embryo of a real organization. Following the meeting a special council was established with 30 members, including some prominent Estonian businessmen, industrialists, and high-ranking officers. Pusta was appointed its representative to the central council of the Pan-European Union in Vienna. Thanks to Pusta's and Piip's personal efforts the society numbered over 200 members in 1931³⁶. This fact, and the celebration of the so-called Pan-European Day, may be considered the peak of the Pan-European movement in Estonia.

However, shortly thereafter the Pan-European movement experienced rapid decline in most countries. The Labour government in Britain tabled a concrete proposal for a tariff

truce, which was intended as the first step toward multilateral tariff reductions. In its wake an economic conference was held in Geneva in 1930, and was attended by 30 countries, most of them represented by government ministers. The decision to freeze bilateral tariffs for one year was, however, a minimal agreement, and few had hopes for future tariff reductions. Foreign Office officials then tried to revive the original idea of the Pan-European Union and stressed economic co-operation, but now underlined the need to bring any such economic discussions within the framework of the League of Nations.

The situation in Europe was far more worrying in September 1930 than it had been a year earlier. The Nationalist Socialist party had made major gains in the German elections, winning 107 seats and becoming the second largest party in the Reichstag after the Social Democrats. The delegates of the League of Nations' assembly gathering in Geneva decided to hand over the Briand memorandum to a newly constituted committee, the Commission of Enquiry for European Union (CEEU). Briand was made president of the new institution. The Commission held its first regular session in January 1931, and the assembly renewed its mandate in September 1931. The economic depression, however, soon put an end to its relevance. Shortly thereafter articles began to appear in the Estonian press criticizing the idea of a Pan-European federation. Among the many weaknesses of the movement the press singled out the threat it posed to the League of Nations. Economic measures against outsiders (without pointing to any concrete country) and an inadequate development of a national idea were also mentioned. Behind the last concern was the suspicion that the Union would work against the principles of self-determination and sovereignty. Pusta's speech at the first meeting of the Estonian Pan-European society had argued that by supporting the Pan-European Union, Estonians were actually working for their own independence, economic success, and preservation of national culture. These topics continued to be discussed in the newspapers.

The League of Nations was highly popular in Estonia. This was the reason why the advocates of Pan-Europe were eager to emphasize the relations between the two institutions. Pusta did not see any opposition between the European Union and the League of Nations. He emphasized that the Union would help to solve the problems in disarmament, minority issues, border disputes, and economic development in Europe. He moreover hoped that it would become a regional alliance within the League. One of his main arguments was that the good relations of the Union with the British Empire and the USA already proved that the Union did not have to be directed against the League. On the other hand, Estonia's highest ranking general and commander-in-chief during the War of Independence, Johan Laidoner, argued that the League's universal nature would better guarantee peace, especially at the Estonia-Russia border. At the same time, Laidoner believed that the creation of larger political units lessened the risk of war. Nevertheless, the faith in the League as expressed in the local press was not overwhelming. The Estonian press praised both Germany and France as the most civilized

countries in Europe and looked on the German-French relationship as the key to the unification of the continent as a whole.

Some writers raised the fear that small nations like Estonia would remain dependent on larger ones and that this dependency would be greater within a European Union as compared to a more universal League. Opponents of the Union therefore regarded the League as the best protector of small states. They argued that the main interest of small states was to preserve the League and prevent the establishment of a new institution lacking clear purposes. On the other hand, others considered the Union to be a regional group covering all of Europe within the League and were confident that small states would increase their influence by joining regional groups and in so doing would also reinforce the League. In the 1930s, when European unification became an official question, the Estonian foreign ministry tried to promote a common position with neighboring Latvia or Finland, but failed in this effort.

The results of the September 1930 Assembly of the League of Nations were a disappointment to the Estonian public and governmental institutions, but official comments were avoided. Some newspapers even celebrated the failure of Briand's proposal. They argued that the League had won out in defending its fundamental idea of universalism and that European federation within the League was still a future possibility, especially if it were agreed on by the whole world, not just one or two countries (Germany and France). Only Pusta continued to argue that the commission (CEEU) was the effective place in which to resolve European problems. He published several articles in German and French journals on the role of the commission. According to him, it had exceeded expectations by turning a utopian project into reality. Piip, on the other hand, voiced only criticism of the CEEU's work. He had become pessimistic and did not see any future for the Union.

The economic depression which struck Europe especially painfully in 1931 proved to be the decisive blow to the idea of the Union in any form. It made it impossible to achieve any European co-operation along economic lines. Estonia and Latvia also buried their old idea of the so-called Baltic common market or custom union in 1930, although both countries had worked several years to this end. From the perspective of Estonia, the Briand initiative failed both in its specific and more general aims. It did not help to restore the diplomatic initiative of France and did not lend any further impulse to European co-operation. In fact, it provided another example of the misunderstanding between Britain and France at a time when Germany was on the eve of regaining total sovereignty in foreign affairs. For Estonia this meant that the small state lost hopes for additional guarantees in order to preserve its independence. Estonia was also seen as being the eastern border of Europe. Piip was convinced that the Union would be strong enough to oppose every step Russia could take toward the West. Pusta and other Estonian politicians were of the opinion that a united Europe should be stronger in order to defend itself against possible Russian attacks. Therefore,

they opposed the possible invitation of the USSR to the CEEU. Estonian politicians and businessmen saw the Soviet Union as aggressive both politically and economically, and regarded it to be the greatest threat against Europe because it subordinated economic questions to political purposes.

The customs union between Germany and Austria proposed in the spring of 1931 came as an unpleasant surprise for the rest of Europe³⁷. In Estonia, politicians worried mostly about the increased distrust between France and Germany. Only the right-wing newspaper “Kaja” [Echo] saw the German-Austrian treaty as a step towards European unification. In reality this treaty was a move away from a common federation and into the direction of regional solutions. In the shadow of the economic depression, the Pan-European movement lost its importance in Estonia. The correspondence between the center in Vienna and the society in Tallinn limited itself only to technical matters. Pan-Europe Day in 1932 was not celebrated in Estonia at all and the local society was near-defunct. It was hardly a coincidence that the end of the active phase of the Pan-Europe movement coincided with the end of Pusta’s career as an envoy in Paris.

Estonian discourse in the interwar years, as in many other European countries, shows clearly that many aspects which drove or hindered unification after 1945 had already been in place years before. After the obvious failures of unification in the 1930s, the war years gave a new boost to the project (at least on a theoretical level) as federalism was seen by many thinkers in the resistance against Nazi Germany as the only possibility to save the continent’s future. The famous photo of Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill at Yalta, however, also epitomized the marginality of the idea of European unification at this time. The United States was geographically not part of Europe, Great Britain felt more outside Europe than ever before, and Russia was separated from the rest of the continent by an ideological divide. The winners of the war were thus clearly not disposed to implement what they regarded as romantic ideas of Resistance intellectuals.

What transpired only shortly thereafter was made possible by three forces. First, France was too weak to establish European economic union under its tutelage and Great Britain opted for retreat from the continent. Since Great Britain had turned its back on a Europe under French-British leadership, Paris knew it had to look for other ways to counter Germany in the future. Second, the policy of the Soviet Union and its influence on communist parties across Europe resembled panic and fear more than a coherent and constructive position. And finally, the United States offered only conditional help for the unification project.

AMERICAN VISTAS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The American ‘Empire’, however one defines it, has been of paramount importance to European integration efforts since 1945. There is a broad consensus among historians of European integration that without the strong and at times even forceful integra-

tionist policies of the United States during the first post-war decade there might have been no European Economic Community (EEC/EC), and thus no European Union (EU). In several ways Washington has proved to be the arbiter of European unification for 'imperial' as well as for geopolitical ends regarding pacification, free trade, and democratization. There was only one major precondition for this remarkably continuous American support for European integration policies: subservience to an Atlantic framework of security and value-sharing. Geir Lundestad has rightly called this 'Empire by integration', although, in its initial stages at least, it was also based on the reverse premise of 'Empire by invitation'³⁸. European integration has thus mostly been envisioned as a process of mutual benefit, not only to (western) Europe, but also to its long-time Atlantic protector, the United States. Seen over the entire period, from 1947 to 2007, one can differentiate at least three motives for the extraordinary consistent public and private support coming from American administrations, policy elites and decision-makers: political considerations, security issues, and economic interests.

There was a short period of post-war aloofness and hesitation, during which the Truman Administration tended towards the idea of a loose, all-European initiative, tentatively entitled Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), which included the Soviet Union as well as eastern European countries. As early as 1947, a resolution in the US Congress called for the "creation of a United States of Europe within the framework of the United Nations"³⁹. With the Marshall Plan, enunciated first by the Secretary of State in a commencement speech at Harvard University on 5 June 1947, the United States committed itself to the economic reconstruction of (western) Europe with the political aim of containing the rival Soviet Union and communism as a whole. There followed, at least in the estimation of Washington, years of procrastination on the part of the Europeans, in which only a regional customs union (Benelux countries), a rather non-committal Council of Europe in Strasbourg, and an initially very weak Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) were set up.

Washington saw the British and French as annoyingly reluctant to lead postwar Europe. By spring 1950, the Americans were even ready to take the initiative themselves by creating what Washington called an 'organization' in the North American-western European area as a kind of 'senior body' overseeing all existing organizational projects, even NATO⁴⁰. This rather vague concept was quickly forgotten when the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, finally launched the reconciliatory idea of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in May 1950. This was to be the first major step towards integrating West Germany economically, and Truman quickly recognized it as an "act of constructive statesmanship"⁴¹. As a means of strengthening NATO, founded in 1949, Washington also supported the idea of the European Defence Community (EDC), and even threatened to withdraw from European military engagement if it did not materialize⁴². Eisenhower's administration also stood squarely behind both the founding of the European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM) and perhaps

less directly, the European Economic Community (EEC), because – as Eisenhower put it – “(European) weakness could not cooperate, weakness could only beg”⁴³.

During the first post-war decade Washington’s main interests in Europe were containing the Soviet Union, tying West Germany to Europe, and keeping France in line as best as one could. Furthermore, the new Europe was to fit into a larger umbrella established through the Marshall Plan, OEEC, NATO and the General Agreements on Tariff and Trade (GATT)⁴⁴. This, of course, meant acknowledging American leadership economically, politically, and militarily. Particularly in the 1950s, Washington pursued European integration efforts even more vigorously than the six ECSC/EEC countries themselves, through diplomatic, financial and even clandestine means⁴⁵.

When, on 25 March 1957, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany signed the Treaties of Rome, establishing EURATOM and the EEC, Washington was elated. Americans generally called it the Common Market and Eisenhower repeatedly spoke of an integrated Europe as a ‘third force’. Still, there were those in the American government and Congress who did not want it to become an independent third force. Since the Six also operated and cooperated under NATO, American leadership was more or less undisputed, at least until de Gaulle’s presidency. This Atlantic framework needed now to be strengthened economically, which was effected by the Dillon Round of GATT negotiations (1958-1962) and the transformation of the OEEC into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which both Canada and the US joined⁴⁶.

On the whole it can be claimed that the US exerted less influence on the European integration process after 1958/59⁴⁷. In 1958 the US faced a huge increase in its trade deficit due to a decrease of exports to western Europe. The era of American commercial sacrifices for the sake of European stability came to an end. The terms of US-European financial and economic interdependence started to change. This coincided with a challenge, even a split between Paris and Washington over a wide range of issues. When, after vetoing British membership in the EEC in early 1963, de Gaulle produced the ‘shock’ of a Franco-German treaty, President Kennedy spoke of an “unfriendly act”⁴⁸. The Americans were earnestly afraid that the French would strike a deal with the Soviets over Germany. In a study ordered by Kennedy himself, US policies were scrutinized, which resulted in a recommendation to continue supporting a unified Europe as only a pronounced independent European stance would threaten American interests in the world. Washington managed to contain the Gaullist challenge even after the French president withdrew France from NATO’s military structure in the early spring of 1966. The Atlantic framework continued to be a cornerstone of American involvement in and with Europe. As a State Department memorandum of early 1965 argued, “we have quietly supported generally ‘federalist’ concepts and the democratization of Europe via increased parliamentary powers, although we have made it clear that the decisions were for Europeans to take”⁴⁹.

Due to continued State Department dominance in foreign policy, political objectives continued to take precedence over economic ones, though – as already mentioned – the latter tended to increase in importance after 1958/59. Pressure on the dollar, balance of payments deficits, agricultural policy and increased protectionist sentiments in the US Congress caused internal dissension over European policy in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. These problems proved to be multi-dimensional and were at least partially off-set by American economic gains. Thus, it was still widely accepted in Washington during the early 1960s that the Common Market was not altogether harmful to the American economy⁵⁰.

With de Gaulle's resignation in 1969, a major challenge to American policy on European integration faded. Yet with the dramatic downturn of the American economy during the Nixon era, which led to growing budgetary and trade deficits, new questions were raised. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger argued that Atlantic cooperation for the US was successful mainly in the security area, and less so in the economic field. In view of the Vietnam fiasco, Nixon warned the Europeans that they could not have it both ways; relying on American security protection while at the same time entertaining "confrontation and even hostility on the economic and political front"⁵¹. Washington also demanded that the western Europeans should shoulder a fairer share of the defence burdens within the Atlantic Alliance. Meanwhile, the Europeans resented this linkage between security and economic issues.

Britain's entry into the EC on 1 January 1973 eased the situation somewhat, and the Nixon Administration even declared 1973 the 'Year of Europe'. Washington's preoccupation with the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam was to be overcome and more emphasis to be placed on Europe. Kissinger reconfirmed US support for the unification of Europe as a "means to the strengthening of the West" within the Atlantic partnership⁵². On the whole, however, the 'Year of Europe' amounted to very little. After Nixon's resignation, and already under President Ford, a regular process of consultation was agreed upon between Washington and the capital of the respective country holding the EC presidency⁵³. Nixon and Kissinger freed the US from involvement in European quarrels over the paths to further integration but it was also evidence of a waning of American influence in Europe.

Historians and European experts agree that the US exercised a significant, if not decisive, influence on European integration efforts, particularly up to 1958/59. Geir Lundestad is even convinced that European integration through all of the 1950s could not have taken place without American backing⁵⁴. For Washington it was not only crucial for the containment of communism in Europe but also the most effective way of 'solving' the German problem. Furthermore, it was recognized as being the cheapest option for the US in the long run. Even if American diplomatic influence in European integration decreased after the 1950s, this was not the case in such important areas as science and technology, business organization, US multi-national investments, and popular culture⁵⁵.

It is understandable, then, that European integration as a strategy and policy remained a firm part of Washington's agenda to the end of the Cold War and even beyond. It was usually – and remarkably – pursued without fear, jealousy or hostility. Washington perceived itself as the balancer and arbiter of European politics. But America's general support for European integration politics was also seen in terms of controlling Europe as part of the 'American benevolent Empire' and has always been based on European acceptance of an Atlantic partnership defined in terms of American core values: federalism, parliamentary democracy, pluralism, egalitarianism, capitalism, consumerism, private enterprise, and free trade. In other words, American support for Europe has always been conditional⁵⁶.

DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY FOR EUROPE? THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE 1970S AND 1980S

The European Parliament (EP) over almost six decades constitutes a telling example of how European integration has been advanced by internal pressure orchestrated by Europhile and federalist actors. The history of the EP, which has always been in the vanguard of the integration process, is the story of an ongoing struggle to enhance its power, a tale of its rise from an essentially consultative role to an indispensable co-legislator in today's European Union. The EP is thus a European institution with a dynamic history, which has been essentially driven forward by convinced 'Europeans'. The rise of the EP is inevitably linked with the issue of the purported 'democratic deficit' in the European institutions – a debate which reached the very heart of the integration process in the 20th century. The first direct elections in 1979 were a watershed in this context because they turned the EP's legitimacy into a direct one and thereby increased the democratic credentials of the entire Community.

Even if it has only borne its name since 1962, the history of the European Parliament goes back to the roots of the integration process following World War II. Its go back to the 'Common Assembly' of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which convened for the first time on 10 September 1952. Interestingly enough, this body was originally not mentioned in the Schuman Declaration since the Council of Europe was initially going to perform this task. During the negotiations, however, a separate Assembly was introduced in order to provide democratic legitimacy and to counterbalance the executive. The Assembly was made up of 78 parliamentarians drawn from the national parliaments of member states according to the principle of proportionality. Given the indirect election of its members, it is difficult to speak of genuine democratic representation in the Common Assembly. For European federalists the creation of the Assembly was only half a victory since they were convinced that European democracy could not be ensured without the direct expression of the *vox populi*⁵⁷. This is also why in the wording of the ECSE treaty one can see the desire for this Assembly to be more

than consultative as the term “representatives of the people” was chosen, which could be contrived as referring to direct elections⁵⁸.

The Assembly, which held annual sessions, had very narrow competences. The High Authority (the ‘government’ of the ECSE and predecessor of the European Commission) was only required to answer oral or written questions from the Assembly, which could also use the measure of censure with a two-thirds majority. Despite these shortcomings, the Assembly had a very special feature: members of the Assembly were organized not by nationalities but by transnational political groups. These groups were based upon the transnational political unions created after World War II, such as the Liberal International in Oxford in 1947⁵⁹. Given these inadequate competences, it might be surprising that during its very first year of existence the Assembly played a crucial role in drawing up the draft treaty to establish a European Political Community. To this end, an *ad hoc* assembly was created on 13 September 1952. Even though the project eventually was abandoned, the EP had nevertheless shown strong signs of life.

The next milestone in the history of this institution was the Rome Treaty. European federalists again tried to use this opportunity to implement their program when the European Economic Community and Euratom were negotiated in 1958. Although no agreement was reached that would have made direct elections to the Assembly possible, a provision was inserted in the Rome Treaty which read: “the Assembly (European Parliament) shall draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States. The Council shall, acting unanimously, lay down the appropriate provisions, which it shall recommend to Member States for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements”⁶⁰. The Assembly also gained added importance thanks to the new treaties. Although all three communities (the two new ones plus the ECSE) had separate executives, all three communities shared the new Assembly. The number of parliamentarians was raised to 142. The institutional status of the Assembly was not altered as it was only granted a power of consultation in the decision-making process. Moreover, the Council was still not bound by the EP’s opinion.

In a step of great symbolic importance, the institution was officially renamed the “European Parliament” in 1962. The extension of the powers of the EP in the 1970s was a nice example of an ‘overspill effect’, meaning that integration in one area automatically affects other areas. When the Communities slowly acquired their own budgets in the first half of the 1970s, some kind of control mechanism was needed. Therefore, in 1970 the Parliament won for the first time control over areas of the Community’s budget (the three communities were merged in 1967), which it had to share with the Council. The EP’s powers were expanded to cover the entire budget in 1975. However, the crux of the EP was still unresolved. Ever since the establishment of the Assembly, the parliamentarians had been fighting for direct elections. As mentioned before, the possibility of directly electing the Assembly had been introduced in the Rome Treaties. However,

the Council was required to agree on a uniform voting system beforehand, which it failed to do. The EP tabled proposals for direct elections in 1961 (the “Dehousse Report”), in 1963 and in 1969. The Parliament also threatened to take the Council to the European Court of Justice, which led to a compromise whereby the Council agreed in theory to direct elections while putting off the issue of voting systems to a later date.

The late 1970s finally witnessed a breakthrough in this power struggle. Instead of requiring a uniform electoral system, the EP now proposed that each member state would be free to determine and implement its own electoral procedure. The Council finally accepted this proposal and the first direct elections to the EP were held in June 1979. In order better to understand this important event in the European integration process, we must quickly discuss the status quo in the 1970s and 1980s.

The period from the departure from office of the French President de Gaulle (1969) to the Single European Act (1986) is generally perceived as a period of stagnation. However, it opened in an optimistic mood as de Gaulle’s successor, George Pompidou, initiated a program of ‘revival’ at a conference in the Hague in December 1969 (called the second European revival). His plan included the “completion, deepening and enlargement” of the European Economic Community. Completion meant finding a compromise on budget questions, beginning with the Common Agricultural Policy. The crux of the issue was that the so-called ‘own resources’ policy for the Community also required a reform of institutions. In 1970, a compromise based on ‘mixed’ budgeting was reached (which meant that the Community was financed on the one hand by the member states but on the other hand received its ‘own’ budget via the Common Agricultural Policy). Starting in 1975, the Community was only to be financed by its own budget and in order to control this budget, competences were shared between the Council and the European Parliament.

‘Deepening’ referred to taking concrete steps towards a Monetary and Economic Union. Such a plan had been tabled by Willy Brandt and supported by George Pompidou at the previously mentioned conference in the Hague. In the 1970s, tangible measures to this end were put in place to harmonize the different European currencies, as for example the ‘monetary snake’ (1972-1976). This instrument failed eventually but was replaced by the more successful ‘European monetary system’ in 1979. In the political realm, the loose European Political Cooperation – following an initiative by the new French President Giscard d’Estaing – was transformed into the institutionalized European Councils, which meant regular meetings by the European heads of government. Last but not least, ‘enlargement’ signified opening debate over the accession of new members. Great Britain (after long and detailed negotiations over financial issues) was finally admitted in January 1973, along with Ireland and Denmark. In the 1980s, negotiations were opened with Greece, Spain and Portugal. Greece joined in 1981 and the two Iberian countries in 1986. Nevertheless, the atmosphere was not too optimistic. At the turn of the 1980s, it seemed to many that the European Community had

somewhat drifted away from what the 'founding fathers' had originally planned in that it ran more or less in an intergovernmental direction dominated by the larger member states. The supranational elements had lost a lot of their importance and, therefore, the idea of a revision of the treaties was again tabled. When Jacques Delors became the new President of the European Commission he became the driving force of the 'third European revival'.

During the 1980s, two events paved the way to the eventual establishment of the European Union in 1992. The first was an ambitious reform proposal by the European Parliament in 1984, the so-called Spinelli Plan, which we will discuss later. After this failed, cooperation between the Commission and the European Council led to the convocation of a large intergovernmental conference on institutional reform and creating an Internal Market. The result was the so-called 'Unique Act Treaty' of February 1986, which in essence put the coexistence of the European Community and the Political Cooperation on a legal basis. The competences of the Community were enlarged and the European Councils institutionally reinforced. A 'White Book' laid out concrete measures which were supposed to lead to the establishment of a real 'great market' in 1993. After having delineated the context of the integration process in the 1970s and 1980s, we can now come back to the year 1979 and the consequences that the introduction of direct elections had for the EP.

When the European Parliament was directly elected for the first time, it set itself apart from similar institutions such as the Council of Europe or the Pan-African Parliament, whose members are all appointed. Since no blueprint for such an election on a European-wide level existed, it is no surprise that the organization of the election did not come about easily. There was no 'European' election procedure and every member state adopted its own election system in the spirit of its own national traditions. Even though members of the European Parliament had organized themselves in transnational political groups, it would be misleading to speak of genuine 'European' parties. Therefore, each national party on its own led the 1979 election campaign to the European parliament. The Christian-Democrat European People's Party at least succeeded in building a relatively structured platform, albeit under strong German influence. The Confederation of Socialist Parties could not come up with a manifesto, and limited itself to publishing an appeal to the people not to speak about the internally divided communists. In addition, the election campaigns in the different states were strongly dominated by internal affairs and not by European issues⁶¹.

In spite of these ambiguities, participation in the elections was strong and remained only slightly below that of normal national elections. It varied from 91% in Belgium (where participation was obligatory) to 31% in Great Britain. The election was won by the two largest parties, the Socialists and Christian-Democrats, which together obtained an absolute majority. After this first direct election, the Parliament elected Simone Veil as its President in its opening session on 11 July 1979. Veil was, by the way,

also the first female President of the Parliament since it was formed as the Common Assembly⁶². The Parliament now counted 410 members and the distribution was slightly less favorable to the small states than before; still, the latter remained ‘over-represented’. France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom elected 81 members each, the Netherlands 25, Belgium 24, Denmark 16, Ireland 15 and Luxembourg 6.

Even if the EP was now elected directly, its powers remained limited to the tasks of political control enshrined in the Rome Treaty and the previously mentioned budgetary competences. It lacked legislative power which is, after all, one of the core competences of parliaments in democratic systems. However, the Parliament – backed by its new legitimacy as an elected body – acted in a more self-confident manner immediately after 1979 and began to draft proposals addressing the functioning of the Union. Inspired by its previous work on the Political Community, it produced the “Draft Treaty establishing the European Union” (also known as the ‘Spinelli Plan’ after its rapporteur Altiero Spinelli) in 1984. Ever since 1979, parliamentarians, headed by Spinelli, had been working to promote institutional reform. The EP adopted the fruit of their labors in 1983. The proposal included – on the basis of subsidiarity – new competencies for the Union and changes in existing institutions, including investing the Parliament with the power of legislation (to be shared with the Commission)⁶³. Since this move went too far for both the national parliaments and the member states, the EP’s proposal was bound to failure since the Parliament had no legislative competences at all. Even so, the principles and many ideas enshrined in the Spinelli Plan were later implemented by other treaties. The newly gained self-confidence of the EP could also be seen in the fact that the Parliament began holding votes on proposed Commission Presidents in the 1980s, before it was given any formal right to do so.

The EP’s location turned out to be a contested and almost intractable issue. Provisional arrangements placed the Parliament in Strasbourg, while the Commission and Council were based in Brussels. In 1985, the Parliament built a second chamber in Brussels and moved some of its work there despite protests from some states. The European Council eventually reached a final agreement in 1992. It stated that the Parliament would retain its formal seat in Strasbourg, where 12 sessions a year would be held, but all other parliamentary activity should be located in Brussels. Although this complicated and costly two-seat arrangement was contested it was nevertheless later enshrined in the Treaty of Amsterdam. There can be not doubt that parliamentarians can act more effectively (and cheaply) if they are closer to the Commission and the Council whose activities they monitor, but this geographic distribution was the price to be paid in the interest of a balanced distribution of institutional rights and privileges⁶⁴. Given the growth of the Community in the 1980s, the number of members of the EP was simply expanded whenever new members joined until, at the Treaty of Nice in 2003, a cap was imposed on the number of members to be elected, namely 732.

Another milestone in the history of the EP was the Single European Act, which placed special emphasis on increasing the Parliament's role in the Community's decision-making process in order to reduce the democratic deficit. This was done in two ways. Firstly, the newly introduced 'assent procedure' required the EP's approval for the validity of certain types of Community acts. The second – and more significant – change was referred to as 'co-operation procedure' and gave the EP for the first time real and significant powers in the decision-making process. In the areas where these procedures were introduced the bi-polar division of decision-making between the Commission and the Council came to an end. In its place a triangular relationship between the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament emerged in which the EP had real, albeit limited, powers⁶⁵.

In the later 1980s significant internal and external developments occurred which promoted integration and eventually led to a new agreement at the beginning of the 1990s, namely the Maastricht Treaty. The most important external development was without doubt the changes in the Soviet Union and finally its collapse in 1989-1990, which left a huge political and economic vacuum. German reunification in October 1990 also changed the distribution of power within Europe. Especially in France and Great Britain reunification strengthened old fears of German domination, which could only be alleviated by reinforcing the Community. Internally speaking, the demand for completing the monetary union exerted greatest pressure. In addition, the member states' governments displayed a clear desire for further integration. The French President, François Mitterand, and the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, appeared as the driving forces behind this new impetus.

One of the most important challenges for the new treaty was to reduce the democratic deficit of the Union, and the only means at hand was the reinforcement of the EP *vis-à-vis* the Council and the Commission. Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which formally established the European Union, gave the European Parliament – in a very deliberate gesture towards addressing the problem of democratic participation – the power of 'co-decision' with the Council of Ministers. Although this only concerned a limited number of issues and mostly not key policies (for example internal market laws, policies of research and development, training and education), the EP now appeared in certain areas as a real co-legislator with veto power over proposed legislation. In addition, the scope of the already mentioned 'assent procedure' was broadened into new areas. The EP also received other additional competences such as the creation of an ombudsman, more investigative power, and the right of veto over the appointment of the Commission and its president⁶⁶.

Nevertheless, the Maastricht Treaty disappointed those who had hoped for radical and fundamental changes to make the Union more democratic and legitimate. One grievance was the 'pillar structure', which assured the preponderance of the member states. Another was the still deficient structure and powers of the EP when compared to 'nor-

mal' parliaments and the other institutions of the Union. When the Amsterdam Treaty was signed in 1997 in order to balance and amend the Maastricht Treaty, the EP was clearly one of the 'winners' as its powers were once again enhanced. New legislative powers were transferred to the EP and its position was again strengthened *vis-à-vis* the other institutions.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Parliament thus became considerably more important as it gained greater powers from successive treaties, especially through the extension of the 'co-decision' procedure. In addition, the Parliament's democratic mandate gave it greater control over legislation as opposed to the other institutions. In 1999 it showed its muscles when it refused to accept the resignation of the Commission led by Jacques Santer. In 2004, following the largest trans-national election in history, the Parliament again exerted pressure on the Commission when it came to the nomination of the new Commissioners. A number of the proposed candidates also had to be withdrawn or reassigned before the Parliament allowed the Commission of José Manuel Barroso to take office.

The European Union, which was initially created as a means of preventing another devastating war, was erected on the basis of a common economic market and evolved into a supranational political system *sui generis* with considerable social and political dimensions. The 'founding fathers' built the European institutions along the lines of Jean Monnet's 'technocratic elitism'. The argument was that only an elitist bureaucratic structure could lead to European unification. It is, therefore, no surprise that for more than two decades an academic and political debate has emerged over the question of whether European integration is a democratically legitimate system or not. The catchword for this debate was 'democratic deficit', meaning that the European institutions lacked democratic legitimacy. It was not a coincidence that the term first appeared in the early 1970s, when a British academic employed it to describe the weakness of the democratic legitimacy of the European Community institutions and proposed direct elections for the members of the European Parliament⁶⁷.

The criticism is without a doubt pertinent. From the very beginning, the European Commission (representing the interests of the Community/Union) and the European Council (the voice of the Member States) have been the dominant forces in the integration process. Due to this institutional structure, the democratic credentials of the Union have arguably always been weak and voices deploring the 'democratic deficit' have been legion. The EP has always served as the 'democratic fig leaf' of European integration. It is difficult to argue – especially after 1979 – that the EP suffers from a 'democratic deficit', or that it does not represent the peoples of Europe. However, if we turn from principle to substance the problems appear again; European elections today are still 'second class' elections because the members of the European Parliament are elected in national elections, rarely do the parties campaign on European issues, and rarely do European voters choose the parties and candidates that show the greatest

European capabilities or the best credentials. As a consequence, the parties' and candidates' campaigns are rarely based on an evaluation or an account of their record in the European Parliament. Another criticism regards the low turn-out in European elections, which shows that the EP continues to suffer from apathy and lack of democratic participation on the part of the European peoples it claims to represent⁶⁸.

Ever since the 1960s, several institutional reforms have – as we have seen – been adopted in the interest of reducing this perceived democratic deficit. In the course of these reforms, the powers of the EP have been considerably enhanced, but they are still a far cry from the powers that 'normal' parliaments enjoy. The successive treaty reforms have brought improvements but have not altered the role, structures, functions, and responsibilities of the major European institutions as devised by the founding fathers. As one observer puts it, the European Parliament suffers a "democratic deficit of a political nature, that is, caused by the choices of the parties and the voters [...] but that to a greater extent it suffers from a democratic deficit of an institutional nature, deriving from its functions, powers and relations with the other institutions"⁶⁹. Some would argue that the only way to resolve this problem would be to create a European federal state. The constitutionalisation process and the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe are steps in this direction. Still, if the current distribution of powers remains unchanged, the 'democratic deficit' will also persist.

In conclusion, it should be added that the criticism often overlooks one important factor: the European Union is an 'unfinished' political system and inevitably destined to be transformed over time. The EP is in fact the best example of this reality. Instead of considering integrated Europe as a consolidated democracy "it would be more productive to follow its institutional vicissitudes as if it were a democracy still under construction, that is, with the democratization process still going on and [...] still undergoing a transition from an imperfect democratic regime to another, equally improvable, but preferable regime"⁷⁰. The democratic deficit is, as we have seen, one of the many things today's European Union is criticized for. Satirists say that the European Union appears as a very attractive club for those who are not in, basing their argument on the six enlargements in the history of the unification process. Among these, the 2004 enlargement probably had the highest symbolic value, as it allowed countries which had always felt part of the continent from a cultural perspective to re-enter Europe politically and economically. Whether institutional changes will keep pace with the needs and desires of this expanding Europe remains to be seen.

RECONNECTING EUROPE: ESTONIA AND EU ENLARGEMENT

The overarching symbolic meaning of the EU's eastward expansion is quite frequently interpreted as 're-uniting Europe'. Never before have the continent's nations been so interlinked in terms of economy, politics, and social communication. The European

Union now comprises nearly 500 million people and epitomizes one of the most significant achievements in the history of human co-operation and development. The eastern enlargement of the EU is particularly important in the light of modern endeavours to redefine the meaning of Europe. At least in re-independent Estonia, the discussion about whether to accede to the EU or not has been a most fundamental decision, touching many areas of the country's identity. By the same token, the Estonian example reflects the debates, discourses, hopes, and fears that have prevailed in the other 'new' and recently associated east and central European countries. In this northernmost Baltic state, the issue of the EU has been not so much a separate event in itself. Instead, it constitutes part of the broader landscape of Estonian society and politics. When applying the so-called civilisational argument, Estonia's transition can be viewed as an inevitable return to the Western world. From here also a paradox emerges; while being consistently successful in the accession process, Estonia turned out to be one of the most Eurosceptic countries. So there is a good reason to survey popular attitudes, as well as the elite's perspective, towards EU accession. Also the dominant discursive approaches to Estonia's meaning and role in its geopolitical or mental map will be outlined. Thus, the following section examines some of the basic macro-historical, political, social, and psychological dimensions of the Estonian process of rejoining Europe.

The concept of Europe remains ill-defined, in terms not only of geography, but also of culture and politics. For centuries Europeans have tried to understand and define themselves more precisely. Recently, and in connection with European integration, the self-determination of Europe has become particularly topical.

There have been some problems in mapping the centre of Europe, especially when one takes into account the still ongoing enlargement of the European Union. European history shows that the task of demarcating its continental or geographical identity has never been an easy one. Rather, both Europe and its borders are discursive constructions. One result is that European geopolitical space has often been defined as a mix of cultural and political factors⁷¹. Even as its borders change, Europe is often thought of as a 'civilisational constellation', meaning not one narrowly-defined and stable entity but one also marked by a dynamic of cultural transmission to other civilisations and societies as well⁷². The historian Robert Darnton has written that Europe has never had natural borders and is, in fact, a state of mind, a way of life based on a feeling of belonging to a common civilisation⁷³. It exists only in uneasily definable and consensual *habitus* or traditions. Allegedly unifying values, which are preliminarily attributed to (western) Europe, have comprised political democracy, separation of powers, rule of law, freedom of speech, economic liberty, secularism, human rights and individual freedom, and the aspiration for social justice⁷⁴. There is at the same time a widespread belief that European identity exists on very different levels – cultural, political and economic. Still others see this identity as still in formation, while some deny that such a collective sentiment exists at all⁷⁵.

Whatever the answer, it is clear that the ordinary meaning of 'Europe' has changed somewhat during recent years. Outward expansion of the EU has been accompanied by a general process of 'Europeanisation'⁷⁶. Fundamental questions for many people from former Eastern bloc countries going through the post-Communist transition were 'who are we?' and 'where do we belong?' Were they ready and capable of joining Europe not only politically but also socially and culturally?

In the case of Estonia, which in 1991 restored its independence, three great narratives have dominated academic and political debates: 1) Estonia as a neutral (Nordic) country; 2) Estonia as a gateway between the West and Russia; and 3) Estonia as a country on a dividing-line of civilisations⁷⁷. The first construction is connected with the idea of a common Balto-Scandia identity, or with identification with a perceived broader regional and cultural unity (e.g. Scandinavia). This political rhetoric, quite popular before and after the country's independence, was interlocked with the concept of the 'demilitarised Nordic' vision of Estonia as a self-dependent geopolitical space. It has not yet met with much acceptance as Estonia is too small and weak for neutrality. In addition, Scandinavia, or any other regional Baltic collective, has not offered credible security guarantees⁷⁸. The second narrative positions Estonia as a bridge between the West and Russia, in which Estonia's role is to serve as an economic, political, and cultural mediator. Although the narrative of being a contact country dominates Estonian geopolitical thinking, our view is that in the long term the third viewpoint is far more important. It sees Estonia as a border state between West and East, while it serves at the same time as the farthest outpost of western civilisation, the so-called skin of western Europe. Estonia's eastern border is represented as the 'eastern wall' of European culture while the western border is almost always discursively abolished. Estonia is thus envisioned as a fixed part of the West, acting both as a connector as well as a dividing line.

The debate over EU accession in recent member states was in almost every case a deeply divisive one, with different collective identities coming to the fore⁷⁹. In this context, the interpretation of changes in post-Communist east and central European countries has been informed by Huntington's seminal theory of a clash of civilizations shaping geopolitical developments at the end of the 20th century⁸⁰. Huntington's theory holds that a transformation of world policy along lines of civilisational impact is underway and that, as a result, cultural boundaries will increasingly coincide with political ones. In such geo-cultural terms, Estonia represents (along with other Baltic states) the easternmost western European cultural tradition. Following World War II, Estonia was incorporated into the Orthodox political and economic system in its new Soviet-Russian form⁸¹. Similarly, the civilisational cleavage manifests itself in the present between ethnic Estonians and the country's large Russian minority. According to this narrative, foreign and domestic authors consider Estonians and Russians very different in terms of culture and temperament⁸². Needless to say, this kind of crude civilisational stereotype has received much criticism⁸³. What matters here is the degree to which this conviction has influenced Estonian politics.

The 'Return to Europe' narrative posits that Estonia has been an integral part of (western) Europe's geographic, economic, cultural, and political life since at least the Middle Ages. In the self-image of Estonian people, belonging to the 'western' cultural space is reflected, for instance, in their juridical and educational system, which developed over the centuries by absorbing Swedish and German traditions. Another example is the architectural environment, which was shaped along medieval European Gothic patterns. Afterwards, in Czarist Russia, the 'Baltic Special Order' was preserved and officially recognised. Within the Soviet Union, the Baltic Republics were looked upon as the 'Soviet West' (*Sovetski Zapad*)⁸⁴, and Estonia was colloquially called 'our Europe' (*naša Evropa*). Hence, in the course of the half century of Soviet occupation Estonia felt itself cut off from the rest of Europe. Or as one authoritative Estonian sociologist has said: "For Estonians and other people with a Western mind-set, living under the Soviets meant a 'clash of civilizations' inside the mind of every single individual, the loss of personal integrity, and even the loss of the right to an authentic life-world"⁸⁵.

However, reestablishment of state independence did not see the emergence of a new and precise national *leitmotiv*. The main objective, indeed top priority, of all governments was integration into western European political, economic and security structures. Following the collapse of communism attempts were made to adapt national policy, legislation, and the economy to this end, in the hope of becoming a 'normal European country'. It was expected that the self-evident outcome of political liberation would take the form of a 'Return to Europe'⁸⁶. Initially, this rhetoric had little to do with the EU as such, and was principally seen as a reaction to a half century of isolation and the desire to mark as much distance from an ex-imperial overlord as possible. For instance, trade was swiftly re-oriented from the east to the west of Europe⁸⁷. The incumbent president, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, has allegorically labelled Estonian efforts as *Drang nach Westen*.

Closer integration with EU structures quickly became more tangible. The EU accession campaign also presented the referendum as an inevitable civilisational 'choice'⁸⁸. Entry into the EU was perceived as completing Estonia's re-union with European historical and cultural space, understood as the 'expansion of European civilisation to its natural borders'⁸⁹. Potential membership in the EU was seen as proof of Estonia's European character and a counterweight to the proximity of the Russian Orthodox tradition⁹⁰. European integration was presented as bolstering Estonia's image and identity as a western country. International integration was pursued as the ultimate expression and codification of Estonian identity and Estonian values. Joining with western institutions was perceived as an affirmation of the country's affiliation to Europe. In line with the narrative of a civilisational gap, Russia was regarded as 'alien', and turning to the east was seen as impossible because of a predictable cultural mismatch.

European states have become EU members at very different moments and for very different reasons. Small states and post-Communist countries are principally interested in security, framed in cultural and demographic, as well as in military and economic terms.

After getting rid of foreign rule, Estonian leaders frequently stated that the country had to move quickly to the West – not only to reunite with Europe but also because it was widely believed that Estonia had only a temporary ‘window of opportunity’ within which to definitely break free from the Russian sphere of influence⁹¹. Such a specific security argument based on fear of a large neighbour has been largely missing in the case of older, ex-candidate countries (Sweden, Austria), or has been relatively attenuated (Finland). All these three afore-mentioned states joined the EU in 1995. Under Russian political pressure, whose central objective was initially to halt any Estonian approach to the EU, Estonia’s tacit approach to Europe went beyond ‘fleeing into the west’. Estonian security discourse emphasised Euro-Atlantic integration as a guarantee against Russia. Although the EU provided so-called soft security, this was still among Estonia’s primary motives for EU membership, so much so that it took priority over the anticipated economic benefits of accession⁹². And that is the reason why, despite being a ‘hard security’ institution, NATO membership has also been an integral part of the ‘Return to Europe’ narrative. Nevertheless, over the course of time defence policy somewhat receded into the background in media debates and practical economic issues gained in importance⁹³. This was especially the case when the Treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1992, which in addition to widening common foreign and internal security policy also formally established the EU and led to the creation of the Euro.

Estonia petitioned to join the EU immediately after independence, and diplomatic relations were established on 27 August 1991. In May 1992 Estonia and the EU signed an agreement on trade and economic co-operation. In May of the following year Estonia joined the Council of Europe, and in 1995 Estonia officially applied for full EU membership. Following the European Commission’s evaluation of eligible candidates in July 1997, Estonia was the only Baltic state and the first former Soviet republic to be included in the first wave of accession negotiations, along with the so-called Visegrád group (Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary), and Cyprus and Slovenia. They all started accession negotiations with the EU on 31 March 1998. While declarations about Estonia’s affiliation with Europe were often only rhetorical, the status of candidacy was a substantial breakthrough and, in some respects, accession negotiations reassured Estonians of their European identity⁹⁴.

As in other European states, in Estonia European integration turned out to be very much an elite-driven project⁹⁵. Estonia evidenced strong cross-party and elite support for EU accession. In the 1990s, political actors had an ideal type of society which they wished to create. In Estonia, this was mostly formed by the popular image of the ‘European welfare state’, mixed with more abstract ideas of an ‘integrated Europe’, ‘western democracy’ and a ‘market economy’. All the parliamentary parties across the ideological spectrum supported EU accession in general terms, while all parties outside the parliament hoped to raise their profile by being Eurosceptic. However, many of these parties were marginal and failed to act as effective social pressure groups. After the general elec-

tions, held in early 2003, there were no truly Eurosceptic parties or parliamentary deputies⁹⁶. At first joining European institutions was primarily seen as a foreign affair, but it soon came to be viewed as being central to internal reforms and the domestic political processes as well. Between 1995 and 2003, all governments in office strove to harmonise Estonia's legislation with that of the EU and to complete accession negotiations as quickly as possible. Irrespective of changes in government policy towards obtaining EU membership remained consistent⁹⁷.

It must be noted that Estonia is characterised by a large discrepancy between the elite and the masses regarding EU membership⁹⁸. According to comparative surveys, Estonia was, from the second half of the 1990s, one of the most Eurosceptic candidate countries ever. Many indicators, such as support for accession, the public image of the EU and trust in its institutions, showed that Estonia consistently lagged behind other candidate countries, even when compared to similarly unenthusiastic countries such as Latvia and Lithuania⁹⁹. History has shown that the citizens of aspirant states have many times refused membership even if there has been overwhelming elite consensus about the benefits of EU membership. Norway, for instance, rejected membership twice in referendums arranged in the 1970s and 1990s. In 1992, Switzerland similarly pushed EU accession back. In the 2000s Danish, Swedish and British voters also said 'no' to the Euro currency, which in the previous year was duly launched by eleven of the fifteen member states of the EU¹⁰⁰. In this sense the Estonian decision to hold a referendum to approve the outcome of negotiations with Brussels entailed some risk.

Estonia also differed from most of the post-Communist applicant countries by having higher social and demographic diversity among those who voted in the accession referendum. Public opinion polls indicated that city-dwellers and people with higher education and incomes were more supportive. Residents of rural areas, retired persons, the unemployed, people with lower incomes and education, and inhabitants of peripheral regions with socio-economic problems were more pessimistic about the EU¹⁰¹. Thus, a certain Euroscepticism was also related to Estonian social polarisation¹⁰². A kind of ethnic divide was also evident in voting patterns, in that support for EU membership was to some extent greater among Estonian ethnic Russians¹⁰³. This has been explained with reference to the Baltic Russians' alleged emphasis on economic questions, and to their different historical background and weaker roots in Estonia. Most ethnic Russians also supposedly felt less concerned than Estonians about the dangers to national sovereignty from joining the EU¹⁰⁴. Somewhat unexpectedly, as the referendum approached the attitudes of the Estonian (and also Latvian) Russian minorities became more ambivalent, and support for EU entry decreased. The reasons for this sudden drop in support for joining Europe among ethnic Russians are complex, and include economic factors as well as problems stemming from the form of the EU campaign (the pro-European arguments were implicitly and sometimes explicitly unfriendly to Russia), and from a fear of losing traditional family relations and business connections with Russia¹⁰⁵. By

the day of referendum the Russians' backing was already substantially lower than that of ethnic Estonians. This was, in a sense, counter-rational since EU membership was expected to offer additional guarantees and strengthening of minority rights as well as better economic prospects¹⁰⁶.

Another explanation of the low levels of support among Russians is that since EU accession was one of the government's central goals, disappointment with government policies towards the Russian minority provided grounds for wielding an anti-EU vote as a form of political 'punishment'¹⁰⁷. Indeed, research has indicated that theories about the correlation between EU support and trust in domestic state institutions as a whole is valid also in the case of Estonia¹⁰⁸. There is a clear correlation between trust in the EU and the popularity of the incumbent government. People who trusted institutions and politicians, supported the EU and vice versa. An analogous connection can also be observed in the EU member states, where people who are content with their government take up a significantly more positive standpoint towards the EU than those who are dissatisfied with the incumbent administration¹⁰⁹. But of course, such attitudes were moulded by many external factors as well, such as events in the Russian Federation, the completion of accession negotiations, or the levels of foreign assistance¹¹⁰.

When talking about the Estonian EU debates more generally, arguments pivoted particularly on claims about geopolitical and cultural threats. On the one hand, integration was discursively constructed as a security measure against the Russian threat. On the other hand, various European institutions played an important role in urging the Estonian government to liberalise its citizenship and minority policies. European integration was thus seen by many as potentially harmful to national culture and identity, as it would lead to a more pronounced influence of supranational institutions on Estonian policy-making, especially ethnopolitics¹¹¹. Naturally, debates over financial, political, legal and social costs and benefits were not absent, although at times it seemed that the issue of potential burden-sharing was largely separated from the overall discussion of European identity¹¹².

One can divide public calculations roughly into two schools. Those who were positive thought in terms of the improvement of Estonia's international position, growing foreign investment and subsidies, and regional policy development. This sort of mind-set expected that in a common European economic space Estonian living standards would improve more quickly. Educational and travel opportunities would broaden, employment would rise, and there would be better possibilities for greater social guarantees¹¹³. The negative thinkers focused on the likely increase in consumer prices, or on the country's questionable competitiveness. They feared that Estonian agriculture would suffer, and that unemployment, social inequality, bureaucracy and corruption might soar; they also foresaw a 'brain-drain' and massive migration conditioned by the free movement of labour that could threaten Estonian identity, culture, and language¹¹⁴. Last but not least, they expected a likely decrease in state sovereignty. Hence the fre-

quent argument that since Estonia had been independent only for a relatively short period, one should not hurry into the EU. One should also take into account that as one consequence of the Soviet period was a heightened sensibility to the possible aberrations of centralised rule¹¹⁵. Estonia's historical experience gave rise to a widespread Eurosceptic cliché of going from 'one union to another', comparing the authority of Brussels with subordination to Moscow. Nevertheless, one must distinguish between scepticism toward European integration in general, and nervousness about the specific dynamics of the EU. Estonian Euroscepticism focused more on EU membership than the process of European integration *per se*¹¹⁶. Also the public's cautiousness with regard to accession did not express a sceptical stance towards belonging to a European cultural space; rather, it was bound up with doubts concerning the functioning of the EU as a political-administrative union.

On the day of the referendum, 14 September 2003, the decisive pro-EU majority went easily beyond expectations based on previous opinion polls: the 'Yes' vote won by a comfortable two-to-one margin¹¹⁷. It must be said that the 'No' camp had been relatively weak, fragmented, and poorly organised, while the 'Yes' movement benefited from considerable Estonian government and EU support. The accession itself took place on 1 May 2004, when Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus, Hungary and Slovenia increased membership of the EU to 25 countries¹¹⁸. Politicians, journalists, and opinion leaders interpreted the day as the official culmination of European re-unification. Estonian elites looked on joining the EU as a symbolic return to Europe, from which Estonia had been illegally and wrongfully secluded after World War II. Although at times scepticism and wariness with respect to the EU had been pronounced, the underlying cultural and political predisposition was positive. This was not a decision restricted to the 'rich club'; instead, the different social layers of the country were involved in the decision-making process. Estonian integration into Europe can be seen as an integral process which has taken place overtly. At the same time, it also involved and expressed hidden mentalities, especially those linked to Estonia's prolonged spatial consciousness.

CONCLUSION

Building upon the authors' different research backgrounds, this chapter has focused a spotlight on certain aspects of the development of European consciousness and integration and deconstructed some of the multiple meanings of the centuries-old term 'Europe'. The latter has been addressed as a geographical term, analyzed as a cultural-civilizational region, and presented as a deliberate political construction. Geography has always been a crucial parameter for Europe, but the lack of natural borders to the east has led Europeans (and others) to look elsewhere for criteria with which to define this entity and its inhabitants. Not surprisingly, there have been countless attempts to describe (or find) Europe's 'identity'. Identity is always closely linked to civilization and a

common past, and offers leeway for instrumentalisation. If there is something like a European identity then it builds largely upon (national) diversity, parliamentary democracy, and civil rights. Today's European Union, despite its heterogeneity, constitutes a voluntary 'community of values'. In analyzing the debate on European civilization and mind-set in the course of Estonia's accession at the beginning of the 21st century, Reigo Lokk has reminded us that, while the roots of this identity can be found in the distant past, these questions have not lost an iota of their importance.

The integrated Europe which has come into being since World War II is a deliberate creation, made possible by the exceptional situation which prevailed after two profoundly destructive wars. The combination of a politically and economically prostrate European continent, which had been torn apart by almost half a century of conflict, allowed different actors to implement the centuries-old 'European dream' of a united continent. Siegfried Beer makes clear that one of these participants was an 'external' one, namely the United States of America, which in many ways acted as midwife for today's integrated Europe. On the other hand, attempts at European unity in the past had always been deliberate initiatives on the part of convinced 'Europhiles'. In the 20th century they were spearheaded by the European federalists. Their influence once again brings home to us that European integration has always been very much an elite project. This can be clearly seen if, as Eero Medijainen does, one regards the activities of the members of the Pan-European movement in Estonia in the interwar period, and analyzes the so-called democratic deficit of the European institutions after World War II. In the latter case, Andreas Gémes has argued that the most important project to remedy this situation after World War II was the European Parliament, which developed from a merely consultative body to a directly elected institution endowed with a certain amount of legislative power.

Historians have identified many driving forces behind European unification: the economy, politics, security, military factors, ideologies and identities, to name just a few. While many criticize today's European Union as being very much built upon economic considerations, the 'founding fathers' of the integrated Europe intended economic unification to be a means of achieving the ultimate goal, namely the preservation of peace in a war-torn continent. The French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, opened his famous declaration on 9 May 1950 with the following words:

World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. [...] A united Europe was not achieved and we had war¹¹⁹.

The interplay between European integration and the wish for stabilization and peace can be observed at numerous instances in the 20th century. Small states like Estonia, for example, were especially interested in European integration (in the interwar period as well at the beginning of the 21st century) due to the external security it provided. In

this particular case, 'Europe' was juxtaposed with other institutions such as the League of Nations in the interwar period, or NATO after the demise of the Warsaw Pact.

In this context, it is perhaps worthwhile to think back to ancient times in order to come to grips with a phenomenon which can be traced throughout European history, namely that Europeans have usually been inclined to unite when they have been faced with common challenges and outside threats. Indeed, ancient Greeks identified with their own polis, and even such forms of unity as the Athenian Empire in the 4th century BC were experienced as forms of oppression by the non-Athenians. In contrast, Roman citizenship, first granted in Italy and then throughout the Empire did link many peoples in a single polity: although municipal loyalties continued to be important, a sense of community and real empowerment distinguished Roman empire, with its cosmopolitan elites.

Often though Europeans have referred to the threat of the 'other' in order to unite their disparate forces. This is the way 'European' armies' confrontation with the Arabs at Tours and Poitiers in 732 has been presented; and the call to 'European' Christians to fight against the 'infidel' was fundamental to the crusades, although already Pius II found that no one was willing to follow his call to oppose the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. A popular saying goes that the person who most merits a medal for European integration is Stalin. Still, it remains to be seen whether and how the challenges of the 21st century will incline (or force) Europeans to complete the centuries-old dream of a genuinely united continent.

NOTES

- ¹ Herodotus, *Histories*, 4, 45; Herodotus also says that the origin of the name for the continent is unknown.
- ² *Hymn. Hom. Ap.* 250.
- ³ N.G.L. Hammond, H.H. Scullard (eds.), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, London 1970, p. 422; M. Ninck, *Die Entdeckung von Europa durch die Griechen*, Basel 1945.
- ⁴ L. Passerini, *Il mito di Europa. Radici antiche per nuovi simboli*, Florence 2002; G. Semeraro, *Gli influssi delle antiche civiltà del Medio Oriente sulla prima formazione dell'Europa*, in G. Bocchi, M. Ceruti (eds.), *Le radici prime dell'Europa*, Milan 2001, p. 307.
- ⁵ M.W. Lewis, K.E. Wigen, *The Myth of Continents. A Critique of Metageography*, Berkeley - Los Angeles - London 1997, at p. 168 for the *Standard World Regions* in 1975 according to American geography books.
- ⁶ M.I. Finley, *Democracy Ancient and Modern*, London 1985 (rev. edn.).
- ⁷ M. Caravale, *Gli ordinamenti giuridici dell'Europa medievale*, Bologna, pp. 40-81; C. Wickham, *The Inheritance of Rome. A History of Europe from 400 to 1000*, London 2010², pp. 136-145; A. Watson, *The Evolution of Law*, Baltimore 1989, p. 46ff for an analysis of the conditions necessary for 'reception'. In early medieval west, two collections of laws or "constitutions", in Latin (the Greek laws were translated) were widely used: the *Epitome Juliani* and from the early 12th century, the *Authenticum*.
- ⁸ Paulus Orosius, *Historiarum Adversum Paganos Libri VII*, 7, 43.
- ⁹ M. Ascheri, *Istituzioni medievali*, Bologna 1994, esp. pp. 40-41.

- ¹⁰ W. Reinhard, *Storia dello Stato moderno*, Bologna 2010 (orig. *Geschichte des modernen Staates*, Munich 2007).
- ¹¹ See K. Tuori, *Ancient Roman Lawyers and Modern Legal Ideals. Studies on the Impact of Contemporary Concerns on the Interpretation of Ancient Roman Legal History*, Frankfurt am Main 2007, for a critical view of 'reception' of ancient law as the proper way of categorizing the legal history of modern Europe: rather Tuori sees the work of lawyers over the past centuries as a projection and reinterpretation of the past on the basis of the concerns of their day.
- ¹² See J.A. Brundage, *The Medieval Origins of the Legal Profession: Canonists, Civilians and Courts*, Chicago 2008. The first redaction of Gratian's *Decretum*, as shown by A. Winroth, *The Making of Gratian's Decretum*, New York 2000, contained relatively few Romanistic elements, although these were soon added in the longer and more complex text that usually goes under Gratian's name.
- ¹³ R.C. Van Caenegem, *The Birth of the English Common Law*, Cambridge 1988²; Id., *Judges, Legislators and Professors. Chapters in European Legal History*, Cambridge 1987.
- ¹⁴ The paragraphs on the Byzantine-Serbian case have been contributed by Aleksandra Smirnov-Brkić, whom we thank.
- ¹⁵ J.M. Hussey (ed.), *The Cambridge Medieval History: The Byzantine Empire. Government, Church and Civilisation*, Cambridge 1967, vol. IV, part II, pp. 55-77.
- ¹⁶ S. Šarkić, *Правне и политичке идеје у источном римском царству*, Belgrade 1984, pp. 141.
- ¹⁷ G. Ostrogorsky, *Istorija Vizantije*, Belgrade 1959, p. 47 (*Geschichte des Byzantinischen Staates*, revised edn., Munich 1963).
- ¹⁸ S. Ćirković (ed.), *Istorija srpskog naroda*, vol. I, Belgrade 1994, p. 318.
- ¹⁹ The text was mentioned in the work of the priest Dukljanin *The Kingdom of Slavs* (c. 1167-1173) and it derived its name from the Slav missionary Methodius (9th century); cf. Ćirković (ed.), *Istorija* cit., vol. I, Belgrade 1994, p. 322.
- ²⁰ In its earliest form this collection dates from the reign of the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius (610-40). This collection was long held in esteem and passed into the Russian Church, but was by degrees supplanted by that of Photios (10th century).
- ²¹ After the 13th century Sava's *Nomocanon* was taken to Bulgaria, and from there to Russia, where it was first printed in 1650, and then reprinted until the 19th century. The last copy was released in 1914.
- ²² B. Marković, *Dušanov zakonik*, Belgrade 1986.
- ²³ S. Šarkić, *Kodifikacija građanskog prava u Srbiji – dva pravca recepcije rimskog prava*, Ksenija Maricki Gadžanski ed., Belgrade 2008, pp. 464-472.
- ²⁴ Reinhard, *Storia* cit., pp. 56-57.
- ²⁵ On empathy and the development of ideas of human rights in the 18th century and beyond, see L. Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A History*, New York 2007.
- ²⁶ F. Chabod, *Storia dell'idea d'Europa*, Bari 1961 (Rome - Bari 2010⁸), pp. 132-133; A. Liakos, *L'unificazione italiana e la grande idea. Ideologia e azione dei movimenti nazionali in Italia e in Grecia*, 1859-1871, Florence 1995.
- ²⁷ Y.S. Tezel, *Transformation of 'state' and 'society' in Turkey: from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic*, Ankara 2005, p. 61.
- ²⁸ M. Wertheimer, *The Pan-German League, 1890-1914*, New York 1971, p. 102.
- ²⁹ J. Erickson, *Panslavism*, London 1964.
- ³⁰ M. Lehti, *A Baltic League as a Construct of the New Europe: Envisioning a Baltic Region and Small State Sovereignty in the Aftermath of the First World War*, Frankfurt am Main 1999.
- ³¹ D. Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union*, London 2004, pp. 3-4.

- ³² Z. Steiner, *The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933*, New York 2005, pp. 583-7.
- ³³ P. Heikkilä, *The Pros and Cons of Paneurope. Estonian Discussion on European Unification in the Inter-war Period*, in "Acta Historica Tallinnensia", 2008, 13, pp. 68-91.
- ³⁴ E. Medijainen, *Saadiku saatus. Eesti välisministeerium ja saatkonnad 1918-1940*, Tallinn 1991.
- ³⁵ R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-European Manifest*, Vienna 1926; *Paneuroopa Liit*, Tallinn 1929; *Paneuroopa ABC*, Tallinn 1931.
- ³⁶ K. Pusta, *Saadiku päevik*, Tallinn 1992, pp. 116-117; *Pan-Euroopa päev*, in "Vaba Maa", 16 May 1931.
- ³⁷ Dinan, *Europe Recast* cit., p. 4.
- ³⁸ G. Lundestad, *'Empire' by Integration: the United States and European Integration, 1945-1997*, Oxford 1998; G. Lundestad, *Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952*, in "Journal of Peace Research", 1986, 23, pp. 263-277.
- ³⁹ R.H. Ferrell, *The Truman Era and European Integration*, in F.H. Heller, J.R. Gillingham (eds.), *The United States and the Integration of Europe: Legacies of the Post-war Era*, New York 1996, pp. 33-37.
- ⁴⁰ Lundestad, *'Empire' by Integration* cit., p. 37.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 6f.
- ⁴² F.H. Heller, J.R. Gillingham (eds.), *NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe*, New York 1992.
- ⁴³ G. Warner, *Eisenhower, Dulles and the Unity of Western Europe*, in "International Affairs", 1993, 69, pp. 325f.
- ⁴⁴ W. Asbeck Brusse, *The Americans, GATT, and European Integration, 1947-1957: A Decade of Dilemma*, in Heller, Gillingham (eds.), *Integration of Europe* cit., pp. 221-49.
- ⁴⁵ R.J. Aldrich, *European Integration: an American Intelligence Connection*, in A. Deighton (ed.), *Building Postwar Europe: National Decision-Makers and European Institutions, 1945-63*, London 1995, pp. 159-79.
- ⁴⁶ P. Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe*, London 1993.
- ⁴⁷ K. Schwabe, *The United States and European Integration, 1947-1957*, in C. Wurm (ed.), *Western Europe and Germany: the Beginnings of European Integration 1945-1960*, Oxford 1995, p. 129.
- ⁴⁸ F. Costigliola, *The Failed Design: Kennedy, de Gaulle, and the Struggle for Europe*, in "Diplomatic History", 1984, 8, pp. 227-51.
- ⁴⁹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-68*, Washington DC 1995, vol. XIII, p. 165.
- ⁵⁰ F. Romero, *U.S. Attitudes towards Integration and Interdependence: the 1950s*, in Heller, Gillingham (eds.), *Integration of Europe* cit., pp. 103-121.
- ⁵¹ *Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard M. Nixon, 1973*, Washington DC 1975, p. 276; Lundestad, *'Empire' by Integration* cit., p. 102.
- ⁵² *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, 14 May 1973, p. 593; Lundestad, *'Empire' by Integration* cit., p. 105.
- ⁵³ *Public Papers of the Presidents: Gerald R. Ford, 1974*, Washington DC 1975, p. 756; Lundestad, *'Empire' by Integration* cit., p. 107.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 39-54.
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Towards a Citizenship of the European Union¹

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The whole concept of citizenship and of the rights and responsibilities of citizens has in the past twenty years again been called in question by the development in Europe of a quasi-federal supra-state, the European Union. In the new European Union, the complex of rights and duties which have traditionally gone under the name of citizenship, and which in former times were exercised by (some of) the inhabitants of smaller territorial units, such as a city or, at most, a nation-state, are now in large measure shared by, and common to, citizens of all the different EU member states. Citizens of EU states resident in another member-state may not formally be enfranchised or have full voting rights at member-state level, but they mostly have rights of residence, of employment, and they have legal protection in ways which were previously the preserve of the citizens of these smaller polities. Specifically, the Maastricht treaty (1992) and the Amsterdam treaty (1997) conferred on all nationals of an EU member state what was in effect the new concept of a European Union citizenship, additional to national citizenship, and according particular rights of access to European institutions (parliament, council, the ombudsman, and to vote in European and local elections), of free movement, residence, and employment, and against discrimination on grounds of nationality. Prior to this, moreover, in the earlier age of competing nation-states, the privileges and obligations of individual national citizenships had deliberately been set out and developed in an oppositional manner – *vis-à-vis* the outsider, the foreigner, the neighbouring state. These definitions in exclusive terms had reflected the prevailing prejudices of the period: for instance, the holding of dual citizenship was frequently forbidden. Now, however, the progressive dismantling of Europe's internal frontiers and boundaries, notably through such initiatives as the Schengen Agreement, has highlighted the need for a reconsideration of what these various national citizenships, and their predecessors, might have had, and did have, in common. It is evident, for instance, that attitudes towards present political structures – whether local, regional, national, or European ones – vary considerably in different parts of the EU, and that in large measure these differences reflect both the particular political cultures and heritages in different regions which have

come down from earlier times and also the diversity of paths towards and away from the EU's stated model, or norm, of participatory citizenship. Thus, in highlighting the need for this reconsideration, we must also ask how far it is possible to identify a common range of historic ideas and rights which may be associated with citizenship in these earlier times?

In posing this question, we also need to be careful not to project our ideas of participatory citizenship in the 21st century back into the past. In the opening volume of our series, we tried to chart the development of modern citizenship rights in the various historical periods and the different European countries in terms of when these rights were acquired. The volume focused on particular historical cases, however, and its individual chapters also had little to say about what individuals actually did as citizens, once they had acquired these citizenship rights. There was also very little in the volume by way of definition or theoretical clarification of the actual concept of citizenship. The danger in this type of approach is of course that, if citizenship is defined in terms of what is now, in a present-day European context, understood as best practice – and particularly one associated with Western states with a long tradition of democracy, in the aftermath of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc – we may end up, not so much understanding the concept of citizenship and how this has changed over time, but rather supplying a pseudo-historical narrative purveying the illusion of triumphant progress towards the present. We need here, therefore, to sidestep the problem that, in some academic traditions, and particularly from the perspective of modern and contemporary history or historical anthropology, the concept of citizenship is closely linked to modern civic society. By contrast, pre-modern specialists would see the complex of rights and duties which make up the concept of citizenship in terms of active participation in the political life of the polis, town, city, region, or state in whatever period of history. The one perspective offers us an approach which is manifestly skewed towards the making of the present; the other runs the danger of a definition which is so broad as to be meaningless.

There are, however, a number of ways around this problem. One is to look more closely at the etymology of the word for 'citizenship' in the different European languages. A second is to establish that the nature of citizenship rights varies in accordance with the type of society and state in which people live. In what follows, this chapter will first review some of the evidence concerning the etymology of the term, including some case studies. There then follows a more extended consideration of the relationship between citizenship rights and the norms and values of the society in which they develop.

Turning to the first question, then, the etymology of the word for 'citizenship' in the different European languages provides an important clue as to the particular origins and development of the concept among those peoples in which the language developed. Also, what in English is called 'citizenship' is rendered in other European languages by a variety of terms which, in many cases, reflect the particular balance of political, legal,

or social conditions obtaining in each of these polities at different periods of their history. To take an obvious example, the German term *Staatsbürgerschaft*, which denotes citizenship in the sense of a feeling of belonging to the nation or state², contrasts with the Irish (Gaelic) word, *saoránacht*, meaning citizenship in the sense of freedom: the one word reflects political conditions in a large territorial entity; the other in a small entity overshadowed by a powerful neighbour. In both languages, however, the concept of citizenship may also be translated by words which reflect a more traditional sense of enjoying political rights in a particular town or city: *Bürgerrecht* in German, *cathróireacht* in Gaelic. Many other European languages have a similar pair of words to denote citizenship, reflecting an original distinction in regard to citizenship rights and national identity: for instance, in French, *citoyenneté* (the modern notion of *citoyen*, originating in the French Revolution) and *nationalité*; in Greek, *πολιτοσύνη* [citizenship] and *εθνικότητα* [ethnicity]; in Romanian, *cetățenie* [state membership] and *naționalitate* 'ethnic origin'. These language pairs are rough equivalents but the etymology and precise nuances of each term reflect the prevailing circumstances in each national tradition in which the term developed. In other words, what we have here, arguably, are a complex of rights and duties which are closely associated with the concept of citizenship but which, through the operation of physical frontiers or mental boundaries in each separate tradition, have developed in somewhat different directions.

In a brief study like the present one, it is of course impossible to trace all the different patterns of state formation which promoted citizenship concepts, but it is nonetheless instructive to offer a few brief case studies. In the first place, there is the French tradition. Citizenship in France, as elsewhere, was not an immutable essence, but a historical construction in constant evolution. The concept covers questions of individual rights *vis-à-vis* the state, as also those of nationality or of national belonging; and as a principle of political legitimacy, citizenship stems from the French Revolution. The sociologist Dominique Schnapper has summed up the juridical meaning of citizenship by positing the notion of a legal subject (*sujet de droit*) enjoying particular civil and political rights: personal freedom, freedom of conscience and of expression, freedom of movement, freedom to marry, equality before the law, a presumption of innocence upon arrest, judgment by a legally-constituted court, and defence by a trained lawyer³. In early modern times, the status of being French was a function of a feudal relationship: it simply meant being native ('*naturel*') to the kingdom of France, viz. born in a territory ruled by the French king: it had nothing to do with any cultural, ethnic or linguistic qualities. Peter Sahlins has used the concept of an 'absolute citizen'⁴ to denote nationality under the *Ancien Régime*, viz. a common status as French. Using his sovereign power, the king might also accord various privileges to foreigners, such as a right of residence in France or exemptions from taxes or the *droit d'aubaine* (seizure by the king of a foreigner's inheritance), according to their profession, nobility or services to the kingdom. So-called naturalization procedures ('*naturalité*') allowed foreigners, by pay-

ment of a tax, to receive the same rights as the French (*'Français naturels'*), contributing also financially to the kingdom of France. Indeed, the status accorded by the *'admission à domicile'* – granting civil rights but with an exemption from military obligations – was only abolished by a law of 1889.

Apart from feudality, the main criterion of political belonging under the *Ancien Régime* was religious identity. Before the French Revolution, being French generally implied being Catholic: baptism was not only a religious sacrament, but also a ritual of integration into the jurisdiction of the state⁵. In consequence, the Protestant Reformation constituted a major challenge to monarchical authority. The promulgation of the Edict of Nantes (1598), acknowledging the existence of a French Calvinist community with religious rights of its own, offered a temporary political compromise to preserve the civil unity of the kingdom. It did not, however, sacrifice religious unity for civil peace: the monarchy remained Roman Catholic, the Edict was revoked in 1685⁶, and religious pluralism was generally denied by the authorities until the Toleration Edict of 1787, which accorded their own vital record to Protestant subjects. In everyday life, “the distinction national/foreigner was seen as a modality of the opposition between familiar/unknown [...]: the foreigner was above all an individual who could not offer the guarantee of being rooted in local society, in particular by having a property, a home, a family”⁷. Whether French or not, these were all indistinctly designated as outsiders (*'forains'*) by the inhabitants and the local authorities. Recent research has suggested that, notwithstanding the paradigm of a centralist state, the concept and definition of a ‘foreigner’ at city level was complex⁸: status was very fluid, depending on relationships at national or local level, or according to religion or profession.

The French Revolution undoubtedly marked a fundamental shift in attitudes by construing the political world in terms of the national sovereignty of citizens. The revolutionaries proclaimed that the citizens as a whole formed the ‘Nation’ which was the source of political power. Michel Vovelle thus defines *citoyenneté* as “the implementation of popular sovereignty, constitutive of a social contract established by a constitution and ruled by the laws made by the people or its representatives”⁹. The Revolution thus defined citizenship in accordance with a philosophy of natural rights, linking it to universal human rights and the right to political participation as an expression of civil liberty (see the *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*, August 1789). The concept of *citoyen* was the opposite of the concept of *sujet* (subject), and its early introduction in the Revolution marked a significant shift in traditional perspectives on political belonging, from a vertical and hierarchical order to a horizontal and egalitarian community. Under cover of Enlightenment philosophy and as a reaction to the Catholic monarchy’s religious intransigence, the new national community was also emancipated from religious belonging. The *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen* mentions religious freedom, which was legally reasserted in the Constitution

of 1791, thereby integrating all the kingdom's Protestant and Jewish subjects into the new political community¹⁰.

This change was not, however, as radical as it first seemed. The proclamation of universal principles formally legitimized political authority and eventually claimed to foster a new humanity: but this universalist and prophetic conception of citizenship was contradicted and subverted by the practical conditions of political participation, by traditional social belonging, and by the French Revolution's historical development in the 1790s under the pressure of wars. Already in 1789, the influential abbé Sieyès (1748-1836) distinguished between an 'active citizen' and 'passive citizen' so as to restrict effective political participation through a franchise based on the poll tax, thereby excluding so-called 'dependents'¹¹. Indeed, the history of the French Revolution was partly determined by ideological conflicts around the modalities of political participation, so reshaping notions of citizenship as a political community. As the political and ideological epicentre of modern liberalism in Europe, France experienced an early connection between nationality and citizenship: the citizen was first and foremost a member of the nation, deemed the only relevant political community, despite the universalist wishes of some *révolutionnaires*¹².

The late modern and contemporary nation is a political and cultural construction built onto the national state, and likewise the notions of nationality and national community. For the first time in history, by proclaiming the equality and the rights of those who have the status of citizen ('*qualité de citoyen*') and therefore the status of being French ('*qualité de Français*'), the Revolution established an essential distinction between French and foreigners¹³, basing citizenship on nationality. Nationality¹⁴ – a term which appeared in the dictionary of the *Académie française* in 1835 – referred not to cultural or ethnic identity but to a relationship to the state, indissoluble from the formation of the nation-state, that is to say from the creation of an abstract entity (the nation) framed by an extensive legal and administrative system (the state). Gérard Noiriel analyses how, in late modern times:

the question of the relationships of dependency between the various nationals and their state (nationality in its present meaning) is not yet really distinguished from the problem of the political participation of citizens in public life (citizenship) ... The abstract reality of a 'national community' (comprehending millions of individuals who are unacquainted with each other, and are extremely diverse in regard to language, customs, resources, etc.) has not really been thought out¹⁵.

This relationship had been reinforced during the course of the 19th century, and formally acknowledged by law under the Third Republic. Inter alia, French liberal conceptions were summed up in 1882 by Ernest Renan's aphorism about nationality as an "everyday plebiscite": this definition of nationality clearly refers to a metaphor of political participation; it pretended to exclude any reference to an ethnic identity or any 'objective' features of identity (for instance, race or language) even if this statement was

obviously made under the weight of circumstances and did not entirely live up to reality¹⁶. This liberal and universalist statement gave birth to a so-called ‘republican model’ of citizenship which believed in the virtue and possibility of a cultural assimilation and cultural integration and the emergence of a true civic religion.

Throughout modern times, French national citizenship has become an increasingly regulated status, typical of a large-scale bureaucratization of an identity. Consequently, the French model of citizenship may operate both in terms of a rhetoric of boundary maintenance or as a tool for boundary subversion¹⁷. The building of the Nation-State is accompanied by a process of identification of the individual: “the administrative procedures of civil identification are by themselves powerful factors of national assimilation”¹⁸. This is the function of the secular registers of birth and death (*état civil*) established since the Revolution by the smallest administrative subdivisions (*communes*). As in the rest of Europe, there was an increasing tendency to “administer identity”¹⁹, to create new ways to categorize people and to determine those who enjoy nationality. The evolution of the passport is thus very significant. At the outset, it was a simple ‘permission of passage’ (so the term) given for a particular journey across the territory of the kingdom. It was only at the end of the 19th century that internal passports were finally suppressed. Since World War I, the passport has acquired “a new role: to substantiate the membership of the individual in regard to the community (the nation) and to testify to their personal identity”²⁰. At the same time, frontiers were closing between the territories of the different Nation-States.

As a country of low demographic growth, the France of the Third Republic needed ‘to make French people’, in the context of a return to the protectionism of the 1880s and of a growing immigration of foreign workers. The American sociologist Roger Brubaker – who developed a socio-historical comparative perspective on citizenship, nationalism and ethnicity²¹ – identified a French “assimilationist nationalism”: the “republican faith in assimilation”²² provided a distinctive French path to nation-statehood. The growing homogenisation of the nation arises out of its republican structures (the army, the school system, etc.) which promote equality among some very different individuals and a variegated population. The ‘nationality Act’ of 1889 is one of the founding laws of the republican regime. It exhibits an open conception of citizenship which combines rights of kinship (*jus sanguini*) inspired by Roman law, and a capacious right based on place of birth (*jus soli*) in regard to the second generation born in France from foreign parents. Even so, the Act also included clauses discriminating against naturalised persons (restricting their exercise of some political rights) and (until 1927) withdrawing the citizenship of French women who married a foreigner. Yet this French republican model faced its obvious limits during the same period, in French colonies where the inhabitants were both French nationals and subjects, dependant and unable to acquire formal citizenship, except in some individual extraordinary cases. In 1865 the Second Empire declared French all the inhabitants of colonial Algeria and gave plenary citizenship to

all who asked for it provided they renounced their Muslim civil status. They could then join the civil service and be accorded political representation in local institutions (albeit in a specific electoral college). But the colonial population refused this model and imposed in its place a segregated indigenous code (1881). Except in the 'little hold colonies' (some islands and four Senegalese cities) and in regard to Algerian Jews²³, the other French colonial subjects remained uniformly excluded from the assimilationist statement of the Republican model.

In Germany, by contrast, the concept of citizenship evolved along rather different lines. In point of fact, the German term for a citizen (*Bürger*) – in modern Germany a term with different meanings – is not a direct heir of the medieval burgher/townsmen (*Stadtbürger*), who was a member of a propertied and privileged group among the town dwellers united by an oath enjoying the prerogatives and sharing the duties of a freeman. The word *Bürger* derives rather from the fortified castles (*Burgen*), and later towns, which were able to defend themselves. It was a legal term which during the 19th century became a social category (*Bürgerstum*) which is still in use today. Within the Holy Roman Empire, the *Stadtbürger* were accepted as a separate estate (*Bürgerstand*) and represented at the rare meetings of the imperial diet. Early modern political theory used the term *Bürger* (Lat. *civis*, citizen) without social or local qualifications to denote the subject (Lat. *subditus*) of the state or states as opposed to mere servants and slaves. These *Bürger* were, as members of the Empire (*Reichsbürger*), in theory entitled to political participation, not as individuals but through their representatives²⁴.

Modern concepts of natural law promoted the idea of a political contract between the sovereign and his subjects. This abstract contract construed them as equals as subjects by natural law and made them theoretically free as citizens within the framework of positive laws set by sovereign. In this sense the term citizen of the state (*Staatsbürger*) – or, in the German territories, of a state – became common at the end of the 18th century²⁵. Today *Staatsbürger* is still a legal term as evidenced by an identity card or passport. But the *Staatsbürger* (pl.) of the 19th century did not form an active social group nor did they see themselves as participants in political issues. Yet among a minority of influential voices, such as the philosopher Immanuel Kant, some authors maintained Rousseau's conception that a *Staatsbürger* has by definition a vote in the law-giving body. Kant immediately mitigated this privilege, however, by restricting it to independent property owners. Pressures to extend citizenship (*Staatsbürgerschaft*) to new groups found expression in publications like *On the Civil Improvement of the Jews* (C.K.W. Dohm, 1781) or *On Improving the Civil of the Status of Women* (Th.G. von Hippel, 1792). The *Staatsbürger* of the late 18th century simply lacked the emotional values of the French *citoyen*. In 18th-century Christian texts we also encounter the 'citizen of this world' (*Erdenbürger*) who hopes to be or to become a citizen in the City of God. More important and more prominent was the catchword of the Enlightenment: 'the citizen of the world' (*Weltbürger*) who as a co-citizen (*Mitbürger*) of the human race mentally

transcended local and national boundaries (cosmopolitan = *weltbürgerlich*). New-born babies were greeted as *neue Weltbürger*.

After the French Revolution the concept of a politically active *citoyen* stimulated democratic expectations, programmes, and demands, but the constitutional reforms and electoral laws of the 19th century in the German states perpetuated in various ways the concept the *Bürger* as a member of an estate (*Bürgertum*) consisting of people with property in real estate, the right to exercise a craft, or to carry on a trade. The *Staatsbürger* remained an abstract and depoliticised concept.

In a more general sense, *Bürger* were that category of subjects who were neither nobles nor peasants, nor were they servants or foreigners. If one talks about misalliances a *Bürgerliche(r)* is a non-aristocratic commoner. The more active and the more prosperous part of the *Bürgertum* was called 'the Bourgeoisie', and more recently historians have talked about *Besitzbürgertum*, *Großbürgertum*, or *Wirtschaftsbürgertum*. The political aspirations of these categories were mainly directed towards securing greater economic freedom. Less well-off people, or the lower middle class, were styled *Kleinbürger* (Fr. *petit bourgeois*), and these were clearly separated from, and often opposed to, the working class. Since the middle of the century the group of higher public servants and professionals, such as academics, lawyers, artists, engineers, politicians, and doctors, have regardless of their wealth or leisure activities been described as society's educated elite (*die gebildeten Stände*): scholars now call them *Bildungsbürger*²⁶. They were proud of their status achieved by their own efforts, and they saw themselves as a cultural elite – substituting intelligence for property. But the bourgeois and the *Bildungsbürger* did not see themselves as members of the same social group, and the distinction between entrepreneurial activities and service to the state hampered common political action among the German *Bürgertum*. The habits and tastes of the *Bürger* were decent and civilised (*schicklich, gesittet*), their life style was *bürgerlich* (i.e. modest, restricted to the family and the private sphere, negatively and pejoratively: cf. *spießbürgerlich*, narrow-minded, parochial). A special virtue of the *Bürger* was and still is that of *Bürgersinn* (citizenship, public spirit), exhibited in a commitment to tasks of a public nature. Civil society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) was made up of these groups, and in Germany they were conceived of as more and more separated from the state. Politically they preferred reform to revolution, and occasionally women were also included among them.

The failure of the revolutionary attempts of 1848 constituted a severe but short-lived check to these ambitions. The authorities were confronted with claims of the *Bürgertum* for political participation by suffrage and civil liberties, e.g. freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly. Yet bourgeois liberals were reluctant to use the term *Bürger* because it promised political equality to the lower classes; but at the same time they needed the term so as to emphasize their equality before the law *vis-à-vis* the aristocracy. Two major thresholds, both precipitated by catastrophes, marked

the transition of the German *Bürger* to an individual *citoyen* with full political rights. These were the end of the monarchy and the Weimar constitution of 1918/19 and the federal constitution (*Grundgesetz*) of the *Bundesrepublik* (West Germany) in 1949.

Due to the close ties between the Scandinavian languages, the term for “citizenship” is the same in Danish (*statsborgerskab/medborgerskab*), Norwegian (*statsborgerskap/medborgerskap*), Swedish and Neo-Norwegian (*statsborgarskap/medborgarskap*). However, the two different terms did not originally have the same meaning: this spectrum of meaning reflects variations in the linguistic uses of the term in the different Scandinavian countries. *Statsborgerskap*²⁷ and *medborgerskap* are each used to describe particular aspects of what is understood by the term “citizenship” in English. While the term *statsborgerskap* refers to certain juridical and political aspects of citizenship in regard to the rights and duties of a single citizen, the term *medborgerskap* has a more social and cultural dimension in regard to an individual’s participation in a society. The two terms overlap semantically for the most part but their meanings are not precisely the same. In other words, an individual in a (Scandinavian) country may be a *statsborger* without fully being a *medborger* and vice versa.

Etymologically the term(s) *statsborger(skap)* are derived in the first half of the 19th century from the German *Staatsbürger(schaft)*²⁸ – reflecting the significant German cultural influence in Scandinavia until the beginning of the 20th century. The term *medborgar(skap)* – German *Mitbürger(schaft)* – is older and may be found in, for instance, Swedish terminology as early as in the middle of the 18th century²⁹.

In all four languages, the word is based on the word *borger*, and corresponds to the French word *bourgeois* and the German *Bürger*. *Borgerskap* is the Scandinavian term for the French *bourgeoisie* or the German (*Groß*)*Bürgertum*. The most striking aspect of the concept, as well as the most common in contemporary popular use, is its implication of social belonging. The *borger* is an individual with economic responsibilities: historically, and as with the word *bourgeois* in French, the *borger* belonged originally to an urban elite. More specifically, the noun *borg* refers etymologically to a castle and, by extension, a city (in Latin *civitas*). Widely employed in European topography (Strasbourg, Edinburgh, Freiburg ...), it implies a place of power and consequently, a political community.

In the Danish language, the listing of the term *statsborger(skab)* in dictionaries may be traced back to the 1830s. While older dictionaries do not include the term *statsborger*, only *borger*³⁰, it is first found in Christian Molbech’s dictionary of 1833³¹, using the term as a synonym for a “member” of a state, but without further explanation. Later, *statsborger(skab)* is frequently found in Danish dictionaries, for instance, the monumental *Ordbog over det Danske Sprog* [Dictionary of the Danish Language], which surveys the Danish language between 1700 and ca. 1950 and which was published between 1918 and 1956 (with a supplement published between 1992 and 2005). In this diction-

ary, *statsborger* is a person who legally resides in a particular country, but with the further remark that this means especially holding the citizenship of that country. *Statsborgerskab* is therefore defined as the legal relationship between the citizen and the state³². The supplement to this dictionary adds the interesting point that during the Occupation in World War II the term *statsborger* was understood as a term for a Danish Nazi³³. Modern dictionaries understand the term exclusively in regard to the legal relationship between the individual and the state: *statsborgerskab* refers in this respect to the rights and duties which an individual receives by birth or naturalisation³⁴.

A survey of various Norwegian dictionaries indicates that the term *statsborger* was already in use in the 19th century, a linguistic inheritance of the Danish-Norwegian Union. In a dictionary of the year 1881 the term *statsborger* was – without further explanation – equated with the term *borgar*³⁵. The first volume of the Norwegian *Riksmålsordbok* from 1937 lists the term *statsborger* as a second meaning of the word *borgar*³⁶, whereas in the second volume (published in 1957) *statsborger* is glossed as a citizen within a state and the particular rights and duties which follow from this³⁷. A Norwegian-Danish etymological dictionary from the middle of the 20th century does not, unfortunately, include an entry for either of these terms³⁸. In contemporary dictionaries *statsborgerskab* is – as with Danish use – linked to the legal relationship between the individual and the state³⁹. The terms included in Neo-Norwegian dictionaries do not disclose any significant differences⁴⁰: here *statsborgar(skap)* corresponds in the 19th and 20th centuries to usage in Norwegian. In some of the older Norwegian dictionaries the term *samfundsborger* may be found⁴¹. Its meaning is related to (active) participation and/or good behaviour in a society and is therefore rather normative. In fact, the term *samfundsborger* corresponds largely with *medborger* and in contemporary Norwegian has been replaced by it. In early 19th-century Norway *borgere* were citizens/subjects according to the Constitution of 1814: the term refers officially to an explicit (and new) political community. Throughout the 19th century, the term was also employed to describe a particular social group, known as the academic bourgeois (*akademiske borgere*), which meant all those persons who had passed the entrance examination at the University of Christiania (Oslo). This may be a particular usage in regard to a country which did not have any significant nobility, and in which the prosperous patricians of the 18th century had been ruined by the Napoleonic wars. From 1814 until the 1870s, the academic bourgeois were one of the most powerful social groups in the country, and usually occupied key political positions. The prefix *stat* (State) was afterwards added to *borgerskap*, in order to mark a distinction between the social meaning and the strictly legal meaning of the term. *Statsborgerskap* (citizenship) is thus the word used in the first citizenship law (1888)⁴². But in a context of a heightened nationalism, this word did not just refer to the simple idea of a political community: it became partly an ethnic-based and to some extent exclusive concept, although the premise of territoriality still seemed predominant. Even today, the word is synonymous with nationality. The distinction between *statsborger(skap)* and

medborger(skap) in Norway thus became politically important in a period in which Norway was becoming a country of immigration⁴³.

In Sweden, the use of the term *medborgarskap* seems more usual: while the term *statsborgarskap* exists, it is quite old-fashioned⁴⁴. There is no entry for the terms *medborger(skap)* in several etymological dictionaries⁴⁵, but their history can be traced back to the 18th century. The term *medborgarskap* has been in use since 1789, but the term *medborgare* is already found as early as in 1746⁴⁶. Östergren's *Nusvensk Ordbok* [Dictionary of contemporary Swedish] from 1934 gives two meanings of the term *medborgare* – the first in regard to a particular state, the second with regard to a society as a community⁴⁷. Here also the term *akademisk medborgare* is mentioned, but without any further explanation. The Swedish counterpart to the above mentioned monumental Danish dictionary – the *Ordbok över Svenska Språket* [Dictionary of the Swedish language], published in the first half of the 20th century, gives four different meanings of the term *medborgare*, with regard to a particular city, university (*akademisk medborgare*), state, or society (community), whereas the term *medborgarskap* refers only to the quality of a *medborgare* as a “member” of the society from which the state is built⁴⁸. Interestingly, the two points of reference for the different terms – state and society/community – are here linked with each other. Furthermore, the *Ordbok över Svenska Språket* lists the term *samhälls-* in the sense of *stats-medborgare* (community-citizen as state-citizen)⁴⁹: in this respect they are synonyms. This notion of synonymity is confirmed by Strömberg's *Stora Synonymordboken* [Large Dictionary of Synonyms], which gives *statsborgare* as the first synonym for *medborgare*, and *statsborgarskap* – in a legal meaning – as a synonym for *medborgarskap*⁵⁰. Contemporary dictionaries support this picture: the term *medborgarskap* is almost exclusively related to the relationship between the individual and the state and certain rights and duties on both sides⁵¹.

Although both terms – *statsborgarskap* and *medborgarskap* – are nowadays largely synonymous, the prefix *med* (with) suggests a slightly different perception of contemporary citizenship in this country: rather than a vertical political membership of a state, with its legal rights and duties, it suggests a horizontal/social/relational sense of belonging in the broadest sense of the term. The core of the definition is adhesion to a set of values and norms representing the status of citizens as ideal members of a society: the concept thus reflects rights, participation and political culture⁵². A possible interpretation of the contemporary use of *medborgarskap* rather than *statsborgarskap* in Sweden may be the historical weight of social democracy and the welfare-state in this country, and the importance of the so-called Swedish model in the 1950s and 1960s: *medborgarskap* is implicitly a more inclusive, egalitarian notion, with a larger meaning than the strictly legal concept of *statsborgarskap*.

Probably because of the proximity of Sweden, *medborger(skap)* has been more extensively used in Norway in recent years, especially in academic literature. A reason which has been proposed to explain the contemporary coexistence of both terms in Norway are

the recent waves of immigration, which may have fostered a more precise distinction between the legal norms of political belonging, and the existence of a set of social, economical and individual rights which may be enjoyed by foreigners independently of their actual legal participation in the national political system⁵³. More generally, the word *medborgerskap* has a strong ethnic and symbolical dimension, and might sometimes be translated in English as community rather than citizenship. It has also been observed that these words have been increasingly used in public debates since the 1980s, possibly because *statsborgerskap* has partly lost its significance in regard to exclusive national norms due to European agreements and globalization⁵⁴.

The case of Italy represents another important European tradition. As in many other parts of Europe, the term 'citizen' derives from the Latin term *civitas*, which meant the condition or *status* of being a citizen, with particular reference to the Roman citizen. In Rome *civitas* connoted above all a juridical rather than a political condition: the Roman citizen was protected by Roman public and private law, and this aspect, rather than a possible participation in political life, was emphasized. In imperial times the right of citizenship was extended gradually from the free men of Rome to include the inhabitants of Latium and finally the inhabitants of the Empire⁵⁵.

Following the development of citizenship concepts in the medieval Italian city-states, it is probable that, by the beginning of the communal age, the concepts of resident (*habitor*) and citizen had converged. Residence in fact appeared to be a necessary condition for carrying out civil and military functions. The citizen intervened in the assemblies, elected and was elected, but also had some specific duties, amongst which were those of residing in the city, paying the taxes, and sometimes of possessing a house or lands⁵⁶. The term *civitas* then came to indicate the city itself, that is an urban agglomerate, the seat of a bishopric, and the terms *cittadino*, citizen, and *cittadinanza*, citizenship, referred only to the inhabitants of the cities and to their status, but not all those who lived in the city were included. Between the 13th and the 15th century, in fact, the right of citizenship, that brought with it full access to public activity, was strongly restricted because of social and political limitations or 'closures'⁵⁷. The specific norms varied from city to city and in each single city, over time, there were often very relevant changes. In general residence (*ius soli*) and descent (*ius sanguinis*) were no longer sufficient requisites for the right of citizenship to be recognised, but it was also necessary to have paid taxes for more or less extended periods of time.

In the modern period, the formation of the territorial state did not bring with it relevant modifications in the concept of citizenship, which continued to be linked to the single cities. In its first edition (1612), the famous *Vocabolario* of the *Accademia della Crusca* (based in Florence, the Academy aimed to preserve the purity of the Italian language and published its authoritative views in Dictionaries of many volumes) explained the term *cittadinanza* as a 'gathering of citizens', whereas for the term *cittadino*, it indicated 'he who is capable of [enjoying] the honours and the benefits of the City'⁵⁸,

thus referring to the privileges of citizenship without mentioning the duties inherent in this condition. The subsequent editions of the *Vocabolario* (1623, 1691, 1729-1738 and 1863-1923) made no changes, with the exception of the last edition (1863-1923) which for *cittadinanza* offered the definition, 'title and degree of citizen, the capacity of having and exercising the rights and privileges of citizen'⁵⁹, whereas it explained *cittadino* as 'he who legitimately participates in the duties and right of a city, and today also of a state and is subject to the civil law of the latter'⁶⁰. In the definition of *cittadino*, hence, two important modifications were introduced: the definition continues to refer to rights, but now also to duties and a new political reality was taken into consideration, the state.

It is perhaps worth looking more closely, too, at the specific context of developments over a much shorter timeframe in another heavily urbanized region which also bears in other ways considerable resemblances to Italy, the Netherlands (including the southern Netherlands, Belgium). The concept of citizenship in Dutch history has been widely explored both in recent and in older historiography. It might even be argued that the *burgher* or *poorter* is at the heart of Netherlandish history and identity. Most recently, the study of citizenship has been explored utilizing theories and methodologies of the German *Begriffsgeschichte* (critical conceptual history)⁶¹. More than their German colleagues, Dutch researchers have explored the concept and its use not just in strictly historical texts, but in literature, art, architecture, linguistics and law. These studies have emphasized that citizenship as a concept with legal, social and cultural implications has been widely used since the 15th century. While the connotations associated with the concept may have shifted from the late middle ages to the 21st century, the *burgher* is still, it has been argued, the most important frame of reference for Netherlandish citizens in Europe today.

As Marc Boone has demonstrated, the terms *burgher* and *poorter* in the late medieval Netherlands associated citizens with cities, as was the case in Italy. Burghers were first and foremost members of a municipal community rather than, for instance, a territory under the sovereignty of a prince or monarch⁶². The political and social conflicts of the 13th-century – mainly Flemish and Brabant – towns and cities led to a differentiation of the two terms with *burgher* now denoting a land-owning, trading elite and *poorter* used as a (self-)descriptor for the aspiring artisan class. Both groups claimed moral superiority over their rivals as being the better representatives of what were then further specified as civic values. Citizens were in charge of upholding and supporting the well-being of the community. Citizenship thus entailed both rights and obligations. In the course of the civic conflicts of the period *burghers*, members of the urban patriciate, rediscovered and increasingly referred to the ancient republican traditions. *Burghers* in this context had a moral obligation to their *civitas* which entailed leading exemplary, virtuous lives and putting public interest before private gain. The relationship between the *burgher* and the surrounding territory, be it a province or the wider political entity

of the Burgundian, and later Habsburg, Empire remained vague. The direct connection between *burghers* and the state was the product of the Eighty Years' War (1568-1648). Pieter de la Court, for instance, regarded *burghers* as members of any political community, be it a city, a republic or a monarchy⁶³. In his interpretation of citizenship, virtuosity, morale and civic culture acquired through a refined, rounded education, were closely linked with a spirit of commerce. The concept of the *Mercator sapiens*, which was so eloquently propagated by 17th-century intellectuals such as Caspar van Baerle epitomized the image of the Dutch mercantile patriciate in cities such as Amsterdam, Haarlem and Leiden. Moreover, good citizenship practice was based on good governance and virtuous conduct was supplemented and supported by virtuous, efficient institutions.

In practice, citizenship rights remained linked to residents of cities⁶⁴. They entailed legal, economic, political and social privileges, which, although in theory equally available for all citizens, were often restricted to a distinct group of prominent families. Distinctions between citizens and non-citizens were further defined with the introduction of the category of "inhabitant" introduced in 1668. "Inhabitants" were not citizens but could, for instance, join guilds, thus obtaining important employment and career opportunities. In the 18th century the concept of citizenship became more closely, but not exclusively, linked to the state. It also had moral transnational connotations highlighting bourgeois qualities and virtues as an alternative to the classical aristocratic or regent elite. The French Revolution and its consequences for the Netherlands led to the development of an imminently political interpretation of the term. Citizens had political rights in the new state. Citizenship thus became less locally defined, but also more abstract. Similar developments occurred elsewhere, such as in the German-speaking lands where, particularly from the time of the French Revolution and under its influence, *Bürger* were those who participated in government and *Untertanen*, subjects, were 'those who do not rule'⁶⁵.

In the course of the 19th century, the term *burgher* became increasingly used as a marker of class and social status expressed through cultural practices and habitus. While the socio-economic role of the bourgeois middle class was still fully recognized in the Dutch and Belgian Revolutions of 1848, the growing appreciation of the economic importance of the industrial working class gradually eroded *burgher* values as being essential for the well being of the state. The cultural values of the term reached, perhaps, their lowest point in the 1960s when the bourgeoisie was associated with conservatism and an adversity to cultural change. Nonetheless, civic awareness is currently resurfacing in the Netherlands and in Belgium. Discussions in the Netherlands are closely linked to immigration debates and the rights and obligations of immigrants and new citizens. They address questions of what Karin Tilmans has called the third substantive innovation in the citizenship concept: that of European citizenship⁶⁶.

In the case of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the major cities in medieval and early modern times all had substantial rural territories attached to them over whose

inhabitants they had jurisdiction. At some point, the concept of citizen shifted to include this wider rural population, as well as the privileged inhabitants of a city. As the earlier discussion of pairs of terms (citizenship and nationality) has suggested, however, another path to citizenship rights lay through the concept of nationality. Italy and the Netherlands were heavily urbanized from earlier times, but in Renaissance England, for instance, the jurisdiction of the town or city ended at the town wall, beyond which lay the county or shire, administered through a separate royal official, the sheriff. Obviously, in such circumstances citizenship rights developed rather differently. The English state, however, was the classic example of a conquest state, having a highly centralized administrative system with uniform structures of local government. 'Citizens', so described, were simply the enfranchised inhabitants of cities. What was much more significant in this context were the rights and duties of freeborn English subjects who had right of residence in the realm, could possess land or goods there, who paid taxes (and customs duties at preferential rates), and were afforded legal protection in the king's courts. Until the mid-16th century, moreover, English 'subject-ship' (if we can coin this word) had a pronounced ethnic (or national) quality: English subjects had to be English by language and culture too, and to be born of English parents (*ius sanguinis*). Thus, in the English case, the path to modern citizenship rights lay through an extension of the rights of free subjects to the population at large (including Irish, Welsh, and the unfree). It had very little to do with the enfranchised inhabitants of towns and cities, except by analogy with citizenship rights elsewhere⁶⁷. Even the introduction of the term 'British citizen' is a very recent development: it refers primarily to the inhabitants of the United Kingdom with right of residence there; but until 1949, they were officially described as 'British subjects' along with other inhabitants of the British Commonwealth of Nations who, until 1983, also had right of residence in Britain⁶⁸.

The pattern of developments in eastern and east central Europe was very different from the position in the West. This was on the whole a less urbanized region, and it is worth noting that, in the early modern Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, the term 'citizenship' was used chiefly as an alternative to the term 'nobility'. Stanisław Sarnicki, for instance, in his *Statuta i metryka przywilejów koronnych* [A Codex of privileges in the Kingdom of Poland, 1594] described himself as "*szlachcic i obywatel chełmskiej ziemi*" [nobleman and citizen of Chełm Land in the Ruthenian *voivodeship*]⁶⁹. Around 8% of the Commonwealth's population (perhaps ca.500,000 people) enjoyed some form of nobility, and civil and political rights were restricted to this relatively large group of landowners⁷⁰. In the modern period, however, large multi-ethnic monarchies of an absolutist character dominated this traditionally less urbanized region, ruling through elites of a different language and culture what had earlier been smaller independent states. These differences inevitably altered the relationship between subjects/citizens and the state. Perhaps typical of this pattern of citizenship rights is the case of Romania where questions of nationality were more important, as in England, but where the major

developments came rather later and were particularly shaped by the state's fluctuating boundaries. In modern Romanian usage, the word for *citizenship* covers an interesting spectrum of meanings with multiple significations in respect of historical conditions and in particular changes in the area of law. Deriving from French legal terminology, it has circulated for almost a hundred years in the form of *nationality*, reacquiring its original connotation after the Second World War, when a clear distinction was made between *citizenship* as "pertaining to the state" and *nationality* in regard to "ethnic origin"⁷¹. From a methodological point of view, Constantin Iordachi identified two institutional dimensions of the term *citizenship*: the first one implies a sense of belonging to a state, understood as a territorial unit, with political frontiers legally delimited; the second reflects the rights and obligations that derive from the quality of being a member and participant in a community, whether a civil, political or social one⁷².

The first juridical definition of citizenship doctrine within the modern Romanian state can be found in the *Civil Code* (1864), whose eighth article established *ius sanguinis* as fundamental to the granting of citizenship at birth. Influenced by 19th-century nationalist dogma, selective naturalization politics in regard to foreigners supported Romanian attempts to limit or even exclude altogether the non-Romanian elites (Greeks, Armenians, Jews) from retaining the power and influence they had previously enjoyed before the middle of the 19th century. Two years later, in 1866, the *Constitution* clearly stipulated the criteria necessary for naturalization – the Christian religion and Romanian ethnicity – so confirming the discriminatory measures of the *Civil Code*. Associated with the phenomenon of Jewish persecution in the Romanian kingdom, the constitutional articles produced, within the offices of European chancellors, and more especially in the press, an extremely critical reaction towards the Romanian state. For example, Henri Martin pleaded in the "Siècle" in favour of those Jews considered to be foreigners in Romania: "This way, against their will, they are part of the population continually on the move. Make them citizens. We don't ask you to make them citizens without condition, but assimilate those Jews who were born in Romania or those who have been living there for 30 years (one generation) with other Romanian citizens, and let the rest be considered just like any other foreigner who can be naturalized. Without any doubt, this is neither excess nor utopia"⁷³. In 1879, under international pressure, "Romanian nationality" (with the meaning of *citizenship*) was extended even to Jews, but only by process of "law and individually". Even so, by 1900 only 85 Jews had been naturalized⁷⁴. At the same time, the Romanian state debated the position of the ethnic Romanians living in Romanian provinces under foreign occupation (Bessarabia, Transylvania, Bukovina), invoking the so-called practice of "admitting citizenship" for the purpose of ensuring their access to the Romanian Parliament⁷⁵. It is no coincidence that in the *Enciclopedia română* published by C. Diaconovich in 1898, the term *citizenship*, which meant affiliation to a state and the ability to discharge public office, was associated with that of being a *Romanian*. From a political point of view, a *Romanian* was one

who was born of Romanian parents, even on a foreign land and this because – as the author noted and as was relevant in regard to the principle of *ius sanguinis* – “the place of birth does not count”⁷⁶.

The First World War and Romania’s territorial reconfiguration inaugurated transformations, strategies and legislative politics, in regard to the newly heterogeneous character of the state from an ethnic and confessional point of view. The *Constitution* in 1923 acknowledged citizen rights and liberties for all the inhabitants of the Romanian state, regardless of their ethnicity, language, religion or social class. Also, the means of obtaining Romanian citizenship was the object of the *Law* of 1924, when to *ius sanguinis* was added the variant of marriage to a Romanian man, as well as naturalization after ten years spent in Romania. But, the change in demographic structure after 1918 brought about a series of difficulties and unexpected conflicts. Towards the end of the 1930s a re-evaluation occurred of the meaning of naturalization in regard to Jews, a clear distinction being introduced between “Romanian citizens” and “naturalized Romanians”. Commonly, Romanian citizens of Jewish origin were prohibited access to public and private institutions in Romania. The citizenship of the de-naturalized inhabitants was restored in 1947 when all the decrees and anti-Semitic laws were declared null and void.

Under the Communist regime, the conditions for acquiring or forfeiting citizenship were redefined in Romania. The *Constitution* of 1948 established, in absolute terms, the word *citizenship*, while the conceptual meaning of the word *nationality* was redrawn to denote ethnic origin, with the parallel introduction of the phrase “co-inhabiting nationalities”. New rules were introduced with the aim of demonstrating the connection between the *citizen* and the “socialist nation”. The conferring of Romanian nationality at birth, in accordance with *ius sanguinis*, could be done either paternally or maternally on condition that at least one parent had lived in Romania. Even so, upon adulthood, children born of mixed marriages had to choose between the mother’s and the father’s nationality: dual nationality was prohibited. Politically, the granting of citizenship might reflect the “democratic attitude”⁷⁷ of the applicant. As regards the withdrawal of citizenship, in addition to the well-known reasons that exist in international law, as far as Romania was concerned, this might be invoked when a person “conspired against the Popular Republic”, prejudicing its good name and reputation or absenting oneself for more than two months after the expiration or revocation of personal papers. Afterwards, in the spirit of the new national Communist ideology, *citizenship* became “the expression of the socio-economic, political and juridical relationship between the individual and the socialist state”, a feature of “honour” and of great “civic responsibility”. Without being too precise about the nature of these relationships, the attribute of *citizenship* rested more on feeling and honour than on judicial principles. From this derived the rather confused definition offered by a specialist in constitutional law: “*citizenship* is a bouquet of profound feelings and high aspirations, of convictions and deeds

for the benefit and prosperity of one's country and people, serving, also, the supreme ideals of the whole of humanity"⁷⁸.

The fall of the Communist regime and the gradual democratization of the political system modified certain criteria in respect of Romanian citizenship. From a juridical perspective, the definition of citizenship remained ambiguous in that it upheld the 1971 formula asserting this affiliation to the Romanian state, without specifying the effects of the affiliation. The main innovation concerned the reacquisition of Romanian citizenship by those who had lived in the territories lost by Greater Romania after the Second World War and who had been deprived of their Romanian citizenship against their will or for reasons beyond their control. The new regulations were to be applied not only in these cases but also in respect of those who had migrated due to political persecution or because their citizenship had been revoked by the Communist regime, including "all former citizens and their descendants". Although the 1991 Law does not specifically mention the main beneficiaries of this political restoration, they are the inhabitants of the former Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldavia, as well as those from Northern Bukovina and Southern Bessarabia in the present Ukraine. After the Soviet wartime occupation, the inhabitants of these provinces had been forcibly stripped of their Romanian citizenship, being granted Soviet citizenship. Moreover, the 1991 Romanian law allows those re-naturalized to preserve their foreign citizenship also, thus creating a category of non-resident Romanian citizens, a fact that has generated international debates concerning the problems surrounding "multiple citizenship" and the "loyalty of citizens with dual citizenship".

In these circumstances, an important object in regard to the development of a common citizenship for the new Europe must be to reassemble, to take account of, and to encompass the breadth and wealth of meaning contained in each of these different citizenship traditions. It is, for instance, not the case that citizenship was always 'a good thing', a goal to which people invariably aspired and strove. In eastern Europe, attitudes towards citizenship remain much more ambiguous and continue to be shaped by the legacy of totalitarian regimes, that is, historical periods when citizens were usually unable to play an active role, and when the term citizen was used sparingly, normally bereft of its individuality, in situations intended to highlight the subordination of the citizen to the state. Likewise, the frequent changes of regimes and borders across central and east-central Europe has meant that the concept of citizenship there is devoid of the emotionality which it usually possesses in western Europe. People identified more readily with their homeland and/or nation than with the state.

This brings us to a second important variable which has shaped the concept of citizenship, that is, the nature of the state in which it is exercised. The kind of 'participatory dictatorship' of the people which developed in East Germany, for instance, successfully harnessed for much of its existence the active participation of most citizens in state activities, including of course voting in national and regional elections; but in practice

'real existing socialism' concentrated real power in the hands of a very small elite⁷⁹. The extension of the franchise and of other citizenship rights did not necessarily go hand in hand with the extension of individual freedoms and a wider power base. In many ways, 'the middling sort' of 16th-century England had more real influence in the political system known as Tudor absolutism than had 20th-century *DDR-Bürger* in East Germany⁸⁰.

Nevertheless, one pointer to an understanding of the actual value placed on these citizenship rights is the particular meaning of the German term, *Staatsbürgerschaft*, which reflects the willingness of the individual to identify with the state in which he/she lives⁸¹. In a modern context, we may analyze the complex of citizenship rights and duties in terms of its civic, social, and political dimensions, including such things as freedom of religion and of speech, equality before the law, civil rights, and the safeguarding of private property⁸², but surely the main point in all this is whether or not the citizen is prepared to accept the legitimacy of the state. Throughout much of eastern and central Europe, the rights and duties of citizens of the totalitarian states of the last century were extensive and specific. States run on socialist lines, for instance, did indeed have some success in reinforcing a sense of community spirit among their citizens; but the real question was how far the citizens of these states could be persuaded to identify with the state. In addition, even in states where democratic citizenship in the Western sense existed, the formal recognition of political rights, as in the case of universal suffrage, does not necessarily translate into effective participation in the political process. Either by specific practices, or through the operation of particular norms and values, various categories of the population ('travelling people' or Romanies in modern society, for instance) may be excluded from political participation. In other cases, exclusion may take the form of self-exclusion, in that citizens may not perceive their participation to be useful or meaningful. This last case was of course also relevant to the Soviet Bloc regimes and other one-party states in which voting and elections were primarily a mechanism to secure popular endorsement of pre-existing policies. In this context, the distinction in German between a state which is perceived to be based on law, a *Rechtsstaat*, and an illegitimate state remains useful. A distinction purely based on law is of course much too narrow: it conjures up again the modern notion of equality before the law. What is rather needed here is a distinction based on consensus, which is, in this context, a much more universal value.

We may argue, for instance, that political consensus in any kind of polity, whether a medieval city-state, a feudal kingdom, an early-modern conglomerate state, or a modern nation-state rests in large part on a general acceptance by its inhabitants that the modes of governance in that polity reflect the pervading norms and values of the particular historical period in which it operated. Thus, while ethnic discrimination was pervasive in medieval Europe, and religious discrimination in early-modern Europe, as well as other institutionalized inequalities such as on grounds of gender at other times, polities

which practised these forms of discrimination were nonetheless based on political consent because such practices accorded with the accepted norms and values of those eras. Early-modern confessional states, for instance, policed the boundaries of confessional norms quite rigidly, expending considerable energy on this task: those few states which extended a measure of freedom of conscience to their subjects – thus anticipating more modern ideas – did not necessarily generate greater political consent, and indeed were often viewed by contemporaries as the weaker for it. Even in modern times, the necessary degree of political consent may nonetheless exist in states which promote collective patterns of behaviour and restrict individual freedoms in favour of ‘the common good’, building on earlier bourgeois values. Certainly, Soviet socialism failed because it lacked political consent, but the Western democracies have struggled to devise means of consolidating the community.

Looked at in this way, therefore, we have a means of measuring the rights and duties of citizens which reflects ‘best practice’ in any historical period. A *Rechtsstaat* is a state which commands this kind of political consent; ‘citizens’ are those inhabitants who are ‘enfranchised’ in accordance with the prevailing norms and values of that particular period; the complex of rights and duties relating to citizenship are those which are likewise consonant with those norms and values. By this approach, we avoid the conceptual trap of seeking to define citizenship in terms of the espousal of modern Western values, and then in effect elaborating a perspective which simply charts the inevitable evolution of more modern concepts of citizenship from the customs of earlier epochs. Thus, in so far as the new European Union has developed a viable concept of citizenship, this is not because it accords more rights and privileges to its citizens, but because such rights and privileges as it enshrines in law are, to a greater or lesser degree, in tune with the norms and values of the societies which it encompasses. This perspective, in turn, offers a new ‘take’ on such vexed questions as the problem of accession states like Turkey. Since freedom of religion is supposedly a modern Western value, the question of Turkey’s accession should, in theory, be a non-issue: that it remains an intractable issue is in part because the legacy of Christianity remains – to a surprising degree in this allegedly ‘post-Christian era’ – so central to European norms and values. In practice, ‘freedom of religion’ in Europe means a freedom to choose between a rather more limited menu of beliefs and customs which do not cut across European norms and values. Conversely, attempts by the former United States’ president, George W. Bush, to export ‘freedom and democracy’ to non-European societies like Iraq and Afghanistan are so out of tune with local norms and values that they fail utterly to build political consensus or to nurture ‘good citizens’.

This line of argument may appear to run the danger of advocating a relativist concept of citizenship. In practice, however, it makes no comment on the particular moral values enshrined in citizenship concepts in any particular period of history. What it does do, is to suggest that those states whose models of governance were more closely aligned

with contemporary norms and values were more likely to command the ready support of their 'citizens', based on political consent. The various strategies developed by different kinds of state in various ages in order to harness the support of its citizens and to achieve this consent are accordingly very relevant to the development of citizenship concepts in the new EU.

NOTES

- ¹ This chapter has been written by Steven G. Ellis on the basis of discussions during the TWG meetings and materials prepared by the co-authors – for France: Laure Teulières, Aladin Larguèche; for Germany: Gerhard Dohrn-van Rossum; for Scandinavia: Katya Rosenbaum, Aladin Larguèche; for Italy: Anna Maria Pult Quaglia; for the Netherlands: Raingard Eßer; for England/UK: Steven G. Ellis; for Poland: Rafał Szmytka; for Romania: Harieta Mareci Sabol, Ioan-Marius Bucur; Elena Mannová and Jaroslav Ira gave useful contributions to the debate that led to the formulation of the chapter.
- ² See the discussion below and the references there cited.
- ³ D. Schnapper, *Qu'est-ce que la citoyenneté?* [What is Citizenship?], Paris 2000; see also her article, *Citoyen & Citoyenneté*, in the *Encyclopaedia Universalis*, <http://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/citoyennete/>
- ⁴ P. Sahlins, *Fictions of a Catholic France: The naturalization of Foreigners 1685-1787*, in "Representations", 1994, 47, pp. 85-110; Id., *The Eighteenth-Century Citizenship Revolution in France*, in A. Fahrmeir, O. Faron, P. Weil (eds.), *Migration Control in the North Atlantic World*, New York - Oxford 2003, pp. 11-24; Id., *Unnaturally French: foreign citizens in the Old Regime and after*, Ithaca 2004.
- ⁵ In 1539, the royal ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts made French the official language of the administration, requiring priests to institute the recording of baptisms. Henceforth, the Church became a central agent in the construction of an absolutist State in the early modern period.
- ⁶ See E. Birnstiel, *La conversion des protestants sous le régime de l'édit de Nantes (1598-1685)*, in M. Bertrand, P. Cabanel (eds.), *Religions, pouvoir et violence*, Toulouse 2005, pp. 111-135.
- ⁷ G. Noiriel, *Surveiller les déplacements ou identifier les personnes? Contribution à l'histoire du passeport en France de la Première à la Troisième République*, in "Genèses. Sciences sociales et histoire", March 1998, 30, pp. 77-100.
- ⁸ H. Sonkajarvi, *Qu'est-ce qu'un étranger? Frontières et identifications à Strasbourg, 1681-1789*, Strasbourg 2008.
- ⁹ M. Vovelle, *Les mots de la Révolution*, Toulouse 2004, p. 20.
- ¹⁰ From 1870, in the aftermath of the recognition of religious freedom, the political privileges of the Catholic Church, which had remained a State church for most of the 19th century, were increasingly contested. They were finally abolished in 1905 by the Law of Secularity (*laïcité*). The French Republic guarantees religious freedom and liberty of conscience, but does not acknowledge nor support any cult.
- ¹¹ About xenophobia under the French Revolution, see S. Wahnich, *L'impossible citoyen : l'étranger dans le discours de la Révolution française*, Paris 1997.
- ¹² C. Laborde, *Republican citizenship in France*, in R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione, E. Santoro (eds.), *Lineages of European citizenship: rights, belonging and participation in eleven nation-states*, Basingstoke 2004, p. 52.
- ¹³ M. Rapport, *Nationality and Citizenship in Revolutionary France: the Treatment of Foreigners, 1789-1799*, Oxford 2000.

- ¹⁴ P. Weil, *Nationalities and Citizenships. The lessons of the French experience for Germany and Europe*, in D. Cesarani, M. Fulbrook (eds.), *Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe*, London - New York 1996, pp. 74-87; Id., *Qu'est-ce qu'un Français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution*, Paris 2002.
- ¹⁵ G. Noiriel, *Socio-histoire d'un concept: les usages du mot «nationalité» au XIX^e siècle*, in "Genèses. Sciences sociales et histoire", April 1997, 27, pp. 25-54.
- ¹⁶ The necessity of justifying the Frenchness of Alsace-Lorraine against German rule which was legitimated by ethnic arguments.
- ¹⁷ Laborde, *Republican citizenship in France* cit., pp. 54-55.
- ¹⁸ G. Noiriel, *L'identification des citoyens. Naissance de l'état civil républicain*, in "Genèses. Sciences sociales et histoire", October 1993, 13, pp. 3-28.
- ¹⁹ V. Denis, *Administrer l'identité. Le premier âge des papiers d'identité en France XVIII^e-milieu XIX^e siècle*, in "Labyrinthe", winter 2000, pp. 25-42.
- ²⁰ G. Noiriel, *Surveiller les déplacements ou identifier les personnes? Contribution à l'histoire du passeport en France de la Première à la Troisième République*, in "Genèses. Sciences sociales et histoire", March 1998, 30, pp. 77-100.
- ²¹ R. Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Harvard 1992.
- ²² Id., *De l'immigré au citoyen. Comment le «jus soli» s'est imposé en France à la fin du XIX^e siècle*, in "Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales", September 1993, 99, pp. 3-25.
- ²³ The so-called Crémieux decree (October 1870) granted French citizenship to all "the indigenous Israelites of Algeria".
- ²⁴ For the history of the term, see M. Riedel, 'Bürger', 'Gesellschaft, bürgerliche', in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon der politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, eds. Brunner O., Conze W., Koselleck R., vol. 2, Stuttgart 1975, pp. 719-800.
- ²⁵ P.-L. Weinacht, *Staatsbürger. Zur Geschichte und Kritik eines politischen Begriffs*, in "Der Staat", 1969, 8, pp. 41-63; M. Stolleis, *Untertan - Bürger - Staatsbürger. Bemerkungen zur juristischen Terminologie im späten 18. Jahrhundert*, in R. Vierhaus (ed.), *Bürger- und Bürgerlichkeit im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, Heidelberg 1981, pp. 65-99.
- ²⁶ W. Steinmetz, *Die schwierige Selbstbehauptung des deutschen Bürgertums: begriffsgeschichtliche Bemerkungen in sozialhistorischer Absicht*, in R. Wimmer (ed.), *Das 19. Jahrhundert. Sprachgeschichtliche Wurzeln des heutigen Deutsch* (Institut für deutsche Sprache, Jahrbuch 1990), Berlin - New York 1991, pp. 12-40.
- ²⁷ For reasons of clarity, the term *statsborger(skap)* in the sense of *medborger(skap)* is rendered here in the Norwegian (*Bokmål*-)form instead of the various other forms used in other Scandinavian languages. The use of the Norwegian term, however, does not reflect any particular preference on the part of the authors.
- ²⁸ N.Å. Nielsen, *Dansk etymologisk ordbog. Ordenes historie*, 2nd ed., Copenhagen 1990.
- ²⁹ Språkdata (ed.), *Nationalencyklopedins Ordbok*, vol. II, Högabä 1996, p. 364.
- ³⁰ O. Kalkar, *Ordbog over det Ældre danske Sprog (1300-1700)*, Copenhagen 1881-1885, which offers a survey of the Danish language from the 14th to the 18th centuries, does not know the term. The term is also not mentioned in a dictionary of 1824: J. Baden, *Almeennyttig Alfabetsk Ordbog over de danske Skrifter og i Omgangsproget mest brugelige, af fremmede Sprog laante, Ord, Talemaader og Konststudtryk; samt de til den græske, romerske og nordiske Mythologie henhørende vigtigste Personer og Gjenstande; med hosføjet kortfattet Forklaring. Anden meget forøgede og forbedrede Udgave*, Copenhagen 1824.

- ³¹ C. Molbech, *Dansk Ordbog indeholdende det danske Sprogs Stammeord: tilligemed afledede og sammensatte Ord, efter den nuværende Sprogbrug forklarede i deres forskjellige Betydninger, og ved Taalemaader og Exempler oplyste*, part 1, Copenhagen 1833, p. 111.
- ³² Det Danske Sprog- og Literaturselskab (ed.), *Ordbog over det Danske Sprog*, vol. XXI, col. 1020f.
- ³³ Det Danske Sprog- og Literaturselskab (ed.), *Ordbog over det Danske Sprog*, Supplement, vol. V, col. 1378.
- ³⁴ E.g., Ch. C. Becker-Christensen (ed.), *Politikens Nudansk Ordbog*, 19th ed., Copenhagen 2005.
- ³⁵ K. Knudsen, *Unorsk og Norsk eller Fremmedords Avløsning*, Kristiania (Oslo) 1881, p. 776.
- ³⁶ Riksmålsvernet (ed.), *Norsk Riksmålsordbok*, vol. I, 1st semi-volume, Oslo 1937, p. 410.
- ³⁷ Riksmålsvernet (ed.), *Norsk Riksmålsordbok*, vol. II, 2nd semi-volume, Oslo 1957, p. 2107.
- ³⁸ H.S. Falk, A. Torp, *Norwegisch-Dänisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, 2nd ed., Heidelberg - Oslo 1960.
- ³⁹ E.g., *Aschehoug og Gyldendals Store Norske Ordbok*, 4th ed., Oslo 1994, p. 572.
- ⁴⁰ E.g., Det Norske Samlaget (ed.), *Nynorsk Ordboka*, Oslo 1986.
- ⁴¹ E.g., Riksmålsvernet (ed.), *Norsk Riksmålsordbok*, vol. II, 1st semi-volume, Oslo 1947, p. 1339.
- ⁴² S. Trollstøl, K. Heidar, *Statsborger eller medborger, hva snakker vi om? Et notat om to ord: deres betydning og bruk*, Oslo 2004, p. 3.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 1.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- ⁴⁵ O. Hellquist, *Svensk etymologisk ordbok*, 3rd ed., Lund 1948; E. Wessén, *Våra ord. Deres uttal och ursprung*, Stockholm 1969, do not list the terms.
- ⁴⁶ Språkdata (ed.), *Nationalencyklopedins Ordbok* cit., p. 364.
- ⁴⁷ O. Östergren, *Nusvensk Ordbok*, vol. IV, Stockholm 1934, col. 467.
- ⁴⁸ Svenska Akademien (ed.), *Ordbok över Svenska Språket*, vol. VII, Lund 1945, col. M 579-582.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, col. M 580.
- ⁵⁰ A. Strömberg, *Stora Synonymordboken*, Stockholm 1979, p. 362.
- ⁵¹ Cf. S. Allén, *Prismas Svenska Ordbok*, Gothenburg 2003, p. 704, as well as Språkdata (ed.), *Nationalencyklopedins Ordbok* cit., p. 364.
- ⁵² Ø. Østerud, K. Goldmann, M.N. Pedersen (eds.), *Statsvitenskapelig leksikon*, Oslo 1997, p. 156.
- ⁵³ Trollstøl, Heidar, *Statsborger eller medborger* cit., p. 1.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 18.
- ⁵⁵ D. Zolo, *Cittadinanza. Storia di un concetto teorico-politico*, in "Filosofia politica", April 2000, XIV, p. 8.
- ⁵⁶ P. Costa, *Civitas. Storia della cittadinanza in Europa*, vol. 1, *Dalla civiltà comunale al Settecento*, Rome - Bari 1999, p. 5; D. Quaglion, *The Legal Definition of Citizenship in the late Middle Ages*, in Molho A., Raaflaub K., Emlen J. (eds.), *City-States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy*, Ann Arbor 1991, p. 161.
- ⁵⁷ M. Berengo, *L'Europa delle città. Il volto della società urbana europea tra medioevo ed Età moderna*, Turin 1999, pp. 181-201.
- ⁵⁸ *Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca*, Venice 1612, sub voce.
- ⁵⁹ *Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca*, vol. III, Florence 1878, p. 77.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

- ⁶¹ O. Brunner, W. Conze et al. (eds.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, 8 vols., Stuttgart 1972-1997. On Dutch approaches to Begriffsgeschichte see K. Tilmans, *Applying Begriffsgeschichte to Dutch History. Some remarks on the practice and future of a research project*, <http://www.karintilmans.nl/pdf/begriffs-geschichte.pdf>
- ⁶² M. Boone, 'Cette frivole, dampnable et desraisonable bourgeoise': de vele gezichten van het laatmiddeleeuwse burgerbegrip in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, in J. Kloek, K. Tilmans (eds.), *Burger. Een geschiedenis van het begrip 'burger' in den Nederlanden van de Middeleeuwen tot de 21^{ste} eeuw*, Amsterdam 2002, pp. 33-53.
- ⁶³ H. Blom, *Burger en Belang: Pieter de la Court over de politieke betekenis van burgers*, in Kloek, Tilmans (eds.), *Burger* cit., pp. 99-112.
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- ⁶⁹ S. Sarnicki, *Statuta i metryka przywilejów koronnych*, Krakow 1594, p. 2r.
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- ⁷⁶ *Enciclopedia Română [Romanian Encyclopedia]*, vol. III, Sibiu 1904, p. 788.
- ⁷⁷ The 11th Article from the Decree no. 125, 7 July 1948 regarding the Romanian citizenship stipulated the following: "a foreign citizen can ask for citizenship provided that he has settled in the country, that he has lived there for at least five years without interruption, that he undertakes to renounce his foreign citizenship, and that he is of good behaviour and does not harbour attitudes which are antidemocratic or against the interests of the People's Republic of Romania".
- ⁷⁸ I. Deleanu, *Cetățenia română [Romanian citizenship]*, Cluj Napoca 1976, p. 5.
- ⁷⁹ The phrase 'participatory dictatorship' is Mary Fulbrook's. See her *The people's state: East German society from Hitler to Honecker*, New Haven - London 2005, pp. 12 (quotation), 182-194, 291-298.
- ⁸⁰ S.G. Ellis, in P. Blicke, S.G. Ellis, E. Østerberg, *The Commons and the State: Representation, Influence and the Legislative Process*, in P. Blicke (ed.), *The Origins of the Modern State in Europe*, vol. 5, *Representation, Resistance and Community*, Oxford 1997, pp. 118-121, 126-128, 138-146.

- ⁸¹ A. Wiener, *Editorial: Fragmentierte Staatsbürgerschaft*, *Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft*, in "Prokla", 105, 26, 1996, pp. 488-496 ("Generell drückt Staatsbürgerschaft Zugehörigkeit aus. Zugehörigkeit meint einerseits einen legalen verfassungsmässig verankerten Status und andererseits eine emotionale Bindung. Legale Zugehörigkeit ist über Staatsangehörigkeit – häufig als 'Nationalität' bezeichnet – definiert und schließt Rechte und Pflichten von StaatsbürgerInnen gegenüber dem Staat bzw. dem Gemeinwesen ein. Emotionale Zugehörigkeit ist dagegen abhängig von Identität, die ebenfalls oft und mißverständlich als Nationalität verstanden wird"). See also D. Heater, *Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education*, London - New York 1990; W. Kaplan, *Who Belongs? Changing Concepts of Citizenship and Nationality*, in Id. (ed.), *Belonging: The Meaning and Future of Canadian Citizenship*, Montreal 1993, pp. 245-264; M. Everson, U. Preuss, *Concepts, Foundations, and Limits of European Citizenship*, Bremen 1995, ZERP Discussion paper.
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Multiple Paths to Citizenship T.H. Marshall's Theory and the Greek Case

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Η ιδιότητα του πολίτη στην Ελλάδα εξετάζεται μέσα από τέσσερις οπτικές γωνίες, οι οποίες έχουν ως αφετηρία τη θεωρία του T.H. Marshall. Η πρώτη περίπτωση εξετάζει την αναφορά στο «γένος» ή στο «δήμο»; Υπερισχύουν τα εθνο-πολιτισμικά χαρακτηριστικά, ή τα εδαφικά κριτήρια, με ανάλογες επιπτώσεις στις πολιτικές ένταξης ή αποκλεισμού. Η δεύτερη περίπτωση εξετάζει την ιστορική σειρά απόκτησης δικαιωμάτων υποστηρίζοντας ότι στην Ελλάδα δεν αποκτήθηκαν πρώτα τα αστικά (civil rights) και μετά τα πολιτικά δικαιώματα, αλλά τα δεύτερα στάθηκαν προϋπόθεση των πρώτων, εξαιτίας του τρόπου με τον οποίο συγκροτήθηκε το ελληνικό κράτος. Η τρίτη περίπτωση προβάλλει το επιχείρημα ότι σε αγροτικές κοινωνίες, όπως ήταν η Ελλάδα έως το 1950, η έννοια των κοινωνικών δικαιωμάτων αφορούσε την αγροτική μεταρρύθμιση και τη δημιουργία ενός σώματος μικροϊδιοκτητών αγροτών-πολιτών. Η τέταρτη περίπτωση εξετάζει τους αποκλεισμούς από την ιδιότητα του πολίτη, σε σχέση με το φύλο, τις μειονότητες, τον εμφύλιο πόλεμο και την κατηγορία των εθνικοφρόνων, και τέλος τους μετανάστες της δεκαετίας του 1990.

During the 1990s, the term citizenship was included among the new key-words in historical and social sciences. But this term was hardly new. It has re-emerged several decades after its elaboration by the British sociologist T.H. Marshall in post-war Britain¹. The new preoccupation with citizenship was not unrelated to social and international realities at the end of the 20th century: mass immigration, European Unification, the fall of the Communist regimes and rising nationalisms, new social movements (especially Feminism), the restriction of state interference in economy and the re-orientation of welfare politics.

But why should we start with Marshall's theory? Because he does not define what the citizenship is or is not, but how it works. He said that citizenship is constructed as a sequence of three types of rights: civil, political and social. He localized them in historical periods of the British society, which corresponded to the transformation of European society. In addition to this historical perspective, the analytical categories which this theory uses avoid the formal definitions of legal citizenship. Instead of asking who is entitled to be citizen, Marshall asks what effective actual rights are required for being a citizen and how these rights have been developed in the course of the making of European society. But this theory has also a normative dimension. By the end of the Second World War in Britain, Marshall was questioning the effectiveness of citizenship. His proposal was that full citizenship requires social rights to complement civil and political rights in order for the inequalities produced by capitalism to be counterbalanced. As a consequence, this

theory paved the path of reconciliation between capitalism and democracy in the Welfare State, and provided the language for justifying the inner connection between democracy and the Welfare State. As a consequence, Welfare politics could be demonstrated to be the heir of liberal traditions and a distinctive European path to democracy. In this chapter I wish to argue that Marshall's theory has potential for societies beyond that whence it emerged, and that it can be used in understanding statecraft in countries which have followed different historical paths. The history of Modern Greece is a useful case for illustrating similarities and differences, in intentions and realities, in constructing social belongings in different circumstances.

WHO IS ENTITLED TO BECOME A CITIZEN? *GENOS* OR *DEMOS*?

Although citizenship in Greek city states is at the origin of the history of the concept, Modern Greek citizenship has to be traced to the Ottoman Empire. Greece was established as an independent state in 1830 after a secessionist revolt and an eight year war against the Ottoman Empire. In the Empire, subjects were organized in *millet*, that is on a religious-ethnic basis. The subject belonged first of all to the *millet*, and through the *millet* to the Ottoman Empire. The *millet* were made up of organized communities on extra-territorial basis². People dispersed in the territories of the Empire belonged to the same millet, although they were living mixed with peoples belonging to different millets in the same territory. What does this mean for our discussion? The organization of the Ottoman Empire determined the participation in political communities on the basis not of territorial but of cultural criteria, and culture in this case was over-determined exclusively by faith. Even the Greek speaking populations of the Aegean Islands did not participate in the Rum-Orthodox millet because they belonged to the Roman Catholic Church. As a consequence, the Ottoman Empire, instead of homogenizing its subjects, was pushing them to be associated with a pre-eminently exclusive criterion of religion. The result was compartmentalization and national cleavage in the region even before independence. Balkanization preceded independence in the Balkans.

This legacy produced a tight linkage between ethnicity and citizenship when nationalism transformed the religious bonds to ethnic allegiance. This route was opposite to the path taken in western European, where citizenship was characterized mainly by territorial and only secondarily by ethno-cultural criteria, and where ethnicity was disengaged from religion. The Ottoman tradition determined the exclusive ethno-religious character of belonging. In this way, *genos* (population on an ethno-cultural basis) and not *demos* (population on a territorial basis, originally the people of ancient city-states) was established as the criterion of belonging. The ethno-cultural sense of belonging was the presupposition of citizenship.

WHICH FIRST? CIVIL OR POLITICAL RIGHTS?

Despite the historical bonds, the construction of a modern state was not bound exclusively to the historical traditions, but it was also a matter of choice. As a consequence the conceptualisation of Citizenship in Greece was not exclusively determined by the Otto-

man legacy. Concepts like citizenship were elaborated under the impact of the French Revolution and the diffusion of Enlightenment ideas through Greek intellectuals. One of the most prominent of these radical intellectuals was Rigas Feraios. In his writings, civil rights depended on the political rights of the citizen. According to his republican view of the polity, the rights of the citizens (civil and political) derived from their sovereignty. Rigas was influenced by Rousseau's ideas on citizenship but the idea that civil rights were dependent on political rights was also widespread in Greek political theory in pre-revolutionary times.

A closer examination of the translation of these terms in Greek reveals the way these ideas were understood. The contemporary Greek word for 'Rights' is *Dikaïomata*, which derives from the root *Dikaion* (Justice/Droit). In the French Revolutionary Declaration [of the rights of man] the word used was, in the plural, *Droits*. Thus Greek intellectuals of 18th century, who relied on the French texts as their model, translated the plural form *Droits* as *Dikaia* and not *Dikaïomata*. This translation is not without significance. In Greek, *Dikaïomata* (rights) has a subjective meaning. 'Rights' belong to the subject. But *Dikaia* (*Droits* in the plural), has an objective meaning. It is the allocation of Justice to each individual. It is not the individual's natural condition by birth. The idea is that if citizens live under the sovereignty of Justice and the Law and if they participate in the polity, they possess *Dikaia* (*Droits*). So if rights were individual, the meaning of *Dikaia* was a collective condition. Where rights refer to a negative Freedom (free from the bondage of power) the *Dikaia* refer to the positive meaning of Freedom (as the right to participate in the polity)³. In the Greek political theory, civil rights were understood as deriving from and depending on political rights.

SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN AN AGRARIAN SOCIETY

In T. H. Marshall's theoretical time-table of citizenship, social rights were institutionalised in the industrial era and considered necessary to counterbalance political rights and the anxiety that the general franchise might provoke an overturn of the social order. In industrial societies, as in Western and Northern Europe, this strategy implied the need for social reform and the welfare state. But what happened in agrarian societies like Greece? Social rights would remain meaningless if they were not related to the majority of the population, the peasantry, and not translated into agrarian reform.

In the period of Ottoman domination, land in Greece belonged to the Ottoman sovereign or to religious foundations. During the National Revolution (1821-1830) all of this land was deemed national land and there were demands for its redistribution. It is worth noting that the land was not sold. If the land had been sold, the local notables would have taken advantage of the situation and would have strengthened their position even more. On the other hand, the selling of land would have conflicted with the general expectations of the Revolution. According to the national rhetoric of this period, since all had participated in the sacrifices, why should some benefit more than others? For all these reasons, the land was distributed over a period of seven years after the establishment of general male franchise (1864, 1871)⁴. From this viewpoint, the establishment of general male franchise, the institution of public education for males and females and the distri-

bution of the national land to families occurred during the same historical period, and constituted the outcome of the way in which the national state was formed in Greece. But this distribution of rights was unequal. Although all were entitled to the social rights, political rights were allocated only to the male population.

When Greece doubled its territory in the period of the Balkan Wars (1912-13), and received a great wave of Greek refugees from Turkey (1922-23), which equalled about one-fifth of the Greek population, there was a new distribution of land to landless peasants. The justification of the reform originated again from the arsenal of the national ideology: "the resettling of the refugees and their integration into the national community". Nonetheless, another reason was offered which brings us closer to Marshall's logic on social rights. It was held that the distribution of land and the creation of small landholders would spare Greece from the danger of revolution and communism. In this way a social mechanism was established, connecting the allocation of the land and the creation of small landholders with social security. Despite the creation of the Social Insurance Foundation (IKA) in the 1930s, under the auspice of and pressure from the International Labour Office, social rights were understood as the creation of small landholders and easy access to land ownership⁵.

This attitude continued to hold sway after the Second World War and the subsequent Civil War, when the balance between the agrarian and the urban population overturned during a mass wave of internal migration in the 1950s and 60s, and the right to vote for the parliament was extended to women (1952)⁶. The politics of the post-war social engineering was not based on social welfare, as in Western Europe, during the same period. It was based on the distribution of super-valued urban real estate in the expanding urban areas. Anybody with a little money from his/her savings was able (or encouraged) to acquire a small portion of landed property, or to share this property with others and use it as an investment to be liquidated during difficult times, as a compensation for the lack of social insurance. This policy, with its visible consequences for the urban landscape in Greece, came to an end after the fall of the Dictatorship (1974), and a new welfare policy was implemented during the Socialist government in the 1980s. The problem this time was that the expansion of the welfare did not coincide with the expansion of the economy as in the 1950s and 1960s, but with a period of stagnation, reduction of public economy and severe criticism of state intervention.

The conclusion is that social citizenship was

- interconnected with the national state and the national ideology;
- understood mainly as the creation of small land owners/small property? holders;
- established not later than political citizenship, although the latter was restricted to the male population till the middle of the 20th century.

CITIZENSHIP AND EXCLUSION

What remained outside of this process of incorporation were the ethnic and religious minorities. During the War of Independence and at the beginning of the foundation of the new state (1821-1830), the non-Christian population (Muslim Turks and Jews) were out-

ed, and their rights as citizens were not recognized. On the other hand linguistic minorities of Orthodox faith (Albanian and Vlach speaking population) were identified as Greek citizens without any distinction from the Greek speaking citizens. The minorities became a political question after the Balkan Wars, the First World War and the Greek invasion of Asia Minor (1912-1922) when agreements for the mutual exchange of populations were made between Greece and Bulgaria, on the basis of the 'consciousness' of national belonging on the one hand, and between Greece and Turkey, on the basis of religion on the other. Minority groups, such as the Muslim community in Thrace and Slav-Macedonians, after mutual agreements, were left inside Greece under the protection of the League of Nations⁷. Formally, these minorities had the rights of Greek citizens, although we should introduce here a distinction between formal or legal rights and the actual exercise of these rights. The discrepancy between the formal and the actual practice of political rights is another serious issue in Greek history concerning political and minority issues. In the inter-war period, just as in the period from the end of the Civil War until the dictatorship of 1967, political rights were guaranteed. Nevertheless, a percentage of the population was excluded from them by laws known as 'para-constitutional' (or 'shadow-state'), which were appended to and supplemented the Constitution. Thus during this period citizens who were considered to belong to the Left were arrested, exiled and impeded in the free exercise of their political rights. Those who were in exile abroad, as political refugees, were deprived their legal citizenship. This exclusion from political citizenship created and was justified by the concept of *ethnikofrosyni* (national mindedness). Those excluded from political rights were considered to be outside the national community. In the post civil war period, the concept of *ethnikofrosyni* was connected to the right to citizenship. The non lawful to the nation was considered as non citizen. The divided citizenship was mirrored in a divided identity. On the one hand, there was the officially promoted identity, on the other, the excluded identity⁸. Only after the fall of the dictatorship and the setting up of the Republic in 1974, the concept of the citizen had forced in Greece a unified national identity with the inclusion of political excluded identities into the citizenship⁹.

During the 1990s the entry of new immigrants from Eastern Europe, the Middle East and other Asian and African countries, counting circa 10% of the population of the country, has challenged the concept of citizenship once more. Access to the right of citizenship was allocated only to a minority of the newcomers, those who could demonstrate their ethnic allegiance to the Greeks, the *omogeneis*¹⁰. Once more the old dilemma between *genos* and *demos* came out in favour of the former.

CONCLUSION

The four cases of Modern Greek history of citizenship show first the tension between two principles of belonging to the 'city', the principle of *genos*, connected to kinship and defined by culture, religion and history, and the principle of *demos* linked to the intellectual tradition of republicanism. Second, we have seen the reversal of the sequence between civil and political rights. Civil rights depended on and derived from political rights and not vice versa. This was the consequence of the making of the nation-state. The construction of citizenship was not a gradual and linear procedure but the result of a rupture in the

history of society. The polity was constructed out of secession with Empires and without state and legal continuity as implied by the Marshallian model of citizenship. Third, social rights were indispensable for the social cohesion of new formed national communities. The majority of the population imposed the need for agrarian reform, and, at the same time, the reform was justified with the national and citizenship discourse. Despite the differences with respect to the social legislation and the welfare policies developed for urban working people, the politics of social cohesion was used as a vehicle of attaining full citizenship, in a way similar to the theoretical proposals of T.H. Marshall.

NOTES

- ¹ T.H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays*, Cambridge 1950.
- ² B. Braude - B. Lewis, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, New York 1982; I. Ortayli, *The Ottoman millet system and its social dimensions* and U. Kocabasoglu, *The Millet System: A Bird's Eye View*, in R. Larson (ed.), *Boundaries of Europe?*, Uppsala 1998, pp. 120-138.
- ³ A. Manitakis, *Ta Dikaia tou Anthropou*, "Politis", 61, 1999, pp. 14-19 (in Greek).
- ⁴ W. McGrew, *Land and Revolution in Modern Greece, 1800-1881*, Kent State 1985.
- ⁵ A. Liakos, *Welfare policy in Greece (1909-1940). From the private needs to the social question*, MIRE, *Comparing Social Welfare Systems in Southern Europe*, Paris 1997, pp. 93-108.
- ⁶ E. Avdela, *Between duties and rights, Gender and citizenship in Greece, 1864-1952*, in F. Birtek - T. Dragonas, *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*, London 2003, pp. 117-143.
- ⁷ L. Divani, *Greece and Minorities*, Athens 1995 (in Greek).
- ⁸ N. Alivizatos, *Les Institutions Politiques de la Grece a travers les crises 1922-1974*, Paris 1979.
- ⁹ N. Alivizatos (ed.), *Greek Constitutional Law and Practice*, Special Issue of Modern Greek Studies, 17, 1, 1999, pp. 1-84.
- ¹⁰ "Omogeneis" (= belonging to the same *genos*): Immigrants belonging to the Greek minority of Albania, and people from Southern Russia and Georgia speaking a Greek dialect of the southern part of Black Sea (Pontus).

Austria's Neutrality and European Integration: A Conflict between International and National Spheres of Law

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ABSTRACT

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the concept of international law enjoyed a period of unprecedented prestige and cast its net to include aspects of international trade, environment, disarmament, and human rights issues. While the jurisdiction of international law had been mostly confined to the European continent before World War I, a substantial step in the direction of universality took place under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) during the process of decolonisation. Parallel to this universalisation, prominent developments also pointed towards an increasingly regionalised world system, above all in Western Europe.

With the burgeoning of international law, and its continuous expansion beyond the strictly political sphere, confrontation with domestic sovereignty became inevitable. The key question in such cases was the relation and the hierarchy between these two categories of law. What if they contradicted each other? Should international law override the national one? Numerous examples of this conflict have arisen since 1945 and ample theoretical concepts have been elaborated regarding these issues. This conundrum was (and is) especially acute within the context of European integration where, since 1957, a unique supra-national legal system has operated alongside those of the different member states. And, in certain instances, the former has overridden the latter.

This chapter focuses on just such a case. Austrian neutrality, and its ambivalent role in the fast-paced process of European integration, perfectly demonstrates the contingencies and intricacies of the relationship between international and national law. We will show how an evolutionary process of international and supranational law-making affected the domestic legal order in Austria and analyse how Austria's political system tried to reconcile the requirements of neutrality with the advance of European integration. After some indispensable theoretical reflections on the relationship between international and national law and the concept of neutrality as a security policy for

small states, the history of Austrian neutrality will be outlined. We will explain how Austria, a small Central European country fully integrated into the European Union, has attempted to maintain its neutrality since the end of the Cold War. By way of an example, the reason why Austria has been reluctant fully to engage in the building of a common security policy for the European Union will be examined. We will then analyse how Austrian neutrality has been undermined and dismantled *de facto* as a consequence of its participation in the process of European integration. Finally, in order to explain the ambivalent stance of Austrian governments towards deeper integration in the field of European security policy, we will analyse neutrality as a domestic political phenomenon.

Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg ist den nationalen Rechtsordnungen durch die Weiterentwicklung und Ausweitung des Völkerrechts Konkurrenz erwachsen. Dadurch wurde in vielen Fällen die Frage akut, welcher der beiden Rechtsordnungen, der nationalen oder der internationalen, im Zweifelsfalle der Vorrang eingeräumt wird.

In verschiedenen Teilen der Welt haben Regionalismen diesen Prozess noch vertieft. Besonders signifikant war und ist diese Entwicklung in Westeuropa durch die europäische Integration. Die Entwicklung in Europa bis hin zur heutigen Europäischen Union hat auch dem Problem der konkurrierenden Rechtsordnungen, nämlich der nationalen und der internationalen, eine neue Bedeutung gegeben. Schließlich hat der Integrationsprozess ein (teilweise) supranationales Rechtswerk geschaffen, welches direkt in die nationalen Rechtsordnungen einwirkt und diese auch teilweise aufhebt.

Dieses Kapitel greift das Fallbeispiel der österreichischen Neutralität und deren Implikationen für die Teilnahme Österreichs am europäischen Integrationsprozess auf, um das komplizierte Verhältnis zwischen internationalem und nationalem Recht zu thematisieren. Für Österreich, einem seit 1955 neutralen Staat, der seit 1995 Mitglied der Europäischen Union ist, haben diese konkurrierenden Rechtssphären im Bereich der gemeinsamen Europäischen Außenpolitik und insbesondere der Sicherheitspolitik zu einer verzwickten Lage geführt. Österreichs Neutralität wurde als eine Geburt des Kalten Krieges im Jahr 1955 nolens volens mittels eines Bundesverfassungsgesetzes durch das österreichische Parlament beschlossen, um die sowjetische Zustimmung zum österreichischen Staatsvertrag zu erwirken. Spätestens in den 1970er Jahren wurde die Neutralität ein wichtiger Bestandteil der österreichischen Identität. Durch die Teilnahme am europäischen Integrationsprozess wurde die Neutralität de jure und de facto ausgehöhlt. Dennoch bleibt sie auch am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts juristisch nach wie vor bestehen, wenn auch nur auf dem Papier. Diese eigenartige Entwicklung ist nur durch die innenpolitische Relevanz der österreichischen Neutralität begreifbar.

THEORETICAL OBSERVATIONS:

International and National Law

Most legal historians agree that the era of international law began with the establishment of the modern state system following the treaty of Westphalia in 1648¹. Its modern corpus was developed beginning in the middle of the 19th century and built upon theoretical reflections by scholars of the classic period of international law such as Jean Bodin (1530-1596) and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). The first World War and the creation in its aftermath of the League of Nations and other international bodies such as the International Labour Organization accelerated the process of international cooperation and law-making. Together they laid the foundation for the United Nations, which was established under the UN Charter in 1945. The UN codified new standards of international law, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, and under its aegis new international norms and organisations were created.

This trend has been deepened and widened through attempts at regional integration, best epitomized by the integration process in Europe. Today's European Union is the only example to date of a fully-fledged, supra-national legal framework, in which sovereign nations have pooled part of their sovereignty within a system of courts and political institutions. It therefore constitutes a new legal order, a system *sui generis*. In short, since 1945, international law has developed as a distinct legal system with wholly new methods of law-making. Moreover, it has defined its own subjects and defined their rights and obligations.

The proper relation and hierarchy between international and domestic jurisdictions has been the subject of much controversy. This is due to the fact that international law today is not only confined to regulating relations between states. It also encompasses matters of social concern such as health, education, and economic policy. The underlying question is whether international law and national law (or to use the *terminus technicus*, municipal law²) are considered to be one integral legal system or two distinct bodies. On this question scholars have traditionally been divided into two schools, the monistic and the dualistic. Monists have a unitary vision and see international and national law as integral parts of the same system. They therefore see transformation of international rules into national ones as unnecessary. In the event of conflict, most monists would contend that international law should prevail. This theory, which was propounded into a fully-fledged doctrine after the First World War by the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), argues that international law is at the top of the pyramid and can validate and/or invalidate all domestic legislation.

In contrast, dualists see national law and international law as independent of one another. International law regulates the relations between sovereign states, while domestic law regulates affairs internal to the state. Accordingly, dualists hold that the two systems are mutually exclusive and cannot impinge upon one another. For international

directives to become binding on domestic authorities and individuals they must first be transformed into national law. In their view, international rules cannot alter or repeal national legislation and national laws cannot influence international rules. Thus, on this reading, no conflict can arise between international and domestic legal systems³. Although recent scholarship has challenged the relevance of this separation between monism and dualism all introductory texts relating to international law still maintain the distinction. The two competing theories, among others, do not purport to offer any general explanation concerning the relationship between municipal and international law. Rather, they reflect different convictions about how the relationship between municipal and international law should be structured. They are thus not positive, but are merely normative in character⁴.

Notwithstanding these theoretical reflections, the manner in which international law has been absorbed in practice by individual nation-states has always been a purely domestic matter. There exists no universal, uniform practice which stipulates how states should incorporate international law into their domestic legal systems. Determining the way in which international law becomes part of domestic law is left to the state's discretion. Considering the scope of international law in our times this is a crucial question. Until the mid-20th century international law was concerned mainly with the conduct of sovereign states and the relations between states. At the beginning of the 21st century international law permeates and conditions national legal orders. Its rules are applied and enforced by national authorities, and on occasion it takes precedence over national law. This is especially true for the member states of today's European Union.

The law of the European Union is a special case and has received an enormous amount of scholarly attention. EU laws have a direct effect on the legal systems of member states and override national laws in many areas. This is especially true within the supranational first EU "pillar" (the "Common Market"). In contrast, the areas of common foreign policy and judicial cooperation (the second and third "pillars") belong to the domain of more conventional intergovernmental cooperation. Given that the old categories of monism and dualism no longer suffice fully to explain the reality of a partly supranational EU, a number of alternative theories have been elaborated to clarify the distinction between European and national law. In any case, the superiority of European Community Law over national law has been supported on many occasions by the European Court of Justice and is generally accepted throughout the European Union⁵.

Neutrality as Security for Small States in the Past and Present

Austria's law on neutrality also exemplified the interconnections between international and municipal law. Before turning to the intricacies of Austrian neutrality, however, it is necessary to discuss the exact meaning of this concept. Ever since its first appearance at the end of the 14th century the concept of neutrality has denoted the non-partici-

pation of a territory or state in war between two or more other territories or states⁶. It took another six centuries for this practice to be formalised. The Hague Treaties of 1907 codified the rights and duties of neutral powers in the case of war at land or sea. According to these agreements a neutral state could not take sides in armed conflict or support belligerent states by delivering weapons or allowing the passage through its territory of men and/or material. In addition, a neutral state had actively to protect its territory against any aggression. In return, the territory of a neutral state had to be respected by the belligerent powers⁷.

With the further development of international law the concept of neutrality became more complex and fragmented. For example, alongside military and armed neutrality the idea of "moral" and "economic" neutrality appeared. "Permanent" neutrality, which is of special importance for the Austrian case, means that even in times of peace a neutral position has to be maintained. This is in contrast to "temporary" neutrality which is only applicable during the time of a specific armed conflict. A permanently neutral state has to avoid peacetime treaties and agreements that would make its neutrality in war impossible, and consequently ought not conclude military alliances that may, for example, allow foreign military bases to be established in its territory. It should be noted that the peacetime duties of a permanently neutral state have not been codified. They are part of customary international law and have thus remained a matter of political and scholarly debate⁸. In time of war, the rules of temporary neutrality apply also to permanent neutrals.

Here it is important to mention the idea of "neutralism". Also known as non-alignment, this concept entered the dictionary of international relations after World War II, and implied a non-binding impartiality between the two blocks in the context of the Cold War⁹. While neither the US nor the Soviet Union cherished the concept of neutrality after 1945 – world and imperial politics never harmonised with the idea of impartiality – the so-called "balance of terror" in the mid-1950s created a new range of manoeuvre for neutrals. To the surprise of the Western camp it was the Soviet Union which revived the concept with the famous "Stalin note"¹⁰ of March 1952 and by accepting Austrian neutrality in 1955¹¹.

Neutrality is especially attractive for small states since they have a precarious position in international relations and security policy. Small states traditionally have two options for their security: imposed or voluntary neutrality, or regional alliances with neighbouring and/or stronger states¹². In post-war Europe, the possibility of European integration can be added as a third option, since small states have been able effectively to guard and secure their independence and economic prosperity thanks to the European Union.

While the concept of neutrality has always been controversial, since the end of the Cold War it has come under especially heavy attack. Different political theories, such

as those expounded by the so-called realist¹³ or the interdependence¹⁴ schools, stress the fact that neutrality has become redundant as a security strategy for small states. According to the realists, the concept of neutrality requires a balance of power in a bipolar or multi-polar international order. The neutral state practices a policy of non-interference between the opposing blocks. Since the bipolar world was replaced by a unipolar international system after the end of the Cold War, realists argue that the structural characteristics necessary for neutrality have disappeared. Classical neutrality is thus obsolete in their eyes¹⁵.

The interdependence model also reaches the conclusion that neutrality is redundant. It suggests that close economic and political integration generates security and makes wars between the engaged countries unlikely. The higher the degree of economic and political integration, the higher the degree of security. According to this model, neutrality not only loses its legitimacy but it might also constitute an obstacle to integration for small countries and thus diminish their security¹⁶. Thus many scholars argue that without a continuing and active participation in European integration there is a danger of increased political marginalisation and thus of lesser scope for action on the part of small states¹⁷. They moreover stress that integration according to the European model is the best security strategy for small and thus vulnerable states.

These theoretical reflections on the security options for small states show that – at least among scholars – neutrality, a security policy with a long tradition, is nowadays an outdated concept. We can now turn to the case of Austrian neutrality and its implications for Austria's participation in European integration, above all in the field of security policies. It should be noted that we are dealing here with the second pillar of the EU, that is, an area of intergovernmental and not supranational cooperation.

AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY: HISTORY AND CURRENT ASPECTS

Austria has a special status amongst the neutral countries of the European Union in that its neutrality – in contrast to that of Finland, Sweden, Malta or Cyprus – is not only a political strategy but forms part of national law. While the latter is also true in Ireland and Switzerland, Austria goes one step further by having its neutrality written into the Constitution.

Austria's Neutrality: a Product of the Cold War

Following World War II, Austria was occupied by the four Allied powers: Great Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union. The negotiations for an Austrian State Treaty, which had been dragging on since 1947, reached a break-through only when the Soviet Union invited an Austrian delegation to Moscow in March 1955. As part of the so-called Moscow Memorandum, Austria promised to "practice in perpetuity a

neutrality of the type maintained by Switzerland” in return for a promise by the Allied powers to respect the “inviolability and integrity of Austrian territory”¹⁸. That Austria would not become part of the Western alliance was thus one of the conditions set by the Soviet Union for the signing of a peace agreement and the withdrawal of its troops from Austrian territory. The Austrian State Treaty was signed in the Belvedere Castle in Vienna on 15 May 1955. All occupying forces then departed and Austria became a free and sovereign country within the borders of 1938¹⁹. The price of the departure of Soviet troops, however, amounted to burdensome payments for the so-called “German property” in Austria which had been taken over by the Soviet occupation force²⁰. On 26 October – and as promised in the Moscow Memorandum – the Austrian parliament passed the federal constitutional law on permanent neutrality²¹. Austria pledged not to become part of any military alliance or to allow military bases on its territory and to defend its neutrality with all possible means²². Austrian neutrality was thus based on municipal law and not on international law. This means that while no international treaty was signed, the international community was informed by “notification” and most states consequently recognized Austria’s neutrality.

Curiously, by maintaining a strictly literal interpretation of its obligations not to join any *military* alliance, the Austrian government was able to join the United Nations in 1955 and the Council of Europe in 1956. It even considered joining the European Coal and Steel Community²³. However, Austrian politicians soon became more cautious in their interpretation of neutrality. This was partly a reaction to the unsuccessful uprisings in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) which prompted the Soviet Union to review its relations with its Eastern European neighbours in general. In this context Austrian neutrality was placed under a spotlight due to vociferous complaints from within the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries²⁴.

Two further developments suggested that Austria’s government had started to view neutrality somewhat differently from its articulation in the neutrality law. Firstly, it accepted that neutrality had certain economic implications. For example, Austria recognised that membership in the European Community (EC; founded by the Treaty of Rome in 1957) was incompatible with Austrian neutrality since the EC perceived itself as a political as well as an economic community²⁵. However, Austrian membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), an exclusively economically-oriented supranational organisation, was thought not to impinge on Austrian neutrality and Austria became a founding member in 1960. The EFTA was nevertheless not a goal *per se* for Austria as it still sought rapprochement with the EC, first via multilateral association along with Switzerland and Sweden in the years 1961-1963, and then via bilateral association in the years 1963-67. Although the Soviet Union officially opposed Austrian negotiations with the EC, in the end it was the Italian government which successfully blocked them in 1967 because of the South Tyrol conflict²⁶.

Secondly, the Austrian government interpreted its legal obligations arising from neutrality more widely. The notification of the international community concerning Austria's neutrality back in 1955 was believed to have established a quasi-treaty relationship between Austria and the states involved. Experts in international law consequently debated – often in rather emotional tones – the possibility of a unilateral renunciation by either side. The Austrian government finally adopted the view that the Federal Constitutional Law on Austrian Neutrality was a quasi-international treaty²⁷.

The broad interpretation of Austrian neutrality that prevailed in the 1970s was closely linked to the Austrian Socialist Bruno Kreisky, who served as Chancellor from 1970 to 1983. He believed that Austrian neutrality should not only be applied to the military sphere but ought to be interpreted more extensively. According to this interpretation neutrality did not only involve exercising restraint in questions of international politics. On the contrary, Kreisky used Austria's neutral status in the international community to develop the so-called “active neutrality policy”. This meant Austria's taking on an active role in international organisations, including devising initiatives to reduce international tensions, affirming a commitment to human rights, offering Austria as a base for international organisations, and using its active neutrality as a “balancing mediator” in the context of East-West and North-South conflicts²⁸. Directed by Kreisky, neutrality grew to be a central factor in the forging of a new Austrian identity after 1945 and almost attained the status of national ideology. The myth was created that only thanks to neutrality could Austria enjoy freedom and economic prosperity.

De facto Dismantling of Austrian Neutrality in the European Integration Process

As we have seen, by forcing neutrality on Austria the Cold War environment determined that it could not seek membership in the EC in the 1960s. Instead, it had to content itself with a more limited role as a member of the EFTA²⁹. With the end of the Cold War, however, the international order changed to such an extent that other security options – such as integration in the European Community – became feasible. Given the radically changed international context at the end of the 1980s both Washington and Moscow lost interest in Austrian neutrality. Austria's application for European Community membership in July 1989 was, therefore, received without much protest³⁰.

Austrian politicians argued that neutrality did not constitute an obstacle to membership. The Socialist-led government of the time judged full participation in the EU (including the common foreign and security policy) to be compatible with an interpretation of neutrality reduced to the military core elements. The government felt comfortable with the European security policy of the time because of the ambiguity of the valid treaty provisions and the intergovernmental character of the decision-making process³¹.

In public, the government chose to wink at the ambiguities which derived from this *de facto* situation. Austria subsequently joined the European Union (as the EC has been called since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992) in the year 1995 after a referendum in which 66,58 percent of Austrian voters declared themselves in favour of accession. Thanks to the massive propaganda campaign and the deliberate avoidance of the neutrality issue the Austrians were, as historian Michael Gehler has claimed, less convinced and more persuaded into voting for joining the Union³². Anyhow, the Austrian accession treaty did not contain any special reference to neutrality. Moreover, Austria bound itself to accept the whole *acquis communautaire* and all obligations emanating from the common foreign and security policy³³.

Also during the 1990s Austria's foreign and security elites sought a rapprochement with the Western European Union (WEU)³⁴ and NATO while maintaining the nation's neutrality. In retrospect, this seems like an attempt to square the circle. Neutrality was publicly scorned by opinion leaders and influential figures, while scholarly research into newly-available Cold War archives questioned its effectiveness.

The practical erosion of Austrian neutrality started with the first Gulf War of 1990/91 when the so-called Verdross Doctrine – named after the Austrian international legal scholar Alfred Verdross – was abandoned. This had stipulated the priority of neutrality over UN obligations³⁵. Furthermore, as a consequence of its accession to the EU, Austria was forced to adapt its security and defence policies even though Austrian politicians had long claimed that EU-membership and neutrality were compatible. After all, the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” (CFSP) and “European Security and Defence Policy” (ESDP) was already established in the Maastricht Treaty. This was achieved with the introduction of a new article into Austria's Federal Constitution (Article 23f) which stated that Austria would participate in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, including potential economic embargoes³⁶. In addition, Austria became an observer in the WEU and accepted an offer in 1995 to become a member of the NATO Partnership for Peace³⁷.

Ever since their accession into the EU, Austria and its neutral partners, Sweden and Finland, have been primarily concerned with preventing the CFSP and the ESDP from advancing in the direction of a common defence arrangement in which they are unable to participate because of their commitment to neutrality. However, the CFSP was further defined and broadened in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. During the negotiation process Austria supported the so-called Swedish-Finnish Initiative which endorsed two key ideas. The first was to limit the CFSP by preventing a mutual assistance clause. The second was to convert the original WEU Petersberg Missions³⁸ into tasks of the European Union³⁹. The neutral states wanted to emphasize the peacekeeping aspects of EU security cooperation in order to prevent a drift towards a military alliance based on mutual defence guarantees. In 1997, during the European summit in Amsterdam, the Petersberg tasks were effectively incorporated into the treaty. Both the WEU and the

EU were empowered to enforce the Petersberg tasks, but with the transfer of the most important WEU assets to the EU in 1999 this distinction is mostly artificial. Austria had to react to this new development with the amendment of the recently-introduced Art. 23f of the Federal Constitution to permit Austrian participation in the CFSP⁴⁰. In spite of Austrian neutrality, its participation in all Petersberg tasks, including “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” now became legally possible.

Despite the best intentions of the Austrian government to maintain its neutrality in the context of EU membership, the Treaty of Amsterdam and the so called Petersberg Clause were the first major steps towards the *de facto* dismantling of Austrian neutrality⁴¹. As we have seen, the Europeanization process represented *ipso facto* a material derogation of neutrality because Austrian troops could now legally be involved in peacemaking tasks.

Paradigm Change from Neutrality to Solidarity

At the turn of the millennium the major political parties in Austria advocated limited participation in the ESDP, even though neutrality remained Austria’s official position and was supported by large sectors of the Austrian population. This ambiguity led to an awkwardness in Austria’s relations with its EU partners. This became particularly obvious on the occasion of the Kosovo war when overflights by allied planes (including those of Austria’s EU partners) were not allowed since the NATO operation had not been authorized by the United Nations Security Council. By contrast, overflights by American planes in support of US operations in Afghanistan were permitted since the Security Council had provided legal cover for the campaign⁴². Austria was derisively labelled a “free rider” by other NATO members⁴³.

Despite this apparent contradiction no formal declaration indicated Austria’s preparedness to surrender its neutral position in the period from 1995 to 2000⁴⁴. The first Austrian government openly to question neutrality was the coalition government of the People’s Party (ÖVP) and the Freedom Party (FPÖ) which had been formed in February 2000. The Minister of Defence, Herbert Scheibner, declared Austria to be non-aligned but no longer neutral, while Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated that Austria had said farewell to neutrality⁴⁵. These words were corroborated by deeds when the Austrian government appointed a commission of experts to elaborate a new “Security and Defence Doctrine” in 2001. In this document the Austrian government acknowledged the European framework to be of primary importance for Austrian security policy and asserted its intention to participate with military personnel in all areas of the ESDP. Furthermore, the document stated clearly that “Austria has – by its unconditional participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU – substantially modified its status of permanent neutrality. Thus, in an international

context, Austria no longer corresponds with the status of a neutral state but with one of a non-aligned or non-committed state"⁴⁶.

In fact, Austria developed what the Austrian legal scholar Waldemar Hummer called a "solidarity doctrine", which required Austria to "act in solidarity within the EU and neutrally outside of it". According to this interpretation, two separate areas of legal obligations existed for Austria: on the one hand, an "area of solidarity" within the EU which remained unaffected by neutrality, and on the other, the area of public international law outside the EU where neutrality prevailed. Even Hummer called this a legal *salto mortale* (death-defying leap) and questioned whether the international community would accept Austria's double status⁴⁷.

The new Austrian Security and Defence Doctrine of 2001 clearly showed how difficult it was (and still is) to reconcile membership in the EU with the status of neutrality. The Europeanisation process of the Austrian security and defence sector not only meant the dismantling of neutrality but also pushed the Austrian government to distance itself from neutrality and to adopt a new non-aligned stance in its foreign policy. However, the government's rhetoric in the international arena was quite different from the rhetoric it employed domestically. Since neutrality had come to be conceived as part of Austria's national identity since 1955, it is not surprising that it enjoyed high levels of support in Austrian society. In fact, its popularity is the main reason why Austrian governments have not yet wholly abandoned it altogether. As will be shown in the next section, the importance of neutrality for the domestic political agenda explains the apparent ambivalence of the Austrian government.

Neutrality as a Domestic Political Issue

Since the early 1990s the commitment to neutrality has faced significant and politically motivated pressure from certain circles in Austrian politics. However, recent opinion polls show that two thirds of Austrians favour neutrality because they perceive it as part of Austrian identity⁴⁸. This has not happened by accident. In 1955, Austrian politicians had to convince themselves and the public of the importance of neutrality and since then every schoolchild has learned the same lesson. Furthermore, the belief that neutrality and European integration were compatible was kept alive when Austria joined the EU in 1995. The main reason, however, why supporters of neutrality can continue to maintain a high level of confidence is because the neutrality clause in the Austrian Constitution can only be overturned by an amendment which would require a 2/3 majority in the Austrian National Assembly. Since one of the two largest parties still favours the concept of neutrality such a majority is not in sight.

Today, Austria's major political parties hold opposing views on the issues of neutrality and participation in European security and defence policy. On the one hand the conservative Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) exhibits a very open-minded approach to

the common defence policy of the EU. It has flirted with the idea of WEU/NATO-membership and even considered this option to be compatible with neutrality. On the other hand the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) opposes any move which might gainsay neutrality. It is thus hostile to WEU/NATO-membership and has often cleverly used the popularity of neutrality for electoral purposes⁴⁹. The Green party and the right-wing Freedom Party (FPÖ)⁵⁰ both vehemently support neutrality.

There is no better example of the impasse between the two major parties than the so-called "report on options". In 1996 the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition, led by the Socialist Viktor Klima, commissioned a report outlining Austria's choices in the face of deepening European security policy. During its preparation it became clear that the ÖVP sought NATO membership while the SPÖ vehemently opposed this idea. The negotiations led to a dead end, the coalition could not find common ground, and the report came to nothing. The Austrian public was left confused by statements from high-ranking politicians, such as the ÖVP defence minister, that Austrian neutrality was compatible with NATO membership⁵¹. The position of the two parties has changed little since then. The general election of 2006 resulted once again in a coalition between SPÖ and ÖVP, with the latter being the junior party. Repealing the Law on Neutrality is currently out of the question and the steps taken in that direction by the previous ÖVP-FPÖ government have been more or less invalidated.

There is another factor which makes the continuance of neutrality desirable for certain circles in Austria. Neutrality has been the justification for very low defence expenditures⁵². Austria is one of the few member states which spend less than EUR 5 billion on defence. It moreover has fewer than 50,000 active military personnel⁵³. The pressure on Austria to increase its defence budget would be significantly increased if it aspired to further integration in European security⁵⁴. In the domestic political arena this is a very sensitive issue. This was highlighted in the summer of 2002 when the then ÖVP-FPÖ government placed an order for Eurofighter Typhoon airplanes to upgrade the Austrian air force. After having promised to cancel the entire deal during the election campaign, the new minister of defence (SPÖ) finally struck a deal with Eurofighter Ltd. and reduced the order from 18 to 15 aircraft⁵⁵. The whole debate over the Eurofighter once again revealed that Austria had not overcome its ambivalence concerning neutrality as a legacy of the past and its commitment to European integration.

The Mutual Assistance Clause in the Constitutional Treaty

Given the domestic importance of neutrality the ambivalent stance of the present Austrian government towards integration in the field of EDSP appears less puzzling. Yet despite these reservations Austria recently agreed to commitments which violate its neutrality law⁵⁶. The adoption of the Austrian Security and Defence Doctrine of 2001 was particularly important because of the foreseen changes with regard to the reformed

European foreign policy in the EU Constitutional Treaty that would have made a number of alterations in the existing treaties. While the proposed European Constitution was abandoned due to negative votes in referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, a similar so-called Reform Treaty was agreed upon in 2007. The mere fact that the Austrian government signed and ratified the Treaty in 2004 justifies a closer analysis of the provisions.

Austria favoured a European Union Constitution because it feared that without it alternative military alliances outside of the European framework might be created. This was certainly not in the interest of Austria because such alliances would surely have been determined by the national interests of the major EU states and Austria would have lost influence. Even if accepting the proposed EU Constitutional Treaty would lead to deeper integration for Austria, this seemed preferable as it would at least take place within the framework of the European Union⁵⁷.

The proposed EU Constitutional Treaty foresaw different forms of cooperation between member states in the field of European defence. One of them was to establish closer cooperation on mutual defence for those member states willing to do so⁵⁸. This clause made it possible for the EU to evolve into a system of collective defence, a kind of military pact. As we have seen, the status of a permanent neutral state is incompatible with full membership in a military pact⁵⁹ and so this development was not supported by the neutrals. Indeed, as a result of pressure from the non-aligned and neutral states in the European Union, the final version of the proposed EU Constitutional Treaty included the so-called "Irish Clause". This stated that the Constitutional Treaty "shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States"⁶⁰, and can be attributed to the long-standing Irish demand to maintain its "military neutrality" within the EU. Thus, there exists no obligation for mutual assistance if the defence and security policy of a neutral country prevents this. Austrian politicians deduced that neutrality was not affected by the CFSP and ESDP and that in the event of a collision with the EU its laws of neutrality would prevail.

However, as the Austrian scholar Hummer has pointed out, by signing the Constitution Austria has violated international neutrality laws. In his view the Constitutional Treaty has legal implications for Austrian neutrality which are easily overlooked. Despite the Irish clause, neutrality law is violated when Austria supports resolutions concerning the CFSP and ESDP which are in conflict with its obligations to neutrality. Secondary law in the CFSP pillar of the EU – where unanimity still prevails – needs the consent of the permanent neutral member states. Thus, according to Hummer, by the mere fact of participating in the voting, neutrals contradict neutrality law⁶¹.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has sought to provide an example of how the international system set up after World War II, characterised by the expansion of international law, has affected the sphere of domestic legislation. The European Union is without doubt a fascinating and unique case. It has served as a model for many other attempts at regional integration, but so far the supranational approach has not been emulated. Laws of the (partly) supranational EU, which can have a direct impact on the member states and can take precedence over national laws, have transgressed the traditional monist or dualist approaches. There is thus ample reason to call the EU a system *sui generis*.

The question of Austrian neutrality was chosen as a case study because the domestic dimension of that country's neutrality has created several problematic issues with regards to participation in European integration since the end of the Cold War. The scholarly debate over whether the law on Austrian neutrality should be considered part of international law also demonstrates the limitations of traditional distinctions between municipal and international law. Since its accession to the European Union in 1995, Austria's security and defence sector has undergone tremendous change. Today, Austrian neutrality is practically obsolete. From 1997 to 2002 Austria cooperated with 5,000 participants in the framework of the "Partnership for Peace", a NATO project aimed at creating trust between NATO and other states in Europe and the former Soviet Union. In the same period more than 120,000 international soldiers and more than 42,000 military vehicles have crossed Austria's borders. Furthermore, more than 91,000 foreign military airplanes have overflown Austrian territory in this period. From an international perspective, Austria's neutrality clearly exists merely on paper. This has happened as a consequence of Austria's participation in the process of European integration and its desire to keep pace with the advance of the common European security policy. However, the concept of neutrality still holds a great deal of sway over the Austrian population and therefore has important implications for domestic politics. Since neutrality is part of Austria's constitution and can only be altered by a 2/3 majority a broad consensus would be needed to do so. Given the conflicting views on the issue between the two major political parties, no such consensus is in sight.

This chapter has argued that Austria has not entirely abandoned its neutrality and has participated only with substantial reservations in the common European security policy. This stance, and the ongoing insistence upon its special status, has led to strains between Austria and several NATO member states. The solution of these issues will not become easier as future developments in the CFSP and in any reformed EU constitutional treaty will most likely further violate neutrality law. Austrian political elites have always avoided the implications of Austria's participation in European integration with regards to its neutrality. As long as the Austrian government does not initiate a serious public debate on this issue, and leading political parties do not abandon their rhetori-

cal hypocrisy, the dilemmas arising from Austria's ambivalent stance towards neutrality and CFSP will persist. This is all the more problematic as participation in all fields of the European integration process has been deemed necessary by a succession of Austrian governments that regard Austria as a key member of the European Union. Ironically, Austria's continued adherence to the principle of neutrality constitutes an obstacle to its own desire for deeper integration in the European Union.

NOTES

- ¹ International treaties have a long history, but it is widely accepted that ancient examples, such as that between the two Mesopotamian city states Lagash and Umma in 3100 BC, are not part of international law as they were not concluded by equal and sovereign states in the modern sense.
- ² The term "municipal law" is used to denote the national, domestic, or internal law of a sovereign state. It includes not only law at the national level, but also at the provincial, territorial, regional and/or local levels.
- ³ R. Wallace, *International Law*, London 2002, pp. 34-36, 31-35; A. Cassese, *International Law*, Oxford 2004, pp. 162-65; I. Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law*, Oxford 2003, pp. 120-123.
- ⁴ S. Voigt, *The Interplay between National and International Law- Its Economic Effects Drawing on Four New Indicators*, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=925796>.
- ⁵ This doctrine of the supremacy of EU law was established in the famous 1964 court case "Costa vs. ENEL". C. Thun-Hohenstein, F. Cede, G. Hafner, *Europarecht. Ein systematischer Überblick mit den Auswirkungen des Vertrages von Nizza*, Vienna 2003. See also T. Öhlinger, M. Potacs, *Gemeinschaftsrecht und staatliches Recht. Die Anwendung des Europarechts im innerstaatlichen Bereich*, Vienna 1998.
- ⁶ The origin of the term is the Latin *ne uter*, which translates as none of both.
- ⁷ U. Pieper, *Neutralität von Staaten*, Frankfurt/Main etc. 1997, pp. 161-63, 167-68.
- ⁸ Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed out of a sense of legal obligation, so much so that it becomes custom. As such, it is not necessary for a country to sign a treaty for customary international law to apply. Customary international law must be derived from a clear consensus among states, as exhibited both by widespread conduct and a discernible sense of obligation.
- ⁹ Historically the "neutralist" states tilted towards the Soviet Union and the concept was thus scorned at by the West. See M. Gehler, *Finis Neutralität? Historische und politische Aspekte im europäischen Vergleich: Irland, Finnland, Schweden, Schweiz und Österreich*, Bonn 2001, pp. 3-5.
- ¹⁰ See for example T. Ripper, *Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952. Die Entwicklung der wissenschaftlichen Debatte*, in "Zeitgeschichte", 1996, 29 (6), pp. 372-396.
- ¹¹ Gehler, *Finis Neutralität* cit., pp. 9-15.
- ¹² A combination of the two, namely a political alliance of officially neutral states as in the case of the Baltic League 1934-40, is also possible.
- ¹³ Realism encompasses a variety of theories and approaches, all of which share the belief that states are primarily motivated by the desire for military and economic power or security, rather than ideals or ethics. This term is often synonymous with power politics. See for example H. J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York 1948, and K. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, New York 1959.
- ¹⁴ The interdependence theory stipulates that the current international system is characterised by growing interdependence, mutual responsibility, and dependency on others. The role of non-state actors such

as international institutions and widespread acceptance of a number of operating principles in the international system are stressed. See for example R. O. Keohane, J. S. Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Cambridge 1971.

- ¹⁵ H. Gärtner, *Modelle Europäischer Sicherheit. Wie entscheidet Österreich?*, Vienna 1997, pp. 4-10.
- ¹⁶ Gärtner, *Modelle* cit., 10.
- ¹⁷ J. Frank, S. Sandawi, *Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der EU-Streitkräfteintegration. Chancen und Perspektiven für kleinere Staaten am Beispiel Österreichs*. Available at: <http://www.bmlv.gv.at/wissenforschung/publikationen/beitrag.php?id=1348>, p. 25 (October 2005).
- ¹⁸ K. Vocelka, *Geschichte Österreichs. Kultur – Gesellschaft – Politik*, Munich 2002, p. 325. Austrian neutrality was attractive to Soviet leaders since it interrupted the NATO communication lines between West Germany and Italy and created another neutral buffer-state in Central Europe. Plus, it kept Austria out of NATO and prevented another Anschluss.
- ¹⁹ On the Austrian State Treaty see: G. Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit. Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost-West-Besetzung Österreichs 1945-55*, Vienna etc. 1998; M. Rauchensteiner, R. Kriechbaumer (eds.), *Die Gunst des Augenblicks. Neuere Forschungen zu Staatsvertrag und Neutralität*, Vienna 2005; R. Steininger, *Der Staatsvertrag Österreich im Schatten der Deutschen Frage und des Kalten Krieges 1938-1955*, Innsbruck 2005.
- ²⁰ A. Gémes, *Die Kosten des Staatsvertrages*, in S. Karner, G. Stangler (eds.), „Österreich ist frei!“ *Der österreichische Staatsvertrag 1955*, Horn 2005, pp. 318-320.
- ²¹ The Austrian Government waited until the last soldier of the occupation forces had left its territory in order to avoid the image of an imposed neutrality.
- ²² Bundesverfassungsgesetz über die Neutralität Österreichs, 26.10.1955. Contrary to common belief, Austrian neutrality is thus not part of the State Treaty.
- ²³ P. Luif, *Austria's Permanent Neutrality – its Origins, Development and Demise*, in “Contemporary Austrian Studies”, 2001, 9, p. 133.
- ²⁴ See for example R. Eger, *Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen: Das Verhalten während des Ungarnaufstandes 1956 und der tschechoslowakischen Krise 1968 – Ein Vergleich*, Vienna 1981. For the Hungarian Revolution and Austria see most recently Z. Fonagy, I. Murber, *Die Ungarische Revolution und Österreich 1956*, Vienna 2006.
- ²⁵ Luif, *Permanent Neutrality* cit., p. 135; K. Liebhart, *Transformation and Semantic Change of Austrian Neutrality: Its Origins, Development and Demise* in A. Kovács, R. Wodak, *NATO, Neutrality and National Identity: the Case of Austria and Hungary*, Vienna 2003, p. 29.
- ²⁶ The reserved French attitude (Paris feared a strengthening of Germany) also played a decisive influence. R. Steininger, *Österreichs „Alleingang“ nach Brüssel 1963-69*, in M. Gehler, R. Steininger (eds.), *The Neutrals and European Integration 1945-1955*, Vienna etc. 2000, pp. 611-632.
- ²⁷ C. Jenny, *Konsensformel oder Vorbild? Die Entstehung der österreichischen Neutralität und ihr Schweizer Muster*, Bern - Stuttgart 1995, pp. 133-200; Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit* cit., pp. 549-567.
- ²⁸ Liebhart, *Austrian Neutrality* cit., p. 27. See also E. Bielka., P. Jankowitsch, H. Thalberg (eds.), *Die Ära Kreisky. Schwerpunkte der österreichischen Außenpolitik*, Vienna 1983, or more recently O. Rathkolb (ed.), *Bruno Kreisky. Erinnerungen. Das Vermächtnis des Jahrhundertpolitikers*, Vienna etc. 2007.
- ²⁹ M. Cox, R. MacGinty, *Farewell to a Beautiful idea: The End of Neutrality in the Post-Cold War World*, in W. Bauwens, A. Clesse, O. Knudsen (eds), *Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe*, London – Washington 1996, p. 131.
- ³⁰ Gehler, *Finis Neutralität* cit., p. 27.

- ³¹ L. Ferreira-Pereira, *The Militarily Non-Allied States in the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Solidarity 'ma non troppo'*, in "Journal of Contemporary European Studies", 1979, 13, p. 22.
- ³² It is questionable if the majority of the Austrian population would have voted yes faced with the choice between EU or neutrality. M. Gehler, *Der lange Weg nach Europa. Österreich vom Ende der Monarchie bis zur EU*, Innsbruck etc. 2002, p. 316.
- ³³ W. Hummer, *The New EU – A 'Military Pact'? Solidarity – Neutrality – 'Irish Clause'*, in G. Hauser, F. Kernic (eds.), *European Security in Transition*, Aldershot 2006, p. 69. The Austrian application for EC-membership of 17 July 1989, however, had contained a neutrality clause.
- ³⁴ The Western European Union (WEU) is a European defence and security organization, established on the basis of the Treaty of Brussels of 1948 with the accession of West Germany and Italy in 1954. Certain WEU-functions such as crisis-management now fall under the EU.
- ³⁵ Gehler, *Finis Neutralität* cit., p. 28.
- ³⁶ Luif, *Permanent Neutrality* cit., p. 143.
- ³⁷ G. Hauser, *Österreich- Zehn Jahre Mitgliedschaft in der NATO-Partnerschaft für den Frieden*, in "Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift", 2005, 6, available at <http://www.bmlv.gv.at/omz/ausgaben/artikel.php?id=347>.
- ³⁸ The Petersberg tasks, which were first formulated by the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992 during a summit in the Hotel Petersberg near Bonn, are a list of military and security priorities. They cover a great range of possible military missions, ranging from the most simple to the most robust military intervention. They are formulated as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks. and finally tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
- ³⁹ Ferreira-Pereira, *Militarily Non-Allied States* cit., p. 27.
- ⁴⁰ Luif, *Permanent Neutrality* cit., p. 143.
- ⁴¹ R. Stadlhofer, *Die Weiterentwicklung der GASP im Entwurf des Vertrages über eine Verfassung für Europa und deren Bedeutung für die Europäisierung der österreichischen Sicherheitspolitik am Weg von der Neutralität zur Integration*, available at <http://www.bmlv.gv.at/wissen-forschung/publikationen/beitrag.php?id=1061>, p. 121.
- ⁴² Y. Boyer, *Which Defence Posture for Austria at the Beginning of the 21st Century?*, available at: http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/17_bspf_boyer_10.pdf, October 2005, p. 4.
- ⁴³ Luif, *Permanent Neutrality* cit., p. 151.
- ⁴⁴ Ferreira-Pereira, *Militarily Non-Allied States* cit., p. 27.
- ⁴⁵ Liebhart, *Transformation and Semantic Change* cit., p. 44.
- ⁴⁶ Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin, available at http://www.austria.gv.at/2004/4/4/doktrin_d.pdf, p. 8.
- ⁴⁷ Hummer, *New EU* cit., p. 71.
- ⁴⁸ Frank, *Möglichkeiten und Grenzen* cit., p. 35.
- ⁴⁹ Ferreira-Pereira, *Militarily Non-Allied States* cit., p. 28.
- ⁵⁰ Note that the FPÖ split in 2005 into two camps, when the former leaders established a new party, the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ), which today holds a (slightly) more positive attitude towards European integration. The FPÖ continues to exist but has shifted even more to the right. It opposes EU integration in general and claims to "defend" Austrian neutrality.
- ⁵¹ Gehler, *Finis Neutralität* cit., pp. 77-80.
- ⁵² Luif, *Permanent Neutrality* cit., p. 152.
- ⁵³ Boyer, *Defence Posture* cit., p. 4.

⁵⁴ Luif, *Permanent Neutrality* cit., p. 152.

⁵⁵ *Die Presse*, 29.6.2007.

⁵⁶ Frank, *Möglichkeiten und Grenzen* cit., p. 35

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁵⁸ Art.I-41 (7): "If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have toward it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter." Stadlhofer, *Weiterentwicklung der GASP* cit., p. 107.

⁵⁹ This means that the neutral state will be collectively defended by the other members of the military pact in the event of military aggression against its territory, but it does not have to participate in a collective retaliation in the case of a military assault against any other pact member.

⁶⁰ Hummer, *New EU* cit., p. 63.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

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SOURCE

The Austrian declaration of neutrality was a constitutional act of the Austrian parliament enacted on 26 October 1955. Formally, the declaration was promulgated voluntarily by the Republic of Austria but politically it was a prerequisite for the departure of the Allied occupation troops which was a consequence of the Austrian State Treaty of 15 May 1955. The document was published in the Federal Law Gazette.

Bundesverfassungsgesetz vom 26. Oktober 1955 über die Neutralität Österreichs

Artikel I.

- (1) *Zum Zwecke der dauernden Behauptung seiner Unabhängigkeit nach außen und zum Zwecke der Unverletzlichkeit seines Gebietes erklärt Österreich aus freien Stücken seine immerwährende Neutralität. Österreich wird diese mit allen ihm zu Gebote stehenden Mitteln aufrechterhalten und verteidigen.*
- (2) *Österreich wird zur Sicherung dieser Zwecke in aller Zukunft keinen militärischen Bündnissen beitreten und die Errichtung militärischer Stützpunkte fremder Staaten auf seinem Gebiet nicht zulassen.*

Artikel II.

Mit der Vollziehung dieses Bundesverfassungsgesetzes ist die Bundesregierung betraut.

Constitutional Law on the Neutrality of Austria of October 26, 1955

Article I.

- (1) For the purpose of the permanent maintenance of her external independence and for the purpose of the inviolability of her territory, Austria, of her own free will, declares herewith her permanent neutrality which she is resolved to maintain and defend with all the means at her disposal.
- (2) In order to secure these purposes, Austria will never in the future accede to any military alliances nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign States on her territory.

Article II.

The Federal Government is authorized to enact appropriate legislation.

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History Wars: Questioning Tolerance

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ABSTRACT

The experience of *history wars* is a laboratory for studying how history is embedded in mass experience. Greece has experienced, recently, such a history war over a new history textbook. The core of the debate centred on whether the nation-state and its ideology should be defended against globalization and the spirit of cosmopolitanism. “History” and “globalization” were set in contrast in a matrix where pastness, particularity, and nationality are pitted against presentism, modernism and cosmopolitanism. This book was written in the historical and pedagogical *Koinè*, the common language of internationalized historical scholarship, history didactics and the spirit of tolerance promoted by the UN, Council of Europe and EU. Studying the war that developed over it also helps us understand, on the one hand, how politics “from above”, promoting human rights, diversity and tolerance in history, encounters political, ideological and cultural reactions in the course of implementation. On the other, its purpose is to observe what happens when the standard language of contemporary history scholarship comes up against national audiences.

Η εξερεύνηση των πολέμων της ιστορίας μπορεί να μας μάθει πολλά για το πώς σκέπτεται την ιστορία μεγάλο μέρος του πληθυσμού στις σύγχρονες κοινωνίες, και τους τρόπους μέσα από τους οποίους αναδύεται η έννοια και η εμπειρία του παρελθόντος. Στην Ελλάδα υπήρξε πρόσφατα ένας παρόμοιος πόλεμος για το σχολικό εγχειρίδιο ιστορίας της Στ' δημοτικού, όπου η «ιστορία» και η «παγκοσμιοποίηση» τέθηκαν σε ένα πεδίο αντιπαράθεσης, στο οποίο από τη μια πλευρά συντάχθηκαν οι έννοιες της «παρελθοντικότητας», της «ιδιαιτερότητας» και της «εθνικότητας» και από την άλλη οι έννοιες του «παροντισμού», του «εκσυγχρονισμού» και του «κοσμοπολιτισμού».

Celebrating the 50th anniversary of their foundation, the United Nations and UNESCO adopted a *Declaration of the Principles on Tolerance* and decided to proclaim 1995 the “International Year for Tolerance”¹. According to the declaration:

tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication, and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in difference. It is not only a moral duty; it is also a political and legal requirement. Tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace.

The reason behind this decision was the preoccupation with the ethnic wars that followed the dissolution and the fragmentation of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the mass killing in Rwanda, racial assaults in Western Europe, and nationalist or religious extremism diffused around the world. Intolerance is increasingly being seen by international organizations as a major threat to democracy, peace and security.

TOLERANCE DISCOURSE SINCE 1948

Fostering tolerance in international relations and promoting a culture of peace through education so as to prevent the outbreak of another world war has been a permanent preoccupation of the UN and UNESCO since they came into existence, after the end of World War II and the defeat of Nazism. The connection between education and tolerance was solemnly declared in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, which affirmed that education: "should promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups" (Article 26)².

Historians and history teachers were called upon to educate young people in tolerance. History books and teaching should be freed from nationalist interpretations and prejudice, and history should no longer be a weapon to achieve national aspirations and ambitions, but become rather a means to knowledge and a way to encourage dialogue between countries. In 1954, the *European Cultural Convention*³, which called on signatory states to encourage study of the history and civilisation of the other contracting parties and to promote such studies in the territory of the other contracting parties, was signed in Paris. In addition, the Council of Europe, from the 1950s, urged its member states to revise their textbooks and to present the events of the past in less conflictual terms. Several bodies in UNESCO, the Council of Europe and the European Union, as well as independent entities like the Georg Eckert Institute in Braunschweig, undertook the task of promoting collaboration among scholars and education authorities from many countries in order to revise history textbooks. To these goals were added the elimination of clichés or incorrect interpretations that tainted the way neighbouring states were presented as well as the removal of discriminating stereotypes against other peoples, religious and ethnic groups. Also encouraged were the reshaping of traditional curricula of history teaching and the planning of new educational programmes against racism, intolerance and gender inequality. For the Council of Europe, the European Union and the constellation of institutes involved, the teaching of history was consid-

ered enormously important for the formation of the future citizens of democratic societies. One of the stronger initiatives was *Recommendation (2001) 15* on history teaching in 21st-century Europe, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of Education with the aim “to make appreciable progress in developing a pluralist and tolerant concept of history teaching”⁴. The EU and the Council of Europe have been involved in helping the states of Eastern Europe to reform their history curricula, publish new textbooks and train history teachers. New concepts such as multi-perspectivity, the cross-border nature of heritage and diversity were added to the inspiring values of history teaching, as were new methods based on multi-media and cyberspace.

How these principles and recommendations on tolerance education were conceived in different countries and what degree of influence they had are issues that are still to be researched. Seen from the day-by-day evening-news perspective, the world seems not to have improved much despite the various activities to promote tolerance. Since the Year for Tolerance in 1995, we have seen new outbursts of ethnic conflict and slaughter, as well as religious, racial and xenophobic extremism. As always, the interpretation of human rights and tolerance has not been uniform. In societies where democracy and citizenship had a working meaning, tolerance was already part of the political culture. For this reason, some intellectuals have often taken a critical distance from the discourse on tolerance and human rights, disapproving of its abstractness which permits selective use to be made of it. They argue that the human-rights discourse, as it has developed, is itself part of the problem. Tolerance is the privatization of the difference, and a substitute for equality, it has been argued⁵. On the other hand, tolerance and human rights have been invoked by societies hitherto lacking tolerance and civil freedom. For people living under religious law or arbitrary regimes, in societies divided by ethnic or civil war, for oppressed minorities, for immigrant groups living without rights, the appeal to the principles of tolerance and human rights is a strategy for empowering the weak. Tolerance is here invoked by those experiencing intolerance. But how have historians viewed this crusade for tolerance?

HISTORY AND TOLERANCE

“History” is a word much older than “tolerance” (an attitude) or “toleration” (an institutional and political practice). While history in its diversity of meanings is a secular term, tolerance emerged as a religious term during the century of religious wars (as a response to them), and retained its religious connotations into the 18th century. John Locke, the 17th-century English philosopher, in his famous *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (1689)⁶, argued that the state should not interfere in defining religious belief or imposing one on its subjects. The meaning of the concept was defined and enlarged during the Enlightenment by Voltaire in his *Treatise on Tolerance* (1763), Kant, mainly in his *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793), and Thomas Paine in his *Rights*

of *Man* (1791). In the 19th century tolerance moved away from the religious context, acquiring a more political meaning and became part of the liberal attitude (John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, 1859), although the spread of European colonialism across the world was sustained by intolerance. The 20th century did not represent the triumph of tolerance, but the opposite. During this century, the literature on tolerance and intolerance was no longer preoccupied with the intolerant state, but mainly with mass politics and intolerant ideologies and mentalities. World War Two was the absolute triumph of intolerance. Since the end of the War, the literature on tolerance has been supplanted by the language of rights. In this way the “other” is not so much tolerated as allowed to be “other”, and even more, his right to respect is protected. Diversity is not “tolerated” but encouraged to be visible. The expanding literature on the politics of difference has gone beyond the concepts of tolerance and intolerance⁷. For this reason, in 2007 UNESCO adopted the *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions* and this year declared a World Day for Cultural Diversity⁸.

What does history have to do with tolerance, diversity and human rights? The entanglement of history with the nation has transformed history into a cultural practice of reshaping consciousness, identities and mentalities, which was part of the crafting of nation-states⁹. Nationalization of historical consciousness created an “us”-and-“them” dichotomy on the past and intolerance was enforced by its justification through history. National history was cultivated as a “science”¹⁰ but, at the same time and under certain political regimes, it could not avoid engaging in what the Council of Europe’s 2001 Recommendation considered the “misuse of history”. Under this definition were included ideological manipulation, the falsification or creation of false evidence, doctored statistics, faked images, fixation on events to justify or conceal others, distortions of the past for propaganda purposes, abuse of the historical record, and the denial or ignoring of historical fact¹¹.

Parallel to the rise of national history one has seen the process of internationalizing historical studies, theories, debates and communities, which has produced a thick network of conferences, societies, joint projects and journals. Some of the more conspicuous turns in the social sciences and humanities have reverberated internationally across these networks¹². Since the last quarter of the 20th century, the national and international itineraries of historical studies have experienced ongoing divergence. The cultural fashion of constructionism, the criticism of nationalism, and the engendering of historical discourse were the main trends through which the new route towards the globalization of historical studies was paved. The influence of theories coming from Social Anthropology, Michel Foucault and Edward Said (*Orientalism*) on historical studies has strengthened the focus on the “other” and the idea of “otherness” as an epistemological concept in the humanities and social sciences, parallel with the the new readiness by international organizations to praise diversity.

But the reality of international meetings hardly corresponds to reality at a national level. Although the former are significant in expanding academic milieus, they are much less visible locally. National audiences are still dominated strongly by national history, which is informed by nostalgia, affection, pride, or antipathy. As a consequence, any attempt to disassociate history from the nation often results in history wars. Sometimes history wars break out after attempts are made to adapt historical teaching in school to the main trends of historiography and educational science. The cause of others is a desire to hang on to national values in education and to prevent the national consciousness from being aligned with new global experiences. Some of these assaults have resulted from a neo-conservative revaluation of national history as a repository of perennial values. They have also stemmed from particular memory groups contesting the authority of the state to define the content of historical consciousness and demanding the right to see their past experience depicted in the official version of history.

Cultural wars centring on history have broken out in many countries around the world since the 1990s, following what has been described as the crisis of the nation-state, globalization, and the rise of new constituencies of history¹³. The idea that this chapter proposes is that the experience of history wars is a laboratory for studying how history is embedded in mass experience. I think that the battlegrounds over history open new frontiers of research for learning what history and historical culture are and how they have been re-conceptualised as social and cultural practices in contemporary societies. More recently, Greece has experienced such a history war over the new history textbook for the final year of primary school¹⁴. This chapter refers to (and draws on) my experience as an observer of and participant in the unprecedented intellectual and ideological war that followed the publication of this book, lasting for more than a year. The book was written in the historical and pedagogical *Koinè*, the common language of internationalized historical scholarship, adopting the history didactics and spirit of tolerance promoted by the UN, Council of Europe and EU. The study of the war that developed over it is also a contribution to understanding, on the one hand, how politics “from above”, promoting human rights, diversity and tolerance in history, encounters political, ideological and cultural reactions in the process of implementation. On the other, its purpose is to observe what happens when the standard language of contemporary history scholarship encounters national audiences.

THE STORY

The textbook was part of a series of new books issued as part of an overhaul of the school syllabus. The subject matter dealt with the history of the modern world since the Renaissance. In Greek primary and secondary education there are separate textbooks, published by the state, for each class. The authors of these textbooks are obliged to follow the official analytical curriculum set for all the country's schools. The Greek

Constitution lays down that education should promote national consciousness and Christian sentiment among students. It is no surprise then that despite its title, *The Modern and Contemporary Period*, the new book focused overwhelmingly on Greek history. Nevertheless, it avoided references to the common myths of Greek national ideology, used a more neutral and detached language in referring to the sufferings or the heroic deeds of the Greeks, and avoided hostile language in referring to the country's traditional national enemies.

When this book was published in March 2006, few expected the unprecedented intellectual and ideological war that followed for more than an entire year. The accusation was that the book undermined the foundations of Greek identity, tried to loosen the bonds between the Orthodox Church and the nation, cultivated historical oblivion regarding Turkey, introduced political correctness into Greek education, and put into practice the supposed imperatives of globalization to eradicate patriotism and national consciousness and to flatten world cultures. According to a more diffused conspiracy theory, a school of Greek historians, in the service of the USA or the EU, has as its purpose the deconstruction of national history and identity. (Note the particular use of the term *deconstruction*). The Church of Greece participated in the debate; its Archbishop condemned the authors as traitors. The book was condemned in churches during Sunday masses and the Holy Synod asked that it be recalled. Cyprus, where Greek textbooks are also in use, did not miss out on the controversy, and the Greek-Cypriot Ministry of Education also requested the book be recalled. Far-right groups burnt the book in front of the Greek Parliament during the National Day parade (25 March 2007). Greek Education Minister Marietta Giannakou refused to recall the book but asked the Academy of Athens to evaluate it. The Academy, a very conservative institute staffed by retired professors, responded (on 22 March 2006) with a text containing almost 80 points of correction, maintaining that the book did not serve the national spirit of education or the cultivation of national memory. The Academy's report was given to the authors' panel, headed by Prof. Maria Repoussi, in order that the book be "corrected". At the same time, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) requested withdrawal of the book on the grounds that it was written in the spirit of European integration, celebrating the free market and the European Union.

Television news shows (with their impassioned debates), the press (with a barrage of opinion pieces), and the internet, where dozens of bloggers and discussion forums created a vast virtual controversy, formed the battleground where this war over the rewriting of Greek history was fought. The controversy over the book became the most popular topic in everyday conversations among common people and one of the hottest issues in the elections debates. Historians who defended the book entered the field by means of a press conference, where five university professors, representing the editorial boards of five history and the social science reviews, explained to the assembled media why the

accusations against the book were unfounded and unjustified¹⁵. They also participated in numerous television and newspaper debates.

HISTORY VS. GLOBALIZATION

The core of the debate centred on whether the nation-state and its ideology should be defended against globalization and the spirit of cosmopolitanism. This idea that there is a battle between globalization and cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and the nation-state and history, on the other, is the common denominator of all (left and right) opposition to the book. “History” and “globalization” were set in contrast in a matrix where pastness, particularity, and nationality are pitted against presentism, modernism and cosmopolitanism.

The concept of history and memory as a moral duty vis-à-vis authority came to the fore in the form of the resistance of people against the new cosmopolitan history, reactivating older ideas about memory as resistance. “Memory as resistance” became a commonplace, giving meaning to the cultural practices of history. In the Greek context, this meaning came from the post-war period when the Greek state suppressed the memory of the resistance against the German occupation. The slogan “Lest I forget” was used as a national emblem for remembering the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and the motto “The people don’t forget what the Right means” was used for the rise of socialists to power and delegitimization of their opponents. The conceptualization of memory as resistance was central to Greek politics. But the link between commemoration and resistance also came from dissident Eastern European intellectuals, who used the appeal to memory against Soviet rule in the aftermath of the Prague Spring in 1968. Milan Kundera’s opening phrase in his novel *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting* (1979) became famous: “The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting”¹⁶. The genealogy of this link also features George Orwell’s dystopian novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, where the struggle against totalitarianism means the preservation of memory. The theoretic investment in this romanticized role of history came, paradoxically, from very different philosophical approaches, like Walter Benjamin’s fragment on “history in peril” and Michel Foucault’s references to counter-memory and counter-history as resistance practices against the dominant ideology¹⁷.

But why has globalization been set in contrast with history and how are both concepts related? Globalization is effected by forces standing above and across economies and societies. The intellectual equivalent of this operation is a high level of abstraction, which is at odds with particularities, proveniences and contexts. It resembles the network of superhighways and skyscrapers above the urban texture of old cities. Such a superimposed construction entails a mental break between the old and the new. The forces which unify the world (capitalism, science, technology) are superimposed structures which contrast the future with the past, the global with the local, the abstract with the

concrete, and modernization with history. This unhistorical world of shining surfaces contrasts with a revival of nostalgia for oldness, and it is in this context that history as a means of conceiving the world in its diversity is juxtaposed with globalization¹⁸.

The activation of historical feelings in the face of coming modernity is older than the conception of globalization. History has long been considered as an expression of loss for a world fast disappearing under the emergence of mass industrial society in the 19th century¹⁹. According to Svetlana Boym, “nostalgia is rebellion against the modern idea of time, the time of history and progress”²⁰. In the context of globalization what turns people to the past is the lack of futurity, or the impossibility of conceiving an ideal future different from the all-consuming and fast-consumed real future. As a consequence, nostalgia seems a defence of the old and familiar context against the threat from the superimposed forces of globalization, which are beyond any public control. From this perspective, globalization is considered to be the kingdom of amnesia²¹. This anxiety is not unjustified. Futurist representations of supermodernity include contempt for history, something common to most utopian thinking²².

HISTORY AND NATIONAL HISTORY

There were three main points of criticism for the new book: 1) The way in which it described the four centuries of Turkish rule, known as the *Turkish Yoke* (an official term, still in use for the centuries of Ottoman rule in Greek lands, from the 15th to the 19th centuries); 2) The role of the Orthodox Church in the national awakening, and the tradition of church-run secret schools; and 3) the expulsion of the Greek population from Asia Minor in 1922 after the Greek-Turkish War, in which the Greek Army invaded the Asia Minor territories of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I.²³ These topics form the main pillars of Greek national ideology, the outline of which is that the Greek nation stems from antiquity and has retained its unity despite foreign domination, preserving the dual legacy of Hellenism and Christianity. The book's authors were condemned by their critics not only because of their “cold” and unsentimental description of Greek suffering and achievement, but also because of their ambiguity about the issue of the continuity of the Greek nation from ancient to modern times. These charges found a large receptive audience because they correspond to the version of history embedded in national ideology. As a consequence, the new book was presented as endangering patriotism; opposition to it, despite initiating from quite marginal groups, thus managed to garner massive support.

The historians who entered the debate explained the fictiveness and inaccuracy, not to mention misinformation, behind most of the charges against the book. Their main argument was that national ideology has created a fictional reality considered to be the history of Greece, which is in sharp contrast with the common acceptances of the scholarly community in historical studies. The historical community in Greece was

formed during the post-dictatorship period, and one of the main ideas commonly accepted by its protagonists was rejection of the “ideological use of history”. Historians understood their historiographical task to weed out “ideological myths” from history. This idea, which contrasted “historical reality” with the “ideological view” of this reality, and “scientific” history with “ideological” history, was the common strategy of historians adopted in the controversy over the book²⁴. Looking back now at the debates on the book, from the distance of time, it is easy to understand that what was at stake was not the supremacy of truth over falsehood, or scientific knowledge over ideologically biased beliefs²⁵.

The hot topics of the debate had less to do with history in general than with the history, or more precisely the *biography*, of the nation. The debate had nothing to do with a disinterested, intellectual curiosity over an “historical past”, but with the passion for “our” “practical past”, which we want to use in our collective and public life. The idea of a distinction between two pasts belongs to the British philosopher of history Michael Oakshott and has been re-elaborated in a recent controversy by Hayden White²⁶. It does not have to do with different pasts, but with different approaches to the past which end up in different pasts. As a consequence national history becomes the “practical past”, while global history is a matter of the “historical past”, because the former corresponds to a lived experience through a nation state, national language, education system, etc., while there is no such a thing as global experience (or it does not yet exist). The “practical past” depends on the “community of experience”, a term employed by Otto Bauer to explain the formation of nations²⁷. Many communities of experience, such as religious communities or the socialist movement, have experienced bitter quarrels over their respective “practical pasts”.

History as the nation’s “biography” refers to the definition of history as the “natural and moral biology of the nation”, provided by the Greek romantic historian Spyridon Zambelios, and as the genealogy of grandfathers, fathers and sons, by which the “national” historian Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos presented the history of the Greek nation from antiquity to its present. Both wrote their books in the period following Greek independence, during which the construction of a national tradition of historiography, tailored to the needs of the new-born state, was begun²⁸. This conceptual transformation of history into national biography proposed an affective approach to describing the sufferings and achievements of the nation. Biography views the nation in the changing roles of victim and hero, fostering compassion and pride. In this way, history acquires affective aspects and becomes “national memory and heritage”, something precious worth preserving. “It is unthinkable that our children could learn a different history from what we learned and from what our fathers learned”, a politician proclaimed during the recent debate. As a consequence, the book incurred disapproval for mutilating or erasing the national memory. History matters not as a cognitive realm, but as an elaboration of experience. Whose experience? The nation, as a construction of

emotion and knowledge, claims the right to define history as the description of its own experience and to enjoy the intimacy of its own past. History is identified with identity, and apart from cultivating identity, history has no other relevance in society. History as national biography becomes a place of enjoyment. Even mourning past sufferings offers enjoyment. National feastdays and heritage are moments and places for enjoying history²⁹.

PERFORMING HISTORY

The vast interest of the media and also of the general public in this debate on a history book is the consequence of preoccupation with the identity issue. Preoccupation with identity has been the common denominator of several ideological and political cleavages in Greece over the last fifteen years, including the Macedonia naming dispute, and the controversy over whether the religious affiliation of citizens should be stated on identity cards, which locked the government and the Church in a bitter conflict in 2001. The preoccupation with identity was also the driving force behind the proliferation of history supplements in the press, and of historical books and leaflets in general.

In the public debate, those historians who supported the book spoke in terms of history, scholarship and truth, while their rivals did so in terms of identity, emotion and pride. In the debate two incommensurable discourses confronted each other. Staging the debate in the mass media gave the confrontation the form of a performance. Viewer ratings for television and radio programmes on the history controversy surpassed those covering the hottest political issues of the period. Declaring the book anathema became a ritual gesture for press and television stars, bishops and politicians. In viewing nationalism as performance, it is understandable why historical debates concerning the nation turn out to be more performative than argumentative³⁰. As a result, historians entering the performance were expected to correspond to the audience's perception of historians as people who relate the "truth" by presenting documents. According to this view, historians should enact history, because in the semiotics of television, the historian is not someone who interprets documents, but someone who stands for documents, who is the visible and speaking exponent of documents. From this perspective, the confrontation was also about traditional, embedded, widely diffused ideas on what history is and what its methodology should be. In the popular imagination history and the past are overlapping concepts, and hence there is no room for multiple interpretations. The role of the historian should be to reveal the truth of the past through documents, to preserve this truth, and to be impartial to the political cleavages of past and present. But such impartiality, in the popular image of the historian, does not extend to national things. With rare exceptions, historical and national truth is felt to be identical. This identification is a crucial point and has a long history, since the use of history for nation building in 19th century. From this point of view, although the question was not

about history, but rather identity, the language dealing with identity should have been legitimized by a modicum of scientificity.

WHO IS ENTITLED TO TALK ABOUT HISTORY?

The claim to scientificity did not mean that history should have been left to scientists; indeed, the opposite. The debate raised the question on “*Who owns history?*”³¹ The same question has been central to the confrontation over the name of Macedonia since 1992/93. The claim by the *altera pars* to the name was considered by the Greek part to be a “usurpation of our history”, and the Republic of Macedonia was accused of falsifying history. “Don’t let them steal our history” was one of the most popular slogans of the period³². The same attitudes surfaced in the debate on our history textbook, one demand being: “Don’t let them fabricate our history”. But if Greece was the owner of Greek history in the previous confrontation, who is the owner of history in an internal confrontation with historians? Who owns history? The question was transformed into “*Who is entitled to talk about history?*” Historians claimed this right for themselves, arguing that they are armed with better knowledge on controversial issues. But this view, considered elitist, was disputed by their opponents: The right to history belongs to the people and to everyone, including the Church. According to this response, history acquires a body, is materialized, owned, defended, and safeguarded against usurpation and alienation. The body of history should be left intact. History materialized as a body was transformed into public property. Defending this public good became a patriotic and democratic task. The dispute over the question “Who is entitled to talk about history?” was a constituent part of this history war. In the same orbit were the demands by several groups that their particular history should be included in the textbook. Pontic (Black Sea) Greeks were the largest group, but regional authorities and veterans’ associations also petitioned that their histories find a place in the textbook.

The demands of particular groups to have their history depicted in the “national” history are remarkable. History is no longer considered the domain of the elite and the state, as it once was³³. This broadening of the historical domain is neither a version of the social history of common people, nor is it the unconventional history of excluded groups; rather, it is a compartmentalization of historical discourse. The particular stories that seek representation in the national story have been forged from the same dialectic pattern of victim and hero. The petitions of minor groups for representation in the national discourse involve broadening the national image-store towards a particularization of identities. In a public debate on the history book, I encountered someone who complained that it failed to make any reference to his home village of Distomo, the entire male population of which was killed by the Nazis during the Second World War³⁴. He was adamant that it should be included, despite the response that a book covering five hundred years of world history could not contain all events of that scale.

For him, it was impossible to conceive a history that failed to mention an experience on which he had based his identity and personal pride. Thus, the question of “*Who is entitled to talk for history?*” proves how experience matters in things relating to past time and how history is conceived as a collective and personal construction of identity. But whose experience?

The thirst for memory and the desire to commemorate have emerged as some of the powerful cultural concerns of our contemporary societies, where the word ‘memory’ has almost substituted the word ‘history’ and has invaded historical studies in the form of expanding memory studies. The traumas of the 20th century are the prime cause for the rise of commemorations, but not all of those who demand recognition for their memories have experiences corresponding to those memories. Eelco Runia argues that the thirst for memory not only comes from an ‘excess’ of memory, but also from a ‘scarcity’ of memory: “Commemorating from ‘scarcity of memory’ springs from ontological homesickness and is a manifestation of a desire to get into contact with the numinosity of history”³⁵. The “ontological homesickness” coincides with the lodging of history as nostalgia and its contraposition to modernization and the futurist premises of globalization. But the controversy over the school textbook (a formal and state-sponsored historical narrative) also indicates just how powerful the need is for institutionalization of memories in a mass and non-hierarchical society. History wars are conflicts not just over memories but also over the *institutionalization of memory*. This is the reason why the politics of recognizing genocide, legislation on denial, and petitioning for forgiveness acquire such force and impetus in the contemporary world, and why historical controversies have to do with school textbooks, museums or monuments.

SYMPTOMATOLOGY

At the same time, the rise of memory and identity has led to a reconceptualization of history for mass audiences. Memory furnishes the material for the construction of identities and invests them with the power of emotion. History becomes a discontinuous and out-of-context collection of symptoms denoting violence and sacrifice. In the public debate history has become a discourse on *symptomatology*.

The thrust of the polemic against the book was not directed against its overall interpretation of Greek history, but at the points dealing with suffering and catastrophes. The most outstanding event of suffering in Greek historical culture took place in August 1922 in Smyrna/İzmir, where the Greek population of Anatolia had massed in the harbour of the city after the collapse of the Greek Army. As these people tried to board boats, the outskirts of the city were set on fire and armed bands assaulted the refugees. The scene was filmed and the pictures of the city in flames became a powerful symbol for the event, which became known as the “Catastrophe of Smyrna”³⁶. This symbol epitomized the refugees’ agony and also their future pains and misery in Greece, the land of their destination.

It later became a symbol of national destiny. The events, symbolized in shorthand by the number “1922”, became the “*lieu du mémoire*” par excellence for 20th-century Greece³⁷. In describing the event, the authors of the history textbook used the quite neutral phrase “waterfront crowding” (*synostismos*). In the debate that followed, the word “*synostismos*” became a symbol for *softening* the dramatic aspects of history and writing a *light* narrative for the purposes of making national consciousness more and more flexible and compliant. The word became the main target of the book’s opponents, and served to rally most of the population descending from the 1922 refugees behind them. The writers were forced to replace the word with “evacuation under dramatic conditions”, the Prime Minister visited the Refugees Museum (a minor museum in the Athens suburbs) in a gesture of respect to the refugee experience, and the authorities decided to give school pupils, as a companion to the textbook, Dido Sotiriou’s novel *Farewell Anatolia* (the original Greek title is *Matomena Chomata*, literally “Bloodied Earth”), the literary expression of the 1922 “*lieu du mémoire*”, in order to balance the emotional deficit and pacify criticism of the textbook³⁸. Nothing pacified the reactions, however, because this sublime event, a central place of memory around which Greek historical knowledge is structured, was turned into a historical symptom of inner pain. And how can a symptom be described without referring to death, blood and atrocities?

The concept of symptom is synonymous with sign in Hippocratic medicine, the method by which an illness was diagnosed from its symptoms. In looking for the pathology of his polis, Thucydides used this method of deciphering signs in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*³⁹. But the modern relationship between symptom and history comes from the use of psychoanalysis in confronting the great historical traumas of the 20th century, the Holocaust in particular. The key argument is that exploration of such traumatic events as symptoms of modern society, rather than the usual historical method, can lead to a deeper understanding of its pathology. But what has happened is the opposite: turning the focus from conventional history to symptoms has produced a series of unrelated and out-of-context traumatic events. In this serialized symptomatology all coherence of explanation has been lost, considered irrelevant and unimportant. What happened in social studies has also happened in historical culture. The sublime events which structure the popular perception of history have replaced the catastrophic events. In this context history has become the description of unrelated symptoms.

Similar entanglements with the past, with strong emotional dimensions, have been described by the term *postmemory*. *Postmemory* refers to traumatic events, like wars, genocides, civil wars and other human catastrophes and it is formed neither by living participation in the events, nor by the transmission of the testimonies of participants, but by circulating rumours, anxieties, and diffused myths. *Postmemory* describes the relationship of the second and the third generation to the traumatic events.⁴⁰ *Postmemory* dominates the public consciousness and under certain conditions of re-activation is associated with *moral panic*. In this case the anxiety of un-remembering the “Catastrophe

of Smyrna” was a sign of the perilous amnesia of the mourning for the “lost fatherlands” which lays at the roots of affection to Modern Greek national identity.

HISTORICAL CYBERCULTURE

The use of the internet and the virtualization of historical resources have enormously facilitated the thirst for memory, the need for recognition of suffering and forgiveness of perpetrators. The internet has made it possible for anyone to write about history, to collect historical data, to gather people around particular historical themes, and to write their own personal, family, or collective history. The recent history war in Greece began on the internet; here petitions were started in protest against the book and where everything written and spoken about the book was stockpiled⁴¹. This use of the internet in debating history should be studied from the point of view of transforming historical culture, because when internet sources outbalance books in providing historical information, then non-academic history outbalances academic history in the formation of historical consciousness. With the massive production of historical images, everyone now enjoys the possibility of producing and diffusing their own historical images, of creating private channels of information and discussion lists, which in turn create on-line communities. Universities and historical institutions cannot exercise any authority over the massive production of these images. Online communities construct their own historical worlds, which follow their own norms, ways of reference and interpretations of the past. The past has acquired a new cyberface, which includes all possible kinds of distorting mirrors⁴². For example, anyone can contribute to Wikipedia, now one of the most read websites in the world. An Irish historian friend whom I talked to about how the book controversy developed on the internet told me that he has noticed how marginal and clearly partisan positions now feature in articles on Irish history in far greater proportion than their actual acceptance in the academic community warrants. Passing straight onto Wikipedia, these ideas gain popularity though their mirroring on other websites and from being read, of course⁴³.

In the case of the history book, being deposited in cyberspace and reflected from mirror to mirror ultimately led it to acquire unimaginable deformations. These deformations, empowered through repetition from site to site and from blog to blog, have come to form new certainties, which have little or nothing to do with the real textbook, but which in turn feed the virtual and non-virtual historical culture with a new reality. Historical culture, in passing through cyberspace, is no longer a place of interaction between institutional history and public memory, nor is it a passive receiver of ideas about the past, elaborated by the academic or the state elites and “high culture”. Rather, it is an active agent in determining how historical images are to be constructed. The entry of history into the realm of “*popular cyberculture*” has changed historical culture⁴⁴. The result of this retrospective impact on the historical discipline is that discursive practices of historians have undergone changes too.

HISTORIANS AND THEIR AUDIENCES

Mass participation in the controversy also had another consequence. Historians did not find themselves in their accustomed position of talking to other historians or to academic audiences of students and colleagues in an environment protected by academic institutions and their culture. On the contrary, they were forced to address a hostile audience. Moreover, this audience disputed the historians' authority on the past; it claimed its own capacity, and indeed its right, to talk about history and defend its own version of it. At the culmination of historicism the audience to which historians appealed was limited to literate people, and political history was the main concern of both sides. Now the audience interested in history has expanded considerably and includes not only the readers of historical books, but also the viewers of historical film and television productions, as well as internet users. The concerns of historians no longer correspond to those of the new multifarious mass audiences. The rise of social, cultural and gender history, as well as deconstruction and the linguistic approach, has broadened the gap between mass-consumed national history, and the world of academic historians. Historical consciousness is still constructed around sublime events and presents the past in the form of grand national narratives. That historical studies have turned to social, cultural and gender history and to the history of everyday life has not yet had any impact on the mass audiences of history, nor does it meet their expectations of history. To some extent, history wars have been the result of a new history attempting to enter the public domain, the realm of education specifically. Divergences between scholarship and public history are acceptable as long as the two camps remain apart.

What was the experience of the historians who participated in the history battle? I mentioned earlier the incommensurability of discourses and the media pressure on historians to perform a traditional positivistic role, a consequence of the fact that the structure of the public domain is still patterned on essentialist history. For historians to intervene and change the image of the historian and history would be a legitimate goal as long as they could control the terms of the debate, which they do not. Given the prevalent essentialism in the public debate on history, they can either refrain from interfering in any way in the debate or they can adapt themselves to the required role and resort to a "strategic essentialism". This term, employed by Spivak, refers to the "strategic use of a positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest"⁴⁵. Strategic essentialism, in this case, entails denouncing a rival opinion as a falsification of history, as a myth without any factual basis, or as a fictitious event, by presenting documents that supposedly tell the truth. The war over the book was fought on the grounds of factual history, even by historians critical of historical positivism. But the dispute was one over meaning, not fact! This double level where facts were the visible signifiers of meaning and discussion of the facts was the signifier of the debate on meaning enabled historians to argue efficiently at a factual level, but left them totally unable to respond at the level of meaning, because meaning was connected with emotionalism and identity. While

their opponents could rely on an efficient narrative founded in identity, nation and history, historians could not count on any such thing. Arguing, as they did, about history as a science, they could indicate the connection between exact historical science and an open society, but they could not present a persuasive alternative history to the nation which could attract the attention of the mass audience. Neither could they present an alternative history of the nation, related to an alternative concept of identity which would in turn cover affect and emotion. Historians did not manage to bridge the gap between themselves and the audience. In order to persuade the latter not to doubt their veracity, they need to convince it, at the same time, of the value and effectiveness of their theory and method. But the debate on theory of history did not become a public issue and even historians hardly understand the social potential of theory.

POSTSCRIPT

The history textbook was withdrawn by the government immediately after the 16 September 2007 general election, in which the education minister who supported the book failed in her bid for re-election, and in which, for the first time, the ultra-right Popular Orthodox Rally party entered parliament, having proscription of the history textbook written on its banner. The history war was lost. But the whole issue has posed the problem of understanding how history, as a cultural practice, is embedded in the fabric of our societies, and why it has become one of the central arenas of contemporary social and cultural conflicts. Each case of course has its specificities, but the frequency and the passion of history wars around the globe are signs of something new we need to explore. Older theories on the public use and abuse of history came down in favour of the history produced by scholars as an inquiry into the past and viewed other uses of history as degenerate forms of historical knowledge. In history wars the apple of discord is use of the past as a constitutive element of the self and the culture we live in. History wars happen not in cognitive, but in cultural fields. We need a new methodology to study this everyday aspect of historical mentalities and practices. The sense of the past in literature and art is, when considered from certain aspects, closer to mass historical culture than historical scholarship. The aforementioned issue concerning Dido Sotiriou's novel, which was to be given to pupils in order to compensate for the emotional deficit of the history book, is indicative of the fact that literature and art are closer to the popular experience of the past than scientific history. Art is related more to emotionality, and, for this reason, it plays a greater role in the shaping of such experience. This is a conclusion that has a significance for the creation of a tolerant society by reforming historical teaching. Intolerance has a stronger veil of sentiment and a more solid basis in mass experience. The two-century reign of national history has not been in vain.

NOTES

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- ² <http://www.un-documents.net/a3r217a.htm> (accessed 31 May 2008).
- ³ <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/018.htm> (accessed 31 May 2008).
- ⁴ <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=234237> (accessed 31 May 2008).
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- ¹⁴ M. Repousi, C. Andreadou, A. Poutachidis, A. Tsivas, *Sta neotera kai sygxrona xronia* [Modern and Contemporary History], Athens 2006.
- ¹⁵ Taking part in the 5 March 2007 press conference were representatives of the journals "Historein", "Historika, Mnemon", "Sygxrona Themata" and "Epitheorisi Politikis Epistimis", (See report at <http://www.in.gr/news/article.asp?lngEntityID=784709&lngDtrID=244>).
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Two Islands of History: ‘History Wars’ in Cyprus and Iceland

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ABSTRACTS

History is one of the most important sources of identity construction in contemporary societies, and therefore the teaching of history in schools is of great concern to both national authorities and others who are interested in the formation of citizens. In this chapter, we compare debates on two islands, Cyprus and Iceland, where ‘nationalists’ and ‘reformers’ have fought over the content of history textbooks in schools. The political context of the two cases is diametrically different, as the island of Cyprus is divided into two national communities – one Greek Cypriot and the other Turkish Cypriot – while Iceland is fairly homogeneous nation and its control of the island is uncontested. There are, however, clear similarities between the two islands; in both cases nationalists have tried to preserve the traditional presentation of national narratives in history textbooks, where the nation is defined in stark contrast to the ‘other’, while reformers have argued for a more nuanced portrayal of the national history. In Cyprus, Greek and Turkish Cypriot nationalists have had the upper hand in the ‘history wars’ in their respective national communities, while in Iceland the disputes ended in a compromise. It is not clear, however, that the reforms in Iceland have accomplished much, as the old nationalist narratives seem to have survived in the public discourses. This seems to prove that more is needed to change national narratives than simply to reform history books in schools.

Modern toplumların kimlik kurgusunda tarihin çok önemli bir kaynak olduğu bilinen bir gerçektir. Tam da bu yüzden tarih eğitimi yurttaşların eğitimi ile ilgilenen resmi makamları ve en geniş anlamda toplumu çok yakından ilgilendirmektedir. Biz bu makalede iki adada, İzlanda ve Kıbrıs’ta tarih eğitiminde yaşanan gelişmeleri, tarih ders kitapları konusunda “reformistler” ve “milliyetçiler” arasında süren tartışmaları karşılaştırmayı deniyoruz. İki ülkenin genel durumları birbirinden gerçekten çok farklıdır. Kıbrıs iki ulusal toplum olarak Kıbrıslı Rumlar ve Kıbrıslı Türkler arasında bölünmüş bir ülkedir. İzlanda ise oldukça homojen, kendi kendini yöneten bir ülkedir. Buna rağmen, iki ülke arasında

önemli benzerlikler vardır. Her iki ülkede de milliyetçiler tarih ders kitaplarında var olan ve “ulusu” “öteki” ile karşı karşıya koyan geleneksel tarih anlatılarını korumak için yoğun bir çaba sarf ederlerken, reformistler ince ayırmalara ve çoğulluğa önem veren bir tarih anlayışından yana tavır aldılar.

Kıbrıs’ta, Kıbrıs Rum ve Türk toplumlarında “tarih savaşlarını” kazananlar milliyetçiler oldu. İzlanda da ise tarih tartışmaları uzlaşma ile sonuçlandı. Ne var ki, İzlanda’da yapılan reformlara rağmen eski milliyetçi söylemlerin kamusal alanda dolaşımdan kalkmadığına bakılırsa, reformların istenilen sonuçları verip vermediği tartışma konusudur. Bu da açıkça gösteriyor ki, yerleşik ulusal anlatıları değiştirmek, tarih kitaplarını değiştirmekten daha fazlasını gerektiriyor.

Saga er einn mikilvægasti þátturinn í mótun sjálfsmynda í nútímasamfélögum, og því er sögukennsla gjarnan áhugamál bæði stjórnmálanna og þeirra sem hafa áhrif hafa á skólamál. Í þessari grein berum við saman deilur á tveimur eyjum, Íslandi og Kýpur, þar sem ‘þjóðernissinnar’ og ‘umbótamenn’ hafa tekist á um innihald sögukennslubóka. Pólitískur bakgrunnur dæmanna tveggja er mjög ólíkur, því að á meðan Kýpur er skipt upp á milli tveggja þjóðarbrotanna – Kýpur-Grikkja og Kýpur-Tyrkja – þá er íslensk þjóð tiltölulega einsleit og yfirráð hennar yfir Íslandi er óumdeild. Þrátt fyrir þennan mun eru dæmin tvö lík um margt. Í báðum þeirra hafa ‘hefðarsinnar’ reynt að verja hefðbundna sögutúlkun í sögukennslubókum, þar sem áhersla er lögð mikilvægi þjóðareiningar og andstæður þjóðarinnar gagnvart ‘öðrum’, á meðan ‘umbótamenn’ hafa talað fyrir flóknari túlkun sögunnar. Á Kýpur hafa grískir og tyrkneskir þjóðernissinnar haft undirhöndina í sögustríðunum í hvorum hluta eyjunnar fyrir sig, en á Íslandi enduðu deilurnar í málamiðlun. Ekki er ljóst þó að umbæturnar á Íslandi hafi breytt miklu, því að hefðbundinn söguskilningur sjálfstæðisbaráttunnar lifir þar enn góðu lífi í pólitískri umræðu. Þetta virðist benda til þess að meira þurfi til að breyta söguskodun þjóða en að eindurskrifa kennslubækur í sögu í grunn- og frámhaldsskólum.

INTRODUCTION

Teaching history is never an innocent affair. ‘Memories’ of past acts of injustice, common achievements and struggles, oppression and cooperation, set the frame for people’s sense of belonging in present, and therefore it is seen as imperative by many to make the young aware of the past. History is also used to legitimate population groups in the present, and to define their existence vis-à-vis other groups – with other memories and origins. In other words, the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, between those who belong to ‘our’ group and those who do not, are drawn through historical references and interpretations. This is particularly true for nations, because the sense of national communities is developed and fortified through the idea of national histories, or narratives of the nations’ development from alleged origins to the present day. National

authorities tend therefore to place great emphasis on the control over the production and reproduction of their respective histories, as they are seen as one of the most important keys to embed the idea of the nation in people's imagination. History is for this reason generally included as an obligatory subject in school curricula, with the explicit or implicit goal of nurturing the students' sense of belonging to a particular national community and teaching them to act and think as loyal citizens of a nation-state.

Here we present two cases of debates on history teaching in schools, where 'nationalists' – or 'traditionalists' – and 'reformers' have battled over the contents of history textbooks. On the surface, the two cases have little in common, beyond the fact that they both relate to islands on the periphery of geographic space called 'Europe', and both centre on history textbooks in schools. The two cases present, however, similar concerns placed in different contexts, and therefore they are worth comparing. The island of Cyprus, as is well known, is divided both politically and culturally between Greek and Turkish speaking communities, while Iceland is politically united and culturally fairly homogeneous. On both islands, strong nationalist tendencies have dominated the political scene, where the internal cohesion of each national community and its opposition to other national communities has been regarded to be of utmost significance. In both cases this sense of internal sameness and difference with respect to others has been explained with references to the past and fostered through historical interpretations, which have been inculcated in schools through the teaching of official historical narratives.

The traditional historical teaching has been criticized severely in recent years in Cyprus and Iceland, from political and didactical points of view. Thus reformers on the two islands have demanded revisions of history textbooks, calling for new ways of presenting the past to the young. They have promoted a more inclusive approach to the past, looking not only at the history of a few individuals or single political events but also at daily life of the common people and the history of social and political divisions, thus questioning both the internal homogeneity of the national communities themselves and their alleged opposition to the various 'others'. The ensuing debates between those who have wanted to preserve the traditional nationalist narratives and the reformers have their similarities and differences, reflecting both the particular contexts of the two cases and the common challenges for educators. The common theme for the history of these two islands is therefore that "history matters", but it does so in different ways at different times and in different situations.

THE ISLAND OF CYPRUS

Political Background of the 'History Wars' in Cyprus

For some time now, a 'war' has been going on in the divided island of Cyprus, pre-occupying intellectual life in the country. The reason for these heated debates was the revision of the history textbooks in the Turkish Cypriot community, which took place

in 2005, and the proposal of the Greek Cypriot Minister for Education and Culture in 2008 to do the same for the Greek Cypriot schoolbooks. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriot nationalists reacted very strongly to these initiatives and used – and still use – similar arguments to condemn the actual changes in Turkish Cypriot history teaching and the potential reforms in Greek Cypriot history education. In the meantime the Turkish Cypriot side has reviewed the textbooks for a second time, as the first thing that the Turkish nationalists did when they returned to power in 2009 was to withdraw the changes made by the previous government. Hence, the heated debate continues in both communities separately, but also of course in a dialogue between the two communities.

In Cyprus there are two kinds of misunderstanding concerning the issue of history books. The first misunderstanding is the naive assumption that when the contents of history books are changed, nationalistic ideas and biases will disappear. This is, however, not as easy to accomplish as it seems at first glance. Changing history textbooks taught in schools will have limited effect if biases and nationalistic ideas are widespread in society. To change the contents of history books is, in itself, hardly enough to reach even a limited success towards eliminating bias. What is important, along with the revision of the textbooks, is to change the training of educators so that they become able to use the materials in the new textbooks. This is because history books, along with history teachers and teaching techniques, constitute the foundation of history education. In fact, in some instances, changing the contents of the history books may be less important than improving teaching techniques¹.

Another mistaken interpretation is the belief that by changing the history books, national identity and national consciousness will be seriously undermined and respective national groups will lose their identities and national cohesion. This notion is very common within both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. This assumption is also widespread in Greece and Turkey. The main reason behind this perception is the widespread essentialist historiography, which is a legacy from the 19th century. It presents history as a “fixed and sacred essence” on which the nation should base its future.

We know, however, by now that history does not present the past on its own terms. Concepts such as the ‘past’ and ‘history’ are not the same. History is produced from the past, but it is a narrative for the present and indeed for the future. Nevertheless this does not mean that one can change the events that happened in the past haphazardly. What already happened cannot be changed. Historical narratives that are produced on the basis of what happened in the past can, however, always be reproduced in a different way. This is because history is not the past itself, but the ‘meaning’ that we produce from the past. Thus, it is important to take into account methodological concepts such as ‘conceptualization’ when it comes to evaluating past events. In other words, one must consider the events in their proper contexts and evaluate them in their own ‘historical time’. If we do not consider historical events within their own historical period, then inevitably

one could assume that the Turkish and Greek Cypriots of today were responsible for the incidents of the past. Hence, it is very important to eliminate the biases and enmities in history books, but not to hide the enmities or atrocities that took place in the past. (This is because history is not the facts themselves, but the meaning created from facts.)

State without History

Leaving these methodological problems and conceptual misunderstandings aside, the 'History Wars' in Cyprus have some complex ideological and political dimensions. Above all, in Cyprus, as it is well known, there was not an internal movement for state building. The Greek and Turkish Cypriot national movements did not strive for independent statehood in Cyprus, but rather for unification with the Greek and Turkish nations. In this historical process the identity formation situated Turkish and Greek Cypriots as "organic parts" and "extensions" of Turkish and Greek nations respectively. Hence, there was not a "History of Cyprus" but the "History of Greek and Turkish nations"².

When Cyprus became an independent state in 1960, the prevailing understanding of history and teaching practices did not change greatly. Greek Cypriots continued to formulate the main goals of history teaching as the development of a strong "sense of belonging to Hellenism" and "enforcement of the cultural union with mother Greece"³. The same went for the Turkish Cypriot community – to its members the aim was to strengthen the ties with Turkey and the Turkish past. Hence, the Republic of Cyprus became a state in fact "without a history".

A State in Search of Its Own History

After the inter-communal clashes of 1964 and only after the policy of *Enosis* (union with Greece) had proven to be unrealizable, the Greek Cypriots began to embrace the Cypriot state – which in the meantime had *de facto* turned into a Greek Cypriot state. This however did not happen without turbulence. In fact a civil-war like situation emerged within the Greek Cypriot community. Some political forces did not give up the idea of *Enosis* and considered the very existence of the Cypriot state as a threat to the Greek national identity. It is indeed this schism, in combination with the former ultra nationalist military regime of Greece, which led to the coup on 15 July 1974 which in turn, opened the way for the Turkish army to invade the island and to occupy 37 percent of the Cypriot territory.

After the Greek coup and the Turkish military invasion in 1974, the Greek Cypriot community embraced fully the Republic of Cyprus and developed a strong sense of belonging to the Cypriot state. It was under these new political conditions that the History of Cyprus was for the first time introduced into the Greek Cypriot schools and textbooks of the History of Cyprus were produced.

The desire to preserve the Republic of Cyprus, which had emerged out of necessity in the 1960s simply because *Enosis* remained an elusive goal, became much more widespread in the aftermath of 1974. The events in 1974 triggered the development of a new political consciousness among the Greek Cypriots. As a consequence of the campaign to preserve and uphold the Republic of Cyprus, the state acquired, over and above its practical value, a symbolic value in the eyes of the Greek Cypriot community. One of the clearest indications of the way Greek Cypriots came to embrace the Republic of Cyprus was the celebration of the Independence Day for the first time after 1974, namely in 1979 with the date of 1 October being chosen at random for this purpose. Until that day, the public discourses had primarily emphasized that Cyprus was a “Greek island”, but from then on this was gradually replaced by an emphasis on the Republic of Cyprus. A message that was sent to the schools in the Republic of Cyprus in 1979 by the Ministry of Education and Culture on the occasion of the first Independence Day celebrations testified to this transformation: “All pupils and teachers must preserve and strengthen the Cypriot state. The attrition, as happened on various pretexts in the past, of the symbols, institutions and establishments of the state will not in any way be tolerated”⁴.

The sole aim of history education was and still is, however, to promote “the national unity” and to “mobilize the future citizens against Turkish invasion and occupation”. Hence, there was and still is no room for critical understanding of the past and history teaching remains within what can be called an accusatory framework.

“The Turks” as “the other” may unite the Greek Cypriot community politically but when it comes to face its own history and to develop an explanatory framework of its past, great frictions and hot debates appear within the Greek Cypriot community itself. There is a strong opposition to the expressed will of the government to review the history books. The Orthodox Church of Cyprus, as the historical agency of Greek nationalism in Cyprus and which has determined throughout history the content of Greek Cypriot education, still wants to play a leading role in developing the curriculum. It is the main agent in keeping an eye on the ethnocentric history teaching and reacts very strongly against any initiative which aims at the revision of the history books. Archbishop Chrysostomos II had on several occasions expressed his strong opposition against any modification of the books but also against the initiative of the Greek Cypriot Minister for Culture and Education to implement a programme of “rapprochement and reconciliation” with the Turkish Cypriot community. In addressing the issues of educational reform and the rewriting of history books as well as the “rapprochement and reconciliation” programme in the schools, the Archbishop presented the following views:

Education is the most basic factor enabling a people to live and survive, because education shapes a people’s national consciousness.

Hellenic Education preserved Cypriot Hellenism and prevented assimilation during various periods of darkness and slavery created by invaders.

Even though today, due to our EU membership, conditions have changed and our society presents multicultural characteristics, it is not an acceptable state of affairs for education to weaken the identity of the Hellenes (Greek Cypriots), who constitute the vast majority of the Cypriot people.

Preserving and strengthening our own identity means fostering self-awareness, preserving traditional values and attaining historical consciousness and not nationalism and national narcissism.

Hellenic Education is by its very nature open to foreigners. Just as it contains elements from other cultures, it also contributes to other cultures. This has gone on from the time of Alexander the Great and the first era of Christianity until today.

The Church of Cyprus, despite suffering great adversity under foreign occupation, has always adopted the Bible as its basis and has never condescended to either nationalism or chauvinism.

We consider the stated goal for this educational year (peace and reconciliation) to be, as much as it is superfluous, harmful. It is superfluous, because our education has never fostered feelings of hatred towards the neighbouring entity, nor has it opposed peace-making. The peaceful co-existence of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots is not a subject that can be placed on the curriculum because this is part of the very make-up of the Cypriot people. It is Turkish occupation, the occupying army and settlers that keep the two communities apart⁵.

This is not only the opinion of the church, because the nationalist intellectuals and political parties still see history teaching as an essential part of identity formation and hence as a tool in the service of the nation against the Turkish invasion and occupation.

Besides these ideological and partly institutional problems there are also deep political dilemmas which some do not want to face. Revision of the history books will inevitably lead to a discussion about the responsibilities for the major events in the past, such as the killings of innocent Greek Cypriot left-wingers between 1955-1959 when the right wing EOKA organization was fighting against the British colonial rule, for atrocities against the innocent Turkish Cypriots in the early 1960s, and for the Greek Coup in 1974 which opened the door for the Turkish invasion. An open discussion about these events may turn into a threat against the corporatist national solidarity which has been artificially created since 1974.

Another possible goal of the revision of the history books is to bring about a rapprochement between the two Cypriot communities, hence to reach somehow the 'de-otherization' of the Turkish Cypriots. This is, in the eyes of many, unacceptable for two reasons: Such a step would deprive the nationalists of the convenient concept of the "evil Turk", an argument which clearly serves the corporatist national solidarity and puts all the responsibility for the troubles squarely on the shoulders of the "others". The second reason is related to the future of Cyprus and has to do with a possible solution of the Cyprus Conflict. Revision of the history books is considered as a preparatory step towards a political compromise which will bring about a federal state in Cyprus. This again upsets many nationalists among the Greek Cypriots.

Under these circumstances and under great political pressure the Minister of Education and Culture gave up his ambitious reform project and decided to establish a committee of experts to design the new curriculum for history teaching after having consulted the political parties. Each political party suggested its “own historian” and as a result of this political corporatism a committee has been set up. The new committee may have satisfied all political parties and the corporatist national solidarity, but the history education has remained unchanged up until today. Moving away from the accusatory framework of history towards an explanatory framework has thus proven to be utterly impossible.

The Turkish Cypriot Case

Up until very recently history education in the Turkish Cypriot schools was based on a simple nationalist dogma where it is stated that “Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots cannot live together; hence the partition of the island is legitimized”. In this narrative the Greek Cypriots appeared as the source of “all evil” and Turkish Cypriots were the only “victims”⁶. This myth-history ruled in the Turkish Cypriot schools up until 2004 when dramatic political changes took place in the Turkish Cypriot community. The political mobilization of the Turkish Cypriots between 2002 and 2004, which aimed at peace in Cyprus, put an end to the rule of the nationalist separatist leader, Rauf Denktaş, and brought to power the leftwing parties and groups under the leadership of Mehmet Ali Talat. One of the first things that Talat and his government did was to change the history textbooks and to replace them with new ones introduced in 2005.

The revised Turkish Cypriot history textbooks were quite different from the old books in various ways. Thus the new history books did not consider the Greek Cypriots as the “other” and tried to situate the Cyprus conflict within a historical context. For example, the rise of nationalism in the Greek Cypriot community was rightly seen from a world-historical perspective and in the context of the nationalist movements of the 19th century. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot community was not considered as “a homogenous community” and considerable attention was paid to underline the differences within the community itself. For example, the differences and conflicts between the Communist Party of Cyprus, AKEL, and the Church of Cyprus were properly presented.

Another important element of the revised textbooks was the inclusion of social history and events of everyday life. This was a very significant improvement. History that talks only about military and political history inevitably exposes only conflicts and tensions, whereas social history reveals a social space where communities lived together and shared common things. This, in turn, promotes the empathy between the members of the two communities. Hence new textbooks gave a special emphasis to the joint participation in traditional marriage ceremonies and to other social events, such as common strikes. Doing so helped bring to light a different and so far ignored dimension of Cypriot history⁷.

It was of course not a coincidence that the Turkish Cypriot nationalists reacted very strongly against the new history books. Given their age-old tendency to 'otherize' the Greek Cypriot community and to present the partition of the island as the only 'just' solution to the political tension there, their disappointment with the new books and the campaign against them is evident. When the nationalist National Union Party won the elections in the Turkish part of Cyprus in 2009, it immediately re-changed the history books, reintroducing the old ethnocentric framework to the history curriculum. Now the Turkish Cypriot school children are learning about how "evil" the Greek Cypriots are and of course the Greek Cypriots vice versa...

In short, the "history wars" in Cyprus are nothing but a by-product of the politics of nationalism, which is still the prevailing ideology in the divided island of Cyprus. Too many actors are involved in this "war". In addition to the two principal sides of the debate, the two mutually exclusive and opposing nationalisms, namely Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, there is an ongoing "war" within the each community separately. So far, with the exception of a short period in the Turkish Cypriot community, on all fronts the 'victory' belongs to the nationalist side.

THE ISLAND OF ICELAND

Icelandic History Debates

For a few months in 1983-1984, during the darkest period of the Icelandic winter, debates on the teaching of history in elementary schools flared up in the Icelandic media and politics. The dispute started with an article published in the conservative daily, "Morgunblaðið" [The Morning Paper], where one of its reporters alerted the readers to what he saw as unfortunate changes in the curriculum of the Icelandic elementary schools. History was not to be taught as a separate subject anymore, he asserted, as it had been integrated – with geography and the social sciences – into the general subject of social studies. At the same time, the ideological underpinnings and the didactical approach to history teaching were to be transformed radically in Icelandic schools. Instead of narrating a coherent story, where the Icelandic past was presented in chronological order, highlighting the role of important individuals and the significance of particular events in the nation's history, the new social history curriculum emphasized the ways in which people lived in the past, their customs, social structures, and popular culture. Moreover, and that was the main point of the criticism, the new social history provided what the journalist regarded as a fragmented picture of Icelandic history, focusing on selected periods rather than providing a comprehensive survey of Icelandic history from its beginning to the present⁸.

During the following months, numerous comments appeared in the Icelandic press, decrying what some interpreted as revolutionary changes in history teaching in Iceland. "No Icelandic history", was the title of an editorial in "Morgunblaðið", where it

was claimed that history teaching had practically been abolished in Icelandic schools. “Until now”, the editor wrote,

it has been the general opinion in Iceland that the country’s existence as an independent nation was rooted in its history and language. Now it has become clear that one department of the Ministry of Education has decided that henceforth no national history will be taught in Icelandic elementary schools. When will it be the Icelandic language’s turn?⁹

The curriculum reforms were an “attack on Icelandic nationality”, claimed another commentator, urging the minister of education to preserve the traditional history teaching in Icelandic schools. “Icelanders generally know more about their origins than other nations”, he claimed, and “we have to safeguard that advantage”¹⁰.

The issue was taken up in the Icelandic parliament, Alþingi, in February 1984, when three of its members presented a motion demanding that national history be allotted more time in Icelandic elementary schools. The schools should “not only provide the pupils with knowledge and understanding of the nation’s history”, they maintained, but also inculcate the students with “faith in the country and the desire to preserve the cultural heritage which has developed here for eleven centuries”¹¹. After substantial debates, the motion was sent to a parliamentary committee from which it never emerged¹². Thus the issue was laid to rest and it disappeared from the public discourses, while the reform project itself was quietly discontinued by the conservative minister of education¹³.

History without a State

The fact that the Icelandic ‘history debates’ never developed into a full-blown ‘history war’ does not mean that the issue was taken lightly in Iceland. History was – and still remains – at the core of Icelandic ‘national consciousness’ and Icelandic national identity formation, as nationalism in Iceland feeds on historical references and examples. History and the national language are, at the same time, considered to be the most important unifying forces in Icelandic society. History is, in this sense, “*la mémoire collective*” of the nation, to use Maurice Halbwachs’ well known term¹⁴, narrating the national story from its alleged origins in the 9th and 10th centuries to the present time. This was the main reason why the critics of the curriculum reform emphasized the importance of continuity and comprehensive overview in history teaching, because, in their opinion, national history was to infuse the students with the sense of the nation as a collective group of past and present generations of Icelanders, all united through their common struggles against foreign oppression and their destiny as a sovereign nation. Moreover, by tracing the story of the nation, from one century to the next, the students were to understand their family relations with the first settlers of Iceland, while they also were to learn that they were somehow different from inhabitants of other countries and the members other national communities.

Reading the reformers' responses to the criticism of their work, it is fairly obvious that they did not really dispute this role of history teaching in schools. As they were quick to point out, their goal was neither to eliminate Icelandic history from the curriculum in Icelandic elementary schools nor to deconstruct the national narrative. Rather, their wanted to adapt the instruction in national history to what they saw as new social and political realities, both in order to make it more effective and to adjust it to new pedagogical objectives. It was generally agreed that the history primers used in the Icelandic school system were thoroughly outdated and had to be rewritten¹⁵, and the leaders of the reform efforts pointed out that after "decades of experience of 'survey teaching', most people concurred that it does not deliver the results we expect"¹⁶. By focusing on a few "significant" periods, rather than attempting to cover the "whole story", the students were to gain deeper understanding of the Icelandic social processes, which the reformers hoped would stay with them longer than the traditional methods of learning facts and names from the entire period of human habitation in Iceland. The goal was therefore, one of the reformers asserted, to "select from history memorable examples which will help the pupils to answer challenging questions, which concern all humanity, such as: Who am I? Where do I come from? Where am I heading?"¹⁷

To reach their goals, the reformers suggested that history teaching would focus on two periods in Icelandic history in particular, that is, the centuries from the beginning of settlement in the late 9th century until Iceland became a part of the Norwegian monarchy in the late 13th century and the period from around 1700 to the present day¹⁸. This choice was hardly a coincidence, because it fitted perfectly with the traditional vision of the Icelandic national narrative. Thus these two periods both framed the national history chronologically and they happened to be regarded as the high points in the history of the nation. Since the early 20th century, when the modern nationalist historiography was conceived in Iceland, the main lesson people had drawn from the past – and also the point that had been driven home with all history writing in Iceland – was that political sovereignty is the basis for the nation's wellbeing in both cultural and economic terms. Thus the first centuries of habitation in Iceland, and then the so-called "age of national rule" [*þjóðveldisöld*, 930-1262] in particular, were portrayed as the "golden age" of Icelandic history, because then Icelanders were supposedly both free from foreign rule and served a leading role in Nordic cultural activity. This was the time when the well-known Icelandic sagas were written, and when scribes of Icelandic origins were sought after by Norwegian kings as chroniclers and court poets. The centuries that followed Iceland's entrance into the Norwegian monarchy in 1262-64 were, however, traditionally regarded as an era of "decline" or "humiliation", which was characterized by increasing poverty and cultural deterioration in Iceland. According to the nationalist historiography, this period came to an end in the 18th and 19th centuries with what could be termed a belated Icelandic "renaissance", leading up to the so-called "age of progress" with growing autonomy and national sovereignty in the early 20th century¹⁹. The moral of the story was that from the late 13th

until the early 20th centuries, the Icelandic nation had history but no state, and that was the cause for prolonged cultural and economic decline in Iceland. Although the reformers criticized the chauvinist tenor of earlier history primers²⁰, they seem to have accepted the general frame of the national narrative. The story of the Icelandic nation was essentially a history of a nation in search of its own state, its nation-state, and therefore the period of “decline” and “humiliation” warranted no particular attention in the textbooks.

As it turned out, a compromise was reached in the debates with a new history primer for Icelandic elementary schools. It was written by Professor Gunnar Karlsson at the University of Iceland, and was published in three volumes in 1985-88, under the common title *Sjálfstæði Íslands* [Independence of Iceland]. The new primer was written in the reformist mode, as the books stressed Iceland's responsibility towards other nations and toned down the nationalist bias of earlier history textbooks²¹. At the same time, Karlsson accepted some of the conservative criticism of the curriculum reforms. The books were, for example, to cover the ‘whole story’, rather than selecting a few epochs for closer scrutiny²², thus supporting the idea of a continuous development from the origins of the nation to the present. Moreover, the structure of the book series pays tribute to the nationalist historical teleology, as it is divided into the traditional periods of Icelandic nationalist history; the first volume covers the period of ‘national rule’ (ca. 870-1262/64), the second is called “Iceland under monarchy” (ca. 1264-1800), and the final volume deals with the “struggle for independence” (the 19th century) and the period of self-determination in the 20th century. The books also place the nation above other social phenomena, the author admitted, such as “class, humanity, NATO or the Christian church”, but his explicit aim was to cultivate “responsible national identity, positive attitudes towards other nations ... and they are free from unwarranted glorification of the nation”²³. Thus the history textbooks were to inculcate the pupils with critical view of the Icelandic past, infused with healthy dose of “national pride”, while they were also to teach them responsibility and care for others. The message was clear however: Iceland is a nation apart, and the nation's search for its own state was still regarded as the essence of the Icelandic national narrative.

History Teaching and Collective Memory

One of the reasons the three members of parliament, who presented the motion in 1984, gave for their desire to improve and extend history teaching in Icelandic elementary schools was their fear for what they regarded as an appalling decline in historical knowledge in society, especially among the younger generations. According to one opinion poll, they pointed out, only 13 percent of Icelanders in the age group of 16 to 20 had recognized the name of the first president of Iceland, and less than half of the people asked knew the date of Iceland's conversion to Christianity. “These results have to be of great concern”, the parliamentary motion stated, and thus the three representatives urged their fellow members of Alþingi to act resolutely to improve the situation²⁴.

This seems to indicate that the MPs saw a direct link between “knowledge” of national history and a person’s sense of national identity – that is, in order to be a “true” Icelander one had to know the most important facts and the names of the most significant personalities in the history of the nation. While it is clear that a sense of a common past is one of the most crucial elements in the construction of all nations, it is equally obvious that the production and formation of this historical sense is much more complex than the parliamentary motion assumed. Firstly, national history is not a simple series of facts, but rather a fluid and contested interpretation of the past. The understanding of Icelandic history has, for example, changed dramatically among academically trained historians in recent decades, as historical processes and sources are read in a different manner from what was the general practice through much of the 19th and 20th centuries. The idea that the nation is a primordial social or cultural unit, which was taken more or less for granted in Iceland until a few decades ago, is now contested and questioned²⁵. Moreover, the view that the history of Iceland is a story of a constant and unified struggle for national sovereignty, motivated by common interests and expressed in one voice, has totally lost its credibility through historical research. Secondly, it is far from clear who formulates people’s understanding of the past, or who controls the production of the national narrative. Similar to France, Icelandic historians used to serve as the ‘priests and soldiers of the nation-state’, to paraphrase the French historian Pierre Nora²⁶, legitimizing its existence and contrasting ‘our’ national history to the national histories of other nations. But, similar to France, the apparent paradigm shift in Icelandic academic research seems to have moved historians out of the public domain into the ivory towers of the academia. What they say may be regarded as interesting, even significant, but it has limited effect on how people view their past.

This does not mean that ‘history’ has lost its role in political discourses. Politicians and political commentators still cite examples from the past to support their positions in the present, especially when it comes to questions regarding Iceland’s relations with other nations and debates on the organization of the country’s sovereignty in the modern world. These public comments show few signs of changing attitudes towards Icelandic history, in spite of the reforms of the history textbooks and new directions in historical research. Thus old clichés of foreign oppression in the past and the importance of national self-determination are repeated again and again in newspapers and in political debates without the slightest hesitation. In the case of Iceland, the general public has not openly disputed the historians’ authority over the past as, according to Antonis Liakos’s adept analysis, happened recently in Greece²⁷. Implicitly they have done exactly that however, as new interpretations of Icelandic history have failed to penetrate the public debates. Moreover, the reform of the history textbooks has had limited effect, at least there are few signs of changing attitudes towards the nation’s past. “I am giving the nation a new history”²⁸, said Gunnar Karlsson, the author of the history primer, when he was asked about the motivation behind the book, but it is still not fully clear if the nation will accept the offer.

CONCLUSIONS

The histories of the ‘history wars’ in Cyprus and Iceland are, as could be expected, quite dissimilar, because the political contexts of the two cases are diametrically different. In Cyprus, the two main communities remain, to a large extent, divided by a political and military barrier, and they are governed by two separate governments. Authority over the curricula in the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities mirrors the political divisions, although debates on both sides of the barrier necessarily take developments in the other community into consideration. In Iceland, however, the hegemony of the Icelandic nation-state over the public school curriculum is uncontested, and therefore its authority in this field is undivided.

This political background gives history teaching more direct relevance in Cyprus than it does in Iceland. In the former case, it is obvious who the ‘other’ is, or against whom each community measures itself – for the Greek Cypriots, the others are the ‘Turks’, while for the Turkish Cypriots, they are the ‘Greeks’. In Iceland this is much less clear, as the identification of the ‘other’ changes from one situation to the next – during the early 20th century it was the former ruling nation, the Danes, during the Cold War either the Soviet Union or the United States, at the present it is the European Union for some, while for others it is either ‘foreigners’ in general or specific religious or ethnic groups. The ‘otherization’ of the history books is therefore more straightforward in Cyprus than it is in Iceland, and the content of the Cypriot history textbooks is, for that reason, more hotly debated and taken more seriously today than it is in Iceland.

When we look beneath the surface, these differences are not as significant as one might expect. History is in both cases regarded as a major factor in the formation of national identities and in the maintenance of cohesion in the respective national communities. For those, both in Cyprus and Iceland, who consider nations as ancient and essential or primordial units, rather than fairly recent political constructions, it is of utmost importance to present the national history as a process of continuous struggle against an outside enemy. If the story of the nation’s past – the national narrative – is reformed or altered, they claim, the nation itself is in danger of losing its sense of self and purpose. On both islands there have been cases of opposition to the ‘accusatory framework of history’, calling for a more critical view of the past. The ‘reformist’ line has been motivated by different political and pedagogical concerns, but it has the common goal of inculcating the pupils with more tolerant attitudes towards others and more inclusive perspectives towards the history of the national community itself. The reformers have, thus, criticized the traditional narratives taught in schools, which have emphasized important individuals (usually men), political events, and struggles for ‘national self-determination’, rather than explaining the daily lives of ordinary people, the peaceful coexistence of cultural groups, or traditional gender and class differences in society.

The debates between 'nationalists' and 'reformers' over the content of history books, or what could be called 'history wars', are still undecided both in Cyprus and Iceland. In the former case, the nationalists seem to have the upper hand at the moment, as actual and planned reforms have been either cancelled or have not been put into practice. In Iceland the picture is more complicated however, as the debates in the 1980s ended in a compromise; the nationalist historical framework was retained, while the ethnocentric and biased tone of the history books was toned down considerably. So far, it is not clear if this has changed much in people's attitudes, as the nationalist narrative, formulated in the early 20th-century Iceland, still dominates the public discourses in spite of all curriculum reforms and paradigm shifts in the academic research.

One conclusion from this comparison seems to be that there is a growing sense in Europe of the need to reform national narratives, at the same time as such reformist ventures are questioned and resisted. But the comparison also implies that it is difficult to transform people's historical perceptions. Producing meaning out of the events and processes of the past is not a simple endeavour, as people learn history through various means and channels – and history teaching in schools just one of many. This poses an obvious dilemma for both sides of the 'history wars'. Both regard history to be of crucial importance, and therefore power over the production of historical meaning is of great concern to them. The fact is, however, that the power over historical understanding is elusive, because history is deeply embedded into various cultural and social practices of all modern societies. Changing history textbooks may be important step in reforming or preserving people's visions of the past, but it is certainly not enough.

NOTES

- ¹ C. Koulouri, *The Tyranny of History*, in Id. (ed.), *Teaching the History of Southeastern Europe*, Thessaloniki 2001, pp. 15-25.
- ² For a detailed analysis on nationalism in Cyprus, see A. Aktar, N. Kızılyürek, U. Ozkirimli (eds.), *Nationalism in the Troublesome Triangle: Cyprus, Greece, Turkey*, London 2010.
- ³ S. Petrou, *Kypriaki Ekpadevsi*, Larnaca 2001, pp. 148-149.
- ⁴ J.S. Joseph, Y.N. Sokratous (eds.), *Sokratous, Eterotita kai Ekpadevsi*, Athens 2008.
- ⁵ "Politis", 20 September 2008.
- ⁶ N. Kızılyürek, *National Memory and Turkish Cypriot Textbooks*, in *International Textbook Research*, vol. 21, Hannover 1999, pp. 387-395.
- ⁷ For a comparative study on the old and new history textbooks, see *Textual and Visual Analyses of the Lower Secondary School History Textbooks*, published by the research institute POST, Nicosia 2006.
- ⁸ G. Magnússon, *Íslandssagan umrituð*, in "Morgunblaðið", 13 November 1983, pp. 54-55. See also Id., *Uppreisn gegn Íslandssögu*, in "Morgunblaðið", 28 January 1984, pp. 12-13; *Um mikilvægi þjóðarsögunnar*, in "Morgunblaðið", 11 February 1984, pp. 18-19; *Um skilning og þroska barna*, in "Morgunblaðið", 18 February 1984, p. 16; Þ. Gunnarsson, *Controlling Curriculum Knowledge: A Documentary Study of the Icelandic Social Science Curriculum Project (SSCP) 1974-1984*, PhD dissertation, Ohio University 1990.
- ⁹ *Engin Íslandssaga*, in "Morgunblaðið", 15 November 1983, p. 20.

- ¹⁰ H. Blöndal, *Aðför að þjóðerninu*, in “DV”, 18 November 1983, p. 13.
- ¹¹ *Tillaga til þingsályktunar um kennslu í Íslandssögu*, in “Alþingistiðindi 1983-84”, 1987, vol. A, pp. 1471-1472.
- ¹² “Alþingistiðindi 1983-84”, 1987, vol. B, col. 2739-47, 2820-32, 2903-31, 3022.
- ¹³ Gunnarsson, *Controlling* cit., pp. 291-292.
- ¹⁴ See in particular M. Halbwachs, *La mémoire collective*, 2nd ed., Paris 1997 (1950), pp. 97-142.
- ¹⁵ See G. Karlsson, *Markmið sögukennslu. Söguleg athugun og hugleiðingar um framtíðarstefnu*, in “Saga”, 1982, 20, pp. 173-222.
- ¹⁶ E. Kristjánsdóttir, *Íslandssagan er kennd og verður kennd*, in “Morgunblaðið”, 24 November 1983, p. 34.
- ¹⁷ L. Guttormsson, *Íslandssaga í grunnskóla*, in “Þjóðviljinn”, 21 January 1984, p. 13; see, also W. Edelstein, *Um samfélagsfræði. Tölf athugasemdir í tilefni af blaðaskrifum*, in “Morgunblaðið”, 8 February 1984, pp. 18-19; L. Guttormsson, *Íslandssaga í grunnskóla. Athugasemdir við dagblaðsumræðu*, in “Þjóðviljinn”, 17 December 1983, pp. 10-11, p. 18; “Þjóðviljinn”, 14 January 1984, pp. 12-13.
- ¹⁸ See I. Sigurgeirsson, *Apinn hermir allt eftir*, in “DV”, 23 November 1983, p. 13.
- ¹⁹ See J. Jónsson, *Íslenskt þjóðerni*, Reykjavík 1903.
- ²⁰ See, for example, H. Pálsson, *Bekking og skilningur*, in “Helgarpósturinn”, 26 January 1984, p. 25.
- ²¹ G. Hálfðanarson, “*Stöndum sem einn veggur gegn öllu erlendu valdi*”. *Hugleiðingar um söguskoðun og íslenska fullveldisþólitik*, in G. Jónsson, H.S. Kjartansson, V. Ólason (eds.), *Heimtur. Ritgerðir til heiðurs Gunnari Karlssyni sjötugum*, Reykjavík 2009, pp. 146-159.
- ²² Þ. Helgason, *Inntak sögukennslu*, in “Uppeldi og menntun”, 1998, 7, pp. 47-53; cf. G. Karlsson, *Endurnijun Íslandssögunnar*, in “Tímarit Máls og menningar”, 1983, 44, 4, pp. 453-460.
- ²³ “Ég er að gefa þjóðinni sögu ...”, in “N1 saga”, 1989, 3, pp. 32-33.
- ²⁴ *Tillaga* cit., pp. 1471-1472.
- ²⁵ See H. Gunnarsdóttir, J.Þ. Pétursson, S.G. Magnússon, *Frá endurskoðun til upplausnar*, Reykjavík 2006; G.J. Guðmundsson, G. Jónsson, S. Ragnarsson (eds.), *Íslensk sagnfræði á 20. öld*, Reykjavík 2009.
- ²⁶ P. Nora, *Entre Mémoire et Histoire. La problématique des lieux*, in Id. (ed.), *Les lieux de mémoire*, vol. 1, 2nd ed., Paris 1997, p. 27.
- ²⁷ A. Liakos, *History Wars: Questioning Tolerance*, in G. Hálfðanarson (ed.), *Discrimination and Tolerance in Historical Perspective*, Pisa 2008, pp. 77-92.
- ²⁸ “Ég er að gefa þjóðinni sögu” cit.

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National and Communist Heroes in Modern and Contemporary Bulgarian History: Vasil Levski and Georgi Dimitrov

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ABSTRACT

Bulgarian football inspired the author to choose this topic. Probably there is no other country in Europe with so many teams (at least in the professional leagues) bearing the names of national heroes. The conclusion can be drawn that Bulgarians are addicted to strong individuals and are keen to be guided by, and adore, such politicians. However, this begs the question of why there was not a strong personality cult towards the leader Todor Zhivkov (1911-1997) who governed the country for almost 35 years during the long period of communist rule. Why did he not enjoy the mass adoration that was part of the personality cults of Enver Hoxha, Ceausescu and Tito in Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia?

In addition to answering this question, the chapter will a) outline the historical contexts surrounding the emergence of both of the cults; b) compare them; c) suggest some ideas regarding the political ends of such a kind of hero worship; d) delineate the main "images" of Levski and Dimitrov; e) sketch out the process of transforming the communist hero into a scapegoat after the big change in 1989; and e) look at the preservation of Levski as Bulgaria's top historical protagonist.

Статията се занимава с въпроса за мястото на героите в новата и съвременна българска история. Като отделни случаи са разгледани Васил Левски и Георги Димитров. Опитвам се да открия причините, поради които Левски се утвърждава като неоспорим български национален герой, докато въпреки масивната пропаганда "героят от Лайпциг" не издържа "теста на времето" и след 10 ноември напуска българския героичен пантеон. Признавайки че основната причина за това е смяната на политическата конюнктура, аз предлагам и друго обяснение, макар и от второстепенна значимост, а именно, че Димитров "не покрива" част от най-важните критерии, които предполага идеалния образ на "комунистическия" герой. В този смисъл считам, че Левски, чието водещо място като национален герой, е запазено от българските комунисти, по-добре се вписва в пропагандните внушения

поне що се отнася до тези, засягащи героичното. Макар да съм съгласен с някои от тезите на оригиналния за българската историография постмодерен подход, “деконструиращ” култа към Левски, аз ще се стремя да обърна в по-голяма степен вниманието към историческия контекст за развитието на посмъртните образи на Апостола и Димитров, както и да набележа контурите на дихотомията “народ – власт”, която поради историческото развитие на страната през XX век не позволява създаването на дълготраен култ към личността на “живия” ръководител. Това е така, защото “народът” възприема като “идеален” водачът, който никога не е бил на власт и точно като такъв се оформя Васил Левски след смъртта си. Димитров има “нещастие” да доживее установяването на социалистически режим в България и да ръководи страната няколко години. Време достатъчно да натрупа “отрицателен” актив, който изваден след четиредесет години, го изхвърля от групата на българските герои. Накрая, но не на последно място, аз си позволявам да твърдя, доразвивайки донякъде една идея на Н. Генчев, че функциите на Левски са да бъде нещо като “идеална” опозиция на “реалната” власт в България, независимо от идеологията ѝ. Интересното в случая е в това, че за дълги периоди българската държава “промотира” благоговението пред един герой, чиято основна обществена функция на пръв поглед е “антидържавна” или по този начин самите управляващи укрепват позициите си с помощта на “идеалната” си противоположност в лицето на Васил Левски.

*Тоз, който падне в бой за свобода,
той не умира*

[The one, who falls in a fight for freedom, never dies]

Verse from Hristo Botev's poem *Hadzi Dimitar*

*Три слънца в небето грезят
Сталин, Тито, Димитров,
Три сърца в едно живеят,
Сталин, Тито, Димитров*

[In the sky shines a triple sun
Stalin, Tito, Dimitrov,
Three hearts beat as one,
Stalin, Tito, Dimitrov]

Refrain from a popular song dedicated to Stalin, Tito and Dimitrov

And the young King came down from the high altar,
and passed home through the midst of the people.
But no man dared look upon his face,
for it was the face of an angel
Oscar Wilde, *The Young King*

Bulgarian football inspired me to choose this topic. If you attend the “eternal” derby of Bulgarian football, you will enjoy the sight of fans dressed in blue shouting at other fans dressed in red, “You are Turks!” Why Turks? The answer, according to the blue fans is, “Because only the Turks could be against the Apostle”. The blue fans support one of the most popular Bulgarian clubs, named after the top Bulgarian national hero Vasil Ivanov Kunchev¹ known as Levski, the Deacon or the Apostle of Freedom². There is no other country in Europe with so many teams (at least in the professional leagues) bearing the names of national heroes. There are two very prominent football clubs in the second largest city in Bulgaria, Plovdiv, and one of them is named after Hristo Botev (1848-1876) who holds second place in the unofficial list of Bulgarian heroes after Levski. If you take a look at the *BFS* (*Bulgarski futbolen sayuz* – Bulgarian Football Union) website³, a few more minor *Levskies* and *Botevs* appear. It is possible to add four or five teams named after Georgi Benkovski (? - 1876) to these clubs. Benkovski was the leader of the unsuccessful April uprising against the Ottomans in 1876. It is obvious that Bulgaria’s football fans enjoy a considerable number of football clubs with heroic names, despite the fact that the results of these teams are not always heroic, but quite the opposite (with some exceptions). If we take a broader Balkan perspective, we find out that this phenomenon *is not typical* for Bulgaria’s neighbours (I must add *Obilić* in Serbia, a team that was created in the 1990s by its late-president, the notorious Zeljko Ražnatović-Arkan. This is the only club, and there is no tradition of naming football teams after national heroes in former Yugoslavia. Therefore, it is obvious that such a phenomenon cannot be regarded as something that is Balkan-wide). The conclusion can be drawn that Bulgarians are addicted to strong individuals and are keen to be guided by, and adore, such politicians. However, this begs the question of why there was not a strong personality cult towards the leader Todor Zhivkov (1911-1997) who governed the country for almost 35 years during the long period of communist rule. Why did he not enjoy the mass adoration that was part of the personality cults of Enver Hoxha, Ceausescu and Tito in Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia?

MAIN INTENTIONS

In addition to answering this question, the chapter will a) outline the historical contexts surrounding the emergence of both of the cults; b) compare them; c) suggest some ideas regarding the political ends of such a kind of hero worship; d) delineate the main “images” of Levski and Dimitrov; e) sketch out the process of transforming the communist hero into a scapegoat after the big change in 1989; and e) look at the preservation of Levski as Bulgaria’s top historical protagonist.

SOURCES

It goes without saying that a large number of sources would have been beneficial for the topic. Indeed, there are interesting documentary sources in the State archive revealing both state and party (after 1944) policy towards both cults, especially regarding the

commemorations⁴. However, I would like to suggest that the primary sources are of secondary importance when cults, worships, rituals and images are examined. Other types of information are of greater importance. The press is a must, as are biographies, brochures, edited documentary collections and collections of memoirs⁵. Posters⁶ and other propaganda goods are compulsory. Songs praising the heroes have to be heard. Literary productions, including fiction, poetry⁷, various works of art⁸ and kitsch should not be passed by. Postage stamps are illustrative too. However, my intention is to present a more general picture of both cults, and the size of the chapter does not permit a more detailed approach. As a result, references to the sources will be scarce, although the analysis is based on multiform data as well as on the authors mentioned below.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Despite the hundreds of publications dedicated to Levski and Dimitrov, for the goals of this text I have mainly used six pieces of research which deal with the questions I am interested in. All of them are written by Bulgarian scholars. This probably reveals that Levski was too Bulgarian (despite the efforts of some Bulgarian historians to prove his Universal significance⁹) and that is why he, like Bulgaria, is not very interesting to Western scholars. Turning to Dimitrov, in a poll conducted a few years ago, he was acknowledged by foreign specialists on Bulgaria's past as the most popular Bulgarian political figure abroad¹⁰. Perhaps the majority of Bulgarian historians who have read about the poll consider this to be unpleasant news, but this does not explain the lack of quality research on Dimitrov in Bulgaria after 1989. It is probably because the question is still too political, and because Todor Zhivkov, who governed the country for most of the socialist period, has been chosen by communist nostalgia as its protagonist, creating greater public interest and a need for historical evaluation. I suppose that on one hand the lack of interest of foreign historiographers has resulted from the inability of Bulgarian socialism to move without producing any "breaking news" (no Yugoslavian summer of 1948, Hungarian autumn of 1956, Prague spring and Ceausescu), and the secondary importance of Dimitrov's cult, which can be shown just as a case study of a communist personality cult.

In 1987, Nikolay Genchev published a monograph simply entitled *Левски*¹¹. Its second part studies the place of the Apostle in Bulgarian's historical memory. The book is written with a strong nationalist pathos (Genchev was an ardent nationalist himself) but this does not diminish its scientific quality. The pages dedicated to the development of Levski's image and the attitudes of the nation towards the Deacon are very informative, with interesting analysis, and it is not an exaggeration to say that Genchev's approach seems rather original in the context of 1980s Bulgarian historiography.

It is quite suggestive that the next piece of research connected with the topic appeared more than ten years later, written by Maria Todorova, a Bulgarian historian working in the US¹². If Genchev's work was driven by nationalist emotions, then Todorova's article was inspired by post-modern analysis and criticism of nationalism. Her article is highly

provocative, although like many post-modern “texts” it lacks historical “optimism” and “activism” as Anthony D. Smith noticed in his review of the scientific debate on nationalism¹³. I would like to stress here the political and social determination on which both Levski’s and Dimitrov’s cults were based. I agree with Prof. Todorova’s argument that the heroes’ posthumous paths strongly depend on poets, writers and historians who “discover them and shed the light of recognition onto them”¹⁴. Taking this thesis into account, I shall try to find out why it was Levski and not Dimitrov or someone else, who has managed to remain at the top of the Bulgarian national pantheon for so long, always surviving political changes. On the other hand, I disagree with Todorova’s otherwise attractive conclusion that the Apostle was the “literary hero” of a narrative¹⁵. I believe he passed along most of the standard heroic road before being a “literary hero”, and this is one of the reasons explaining the longevity of his glorification.

Maria Todorova’s lasting interest in Levski’s personality, or to be precise, in the process of the hero’s “construction” led to another provocative, as well as controversial, “text”¹⁶. In 2003, she wrote an article dedicated to the methodological problem of the place of memoirs in historical science. Levski’s story is very interesting in this respect because of the debate surrounding Deacon’s remains in 1987, when many professional historians questioned the reliability of oral history and memoirs. Taking this as a starting point, Todorova “reconstructed” the “painful steps” to write a scholarly biography of Levski from the first half of the 1920s to 1947 when Ivan Undziev’s enormous volume (more than 1000 pages) was published. According to Todorova, Undziev, while claiming to be a “mainstream” researcher, actually relied on memoirs and had been acting as an oral historian. Todorova’s contribution shows the gaps in the positivist national history and as such, although without being original in its general theoretical perspective, it is valuable in the context of the small Bulgarian historical school where the nationalist positivist approach has been mainstream for too long.

In contrast to Maria Todorova’s post-modern approach of stressing narratives to be deconstructed, Georgi Todorov doubts Levski, employing a rather “pre-modern” interpretation of the national hero from the Orthodox point of view¹⁷. His criticism is valuable because the author is a renowned Bulgarian theologian, an ex-editor of the Church’s official newspaper, and he represents the semi-official position of the Bulgarian Patriarchy regarding Levski. The author states that the gratitude of the nation towards the hero turns into a cult which leads toward some kind of messianic worship, and because of that the “revolutionary content” of Levski’s work has been mistakenly taken for “sanctity”. Revolutionaries such as Levski are products of the “belief in humanity which substitutes the faith in Christ”. The author argues, “But neither sacrifice, courage, honesty, incorruptibility or other similar values make sanctity, but life and death in the name of God and through him, in the name of the Church and through it”¹⁸. Todorov claims that a revolutionary and a saint have nothing in common and that is why Levski should not be compared to Christ or canonized as a Bulgarian saint. He gives an example from the Greek experience, where the long and strong opposition / cooperation between nationalism and orthodoxy led to a division between martyrs in

the name of Church and those who sacrificed themselves in the name of people. He explains later in the text that this practice was not a correct one. I respect Todorov's stand because he brings a different insight to the topic. On the other hand, his point clearly reveals the fact that during modern and contemporary Bulgarian history, the Orthodox Church has lost its monopoly over religious suggestions, which have been more successfully implemented by nationalism and communism which adapted them to their respective ideologies to serve the needs of state power.

Turning to Dimitrov, an article written by the late Ilcho Dimitrov has been of particular usefulness for me¹⁹. The text is probably the best one dedicated to Dimitrov after 1989. Ilcho Dimitov's careful study examines the dead leader's personality in the light of his recently-published diary. The article provides an excellent insight into the leader's character, but there are also some observations regarding Georgi Dimitrov's cult and his place in Bulgarian historical memory before and after 1989. Ilcho Dimitrov's contribution, although clearly representing a left wing point of view, is of particular value, and all the more so if one bears in mind that the author himself had interesting political experiences before and after the change²⁰.

Another piece of research on Dimitrov appeared recently in the Bulgarian art weekly *Kultura*²¹. The text, written by Ivaylo Znepolsky, an authority in the field of Bulgarian cultural studies, explores the relationship between Stalin and Dimitrov. In the background to study, the author just touches on questions concerning Dimitrov's personality cult. Znepolski explains that the authoritarian native tradition (i.e. the regime of Tsar Boris the Third and his short-lived post-mortem worship) contributed to Dimitrov's adoration and his posthumous glorification. According to Znepolsky, Dimitrov's body has been used as "an incarnation of people's unity" since he passed away, and so his case could be compared with some of the perceptions of the monarch's body in Western tradition. It is hard to disagree with such parallels, especially when they are dressed up in a fancy theoretical manner, but it seems to me that a better thing to do would be to underline the importance of the Soviet example so strictly followed by the Bulgarian communists. In this sense, a more reasonable explanation, at least to me, lies in the copying of the Soviet double Lenin-Stalin, transferring it to Bulgarian ground and reproducing it as Dimitrov and his corresponding heir. Just as Lenin had a Mausoleum, so should his Bulgarian reflection.

As to the theoretical perspective, it is clear that I use terms like civic religion, personality cult, hero worship, charisma, legitimization, etc. But this chapter is based on an historical approach because I have serious doubts about my intellectual capacity and professional training. That is why I have decided not to swim in the deep waters of theory where I have heard much better swimmers than I have already drowned. So, as a lay person, I have employed the special terms found in sociological dictionaries and manuals without any ambition to make a contribution to this highly respected science.

However, before grappling with the tasks, I suppose that despite the existence of available data written in English on Dimitrov²² and Levski²³, it would be "reader-friendly" to include some important facts from their biographies.

VASIL IVANOV KUNCHEV (6/18 JULY 1837-6/18 FEBRUARY 1873)²⁴

Vasil Levski was born in Karlovo, a comparatively well-to-do town situated in the central part of Bulgaria. His father, who was a craftsman, died when Vasil Ivanov was a young boy. The burden of supporting the big family fell on the shoulders of Levski's mother Gina. Levski had attended school in his native town, but had to quit in order to become a novice for his uncle, Vasiliy, who was a *taxidiot*, a person occupied with fund raising for the benefit of the Hilendar monastery on the Holy mount. In 1858, Levski became a monk and later obtained the rank of Deacon. In 1862, he joined the First Bulgarian legion, established in the Serbian capital, Belgrade, by another great symbol of Bulgaria, Georgi Rakovski (1821-1867). It was in Belgrade that he received his famous revolutionary byname of Levski (from "lion"). The legion was quickly disbanded, and in 1863, Levski returned to his native town. In 1864, he renounced, probably for the second time, the rank of Deacon and worked for a while as a teacher. In 1867, he left for Romania. This country was a nest of Bulgarian revolutionary emigrants who were against the Ottoman Empire. Levski joined the revolutionary band of the famous *voivoda* [chieftain] Panayot Hitov (1830-1918). Together with Hitov, he crossed the



Fig. 1

Levski's classic photo, taken in Bucharest, probably in 1872. The Deacon's signature is under the photograph. The photo was in every copy of the Bulgarian edition of Genchev's book on Levski.

Danube and participated in some minor engagements with the Ottoman detachments. The band withdrew to Serbia, and Levski joined the Second Bulgarian legion in Belgrade. When relations between Serbia and the sultan improved the legion was disbanded, and Levski once again found refuge in Romania. It was there that he met Hristo Botev, the future holder of second place in the Bulgarian national pantheon. Later, the great poet expressed a high opinion of Levski in a letter addressed to a friend. Probably on the basis of his Serbian and Romanian experience, Levski decided that Bulgarian liberation had to be organized in the Bulgarian lands under the Ottoman rule, and not in Romania or Serbia. At end of 1868, he began his first mission in the Ottoman Empire, visiting many towns and villages in Northern and Southern Bulgarian lands. After a short stay in Romania, on 1 May 1869, he started his second mission in the Ottoman provinces populated by Bulgarians. During this tour, Levski established the first Bulgarian revolutionary committees in the Ottoman Empire and probably laid the foundations of the Internal Revolutionary Organization. In the second half of 1869, Levski went to Romania, where he had talks with the representatives of the Bulgarian revolutionary Diaspora, trying to convince them of the need for development of the Internal Organization. In the spring of 1870, Levski returned to Bulgarian lands and established a revolutionary centre in Northern Bulgaria called the Provisional Government. In 1872, he participated in the General Meeting of the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee headed by Lyuben Karavelov. The forum recognized Levski as the “supreme Apostle of all of Bulgaria, Thrace and Macedonia.” In June, the Apostle left Bucharest, continuing his mission south of the Danube and dedicating himself to expanding and strengthening the network of revolutionary committees. His activities were put to an end because of the *Arabakonak* robbery of the Ottoman post conducted by his deputy Dimitar Obshti (or Kosovetsa due to the fact that he was born in Kosovo town of Djakovitsa) (ca 1835-1873). After the robbery, Obshti was imprisoned by the Ottoman authorities and the police succeeded in arresting many revolutionary activists. Levski decided that it was necessary to meet with the Central Committee members in Bucharest, but in December 1872 he was arrested near the town of Lovech. According to some hard-to-prove rumours, he was betrayed by a priest. The Apostle stood trial in Sofia and was hanged on 18 January 1873 in the outskirts of Bulgaria’s future capital. His grave remains unknown, and his death is commemorated on 19 January²⁵.

Levski was not married and had no heirs.

GEORGI DIMITROV MIHAILOV (18/30 JUNE 1882-2 JULY 1949)²⁶

Georgi Dimitrov was born in Kovachevtsi, a village not far away from Sofia. His parents were refugees from Macedonia. They moved to Sofia and all Dimitrov’s life in Bulgaria was connected to the Bulgarian capital. He left school when he was 12 years old and became a printer. It was not long before he entered the labour movement. He became a member of the Bulgarian Workers Social Democrat Party at the age of 20. After the split of this organization, he joined the “narrow” socialists, whose leader, Dimitar Blagoev, was also of Macedonian origin. Under his influence, Dimitrov became a passionate and determined,

but rather dogmatic, supporter of Marxism. It is interesting to note that most of the Party leaders were not “working class heroes”, but intellectuals. Dimitrov was among the first workers to be included on the Central Committee, in 1909. He remained a CC member until his death. In 1913, he was elected as a Member of Parliament. Because of his activities against Bulgarian participation in World War One, he was imprisoned. After the war, the “narrow” socialists accepted the Bolshevik ideas, and acquired a new name – the Bulgarian Communist Party. Under the guidance of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, Dimitrov, together with Vasil Kolarov (1877-1950), led the unsuccessful September Uprising in 1923, which broke out against the allegedly “fascist” government of Bulgaria. After the revolt, Dimitrov escaped to Yugoslavia (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). In the following decade, he lacked popularity among the activists that had left the Communist party which had been persecuted by the Bulgarian government. On the other hand, he succeeded in securing his position at the forefront of the Bolshevik leaders and in the Comintern. He played an important role in the Balkan Communist Federation, and from 1929 to 1933 he was in charge of the Western European Bureau of the Comintern. In March 1933, he was arrested in Germany. The Leipzig Trial began and this event could probably be judged as his finest hour. Due to his courageous behaviour during the trial, he was acknowledged as an international communist hero. After his release and departure for the USSR, he became Secretary General of the Comintern. In a very short time, the ex-printer reached the peak of his development as a revolutionary and international politician. Dimitrov was declared the leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party after his arrival in Moscow. Between 1937 and 1945, he was also a member of the Supreme Council of the USSR. In 1943, the Comintern was disbanded, and with the end of war approaching, Dimitrov became more and more involved in Bulgarian affairs. In 1944, the ex-leader of Comintern accepted the Yugoslav position on the Macedonian question (i.e. Macedonia in the framework of Federal Yugoslavia), although it was not without some doubts. Two years later, he became the first communist prime minister of Bulgaria. His government suppressed the legal opposition. The authorities arrested, put on trial and hanged the agrarian leader Nikola Petkov. In his external policies, Dimitrov preserved his good relations with Tito. To a certain extent, Josip Broz was in debt to Dimitrov, as a head of Comintern, for his position as the Yugoslav communist leader. From 1944 up until the famous Cominform resolution (28 June 1948) against the Yugoslav leadership, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were close allies and there were serious plans for the creation of a common state. It was very hard for Dimitrov to accept the Cominform sentence against Tito, issued in Bucharest on 28 June 1948. In August, his health deteriorated. In 1949, he went to Moscow for medical treatment, only to return in a coffin. In just a few days, the authorities built a mausoleum and mummified his body. It lay there for the next 40 years.

Dimitrov was married twice. His first wife, the Yugoslav Lyuba Ivoshevic, died during the Leipzig trial. He had a son, Dimitar, by his second wife, Rosa Fleishman, but the son died during the Second World War. When the war ended, Dimitrov and Rosa Fleishman adopted two children – Boyko²⁷, whose parents had been killed while working as activists for the anti-fascist resistance in Bulgaria, and Fanya, the daughter of the Chinese communist leader Van Min.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND THE EVOLUTION OF BOTH CULTS

I share Paschalis Kitromilides' thesis that the secular ideology of nationalism gradually subjected religion in the Balkans²⁸. On the other hand, there are good reasons for George Arnakis' argument stressing the very importance of religion as factor which shaped the national consciousness on the peninsula²⁹. As the new dominant secular religion, nationalism had to adopt some religious symbols and exploit them for its propaganda. As such, the old religious saints were replaced (not entirely of course) by the new national heroes and martyrs, new places of worship were promoted and the people had to be good patriots and not good Christians although it is also correct to say that a good patriot was naturally a good Christian. Nationalism became the new home of the "sacred". A lot of similarities between religion and nationalism were formal, but I suppose that it is the formal similarities that are significant when propaganda suggestions are under consideration. Bulgaria fit the general Balkan pattern of nationalism and could probably even serve as one of the most extreme examples. Bulgarian nationalists like Father Paisiy (1722-1773) and Sofroniy Vrachanski (1739-1813) were priests, and in the 19th century Orthodoxy had been "Bulgarized", serving as a tool for achieving the goals of nationalism. The establishment of the modern Bulgarian nation had other important features which I have to mention here. The meaning of the Bulgarian nation is complicated. It is a religious, linguistic and historical structure probably erring on the darker side of the controversial divisions of nationalism as formulated by Hans Kohn and Elie Kedourie³⁰. But the Bulgarian nation was also perceived as a social community, a community of oppressed poor people against masters and the rich. Perhaps this was an historical outcome of the development of an egalitarian society without an aristocracy in the Bulgarian lands under Ottoman rule³¹. Levski's life conveniently fits the pattern of Bulgarian nationalism and the meaning of the Bulgarian nation. On one hand, he is an incarnation of nationalism's triumph over religion. As I have already mentioned, Levski left the church and dedicated himself to the nation. On the other hand, Levski's biography clearly shows that nationalism needed a religious example to follow. It is emblematic that Levski has been called the Deacon and Apostle³². His personal life resembled that of a Christian monk – the absence of personal life: no wife, no children. His personality and ideas also equated to the meaning of the Bulgarian nation in the sense that as a freedom fighter against the Ottomans, he expressed its ethnic and religious base. But a famous quotation presents him as a champion of social justice aiming to create an ideal state, a paradise on Earth for the nation as a community of the oppressed and under-represented:

...all nations will live under pure and sacred laws... everything will be equal for the Turk, for the Jew, etc., whoever they are... We do not chase away the Turkish people, or their religion, but the sultan and his laws, in a word, the Turkish government, which rules barbarously not only over us, but over the Turks themselves.

This thought, expressed in a letter to an associate (its pathos is in line with the nationalism of Mazzini, as observed by Maria Todorova³³), is very popular today due to the participation of Turks in Bulgarian government.

Next, I shall try to outline some of the features of Bulgaria's political history which influenced the evolution of the hero worship for Levski and Dimitrov.

The Bulgarian national movement, like many other such movements, was not united. Various groups and different generations had disagreements over the ends of nationalism. Some relied on the Ottoman Empire and thought that the Bulgarian national question could be solved with the help of the sultan. Others counted on the Russian emperor. Levski was part of the revolutionary current which, despite his industrious efforts, was possibly the least influential at the beginning of the 1870s. Soon after the Deacon's death, famous representatives of the revolutionary circles in Bucharest, such as Lyuben Karavelov (1834-1879) and Hristo Botev, "shaped the public discourse on Levski as it developed over the subsequent decades"³⁴. They gave the earliest evaluation of him as a martyr of freedom and outlined his political canonization, etc. Botev's poem, *The Hanging of Vasil Levski*³⁵, was especially influential. The radical young man was the first to popularize Levski's image when, in 1876, he edited a calendar with the Deacon's image on it³⁶. In doing so, Botev broke with the religious tradition of depicting saints or religious martyrs on calendars. It is rather tame to state that the Apostle became a legitimizing tool of radical nationalism in Bucharest, although maybe there is some truth in such a suggestion. It is hard to believe that Levski was just a tool in a power game for such a passionate, emotional person as Hristo Botev – a socialist, anarchist, communist, nationalist, talented poet and, last but not least, a hooligan and loser who spat on traditional morals when he married a divorced woman. For those like Botev, the Deacon was an inspiration, an example to follow and not a political argument and a means of propaganda. It is even better to say that Levski became some kind of painkiller, relieving the revolutionaries of their regrets about the lack of mass support for action against the Ottomans and proof that their existence had reason. Botev sacrificed his life a few years later. However, their example might have been one of the first attempts on behalf of the radical Bulgarian nationalists to create a kind of civic religion in the sense of a new "religious dimension" in order to provide the people with a different interpretation of their historical experience³⁷.

The Bulgarian nation gained independence because of Russia's military efforts. The Apostle's idea of a large scale rebellion and liberation with limited foreign aid turned out to be utopian. It is no surprise that Russia was extraordinary popular and became an object of worship. The real beginning of the Russian cult in Bulgaria had started. Bulgarians perceived the Russian Emperor, Alexander the Second, almost as their head of state; his birthday was celebrated officially as a State day, and his portraits were as widespread as those of the Bulgarian prince, who had the same name and, despite being of German origin, was the Tsar's favourite nephew. The excessive Russian influence and the disappointment of political life in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia was far away from the Apostle's imagined "pure and holy Republic", and pushed Levski's cult forward. Two people were important in shaping the Deacon's image in the period after the Liberation until the wars from 1912-1918. They were the "Patriarch" of Bulgarian literature, Ivan

Vazov (1850-1921), and the revolutionary, cunning politician, journalist and writer of extraordinary talent, Zahari Stoyanov (1850-1889).

Vazov was a Russophile, but on the other hand, he felt deep frustration because of the political and social development experienced in Bulgaria and Rumelia. Vazov had been sick at the time “when giants are missing and midgets wake up.” The poet incessantly ridiculed the new society and its ideal of the “practical man”³⁸. He mocked at the ignorance of Bulgarians, not only of their history, but also of their geography. A Bulgarian who knows geography well will not have visited Sliven, he complained, and “will know much better the whereabouts of New Orleans in North America or of Algiers, than the unfortunate birthplace of Hadji Dimitar”³⁹. “But what can one expect of a nation which is proverbially apathetic and ignoring itself...” he asked in the same emotional manner. According to Maria Todorova “this was an open challenge to the syndrome of weak or non-existent nationalism...”⁴⁰. Or, I would add, the voice of the failed attempt of Bulgarian radicals to create a kind of Bulgarian civil religion and the surprising lack of governmental support. It is generally accepted that the first many-coloured literary portrait of Levski was created by Ivan Vazov⁴¹. The Apostle had been part of his literary world from 1876 to 1903. His ideas and emotions concerning Levski modelled the way generations have imagined the hero. In 1884, Vazov published his extraordinary popular epic poem *Епопея на забравените* [*Epic of the Forgotten*], reacting to his disgust towards the Bulgarian reality. The work included the poem *Levski* published a few years earlier in 1881. In this poem, the author compared his hero’s sufferings to those of Christ. Vazov recounted the great wandering feats of the Apostle and the people’s love for him. The poem said that the monastery proved to be cramped for Levski’s spirit, and he set out to find out another path. For nine years, he wandered homeless, sleepless and restless on his great enterprise, which drew in “every age, class, sex and occupation”, and became a “phantom of the shadow”, fearless and unrestricted⁴². Vazov introduced Levski’s physical appearance for the first time into one of his novels – *Немили недраги* [Outcasts] (1883). Levski was of moderate height, with blond hair and grey, almost blue, eyes. A strange smile lighted up his saintly looking face on many occasions. The author also focused on his character, particularly the two main qualities of persistence and tenacity, which made Levski superior to all other revolutionaries. In Vazov’s description, Levski “had something of Kableshkov”⁴³ (1851-1876) enthusiasm, Benkovski’s firmness, and the strength of the Karadzha (1840-1868)⁴⁴. But he also had something that they lacked; unflinching patience and persistence”⁴⁵.

Levski is the manifestation of a force emerging from centuries of suffering, from an ocean of humiliation, steady to a point of impossibility, persistent to the point of madness... Such was the individual known under the names of the Deacon, V. Levski, the Apostle, whom fate sent to lead a host of preachers and martyrs of freedom, in order to move the masses, to generate events, to engender future...⁴⁶

Using such means, Vazov did much to promote the worship of the hero, which in the end turned him into a kind of an icon. But one should bear in mind that he was a poet, and a poetic canonization is different from a scholarly study.



Fig. 2
The first picture depicting the hanging of Levski.

Vazov's efforts were well supplemented by Zahari Stoyanov's exceptional capacity as a storyteller. He wrote the Deacon's most important biography after the Liberation. Stoyanov's work was not the first attempt to present the life of the Apostle. Nevertheless, with its literary quality and political cunning, the book outmatched the previous efforts. Zahari Stoyanov completed the text in 1883 and the book appeared in 1884. Efreim Karanfilov outlined the aims of the book in the preface for its 8th edition in 1980. They were to set Levski against the banality and lack of ideals that characterized the contemporary age, and also to have the Apostle opposing the Russians. The very beginning of the book reveals the anti-Russian sentiment in spite of the fact that that liberator's name is not mentioned:

Amongst appraisals of general's epaulets, frantic hurra and shedding of tears over foreign graves and majesties, it wouldn't be bad that a little something be written about our people and our activities. At last we have also become a nation, oh God, we also have our national egoism, human dignity, which must be triumphant over foreign authorities, which define us a nation, and not as an unconscious, self-humiliated crowd... It is more than enough that we have been flattering those idols who couldn't be discussed that one day they could be ours. Whatever we do, their true admirers know that our tears are false to say the least. "Gratitude and brotherly feelings" – we cry out in the literature and diplomatically and in private between ourselves. But what about our own brothers, our heroes (whatever they are) after all our pride do not deserve the

above mentioned honours? If many well-wishers want to prove that we are simple common folk without a past and without great people, must the Bulgarian intellectuals confirm this bitter truth, must they close their eyes and state that this is in our interest? It is time to face things around us⁴⁷.

It was through such means that Vazov and Stoyanov fixed the main tenets of Levski's worship or cult. The Apostle began to serve as an ideal example, opposed to the existing Bulgarian social and political reality. The Deacon was to play a crucial part in the strengthening of Bulgarian national consciousness. Levski also had to fill the nation with a sense of pride and stand as a guardian of "Bulgarian national spirit" against foreign influence.

The commemorative "industry" surrounding Levski showed a gradual growth after the Liberation, from modest beginnings with provincial celebrations, through the inauguration of the famous monument in Sofia in 1895, to the twenty-fifth anniversary and inauguration of a monument in Karlovo in 1903. The Apostle was on his way of becoming one of the main sources of common values, commitment and solidarity for Bulgarian national integration. What seems like a surprise from today's perspective is the careful and not too enthusiastic position of Bulgarian officials and the court in the hero's worship. However, that does not mean that the government did not participate in the events dedicated to Levski. For example, as part of the policy for the gradual *Bulgarization* of Bulgaria's landscape in 1897, the town of *Turski Karaagach* became *Levski*⁴⁸. In 1906, another place with a "Turkish-Arabic" name, the village of *Aladaalii*, also acquired this honour. Before the wars, Levski had not been a top hero in the National Pantheon. The main reason was the relatively positive development of the Bulgarian nation-state. The position of the Bulgarian monarch, King Ferdinand (up to 1908, he had the title of Prince), was strong, and the aims of Bulgarian irredentist nationalism stressed the Medieval Bulgarian khans and kings, which sounded better in Ferdinand's aristocratic ears. But the court was not the only one having doubts about the Apostle. Curiously enough, the "narrow" socialists (Dimitrov's party, the future communists) also underestimated Levski's significance. The "narrows" counted on Botev, proclaiming him to be a top revolutionary hero due to his supposedly communist ideas. Their leader, Dimitar Blagoev (1856-1924), regarded Levski as a brave but ignorant revolutionary lacking scientific theoretical training⁴⁹.

Things changed after the period of the wars (for Bulgaria it was 1912-1918). The country suffered a heavy defeat. The nation was depressed. The monarch was out. His son Boris III, clever enough to realize his weak position, hid in the shadows of Bulgarian politics and waited there for better days to come. The crisis created the proper environment for the development of a wide range of salvation promoters, from the extreme right to the extreme left, and from religious spiritual philosophers like Peter Dunov (1864-1944) to peasant prophets, fortune-tellers and visionaries⁵⁰. The state crisis and the mental chaos experienced by the nation cleared space for the Apostle's cult to spread. He became a banner for all political parties and movements. The ex-"narrows", the communists, finally recognized him when an article signed by Valko Chervenkov (1900-1980), the future son in law of Dimitrov as well as the future leader of the Bul-



Fig. 3

A different version of the heroic pantheon: Bulgarian monarch Ferdinand is surrounded by the Bulgarian medieval kings, princes and khans.

garian Communist party and prime minister, appeared in 1923. Chervenkov chose a rather indicative title – *Жив е Левски! Долю пъжете, светомамци!* (Levski is alive! Hands off, you blasphemers!) In the article, Chervenkov praised Levski as “the greatest, most beloved, most staunch and complete Bulgarian revolutionary” who hated “the rich blood-suckers”⁵¹.

In the late 1920s and 1930s, an elaborate and systematic ritual of commemoration came into place, especially with the solemn and scrupulously organized commemoration of the 100th anniversary of Levski’s birth in 1937. Literature dedicated to the hero flourished, and in 1937, a museum opened its doors in the renovated (actually rebuilt) house of the Apostle. The Bulgarian government more willingly expanded Levski’s presence on the map. In April 1923, the village of *Yavashevo* was christened Vasil Levski. In 1934, during the great renaming campaign conducted by the short-lived May 19th Regime, three more villages – *Kalagare* (this particular village became *Dolno Levski*, which could be translated as Lower Levski – a rather tasteless choice, so the communists repaired the mistake in 1987 when *Lower* disappeared from the village’s name), *Chatma* and *Mitirizovo* were named after the Apostle. In 1940, Bul-

garia restored its authority over Southern Dobrudza, and the Government used the Deacon to fight the Romanian names of some the villages, which were the result of Romanian rule in the region from 1913 to 1940. For example, *Regina Maria* (a village christened after Romanian Queen Mary) became Vasil Levski⁵² in 1942. But the Apostle proved to be the godfather not only of towns and villages. In 1942, one of the highest peaks in the Balkan mountain range, *Ambaritsa*, acquired the name Levski.

In the late 1930s, and during World War Two, the growing post-death cult towards the Apostle coexisted peacefully with another phenomenon which was relatively new, and although it had some roots in Bulgarian political tradition, its essence had been imported from abroad. It was the propaganda cult dedicated to the living ruler, Tsar Boris the Third. Boris became the object of glorification, which included clichés such as “the first citizen”, “supreme leader and creator of new Bulgaria”, “the most powerful engine of the rise of our fatherland”, “the dearest leader of the people”, “great personality”, “wise state leader”, etc⁵³. In 1942, the Tsar received the praise “helmsman”⁵⁴ – an attribute which communist propaganda used to define leaders like Stalin, Mao and Ceausescu. The cult outlived Boris, who died of heart disease in 1943, but disappeared in 1944 when the communists came to power and turned the late monarch into a scapegoat. His cult proved to be a short-lived feature of Bulgarian social and political development. I have noted the existence of this phenomenon because the Deacon’s worship had to co-exist with similar personality cults in the future.

Why did Levski become an undisputed national hero after the First World War? I have already mentioned some of the reasons, but probably a little bit more specificity would be useful. The defeat in the First World War, and its consequences, facilitated the strengthening of the cult. With a bespattered political class, discredited state and national ideal under question, the state and various politicians were forced to promote a period of Bulgarian history when there was no Bulgarian state – the Bulgarian Revival⁵⁵ – as ideal. The Apostle became the Bulgarian Revival’s main representative, and the nation chose him as its greatest hero. The state started to shape a cult towards an extraordinary person (for Levski was such a person) whose ideas were actually contrary to its bureaucratic, institutional and capitalist basics, because the “pure and holy Republic”⁵⁶ searched for by Levski had none of them. Consequently, the function of Levski as an ideal example, opposed to the existing Bulgarian social and political reality, found further expression⁵⁷.

After 9 September 1944 when the communists seized power, they preserved Levski as a national hero. His worship would have its “ebbs and flows”, but it was never suspended. The Apostle’s cult proved to be as adaptive as the nationalism. The communists used Levski as a symbol during the resistance. The partisans named detachments after him, and the attitude towards him was probably well described in the song called *Партизански мариш* (Partisans’ March):

*Земята на Ботев и Левски
отново е робска земя
Балкана хайдушката песен
отново размирно запя*
[Again the country of Botev and Levski
A land is of slaves,
The mountain sings
The *hauducs'* song again]

*Кой люби народа поробен
и пази завета велик
завета на Левски бунтовен
при нас нека дойде войник*⁵⁸
[Those who love the enslaved people
And keep the great testament,
The revolutionary testament of Levski
Come with us as a fighter]
[...]

In 1945, a few months after becoming masters of the country, the communists presented Levski as the champion of southern Slavic unity. He was also exploited as an inspiration for Bulgarian soldiers during their participation in the war against the Nazis, as a drawing by Stoyan Venev (1904-1989) suggests. The prominent Bulgarian painter and cartoonist depicted the Apostle pointing a finger towards Berlin to a charging Bulgarian soldier⁵⁹. This showed how flexible the great hero's posthumous worship could be. The new regime preserved and expanded the old places of memory dedicated to Levski. In 1963, the museum in his native town Karlovo expanded, with a new hall dedicated to the Deacon's revolutionary work. Printed editions about Levski during the period of socialism accumulated. The authorities christened more towns and villages after the Apostle. In general, this policy had support among the population because with the growth of the cult came the desire to be part of it. Nikolay Cenchev observed⁶⁰ that "Hundreds of villages, towns, monasteries and churches were to claim to have been visited by Levski, putting up plaques to perpetuate his presence". His native town, Karlovo, was called *Levskigrad* from 1953 till 1962. In 1953, the Bulgarian national stadium opened its doors. It was named after Levski. The Deacon also became the godfather to a residential district in Sofia. Actually, the state standardized the public ceremonial of Levski cult during the period of socialism. The "routinisation" of the Apostle's "charisma" on an official level did not harm his image in society. In fact, it was just the opposite. This explains why, when in the 1980s with growing nationalism among the ageing leadership, the discussion about the Apostle's grave, which had some similarities with the one from the 1930s, turned into a furious debate between historians, architects and writers addicted to history, such as Nikolay Haytov (1912-2002). This conflict was regarded by some authors as a typical power struggle for the rights over the interpretation of the past. From the Bulgarian historians' point of view, it was a fight to keep professional criteria alive in historical research, even when the post-death worship of the "nation's greatest son" was under question⁶¹. But what is

more important is the fact that Vasil Levski was capable of producing a lively debate and emotions which were not orchestrated.

Unfortunately for Georgi Dimitrov, this was not his case. Bulgaria was defeated in the Second World War; the country had to change sides, and in the autumn of 1944, the Germans became the enemy and the Soviet Union an ally⁶². Yugoslavia, the former enemy, became a brother. As I have already pointed out, King Boris III became a scapegoat in the eyes of the same people who were probably quite sincere when crying at his funeral in 1943. The same eyes were soon to shed tears over Dimitrov's death⁶³. Obviously, it was a time for new cults and new heroes⁶⁴. Quite simply, power needed them⁶⁵. If one watches Bulgarian "fascist" newsreels before September 1944 and "communist" newsreels after this date, the impression is that the narrator's voice belongs to a single person. Immediately after 9 September 1944, Dimitrov's cult emerged, although at the beginning it was rather difficult explaining to the people, especially the common folk, who he was⁶⁶. Local communist (i.e. not ex-emigrants from Moscow) leaders such as Traycho Kostov (1897-1949), partisan commanders like Slavcho Transki (1914-1999) and ignorant, but otherwise talented public speakers and agitators like Dobri Terpeshev (1884-1967) and Tzola Dragoycheva (1898-1993) were much more recognizable than Dimitrov, who had lived in Moscow from 1934 till 1945. The communist writer and poet with a rather anarchist outlook, Dobri Zhotev (1921-1997), remembered that during the Second World War when Bulgaria joined the Allies, he had to "advertise" Dimitrov among the soldiers. Zhotev showed them a portrait of Leipzig's hero and asked them if they knew him. A soldier of peasant origin answered him, "I suppose it's you, sir." Despite this ironic memoir, propaganda did its best, and when Dimitrov arrived in Sofia, he was welcomed by an exultant crowd as though he was the Messiah. Bulgarians were accustomed to welcoming saviours from abroad. In 1877-78 the saviour was the Russian army. The first Bulgarian princes, Alexander Batenberg and Ferdinand Sax-Coburg – Gota, foreigners by origin, came from abroad to be received as saviours. The Wehrmacht and Red armies, in 1941 and 1944 respectively, also enjoyed a warm welcome. Dimitrov fitted in with this pattern, which in the Balkans was not a unique Bulgarian national peculiarity⁶⁷.

Georgi Dimitrov enjoyed a personality cult during his lifetime when he held the positions of prime minister and secretary-general. But it was a short period of time, and up to 1948, he had to share the glorification with Stalin and Tito. After the Soviet-Yugoslav split, he remained in the shadow of Stalin. The posthumous ritual of perennial homage paid to him was much more important. Valko Chervenkov, the next secretary-general, wrote,

His work is alive. It lives among the steel rows of hard like granite Bulgarian communist party which he has created and educated. It lives in our mighty working class, among the laborious peasants, people's intelligentsia and in their sacred unity incarnated by the Fatherland's front. It lives among the people's Youth and our dear bright and cheerful pioneers. It is in the hearts of every loyal to his Motherland toiler⁶⁸.

In the course of almost four decades that followed his death, Dimitrov was praised as "Bulgaria's greatest son", a "leader and teacher of Bulgarian people", "people's leader", "be-

loved leader”, “beloved teacher”, “talented Leninist”, “wise statesman”, “brave revolutionary”, “proletarian tribune” etc. Thousands of volumes dedicated to “his life and work” were published. Memories of him were collected. Annual meetings, sessions and other kinds of adoration took place on his birthday. In almost every Bulgarian town, one of the main streets carried his name. The dead leader was a ‘godfather’ to many schools, factories and collective farms, even the *Komsomol* and the pioneers’ organization. Dimitrov became the name of the most prestigious Bulgarian state awards and the highest Bulgarian decoration. The party and state propaganda ‘canonized’ him as the founder of the Fatherland Front and the People’s Republic, the most important party leader, proto fighter against the fascism, one of the major activists in the international workers and communist movement, theoretician of the People’s democracy and inspirer of Bulgarian-Soviet friendship. It was almost impossible to have any doubt about his theoretical heritage and historical role, which in practice were almost neglected by his successors.

The Dimitrov post-death cult occurred for several reasons. It fitted the traditional cults towards the dead. It was part of the very important cult towards the Soviet Union due to his relations with this country and, consequently, he survived Stalin’s denunciation in 1956. The cult also became part of the communist power struggle and helped Valko Chervenkov to establish himself as party leader and prime minister as Dimitrov’s




Fig. 4

The products of a cult industry: busts of Stalin and Dimitrov. On that of Stalin is written “The Liberator”. Dimitrov is defined “The people’s leader”.

true follower and successor. For the second time, Todor Zhivkov presented himself as Dimitrov's true follower and successor, with the purpose of denouncing Valko Chervenkov for deviating from Dimitrov's path and the path of socialism after the 20th Congress. Dimitrov's cult was a clear expression of the Soviet model in forming an attitude towards the leaders. This means that during Chervenkov's rule, the 'pair', Dimitrov – Chervenkov, mirrored the 'couple' Lenin – Stalin. After the official "divorce" of the latter in 1956, the leadership of the BCP preserved Dimitrov as a Bulgarian reflection of Vladimir Ilich, with Zhivkov becoming Bulgaria's Khrushchev. Following this logic, in the years to come, the dead Dimitrov continued to play Lenin's part while Zhivkov proved to have a real talent, acting as the different Soviet leaders, and only Gorbachov's part proved to be too difficult for the ageing actor to perform, although he tried hard.

The propaganda tools of both the Levski and the Dimitrov cults were rather similar. Both were the subject of numerous printed editions representing various kinds of genres. The publications concerning Levski could be divided into several groups: a) different sorts of books dealing with his life and work, such as bibliographies, biographies and biographical sources; b) literary works including novels, short stories, childrens' stories, fairy tales, poetry, songs etc.; c) albums presenting his role as an inspiration for Bulgarian artists; and d) works about the Deacon's ideas or his *Weltanschauung*. Those regarding Dimitrov comprised of photo biographies, biographical materials, bibliographies, literary works including novels, short stories, childrens' stories, poetry, songs etc., albums presenting his role as an inspiration for Bulgarian artists' photo albums, works on ideology and world views, thematic collections presenting his stand on different subjects (Dimitrov and...) and works on his place as a champion of peace. Another group of works deals with his vital role in Bulgarian-Soviet friendship. Among the other main groups of printed propaganda editions are those presenting the importance of Dimitrov for the international communist and workers movement, as a teacher and inspiration of youth, his performance at the Leipzig trial, Dimitrov and the trade unions, Dimitrov and different countries, works dedicated to his family and a special group of editions regarding his commemorations. When compared to Levski, this variety of literature on Dimitrov is to some extent due to his many activities as revolutionary, workers' leader, prominent member of the international communist movement, party worker and statesman during a political career that was much longer than Levki's. On the other hand, the abundance of sources on Dimitrov, in contrast to the existing data regarding the Deacon, made it easier for printed propaganda to expand and vary its production.

Both Levski and Dimitrov made their way into Bulgarian art, becoming an inspiration for painters and sculptors. Both of them encouraged different forms of kitsch, such as badges, accessories for bureaus, tapestries and so on. Dimitrov has been the object of such kitsch more frequently, probably because state and party functionaries found it necessary to decorate their offices with such material.

It is interesting to present how Levski⁶⁹ and Dimitrov⁷⁰ were portrayed on the stage and screen. It was much easier for directors in Dimitrov's case. The existence of docu-

mentary reels probably helped them in their job. Despite the state-sponsored deification of the dead leader, or because of it, perhaps the nation felt indifferent towards the communist hero, making it easier for the directors and audience to perceive him. On the other hand, Levski turned out to be a hard nut to crack for Bulgarian theatre and cinema. Every play and movie dedicated to him created a public scandal⁷¹. The actors who had the opportunity of portraying him were criticised by the audience and the critics. It is difficult to find a satisfactory explanation, although one of the reasons lay in his ideal, almost icon-like, image, which limited the opportunities for directors to work on him, almost paralysing their creativity. But there is something else. It seems to me that Levski as a national hero is a brilliant piece of art (below I will try to develop the idea) and a perfect feature of Bulgarian civil or secular religion that is able to create emotions among the people. The nation is not indifferent to what happens to him or what he is doing, even on the stage or on the screen. His destiny is dear to almost every Bulgarian heart, but strangely enough, and in contrast to such banalities which made him an icon, such love and interest on behalf of Bulgarians is in reality because they individualize him, and everyone perceives him in his own way and rejects the hero proposed by the directors⁷². The same can be said about some of the great literary masterpieces which even the most talented director is incapable of transforming into sound and vision. Naturally there are exceptions.

The common points of both cults, as well as the common tools for their implementation which I have outlined, could only partially be explained by the socialist propaganda which promoted both heroes for so long, because a draft of the “conception” for the hero cult had been sketched out before the communists came to power. It is rather questionable whether one can speak of proper socialist propaganda regarding the hero image as a set of basic ideas, and it would be better to say that it was the national propaganda and its means, only strengthened and unified on an institutional level by the socialist regime and expanded by the fast spreading of literacy under the communists and the inevitable technical development which led to the mass introduction of radio in the late 40s and 50s followed by TV in the 60s and 70s. Much more profound future research is needed to solve the problem regarding the continuity or discontinuity of propaganda in Bulgaria, as well as the general question about the ‘bridges’ and ‘gaps’ in Bulgarian development throughout the 20th century.

Compared to Levski’s cult, Dimitrov’s was much more orchestrated and ‘advertised’. The state and party probably realised that the later worship lacked such the natural support of Levski. It is instructive that the communists did not dare name a football club after Georgi Dimitrov. It is also instructive that communist propagandists made significant efforts to present Dimitrov as a national hero and a Bulgarian patriot instead of stressing his ideological allegiance. This idea has been promoted both in front of home and foreign audiences. For the same purpose, cult speakers repeated over and over the famous lines of Dimitrov’s legendary defence at the Leipzig trial, “I have no reason to be ashamed of being a Bulgarian and I am proud of being a son of the Bulgarian working class”⁷³. As an instruction of how to make a report dedicated to Dimitrov, edited by

the State publishing house, the Sofia Press, it begins with the most beloved quotation from his defence:

It is true, indeed, that Bulgarian fascism is savage and barbarous. But the working class and peasants and the Bulgarian intelligentsia who come from the people are not in the least savage or barbarous. There is no denying that the material level of culture in the Balkans is not so high as in other European countries, but spiritually and politically the great mass of our people are not on a lower plane than the people in the other countries of Europe. Our political struggle and aspirations in Bulgaria are no less noble than those of other countries. Such people as ours, who lived for 500 years under a foreign yoke without losing their language and nationality, such workers and peasants as ours who are fighting against Bulgarian fascism and striving to establish communism, such, I say, are neither savage nor barbarous...⁷⁴

Propagandists have also tried to strengthen Dimitrov's position by underlining the connection which supposedly existed between him and the heroes from the Bulgarian national revival period. Among other things, such a link found expression in a series of postage stamps issued in the 50s, and had been part of the general idea that the communists were successors of the national revolutionaries. On a postage stamp which appeared in 1951, and had been part of an issue dedicated to the April uprising, Dimitrov was shown as a statesman who made real the goals of rebels depicted as the legendary horsemen led by Georgi Benkovski. The persistent reminder of the existence of such a link was probably the result of the unconscious idea about the still weak position of the communist newcomers in the Bulgarian heroic pantheon.

The future showed these efforts to have been in vain. The Apostle calmly waited in the grave or in the heavens, knowing that the time for his rival for the title of "greatest Bulgarian son" was slowly running out. Dimitrov was an ideological and party hero, and like other important Bulgarian party politicians such as Stambolov and Stamboliyski, he had no chance of surviving the political situation and being adapted to another context. Furthermore, he did not even fit perfectly into the general stereotype designed for the communist hero in Bulgaria. Let me make a slight detour. There was a big industry dealing with communist heroes. They were often victims of a violent death. Most of them were killed as part of the Bulgarian resistance. For instance, the famous Bulgarian communist poet from the Bulgarian part of Macedonia, Nikola Vaptsarov (1909-1942), who had been tried and shot in 1942, the group of young Communist martyrs, the *Петумата от PMC* [Five from RMS]⁷⁵ (Lilyana Dimitrova, Adalbert Antonov – *Malchika*, Jordanka Nikolova, Svilen Rusev and Alexander Dimitrov – all of them killed during the resistance), Mitko Palauzov the child-partisan, killed in a fight with the Gendarmerie, the children of Yastrebinov, shot in December 1943, the youngest of whom was only six years old and so on. Others perished during Bulgarian participation in the war against the Nazis in 1944-45. Here I must mention the young Stefan Halachev who, in Matrosov's manner, threw himself against the muzzle of a German machine gun. The interesting thing is that the partisans who survived, such as the famous commanders Slavcho Transky, Dencho Znepolsky (1920-1989)⁷⁶, Slavcho Radomirski (1913-1997)⁷⁷ etc., were the subjects of limited attention. I will not present this phenomenon in detail, but I will restrict myself to a particular illustrative example.

In 1981, an album entitled *Образът на комуниста в българското изобразително изкуство. Дванадесет избрани живописни творби*⁷⁸ [The Image of the Communist in Bulgarian Fine Art. Twelve Selected Works] appeared. In a compressed form the collection shows what the regime thought a communist should have been. Most works of art present communists as rebels and victims. Some depict them as strikers and young romantic promoters of the socialist ideals. One painting was dedicated to a leader's burial, that of Georgi Dimitrov, showing people's grief. Only one was dedicated to the living leader, Todor Zhivkov, an official portrait, included perhaps because of his 70th anniversary (he was born in 1911). Obviously, the general communist hero was not attached to the state but just the opposite. Dimitrov did not fit into this general image because, despite the fact that he had been tried (a must in the image of a communist leader in general and a communist hero in the Balkans), he could neither be presented as a rebel with a gun in his hand, nor as a victim. Strangely enough, the communists popularized the idea that the best communist is a dead one, and this could also be part of the traditional cult towards the dead in Bulgaria. School students were obliged to learn by heart the famous poem written by Veselin Andreev⁷⁹ *Поема за Антон* (Poem about Anton), with a rather instructive ending

- Не човек, а желязо,
 Просъскал агентът фашист,
 Тихо мъртвият казал,
 - Не, комунист.
 [He's not a human, he's like iron,
 Lipped the agent fascist,
 The dead said quietly,
 No, I am a communist.]

It is interesting to note that such an idea was popular among the people, and it was not unusual to hear in private remarks that the true communists were killed by "the fascists". These remarks were directed towards the living communists in power. It was therefore Levski, and not Dimitrov, who proved to be more appropriate for the communist pantheon, which then complemented and coincided with the national identity.

CONCLUSION

The year 1989 brought a lot of chaos to Bulgarian people. But sometimes there is a great deal of logic in the state of chaos. Following this logic, Levski remained at the top of the Bulgarian national pantheon while Dimitrov did not survive the change and became a scapegoat. His body was removed from the Mausoleum in the centre of Sofia and taken to an ordinary graveyard, and the Mausoleum was blown up by the Government of the United Democratic Forces led by Mr. Ivan Kostov⁸⁰. Together with that of Dimitrov, the cult towards the Soviet Union and Russia came to an end, at least at an official level. Levski benefited from this deconstruction and acquired new boulevards and streets in the capital and the country that were previously named after communist activists or dedicated to the Soviet Union. In 1996, the secessionist Orthodox Church (after 1989,

the Bulgarian Orthodox church split and there have been two Orthodox Synods until recently) canonized Levski and tried to use the hero's charisma for its own benefit. The Official Bulgarian Orthodox Church stood up against this populist act, without entirely rejecting the Apostle's nimbus. Their reaction proved to be the right one because public opinion in Bulgaria already considered the Deacon as a kind of secular saint and martyr who did not need official canonization.

After the initial "scapegoating" of Dimitrov, a new moderate and analytical approach towards him is on the way. The ex-idol is probably driving on the same road of Bulgarian historical memory as other important but controversial Bulgarian politicians like Stambolov, Stamboliyski and Boris III have. In the past, they have been "scapegoated" because of changes of the political situation, too. Dimitrov will continue to be included in political debates, but at the same time, he will gradually be regarded as an important historical personage rather than a negative or positive political symbol. That will not be the case with Vasil Levski.

The state continued to take an active part in the hero's worship just as it had during the period of socialism and earlier during the Interwar period (see Source 5). Recently, the National Committee for the Celebration of the 170th Anniversary of Levski's birth, whose president is the Bulgarian minister of culture, accepted a national program for marking the Anniversary. The program includes national scientific conferences, reconstruction of "important buildings related to the Apostle's life", introduction of new memorial plaques "at home and abroad", students' historical and literary competitions, a selection of the best song dedicated to Levski by means of a competition with the participation of poets and composers "from all musical genres", national fairs "and much more"⁸¹. Although very important, this massive state interference is not decisive for the longevity of the hero's cult.

I have already underlined some of the reasons which probably explain the persistence of the Apostle's cult, so I would like to expand further my idea that as a cult, the dead hero's worship is a masterpiece of image as well as function. The Deacon's life was an heroic journey⁸². He lost his father at an early age, then went through a transformation from monk to freedom fighter. He was tempted, but was stronger than temptation. He passed through trials, and at the end he died a violent death as a hero. He died young as a true incarnation of the romantic idea that "only the good die young and only evil seems to live forever". Last, but not least, the few photos that have survived to the present show the Apostle as a rather handsome person (Dimitrov also was handsome in his youth, but had the chance to grow older). After his death, Levski's cult was shaped by other extraordinary personalities like Hristo Botev, Lyuben Karavelov, Ivan Vazov and Zahari Stoyanov. These people possessed great literary talent and were conscious of what was valuable from the respective historical context they were living in. It is worth mentioning that all of them also became part of the National Pantheon headed by the Apostle. The disgrace of the Bulgarian state after the Second Balkan and First World Wars, the interwar Bulgarian Nationalism combined with the outcome of World War Two, and the long socialist period and its collapse only served to maintain Levski's un-

disputed position and the cult towards him. Levski's cult proves that the long-term worship of a person that was in power is not possible, at least not in Bulgaria. Certainly, personality cults towards living state and party leaders have existed in Bulgaria like anywhere else in the Balkans, but they have been short-term phenomena. This probably explains why Todor Zhivkov, who obviously possessed strong political instincts, was not very keen to encourage the creation of his personality cult. He preserved the already existing cults towards the Soviet Union, Georgi Dimitrov and Bulgarian national heroes led by the Apostle. Zhivkov was praised, but this was more a routine, paying homage to a powerful dictator rather than a developed personality cult of the Yugoslavian and Romanian type with a powerful supporting media, literature and art industry. Dimitrov's cult had such an industry, but it was not the worship of a living leader. It was closer to Lenin's post-death glorification and to that of Tito after 1980.

From a broader Balkan perspective, Levski's cult, in contrast to that of Dimitrov, is probably unique for its persistence and origins. I dare to suggest that there is no other Balkan country paying such tribute to a nationalist who died before the creation of the national state. Few countries in the region even have an undisputed national hero like the Apostle of Freedom. Although Romania⁸³ and Serbia possess large National pantheons composed mainly of Medieval kings and princes combined with some rulers from the modern age and heroes from the nationalist movements, there is no leading person of Levski's type. The Greek national pantheon is also lacking. Albania has its Skenderbeg (1405-1468), but he was a medieval ruler and leader of the struggle against the sultan Mehmet Fatih, and it was revived by late Albanian nationalism. Only Turkey, heir to the Ottoman Empire, in which the Bulgarians have lived for so many years, possesses a top national hero in the person of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the Father of the Turks. The persistence of Atatürk's cult⁸⁴, which has survived all the changes in Turkish politics so far, is similar to that of Levski's worship. Kemal, like Levski, was an active nationalist and his cult has been the product of the age of nationalism. But unlike the Apostle, Kemal did not die before the establishment of the Turkish state. On the contrary, he created it and became its first leader. His post-death cult, developed by the State, became part of the political legitimization of his successors and of the secular basis of the Turkish national state. It has been, and still is, exploited, by Turkish politicians as an effective weapon against the Muslim 'threat'. In this way, the cult of Kemal can also be compared to that of Dimitrov because it was the worship of a statesman, revolutionary and party leader, since a single party, the National-Republican, ruled the country up to 1950. Despite the fact that Atatürk has probably been the most successful modern and contemporary Balkan statesmen, it seems that his role as a politician is a danger for the future of his cult. Will it survive a radical political change in Ankara (i.e. the victory of Muslim values over the secular philosophy of Kemalism) or it will collapse like Dimitrov's or Tito's posthumous cults?

Now we are at the end, let me go back to the beginning of the chapter. Although Levski is clearly godfather to a Sofia football club of the same name, CSKA fans (those of FC "Levski's" greatest rivals) will never admit this. They used to tease the "Levski" crowd

with the slogan “If the Apostle was alive he would have been one of us”. As far as Dimitrov is concerned, he is no part of Bulgarian football folklore, nor has he ever been.

NOTES

- ¹ Recently in a poll the nation elected Levski as the Greatest Bulgarian. The poll looked something like a one man’s race.
- ² In his lifetime, friends and associates usually called Levski the *Deacon*. It seems that the name the *Apostle of Freedom* appeared after the Deacon’s death and was invented by Ivan Drasov (1848-1901) under the influence of a book dedicated to Guiseppe Mazzini (1805-1872) which had been published in 1873 by the Czech nationalists. The book was entitled *The Apostle* and mentioned Mazzini as *The Apostle of Freedom*.
- ³ <http://www.bfunion.bg/bg/index.php>
- ⁴ Such documentary sources are quite numerous, especially for the period of the socialist regime. For example, excellent data revealing the party involvement on a central level is available in the files of the Party’s Central Committee in the Central State Archive in Sofia, and in particular, the documentary of its Department of Propaganda and Agitation. For instance ЦДА [Central State Archives], ф. 16, оп. 15, а.е. 31, Отдел “Пропаганда и агитация” (1944-1964) 16 февруари – 1 юни 1945 г, *План, тезиси, беседи, доклади и лозунги на отдела по случай годишнини от смъртта на Васил Левски, Христо Ботев и Георги Бенковски*; ЦДА, ф. 16, оп. 15, а.е. 173, Отдел “Пропаганда и агитация” (1944-1964), 13 май – 28 юни 1947 г., *План, предложение и биографични справки на отдела във връзка с честване 65-годишнината на Георги Димитров и 70-годишнината на Васил Коларов; бележки на секретаря на ЦК по агитация и пропаганда*; ЦДА, Ф. 16, оп. 15, а.е. 304, Отдел “Пропаганда и агитация” (1944-1964), 15 юли 1949 г., *Съобщение от Секретариата на ЦК до секретаря на ЦК по агитация и пропаганда във връзка със събиране от отдела всички речи, списъци, ленти от венци, бюлетини, снимки и печатни материали, свързани с погребението на Георги Димитров*; ЦДА, Ф. 16, оп. 15, а.е. 334, Отдел “Пропаганда и агитация” (1944-1964), 21 ноември – 5 декември 1949 г., *Предложение от зав. отдела до Секретариата на ЦК във връзка с организиране свалянето на шапка от гражданите при минаване край Мавзолея на Георги Димитров; бележка на секретаря на ЦК по агитация и пропаганда*.
- ⁵ For extensive bibliography on Levski up to 1987 see *Васил Левски 1837-1873: Био-библиография* [*Vasil Levski 1837-1873: A Bio Bibliography*], Съст. Е. Василева, София [Sofia], 1987. On Dimitrov – Е. Савова, *Георги Димитров. Библиография* [*Georgi Dimitrov: A Bibliography*], БКП, София [Sofia] 1968; А. Юрьева, *Георгий Димитров. Библиографический указатель*, Москва [Moscow] 1982.
- ⁶ Many posters honouring both Levski and Dimitrov are kept in the Bulgarian national library *St. St. Cyril and Methodius*. Most of the posters were part of the commemoration anniversaries of Levski and Dimitrov. Those dedicated to the Apostle underlined his sacrifice and included famous quotations from his writings, or by Hristo Botev, Ivan Vazov and Dimitar Blagoev. A few posters from the 1980s also included quotations from Todor Zhivkov – “*Животът на Левски е изцяло проникнат от кристално чист и възвишен патриотизъм, от чувство на дълг и самопожертвователност пред интересите на своя народ*” [Levski’s life is entirely inspired by noble patriotism of crystal purity, sense of duty and self-sacrifice in front of his people’s interest] (Тодор Живков), poster by R. Burov, 1987 and “*Левски ни завеща идеала за “свята и чиста република”. Неговата безсмъртна фраза “Ако спечеля, печеля за цял народ, ако изгубя губя само мене си”, определи живота на поколения български революционери*” [Levski has bequeathed to us the ideal of “sacred and pure republic”. His immortal phrase “If I win – the entire nation wins; if I lose – I lose only myself”, has determined the life of generations of Bulgarian revolutionaries] (Тодор Живков), poster by R. Burov, 1987. Some of the painters represented him as a symbol of Bulgarian history and national liberation struggle. Dimitrov’s posters were very similar in technique, but the propaganda suggestions were different, albeit not entirely. A high quality collection

dedicated to the communist appeared in connection with the 100th Anniversary of his birth. The posters presented him as a statesmen, leader and teacher, fighter, internationalist, Leipzig hero, champion of peace and common man. Some of the posters included famous quotations from his works. Some painters used a trick, which is very common in the hagiography of the socialist leader, depicting sacred years which had been connected with Dimitrov's life as well as with the history of the Bulgarian and international communist movements. For example, the painter Alexander Popilov put the years 1923, 1933, 1935, 1942, 1944, 1946, 1947 and 1948 on his poster. Other posters stressed his role as a successor of Marx, Engels and Lenin, or underlined his role as heir to Dimitar Blagoev, the founder of the Bulgarian workers social-democratic party, which later turned communist. His image as the creator of socialist construction has also been considered, as well as that of the champion of youth. *Георги Димитров. 1882-1982. Плакати* [*Georgi Dimitrov 1882-1982: Posters*], София [Sofia] 1982. Some of the posters are available online: <http://www.anamnesis.info/gallery10.php>

- ⁷ For poetry dedicated to Dimitrov see, for example, the collections Б. Димитрова, *Стихове за вожда* [*Verses for the Leader*], София [Sofia] 1950; *Димитров ни води. Сборник стихотворения* [*Dimitrov leads us: Collection of verses*], (съст и ред. Хр. Радевски, Н. Фурнаджиев и Р. Ралин), София [Sofia] 1952; *Стихове за Ленин, Сталин, Димитров, Червенков* [*Verses for Lenin, Stalin, Dimitrov, Chervenkov*], (Под ред. на Б. Божилов), София [Sofia] 1953; In the text, I mention some of the famous lines dedicated to Levski, so there is no need to list them again here.
- ⁸ Ж. Попов, *Васил Левски в българското изобразително изкуство* [*Vasil Levski in Bulgarian Fine Art*], София [Sofia] 1976; Георги Димитров. Репродукции от общата художествена изложба, посветена на живота и делото на Георги Димитров [*Georgi Dimitrov: Reproductions from the General Art Exhibition, Dedicated to the Life and Work of Georgi Dimitrov*], София [Sofia] 1951.
- ⁹ For example Nikolay Genchev. Н. Генчев, *Левски*, София [Sofia] 1987.
- ¹⁰ Запрянова, А., Бл. Нягулов, И. Марчева, *Историографията между приемственост и промяна* [*Historiography between a Continuity and Change*], in "Исторически преглед", Година LXI, книжка 1-2, стр. 3-97.
- ¹¹ Н. Генчев, *Левски* cit. In the same year, which marked the 150th Anniversary of the Apostle's birth, the state publishing house "Sofia Press" released a concise version of the book N. Genchev, *The Apostle of Freedom: A Short Biography of Vasil Levski*, Sofia 1987.
- ¹² М. Todorova, *Creating a National Hero: Vasil Levski in Bulgarian Public Memory*, in S.P. Ramet, J.R. Felak, H.J. Ellison (eds.), *Nations and Nationalisms in East-Central Europe, 1806-1948: A Festschrift for Peter Sugar*, Slavica 2002, pp. 159-181.
- ¹³ A.D. Smith, *Gastronomy or Geology? The Role of Nationalism in the Reconstruction of Nations*, in "Nations and Nationalism", 1, 1995, p. 9
- ¹⁴ Todorova, *Creating a National Hero* cit, p. 167.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 181.
- ¹⁶ М. Тодорова, *Спомени, биография, историография: Реконструкция на животоописанието на Васил Левски* [*Memoirs, Biography, Historiography: The Reconstruction of Levski's Lifestory*], in "Studia Balcanica", 24, София [Sofia] 2003, *Изследвания в чест на проф. Веселин Трайков*, с. 402-412.
- ¹⁷ Г. Тодоров, *За Левски, светостта и българския Христос* [*On Levski, Sanctity and the "Bulgarian" Christ*], <http://synpress-classic.dveri.bg/05-2004/levski.htm>
- ¹⁸ Г. Тодоров, *За Левски, светостта* cit.
- ¹⁹ И. Димитров, *Георги Димитров и неговият дневник* [*Georgi Dimitrov and His Diary*], in И. Димитров, *Очевидци и изследвачи* [*Eyewitnesses and Researchers*], София [Sofia] 2005, с. 405-462.
- ²⁰ He was the Minister of Education (1986-1990) and a Central Committee member (1986-1989), and again the head of the Ministry of Education in 1995-97 as part of the Socialist party's government led by Zhan Videnov.

- ²¹ И. Знеполски, *Сталин и Димитров* [Stalin and Dimitrov], in "Култура", 26 January 2007, 3, p. 5; "Култура", 2 February 2007, 4, p. 5. The text is available also on the weekly's online edition at <http://www.kultura.bg/article.php?id=12549>.
- ²² Propaganda biographies dedicated to him were translated into English by the Bulgarian socialist state. See S. Blagoeva, *Georgi Dimitrov: A Biographical Sketch*, Sofia 1961; S. Rusinov, *Georgi Dimitrov, (1882-1949)*, Sofia 1972. His diary is published in English: *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov 1933-1949*, ed. Ivo Banac, Yale University Press 2003.
- ²³ For example, M. McDermott, *The Apostle of Freedom: A Portrait of Vasil Levski against the Background of Nineteenth Century Bulgaria*, Sofia 1979; also brochures by N. Genchev, *Vasil Levski*, Sofia 1982 and *The Apostle of Freedom*.
- ²⁴ The biographical data is from reference books such as the Bulgarian Encyclopedia and the multivolume academic History of Bulgaria. *Енциклопедия на България* [Encyclopedia of Bulgaria], Том 3, София [Sofia] 1982, с. 724-727; *История на България* [History of Bulgaria], Том 6, София [Sofia] 1987, pp. 262-269, 280-297, 307-325.
- ²⁵ Levski was hanged on 6 February according to the Julian calendar. With the adoption of the Gregorian calendar in 1916, the date was erroneously calculated as 19 February, with that date becoming the official commemoration date. Although aware of the error, the authorities do not change it because of its symbolic meaning.
- ²⁶ Here, I follow the historical essay by И. Димитров, *Георги Димитров и неговият дневник*, pp. 405-462.
- ²⁷ He was the Bulgarian foreign minister after the Big Change in 1989.
- ²⁸ P.M. Kitromilides, *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy. Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of Southeastern Europe*, Aldershot and London, 1994. Here, I have used the Bulgarian edition of the book П. Китромилidis, *От кръста към флага. Аспекти на християнството и национализма на Балканите*, София [Sofia] 1999; see also P. M. Kitromilides, *Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Questions in the Balkans*, in M. Blinkhorn, Th. Veremis, (eds.), *Modern Greece. Nationalism and Nationality*, Athens 1990, pp. 23-66.
- ²⁹ G. Arnakis, *The Role of Religion in the Development of Balkan Nationalism*, in Ch. Jelavich (ed.) *The Balkans in Transition: Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics Since the Eighteenth Century*, Berkeley 1963.
- ³⁰ See E. Kedourie, *Nationalism*, London 1960; H. Kohn, *Nationalism, Its Meaning and History*, Princeton, etc. 1965; compare to M. Todorova, *The Trap of Backwardness: Modernity, Temporality, and the Study of Eastern European Nationalism*, in "Slavic Review", 2005 (Spring), 64, 1, pp. 140-164.
- ³¹ Iwaylo Znepolsky has his explanation of the meaning of *narod* during the socialism – И. Знеполски, *Сталин и Димитров*.
- ³² Despite the important significance of religion for Balkan nationalisms, such straight religious allusions regarding national activists are rather an exception. Only in interwar Romania, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the leader of the Legion of Archangel, presented himself and has been presented by the Legion's propaganda as the incarnation of the Archangel Michael. But as a political leader, his cult was short term and collapsed along with the suppression of his organization. On the cult of Codreanu, see C. Iordachi, *Charisma, Religion, and Ideology: Romania's Interwar Legion of the Archangel Michael*, in J.R. Lampe, M. Mazower (eds.), *Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth Century South Eastern Europe*, Budapest - New York 2004, pp. 29-31; also N. Nagy-Talavera, *The Green Shirts and the Others: A History of Fascism in Hungary and Romania*, Berkeley 1967.
- ³³ Todorova, *Creating a National Hero* cit., p. 162.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 165.
- ³⁵ For an English translation, see T. Butler, *Monumenta Bulgarica* [s.l.], 1996, p. 469. His translation of the poem is also available on the Internet: <http://www.slovo.bg/showwork.php3?AuID=2&T1=The%20Hanging%20of%20Vasil%20Levski&T2=&T3=&Add1>

- ³⁶ The previous year, he put on his calendar the image of another people's martyr: Hadzi Dimitar.
- ³⁷ R. Bellah, *Civil Religion in America*, in "Daedalus", 2005, 134.
- ³⁸ M. Todorova, *Creating a National Hero* cit., p. 170. Compare with N. Genchev, *The Apostle of Freedom* cit., p. 57.
- ³⁹ Ex-vagabond, leader of the revolutionary band that crossed the Danube in 1868, who was killed in a fight with Ottoman detachments.
- ⁴⁰ Todorova, *Creating a National Hero* cit., p. 170.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 170, compare to Nikolay Genchev, *The Apostle Of Freedom*, p. 57.
- ⁴² Genchev, *The Apostle Of Freedom* cit., p. 57.
- ⁴³ Among the leaders of the April uprising. He committed suicide while imprisoned by the Ottoman authorities after the crash of the revolt.
- ⁴⁴ Stephan Karadza together with Hadji Dimitar was the head of the same band. He was captured and sentenced to death by the Ottoman authorities.
- ⁴⁵ Cited in Todorova, *Creating a National Hero* cit., p. 170.
- ⁴⁶ Cited *ibid.*, p. 170. This description of Levski made by Ivan Vazov has been hugely exploited for the continuity of the Deacon's canonization and even appeared in the teenage comics journal *Дъга* [Rainbow] in 1987, 28, 1987, p. 10.
- ⁴⁷ З. Стоянов, *Васил Левски. Четите в България. Христо Ботев*, София [Sofia] 1980, с 21.
- ⁴⁸ A few years earlier, in 1892, the village of *Chomlekyay* became *Botevo*.
- ⁴⁹ Н. Генчев, *Левски* cit., p. 165, 179
- ⁵⁰ For fortune tellers and visionaries during the Interwar Period in Bulgaria, G. Valchinova, *Unconscious Historicization? History and Politics in Interwar Bulgaria through the Eyes of Local Visionaries*, "Anamnesis", 2006, I, 2, pp. 90-114, <http://anamnesis.info/broi2/Valchinova.php>
- ⁵¹ Н. Генчев, *Левски* cit., p. 179.
- ⁵² Н. Мирчев, *Речник на имената и статута на населените места в България 1878-2004* [Dictionary of the names and status of the settlements in Bulgaria 1878-2004], София [Sofia] 2005, с. 69, 219.
- ⁵³ Н. Поппетров, *Образът на цар Борис III в дневния ред на българското общество 1918-1943* [The Image of Tsar Boris the Third in Bulgarian Social Order of the Day], in "Исторически преглед", 1-2, 2002, pp. 64-65.
- ⁵⁴ Л. Деянова, *Националното минало и "големият декор"* [National Past and the "Theatrical Public Space"], in "Социологически проблеми", 1-2, 2005, p. 43.
- ⁵⁵ Recently, the thesis that the Bulgarian Revival constitutes a separate period in the national history has been heavily criticized in А. Везенков, *Очевидно само на пръв поглед: "Българското възрождане" като отделна епоха* [Not so Apparent Truths: The Bulgarian Revival as a Separate Era], in *Балканският XIX век: Други прочити* [The Balkan Nineteenth Century: Other Readings], Диана Мишкова (ред.), София [Sofia] 2006, pp. 82-127.
- ⁵⁶ This quest for an ideal government had some formal similarities with the Russian common people's attitude towards the state described by Nikolaj Berdyev. N. Berdyayev, *The Origin of Russian Communism*, London, 1948, p. 6.
- ⁵⁷ Something similar was said by the journalist Kristina Patrashkova during the last TV broadcast of *The Greatest Bulgarian* poll, Channel, Saturday 17 February 2007, 21:00-23:00.
- ⁵⁸ Quoted after *Архив на ЕИМ* [Archive of the Ethnographic Institute and Museum], Ф. II, Инв. № 88, *Партизански песни от Трънско (Из бележника на Славчо Трънски)*, л. 2
- ⁵⁹ S. Venev's drawing *Духът на Левски* [The Spirit of Levski], 1945 г., in Ж. Попов, *Васил Левски в българското изобразително изкуство*, p. 34.

- ⁶⁰ Nikolay Genchev, *The Apostle Of Freedom*, p. 63. However, it is rather dubious whether Turkish villages shared this enthusiasm, but bearing in mind that the leader of Bulgarian Turks, Mr. Ahmed, recently said that he is a true admirer of Levski, the question is hard to answer.
- ⁶¹ For the official position formulated by Bulgarian historians, see *Археологически данни за по спора за гроба на Васил Левски в църквата "Св. Петка Самарджийска". Документи и становища* [Archaeological Data on the Debate about Vasil Levski's Grave in the church of St. Petka Samardziyska. Documents and Positions], София [Sofia] 1988.
- ⁶² Bulgaria did not declare war on the USSR in 1941.
- ⁶³ In her memories, a journalist from the party's official newspaper, *Работническо дело*, says that she was quite surprised by the similarities of the popular feelings created by the Tsar's and Secretary-General's funerals. Н. Каралиева, *Журналистката: Записки из българската душевност в периода 1944-1958* [The Journalism. Notes from the Bulgarian Mentality in the period 1944-1958], София [Sofia] 1995, pp. 21-22.
- ⁶⁴ Compare to Znepolsky's explanation. И. Знеполски, *Сталин и Димитров* [Stalin and Dimitrov].
- ⁶⁵ Perhaps it would be worth using a quotation from a report by an old clerk from the Direction for National Propaganda which, after 9 September, changed into the Ministry of Propaganda. The experienced official explained something very important to the new chiefs: "The political standing of all the clerks and applicants has to be checked in order to find out if they are agents foreign to Bulgarian interests and ideas. But, there may be some people who are to be preserved, for we should not forget, that a man works for the state, which is eternal, and not for the purpose of a particular political regime, however good it may be." Cited in К. Чуканов, *Българската национална пропаганда и нейната институционализация през 40-те години. Опит за сравнение на структурата на Дирекцията на националната пропаганда и Министерството на пропагандата (информацията и изкуствата)* [Bulgarian National Propaganda and its Institutionalization in the 1940s.: An Attempt to Compare the structure of the Direction for National Propaganda to that of the Ministry of Propaganda (Ministry of the Information and Art)], in "Анамнеза" 2006, Год. I, г., кн. 3, p. 130, available on-line www.anamnesis.info/Chukanov.php
- ⁶⁶ The communist and leftist press published a number of articles with various pictures of Dimitrov immediately after 9 September 1944. As a symbol of the "new" Bulgaria, his "life and work" soon became part of the state propaganda targeted at the foreign audience. One can find a good example of the beginning of this process in the propaganda brochure *Georgi Dimitrov. Short Biographical Notes*. Ministry of Information and Arts Press Department, Sofia 1946.
- ⁶⁷ On the Romanian case, for example A. Cioroianu, *Ce Ceaușescu qui hante les Roumains. Le mythe, les representations et le culte du Dirigeant dans la Roumanie communiste*, Bucarest 2004, pp. 81-93.
- ⁶⁸ This quotation by Chervenkov was part of the exhibition dedicated to Dimitrov in the framework of his museum house in Sofia. The quotation was next to Dimitrov's bust. *Къща- музей "Георги Димитров"* [Museum House of Georgi Dimitrov in Sofia], София [Sofia] 1953.
- ⁶⁹ *Бунтът на робите* [The Slaves' Revolt] which was produced in 1933 was the first movie about Levski. The melodramatic screenplay fitted the spirit of the period. А. Янакиев, *Българско кино. Енциклопедия* [The Bulgarian Cinema: Encyclopedia], София [Sofia] 2000, p. 321.
- ⁷⁰ Dimitrov was a protagonist in numerous movies like *Септемврийци* [Septembrists] (1954), *Урокът на историята* [History Lesson] (1956), *Наковалня или чук* [Hammer or Anvil] (1972), *Войници на свободата* [Soldiers of Freedom] (1977), *Предупреждението* [The Warning] (1982), etc.
- ⁷¹ The heaviest criticism was for the TV serial *Демонът на империята* [The Demon of the Empire] (1971). The director tried to present the Apostle as an adventurer – the audience perceived the director as an idiot. The reaction of foreign spectators was quite different and the film proved to be the best selling picture produced by Bulgarian National Television. А. Янакиев, *Българско кино*, p. 359.
- ⁷² For a rather similar explanation see А. Янакиев, *Българско кино*, p. 359.

- ⁷³ *Data for a Report on the Life and Work of Georgi Dimitrov*, Sofia 1972, p. 1.
- ⁷⁴ S. Blagoeva, *Georgi Dimitrov. A Biographical Sketch*, New Delhi 1971, p. 3.
- ⁷⁵ Youth Revolutionary Union.
- ⁷⁶ His real name was Mladen Gyurov Gigov.
- ⁷⁷ Just another detail: in 1944, Slavcho Petrov Bochev (Radomirski) commanded a partisan detachment named after Georgi Dimitrov.
- ⁷⁸ *Образът на комуниста в българското изобразително изкуство. Дванадесет избрани живописни творби* [The Image of the Communist in Bulgarian Fine Art: Twelve Selected Works], съст. Чавдар Попов, София [Sofia] 1981.
- ⁷⁹ The author was an active member of the resistance and had a critical attitude towards Todor Zhivkov in the 80s.
- ⁸⁰ The annihilation of the building began on 21 August 1999. For an exciting analysis of the mausoleum's destruction, see М. Тодорова, *Мавзолеят на Георги Димитров като lieu de memoire*, in "Факел", IV-V, 2004, pp. 371-396; in 2006 the article appeared in English, see Id., *The Mausoleum of Georgi Dimitrov as lieu de memoire*, in "The Journal of Modern History", 78, 2006, pp. 377-411. For visualization of the mausoleum's detonation, see the American short documentary <http://www.uctv.tv/search-details.asp?showID=7644>
- ⁸¹ <http://mc.government.bg/newsn.php?n=378&i=1>
- ⁸² See Joseph Campbell's theory of the journey of the archetypal hero found in world mythologies and religions: J. Campbell, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*, Princeton 1949.
- ⁸³ For an excellent insight into this country's national pantheon, see L. Boia, *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească* [History and Myth in the Romanian Consciousness], Bucarest 1997.
- ⁸⁴ For Kemal's political life, his personality cult and recent Turkish attitudes towards him, see A. Mango, *Ataturk*, London 2004, pp. 512-539.

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SOURCES

Source 1EXTRACTS FROM IVAN VAZOV'S POEM *LEVSKI*

[...]

Utterly fearless, his courage sufficed
 To die a hundred times on the cross like Christ,
 To burn at stake like Huss, or to perish
 Sawn, like Simon, for the truth he cherished.
 For him Death was brother as well as friend.
 In his sleeve he sewed poison of terrible strength.
 At his waist was a trusty weapon he wielded
 To terrify enemies whenever needed.
 A stranger to sleep, relaxation and rest
 He was spirit and made manifest.
 His thoughts he expounded concisely and clearly,
 His forehead at times would frown severely,
 With wrath and reproach his gaze would fill,
 Revealing a staunch heart and iron will.

[...]

But he was betrayed, and betrayed by a priest!

This groveling worm, this despicable beast,
 This outrage to God, on the Church this foul blemish,
 Through whose vicious treason the deacon did perish!
 Through infamous rogue who no shame ever saw,
 Who appeared here on earth Heaven knows what for,
 This sneaking betrayer, this priest in God's service,
 Such title without shame or conscience usurping,
 Whose lips, from which venom and bitterness ran,
 Cried basely: "Take hold of him! That is your man!"
 Who raised his right hand not in blessing, but pointing
 In treason – no thunderbolt struck to destroy it! –
 Whom I now deliberately do not name
 For fear such a mention my poem profane,
 Whose mother bereft was of reason and ruthless,
 This priest with one equal in Hell – and that Judas,
 Thus plunged a whole nation in mourning and tears!*

* Ivan Vazov, *Epic of the Forgotten*,

<http://www.slovo.bg/showwork.php3?AuID=283&WorkID=10651&Level=2>

Source 2

EXTRACTS FROM THE EDITORIAL OF THE COMMUNISTS' SATIRICAL NEWSPAPER *СТЪРШЕЛ* (HORNET) DEDICATED TO DIMITROV'S DEATH (8 July 1949)

On the 2nd July, our teacher and leader, great son of the working class, comrade Georgi Dimitrov died. His untimely death sank the Bulgarian nation into a deep grief. The workers, peasants and working intelligentsia have lost their leader, defender and inspirer in the great and hard march towards socialism.

Our newspaper has lost the man who with his word and life example has outlined its path – an uneven path of continuous struggle against what has remained from the reaction, against the obscurantists and restaurateurs, against the dead souls and heartless bureaucrats, scoundrels, careerists, loafers and all who harm the sacred socialist advance in Bulgaria. Our newspaper has lost the wise directions of a man, whose brave activity has been an example of relentless struggle against aspirations of the imperialists and warmongers with all of their internal collaborators – the mean nationalists and cosmopolites, the disrupters of international workers' solidarity and the destroyers of our friendship with the people of Great Soviet Union.

The great son of the working class is no longer among the living but his beautiful image of a revolutionary and constructor, his example of sacrifice in front of the sacred ideals of socialism and communism, his wise immortal word shall live with greater strength in us. He is alive in our hearts and memory, he will live forever. This newspaper which has grown up under his wise look also will not be left without a guiding light, for alive are his ideas and alive is the party that is stronger, mightier and more solid after this bitter loss; the party which has brought him up and has given him powers and wisdom; the party that has been led by him in the most decisive years of its existence.

[...]

Dear our teacher, in front of your sacred memory we swear faithfulness to follow your testament and to fulfil our promises.

From the Editorial Committee**

** *Стършел, Траурен брой* [*A Mourning Edition*], 8 July 1949, c. 1

Source 3

ABSTRACT FROM TODOR ZHIVKOV'S SPEECH DELIVERED ON 17 JUNE 1982 IN FRONT OF THE INTERNATIONAL THEORETICAL MEETING DEDICATED TO "DIMITROV'S LIFE WORK AND OUR CONTEMPORANITY" PUBLISHED IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S OFFICIAL *РАБОТНИЧЕСКО ДЕЛО* (18 June 1982)

The power of Georgi Dimitrov as a theoretician and political worker is in his boundless faithfulness toward Marxism Leninism, towards proletarian socialist internationalism. He was a master of the revolutionary action, he possessed of amazing skill to find out new forms and approaches for the successful display of the revolutionary energy of the masses, new means and paths appropriated to the objective necessities of the time. He knew how to

learn the lessons of life, to ascertain in practice the truthfulness of the theoretical statements and to propose new decisions, which at the end were contributing to the very theory.

That's why the day before yesterday, during the first day of our conference, an event, enormously important for the fight of the peoples against the war, took place: Soviet Union took the responsibility in comrade Leonid Brezhnev's message to the Second Session of the General Meeting of UN on disarmament to not use nuclear weapons first.

Now it's the others' turn. Let us hope that the US and the other nuclear powers will respond to this noble gesture. However, there is no doubt, that the news about the Soviet declaration will reverberate in millions of hearts with the call of hope and that it will give a mighty push to the struggle for disarmament.***

*** *Работническо дело*, LVI, бр. 169, петък 18 юли, 1982, с. 1

Source 4

FROM THE PARTY'S OFFICIAL NEWSPAPER LEADING ARTICLE DEDICATED TO THE CELEBRATIONS OF THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY OF LEVSKI'S BIRTH

[...]

A red rocket announces the beginning of the solemn retreat. The ritual fire flares up. In every one of us the spark of our love lives, the spark of our appreciation of the Apostle, who is devoted to his time, to our time and to the future.

The names sound of the fallen ones. The alphabet of Bulgaria's immortality: Georgi Rakovski, Lyuben Karavelov, Hristo Botev, Hadji Dimitar, Stefan Karadja, Panayot Hitov, Angel Kanchev, followers and associates of the Apostle, legendary heroes [...].

Report. They are always in the row. With us!

A minute of silence. A minute of the eternal time. Karlovo and Bulgaria are on their knees in front of Apostle Vasil Levski's memory, the immortal one who has always been "an hour" in front of his time.

In front of the one who is eternally living – living flowers and wreaths of gratitude. [...]****

**** *Работническо дело*, LXI, бр. 199, събота 18 юли, 1987, с. 1

Source 5

INFORMATION FROM THE BULGARIAN EMBASSY IN THE US ENTITLED "BULGARIA PAYS HOMAGE TO LEVSKI, THE APOSTLE OF FREEDOM" [1995]

Sofia, February 19 - Thousands of Bulgarians across the country today laid flowers at monuments to Vasil Levski (1837-73), to mark the 122th anniversary of his hanging in Sofia. A ceremony at Levski's monument in Sofia, built on the place where the gallows stood, was attended by President Zhelyu Zhelev, National Assembly Chairman Blagovest Sendov, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov, cabinet officials, MPs and representatives of political forces. Attending was also Bulgarian Patriarch Maksim, accompanied by high clerics. Levski was the ideologue of Bulgarian national revolution. He traveled across Bulgaria setting up revolutionary committees to lead people in a revolt against a 500-year Turkish rule. Levski

is the only undisputed personality in Bulgaria's history. His name has always been revered regardless of the political regime. Streets, schools, stadiums, sport clubs in all cities and villages in this country bear his name. The question of officially canonizing Levski as a saint has been brought forth on a number of occasions, all the more so that as a young man he was a monk. In the national consciousness Levski has long ago become a saint. Just like the Christian apostles, he went across Bulgaria's lands to preach revolt against the oppressors and now people unanimously refer to him as the Apostle of Freedom. In his address at today's ceremony in Sofia, President Zhelev recalled Levski's ideas for freedom, struggle, self-sacrifice, pure and sacred republic, brotherhood among all Balkan nations with all people being equal before the law regardless of their ethnicity or religion. "If Bulgaria now has a reputation as a tolerant and respectable country with no ethnic or religious conflicts, where xenophobia, racism and anti-Semitism are alien to the people, this we owe to Vassil Levski, to his democratic and humane ideas", Dr. Zhelev said in his address. The President further hailed the idea for building a monument to Levski in front of the Bulgarian Embassy in the US and called upon government institutions, political forces and public organizations to back the undertaking. A traditional tattoo yesterday marked the anniversary in Levski's home town, Karlovo. It was attended by the National Assembly Chairman, MPs, public figures and members of the public. The events on the anniversary in Karlovo continue today.

***** Bulgarian Embassy in Washington, D. C.

<http://www.b-info.com/places/Bulgaria/news/95-02/feb20.bta>

Islamic Religious Instruction in North-Rhine-Westphalia (1979-1999): Constructing a German Muslim Identity between Authenticity and Responsibility

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Europeiske land har, på bakgrunn av ulike tradisjoner hva angår forholdet mellom stat og religion, møtt ulike utfordringer i møtet med islam som ny minoritetsreligion. I Tyskland har spørsmålet om bekjennende religionsundervisning i den offentlige skolen stått sentralt i debatten om den institusjonelle integrasjonen av islam. Det bekjennende religionsfaget i den offentlige skolen er forankret i den tyske konstitusjonen, og tilbys i prinsippet alle trossamfunn, ettersom den tyske stat er konfesjonsnøytral og det ikke finnes noen statskirke.

Muslimske organisasjoner har siden slutten av 1970-tallet arbeidet for å bli anerkjent som offisielle samarbeidspartnere for staten, med det formål å få utarbeidet et konfesjonelt islamsk religionsfag på linje med det konfesjonelle katolske og protestantiske faget. Hittil har ingen muslimsk organisasjon lyktes. Den offisielle begrunnelsen fra tyske myndigheter har vært at det ikke finnes noen kirkeorganisasjon innenfor islam; ikke noe sentralisert og representativt muslimsk organ som representerer islam i Tyskland, og som staten kan forhandle med. Muslimske organisasjoner i Tyskland har snarere vært ansett som sosiale og politiske organisasjoner enn som trossamfunn, slik dette defineres innenfor tysk kirkerett.

Et sentralt argument i denne artikkelen er at den særegne pedagogiske og skolepolitiske tradisjonen den bekjennende religionsfaget står i, muligens representerer et mer dypereliggende dilemma enn den rent formal-juridiske siden. Det faktum at muslimske organisasjoner siden slutten av 1980-tallet har beveget seg langt i å utvikle sentraliserte, representative strukturer og medlemsbaserte organisasjoner tilsvarende kirkene, uten at dette har bidradd til noen løsning, synes å underbygge dette. Det bekjennende religionsfaget har etter den andre verdenskrig, særlig siden 1960- og 1970-tallet, utviklet seg i retning av et kultur- og identitetsfag. Det rettferdiggjøres i dag som en form for civic education, der formålet er å gi barna en fast kulturell og etisk forankring som igjen vil gjøre dem til sosialt ansvarlige borgere. Et problem med denne tilnærmingen er at den synes å forutsette at innholdet i den konfesjonelle undervisningen på vesentlige punkter stemmer overens med det som oppfattes å være samfunnets mer almene verdigrunnlag. Den kristne kulturarv oppfattes ikke å være i strid med grunnleggende samfunnsnormer og politiske idealer, men hva med islam? Det synes ikke foreligge tillit til at de muslimske organisasjonene i Tyskland vil ivareta den samfunnsgavnelige funksjon religionsfaget er ment å ha. De assosieres med en autoritet pedagogikk, med utenatføring av koranvers og politisk indoktrinering. Samtidig utgjør

diskrimineringen av de muslimske organisasjonene et påtrengende dilemma som politikere er enige om at må løses for at islam skal kunne finne sin plass i det tyske samfunn.

Skolepolitikk er i Tyskland er delstatsanliggende, og Nordrhein-Westfalen er den delstaten som har gått lengst i å utvikle et konsept for hva islamsk religionsundervisning på tysk kan innebære. Arbeidet med å utvikle tyske islamske læreplaner startet på slutten av 1970-tallet, og ble ledet av det statlige pedagogiske institutt som følge av at en ikke fant det en oppfattet som adekvate muslimske forhandlingspartnere. Faget er offisielt ikke-bekjennende, ettersom det er utviklet av den i prinsippet konfesjonsfrie staten. Likevel beveger det seg i grenselandet mellom bekjennende og ikke-bekjennende: det dreier seg ikke om ren religionshistorie, men er snarere et identitetsfag der elevene skal tilegne seg "orienteringsredskaper" for et liv i tyske omgivelser, på basis av islamske tekster. Artikkelen drøfter, med utgangspunkt i prosjektet i Nordrhein-Westfalen, hvilke kvaliteter politikere og pedagoger ser for seg at en islamsk religionsundervisning må ha for å tjene det overordnede mål om samfunnsmessig integrasjon.

INTRODUCTION

Due to different traditions of church-state relations, European countries have faced different challenges regarding the new presence of Muslim minorities. Particularly within the sector of public education different responses have been given as to how to deal with Islamic claims, from the wearing of headscarves to religious instruction. In Germany the institution of confessional religious instruction in public schools, in principle open to all faith communities (*Religionsgemeinschaften*), has been a major topic in the debate on the integration of Islam¹. No adequate solution has yet been found. The authorities have pointed to the lack of a centralised and representative Muslim body with whom to negotiate on the contents of such courses. Doubts have also been uttered regarding the compatibility between Islamic teachings and the broader pedagogical aims of the public school, as well as the German Constitution.

Some sort of Islamic instruction has been provided in most of the German *Länder* since the mid 1980s, generally as part of Turkish language classes and according to Turkish curricula. This instruction is, both in juridical and pedagogical-didactical terms, not equivalent to that of the Protestant and Catholic churches: it is non-confessional, not carried out in cooperation with Muslim organisations in Germany, and it lacks the status of ordinary school subject. It is therefore, after twenty years, still considered a provisional solution to the Muslim demands of religious instruction in public schools². While the fragmented Muslim community and the lack of a representative body officially have been presented by German authorities as the main reasons for this delay, I will claim that a more accurate understanding is perhaps the particular pedagogical and societal objectives of the institution of confessional religious instruction, and disbelief as to whether Islamic organisations in Germany will sustain these objectives.

North-Rhine-Westphalia, the *Land* containing the largest Muslim population in Germany, represents a special case in that the authorities have initiated the elaboration of a German Islamic syllabus. The work was inaugurated in the late 1970s and has been a sort of pilot-project in Germany. None of the other *Länder* has moved as far in delineating

what a German Islamic instruction might look like, to serve the purposes of integration. Initially the Islamic courses in North-Rhine-Westphalia were part of the Turkish language classes, although the curricula were drafted in Germany to suit German conditions. Since 1999, however, the courses have taken place separately, in the German language, and are considered an ordinary school subject with marks³. Thus, a further step has been taken to incorporate Islam into the pedagogical canon of the public school. Before turning to the development and the design of the Islamic curricula in North-Rhine-Westphalia, the state-church relations in Germany and the institution of confessional religious instruction in public schools will be briefly outlined.

CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN GERMANY AND THE INSTITUTION OF CONFESSIONAL RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

From 1919 the Weimar-Constitution established the principle of separation between state and churches in Germany, a principle that was incorporated into the new West-German Constitution in 1949. The secular regime of Germany however does not involve a strict separation between state and church and religion and public realm comparable to the French *laïcité*. The autonomy of the churches coexists with a close, institutionalised cooperation between state and churches, not least within the education sector⁴. As Corporations of Public Law (*Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*) the churches also benefit from a range of legal and financial privileges. Given the neutrality of the state this public juridical status is offered to all faith communities (*Religionsgemeinschaften*) alike, presupposing that these can prove a certain endurance in and impact on society.

The institution of confessional religious instruction is not held by juridical scholars to be dependant on recognition as Corporation of Public Law⁵. According to article seven of the Basic Law religious instruction is provided in public schools according to the teachings of the faith communities. No explicit requirements are given regarding their legal status. When Islamic organisations have failed to enter the public schools this has been justified, in legal terms, by their lack of characteristics as faith communities. There is no legally enshrined definition of a faith community, but according to the juridical literature a faith community consists of adherents of the same faith, gathered within a certain geographical area to fulfil the particular religious rituals. Muslim organisations, it has generally been claimed, lack a distinguishable religious consensus and a definable stratum of adherents, and are rather to be considered as political or social organisations⁶.

The vast public legroom granted the German churches (and in principle other faith communities) is sustained by a legal and political tradition of considering religious freedom as a *positive* freedom: the neutral state should not endorse secularization but provide space for religious practice. The alliance between state and church has long historical roots in Germany. After the Second World War it regained relevance: the devastating experience of totalitarianism rendered a new legitimacy to the public role of the churches. Religion (Christianity) was considered a positive social and cultural force, serving democratization and strengthening moral standards. Even today vital religious communities are regarded by many as a necessary counter-balance against an overly powerful state⁷.

Religious instruction in public schools is thus rooted in a tradition of positive religious freedom and valuation of Christianity as an important part of German culture and history. From the 1960s and 1970s the religious pedagogical thinking shifted even more in the direction of *Kulturrkunde*: in order to uphold the legitimacy of confessional religious instruction in public schools in an increasingly secularized society, religious education was conceptualised in terms of identity construction. Catechism and bible verses learned by heart were replaced by emphasis on reflective practices and social relevance. Thus, the defenders of confessional religious instruction maintain that this institution continues to fulfil an important pedagogical and societal task in contemporary Germany, namely that of educating morally responsible and culturally self-confident citizens. As put by the legal scholar Martin Heckel:

Der weltliche Staat hat auch ein eigenes Interesse an der religiöse Bildung seiner Bürger, weil er sich aus der Förderung ihrer religiös motivierten Sozial - und Individualethik zugleich eine Festigung seiner eigenen sittlichen Grundlagen und Verfassungsvoraussetzungen verspricht - weil also die weltlichen Wirkungen der religiösen Unterweisung auch einer säkularisierten Gesellschaft und Rechtsordnung weltlich von Nutzen sind. Die Religionsunterricht soll die Jugend der verschiedenen Bekenntnisse zur selbstständigen Auseinandersetzung mit ihrer religiösen Herkunft und zur freien Einsicht in die tragenden Werte führen, auf die zum guten Teil die kulturelle Leistungen und die sittlichen Fundamente auch des weltlichen Gemeinschaftsleben gegründet sind⁸.

DEVELOPING AN ISLAMIC CURRICULUM IN NORTH-RHINE-WESTPHALIA: NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTROVERSIES

In 1978 three Muslim organisations turned to the school authorities (*Kultusministerium*) of North-Rhine-Westphalia, claiming religious instruction in public schools, on a par with the churches⁹. A survey undertaken by the organisations revealed widespread support for such instruction among Turkish parents. The authorities first responded positively. There were several objectives underlying the decision to consider the inauguration of Islamic instruction in public schools. A public debate on the establishment of private Koran-schools in Germany had erupted in 1977¹⁰, and fear of Islamic fundamentalist pressure was clearly a motivation for considering public Islamic instruction¹¹. Moreover, German policy towards immigrants in the late 1970s and early 1980s was to encourage their return, and Islamic instruction was initially, together with Turkish language courses, assessed as a preparation for return, a sort of "mentale Rückkehrhilfe"¹².

Talks with the Muslim organisations were launched in 1978, but, according to the authorities, negotiations broke down due to disagreement among the Muslim partners involved¹³. Hence, the authorities decided to move on independently. In 1979 the state institute for further education (Landesinstitut für Schule und Weiterbildung) in North-Rhine-Westphalia was charged with the task of developing an Islamic curriculum. A curriculum committee was established, consisting mostly of Turkish language teachers and German scholars in the fields of religious pedagogy and history of religions. Klaus Gebauer from the state institute coordinated the work of the committee and gained a key role in the project¹⁴. Representatives of the Muslim organisations were not included. On the other hand cooperation with the Turkish state was started in the early 1980s. The cur-

riculum project in North-Rhine-Westphalia coincided with a shift in the policies of the secular Turkish Republic towards Islam. After a military coup in 1980, Turkish authorities sought to outbalance rightwing and leftwing radicalism through what became known as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. This implied a growing sensitivity towards Islam as a means of strengthening national coherence, and after 1980 religious instruction merged with Turkish nationalism became compulsory in all Turkish schools¹⁵. In this perspective Islamic affiliations and activities among the many Turkish citizens in Germany also became highly pertinent. Hence, for different reasons German and Turkish authorities had a common interest in supervising Islam in Germany and in limiting the influence of Turkish Islamic organisations in Germany, many of them rooted in an anti-Kemalist tradition.

The work of the curriculum committee proceeded in the period between 1980 and 1986 within the tensions of different and conflicting interests. In 1986 the first curriculum draft was published and made available for use in the Turkish language classes. If preparing for return to Turkey initially had been a major intention, securing integration into German society moved to the fore of the political and pedagogical agenda as Turkish settlement progressed in the 1980s. This objective differed from that of the Turkish state, that favoured the stronghold of Turkish patriotism among its expatriated citizens. It also conflicted with the interests of the Islamic organisations in North-Rhine-Westphalia, who disputed the legitimacy of the state courses and their own lack of influence. They also feared that the courses would endorse a secularised Turkish state-Islam. Turkish language teachers and secular Turkish organisations in Germany, on the other hand, objected, as did the Turkish state, to a confessional Islamic instruction negotiated with the Islamic organisations. The German churches, finally, checked carefully that the legal arrangements between state and faith communities were not violated. They objected to state intervention in religious education, but were willing to accept the Islamic courses in North-Rhine-Westphalia provided that they took the form of non-confessional history of religion¹⁶.

The situation was thus: the Islamic courses emerged not as an equivalent to the Protestant and Catholic confessional instruction, but as a legal and pedagogical compromise. The courses were officially non-confessional, called *Islamische Unterweisung* and not *Islamischer Religionsunterricht*. Still the teachers had to be of Muslim origin and the curricula drafts were evaluated by theological faculties in Turkey and Egypt in 1984 and 1985 to ensure that the contents of the courses did not contravene Islamic teachings. Finally, the aim of the Islamic instruction was, as stated in the introduction of the curriculum draft, to make Muslim children in Germany aware of their religious and cultural roots, to convert this knowledge into interpretative skills, to support the children in their identity construction and to sustain the development of an Islamic identity viable in a non-Islamic society¹⁷. In 1987 the first curriculum, covering the first to the fourth grades, came into use. In the years 1988-1990 the state institute published the first German Islamic school-textbooks, and in 1991 and 1996 subsequent curricula appeared for the fifth to the tenth grades.

THE PEDAGOGICAL-DIDACTICAL DESIGN OF THE ISLAMIC CURRICULA

The design of the state-initiated Islamic curricula reflects a particular interpretation of the social situation of Muslim immigrants and their children in Germany, which, indeed, fits

into what the American scholar Peter O'Brien has labelled a new paradigm for the construction of otherness in post-war Germany: between civilized and modern on the one hand and traditional and backward on the other¹⁸. The Turkish immigrant population was ascribed a rural, traditional culture, which was considered inapt for managing life in urban, industrialized surroundings, or, as put in a curriculum draft from 1982, a society characterized by another degree of societal modernity¹⁹. The psychological stress stemming from this 'interpretative crisis' was deemed further aggravated by social and economical problems. This vulnerability of the Turkish immigrants, rooted in scarce social and intellectual resources, in turn made them accessible to the propaganda of Islamic fundamentalists²⁰.

The Turkish popular beliefs, perceived inadequate in Germany, not only rendered the immigrants vulnerable to 'fundamentalist abuse', but were also considered an obstacle to dialogue between Turks and Germans, Christians and Muslims. Rural, popular Islam, transmitted to Germany from the Turkish countryside was deemed a sort of silent (*sprachlos*) knowledge, characterized by mechanised practices and rituals, as opposed to an internalised and reflective form of 'modern religiousness'²¹. From this perspective the situation of the immigrant children was perceived as disturbing: they grew up on the borderline between two irreconcilable cultures, but also in a sort of 'interpretative vacuum'. Neither their parents nor the teachers of the Koran-schools were, by the German pedagogical scholars, considered competent in providing the intellectual and discursive tools needed for a well-conducted socialisation²². The children were in need of more 'sophisticated' intellectual equipment in order to surmount their difficult life conditions.

Thus, it was considered an important task of the public school to undertake Islamic instruction, to help the children to build a terminological bridge between the different cultural universes. Islam needed to provide answers to questions not posed in Islam's traditional surroundings²³. An 'intellectualisation' of Islam was required in order to accomplish the twofold task of serving the identity construction and successful socialisation of the individual child on the one hand and entailing mutual understanding between different religious groups on the other hand. As explained by Klaus Gebauer from the state institute in North-Rhine-Westphalia: "Dem Islam muss nicht nur materiell geholfen werden, sondern auch rechtlich, politisch und diskursiv [sic!]"²⁴. Public Islam courses were seen as the appropriate device for the intellectualisation of Diaspora-Islam. In other words, assimilation was rejected, rather culture and religion was perceived as contingently serving the object of integration. As Christian religious instruction was considered a sort of civic education, sustaining ethical consciousness, social responsibility and democratic competencies, so Islamic instruction could play an analogous role, if only adequately organised. As expressed by Klaus Gebauer:

Der demokratische Staat darf bei einer so grossen Bevölkerungsgruppe nicht zulassen, dass Identitätsdiffusion und Identitätsverlust verewigt oder gar gefördert werden, ohne Gefahr zu laufen, seine freiheitliche Verfassung zu gefährden. Politisch unartikulierbare soziale Konflikte können zu Gewalt und Friedlosigkeit und in Reaktion darauf zum Abbau demokratischer und freiheitlicher Errungenschaften führen. Der deutsche Staat hat deshalb ein objektives Interesse an einer gefestigten kulturellen Identität seiner Immigranten²⁵.

The exercises sketched out by the curricula all seek to combine theoretical knowledge of Islam with genuine life experiences of the Muslim children in Germany. This so-called

principle of correlation (*Korrelationsprinzip*) was also fundamental in Christian religious pedagogy, as reformed in the 1960s and 1970s²⁶. Regarding the education of the Muslim minority children it seemed to gain a particular relevance, as the gap between Islamic knowledge and customs on the one hand and norms of the German Christian and secularised society on the other hand, was more profound. Thus, the exercises were designed to produce reflections on the correlation between different cultural spheres; between discourses and practices and between the Islamic community (*Gemeinschaft*) and German society (*Gesellschaft*). The founding pedagogical and didactical principles of the curricula represented in fact the opposite of what was deemed the traditional Islamic pedagogy, as carried out by the private Koran-schools: the reciting of Koran-verses by heart and performance of external, corporal rituals.

One of the exercises in the curriculum for the first to the fourth grades is titled “Allah rewards those who work”. Contingent life experiences are referred to, as in such examples as “My father works in a factory”, “My uncle is unemployed and spends his days in the Turkish coffeehouse” and “When I have finished doing my homework I help my mother”. Such life experiences should be reflected upon on the basis of Islamic texts dealing with human work, and rewards in this world and the hereafter. The pedagogical aim was to learn to take charge of one’s own destiny, in religious terms conceptualised as Jihad, understood not as holy war, but as personal effort and devotion. According to the curriculum it was important to transmit hope and confidence in the ability to influence and ameliorate one’s conditions²⁷.

Another exercise in the curriculum for the fifth and sixth grades is titled “Going away – pain and possibilities”. The experience of migration is associated with the Prophet Muhammad’s flight to Medina in 622, which made possible the foundation of the first Muslim community. The intention is, according to the curriculum, to make the children reflect upon the chances related to migration: leaving one’s home country can be painful, but also opens up the possibilities of finding a new home and making new friends²⁸.

The Islamic curricula of North-Rhine-Westphalia were and still are, officially, non-confessional. As pointed out above, the neutrality of the state requires cooperation with a faith community in order to arrange confessional courses, as envisaged by the German Constitution. No Islamic faith community has figured as official state-partner in North-Rhine-Westphalia. However, the curricula obviously represent something more than pure history of religion. The intention of the courses is rather to assist the construction of a Muslim identity according to what is perceived as suitable for life in Germany. Islamic sources are not treated as purely historical accounts. They are depicted as having relevance for present ethical and personal orientation. The discussions foreseen by the curricula have life in Germany as their focal point, and, moreover, the discussions as envisaged by the curricula are not to take place within an ethical vacuum. According to the didactical conceptions, as outlined in the curriculum for the seventh to the tenth grades, it would be inopportune to convey firmly a particular image of society within the public courses. Still, as religiosity deals with the present and future perspectives of humanity, a ‘responsible’ Islamic instruction (*verantwortungsbewusste Islamische Unterweisung*) should carefully point to the present and future challenges of humanity. These, according to the curricu-

lum, could be summarized as peace, democracy and equality between individuals, genders and ethnic groups²⁹.

According to Peter O'Brien's analysis of German minority policies in the post-war era, German officials adopted the 'civilising project' Western Allies had imposed on the Germans after the Second World War. Vis-à-vis the immigrants, the new 'illiberals', the Germans had taken on the task as civilizers. As they had come to believe deeply in the democratizing potentials of education, the political culture of the Federal Republic itself being a pedagogical achievement, education appeared the obvious means through which the immigrants could be 'saved' from their backward and bigoted mentalities³⁰. O'Brien's labelling of German integration policy as one with civilizing ambitions does indeed seem appropriate in the case of the Islamic curricula of North-Rhine-Westphalia. Concurrently the project reflects more generally the pedagogical traditions and political validations of religious instruction in German public schools, as this institution has evolved in the post-war era. Religious education is emphasised as something more than history of religion (*Religionskunde*); rather as a sort of civic education, sustaining democracy and social peace if correctly and responsibly undertaken.

Underlying this assumption of religion's social and pedagogical role seems to be a particular understanding of personhood, as so deeply embedded in culture and history as to be distorted if cut loose or alienated from these inherited belongings. Simultaneously, however, such collective schemes of interpretation should not be mechanized if democratic behaviour is to be accomplished. The critical and autonomous individual, as represented in the curricula, appears to be one who has internalised a particular culture, but who is also capable of performing the introspective activity of constantly questioning this cultural self. How did the Muslim community react to the state-initiated Islamic curricula? How did they perceive the 'liberalising endeavours' of the German authorities and pedagogical scholars?

MUSLIM REACTIONS

According to Michael Kiefer, who evaluated the project in 2000, nearly 80% of the Muslim children who had been offered Islamic instruction that year had participated. Kiefer's survey also indicated that the parents generally consented to the pedagogical methods and objectives³¹. Several Muslim organisations have, however, continuously disputed the legitimacy of the project since its beginning.

On the one hand they defied the legitimacy of the curricula on formal grounds: the curricula had come about without close cooperation with representatives of organized Islam in Germany, hence, in their eyes, discriminating the Muslim community vis-à-vis the churches. On the other hand, the formal aspects, in terms of who represented Islam to Muslim children in Germany, had potentially wide-reaching consequences for the contents. The question of representation had troubled the authorities in North-Rhine-Westphalia, and was a major reason for implementing public Islamic instruction in the first place, in order to weaken the impact of private Koran-schools. Similarly the question of representation disturbed the Muslim organisations, who themselves strived for the right to undertake religious instruction.

The marginalisation of Muslim organisations in the political and pedagogical process was perceived as disturbing since the courses were obviously not 'neutral'. They were constructed to transmit a particular understanding of the human being and his or her position in the world. The fact that Islamic instruction until 1999 was provided as part of the Turkish language classes was likewise disapproved. Not only did this exclude Muslim children of other nationalities, it also entailed the risk that Turkish language teachers, generally close to the secular doctrines of the Turkish republic³², would misinterpret and distort the Islamic teachings³³. The involvement of Turkish language teachers, as well as the negotiations with Turkish state officials in the mid 1980s, caused apprehension that the Islamic courses would serve to convey a secularized and, in their eyes, a politically instrumentalized Islam. Muslim organisations in Germany favoured what they construed to be the *universal Islam*, cut loose from particular nationalist doctrines³⁴.

The heavy involvement of German scholars and school authorities was, per se, appraised as an affirmation of the importance of Islam in the process of socialisation³⁵. On the other hand, the Muslim organisations who were hostile to the public Islamic curricula in North-Rhine-Westphalia challenged the methods and pedagogical concepts upon which the project rested. Since the mid 1990s several Muslim organisations in Germany have moved far in adopting the pedagogical principle of correlation, in order to gain access to the public schools and be recognized as state-partners. In fact, in 1999 the two main umbrella organisations, the *Islamrat der muslimen in Deutschland* and the *Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland*, joined forces and published their own Islamic curriculum, where the principle of correlation, as well as intellectualisation and critical discussion, are presented as basic didactical conceptions³⁶. Before the mid 1990s, however, the pedagogical principle of correlation was the main target of criticism. It was claimed that this principle, according to which teachers could freely induce discussions on the meaning of Islamic texts in relation to the living conditions of Muslim children in Germany and vice-versa, represented a relativistic and historicising approach that concealed the universal and timeless values and principles of Islam. As expressed in an article in the German Muslim revue *Al-Islam* in 1983: the particular life conditions of an East-Anatolian and proletarian family settled in Germany should not overshadow the richness of the Islamic civilisation³⁷. And as claimed by another article in the same revue the year after: the greatness of God was replaced by focus on a continuously shifting society, like a false god³⁸.

In the prolongation of this criticism of the principle of correlation, as too historical and too relativistic, another critical argument appeared which questioned the effects of the social analysis upon which the pedagogical concept rested. It was claimed that the principle of correlation, also frequently referred to as *Konfliktpädagogik* by the Muslim organisations, conceived the Muslim pupil as a patient in need of treatment³⁹, and conveyed an image of the Muslim family as weak and conflict-ridden both internally and externally. If the image of unemployment, marginalisation and family quarrels were allowed to replace pride of one's Muslim background, it would damage the self-esteem of the child, it was argued, which was contrary to the ambitions of the project. As expressed in a critical assessment by the *Islamischen Arbeitskreis in Deutschland* (precursor of the *Zentralrat*):

Es wird bei diesem Thema unseres Erachtens zu sehr die Schwäche der Eltern, ihre Schwierigkeiten und ihr Scheitern in der deutschen Gesellschaft betont. Von den Schülern wird charakterliche Stärke erwartet, so dass sie die Eltern trotz ihrer Schwäche nicht verachten. Dabei werden die Lernvoraussetzungen der sechs- und siebenjährigen Schüler nicht genügend berücksichtigt. Ein Kind in diesem Alter hat sicherlich noch nicht erlebt: „Vater braucht meine Hilfe bei Behördengängen“, „Mutter begleite ich zum Arzt“. Kinder in diesem Alter vertrauen den Fähigkeiten der Eltern. [...] Die Familie als kleinste „Ummah“ ist von zentraler Bedeutung für das Leben eines Muslims. Aus der Sicht islamischer Pädagogik erwartet man hier als Schwerpunkt die Behandlung des religiösen Lebens in der Familie und nicht wie im vorliegenden Curriculum geschehen eine Übertonung sozialer Probleme, wie Arbeitslosigkeit, Wohnungsnot, Krankheit, Pflichten im Haushalt, Video oder Fernsehen bis in der Nacht etc.⁴⁰.

The claims for a genuine confessional Islamic instruction, equal to the Christian religious instruction, are maintained, even if the main Muslim organisations adopted a more pragmatic approach to the pedagogical and didactical questions towards the end of the 1990s. Responding to the authorities' argument; that confessional Islamic instruction cannot be organized due to lack of a representative Muslim body, local organisations have formed larger regional and federal umbrella organisations. The two main national umbrella organisations, the *Islamrat* and the *Zentralrat*, were founded in the late 1980s, comprising the quasi-totality of Muslim organisations in Germany not belonging to the foreign branch of Turkish state-Islam; Diti⁴¹. The three organisations which had turned to the authorities of North-Rhine-Westphalia in 1978, requesting Islamic instruction, all joined either the *Zentralrat* or the *Islamrat*.

As part of their continuous struggle for confessional Islamic instruction, undertaken in co-operation with representatives of organized Islam, the two umbrella organisations signed a common request to the authorities of North-Rhine-Westphalia in 1996⁴². In 1999 a common body dedicated to the question of Islamic religious instruction was founded and the same year the Islamic curriculum, based on German pedagogical conceptions, was published⁴³. The year before, in 1998, the two organisations had brought their case before the court in North-Rhine-Westphalia, but finally lost in 2001. The tribunal concluded that the two organisations were not faith communities according to German law, and hence not in a position of negotiating on religious instruction with the state⁴⁴. This was shortly after the non-confessional and state-initiated *Islamische Unterweisung* was made a separate and ordinary school discipline in the German language, in 1999. Commenting upon the legal questions and the court process of *Zentralrat* and *Islamrat*, the head of the education department in North-Rhine-Westphalia, Rainer Ernst, declared:

Voraussetzung für die Erteilung von Religionsunterricht als ordentlichem Unterrichtsfach ist danach die Bildung einer organisierten Religionsgemeinschaft. Existiert eine solche nicht, kommt [...] nur ein vom Staat verantworteter religionskundlicher Unterricht nach Art der in Nordrhein-Westfalen angebotenen islamischen Unterweisung in Betracht. Ansonsten bleibt die Bildung einer Religionsgemeinschaft abzuwarten, die befugt ist, verbindlich die religiösen Inhalte des Religionsunterrichts zu formulieren und zu vertreten⁴⁵.

CONCLUSION

In the German political debate on Islamic religious instruction, which has been going on for more than twenty years, the lack of a centralised and representative Muslim body has been

purported to be the major reason for not organising confessional Islamic courses equivalent to the Protestant and Catholic instruction, and as envisaged by the Constitution. As expressed in the quotation above, this argument has also been conveyed in North-Rhine-Westphalia. In fact, the head of the education department, Rainer Ernst, asserted that confessional Islamic instruction would be undertaken in public schools once a proper Muslim faith community, capable of communicating a particular dogma, had materialized.

I have suggested that a perhaps more accurate understanding of the German dilemma regarding the institutional integration of Islam is the vast public influence granted faith communities (historically the churches) by the Constitution, particularly within the school system, and the social function that religious instruction is presumed to have in society at large. The fact that Muslim organisations in Germany in the last ten to fifteen years have moved far in building centralised structures without gaining access to public schools, seems to underscore that the problem basically lies elsewhere than in formal features. The basic problem seems to be the lack of trust in Muslim agents, and their capability of formulating a dogma that is compatible with the civic virtues to be endorsed by religious instruction in public schools.

North-Rhine-Westphalia is the *Land* which has gone furthest in developing a German concept of Islamic instruction. This concept, officially non-confessional and clearly secular in its objective to integrate the Muslim children, still differs fundamentally from the French notion of *laïcité*. Religion is not deprived of public relevance but rather considered an asset if only carried out 'responsibly'. In fact, the valuation of the authentic religiousness, as contributing to the constitution of a 'whole' and morally responsible being, obviously permeates the rational of the curricula to the extent that the demarcations between confessional and non-confessional seem to vanish. Ironically, however, this very assessment of authenticity entails an instrumentalisation of the religious in service of the secular task of integration.

NOTES

- ¹ Germany has the second largest Muslim minority in Western Europe (after France), approximately 3.2 million. The vast majority is of Turkish origin, about 2.4 million. See F. Şen - A. Hayrettin, *Islam in Deutschland*, München 2002, p. 15.
- ² I.-C. Mohr, *Islamic religious instruction in Germany and Austria. A comparison of principles derived from religious thought*, "Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien", 33, 2002. Article found at <http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/publica/cemoti/textes33/mohr.pdf>
- ³ North-Rhine-Westphalia is the first Land to introduce Islamic instruction as an ordinary school subject. See B. Schröder, *Islamische Unterweisung in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, in P. Schreiner - K. Wulff (eds.), *Islamischer Religionsunterricht. Ein Lesebuch*, Münster 2001, p. 107.
- ⁴ S.V. Monsma - C.J. Soper, *The challenge of pluralism. Church and state in five democracies*, New York - Oxford 1997, pp. 155-156 and G. Jonker, *Muslim emancipation? Germany's struggle over religious pluralism*, in W.A.R. Shadid - P.S. van Koningsveld (eds.), *Religious freedom and the neutrality of the state: the position of Islam in the European Union*, Leuven-Paris 2002, pp. 39-40.
- ⁵ See for example S. Koriath, *Islamischer Religionsunterricht und Art. 7 III GG. Zu den Voraussetzungen religiöser Vielfalt in der öffentlichen Pflichtschulen*, "Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht", 16, 1997, p. 1046; W. Bock, "Verfassungsrechtliche Probleme der Einführung islamischen Religionsunterrichts", "Recht der Jugend und des Bildungswesens", 49, 2001, pp. 336-337 and A. Campenhausen, *Neue Religionen im Abendland*, in "Zeitschrift für Evangelisches Kirchenrecht", 25, 1980, p. 146.

- ⁶ See for example M. Heckel, *Religionsunterricht für Muslime?*, "Juristenzeitung", 54, 1999 and S. Muckel, *Islamischer Religionsunterricht und Islamkunde an öffentlichen Schulen in Deutschland*, "Juristenzeitung" 2, 2001.
- ⁷ Monsma - Soper, *The challenge of pluralism* cit., pp. 162-165 and H. Schmidt, *Religionsunterricht angesichts einer religiös pluralen Gesellschaft*, in "Loccumer Pelikan (Religionspädagogisches Magazin für Schule und Gemeinde)", 3, 1992, pp. 11-12.
- ⁸ Heckel, *Religionsunterricht für Muslime?* cit., p. 746.
- ⁹ W. Schiffauer, *Fremde in der Stadt*, Frankfurt 1997, p. 51.
- ¹⁰ This debate was instigated by a report by a North-Rhine-Westphalian school official, Renate Irskens, which gained nation-wide attention. Irskens claimed that Islamic fundamentalist organisations were rapidly gaining influence among immigrants, not least among the younger ones, who were recruited to Koran-schools and sport clubs where a deeply intolerant religious ideology was conveyed. North-Rhine-Westphalia's Education Minister established a special commission to investigate and combat the problem. See P. O'Brien, *Beyond the swastika*, London-NewYork 1996, p. 64.
- ¹¹ Korieth, *Islamischer Religionsunterricht und Art. 7 III GG.* cit., pp. 1043-1044.
- ¹² Expression used by Klaus Gebauer, see K. Gebauer, *Schulversuch Islamische Unterweisung in deutscher Sprache – organisatorische Rahmenbedingungen, curriculares Konzept und Qualifikation der Lehrerinnen und Lehrer. Zwischenbericht*, December 2000, p. 2.
- ¹³ Klaus Gebauer from the state institute of further education in North-Rhine-Westphalia pointed, however, later to the lack of a recognised Muslim faith community as the reason for the interruption of the negotiations. See K. Gebauer, *Islamischer Religionsunterricht. Ein Beitrag zur Verständigung* (1990), in Landesinstitut für Schule und Weiterbildung (ed.), *Religiöse Unterweisung für Schülerinnen und Schüler islamischen Glaubens in Nordrhein-Westfalen (1979-1995)*, Soest 1995, p. 49.
- ¹⁴ Schiffauer, *Fremde in der Stadt* cit., p. 51.
- ¹⁵ H. Alacacioglu, *Ausserschulischer Religionsunterricht für muslimische Kinder und Jugendliche türkischer Nationalität in NRW. Eine empirische Studie zu Koranschulen in türkisch-islamische Gemeinden*, Münster 1999, pp. 31-33.
- ¹⁶ See K. Gebauer, *Islamischer Religionsunterricht an deutschen Schulen – Diskussionsrahmen und Diskussionsebenen* (1987), in Landesinstitut für Schule und Weiterbildung (ed.), *Religiöse Unterweisung für Schülerinnen und Schüler islamischen Glaubens* cit., pp. 5-14.
- ¹⁷ CIBEDO-Dokumentation, *Islamischer Religionsunterricht an deutschen Schulen. Drei Curricula*. December 1983, 28 and Landesinstitut für Schule und Weiterbildung (ed.), *Religiöse Unterweisung für Schülerinnen und Schüler islamischen Glaubens, 24 Unterrichtseinheiten für die Jahrgangsstufen 7 bis 10*, Soest 1996, p. 7.
- ¹⁸ O'Brien, *Beyond the swastika* cit., pp. 58-64.
- ¹⁹ Landesinstitut für Curriculumentwicklung, Lehrerfortbildung und Weiterbildung (ed.), *Religionsunterricht für Schüler islamischen Glaubens—zwölf Unterrichtseinheiten*, 1982, p. 5.
- ²⁰ See for example Gebauer, *Islamischer Religionsunterricht. Ein Beitrag zur Verständigung* cit., p. 48.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-47.
- ²² See for example Landesinstitut für Curriculumentwicklung, Lehrerfortbildung und Weiterbildung (ed.), *Religionsunterricht* cit., pp. 48-49.
- ²³ "[...] der Islam muss Fragen beantworten, die ihm dort, wo er zu Hause ist, so bisher nicht gestellt wurden". See Landesinstitut für Curriculumentwicklung, Lehrerfortbildung und Weiterbildung (ed.), *Religionsunterricht* cit., p. 6.
- ²⁴ K. Gebauer, *Islamische Tradition, Integration und politisches Bewusstsein—einige Überlegungen und Folgerungen* (1984), in Landesinstitut für Schule und Weiterbildung (ed.), *Religiöse Unterweisung für Schülerinnen und Schüler islamischen* cit., p. 97.
- ²⁵ Gebauer, *Islamischer Religionsunterricht. Ein Beitrag zur Verständigung* cit., pp. 49.
- ²⁶ More on the pedagogical principle of correlation and its conceptualisation in relation to Islamic religious instruction, see K. Gebauer, *Islamische Unterweisung und Möglichkeiten interreligiösen Unterrichts in den Schulen von Nordrhein-Westfalen (1992)*, in Landesinstitut für Schule und Weiterbildung (ed.), *Religiösen Unterweisung für Schülerinnen und Schüler islamischen* cit., pp. 64-68.

- ²⁷ Landesinstitut für Schule und Weiterbildung (ed.), *Religiöse Unterweisung für Schüler islamischen Glaubens. 24 Unterrichtseinheiten für die Grundschule*, Soest 1986, pp. 102-103.
- ²⁸ Id. (ed.), *Religiöse Unterweisung für Schülerinnen und Schüler islamischen Glaubens. 12 Unterrichtseinheiten für die Klassen 5 und 6*, 1991, pp. 118-128.
- ²⁹ Id. (ed.), *Religiöse Unterweisung für Schülerinnen und Schüler islamischen cit.*, p. 11.
- ³⁰ O'Brien, *Beyond the swastika*, cit., pp. 64-67.
- ³¹ M. Kiefer, *Der Islam in der Schule*, in E. Gottwald - D.Chr. Siedler (eds.), *"Islamische Unterweisung" in deutscher Sprache. Eine erste Zwischenbilanz des Schulversuchs in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, Neukirch 2001, pp. 50-51.
- ³² The secular attachments of the Turkish language teachers were also acknowledged by Klaus Gebauer from the state institute in North-Rhine-Westphalia. See Gebauer, *Islamischer Religionsunterricht an deutschen Schulen* cit., p. 11.
- ³³ See for example A. Zilelioglu, *Islamischer Lehrplan umstritten*, "Al-Islam", 01.08.1983 and *Islamischer Religionsunterricht an deutschen Schulen – eine Herausforderung an die Muslime in Deutschland?*, "Al-Islam", 01.02.1984. Republished in Zentralinstitut Islam-Archiv-Deutschland e.V. (ed.), *Islamunterricht in NRW. Muslimische Stellungnahmen*, Dokumentation nr. 2, 1997.
- ³⁴ On the different notions of Islamic religious instruction in Germany, and the contrasts between the 'universal' and the 'nationalist' conceptions, see H.E. Hamer, *Differing conceptions of Islamic religious instruction in German schools*, in "British Journal of religious education", autumn, 1984 and H.E. Hamer, *Die öffentliche Schule und der islamischen Religionsunterricht*, "Pädagogik und Schule in Ost und West", 32, 1984.
- ³⁵ See for example Zilelioglu, *Islamischer Lehrplan umstritten* cit.
- ³⁶ Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V., *Lehrplan für den Islamischen Religionsunterricht (Grundschule)*, Cologne 1999, p. 3.
- ³⁷ Zilelioglu, *Islamischer Lehrplan umstritten* cit..
- ³⁸ *Islamischer Religionsunterricht an deutschen Schulen – eine Herausforderung an die Muslime in Deutschland?* cit.
- ³⁹ Expression used in Zilelioglu, *Islamischer Lehrplan umstritten* cit..
- ⁴⁰ VIKZ, *Kritische Analyse der Unterrichtseinheiten der ersten Klasse der „Religiösen Unterweisung für Schüler islamischen Glaubens“*, Cologne 1992, pp. 9-11.
- ⁴¹ T. Lemmen, *Muslime in Deutschland. Eine Herausforderung für Kirche und Gesellschaft*, Baden-Baden 2001, pp. 120-124.
- ⁴² M. Wehner, *Die Debatte über islamischen Religionsunterricht*, "Die Brücke", 6, 2000, p. 35.
- ⁴³ Jonker, *Muslim emancipation?* cit., p. 43 and Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V., *Lehrplan für den Islamischen Religionsunterricht (Grundschule)* cit.
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SOURCES

Tasks of the religious instruction for Muslim pupils in the elementary school (didactical introduction)

Allah is He besides Whom there is no god, the Everliving, the Self-subsisting by Whom all subsist; slumber does not overtake Him nor sleep; whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth is His; who is he that can intercede with Him but by His permission? He knows what is before them and what is behind them, and they cannot comprehend anything out of His knowledge except what He pleases, His knowledge extends over the heavens and the earth, and the preservation of them both tires Him not, and He is the Most High, the Great (Sure 2, 255)

Assumptions and intentions

Religious instruction for Muslim pupils in the schools of the Federal Republic of Germany takes place under particular circumstances, from which special tasks and challenges emerge. Most Muslims in Germany are living within an unfamiliar cultural context. A different degree of societal modernity, a different relation between religion and culture, and between society and politics structures life differently, and offers different means of dealing with concrete life experiences. Such cultural differences can be arduous, and also pose difficulties regarding the development of long-term perspectives regarding life in Germany. Furthermore, linguistic, social and economical problems influence the everyday-lives of people who have come to Germany to find work.

The children suffer from additional problems. They know their original culture only through oral stories and the everyday practices of their parents – not through personal experience of life in the country of their families. For Turkish Muslims another challenge is rooted in the fact that society in their country of origin for more than fifty years has been undergoing substantial changes in the fields of politics, economy, culture and religion. The values and patterns of behaviour they have brought with them are often incompatible or badly adapted to life in Germany. Frequently this entails insecurity in their intercourse with Germans and German society and culture. This disparity and discomfort is necessary strengthened by the fact that the norms and values they have brought with to Germany also are deteriorated and under pressure in their home country.

Only slowly, due to the constraints of coexistence and cooperation, new patterns are likely to emerge that can bring the different cultures closer to one another.

Particularly for the generation already born in Germany the two cultures are confronted directly in the process of identity construction: on the one hand the upbringing and everyday life in the family, where traditional values and patterns of behaviour rule, on the other hand everyday life in the neighbourhood and at school, as well as media and the work of their parents.

Such a bicultural socialisation should not be left to its own dynamics if peaceful and constructive coexistence and cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims in Germany are to prevail to the benefit of all.

Religious instruction has, under these circumstances, the following particular tasks:

- to instruct, above all the Muslims born in Germany, in their history, ethics and religion, and to help them to make use of these traditions in their identity construction and life course.
- to support the development of a Muslim identity in non-Muslim surroundings.
- to provide a contribution to a prosperous coexistence between Muslims and Christians, particularly between Turks and Germans, in equality, peace and mutual exchange.

This means that the religious instruction for Muslim children must be related to the situation in Germany.

The Islamic tradition must help Muslims in interpreting and managing life in Germany. This means, also, that Islam must provide answers to questions hitherto not posed in its traditional surroundings. There must be established a correlation between the Islamic tradition and the living conditions of Muslims in the Federal Republic. This implies that conceptions of moral and ethics within the two cultures must be communicated; the compatible and the incompatible must be exposed through open and honest dialogue. This way the efforts to attain consensus and solidarity can be endorsed through mutual learning.

The teacher faces high expectations and challenges. He must, on the hand, be able to transfer the Islamic tradition to the societal conditions in Germany. On the other hand he must be capable of interpreting the Islamic texts from the perspective of the life experiences of these children in such a way that this can provide help in handling this everyday life. The curriculum can only offer suggestions and indications as to how this may be done.

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Tolerance and Non-discrimination Policies in the Multilingual European Union

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ABSTRACT

Since 2007, there are 27 member states in the European Union, and 23 official languages co-exist as the official languages of this unprecedented supra-national formation. If the other languages spoken within the EU borders – regional, minority, immigrant ones – are added, there are about 200 different idioms represented in the European language landscape. The project of European integration will be successful only if Europe's linguistic diversity is preserved and promoted. Many cultural achievements of Europe are closely linked to the achievements of specific languages and intellectual traditions. If these languages were no longer used, this would mean a serious depletion and loss of Europe's cultural diversity. European citizens will support the idea of an integrated Europe only if their own linguistic and cultural heritage, present and future, is part of it. Most European languages function in language contact situations, and in addition to people's mother tongues, other languages also have direct impact on the life of every citizen. Multilingualism refers to both person's ability to communicate in more than one language (individual multilingualism or plurilingualism) and the co-existence of different language communities in one geographic area (societal multilingualism). Multilingualism has been officially proclaimed an integral part of the present and future development of Europe. However, the mechanisms for full-fledged protection of languages under processes of European integration and multilingualism need further elaboration. Over the past two decades the protection of language rights has been increasingly associated with fundamental human rights thus creating the concept of linguistic human rights. Non-discriminatory language practices in the EU are still being developed. The basic principles have often been discussed – how the general EU documents should be improved in order to reflect economic and ethnodemographic diversity of the member states and ensure linguistic human rights for all citizens. This study analyses the sociolinguistic situation in the European Union against the background of the EU language policies. In order to demonstrate the impact of coordination of EU and national language policy the Latvian case has been chosen.

Kopš 2007. gada Eiropas Savienībā ir 27 valstis un 23 oficiālās valodas. Ja ņem vērā arī dalībvalstu teritorijās runātās reģionālās, minoritāšu un imigrantu valodas, ES lingvistiskajā ainavā pārstāvētas vismaz 200 valodas. Nepieciešams nodrošināt ikvienas valodas runātāju lingvistisko cilvēktiesību aizsardzību un izstrādāt pretdiskriminācijas politikas vadlīnijas. Gan politiskajā, gan zinātniskajā arēnā notiek plašas diskusijas par to, kā šāds pasaules vēsturē unikāls sociolingvistisks eksperiments ietekmēs Eiropas Savienības funkcionēšanu. Daudz mazāk tiek skarts pretējais aspekts - kā ES oficiālās valodas statuss ietekmēs konkrētas valodas situāciju - īpaši jaunajās dalībvalstīs. Filozofiskās vadlīnijas Eiropas Savienības valodas politikā attieksmē pret daudzvalodību un valodu saglabāšanas iespējām ir skaidras: valodas ir vērtība, Eiropas bagātība, nacionālās un arī eiropēiskās identitātes pamats. Vienlaikus gan tiek atzīts, ka valodu dažādība rada lielas problēmas gan ekonomiskā, gan politiskā ziņā. Eiropas Savienības valodas politikas koncepcijai vēl nav pielikts punkts. Joprojām risināšanas stadijā atrodas problēmu komplekss, kas saistīts ar valodu juridisko un faktisko statusu gan Eiropas Savienības institūcijās. Eiropas Komisijas "Darbības plānā lingvodiversitātes un valodu apguves veicināšanai" skaidri noteikts, ka dalībvalstis ir atbildīgas par valodu dažādības saglabāšanu, par valodu apguves iespēju nodrošināšanu un par savu valodu popularizēšanu citās valstīs, it īpaši kaimiņvalstīs. Valstīs, kur dzīvo minoritāšu kopienas, jānodrošina arī valsts valodas apguve sabiedrības integrācijai. Šai ziņā īpaša nozīme ir ne tikai valodas apguves metodikai, bet arī motivācijai un stratēģijai. Valodas liktenis lielā mērā atkarīgs no valodas ekonomiskās vērtības konkrētajā valodu konkurences situācijā. Izšķirīga nozīme mūsdienu demokrātiskās valstīs ir juridiskajai valodu aizsardzības sistēmai (valodu statuss konstitūcijās, valodu likumi un normatīvi akti), kā arī ekonomiskiem faktoriem, kas lielā mērā rada motivāciju konkrētas valodas lietošanai valodas eksistencei svarīgākajās sociolingvistiskajās funkcijās. Valodas ekonomisko vērtību turpretim var paaugstināt vai pazemināt apzinātas valodas politikas ceļā. Lai parādītu Eiropas Savienības un atsevišķu dalībvalstu valodas politikas koordinācijas nepieciešamību, pētījumā analizēta valodas politika Latvijā, latviešu valodai nodrošinot sociolingvistiskās funkcijas gan savas valsts ietvaros, gan Eiropas Savienības oficiālās valodas statusā.

INTRODUCTION

During the second half of the 20th century, two contradictory tendencies took place. One was the intensification of the globalization of all aspects of human life and the second was the continuing affirmation of special human identities. These developments are clearly visible in two major areas: 1) the development of ethnic and national identities, and 2) the evolution of identities based on particular ideologies and religions. A great number of factors can challenge language as the backbone of identity: supranational corporations, free flow of goods, services and working-force, migration, international mass media etc. There is one more identity which is not mentioned very often among other identities – the identity of economic well-being. It has a direct impact on language. People who identify themselves with a particular language, which does not

enjoy high economic value, are forced to use a language with higher economic value, at least in some spheres. However, the trends of globalization and linguistic imperialism have brought forth a counter phenomenon. The number of organizations and movements protecting local identity is growing dramatically despite the logic of the market. In this confusion of global networks and local identities language plays a critical role. Language is the last bastion of resistance and self-control, not just a tool of entrepreneurship. The preservation of the linguistic identity of a particular territory is the only way to ensure the protection of linguistic diversity in the world.

Over the past two decades the protection of language rights has increasingly been associated with fundamental human rights thus creating the concept of linguistic human rights. At an individual level language rights, imply the right of every person “to identify positively with their mother tongue, and to have that identification respected by others”¹. At the collective level it means the right of peoples to maintain their ethnolinguistic identity and alterity. These and other more specific standards are directed against the assimilation of communities using languages with less market value and against so-called linguicism – ideologies, structures, and practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate, regulate, and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (both material and immaterial) between groups which are defined on the basis of language.

PRINCIPLES OF NON-DISCRIMINATORY LANGUAGE PRACTICES

Aiming at realising a space of freedom, liberty and justice in Europe, the Union’s objectives like democracy and solidarity, equality and non-discrimination, efficiency and good administration, safeguarding cultural identities and protecting smaller linguistic communities have also to be recognised in language use between people (communication) in their daily fields of activities and to be guaranteed in a constitutional framework of the European Union.

Non-discriminatory language practices in the EU are still being developed. The basic principles have often been discussed (e.g. during European Parliament Hearing “Effects and Consequences of Linguistic Discrimination” on 2-3 July 2007). The eight main principles were proposed already in 2003²:

1. Everybody is free in the choice of the language for communication with others, “*but* in the communication with public services and authorities, everyone has to conform with the legal and linguistic provisions that are applied at the place concerned” (*territorial principle*).
2. In the private sphere, everybody has the right to communicate in the language of his/her choice, *but*, those standing for election to public office should master communication in the local language(s) and recognise the legal and linguistic provisions of the place concerned (*principle of integration*).

3. In the field of private activities, everyone can organise his/her communication in the language of his/her preference, *but*, in dealing with public authorities, everyone's language use (communication) has to be in conformity with the legal and linguistic provisions in force at the place concerned (*principle of local self-government*).
4. In the internal organization of one's own business, everyone is free to determine the language of communication, *but*, in applying for a job, everyone has to meet the professional requirements including the necessary linguistic qualification for communication required for the activity concerned by the employing firm, association or institution (*principle of professional qualification*).
5. Communication within public services and administration in Member States depends on the legal and constitutional framework of the country concerned (*principle of subsidiarity*).
6. Communication of the Institutions of the European Union should be non-discriminatory, rational and efficient; therefore, as general guideline it can be said that external communication towards the citizen and within the framework of a political mandate has to cover all official languages of the Union, while internal communication needs a common means of communication; as long as such a working language consists of a national language, discrimination in communication persists (*distinction between external 'citizen' communication and internal 'professional' communication*).
7. As long as discrimination in the internal communication of the institutions of the Union does exist, the competent bodies at the Union level and the education authorities in the Member States should undertake research in the field of a non-discriminatory system such as a universal language model (planned language), its conditions, capacities and limits, to support feasibility studies and to facilitate language experiments with view to ultimately resolving the remaining discrimination in internal and inter-ethnic communication (*principle of equality and non-discrimination*).
8. Finally, it is in the responsibility of the competent authorities in the Member States and of the competent bodies at the European level to co-ordinate best practices in this field, to organise the necessary language instruction in schools, to offer and guarantee diversity in language learning, and, finally, to safeguard the cultural and linguistic identities within this multilingual Union (*principle of diversity in unity*).

MULTILINGUALISM, LANGUAGE ACQUISITION, PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

The years 2000/2001 have become a symbolic watershed between past and present, and the ongoing processes of globalization and technological revolution urge humankind to find new models for interaction between economy and personality development. In this early part of the 21st century we find ourselves re-evaluating language policies in both EU and its member states – how they respond to the changing world. The Lisbon goals³ may be implemented only by developed personalities having multiple intelligences (not only intellectual, but also emotional, aesthetic, moral and spiritual qualities) and high order cognitive skills. The key competences are necessary prerequisites to guarantee conditions

favourable to the individual's personal fulfilment, active citizenship and social, cultural and professional integration. In "Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 in key competences for lifelong learning (2006/962/EC)", these competences are defined as a combination of knowledge, skills and attitudes appropriate to the context. Key competences are those which all individuals need for personal fulfilment and development, active citizenship, social inclusion and employment.

The Reference Framework sets out eight key competences:

- 1) Communication in the mother tongue
- 2) Communication in foreign languages
- 3) Mathematical competence and basic competences in science and technology
- 4) Digital competence
- 5) Learning to learn
- 6) Social and civic competences
- 7) Sense of initiative and entrepreneurship and
- 8) Cultural awareness and expression

At least four of these core competences involve language and linguistic identity dimensions which are necessary to protect and to promote the humanistic values shared by our societies. The task of the European educational systems is to form linguistic personalities able to communicate in their mother tongue ("to express and interpret concepts, thoughts, feelings, facts and opinions in both oral and written form [listening, speaking, reading and writing], and to interact linguistically in an appropriate and creative way in a full range of societal and cultural contexts; in education and training, work, home and leisure") and in foreign languages, "according to one's wants or needs. Communication in foreign languages also calls for skills such as mediation and intercultural understanding. An individual's level of proficiency will vary between the four dimensions (listening, speaking, reading and writing) and between the different languages, and according to that individual's social and cultural background environment, needs and/or interests"⁴. In other words, the recommendations ask the educational systems to develop multilingualism and a harmonious balance between globalization, internationalization and European integration, on the one hand, and cultural and linguistic identity, and sovereignty of the member states, on the other hand.

The protection and preservation of the diversity of languages was first mentioned as a conceptual goal in the "Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union"⁵. Respect for the diversity of the Union's languages is a founding principle of the European Union. The European motto "United in diversity" includes a strategic approach which has to be incorporated to detail in legislative acts and programmes, e.g. *Guide for the Development of Language Education policies in Europe* (2002)⁶, the strategic plan *Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity: An Action Plan 2004-2006* adopted in July

2003⁷, *A New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism* (COM(2005)596 final⁸). The EU Commissioner responsible for multilingual issues identified languages as an integral part of lifelong learning enabling an effective intercultural dialogue⁹. However, the mechanisms for robust protection of languages under processes of European integration and multilingualism need further elaboration. Robert Phillipson clearly indicates this point in a recent study of European language policies: “One of the paradoxes of language policy in the EU institutions is that languages are often regarded as purely practical, technical matters, while at the same time they are fundamental to personal, group and national identity and national interests”¹⁰.

Language, or linguistic identity, occupies a special place in the complex structure of multiple identities. In order to describe this type of identity several questions have to be answered. Is linguistic identity identical or separate from ethnic identity? Are there significant differences among ethnic groups? What is the role of supranational organizations? New EU countries must be taken into account, giving rise to new needs in terms of specialised communication that makes speakers of not so widespread languages unsure of their future prospects. Europe has built its cultural identity on two instruments: Latin and the Christian religion. Is English as *lingua franca* becoming a new linguistic identity element?

Certain criticisms have been directed towards an overly general approach to languages that ignores their sociolinguistic differences (“ideal state” and “ideal language learner” concepts, which remind one of N. Chomsky’s “ideal speaker-listener” hypothesis). Are there grounds for such criticism, and how should the general documents be improved in order to reflect economic and ethno-demographic diversity of the member-states? Let us analyse the sociolinguistic situation in the European Union against the background of the EU language policies.

LINGUISTIC IDENTITY IN THE EU

According to one of the possible classifications the languages spoken in the EU can be divided as follows:

1. Official and working languages (23 since 2007, including the former “Treaty language”, Irish)
2. Language with special status in the programmes (Luxembourgish)
3. Regional and minority languages: 45 ‘less used languages’ in the old member states, and an unknown number in new member states
4. Non-territorial languages (Yiddish, Romani)
5. Diaspora languages of refugees and labour migrants

According to Robert Phillipson, in “principle, what happens to languages in each member state is exclusively their own concern ... However, it would be naive to assume that

each EU state is a linguistic island, and that EU policies do not impact on all European languages¹¹. It is estimated that between 60 and 80 percent of national legislation in Europe has been harmonized with the EU and it is necessary to develop both dimensions: centralized EU activities and activities in the member states.

The actual positions of these languages depend on several factors, for instance:

1. Number of speakers (including second language speakers)
2. Development of economy in the country
3. Market for goods and services in the language
4. Regional status, traditional use and learning in neighbouring countries
5. Linguistic development (standardization, terminology, software etc.)

Most of the new member states' languages have considerably fewer speakers than the old member states' languages. The power of the most-spoken languages (English, French, German, Spanish and Italian) in the EU has been strengthened by great numbers of speakers worldwide and by developed traditions of teaching and learning these languages as second languages.

Of the new languages, only Polish, Romanian, Czech and Hungarian are more or less quantitatively competitive as concerns first language speakers. None of the newcomers' languages have developed traditions of teaching as a foreign language abroad, as has been demonstrated in Eurobarometer surveys. The fact that only five 'major' languages have been chosen for creation of a "European Survey on Language Competence" as a means to collect the data necessary to construct a European level indicator tends to deepen the gap between the 'widely taught' and 'less widely taught' EU official languages¹². We also have to pay attention to the fact that several member states may share a common official language (therefore there are 27 member states, but only 23 official languages) and that not all the inhabitants of the respective states are native or even second-language speakers of the official language. The percentage of minorities also varies considerably among EU member states (e.g., it is 5 percent in Austria, Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Poland, while it is more than 40 percent in Estonia and Latvia). Thus, the inappropriate application of Western European minority language rights standards to post-imperial language situations in Eastern Europe has caused serious problems for some new member states' languages. "Small languages may find that to avoid being overwhelmed by outside intervention," argues Uldis Ozolins, "they need to have an articulated defence based upon a thorough appreciation of their own linguistic situation"¹³.

The main factors influencing perception of linguistic identity are the existence of supranational political and economic formations, the distribution of international mass media, an ideology which evaluates languages from the point of view of market economy, youth culture and sport, extensive foreign language teaching, humanitarian aid, especially in post-communist countries, and asymmetrical supranational cooperation.

Most of these elements are present in the “new” member states whose languages mostly belong to so-called “less widely used” ones.

Taking into account all these aspects we could state that the small official languages of the EU form a special group which are insufficiently protected by market forces (as so-called international languages) or by international declarations, charters or conventions (as minority languages). This means that it is appropriate to raise the issue of their future prospects. Will the respective communities be able to continue to use their language in the most significant sociolinguistic functions and to transmit it to the next generation under new circumstances? What is the role of the national governments, EU institutions and market forces in language maintenance or shift? In order to demonstrate the impact of coordination (or lack of coordination) of EU and national language policy the Latvian case has been chosen.

LANGUAGE SITUATION AND LANGUAGE POLICY IN LATVIA: A CASE STUDY

Two interlinked processes are taking place now: the integration of society in Latvia (linguistic integration against the background of the Latvian language skills) and integration of Latvia into the European Union (involving individual plurilingualism). Therefore the language planning strategy proceeds from the following principles: 1) an official language is both the symbol of the state and an instrument for integration of society: learning and using the Latvian language is one of the main factors which ensures the stability of a multilingual state; 2) ensuring all inhabitants of Latvia the possibility to study and to use the Latvian language in order to promote the integration of the society; 3) supporting the learning and use of the minority languages in Latvia; 4) ensuring the possibility to study foreign languages in order to stimulate readiness for communication in a foreign language and integration into European structures¹⁴.

Education in national minority languages is a precondition for maintaining the cultural identity of national minorities in Latvia. The Latvian government provides education in eight national minority languages, even where only a small number of children are seeking instruction in a certain language. State financed secondary education in Latvia is available in these eight national minority languages: Russian, Polish, Hebrew, Ukrainian, Estonian, Lithuanian, Roma and Belarussian. Courses in state financed universities are conducted in Latvian, while a number of private educational institutions have language(s) of instruction other than Latvian. In the 2006-7 school year, 727 schools use Latvian as the sole language of instruction, 148 schools use Russian (implementing a bilingual education programme), and in 92 schools the language of instruction is both Latvian and Russian (bilingual education programme; these are schools where there are both Latvian and national minority classes). In four schools instruction is given in Polish, at one in Ukrainian, and at one in Belarussian. In one Estonian and

in one Lithuanian school some subjects are taught in the national minority language. In two schools Roma is taught as an optional subject.

The Government urges minority organizations to be socially active and to promote linguistic tolerance and understanding as essential elements for a future conflict-free development of the country. Realistic evaluation of the history and the present position of languages in Latvia would allow one to make the prognosis on the future perspectives in connection with objective ethno-demographic, economic, political processes in the country, Europe and the world.

EU LANGUAGE POLICY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

There is an urgent need for a more definite language policy in the European Union, taking into account sociolinguistic realities in the Union: different economic (market) value of the official languages, historically established unofficial linguistic hierarchies, competition among the 'major' languages and different position of languages among identity elements. Language, or linguistic identity, occupies a special place in the complex structure of multiple identities. In order to describe this type of identity several questions have to be answered. Is linguistic identity identical or separate from the ethnic identity? Are there significant differences among ethnic groups? What is the role of supranational organisations, including the EU? What will the effects of the expansion of the European Union be on EU language policy? And, above all, what will be the long-term effects of language and language policy on European citizens' future? Is English as *lingua franca* becoming a new linguistic identity element? The role of widespread bilingualism and multilingualism must be studied.

It is important to pay more attention to the language dimension of the European identity. More cooperation among sociolinguists, politicians, teachers, representatives of NGOs, journalists, etc., would be welcomed. It is also necessary to develop the principle of mutual responsibility: any restriction of the rights, for instance, of Latvian, would mean the precedent for restriction of Finnish, Lithuanian, Slovene and other smaller official languages. The task of educational systems is not only to teach languages, but also to debunk common myths (excessive costs of EU language services, the benefits of one or few EU languages, harmful effect of bilingualism etc.). The common citizenship of the Union, the freedom to move and to settle within the territory of the Union, the right of every EU citizen to participate, among others, at the place of their main residence in municipal elections and the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality require a non-ambiguous formulation of communication rights and duties of the different actors in the European Union.

By 2010, Europe should be the world leader in terms of the quality of its education and training systems thanks to fundamental transformation of education and training throughout Europe. This process of change will be carried out in each country accord-

ing to national contexts and traditions and will be driven forward by cooperation between Member States at European level. The philosophical guidelines of the European Union language policy towards multilingualism and language protection are evident – languages are an asset, the backbone of the national and European identity. The European Union is by definition a multicultural, multilingual and multinational Community of people. Non-discriminatory communication between citizens of different mother tongues is a crucial element of peaceful living together and of long-term political cohesion of the Union.

NOTES

- ¹ T.Skutnabb-Kangas, R.Phillipson, M. Rannut (eds.), *Linguistic Human Rights. Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination*, Berlin - New York 1994, p. 6
- ² H. Erasmus, M. Cwik "Declaration on the citizens' communication rights and duties in a multilingual European Union", (http://www.europe-citizen.net/documents_symposium/declaration.html). See also European Federation of National Institutions for Language (EFNIL), *Brussels Declaration on Language learning in Europe*, Amsterdam, 2006.
- ³ *The Lisbon Strategy*. (http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/2010/et_2010_en.html). See also *Barcelona European Council*, 15 and 16 March 2002, Presidency Conclusions, part I, 43, 1.
- ⁴ *Recommendation on key competences for lifelong learning (2006/962/EC)*, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_394/l_39420061230en00100018.pdf.
- ⁵ See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf.
- ⁶ See http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/linguistic/Source/FullGuide_EN.pdf (revised version from 2003).
- ⁷ See http://ec.europa.eu/education/doc/official/keydoc/actlang/act_lang_en.pdf.
- ⁸ See <http://europa.eu/languages/servlets/Doc?id=913>.
- ⁹ L.Orban, "Multilingualism is in the genetic code of the Union", Meeting with the Cultural Committee, Brussels 27 February 2007; see http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/orban/policies/doc/sp_070227_EN.pdf.
- ¹⁰ R.Phillipson, *English-Only Europe?: Challenging Language Policy*, London 2003, p. 21.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9. See also R.Phillipson, *English, a cuckoo in the European higher education nest of languages?* in "European Journal of English Studies", 2006, 10, 1, pp. 13-32.
- ¹² See "Framework for the European Survey on Language Competences", Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 13 April 2007; http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/2010/doc/com184_en.pdf.
- ¹³ U. Ozolins, *The impact of European accession upon language policy in the Baltic States*, in "Language Policy", 2, 2003, p. 234.
- ¹⁴ I. Druviete, *The future of the Latvian language in the enlarged European Union*, in "Humanities and Social Sciences. Latvia", 34, 2002, pp. 34-46; G. Hogan-Brun, *The Baltic Republics and language ideological debates surrounding European Union Accession*, in *Language and Social Processes in the Baltic Republics Surrounding their EU Accession*, special Issue of "Journal of Multilingual & Multicultural Development", guest editor G. Hogan-Brun, 26, 2005, pp. 367-377.

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Naming the Single European Currency in Latvian: Discourses of Power and Language

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ABSTRACT

After the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) joined the European Union, the next step towards integration was participation in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the introduction of the Euro. This chapter will not describe the monetary history of Latvia nor the socio-economic processes of its integration into the Euro-zone. Our analysis considers the Euro and the issues linked to its introduction which relate mainly to language and linguistics, the language policy of the European Union and regulations on the use and spelling of 'Euro' in national languages. The main sources of this chapter are the public debates concerning these matters conducted in the Latvian media. The chapter shows how the initial discussion of linguistics gained a political dimension on both a local and European scale. It also demonstrates how the process of naming the Euro facilitated an intellectual discussion on the sensitive issues of scientific terminology and linguistic rights in Latvia and the European Union. The Euro's name was initially created in an indeclinable 'neuter' linguistic formation but the grammatical categories of the Latvian language tended to classify it as belonging to either a feminine or masculine gender. To decline a noun means to allocate it a grammatical gender category. Thus discussions of the Euro in Latvia also focussed on the psychological aspects of grammatical gender and their extra-linguistic consequences: the issues of theory and correlation among biological gender, social gender and grammatical gender.

Viena no naudas kā varas pirmajām asociācijām ir tās ekonomiskā vara un ietekme. Tomēr uz naudu var palūkoties arī citā perspektīvā – nauda kā naudas zīme tās priekšmetiskajā izpausmē, monēta vai banknote kā specifisks māksliniecisks veidojums un kultūrvēsturiskās informācijas avots, kas tādējādi dokumentē ne tikai sabiedrības ekonomiskās attīstības gaitu dažādos pasaules reģionos un laikmetos, bet arī kultūrvēsturiskos procesus. Ar naudas zīmes kā artefakta, vēsturiska dokumenta un kultūrvēsturiskās informācijas avota izpēti nodarbojas vēstures palīgzinātne numismatika. Savdabīgs vēsturiskās izpētes objekts var būt arī valsts monetārā vēsture, ceļš uz nacionālo valūtu, kultūras un varas sinerģija monētu un banknošu simbolikā, piemēram, noteiktu valtsvīru, politiķu vai intelektuāļu un kultūras darbinieku portretu izvēle naudas zīmju aversos.

Numismatikas zinātnē līdz šim mazāk aktualizēts, naudas zīmes veidojumā ietilpst arī teksts, proti, tās nosaukums vienā vai vairākās valodās, dažkārt arī kāds lozungs vai devīze, piemēram, uzraksts uz ASV dolāra „In God we trust”. Tātad naudas zīme var tikt pētīta arī lingvistiskā aspektā. Eiro zona, dolāra zona, rubļa zona – šie un līdzīgi nosaukumi liecina, ka nauda ir pārnacionāls vērtības mērs un maksāšanas līdzeklis, un naudas zīme savu nosaukumu parasti iegūst kadā no reģiona ekonomiski visietekmīgākajām valodām. Līdz ar Eiropas Savienības un tās monetārās sistēmas izveidodošanos, latviešu un citās ekonomiski aktīvo pasaules tautu valodās sevi ir pieteicis vienotās Eiropas valūtas nosaukums euro, – jaunvārds un svešvārds ar starptautiski nozīmīga termina funkcijām, un tā adaptācija latviešu valodā ir izraisījusi asas sabiedrības un valodas speciālistu diskusijas, kas plaši tika atspoguļotas dažādos plašsaziņas līdzekļos. Raksta pamatā ir šīs diskusijas analīze un interpretācija vēsturiskā un sociolingvistiskā aspektā. Valoda šajā rakstā ir traktēta kā kultūras sastāvdaļa, bet varas jautājumi konkretizēti galvenokārt trīs aspektos: Eiropas Savienības valodas politika un regulas par euro lietošanu un rakstību nacionālajās valodās, galvenokārt latviešu; Latvijas valsts valodas politika, tās realizācijā iesaistītās institūcijas un nostādnes euro latviskošanas jautājumā; valoda un valodnieki, valodas lietošanas prakse, normatīvā lingvistika un lingvistiskā kompetence. Euro latviskošanas stratēģija rosināja pārdomas arī par šobrīd aktuāliem zinātniskās terminoloģijas un lingvistisko tiesību jautājumiem, kā arī gramatiskās dzimtes psiholoģiskajiem faktoriem un ekstralingvistiskajām sekām; sociālā dzimuma (dzimumsocialitātes), bioloģiskā dzimuma un gramatiskās dzimtes kopsakarību un teorijas jautājumiem.

The study of money provides crucial insights to history, not only from an economic and political vantage point but also from social and cultural perspectives. The range of what constituted money in different epochs and regions of the world is enormous: gold and silver in Eurasia, iron rods in Africa, shells in Polynesia, glass beads in India, cocoa beans in America, amber, honey and wax in the Baltic, to name but a few. Ancient coins often contain unique visual information that cannot be found elsewhere: facts about ancient historical events and cultural monuments, myths and legends, countries, rulers and their subjects, relations of production and levels of industrial development, migration processes and political changes. From a historical perspective, such coins are a concentrated source of interaction between culture and power.

Every coin and banknote records its epoch. As a document of the age, it is studied by the auxiliary branch of history, numismatics, whose origins are usually associated with the Austrian abbot I. Ekhel, dating back to the beginning of the 19th century¹. Antique Greek and Roman coins depict mythical stories and characters, as if indicating the mythical nature and origins of money and the power that it represents. The Latvian term for metal coins is derived from Latin *monēta*. The term originates from the second name of the Roman female deity Juno, who assumed the name Moneta, thus establishing a connection to the *mint*, which in the 7-8th century BC was located by the pedestal of the temple of Juno Moneta in Rome². The name of the Roman goddess Moneta has also been immortalized in the English language (the language most fre-



Fig. 1
Five Lats coin of the Republic of Latvia (1923). Image of a Latvian woman.

quently used by the World Bank today), with the word *money* designating both metal coins and banknotes.

The raw material of money changes over time, as does its design and the symbols of power employed. As a means of payment, coins were largely overtaken by paper money, whose name *banknote* (from Fr. *banque*, It. *banca*, Engl. *bank*) immortalized banking institutions that save money and perform different financial transactions. However, the mythical images and stories were replaced or supplemented by the images of key historical figures such as kings, emperors and state officials. The synergy between culture and power shown in the symbolism of coins and banknotes emerged in the 20th century, when images of national iconic figures who increased the intellectual and cultural standing of the state began to appear. For instance, at the beginning of the 20th

century, the coins and banknotes of the newly established Baltic States depicted the Latvian folklorist, Krišjānis Barons, the poetess of Estonia's national awakening, Lydia Koidula, the author of Lithuanian realist prose, Julija Žemaitė and others (see Figure 1). Changes in the form and design of money, and its measure of value, attracted the attention of the greatest European writers and philosophers, leaving deep traces in European cultural philosophy and anthropology. For instance, in Goethe's *Faust*, the inventor of printed paper money is Mephistopheles. Doctor Faust does not approve of the activity³. Paper money is also more susceptible to physical risks such as fire, flooding or simply the ravages of time.

There is no doubt that money is a double-edged tool: it can be used to increase production and improve well-being, but it can also be used to exploit, subjugate, and impoverish other people, as Marx and some more recent social philosophers have made clear⁴. Georg Simmel's famous work *The Philosophy of Money* draws on 19th-century European social and cultural philosophy. Simmel analysed the impact of money on individuals and society more widely, emphasising money's positive attributes, like countability, portability, divisibility, homogeneity and substitutability, as a sign of the increasing rationality of society⁵. A. Stepčenko stresses that when Simmel was writing, the disciplines of sociology and cultural anthropology were at an early stage of development. His innovative cross-disciplinary work did not fit any particular audience. The title of his work mainly attracted the attention of economists and philosophers, yet the work did not relate to their professional interests or the needs of economists, while among philosophers it was ignored because "money evokes in them aversion rather than interest"⁶. Historians also displayed a lack of interest.

Throughout history, great powers and alliances of states have introduced their own currency to the countries that they have conquered. For instance, the establishment of the Soviet Union led to the introduction of the Russian rouble, thereby abolishing a number of national currencies, including the Latvian lat. The European Union has taken a different path, introducing the unified currency Euro in the form of money transfers in the European Economic and Monetary union (EEM) or in the so-called Euro-zone countries, on 1 January 1999. Three years later, on 1 January 2002, Euro banknotes and coins came into circulation. The introduction of common money and a single monetary system is one of the most powerful integrating mechanisms of the European Union. At the same time, as the name of a world-wide currency, the neologism, Euro, has enriched not only the lexicon of languages of the European Union, but also that of all globally economically active languages. However, among some linguists and countries, it has sparked a series of discussions about language and power.

Originally there were 12 countries in the Euro-zone – Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain – and three countries – Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom – which have refrained from introducing the Euro to date. In January 2007, the Euro was introduced to Slovenia, making it the first and, at present, the only, country of the post-socialist European block to use the single European currency. The rest of the new member

states that joined the EU in 2004 – Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Slovakia – aim to enter the Euro-zone but have to solve a number of economic and social problems connected with inflation first. The most pressing challenge for the Baltic States is the successful fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria. Latvia's accession to the Euro-zone has been forecast to take place some time after 2008⁷.

The circulation of a new currency and changes to the monetary system leave traces not only in economics, but also in language and culture, by supplementing national languages and introducing foreign words denoting the names of other world currencies. Although the Euro and issues associated with its introduction mainly relate to the history of economics and numismatics, these issues are also undeniably present in discourses of power and culture. This is explicitly demonstrated in the contemporary history of the new EU member states, including Latvia.

This chapter treats language as a cultural phenomenon, but in terms of power, language has four major aspects:

1. The language policy of the European Union and regulations on the use and spelling of 'Euro' in national languages, particularly Latvian;
2. Local institutions or bastions of linguistic power in Latvia, their mutual battles for the rights to regulate language use and to express official opinions on language norms in Latvia;
3. Language and linguists, the natural life of the language or its 'self-regulation' and the influence and power of normative linguistics over language;
4. Linguistic expertise and ideology, specifically the grouping of linguists and language users in regard to naming of the unified European currency in Latvian, following the Latvian tradition or supra-national ideology.

The EU directive stipulates that the name of the single European currency should be non-declinable and identical in all official EU languages. This extends to singular and plural forms⁸. Thus discussions about the introduction of the name 'Euro' in Latvian have two perspectives: that of national language policy, and the context of the EU.

In Latvia, the emergence of the Euro provoked not only economic, but also linguistic problems and discussions about the language and cultural policy of the expanding Europe. In recent years, heated and wide-ranging debates have been conducted in the media about the name of the Euro in Latvian. These media discussions are the main sources of this study. Debates over the Latvian name for the single European currency have invoked the history of Latvian linguistics and culture for several reasons. Firstly, this discussion went beyond the scope of language specialists – the discussion took place between different sections of the Latvian media⁹, creating a polylogue between science and the public. This illustrated both the force of inherited linguistic authority and public institutions, as well as the role of public opinion and democracy in the

decision-making process¹⁰. Second, it brought into focus the history of the Latvian language, terminology and normative linguistics, that were linked not only to the representation of currency names in Latvian but also to the legal issues of integration into the European Union. Third, it also brought attention to questions of language policy, the status of the national language, and the situation during the transition period from Soviet normative linguistics to the jurisdiction of the European Union.

The extra-linguistic character of discussions on the Euro was identified by Aldis Lauzis, Terminology Commission expert of the Academy of Sciences of Latvia. In the most popular daily newspaper in Latvia, “Diena”, Lauzis stated that

this is not merely a dispute about the form of the word /../. Centres, commissions, agencies are producing replies, announcements, explanations; they argue, intimidate and misinform. “The Euro issue” has given an opportunity for everybody to linger in the spot-light reminding of their existence¹¹.

The analysis and interpretation of discussions on the Latvian spelling of Euro are made particularly interesting by the fact that public debate exploded in 2004 – long after the Latvian equivalent of Euro, *eiro*, had been used both in oral and written language (including mass media, works of fiction and documents issued by the government and the Bank of Latvia)¹². This meant that the selection of the currency name had happened in a natural, almost automatic way, in daily communication without great input from linguistic experts. Therefore we must ask who, and with what motivation, started the discussions, and what was the argument in favour of introducing another, better, spelling of Euro in the Latvian language?

This question became part of the political agenda for a practical reason: the translation into Latvian of a legally significant and binding “umbrella document” – the text of the European Constitution – in which the name “Euro” appeared. To avoid mistakes in translating ‘Euro’ into Latvian, the Translation and Terminology Centre submitted a request for a decision on the translation to the Terminology Commission of the Academy of Sciences of Latvia. This was because the decision of the Terminology Commission was legally binding. The Terminology Commission decided that the preferred equivalent in terms of Latvian grammatical structure was *eira*. The decision taken by the Terminology Commission (although not unanimous) was in open contradiction to the name already established, *eiro*. It also differed from the variant proposed in the EU directive, *euro*, and created confusion. In the heated discussions that followed, it was even suggested that the authority of the Terminology Commission of the Academy of Sciences of Latvia should be amended to prevent their decision from becoming final and legally binding.

Consequently, and almost simultaneously, two leading language-monitoring institutions declared contradictory opinions on the preferred name of the currency. The declinable name *eira*, proposed by the Terminology Commission, was immediately followed by an appeal from the State Language Centre of the Ministry of Justice to retain the name *eiro*. At the same time, negotiations took place between public authority representatives and

the European Central Bank to try to ensure that EU legislation in Latvian would use *eiro* instead of *euro*. The European Central Bank has not agreed to this to date, but further negotiations are planned¹³. The Terminology Commission examined the issue again but upheld the original decision, categorically refusing the variant *euro*. As the Terminology Commission of the Academy of Sciences of Latvia is the only institution able to make binding decisions on language, the other Latvian language standard institutions argued that the Terminology Commission's decision was not legitimate. The basis for this challenge was that the Terminology Commission did not have the authority to make decisions on this question, as determining the endings of word forms was outside its competence¹⁴. The State Language Commission also proposed that the Terminology Commission's rules be amended to include the stipulation that in disputed cases, the decision of the Expert Commission of the Latvian Language should be final. Most institutions concerned with norm-setting in the Latvian language became involved in this discussion¹⁵. We should note that Latvian is the state language of the Republic of Latvia. Its status is protected by the "State Language Law", as well as other legal acts passed in the Republic of Latvia¹⁶. The Latvian language is also one of the official EU languages.

Let us look at the 'Euro discussion' in Latvia from a linguistic point of view. A rich lexical stratum in the Latvian language comprises the names of foreign currencies that have been used as payment in Latvia, or used in business activities by speakers of the Latvian language outside Latvia. Latvian translations of currency names have provided a stimulus, impetus and requirement for the development of a standard spelling of foreign words in Latvian. This is a result of the changing political and economic dominance of different powers in Latvia, leading to the presence there of currencies from outside. In today's climate, the Euro is one such 'touchstone' of language and linguistics promoting interest in European languages.

Latvian (like many other European languages) is an inflective, synthetic language. Therefore the grammatical meaning is mainly expressed by word endings, prefixes and suffixes, declining and conjugating the words. Nouns normally have categories of gender, number and case. Foreign words added to Latvian are usually adapted by adding a Latvian ending; the stem can also be changed (for example, *dollar* *dolārs*). If foreign words are not allocated a Latvian ending, they become indeclinable (for example, *escudo* *eskudo*, also *euro*, if it maintains the ending – *o*). Indeclinable nouns are unnatural in Latvian, they create grammatical ambiguity in the language.

Traditionally, in Latvian, foreign words (and currency names too) are transcribed by their pronunciation, i.e., they are not spelt in a way that preserves the pronunciation in the original language to its maximum degree. Likewise, they have to comply with the grammatical features of Latvian, namely, to be integrated into the phonetic system of the Latvian language with an inflective ending. These conditions are not always successfully applied and Latvian has had to adapt to features of other languages, including the names of foreign currencies. Table 1 shows the names of European currencies in Latvian before the introduction of the Euro. The names of the national currencies are grouped according to the gender that they take in Latvian.

Table 1. Examples of the names of European national currencies in Latvian.

Country	Masculine	Feminine	Indeclinable
Albania	Leks		
Andorra		Peseta	
Austria (before Euro)	Šiliņš		
Belarus	Rubelis		
Belgium (before Euro), France (before Euro), Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Switzerland	Franks		
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro	Dinārs		
Bulgaria		Leva	
Croatia		Kuna	
Cyprus, Ireland (before Euro)		Mārciņa	
Denmark, Estonia, Iceland, Norway, Slovakia, The Czech Republic, Sweden		Krona	
Finland (before Euro), Germany (before Euro)		Marka	
Greece (before Euro)		Drahma	
Hungary	Forints		
Italy (before Euro), Malta, San Marino (before Euro), Turkey		Lira	
Lithuania	Lits		
Macedonia	Denārs		
Moldova, Rumania		Leja	
Netherlands (before Euro)	Guldenis		
Poland	Zlots		
Portugal (before Euro)			Eskudo
Russia	Rublis		
Slovenia	Tolars		
Spain (before Euro)		Peseta	
Ukraine	Karbovaņecs		
United Kingdom		Mārciņa	

We can see that most of the currency names have masculine or feminine endings. Only one of the European national currencies, the *eskudo* of Portugal, is indeclinable. Among the wider stratum of world currencies in Latvian we find other indeclinable names (*peso* (Mexico), *boliviano* (Bolivia), *oro* (Nicaragua)), but all are currencies that are not important in the daily life of Latvia. This is not the case with the Euro which will become a regular currency in Latvia.

The linguistic aspects of the Euro discussion are connected to the problem of how to represent the name of the single European currency in Latvian. Potential solutions included importing it without transformation or adapting it to the grammatical structure of Latvian. The following options were proposed. Each had their arguments and counter-arguments (see Figure 2)¹⁷.




Fig. 2
Different proposals for the name of Euro in Latvian.

The discussions of linguists and language users focussed on two issues:

1. what is the most appropriate representation of the stem of Euro in Latvian?
2. what is the appropriate word ending?

Let us first examine the issue of the word ending.

There are two opinions:

1. It should be an indeclinable word, *eiro*¹⁸. The main arguments in favour of this form are that it is already used in the language. At present it is the most widely used Latvian form and the ending complies with the EU directives on *euro*.
2. It should be a declinable word. In this case, the most desirable option is usually *eira*¹⁹. The masculine form *eiris* or *eirs* has also been suggested, but was unpopular. The main strengths of this option are that the word has to be declinable in order to avoid misunderstandings. Over the course of time, indeclinable borrowings tend to become declinable. The word is also declinable in other European languages²⁰.

The second main issue of the discussion, whether the stem of the name should be the diphthong *eu* or *ei*, also has two opposing viewpoints:

1. The root has to be *eir-* (*eiro/eira*)²¹. The main arguments in favour are that the root complies with the specificity of the Latvian language. It is also the same as the root of the name Europe (*Eiropa*) in Latvian and is the most popular and widely used form.
2. The root should be *eur-* (*euro/eura*)²². The main strengths of this option are that it complies with EU legislation, which stipulate that the single European currency in all the languages should be called *euro*²³. Likewise, the diphthong *eu* is not entirely unnatural in Latvian because it is used in some pronouns and in slang.

Although the official position of the European Central Bank is that the name of the single European currency should be identical in every language, in reality Latvian is not the only language in which the most widespread form of the word is different. On the contrary, at present the Euro is declined in all European languages that have a declension system²⁴. Table 2 gives the name of the Euro in different European languages (singular and plural nominative forms only):

Table 2. The name of the Euro in different European languages.

Language	Sg. Nom.	Pl. Nom.
Czech	<i>Euro</i>	<i>Eura</i>
Danish	<i>Euro</i>	<i>Euroer</i>
English	<i>Euro</i>	<i>Euros</i>
Estonian	<i>Euro</i>	<i>Eurod</i>
Finnish	<i>Euro</i>	<i>Eurot</i>
French	<i>Euro</i>	<i>Euros</i>
German	<i>Euro</i>	<i>Euros</i>
Greek	<i>Ευρώ</i>	<i>Ευρώ</i>
Hungarian	<i>Euro</i>	<i>Eurók</i>
Icelandic	<i>Evra</i>	<i>Evrur</i>
Irish	<i>Euro</i>	<i>Eorónna</i>
Italian	<i>Euro</i>	<i>Euro/Euri</i>
Latvian	<i>Eiuro</i>	<i>Eiuro</i>
Lithuanian	<i>Euras</i>	<i>Eurai</i>
Malta	<i>Ewro</i>	<i>Ewro</i>
Norwegian	<i>Euro/Euroen</i>	<i>Euro/Euroane</i>
Polish	<i>Euro</i>	<i>Eura</i>
Rumanian	<i>Euro</i>	<i>Euro/Euroi</i>
Serbian	<i>Evro</i>	<i>Evra</i>
Slovakian	<i>Euro</i>	<i>Eurá</i>
Slovenian	<i>Evro</i>	<i>Evra</i>
Spanish	<i>Euro</i>	<i>Euros</i>
Swedish	<i>Euro</i>	<i>Euror</i>
Welsh	<i>Ewro</i>	<i>Ewroaid/Ewros</i>

From this, we see that the majority of languages have borrowed the root *eur-*, but that there have been transformations in line with the different grammar systems, for example, Icelandic, Latvian, Maltese, Serbian, Slovenian, and Welsh. In general, the root of

the currency is the same, but the ending is coined in compliance with the grammatical features of each individual language. This is highlighted particularly in the plural forms (the forms also vary according to grammatical cases not given here).

What were the outcomes of the 'Euro discussion' in Latvia²⁵? The discussion clearly showed that so many institutions are involved in the formation of Latvian language policy in the restored independent Latvia, that they find it difficult to agree on common goals. As a result, the initially linguistic discussion took on a political dimension, both on a local scale and in the context of the EU more widely. The strategy of naming the Euro facilitated an intellectual discussion on the sensitive issues of scientific terminology and issues of linguistic rights in Latvia and the European Union. To decline a noun means to allocate it a grammatical gender category. The name 'Euro' was initially created as an indeclinable 'neuter' linguistic formation. However, the grammatical categories of the Latvian language tend to classify it as belonging to the feminine or masculine gender, as is the case with the majority of other currency names in Latvian. Thus Latvian discussions of the Euro also raised psychological aspects of grammatical gender and their extra-linguistic consequences: issues of theory and correlation among biological gender, social gender and grammatical gender.

In a purely theoretical way, the issue of how the name of a currency differs from another internationally used term when it is transposed from one language into another might be explored. Likewise, the issue of whether the EU's requirement that the Euro currency should have a standard spelling and pronunciation is valid, is also debateable. From a historical perspective, the USSR rouble is an example of how a currency can function in different language forms. The USSR rouble had a different name in each of the 15 republics. The 15 different names of the rouble were printed in all 15 languages on the banknotes in four alphabets: mainly in Cyrillic, as well as Latin (in the Baltic republics), and Georgian and Armenian, both of which have their own specific alphabet (see Figure 3).



Fig. 3
One rouble bank-note of the Soviet Union.

Officially, all EU official languages have equal rights but in the process of translating the term 'Euro', some EU states found that they had restricted linguistic rights when making decisions on issues of language. Today the only variation on 'Euro' printed on banknotes is the Greek version. There remains a question whether in future the term for Euro could be printed on banknotes in every language of the EU member-states, in order to uphold the principle of union in diversity. There is, however, little sign of that at present.

As a result of these discussions on the Euro, Latvia has expressed official objections to the use of a unified name for the EU currency irrespective of national languages. This extends to payment documents. Latvia is not the only country that has started discussions with the EU on this issue. Countries including Lithuania, Hungary and Slovenia have also tried to gain the right to transcribe and use the currency name in accordance with the grammatical rules of their individual national language. For instance, in ratifying the EU constitution, Latvia and Hungary signed a declaration asserting that:

Latvia and Hungary declare that the spelling of the name of the single currency, including its derivatives as applied throughout the Latvian and Hungarian text of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, has no effect on the existing rules of the Latvian and Hungarian languages²⁶.

From the perspective of actual language use, nothing has really changed as a result of the discussions. In everyday Latvian, the most popular form is still *eiro*. The average language speaker is not particularly interested in decisions made by institutions, including linguistic ones²⁷. Although there is no date set for the Baltic States to join the Euro, some shops already voluntarily indicate prices in both the national currency and the Euro. This is intended to make shopping easier for visitors from other EU states arriving in the Baltic States as tourists or guest-workers. While legislative acts issued by the EU still have the form not adapted in Latvian, *euro*, discussions between Latvia and the EU on this issue are ongoing and there is no indication of which side will prevail.

Latvia's recent past shows that the history of economics and art (money design, artistic imagery) with which numismatics has been aligned, could now be enriched by linguistics, drawing on the perspective of the histories of European languages, language policy and sociolinguistics. The focus of this chapter has been the integration and adaptation of the Euro, mainly in the linguistic environment and the linguistic and political problems associated with it. The theme of a future study could be the monetary history of Latvia as a manifestation of different ruling powers, as well as the road to the national currency, integration into the Euro-zone, and symbols of Latvian culture and ideology within the total system of Euro design and symbols.

NOTES

¹ R. Ceplīte, *Numismātika* [Numismatics], Riga 1968.

² Й. Ирмшер, Р. Йоне (eds.), *Словарь Античности* [Glossary of Antiquity], Moscow 1989.

³ J.V. Gēte, *Fausts: Traģēdija*, Riga 1936.

- ⁴ T. Barfield (ed.), *The Dictionary of Anthropology*, Oxford 1999, p. 328.
- ⁵ *Philosophie des Geldes*, Leipzig 1900.
- ⁶ A. Stepčenko, *Nauda un dzīvesstils*, in *Money, Lifestyle, Identity. Dedicated to the Life Philosopher and Sociologist Georg Simmel*, in "Acta Universitatis Latviensis", 2000, 629, p. 55.
- ⁷ Č. Gržibovskis, *Euro Introduction in the Baltic States: to be or not to be?*, in T. Muravska (ed.), *The European Union Enlargement of 2004 and Beyond: Responding to the Political, Legal and Socio-Economic Challenges*, Riga 2006, p. 201.
- ⁸ Directive (EC) No. 1103/97 of 17 June 1997 from the European Council, in "Official Journal of the European Communities", 19 June 1997, p. 1.
- ⁹ www.vvk.lv; www.tvnet.lv; newspaper "Diena", January 2001 and others.
- ¹⁰ R. Grīse, *Par ērtu, saskanīgu Eiropas naudas nosaukumu* [On a Convenient and Assonant Name of the European Currency], in "Latvijas Vēstnesis", 13 February 2002.
- ¹¹ J. Borzovs, A. Lauzis, V. Feists, *"Eiras" cīņu aizkulises* [Behind the Scenes of "Eira's" Battles], in "Diena", 18 December 2004.
- ¹² Interestingly this form in the European Union legislative acts has never been accepted and it is there corrected to EURO, creating the situation that the same word in Latvian is being used in two forms: one at national level and another in official EU texts.
- ¹³ *Informatīvais ziņojums "Par Eiropas Savienības vienotās valūtas nosaukuma atveidi latviešu valodā"* [Informative report "On the Representation of the European Single Currency in Latvian"], in http://www.mk.gov.lv/doc/2005/FMzino_201205.doc.
- ¹⁴ The State Language Centre of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Latvia, State Language Agency, State Language Commission, Latvian Language Institute of the University of Latvia, Translation and Terminology Centre.
- ¹⁵ These included the State Language Centre of the Ministry of Justice (founded in 1992, its main function is to monitor and control language compliance), *Valsts valodas centra nolikums* [Statute of the State Language Centre], in "Latvijas Vēstnesis", 30 March 2005; the Expert Commission of the Latvian Language (founded in 2002, its main function is setting the norms of Latvian literary language), *Valsts valodas centra Latviešu valodas ekspertu komisijas nolikums* [Statute of the State Language Centre Expert Commission of the Latvian Language], in "Latvijas Vēstnesis", 29 August 2000; the State Language Agency (founded in 2003, its main function is strengthening the status of the state language and managing the activities linked with language development), *Valsts valodas aģentūras nolikums* [Statute of the State Language Agency], in "Latvijas Vēstnesis", 10 September 2004; the Latvian Language Institute of the University of Latvia (founded in 1946, its main function is academic research into the Latvian language); the Translation and Terminology Centre (founded in 1996, its main functions are to provide translations of legal acts and other documents to public administration institutions and society, to submit proposals on terminology development and standardisation), *Valsts aģentūras "Tulkošanas un terminoloģijas centrs" nolikums* [Statute of the State Agency "Translation and Terminology centre"], in "Latvijas Vēstnesis", 07 October 2004; the Terminology Commission of the Academy of Sciences of Latvia (founded in 1919, its main functions are to develop a unified and academically sound system of terms in various scientific branches, to coordinate work on terminology), *Latvijas Zinātņu akadēmijas Terminoloģijas komisijas nolikums* [Statute of the Terminology Commission of the Academy of Sciences of Latvia], in "Latvijas Vēstnesis", 1 December 2000.
- ¹⁶ *Valsts valodas likums* [State Language Law], in "Latvijas Vēstnesis", 21 December 1999.
- ¹⁷ A. Lauzis, *Dienīšķās naudas vārds jāloka* [The Daily Currency Name Should Be Declined], in "Latvijas Vēstnesis", 30 December 2003.
- ¹⁸ This opinion is represented by the State Language Centre, the Bank of Latvia and others. Many language speakers also hold this opinion.

- ¹⁹ This opinion is represented by the Terminology Commission of the Academy of Sciences of Latvia (it is particularly actively expressed by the commission member, linguist Aldis Lauzis), by some linguists including those who strongly maintain a traditional view of Latvian linguistics, and also by some language speakers.
- ²⁰ *LZA Terminoloģijas komisijas lēmums Nr. 36 "Par Eiropas naudas nosaukumu eira"* [The Terminology Commission of the Academy of Sciences of Latvia decision Nr. 36 "On the Name of the European Currency *Eira*"], in "Terminoloģijas Jaunumi", Riga, 2004, 9, pp. 17-18; Lauzis, *Dienišķās naudas vārds jāloka cit.*, p. 183.
- ²¹ This opinion is supported by the former minister of education and linguist, professor Ina Druvieta, and the Terminology Commission of the Academy of Sciences of Latvia representative, Aldis Lauzis. It is also the opinion of the majority of language users (the form actually used).
- ²² This is the view of Rasma Grīle.
- ²³ *Council Regulation No 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the introduction of the euro*, in "Official Journal of the European Communities", 11 May 1998, 41, pp. 1-5.
- ²⁴ Lauzis, *Dienišķās naudas vārds jāloka cit.*
- ²⁵ J. Borzovs, A. Lauzis, V. Feists, "*Eiras*" cīņu aizkulises cit.
- ²⁶ *Declaration by the Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Hungary on the spelling of the name of the single currency in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe*, in http://europa.eu/constitution/en/ptoc184_en.htm#a662.
- ²⁷ Cf. the Cabinet of Ministers' Regulations: *Cabinet of Ministers' Regulations Nr. 564 "Regulations on transcription of the name of the single European Union currency in Latvian"*, in "Latvijas Vēstnesis", 29 July 2005; it is also the form used by the Bank of Latvia.

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Dissidence and Soviet Latvian Poetry: the 1960s

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ABSTRACT

In approaching Latvian dissidence poetry as the subject for a case study on cultural rebellion and resistance, it is important to recognize that in the USSR dissidence was a multinational movement and had a broad political and cultural frame of reference and complex causes. The theme of this chapter is cultural resistance; it can be claimed almost unequivocally that the Latvian poets of dissident sentiments who are the focus of this study devoted themselves to a search for a correct socialism and a true art of the word, and that they had no other or farther-reaching political goals and intentions within the time period in question.

In Soviet Latvian poetry dissidence manifests itself in two ways: firstly as political dissidence, i.e., as the *great dialogue* with totalitarian power and ideology with a view to actualizing it and then to dissecting it poetically. Political dissidence necessarily implies a dialogue with power and in a way it means defeating this power with its very own weapons; secondly as decadent dissidence, i.e., by totally ignoring the thematic framework of totalitarianism and finding a refuge in poetry – a possibility to reflect on something else.

The history of the Latvian Soviet poetry of the 1960s undeniably provides proof of strong resistance and the negative consequences which dissidence entailed for the lives of the poets: a ban on publishing their works; public reprobation, defamation of the artistic qualities of their poetry; or even charges of high treason and deportation to Siberia. Nevertheless a particular thematic perspective on the Soviet Latvian dissident writing can be opened to examine the links between collaborationism and dissidence, belief and falsehood and the subtle borderline that divides them.

Latviešu padomju 60.gadu brīvdomīgā dzeja, kas nepakļāvās padomju totalitārisma estētiskai glorifikācijai, skatīta kā daudz nacionālas un multikulturālas nevardarbīgas pretošanās kustība daļa, kas aktualizē jūtīgus, ar PSRS sabrukumu, Latvijas valstiskās neatkarības atgūšanu un integrāciju ES saistītus jautājumus. Apceres uzmanības centrā ir izvirzīti trīs izcili latviešu dzejnieki Vizma Belševica (1931-2005), Ojārs Vācietis (1933-

1983), *Knuts Skujenieks* (dz.1936) un viņu 60. gados rakstītās dzejoļu grāmatas „Elpa”, „Sēkla sniegā” un „Gadu gredzeni”. Disidentisma strāvojums 60. gadu latviešu dzejā, literatūrā un kultūrā kopumā saistīts ar PSRS iekšpolitiskas un ārpolitisko krīzi un nacionāl-komunisma kustības aktivizēšanos Latvijā.

Skaidrojot disidentisma cilmi, norādīts, ka ar retiem izņēmumiem līdz 60. gadiem latviešu padomju dzejā valdīja padomju dzīvi apliecinošas tēmas un intonācijas, un tās spēcīgi jūtamas arī topošo disidentisma dzejnieku debijas krājumos, Belševicas „Visu ziemu šogad pavasaris” (1955) un Vācieša „Tālu ceļu vējš” (1956), tādējādi skarot arī disidentisma un kolaboracionisma problemātiku. Konstatēti divi disidences dzejas strāvumi: 1) politiskā disidence – kā dialogs ar varu par padomju ideoloģijai tuvuām tēmām un to estētiska uzšķēršana (Vācietis); 2) dekadentiskā disidence – poētiska distancēšanās no t.s. sabiedriski nozīmīgajām tēmām un aktualitātēm (Ziedonis, daļēji arī Belševica un Skujenieks). Latviešu padomju 60.gadu dzeja raksturota kā unikāls, gan vienojošs, gan konfliktējošs kultūras atmiņām bagāts vēstures avots sturkultūru dialoga un sapratnes veicināšanai starp tautām un indivīdiem ar dažādu vēsturisko pieredzi.

Theoretical reflections on the attempts of totalitarian regimes to construct a new cultural space play an important role in the history of European ideas and culture and are suitable to become the object of case studies. Latvia is one of those EU member states that were occupied both by Stalinists and by Nazis, and the totalitarian past plays an important role in the formation of the historical consciousness of the Latvian nation and its search for historical self-awareness. In the 20th century, Latvia witnessed two periods of particularly active invasion by the Soviet totalitarian culture: first, in the early years of the 20th century, during the revolutionary dictatorship; and then during the decades of Soviet occupation after World War II.

These periods comprise a body of undebated topics that should be on the agenda of academic research. Not only in the realm of public and political discourse and deliberations but also in that of scholarly history today we perceive substantial differences in the way such terms as “Stalinist”, “Soviet”, “occupation”, “communist” and the like are used: such is the case also with the notion of “dissidence”. This chapter is dedicated to the second period of the Soviet occupation, linked to the Second World War and the post-war experience and its reflections in Latvian culture, in poetry in particular, which is rightly considered the emergency response genre in literature because, in comparison to large scale works, poetry is capable of reacting faster and in a more straightforward way to changes in human life and perception of the world, and thus also reaching the reader.

When approaching Latvian dissidence poetry as an object for case studies it is important to recognize that in the USSR dissidence was a multinational movement and had a broad political and cultural frame of reference and complex causes. Dissidence as a multinational and multicultural movement includes sensitive issues related to awkward

memories, which, with the demise of communism¹, the restoration of national independence and the accession to the EU, tend to be swept under the rug and expelled from the nation's own historical memory, as well as struck out of its cultural historiography. A selective attitude, with a tendency to highlight aspects which appear preferable today while understating inconvenient facts and works, is also apparent in the lives and literary biographies of the Latvian dissident poets as presented in encyclopedias and biographical lexicons².

The second volume of the ten-volume *Soviet Encyclopaedia of Latvia* (1982), which among other things attempts to sum up the ideological essence of Soviet existence, contains an entry on 'dissidents'. But dissidence is defined there as an anachronism, as something that manifested itself in the framework of religious movements and vanished by the end of the 18th century. The entry then goes on to indicate that in Mediaeval Europe those who did not accept Catholicism were commonly referred to as dissidents and that the issue of their civil rights was particularly central in 16th- and 17th-century England (Dissenters), in 17th- and 18th-century France (Huguenots) and Poland. Although the volume in question was published in 1982 when the court trials of the eminent Soviet dissidents, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov, had already taken place and the Latvian dissident poet Knuts Skujenieks, a member of the so-called "French group"³, had already been sentenced to 10 years in GULAG penal labour camps – all these repressive measures were still very vivid memories – the encyclopaedia makes no mention of the dissident movement in the URSS and Soviet Latvia.

In fact, during the years of the Cold War⁴, the USSR did not consider that such a phenomenon as dissidentism existed within its confines and the topic was taboo in Soviet historiography. It was foreign Sovietologists who dealt with this issue and crowned Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn and other free thinkers of the Soviet Union as dissidents. During the early years of *glasnost*⁵ instituted by Mikhail Gorbachev, *The Political Encyclopaedia* published in Soviet Latvia by the principal editorial board for encyclopaedias provides the following definition:

Sovietology: a specific reactionary trend in contemporary bourgeois science, propaganda and ideology which specialises in complex studies of economy, political system, history, culture and other aspects of the USSR and other socialist countries.[...] The majority of sovietologists falsify the home and foreign policy, lifestyle, social progress of real socialism. The use of the term "sovietology" spread widely in the 1960s. [...] Marxist-Leninist science does not engage in polemics with Sovietology⁶.

In the context of our study it is important to note the phrase "not engage in polemics with Sovietology", which means not only disassociation but also a strict ban for Soviet scholars to handle the subject. This is also an indirect indication that dissidentism was regarded as a dubious term and a topic which was alien and unwelcome in Soviet science: "As designated by the means of mass propaganda of imperialist countries, dissidents are people who deny the socialist system, engage in anti-Soviet activity, break the

law and, supported by the propaganda and intelligence centres of imperialist countries, actively fight against the socialist order”⁷.

Sociologists of culture now write that “dissident, in countries with mono-partite system, is a person who intellectually diverges from the official political line”⁸. To exemplify this, the URSS is mentioned, “where dissidents are being exiled, thrown in jail, sent to labour camps, locked away in psychiatric hospitals or sacked”⁹. All the repressive methods listed are included in the CVs of the dissenting Latvian poets. In a broader sense, dissidents as free thinkers should be valued per se, regardless of their place of residence, political landscape in their motherland, age, sex, ethnic identity or race.

Although the Latvian historian Henriks Strods did not claim to be formulating an all-embracing interpretation of the dissidence movement in the USSR, we can agree with his statement that the aims and methods of action of the political opposition in the 1960s were rather varied, going

from the search for a correct Leninist socialism and communism to the restoration of the Russian monarchy. The forms of resistance ranged over the whole spectrum of non-violent resistance, starting from political non-cooperation, cultural resistance, emigration and escape to foreign countries, down to the formation of resistance groups and organisations¹⁰.

The theme “Dissidentism and Soviet Latvian Poetry: the 1960s” relates to the form cultural resistance took and it can be claimed, almost unequivocally, that the Latvian poets with dissident sentiments who are the focus of this study devoted themselves to the search for a correct kind of socialism and a true art of the word, and at that time had no other or farther-reaching political goals and intentions¹¹. A quest for an authentic communism and correct socialism, and propagating views that diverged from the official government position, were rather widespread phenomena in Latvian prose and drama the 1970s too¹². The most striking works, in an artistic sense, and the works that show the greatest talent faced different fates: even if they possessed the same freethinking qualities, part of them received Soviet government awards but others, because of censorship, were relegated to the so-called ‘literature for the drawer’¹³.

In the present study, three outstanding Latvian poets are placed in the spotlight: Vizma Belševica (1931-2005), Ojārs Vācietis (1933-1983) and Knuts Skujenieks (born in 1936). The most prolific and meaningful period of their creative activity fell in the Soviet era, but their contribution to the literary and cultural life of Latvia has been so significant that they have all been included in the encyclopedia *A Hundred Great Latvians*, published in 2006: that is, quite some time after the restoration of Latvia’s statehood and the accession to the European Union, after the national heritage values had been reassessed, applying particularly strict criteria to the literary legacy of the Soviet era¹⁴. Dissidentism as a movement in culture and the repercussions caused by this movement in the society of the 1960s relate mainly to two genuine poetry collections: *Elpa* [Breath, Riga 1966] by Vācietis and *Gadu gredzeni* [Yearly Rings, Riga 1969] by

Belševica. Neither of these books can be considered works that belong to the genre of socio-political poetry, directly opposing Soviet power; essentially, this is meditative lyrical poetry imbued with motifs rooted in Latvian folklore or European culture or emotionally expressive publicistic poetry. In this poetry, the Communist Party leadership and official criticism saw dangerous deviations from the canons of the socialist realist genre in which there was no place for philosophical reflections on the meaning of human life or the life of a nation outside the Socialist paradise.

AESTHETIC GLORIFICATION OF THE SOVIET STATE

The institution through which the writers' work was controlled, supervised and subjected to the dogmas of Socialist Realism was the Writer's Union of Soviet Latvia¹⁵ and its periodicals – a literary monthly journal called “Karogs” [The Banner] and a weekly paper named “Literatūra un Māksla” [Literature and Art], as well as “Cīņa” [Struggle], a daily produced by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Latvia¹⁶. Soviet totalitarian culture was subjected to the dogmas of Socialist Realism, and one of the leading principles in the canon was severe thematic censorship. In relation to the history of Soviet Literature as a process, two inter-connected factors with some bearing on literary creativity are often invoked, namely, censorship and self-censorship which found expression in several ways, such as, on the one hand, though the exclusion of several thematic areas (the so-called taboo topics, such as non-Soviet history); and on the other through the adoption of thematic approaches to validate the ideological values important to the Soviet State and society and to combat negativism, usually presented as relics from the past that hindered the progress of life.

During first decade following World War II, for the purposes of Soviet patriotic education, special focus was placed on the theme of the War, which was called the Great Patriotic War in Soviet historiography, and continuous attention was devoted to the reflection of war in literature and art during the whole period of occupation. To give an idea of what this meant in practical terms, we reproduce here a fragment of a document, “No. 85”, entitled *Recommendations by the Art Affairs Council of the Council of the People's Commissars of the Latvian S.S.R. regarding topics to be reflected in works of art. Thematic plan and a list of sample topics*. This was proposed in November-December 1944 as a writers' and artists' vademecum:

1. Scenes of daily life and battles of the Red Army.

Heroic deeds by Red Army commanders and political commissars at the Battle of Moscow; moving westwards and in the direction of Latvia.

“On the eve of an attack”, “Attacking a settlement”, “Admission into the Party after the battle”, “A sniper on mission”, “Capture of a prisoner”, “Awarding the banner of the Guards unit”, “Scouting”, “A political information session”, “Tank-borne infantry”, “Airborne assault landing”, “Combat medics on the battlefield”, “Actors at the battlefield”.

From the daily life of a reserve unit.

“Waking up in the morning” (brisk morning mood), “On training” (in summer on a sunny day or in autumn in rain and mud; energy and impetuosity), “On political training” (focused attention), “Leisure” (evening games, cheerfulness), “Amateur performance”, “Actors visiting”, “Leaving for the battlefield”.

2. The fight of partisans against German occupants.

“In partisans’ headquarters”, “With partisans in the woods”, “Partisans reconnoitring”, “Signalers”, “An oppressor’s trial”, “A traitor’s trial”, “Young partisans”, “Portraits of the partisans”.

3. Daily life and activities of Latvians in evacuation.

“Young woman Communist – a tractor driver”, “Woman – a blood donor”, “At the children’s home”, “Factory and plant vocational school”, “Joint work in the kolkhoz”, etc.

4. From the history of the Latvian nation.

5. The period of German occupation.

“New order in the countryside”, “Traitors of their own people”, “Hanging of civilians”, “In the Salaspils concentration camp”, “People – beasts”, “Hiding a wounded commissar”, “Killing of children”, “Übermensch”, “Robbed”, “In the penal servitude of fascists”, “Manhunt”, “Running away” (the Red Army is coming), etc.

6. Latvia – free from the German occupants.

“Liberators are coming”, “On the shore of the Daugava River after banishment of Germans”, “Renovating the railway”, “Rally on 22 October 1944”, “The red flag above Riga once again”, “Returning to fields”, “Land surveyors working”, “Rebuilding industry”, “The school year starts”, “Portraits of strike-workers”.

7. Landscapes of the homeland.

“Riga destroyed”, “The wide Daugava”, “The sea”, “Fields in crop”, “Forests”, “The golden autumn”, “Gaiziņkalns Hill in winter”, “Jelgava after occupation”¹⁷.

A detailed clarification of the instructions laid down in the Party documents usually appeared in literary and cultural periodicals, and the document quoted above was no exception¹⁸. The divergence of opinions and ideological tension that were the hallmarks of the Cold War dominates the opinions of once-warring countries, nations and individuals with regard to the historic significance of World War II and provide evidence of how instrumental the perspective on World War II as perceived in literature and culture was for the inculcation of the Communist ideology. An Eastern European historian, Erwins Oberlender, notes that

the myth of the Great Patriotic War obviously has as great importance to the Russian Federation for shaping its identity as it had to the Soviet Union. In 1970s, the myth of Victory superseded the myth of the October Revolution as a symbol of collective identity. Today the victory in the ‘Great Patriotic War’ can be said to be the only positive message left over from the USSR¹⁹.

How purposeful, persistent, at times bizarre and, nonetheless, effective the activities by the USSR CP in the ideological supervision and control over the creative process were

can be illustrated by an *Extract from the visiting meeting of the Panel of the Ministry of Culture of the Latvian SSR on the occasion of viewing the design of the monument for the Year 1905 Park, with attendance of old Bolsheviks*, dated 27 March 1959, Protokol No 90:

[...] Comrade Treimanis. This monument fails to express completely the spirit of the era. The figure of a woman, personifying Revolution, is unnecessary. The author has returned to the image from the time of the French revolution. The year 1905 is important to us. Do we find that in these figures? Of course not. The era related to the revolution of 1905 cannot be expressed in a single figure of a worker. Here is some young man or other, lost in thought, leaning against Revolution, seeking her support. And then the raised hand of the woman. That's not a call to revolution, to the battle, no, that's a warning – Not a step forward, stay where you are! And as to the bas-relief, the people are walking towards the central figure. If the people went in the other direction, then it would seem that the woman is sending them to fight. But they are going the other way. The bas-reliefs hardly reflect the message.

Comrade Krasovskis. You should have invited us when the idea for the design was discussed.

Comrade Edžinš. They should put a flagstaff in the man's hand. That will make him more dynamic. They should also remake the woman. [...] ²⁰.

A curious textbook example of the cult of Socialist Realism in Latvian literature is a collection of poems *Brāļu saimē* [Fraternal Family, 1947] by Janis Sudrabkalns (1894-1975) which received the USSR State (Stalin), award in 1948²¹. It contains dedicatory poems that illustrate the theme very clearly, for example, *Sarkanai Armijai* [To the Red Army], *Padomju tankam* [To a Soviet Tank], *Maskavai* [To Moscow], *Krievu tautai* [To the Russian Nation], *Padomju cilvēks* [Homo Sovieticus], *Padomju sievietē* [Soviet Woman], *Vecā Eiropa* [Old Europe] and others of the same kind. The dogmas of normative aesthetics of Socialist Realism required that life in the URSS should be depicted as a de facto utopia where freedom, fraternity, equality and happiness thrive, in opposition to Old Europe that represented a dystopia where man is as a wolf to his fellow men. The euphoric mood of *Fraternal Family* dominated the scene of Soviet Latvian Poetry up to the 1960s, including the creative efforts of a new generation of poets who would later become dissidents.

For instance, Vizma Belševica writes in her first collection of poems *Visu ziemu šogad pavasaris* [This Year the Spring is here the Whole Winter, 1955]:

Laipe ir dzīvot zem saules - kā pasaka zeme šī skaista.
Laipe likst dzirkstot Tēv pāri kā varvīksņots vasaras lietūs,
Un, lai to neatņem Tēv, sardzē stāv Padomju valsts ²².

[It is happiness to live under the Sun – this land is beautiful like a fairytale. //Happiness streams over you like summer rain with rainbows//, and no one can take it away from you, not with the Soviet state standing on guard].

The suggestive power of the *Fraternal Family* and Moscow is also reflected in later dissident poets' exchanges of letters. In 1954, Ojārs Vācietis wrote a letter to Jānis Sudrabkalns, emphasizing the suggestive impact that the collection of his poems *Fraternal Family* had on the poets of the new generation: "My friend studies in Moscow. When

moving to Moscow he could not manage to fit everything in his little suitcase. He threw out his towel and a bar of soap but your *Fraternal Family* travelled to Moscow: my friend could not live without it”²³.

The literary biographies of the poets mentioned above share another significant detail – studies at the Maxim Gorky Literature Institute in Moscow, or less direct but sufficiently close emotional and creative ties with Moscow. In their early biographies, Moscow stands for Otherness in its intellectual and literary domain, a space for freedom of thought and expression, a symbol of solidarity between active writers. It was not yet perceived as a generator of totalitarian ideologies and dogmatic regulations. Literary critic Anda Kubuliņa writes: “Vizma Belševica and other Latvian students in Moscow were a link with the world”²⁴, i.e. she was teaching others to find their way in contemporary Russian literature, she was a keen reader of Solzhenitsyn, she had overcome her judgmental attitudes against the Russians and got in touch with other students of various ethnic backgrounds. This is confirmed by a quotation from the first collection of poems by Ojārs Vācietis, *Tālu ceļu vējš* [The Wind of Distant Roads, 1956], namely, the poem *Maskava, māt!* [Moscow, o Mother!]:

*Nu nākam mēs ar Dzintarjūras šalkām
Pie tevis Maskava, pie Tevis māt!
Nav tāda spēka, kas mūs uzvarētu
Ar tevi, Maskava, ar tevi, māt!*²⁵

[We now come to thee, Moscow, o Mother, with the murmur of the Amber/Baltic Sea! [...]
Nothing can beat us when we are with thee, Moscow, o Mother!]

The collection of poems by Belševica, *Visu ziemu šogad pavasaris* [This Year, the Spring is Here the Whole Winter, 1955] which was published a year before Vācietis' *Tālu ceļu vējš* [The Wind of Distant Roads] expresses more reserved but still special feelings for Moscow. For instance, a poem *Vēstule draudzenei Uzbekijā* [Letter to a Friend in Uzbekistan]:

*Mīļā Covik! Es atmiņā glabāju
Kuplās liepas, ap Kremli kas zied.
Tavu sirsnību, draudzene labā,
Blakus Maskavas gaišajam tēlam*²⁶.

[Dear Tsovik! I still remember the bushy lime trees in blossom around the Kremlin. [...]
And your cordiality, my good friend, along with the bright image of Moscow].

THE ORIGINS OF DISSIDENCE

The current of dissidentism reveals itself in Latvian poetry in parallel to the crisis in domestic policy and external relations crisis in the USSR reflected by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR (Moscow, 1956) that criticised the Stalinist cult and proposed measures for the liquidation of its consequences. This sparked the Na-

tional Communism movement in Latvia²⁷, which leads to the conclusion that the circle of dissidents included Communists as well as others.

When speaking about the origins of dissidentism in Latvian poetry, one must bear in mind that, with few exceptions, themes and attitudes that glorified Soviet life dominated Latvian poetry until the 1960s. Although limited by censorship, publicly rebuked from the podiums of the Latvian Communist Party [LCP] Central Committee meetings and criticised by critics subservient to the regime, Belševica and Vācietis lived and wrote in Latvia. Their first collections of poems – Belševica's *Visu ziemu šogad pavasaris* [This Year, the Spring is Here the Whole Winter, 1955] and Vācietis's *Tālu ceļu vējš* [The Wind of Distant Roads, 1956] took forward the poetic tradition instituted by Sudrabkalns. Skujenieks, an employee of the weekly "Literatūra un Māksla" [Literature and Art], did not live to see the publication of his first poetry book, being deported to Siberia in 1962, to a camp for political prisoners in Mordovia, where he created superb poetical works. For the wider public in Latvia, Skujenieks became known only in the late 1980s, when the collection of his lyrical and philosophical poetry, *Iesien baltā lakatiņā* [Bind in a White Scarf, 1986], was published, and especially after 1990, when the poetry book *Sēkla sniegā* [Seed in the Snow] saw the light, a part of the poems written in the camp in Siberia (1962-1969) and in the author's own compilation. By contrast, Skujenieks composed his first pieces following the aesthetics and rules of Socialist Realism, and his first poem is entitled *Padomju cilvēks* [Homo Sovieticus, 1950], just like the model poem in Sudrabkalns' *Brāļu saime* [Fraternal Family].

Belševica and Vācietis were in possession of nearly all the faculties to become genuine Soviet poets as understood within the framework of Socialist Realism. They were of the "right" descent, belonged to the "right" social class, they had an acute sense of social justice, adequate literary education and their first collections of poems instilled hopes in Soviet apparatchiks that they were "getting there". However, already in the middle of the 1960s, confronted with the reality of Soviet life, both "adherents" became tragically frustrated in their faith in Communist ideals, and this was reflected in their poetry. Ojārs Vācietis, winner of the USSR State Lenin Komsol prize who was rightly considered the most pro-Communist poet in the history of Latvian literature, in his poem *Partijas piederība* [Party Membership] criticizes the real motivation of some of his fellow party members:

Zagt

*Ar partijas biedra karti kabatā!*²⁸

[To steal // With a member's card in your pocket!]

The epistolary legacy of Ojārs Vācietis contains testimony about his discursive experience gained in theoretical discussions at the State University of Latvia and in the literary circles of Riga. He understood that the Soviet theories had deeply misrepresented the literary heritage of the period preceding Socialist Realism, Latvian folklore and my-

thology being no exception. For example, the characters of the Latvian legend *Lāčplēsis* [Bearslayer]²⁹ depicting 13th-century events in Latvia, the tragedy *Jāzeps un viņa brāļi* [Joseph and his Brothers, 1919]³⁰ and the symbolic drama *Uguns un nakts* [Fire and Night, 1905] by Rainis had been treated in such a way that:

Bearslayer in his essence and strivings was a Bolshevik, the first Latvian Bolshevik. [...] “Joseph and his Brothers” by Rainis is a striking example of Socialist Realism. Joseph already in his day and age went to look for unexplored lands. In the figurative sense, Rainis is a tractorist and Joseph with his brothers couplers. [...] Antiņš is the party official of the village, Saulcerīte stands for collectivization and the seven ravens are kulaks [affluent farmers working for their own profit] who put obstacles to the setting up of kolkhozs [collective farms]³¹.

The “Yearly Rings” by Belševica and other collections of poems testify to the fact that one of the most peculiar characteristics of Latvian dissident poetry “behind the iron curtain” is an active presence of history (for instance, the poem *Latvieša Indriņa piezīmes uz Livonijas bronikas malām* [The Notes of Henry the Latvian on the Margins of the Livonian Chronicle], as well as archetypal motifs from foreign cultures. It is the inter-cultural communication and “metaphysical solidarity” that counts amongst the most important sources of inspiration for resistance.

A dissenting poet in Soviet Latvian poetry is often associated with the character of Don Quixote, as is the case in the poem *Spānijas motīvs: mūžīgie donkihوتي* [Spanish Motif: the Eternal Don Quixotes] by Vizma Belševica from the collection of poems *Gadu gredzeni* [The Yearly Rings], impounded by Soviet censors. Belševica's Eternal Don Quixotes fight against the windmill of falsehood and deceit:

*Maļ vēdzirnavas melus
Un meliem zemi baro.
Lūst kauli, štēpi nelūst,
Un donkihوتي karo*³².

[A windmill grinds falsehood//And feeds the land on it.//The bones are broken, the spears do not break. And the Don Quixotes still wage war].

Reflecting upon his literary experience during the years spent in Siberian prisons, Skujenieks also accentuates the feelings of solidarity rooted in the cultural heritage of the world: “Exile, prisons, torture, confiscation, psychiatric wards – violence has accompanied literature from its very beginning, whether in the Roman empire, Mediaeval Europe, enslaved territories or national states. This conscious solidarity imparted a new dimension to life and to poetry”³³.

Vācietis' poetry also takes root in a vaster cultural terrain and it reminds us that retaliation and keeping quiet for political reasons, as in totalitarian systems, is unfortunately an unmistakable aspect of the history of culture. Creativity and distinction – i.e. ‘being different’ – often catalyses a potent reaction from the immediate environment, as there is the

'awkwardness' that does not fit in with the *communal* atmosphere or with the institutional environment. The history of culture and intellect is full of examples of intolerance and even of the physical extermination of creative genius, not only in Latvia and not only in Soviet history, and the poet Vācietis in his "Einsteiniana" expressed this most eloquently:

When the great meets with the miniscule
 When the known meets the unknown
 Then always
 The first fault:
 – You have two hands
 We have two hands
 So why are you permitted
 To discover more than we?
 Against the wall!
 In flames!
 But the fault is only one –
 That you are a Bruno
 That you are a Lorca
 That you are an Einstein
 Greatness ... that is treason!³⁴

In prose, including historical prose, it is easier to complete the manoeuvres necessary for self-censorship because a writer can take a rational decision as to how far he or she would like to develop a particular plot-line, what a character is going to say or leave out, in order to include it in a relative category of the good or the evil, and so forth, thus such prose can be reasonably consumable. Naturally talented poets do not have this margin for adjustments and they cannot subject themselves to self-censorship because genial poetic inspiration is born from an automatic reflex. In Soviet Latvian poetry dissidence manifests itself in two ways:

- (1) as political dissidence, i.e., as the *great dialogue* (according to Bakhtin) with power and ideology with a view to actualizing it and then to dissecting it poetically (Ojārs Vācietis). Political dissidence necessarily implies a dialogue with power and in a way it means defeating this power with its very own weapons;
- (2) as decadent dissidence, i.e., by totally ignoring the thematic framework of totalitarianism and finding a poetic refuge, a possibility to reflect on something else (Imants Ziedonis, partly also Vizma Belševica and Knuts Skujenieks).

Decadent dissidence or passive resistance in the context of Latvia had a considerable, even crucial, role in stimulating and rejuvenating the national culture and creativity. For what reason? As revolutionary Marxism spread in Latvia at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the phenomenon of decadence acquired the status of a socially harmful, dangerous, weird and transient phenomenon, marginal or extraneous to Latvian literature, so that it had to be eradicated at all costs. Subsequently, however, it exerted strong influence on culture in Latvia (including literary theory and criticism). The spectre of

this 'marginal' phenomenon as late as the 1960s was still resurrected to scare the intelligentsia of Soviet Latvia and to persecute poets who refused to glorify the progress of Soviet life and oddly persisted in their "attempts to publish their apocalyptical and, at times, even decadent work. [...] By way of example, the cycle of poems by Belševica *Siržu seifs* [A Safe-Box of Hearts] is permeated by flabby poetic images, aestheticism, subjective feelings that are unrelated to the social life of our society, in some cases even succumbing to fairly decadent trends"³⁵.

To illustrate the drawbacks attributed to decadence I would like to quote some passages from publications that were used as main points of reference through the generations from the early 20th century:

We can no longer afford scoffing at our decadents just in some humorous journals – we have to counter them at once and criticize them severely. The tree of our nation's freedom is now harbouring these harmful maggots³⁶.

Scepticism ... scorn for any sign of optimism and hopes made decadents to delightfully linger over everything that is morbid, putrescent and disgusting, gilding it with the lustre of aestheticism (Baudelaire)[...] Quite a few ex-naturalists lapsed into this philistine, spiritual barefootedness and anarchism"³⁷.

The decadent parasites did not perish instantly. To protect the realistic art that is rooted in the depths of the masses a continuous and relentless counteracting proved necessary³⁸.

Decadence as a sign of degradation and disintegration of bourgeois literature first appeared in Latvia at the end of the 19th century. [...] Decadents denied that art is related to life. [...] Their works abounded in mysticism, sexuality, pornography, admiration of the basest instincts of a degenerate individual³⁹.

Decadence (1) downturn, decline, degeneracy (of culture, its products), (2) reactionary bourgeois art, typically pointless and anti-social⁴⁰.

The defenders of Soviet literature underscore that it is essential not only to get rid of the local "chiefs of decadence and their henchmen" but also "to expose and destroy the theoretical foundations and philosophical idols" on which decadence is based. As we can see, decadence there is mainly described in terms of a social-political rather than a literary movement, in its definitions its physical or biological component is emphasized particularly (degeneracy, disintegration, putrescence, sexuality, larvae, decadent parasites), as well as military, sports and legal terminology (battle, front, camp, assault, unmasking, exposing, manoeuvres, the decadent-in-chief, henchmen, advocate etc.).

DISSIDENCE AND COLLABORATION, BELIEF OR FALSEHOOD

The history of the Latvian Soviet poetry of the 1960s undeniably provides proof of strong resistance and the negative consequences which dissidence entailed for the lives of the poets. These took the form of a ban on publishing their works; public reprobation, defamation of the artistic qualities of their poetry (as in the cases of Belševica,

Vācietis), or even led to charges of high treason and deportation to Siberia (Skujenieks, members of the so-called French group and others).

Nevertheless it would be useful to adopt a particular thematic perspective on Soviet Latvian dissident writing in order to examine the links between collaborationism and dissidence, belief and falsehood and the subtle borderline that divides them. Soviet Latvian dissident poetry was written in the framework of a strong cultural unifying force and we have to remember that the most distinctive poets who were at the forefront of the dissident poetry of the 1960s were all members of the Communist party (except Knuts Skujenieks who was expelled when sent to Siberia in 1963).

It has to be said that even in the texts by the most talented authors the signs of their partisanship can be felt as late as in the 1970s. For example, prosaist Regīna Ezera – who by no means merits being labelled as fanatical collaborationist or a vehicle of Soviet ideology – in her novel *Nodevība* [Betrayal], written in the 1970s and published in 1984, has an autobiographical character, a Writer or the *nun of prose* who, when asked what she would rescue from her house if it were on fire and she could only enter it once, answers that her priorities would be the following:

- (a) her grand-son;
- (b) a manuscript in progress;
- (c) her Communist party member card;
- (d) a dictionary of Latvian by Mūlenbach and Endzelins;
- (e) the novel “Aija” by Jaunsudrabiņš; and
- (f) her dog⁴¹.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fact was revealed to the general public that, through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviet Stalinist and the Nazi regimes had been active accomplices. Thus Latvian historiography had to formulate a new national opinion on 20th-century European history in its broadest international context, as well as to restore and adjust to its particular experience the identification framework of the Latvian people. That experience had been intentionally erased not only from the academic history writing but also from the nation's historical memory and artistic expression. An insight into the history of the Latvian Soviet dissident poetry and writing as a whole reveals a consistently complex mental picture and, in unison with contemporary historiography, makes one conclude and inquire: “In Latvia we know that there was no ‘Holocaust without Germans’, but should we not also ask, ‘did a Soviet regime without Latvians’ really rule for 47 years?’”⁴²

Latvian Soviet literature has been a battle arena with vivid examples of active and passive resistance as well as collaboration. Thus the poetry of the 1960s, in particular, may serve as a unique historical source, rich both in unifying and conflicting memories that are necessary nowadays to promote inter-cultural dialogue and understanding between nations and individuals with a differing historical location and experience.

NOTES

- ¹ *Politics of the Past: the Use and Abuse of History*, Brussels 2009, p. 9. Published by the Socialist Group in the European Parliament, this report is also available at http://www.socialistgroup.org/gpes/media3/documents/2856_EN_politics_past_en_090603.pdf
- ² Encyclopaedias and biographical lexicons published after 1990s do not specify that any poet was a Communist Party member, which contrasts with reference literature published earlier in the Soviet Union, when the year of joining the Communist party was a material fact always specified in the biographies of the creative intelligentsia.
- ³ An informal group of authors and artists established during the second half of the 1940s in Riga. The KGB named it "The French Group" due to the fact that most of its members spoke French and convened to hear lectures and discuss French literature and culture. The KGB claimed that the group included 21 persons; 13 of them were convicted, and, in 1951, some of them were deported to Siberia for anti-Soviet activity. Painter Kurts Fridrihsons, the group's leader, was sentenced to 25 years in prison and deported to Siberia. Presumably, the trial was staged by the Soviet authorities to intimidate the Latvian intellectuals. V. Blūzma, T. Jundzis, J. Riekstiņš, H. Strods, D. Šārps, *Nevardarbīga pretošanās: Latvijas neatkarības atgūšanas ceļš, 1945-1991* [Non-violent Resistance. Latvia's Way to Restoration of Independence. 1945-1991], Riga 2008.
- ⁴ Here, the Cold War means the period from 1945 to 1990, when NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries signed the so called November Treaty officially proclaiming the end to the Cold War. The end of the Cold War was symbolically marked by the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
- ⁵ *Glasnost*: a political course initiated by former USSR leader Mikhail Gorbachev took effect in 1986, and was aimed at liberalisation of a number of norms of Soviet life, an enhanced freedom of speech and more open foreign relations, including western countries.
- ⁶ *Politiskā enciklopēdija*, Riga 1987, p. 636.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 148.
- ⁸ *Ideju vārdnīca* [The Hutchinson Dictionary of Ideas], Riga 1994.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰ H. Strods, *Prāgas pavasara atskaņas Latvijā 1960-1970* [Repercussions of the Prague Spring in Latvia in 1968-1970], in "Latvijas Vēsture", 2008, 4, 72, p. 73.
- ¹¹ This is not quite true of Knuts Skujenieks who admits that his political illusions were dispersed by the camp for political prison in Siberia, where he spent seven years (1962-1969) see J. Rokpelnis, *Grāmata par Knutu Skujenieku* [A Book about Knuts Skujenieks], Riga 2006; Solzhenitsin's necrologues attribute a decisive role in the collapse of the USSR to Siberian deportations and their reflections in literature: *Padomju Savienība sakās ar grāmatu, ko sarakstīja Kārlis Markss, un beidzās, pateicoties Solženicina grāmatai "Gulaga arhipelāgs"* [The Soviet Union emerged from the book written by Karl Marx and came to its end because of the *Archipelago Gulag* by Solzhenitsyn], in "Diena", 5 August 2008, p. 12.
- ¹² To be named here are a novel by Alberts Bels, *Saucēja balss* [Voice in the Wilderness, 1973], dramas by Pauls Putniņš, *Aicinājums uz pērienu* [Invitation to Flogging, 1976] and *Uzticības saldā nasta* [Sweet Burden of Trust, 1981] etc. The dramatic conflict is most intense in a play by Gunārs Priede, *Smaržo sēnes* [The Fragrance of Mushrooms], a politically articulated drama, written in 1967, staged in 1988, that is, kept in the drawer for 11 years because of censorship. All three writers were members of the Writers' Union of Soviet Latvia and of the Communist Party.
- ¹³ *Writing for the drawer*: in the 1960s and up to the early 1980s authors rather often use this phrase to characterise their own creative work. The authors knew and sensed what could be published and what could not, and guided by self-censorship did not offer their works to publishers. Thus the works incompatible

with Soviet ideology were stored in the desk drawers of the authors themselves or in those of the publishers.

- ¹⁴ The works by all three poets were translated into foreign languages, mainly into Russian, Ukrainian, English, the languages of the Baltic and Scandinavian states; Skujenieks and Belševica have been translated into Swedish many times. Skujenieks is one of the most active translators of foreign poetry into Latvian, and for this has been awarded the Spanish order of Isabella the Catholic (1994), the Tomas Tranströmer Award in poetry (1998), the Order of the Grand Duke Gediminas of Lithuania (2001) etc. Belševica has been repeatedly nominated for the Nobel Prize in literature (no author from the Baltic States has yet received the Nobel Prize).
- ¹⁵ The Writers' Union of the Soviet Latvia was founded on 26 October 1940, namely, during the first Soviet occupation, directly after the Red Army marched into Riga. During the German occupation, the Union's members were evacuated to Moscow and, having returned to Riga in October 1994 together with the Red Army troops, actively engaged in Sovietisation of Latvian literature.
- ¹⁶ "Cīņa" [Struggle] – a paper of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party. As the paper of the Latvian Social Democratic Workers Party it had been published since March 1904 in Riga, and since July 1910 in various cities outside Latvia: in Brussels, London, Boston, Moscow, etc., and from October 1944 in Riga again. With the aim of highlighting the social significance of poetry, in the 1960s a tradition was launched to gather together representatives of intelligentsia on the New Year's Eve in the "Cīņa" editorial office, in order to look back at the outgoing year's poetic yield and to select the best poems, which were published in the New Year edition on 1 January. To mark the "Cīņa"'s 80th anniversary in 1985, an anthology entitled *Apcirkņi. Latviešu padomju dzejas gadi „Cīņas” lappušu skatījumā* [Corn-bins. The years of the Latvian Soviet poetry as seen by "Cīņa"], was introduced by the poem *Partijas piederība* [Party membership], a sample of Ojārs Vācietis' dissident poetry.
- ¹⁷ *Latvija padomju režīma varā, 1945-1986, Dokumentu krājums* [Latvia under Soviet rule, 1945-1986. A collection of documents], Riga 2001, pp. 389-390.
- ¹⁸ For instance, A. Pelše, *Lielais Tēvijas karš un mākslas darbinieku uzdevumi* [The Great Patriotic War and tasks of art workers], in "Literatūra un Māksla", 2 February 1954, p. 2.
- ¹⁹ E. Oberlenders, *Baltijas valstu okupācijas konfliktējošās kultūras atmiņas* [Conflicting cultural memories of the occupation of the Baltic states], in "Diena", 17 January 2009, p. 12.
- ²⁰ *Latvija padomju režīma varā, 1945-1986, Dokumentu krājums* [Latvia under the rule of Soviet regime, 1945-1986. A collection of documents], Riga 2001, pp. 404-405.
- ²¹ As a work awarded the Stalin Prize, Sudrabkalns' *Brāļu saimē* [Fraternal Family] was translated into all the languages of the USSR peoples and saw several editions in Latvian (the last one in the 1984 series *Ar PSRS Valsts prēmiju apbalvotie latviešu literatūras darbi* [Works of Latvian literature awarded the USSR State Prize]); it was included in the educational curriculum and until the late 1980s served as a tool to indoctrinate Soviet patriotism at schools. *Brāļu saimē* [Fraternal Family] is a unique source of Latvian literary history, as it was able to assimilate all the basic principles of the normative aesthetics of Socialist Realism and also to reflect the dynamics of Soviet ideology under censorship, for instance, by erasing Stalin's name from the editions published after the personality cult was condemned.
- ²² V. Belševica, *Visu ziemu šogad pavasaris* [The Spring is here the whole Winter this Year], Riga 1957, p. 31.
- ²³ O. Vācietis, *Raksti, 10. sēj.* [Works, vol. 10], Riga 2003, pp. 144-145.
- ²⁴ A. Kubuliņa, *Vizma Belševica*, Riga 1997, p. 102.
- ²⁵ O. Vācietis, *Raksti, 1. sēj.* [Works, vol. 1], Riga 1989, p. 35.
- ²⁶ Belševica, *Visu ziemu šogad pavasaris* cit., p. 35.

- ²⁷ An active movement of National Communism in Latvia dates back to 1956-1960. The Latvian Communists opposed neither Latvia's incorporation into the USSR nor the model of the Soviet Socialism. However, they raised protests against the fact that the interests of the 'centre', i.e. Moscow and Russia, were set higher than those of Latvia. The general meeting *in camera* of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist party on 7-8 July 1959 in Riga condemned economic, social and cultural initiatives by the National Communists and soon after the meeting Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Latvia, Eduards Berklāvs (1914-2004), was suspended from duty and exiled to Vladimir in Russia. In 1971 Berklāvs organised the sending of a letter, signed by 11 Latvian communists, to communists in foreign countries. The letter that for the most part told about Latvia's Russification, made it to the foreign media and became the first document to bring message to the international community about the genocidal policy in Soviet Latvia. V. Blūzma, T. Jundzis, J. Riekstiņš, H. Strods, D. Šārps, *Nevardarbīga pretošanās: Latvijas neatkarības atgūšanas ceļš, 1945-1991* [Non-violent Resistance: Latvia's Road to Restoring Independence], Riga 2008.
- ²⁸ O. Vācietis, *Raksti, 1. sēj.* [Works, vol. 1], Riga 1989, p. 486.
- ²⁹ O. Lāms, *The Interaction of Power and Culture in Perceptions of the Latvian Epic Lāčplēsis*, in J. Osmond, A. Cimdīņa (eds.), *Power and Culture: Identity, Ideology, Representation*, Pisa 2007.
- ³⁰ F. Gordon, *Latvians and Jews Between Germany and Russia*, Stockholm - Riga - Toronto 2001, p. 34.
- ³¹ O. Vācietis, *Raksti, 10.sēj.* [Works, vol. 10], Riga 2003, p. 149.
- ³² V. Belseviča, *Raksti, 1. sēj.* [Works, vol. 1], Riga 1999, p. 222.
- ³³ K. Skujenieks, *Raksti* [Works], Riga 2002, p. 478. From the lecture *Cietums literatūrā un literatūra cietumā* [Prison in literature and literature in prison], delivered in Prague in 1996, at the conference of the Czech P.E.N. Centre.
- ³⁴ O. Vācietis, *Raksti, 1. sēj.* [Works, vol. 1], Riga 1989, p. 492.
- ³⁵ *Turēt augstu partejiskuma karogu!* [To keep the flag flying!], in "Literatūra un Māksla", 23 March 1963, p. 2.
- ³⁶ J. Jansons (Brauns), *Fauni vai klauni?* [Fawns or Clowns], Riga 1908, p. 16.
- ³⁷ A. Upīts, *Latviešu literatūra* [Latvian Literature], Riga 1951, p. 137.
- ³⁸ *LPSR ZA Valodas un literatūras institūta raksti* [Papers of the Language and Literature Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the LSSR], Riga 1954, p. 8.
- ³⁹ *Latviešu literatūras vēsture, 4. sēj.* [History of Latvian Literature, vol. 4], Riga 1957, p. 311.
- ⁴⁰ *Latviešu valodas vārdnīca* [Dictionary of the Latvian Language], Riga 1987, p. 108.
- ⁴¹ R. Ezera, *Nodevība* [Treason], 1984, p. 202.
- ⁴² E. Oberlenders, *Baltijas valstu okupācijas konfliktējošās kultūras atmiņas* [Conflicting cultural memories on the occupation of the Baltic states], in "Diena", 17 January 2009, p. 12.

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Birth of a State: Formation of Estonian Citizenship (1918-1922)

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Kui Eesti Vabariik 1918. aasta 24. veebruaril välja kuulutati jäi noore riigi kodanikkond esimese hooga määratlemata. Selleks ei olnud lihtsalt aega, enne algas Saksa okupatsioon. Uus võimalus oma riigi asjade otsustamiseks saabus alles 1918. aasta novembrikuus, mil viimased Saksa väeüksused Eestist lahkusid. Maanõukogu võttis määruse Eesti Vabariigi kodakondsuse kohta vastu 26. novembril. See oli kaks päeva enne Vabadussõja puhkemist. Veel päev hiljem, 29. novembril, kuulutati välja üldmobilisatsioon. Kodanikkonna määratlemisega oli tuli takus – vabariik vajas kodanikke, kes asuksid täitma oma kodanikukohust riigi kaitsel.

Käesolev artikkel vaatab Eesti Vabariigi kodakondsuspoliitikat iseseisvuse esimesel neljal aastal, andes ülevaate nii esimestest kodakondsusalastest regulatsioonidest kui nende rakendamisest. Artikkel ilmub ETF granti nr. 5484 toel.

The fall of the Russian Empire in the revolutions, favored by the state's economic breakdown in World War I, paved the way to Estonia's independence. The Soviet Power enforced in the Russian Baltic Provinces at the end of 1917 did not last for long. The status and belonging of these provinces was an issue in the peace negotiations held between Soviet Russia and Germany in Brest-Litovsk. In February 1918, after the negotiations were broken off, the German offensive towards Estonia and Latvia forced the Bolsheviks out. Taking advantage of the short military interregnum, Estonia was declared a democratic republic within its historical and ethnic borders on 24 February 1918. The next day Tallinn, the capital city, was invaded by German troops. Although the establishment of the state institutions had to be postponed until the end of the German Occupation, a new state, the Republic of Estonia, had entered the historical arena.

According to a well-known definition of the state introduced by the Austrian lawyer Georg Jellinek at the beginning of 20th century, states consist of three essential elements: territory, people and the power (sovereignty)¹. However, the people in this sense do not consist of all the inhabitants in the state's territory, but of those who are members of the state and entitled to all the formal rights and obligations that this membership entails. These persons are the citizens, regarded as the basic among the three above-mentioned elements². By using their political rights, e.g. voting in elections, citizens 'give face' to the state. At the same time the state is forming and shaping itself when setting the parameters of citizenship. This produces a special relationship which is not shared with everybody and makes the decision on citizenship the central point of state politics.

This chapter is a case study investigating Estonian citizenship policy during the first years of her independence. In particular, it tries to find out what the main factors were influencing the decisions made on Estonian citizenship at the very beginning.

Hitherto no comprehensive survey of Estonian citizenship policy between the two World Wars has been published and only a few of its aspects have been treated. The option of Estonian citizenship in Soviet Russia has been touched upon in some respects by Hill Kulu and Eero Medijainen, and the problems related to the war prisoners discussed in the works of Karsten Brüggemann and Vahur Made (see Selected Bibliography). Based mostly on the materials of the Estonian State Archives³, this chapter attempts to launch a study on Estonian citizenship policy in the period of its formation, integrating its different aspects (Fig. 1).



Fig. 1
Map of Estonia with her neighbours.

THE FIRST LAW ON ESTONIAN CITIZENSHIP

Regulating citizenship issues was one of the most important tasks for Estonian policy makers after the German troops left the country in the early winter of 1918. The first Estonian citizenship law, 'Resolution Concerning the Citizenship of the Democratic Republic of Estonia', was adopted by the Estonian National Council on 26 November 1918⁴. It was two days before the outbreak of the war with Soviet Russia and three days before the general mobilisation of the Estonian Army was publicly announced. There was an urgent need for citizens to start fulfilling their citizen's duties: protecting the state against the enemy.

The text of the Resolution was quite liberal. All people, regardless of their ethnicity and faith, who fulfilled the following conditions were proclaimed Estonian citizens:

- 1) were permanently residing on the territory of the Republic of Estonia on the day the Resolution came into force;
- 2) had been subjects of the Russian State prior to 24 February 1918,
- 3) originated from the territory of Estonia or were entered in the parish registers held in the territory of Estonia.

The majority of the Estonian population met the Resolution's requirements. Nevertheless, there were many people who did not comply with the third criterion – were neither born nor registered in Estonia. For such people a simplified procedure of acquiring citizenship was foreseen if they had "vital interests" in Estonia. By this any kind of property, business, company or professional connection with Estonia was taken into consideration. Besides the proof of the existence of vital interests, an approval by the local municipality and confirmation that the applicant was able to sustain himself and his family was to be added to the applications for citizenship under this article.

The right to Estonian citizenship was also reserved for those subjects of the former Russian State who were temporarily away from Estonia. The length of such temporary absence was to be decided later by the Provisional Government. But this was never done. Nobody knew when the Estonians who had left the country during the Tsarist times or as soldiers or refugees during World War I could return, and giving such people an official status equal to that of foreigners was not wanted.

All the others could receive Estonian citizenship through naturalisation, and again, the terms were quite liberal: only permanent residence in Estonia for at least five years was needed. No language requirements were included not only in the first citizenship law in Estonia, but also in the relevant acts of the other new states like Latvia, Lithuania and Finland. However, the comment made by the Finnish lawyer R. Erich, that knowledge of the official language could have definitely favoured the application for Finnish citizenship⁵, can be considered characteristic also in the case of Estonia.

The citizenship regulation regarding minors and wives followed very much the international practice: minors had the citizenship of their parents; wives acquired the citizenship of their husbands. That principle was common all over Europe in the 1920s and was adopted by the states founded after the collapse of the Russian Empire⁶.

Authority to implement the Resolution was given to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the MoIA). According to its prescription, the issuance of citizenship certificates to people acquiring citizenship automatically (complying with the first three requirements) was to be the responsibility of the local governments which had to forward the documents to the ministry for a decision to be made only if there were any suspicious circumstances. The issues regarding citizenship of all the others, including foreigners, people with vital interest in Estonia and the absentees, had to be decided at ministerial level.

The starting point for the implementation of the law was all but easy. The state needed citizens but could provide them with very few benefits. The Estonian economy, which had been orientated to the markets of the Russian Empire, had to be reoriented to comply with the needs of an independent state. In other words, the economy was to be built up

from scratch⁷. The situation was even harder as at the same time the War of Independence was being fought with Soviet Russia. The inhabitants of the new republic lacked almost everything; the cost of living rose at an enormous speed. For example, the prices of common goods like firewood, herring, sugar and salt rose more than 400% during the period from January 1919 until April 1920⁸. The situation was the worst in the cities, the inhabitants of which often relied on support from relatives engaged in farming in the countryside.

The situation was further complicated because of the growing number of foreigners coming to Estonia from the other parts of the former Tsarist Empire and the continual influx of people with unclear background. The issue of Russian refugees had already been raised in 1919, when Estonia became a destination for people trying to escape the Russian Civil War, and a shelter for thousands of soldiers and officers (and their family members) of the Russian North-West army, led by Nikolai Judenitsh⁹. As the stay of the Russian refugees in Estonia was guaranteed by special acts and supported by the League of Nations, demanding not only special treatment for them, but also Estonian citizenship, that of the others had to be examined more closely. At the beginning of 1920 the Minister of Internal Affairs started to use his right to expel foreigners "according to his judgement and prescriptions", which was given him by the Safety Act in force. All the foreigners who had come to Estonia after 1 January 1915 and were entitled to the citizenship in the other new states like Latvia, Lithuania and Poland were ordered to leave¹⁰. However, as the Minister of Internal Affairs, Karl Einbund, explained in the press meeting after making this prescription, the expulsion concerned only these foreigners, who were "not valuable to the state"¹¹. But first of all, it concerned those who had committed criminal offences, had no work or a permission to stay in Estonia and were actively engaged in an anti-state policy.

In the multicoloured company of foreigners the disposition against the prevailing order was nothing unusual. The war with Soviet Russia was in progress and nobody knew what the outcome was going to be. Communist subversive activities, directed from the Soviet Union, were taking advantage of the difficulties in transforming the economy, the increased unemployment and increasing cost of living. Although those activities resulted only in 1924 in an armed *coup d'état* attempt, which failed due to the lack of support from the people and the army, the threat to domestic security was existent throughout the beginning of 1920s.

At the same time, thousands of people, both Estonians and non-Estonians, connected to Estonia in different ways and wanting to return for various reasons, were waiting on the other side of the border for their opportunity to do so.

DECIDING ON CITIZENSHIP OF THE ABSENTEES

The text of the Resolution was liberal, but at the same time declarative enough to leave many issues for the implementer to decide. Among others, there was the issue of citizenship of the absentees. They were reserved the right of Estonian citizenship by law, but there were no rules on how to use that right. In principle all the subjects of the former Russian Empire who were not granted Estonian citizenship automatically became stateless per-

sons. However, there was a special law regulating the citizenship issues of the absentees in preparation in the MoIA in 1920, but it was never adopted. Apparently the draft was put aside when it was realised that granting Estonian citizenship automatically to everybody enrolled in the parish registers held in the territory of Estonia would mean giving it simultaneously to many foreigners without the possibility of checking their background¹². That kind of course of events was hardly favourable to a state already engaged with expatriation of foreigners.

As a matter of fact, all the absentees had a possibility to apply for Estonian citizenship through the Estonian foreign representations and they would have supported these applications if the person was not suspected of being unfavourable for the state¹³. However, the question whether to grant citizenship to those persons or not was for the MoIA to decide. For the state it was an acceptable arrangement: if the applicant did not have any strong connections with Estonia or had a suspicious political background, citizenship was denied.

In some cases, however, the processing of the application was suspended for a longer period before the final decision was made. This was often the case when deciding on granting Estonian citizenship to Baltic German political emigrants who had fled from Estonia before or during the war. These applications required special attention as there was a strong political opposition among the local governments where the information about the applicants was gathered against granting Estonian citizenship to emigrants who had been against Estonian independence and fought against the Estonian Army¹⁴.

For the Estonians who resided in the territory of Latvia and Soviet Russia, the chances of getting Estonian citizenship were clarified with the respective articles in the border agreements signed in 1920. Both agreements provided the people with Estonian origin residing in one of those countries with a possibility to opt for Estonian citizenship. In other words, to choose between citizenship of Estonia and citizenship of the state where they were residing. In 1921 a special agreement concerning the option was also signed with the Ukraine, although it concerned a smaller number of people than the other two agreements.

THE OPTION OF ESTONIAN CITIZENSHIP IN SOVIET RUSSIA

The option of Estonian citizenship in Soviet Russia was not only the most complicated one, but concerned the greatest number of people. There were approximately 200.000 Estonians (20% of the Estonian population) living in Soviet Russia in 1918, who had gone there on different occasions and for different purposes. The Estonians who had settled in Russian cities had often made a quick career either in science or business. However, the majority of Estonians were settlers who had emigrated in the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century in order to get free land.

A drastic change in the life of Estonian settlers was brought about by the Russian revolution in 1917 and by the subsequent Civil War with its terror and war-communism policy. The new situation forced the emigrants to consider returning to Estonia, particularly as it had become an independent state. It was a widespread notion among the settlers that

after the lands were expropriated from the Baltic German landlords, there would finally be enough land for everybody¹⁵. At the end of 1920, the Head of the Control-Option Commission in Moscow wrote to Tallinn that he would have never believed the great interest in returning to their homeland among the rural population: "The confiscation of their property and the unprotected and outlawed situation has driven the people to desperation. Whole villages want to return to Estonia at all costs. Some villages plan to start their journey in spring by horse"¹⁶.

Besides, thousands of Estonians had come to the Russian territory in the course of World War I, both as refugees and soldiers. The return of those people became an issue right after independence was proclaimed. The real chance to bring them back came with the conclusion of the Treaty of Tartu in February 1920, ending the war between Estonia and Soviet Russia and giving simultaneously the first *de jure* recognition to the Republic of Estonia. The option had to be carried out within one year, which was later prolonged to two years. The complicated situation in Soviet Russia and the hopes connected with the homeland put tens of thousands of people in motion. Estonia had to arrange for the reception of this human avalanche.

Soon after the treaty was signed, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was ordered by the Government to arrange the return of the Estonians from Soviet Russia¹⁷. In May 1920 a special Control-Option Commission was established and sent to Moscow. Its departments were established in Petrograd (former St. Petersburg) and in Omsk (in Siberia) (hereinafter all called option commissions or commissions). It was agreed with Soviet Russia that all the people who wanted to opt for Estonian citizenship had to submit a relevant application to the commission in two copies, sending them by mail or forwarding them through local province authorities. In Moscow an applicant could also submit the necessary documents directly to the commission¹⁸.

The Soviet Russian authorities were hostile to the option process from the very beginning and did not hesitate to use force to hinder it. The applications were not properly forwarded to the commissions by the local authorities and it was not unusual for the property of the optants to be expropriated after they dared to submit the application. Violence was also used against the returnees. The first echelon of optants was stopped at the Jamburg Check-Point; optants were forced to take off their clothes and were brutally searched. All valuables, including money, were seized. This action was immediately followed by protest by the Estonian Government. The next echelons were saved from such brutality, although it was not unusual that the optants had to leave some of their belongings with the Soviet Russian border guards (Fig. 2).

CITIZENSHIP POLICY WITH TWO CENTRES

The commissions had to work closely with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Before their departure it was decided in a meeting between the representatives of the commissions, the MoIA and Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the commissions should opt independently only the well-known public figures and persons they could personally recommend. All the other applications had to be sent to the MoIA for decision-making¹⁹. In reality the



Fig. 2
 "At the Optants' Check Point" [in Soviet Russia]. Cartoon from the Estonian journal "Meie Mats", 21 August 1920. The caption reads, "So, and now blow your nose, and then you can go".

commissions started to act quite independently, justifying that with the troubled situation in Soviet Russia and the fact that in many cases the background information about the optants who had lived in Russia for many years could only be found on the spot.

While the MoIA could accept the expanded authority of the commissions concerning the option of Estonians, problems started to arise in relation with the commissions' arbitrary actions in opting non-Estonians. Besides, the commissions started to grant entry permits to Russian refugees without asking the Ministry's permission. It was impossible to provide the commissions with such vast authority which would have meant giving up the central control on the citizenship policy and on the entry to the state's territory. Nevertheless, the commissions worked quite independently, ignoring the continual orders from Tallinn not to opt nor grant entry permits to foreigners without informing the Ministry. There were even cases when the refugees and prisoners were sent across the Estonian border without checking their political background, explained by the pressing need to improve their living conditions. By trying to help the suffering people, the commissions were, on the other hand, causing an uncontrolled flow of persons that the MoIA had to handle internally. Different standpoints started to clash, as the Ministry concentrated on the problems inside the country, trying to avoid overpopulation and flow of unknown people, whereas the commissions, especially in the border areas, were confronted day after day with people gathered there, sometimes without having a place to stay or money to buy food, in the hope of finding a better life.

In summer 1921 when the Minister of Internal Affairs, K. Einbund, sent the next note to the Commission in Moscow, threatening to dispatch the people coming to Estonia without the Ministry's permission, tempers finally exploded. In the reply a deep dissatisfaction with the Ministry's attitude was expressed. The Acting Head of the Commission contested the Ministry's right to give it instructions and orders. As he saw it, the Control-Option Commission in Moscow and its departments in Petrograd and Omsk were established by



Fig. 3
Train of Estonian optants, Moscow, summer 1920 (Estonian Archives).



Fig. 4
A glimpse inside the carriage of Estonian optants, Moscow, summer 1920 (Estonian Film Archives).

the Government and worked under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Estonian foreign representatives, and “would continue on deciding the option matters independently and conclusively”²⁰. As the authorisation for the latter was never given, the exchange of letters contesting each others’ decisions on granting Estonian citizenship lasted until the end of the option time in summer 1922 (Figs. 3-4).

RESTRICTIONS ON OPTING ESTONIANS

Simultaneously with the attempt of restricting the influx of foreigners, the state had to start to limit the return of ethnic Estonians. Only when the first echelon arrived in Estonia, the Mayor of Tallinn sent a letter to the Minister of Internal Affairs with a request to forward it to the commissions. He asked the commissions to keep in mind the shortage of apartments and food in Estonia and to give permission to return to only those persons, “who could contribute to the improvement of the economic situation”²¹. As a matter of fact, the economic hardship Estonia was facing had already been taken into account by the commissions. Priority was given to those who were expected to find a job more easily. In the Moscow Commission’s view, those persons were qualified workers, doctors, engineers, wealthy factory owners, teachers, scientists, artists, officials, etc. In the first rank, there were also families with many children. Only then would the time come for the rest. “There are quite a few of them – mostly maids, dressmakers, servants, mostly old maids./.../ It is not easy for them here, either, but in Russia they are ‘figures’ – they can work as officials in the governmental agencies, but in Estonia will probably face unemployment”. As the head of the commission noted, those people were opted without delay only if they had relatives in Estonia capable of supporting them with accommodation and food²². The option of the others had to be postponed until the end of the option period.

But even the return of these ‘selected’ ones caused problems in the homeland. Even the professionals whose option was the top priority in the commissions had to seek for a job for months. Some of them were wise enough to send a ‘job application’ before returning, as did the Head of the Physics Observatory in Petrograd, Mr. Vannar. Unfortunately, nothing better than the post of biology teacher in a secondary school, was offered²³.

Regarding the problems arising from the increasing number of unemployed people, a harsh decision was made “both in the national interests and in the interests of the optants” in April 1921. As was decided in a meeting between the representatives from the MoIA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture, the option of certain groups of people had to be rejected. These people were: those over 50 years old and without property, if they did not belong to a family with a sufficient number of people capable of working; those under 55, but disabled and indigent; those requiring sustenance from the state and whose supporters remained in Soviet Russia; people who sponged on others in Soviet Russia and had no close family members or relatives in Estonia obliged to support them; farmers who had kept their land and household; and employees of clerical offices, bureaus or of other similar kind of institutions, if they were not professionals. Applications from people capable of working and thereby able to sustain themselves in Estonia had to be allowed as before. The others, however, had to wait for better times to come.

Together with these guidelines the commission received a mandate to decide independently on the rejection of applications from both Estonians and foreigners, and to send to the Ministry only applications that the commissions could approve.²⁴ Besides, the commissions were granted the right to refuse applications already approved by the MoIA, if they found additional information about the applicant in Soviet Russia that did not favour his or her acceptance²⁵.

Whether the members of the commissions were really able to refuse the applications of the indigent people was another question. One of the officials from the Moscow commission was in 1921 deeply moved by the 'heartbreaking' pleas of the poor Russians who had no connection with Estonia, and found it possible to justify granting them Estonian citizenship "for the sake of his conscience"²⁶.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

The time for option in Soviet Russia was over in summer 1922. Within two years, 106 000 people had applied for, and 81.027 of them acquired Estonian citizenship. Compared with the whole citizenry, those were imposing figures – the former was 8.5% and the latter 6.5% of all the citizens of Estonia. But only half of those who had acquired citizenship arrived in Estonia. Why not the others? Certainly the repressions by the Soviet authorities played a part. Besides, the departure from the farther regions was often hindered by long train queues and the possibility of taking along only a few things. It was often preferable to stay in Soviet Russia with the property, instead of returning to Estonia in destitute. Besides, in 1921 new winds started to blow from Moscow – the transition to the new economic policy, introduced in 1921, gave the settlers hope for change. Unfortunately, the collectivisation starting in 1927 and the following repressions and deportation destroyed these illusions²⁷. However, the borders were not completely closed after the summer of 1922, and some of the people were able to return with the help of Estonian representatives, often under the smokescreen of being war refugees.

In 1922, the new Citizenship Law was adopted. As the explanatory note to the draft submitted to the Parliament explained, "many situations arising from everyday life could not be resolved during the application of the 1918 resolution. Some of these remained unsolved, while others were settled by considering the circumstances as there were no statutory grounds to rely on"²⁸. Deciding on citizenship matters was finally placed on firm statutory grounds. While the Resolution had defined the initial citizenry, the new law defined the principles of its succession, applying the *ius sanguinis* principle. This was a natural course of events considering that Estonia historically belonged to the German legal space, where the citizenship laws were predicated upon the principle of descent from the very beginning. In the explanatory note the application of the *ius sanguinis* principle was also justified by an attempt to "secure the state from an influx of suspicious persons".

In the second half of the 1920s, the Estonian economy also started to overcome the difficulties it had faced during the first years of independence. During this period the laws concerning the foreigners' work and residence permits in Estonia were softened. Simultaneously interest in acquiring Estonian citizenship rose among Russian refugees.

The figures showing the share of citizens in Estonia before the Soviet Occupation in June 1940 were remarkable – 98.5% of the inhabitants of Estonia were Estonian citizens.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Estonia started to form its citizenship at a very difficult time. A harsh war was fought with Soviet Russia and the state was facing economical hardship with a great number of unemployed people and an increasing cost of living. Although the text of the first legal act regulating citizenship issues was liberal, setting forth no rules distinguishing on the basis of ethnicity, it remained rather declarative and left many questions to the implementer to decide. In these cases naturally the states' best interests were followed. First of all, there was a possibility to avoid granting citizenship to these people who had left Estonia before the beginning of war with Soviet Russia and who were not welcomed back. This concerned not only these Baltic German political emigrants who had been against Estonian independence and had later fought against the Estonian army in the lines of the *Landeswehr* military units, but also many people from Soviet Russia, which was not only a source of influx of people with unclear background, but a source of a real threat to independence – among others the Bolsheviks that left Estonia before the arrival of German troops were waiting to return.

At the same time the organisation of state affairs in arranging the option of Estonian citizenship in Soviet Russia left a lot to be desired. The unclear extent of authority of the option commissions caused permanent arguments and entry to Estonia of people the Ministry of Internal Affairs might have refused. There is no reason to doubt the sincere wish of Estonian policy makers to get back all their compatriots suffering in Soviet Russia under the war-communism policy. But it was not possible to follow the ideal without noticing that it had little to offer. The growing number of returnees hindered the already bad economical situation and again raised the question of national security. Among the returnees who could often find no job or land the communists could have found fertile terrain for their propaganda, promising everything to everybody.

There is no doubt that the first years of independence were the most difficult for exercising the policy on citizenship for the Republic of Estonia. However, these were also the most important. It was the time when the initial citizenry was formed, becoming the origin of the present citizenry by the application of the principle of *ius sanguinis* in 1922.

NOTES

¹ G. Jellinek, *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, 3rd edition, Berlin 1921, orig. ed. 1914.

² T. Annus, *Riigioigus: õpik kõrgkoolidele* [State Law: Manual to Universities], Tallinn 2001, pp. 18-25.

³ In the footnotes referring to archival materials, the first number indicates the series of a certain institution: 975: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 14: Ministry of Internal Affairs; 28: Control-Option Commission in Petrograd; 31: The State Chancellery; 33: Control-Option Commission in Siberia; 36: Control-Option Commission in Moscow; and 80: Parliament.

⁴ "Riigi Teataja" [State Gazette], 1918 (hereinafter RT), 4, p. 3.

⁵ R. Erich, *Suomen valtio-oikeus* [Finnish State Law], 1, Porvoo 1924, p. 211.

- ⁶ See for example, Richard W. Flournoy – Manley O. Hudson, *A collection of Nationality Laws of various countries as contained in institutions, statutes and treaties*, New York 1929.
- ⁷ J. Valge, *Eesti majandus ja majanduspoliitika aastail 1920-1924* [Estonian economy and economic policy 1920-1924], Kaks algust. Eesti Vabariik – 1920. ja 1990. aastad. Tallinn 1998, p. 81.
- ⁸ "Päevaleht" [Daily Newspaper], 17 April 1920, 85, p. 2.
- ⁹ V. Made, *Külastisena maailmapoliitikas. Eesti ja Rahvasteliit 1919-1946* [A Visitor in World Politics. Estonia and the League of Nations 1919-1946], Tartu 1999, p. 257.
- ¹⁰ RT 1920, 133/134, p. 1057.
- ¹¹ "Vaba Maa" [Estonian newspaper], 25 October 1920, p. 3.
- ¹² Eesti Riigiarhiiv [Estonian State Archives, hereinafter ERA], 957-8-134, p. 228.
- ¹³ ERA 14-1-503, p. 283.
- ¹⁴ ERA 14-1-482, pp. 288-289.
- ¹⁵ H. Kulu, *Eestlaste tagasiränne 1940-1989 Lääne-Siberist pärit eestlaste näitel* [The return migration of Estonians in 1940-1989: an example of Estonians from Western Siberia], Ph.D. thesis, Helsinki, 1997, p. 107.
- ¹⁶ ERA 33-1-25, p. 82.
- ¹⁷ ERA 31-1-214, pp. 27-28.
- ¹⁸ ERA 36-1-1, p. 68.
- ¹⁹ ERA 14-1-522, p. 3.
- ²⁰ ERA 14-1-482, p. 58; pp. 353-355; Tooms, *Opteerimisliikumine ja Eesti jõudnud optandid* [Option movement and the optants who arrived in Estonia], "Eesti Statistika" [Estonian Statistics], 5, 1922, pp. 13-14.
- ²¹ ERA 14-1-522, p. 16.
- ²² ERA 957-11-593, pp. 67-70.
- ²³ ERA 28-1-12, p. 22.
- ²⁴ ERA 14-1-482, p. 36.
- ²⁵ ERA 36-1-238, p. 3.
- ²⁶ ERA 957-11-1101, p. 92.
- ²⁷ Kulu, *Eestlaste tagasiränne 1940-1989 Lääne-Siberist pärit eestlaste näitel* cit., p. 108.
- ²⁸ ERA 80-1-821, p. 6.

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1. Excerpt from Estonian Declaration of Independence, "Manifesto to All the Peoples of Estonia" on 24 February 1918

Eesti rahvas ei ole aastasade jooksul kaotanud tunni iseseisvuse järele. Põlvest põlve on temas kestnud salajane lootus, et hoolimata pimedast orjaööst ja võõraste rahvaste vägivalvalitsusest veel kord Eestis aeg tuleb, mil "kõik piirud kahel otsal lausa lõovad lõkendama" ja et "kord Kalev koju jõuab oma lastel õnne tooma". Nüüd on see aeg käes. Ennekuulmata rahvaste heitlus on Vene tsaaririigi pehastanud alustööd põhjani purustanud. Üle Sarmatia legendiku laiutab end hävitav korralagedus, ähvardades oma alla mätta kõiki rahvaid, kes endise Vene riigi piirides asuvad. Lääne poolt lähenevad Saksamaa võidukad väed, et Venemaa pärandusest omale osa nõuda ja kõige pealt just Balti mere rannamaid oma alla võtta. Sel saatuslikul tunnil on Eesti Maapäev kui maa ja rahva seaduslik esitaja, ühemeelsele otsusele jõudes rahvalitsuse alusel seisvate Eesti poliitiliste parteidega ja organisatsioonidega, toetades rahvaste enese määramise õiguse peale, tarvilikuks tunnistanud Eesti maa ja rahva saatuse määramiseks järgmisi otsustavaid samme astuda: EESTIMAA tema ajaloolistes ja etnograafilistes piirides, kuulutatakse tänasest peale ISESEISVAKS DEMOKRATLISEKS VABARIIGIKS. [...]

Kuni Eesti Asutav Kogu, kes üldilise, otsekohese, salajase ja proportsionaalse hääletamise põhjal kokku astub, maa valitsemise korra lõpulikult kindlaks määrab, jääb kõik valitsemise ja seaduseandmise võim Eesti Maapäeva ja selle poolt loodud Eesti Ajutise Valitsuse kätte, kes oma tegevuses järgmiste juhtumõtete järele peab käima:

1. Kõik Eesti vabariigi kodanikud, usu, rahvuse ja poliitilise ilmavaate peale vaatamata, leiavad ühtlast kaitset vabariigi seaduste ja kohtute ees.
2. Vabariigi piirides elavatele rahvuslastele vähemustele, venelastele, sakslastele, rootslastele, juutidele ja teistele kindlustatakse nende rahvuskultuurilised autonoomia õigused.
3. Kõik kodanikuvabadused, sõna-, trüki-, usu-, koosolekute-, ühisuste-, liitude- ja streikidevabadused, niisama isiku ja kodukolde puutumatus peavad kogu Eesti riigi piirides vääramata maksma seaduste alusel, mida valitsus viibimata peab välja töötama.[...]

Never in the course of centuries have the Estonian people lost their ardent desire for Independence. From generation to generation Estonians have kept alive the secret hope that in spite of enslavement and oppression by other nations the time will come in Estonia "when all splinters, at both end, will burst forth into flames" and when "Kalev will come home to bring his children happiness." Now this time has arrived. An unprecedented struggle of nations has destroyed the rotten foundations of the Russian Tsarist Empire. All over the Sarmatian plains ruinous anarchy is spreading, threatening to overwhelm in its wake all peoples living within the borders of the former Russian Empire. From the West the victorious armies of Germany are approaching in order to claim their share of Russia's legacy and, above all, to take possession of the coastal territories of the Baltic Sea. In this fateful hour the Estonian National Council, as the legal representative of our land and people, has, in unanimous agreement with Estonian democratic political parties and organizations, and by virtue of the right of self-determination of peoples, found it necessary to take the following decisive steps to shape the destiny of Estonian land and people. ESTONIA, within her historical and ethnic boundaries, is declared as of today an INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC.

Until the Estonian Constituent Assembly, elected by general, direct, secret, and proportional elections, will convene and determine the constitutional structure of the country, all executive and legislative authority will remain vested in the Estonian National Council and in the Esto-

nian Provisional Government created by it, whose activities must be guided by the following principles:

1. All citizens of the Republic of Estonia, irrespective of their religion, ethnic origin, and political views, shall enjoy equal protection under the law and courts of justice of the Republic.
2. All ethnic minorities, the Russians, Germans, Swedes, Jews, and others residing within the borders of the republic, shall be guaranteed the right to their cultural autonomy.
3. All civic freedoms, such as the freedom of expression, of the press, of religion, of assembly, of association, and the freedom to strike as well as the inviolability of the individual and the home, shall be irrefutably effective within the territory of the Estonian Republic and based on laws which the Government shall immediately work out. [...]

2. Excerpt from the letter from the Minister of Internal Affairs Karl Einbund to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 16 April 1921 concerning the option of Estonian citizenship in Russia. Eesti Riigiarhiiv [Estonian State Archives] 14-1-482, p. 36.

Kodakondsuse opteerimise teel walgub Eestisse palju niisuguseid isikuid, kes siin riikliselt seisukohalt waadates mingit kasu ei too, waid ennem kahjulikud on, aidates suurendada nende arwu, kes seltskondlisest toetusest elawad ja tööd ehk abi otsides linnawalitustuste hoolekande osakondi ja teisi asutusi tülitawad. On ka neid, kes Wenemaal, kuigi mitte külluses elades, siiski läbi said, kuid siia jõudes oma lootustes petetud saawad, sest et nende tööala, mis Nõukogude Wenemaal kõige pahe pale waatamata siiski eluülewälpidamist teatawa mõõduni wõimaldas, siin aga seda ei wõimalda, sest et sellel tööalal siin pakkumine suurem on kui nõudmine ehk jälle suuremat oskust nõutakse, näituseks, bürootööde alal.

Paljuid meelitab siia lootus kodumaal maasaamise peale, ka neid, kellel praegu omal maa ja majapidamine wõrsil wõrdlemisi lahketes oludes elamist wõimaldawad. Kuigi neil soow on armsale kodumaale tagasi pöörata, ei wõi neile praegusel momendil wastu tulla nende soowi täitmises, kuna meil lootust ei ole neid lähemal ajal maaga warustada, sest esimeses järjes on sarnaseks warustamiseks õigus meie wahwatel sõduritel ja selle järele neil, kes meile rasketel aegadel kodumaal wiibisid ja sõjaaja raskusi kandsid. Praegusel ajal wabasid maid ei ole ja seepärast oleks asjata lootust anda maasaamise pääle kodumaal nendele, kellel wõrsil maa on, mis elamist wõimaldab, ja mida Eestisse minnes käest äraandma peab. Igatahes jääb nendel edaspidi lootus Eestisse pääseda, kui olud paranewad.

Sellepärast otsustati nõupidamisel Siseministeeriumis, millest osa wõtsid Põllutööminister ja Wälisteministeeriumi esitaja, opteerimise alal järgmist korda maksuma panna üleliigse optantide sissewoolu takistamiseks nii nende eneste kui riiklistes huwides.

Tagasi lükata tulewad opteerimise palwed nende poolt:

1. kes on üle 50 aasta wanad ja ilma waranduseta, kui nad mitte perekonna hulka ei kuulu, kus tarwilisel määral tööjõulisemaid isikuid olemas;
2. kes alla 55. a wana, kuid tööwõimetu ja waranduseta;
3. kes ainult siia toitmisele tulewad ja kelle toitjad perekonnaliikmed Wenemaale jääwad;
4. kes Wenemaal teiste kulul elawad wõi teiste ülewälpidamisel on ja kelle Eestis lähemaid sugulasi wõi perekonnaliikmeid ei ole, kes neid kohustatud oleks ülewälpidama.
5. kes põldu hariwad ja kellele maa ja majapidamine alles;
6. kantselei- kontori ja teiste sarnaste asutuste ametnikud ja äriteenijad kui nad mitte eriteadlased ei ole.

Kõik eestlased, kes tööjõulised ja warandusega, ehk kui waranduseta, aga töö- ja tegujõulised produktiivseks tööks Eestis, on endiselt soowitawad. Tööwõimetuid rahwusmajanduslikult

mitte produktiivseid elanikke tuleb kindlasti tagasi hoida, kuigi nad Wenemaal wiletsuses ja hädas [...]

Through option of the Estonian citizenship, such people are coming to Estonia in great numbers who bring no profit to our state, but are rather causing harm by helping to increase the numbers of those who live on social support and, while looking for work and assistance, frequently trouble the social welfare departments of the city governments and other institutions. There are also others who, although not living in wealth, have still managed to get by in Russia, but upon their arrival here will be disappointed in their hopes, as they realise that the job they did in Russia, despite everything, enabled them at least to gain some kind of sustenance, while failing to do it here, as the supply of employees for the same job here is higher than the demand, or higher skills are required here, for example in case of office jobs.

A number of people are also attracted by the hope to receive land in their homeland, including those, whose land and households on the foreign soil enable them to carry on quite comfortably where they are. Although they are entertaining a wish to return to their beloved homeland, we are not in the position to fulfil that wish at the moment; granting them any land in the near future is impossible, as the first ones in line are our brave soldiers, who have the right to receive land, followed by those people who stayed here at home during the hard times, bearing the difficulties of the war. Currently, no free lands are available for them, therefore it would be wrong to give any hopes to such people who have land abroad which enables them sustenance and which they should give up when returning to Estonia. However, they will have a hope to return in the future, when the circumstances improve.

Therefore, a decision was taken at the meeting held in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and attended also by the Minister for Agriculture and a representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to enforce the following rules and procedures regarding option, in order to restrain the excessive influx of optants, both in the latter's own interests and in the interests of the state.

To reject the option applications submitted by the persons who are:

1. over 50 years old and have no property, unless they belong to a family with a sufficient number of people capable of work;
2. aged under 55, but have no capacity to work, or have no property;
3. only needing sustenance by the state and whose supporting family members remain in Russia;
4. living in Russia at the expense of or upon sustenance by others, having no close family or relatives in Estonia who would be obliged to support them;
5. farmers having kept their land and households;
6. clerical, office and other similar employees and business servants, provided they are not specialists or experts.

All the Estonians who are capable of work and have property, or if without property, are capable of productive work in Estonia, are welcome as before. Return of those incapacitated to work or economically non-productive residents should be avoided, although they may be facing hardships and misery in Russia. [...]

The Role of International Governmental Organisations in Conflict Prevention in Post-Communist Estonia

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During the post-Cold War process of democratisation, nation and state-building as issues relating to national minorities received considerable attention in both the media and academic circles. Tensions produced by the cultural heterogeneity of the so-called nation-states, and in particular ethnic minorities' isolation from their homelands, have challenged the security, territorial integrity and social integration of states. The new transitional societies of the former Soviet Union have been no exception to this and have been forced to resolve these issues.

In Estonia, the period of the Soviet occupation witnessed a massive influx of Russian-speaking groups (primarily Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians) from the rest of the Soviet Union and this had a considerable impact on the Estonians' struggle for national identity and political power. Since Estonia regained its independence as a state, this conflict has pitted the native Estonian population against immigrants, citizens against non-citizens, and the national centre against a regional periphery.

When it became clear that Estonia would regain its independence, some of the Russian migrants and their descendants left Estonia. However, the majority of them remained, which meant that although Estonia recovered its independence, the Soviet period had introduced substantial changes in the country's ethno-demographic structure. This chapter addresses the consequences of Russian migration following World War II, and in particular focuses on the juridical, political and social problems it created.

There is considerable literature on ethnopolitical developments in post-Communist Estonia. Most studies have concentrated on its domestic dimensions, including: the status of ethnic minorities; the formation of new identities; Estonian legislation on language and education; and finally, citizenship, economic and integration policies. Despite its importance for the question of the institutional relations among the different ethnic communities, the international dimension of these issues is relatively less studied, even though it exerted considerable influence on Estonian ethnopolitical dynamics, especially in the critical period of the early 1990s. The following chapter discusses new research on these issues and studies the role of powerful transnational institutions on mediation and conflict prevention.

Artikkel käsitleb internatsionaalsete valitsustevaheliste organisatsioonide tegevust Eesti 1990-ndate aastate alguse kriisijuhtimisel ja etnilise konflikti ennetamisel. See oli intensiivne siirdeperiood, mil taasiseseisvunud Eesti Vabariik seisis muuhulgas silmitsi ka mitmesuguste kodakondsus- ja rahvuspoliitika alaste sõlmküsimustega, mis omakorda olid oluliselt mõjutatud riigi keerulisest majanduslikust, demograafilisest ning julgeolekusituatsioonist. Ühiskonna etnoliitiline polarisatsioon püsis

vaadeldaval ajavahemikul jätkuvalt suhteliselt kõrge, uued juriidilised regulatsioonid ja institutsionaalsed ümberkorraldused põhjustasid Eesti venekeelse elanikkonna seas laialdast rahulolematust. 1993. aasta suvel ei olnud Kirde-Eesti puhul välistatud ka süveneva etnoregionalismi ehk territoriaalse autonoomia võimalus.

Pingete haripunkti sekkusid Eesti kriisijuhtimisse ning tegelesid võrdlemisi edukalt sealsete rahvuspingete maandamise ja dialoogi organiseerimisega peamiselt kolm suuremat riigiülest rahvusvahelist institutsiooni: Euroopa Julgeoleku- ja Koostööorganisatsioon ning selle rahvusvahemuste ülemkomissar; Euroopa Nõukogu; ning Euroopa Liit. Alljärgnevalt analüüsitaksegi antud kontekstis nende Euroopa supranatsionaalste jõudude omavahelist koostööd, mõju konflikti erinevatele osapooltele ning Eesti julgeoleku- ja identiteedidiskursusele. Artikli ühe põhijärelduse kohaselt aitas Lääne preventiivse diplomaatia suhtelist tulemuslikkust Eesti tolleaegse ühiskonna stabiliseerimisel, seadusandluse modifitseerimisel ning sotsiaalse integratsiooni edendamisel suuresti tagada nn. poliitiline konditsionaalsus riigi sisepoliitika kujundamise ja tema Euroopa-orientatsiooni teostamise vabel.

INTRODUCTION: CONFLICT PRECONDITIONS

Most theories regarding ethnic conflicts link the conditions for escalation of such conflicts with two sets of circumstances: on the one hand, a strong sense of national identity, and on the other, actual or perceived discrimination within a certain ethnic community. The latter may appear both in material and political respects¹. Increased ethno-political mobilisation² of minorities and majorities competing for socially valued resources, was a characteristic feature not only of Estonia during the 1990s, but also of the other successor states of the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the former Austro-Hungarian empire.

Several theoretical studies identify the high possibility of ethnic polarisation during periods of large-scale social transition. The phase of political transition is considered as one of the potential influences that intensifies the process of ethno-political mobilisation. The key factors of this social development are: a social context prey to exceptional uncertainty amid the open-ended distribution of power, which concerned actors perceive as dangerous, while at the same time offering new political opportunities. In societies characterised by deep, ingrained, internal division such upheavals tend to strengthen opposition between a ruling regime and national minorities and as a result often lead to an exaggerated emphasis on ethnic identity. In many respects, wide-ranging democratisation processes can also contribute to the formation of ethnic and communal conflicts. In these cases certain parties within an ethno-political conflict can gain additional political resources from conventional democratic systems³. A wide range of analyses also suggests that imperial decline and the increase of nationalistic tendencies tend to coincide for a variety of internal and external reasons⁴.

Following the collapse of an empire, the existence and legitimacy of the institutions of new states depend greatly upon the nature and depth of opposition to the former imperial core. Any group linked to the former central authority is likely to be seen as potentially disloyal and the representatives of the new regime may argue for (temporary) constraints on their political participation. A centralised state is most likely to be favoured over other forms of federation or devolution. Therefore, the post-imperial structure creates many opposing incentives in a population that within a multi-ethnic environment applies its seal of approval to every project of nation-state building. In a post-imperial context, reductions in the privileges of the former dominant population group can become a significant cause of conflicts.

The Republic of Estonia, proclaimed on 24 February 1918, was between the two World Wars a reasonably homogeneous state in terms of ethnic composition. Ethnic Estonians made up nearly 90 per cent of the population. The contrast to this offered by Estonia's post-World War II demo-

graphic structure clearly indicates the dramatic transformation that had taken place, perhaps one of the most drastic examples in recent world history. After the war and as part of the policy of forced industrialisation, the Soviet authorities began immediately to facilitate the migration of workers from the rest of the Soviet Republics to Estonia. During the Soviet occupation, the non-Estonian population grew rapidly, from 3% in 1945 to 38.5% in 1989. This meant that almost in the course of a single generation, the number of non-Estonians increased by a factor of twenty-six, from 23,000 in 1945 to 602,000 in 1989. At the same time, the number of Estonians decreased from about 1,000,000 in 1940 to 965,000 in 1989. This demographic change was due to migration and differences in fertility, in addition to Soviet political and military measures⁵. On the basis of these figures the majority Russian-speaking Estonian population cannot be categorised as an historical ethnic minority. The main centres of immigration during this period were the capital Tallinn and the industrial districts of north-eastern Estonia. Today there are only a few ethnic Estonians living in the county of Ida-Virumaa's largest towns, such as Narva, Kohtla-Järve and Sil-lamäe. As a result of Soviet political and economic colonisation, by the end of the 1980s Estonia had become one of the most multinational countries of Europe. The result of this particular history of migration is the major inter-ethnic tensions plaguing Estonia today.

These demographic shifts have provoked serious fears among Estonians for their continued existence as an ethnic group. Furthermore, the geographical concentration of the Russian population in the regions bordering Russia is perceived as an additional threat to the security of Estonia. Above all, the potential risk of political secession has been located in the north-east periphery, a politically dependent and culturally marginal industrial area characterized by higher than average unemployment, relatively low average income, and the largest concentration of non-Estonians.

It should be clear that this situation corresponds to the preconditions of peripheral political mobilisation, or what is known as ethnoregionalism, which aims at greater parity in the economic, cultural and political spheres⁶. Instability in this region was further aggravated by the geopolitical and military-strategical ambitions of the Russian Federation in the Baltic states. In accordance with the radicalization of its international policies in 1992-93, Russia has made several attempts to maintain the territories of the former Soviet Union as a sphere of influence. Characteristic of this type of "near abroad" policy has been Russia's marked neo-imperialist rhetoric⁷, which includes exploiting for political ends the presence of the Russian-speaking Estonians, implementation of economic sanctions, and postponement of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the now independent states. Although inconsistent in application, this policy has substantially complicated the adaptation and integration of the Russophones to their new countries of residence.

Several political, economic, cultural, and socio-psychological factors explain the limited integration of immigrant and indigenous populations. Prior to independence the two communities essentially lived separately. Estonian society as a whole was divided into two linguistically-based communities. A dual educational system intensified this segregation. The existence of comparatively few inter-ethnic marriages or informal friendship circles has furthered the tendency of Estonians and Russians essentially to live each in their own world⁸. This atmosphere of mutual distrust was particularly intense during the late 1980s and the early 1990s.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union gave rise to a series of phenomena typical of societies in transition, including the simultaneous appearance of complex changes in a post-Communist, post-imperial and post-colonial key⁹. The restoration of the Estonian Republic led to many profound changes, including privatisation, the establishment of new legal standards, and the switch to market-based economic relations. For the Russian-speaking community, this shift also brought about changes in their social status. They were now, all of a sudden, transformed from the dominant imperial nation into the minority population of a small and culturally alien nation-state.

The “minority” status of the Estonian Russian-speaking residents proved a source of tension for most of them¹⁰. Therefore, with the violence of Moldova and the former Yugoslavia as precedents, both foreign observers¹¹ and local analysts predicted the possible appearance of inter-ethnic violence. Despite these widespread predictions Estonia actually proved remarkably effective in avoiding large-scale ethnic unrest following the collapse of Soviet power. Despite many structural difficulties Estonia did not witness any kind of ethnic-based violent conflict during the 1990s. One significant fact was that most of the Estonian Russophones had regarded the division during the Soviet period between citizens and non-citizens as artificial and discriminatory. Thus, according to many analysts, Estonia can be viewed as an example of the successful management of ethnic relations in a relatively unfavourable environment. As a result it was able to maintain its democratic evolution, stable economic growth, and its integrity and viability as a state. Estonia’s entry into both the EU and NATO has further consolidated this process. The new state also succeeded in neutralising the potential risk of the development of a bipolar political system. Although some experts are concerned that at a nation-wide level the Estonian Russian community is marked by a certain political alienation and rather passive resentment¹².

FIELD OF RESEARCH

One could ask how it has been possible to introduce profound social change without violence in Estonia? The following factors have been seen as contributing to the lack of ethnic violence in Estonia: each national group’s attributes (real or imagined); ethnic interaction at the local level; domestic legislation and ethnopoltics; and the wider context of international relations¹³. An important question that demands further study is to what extent the low level of ethnic conflict in Estonia has been a result of internal as opposed to external factors? It is beyond the scope of this chapter to address this in detail. However, in order to address the impact of the international environment on post-Communist ethnic tensions this study will examine the following matters: the role of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CE) and the European Union (EU) in conflict prevention and in easing possible ethnic tensions in post-Communist Estonia; the reasons why, among all the inter- and non-governmental organisations, the OSCE was particularly successful; the co-operation and interaction among the IGOs; the interests and diplomatic activity of the Russian Federation that underpinned the launch of the international monitoring missions; the main issues that influenced Estonian legislation and policy toward its Russian-speaking population; and finally, the reactions by both the Estonian state authorities and the public to the work of these organisations and institutions. In regard to the latter point two additional themes arise: the hitherto neglected issue of political conditionality and its effect on Estonian discourses concerning security and identity; and how the origins of Estonian Euro-scepticism and resentment were conditioned by the view of international interventions as meddling in matters beyond their jurisdiction.

All these issues are examined through a case study that focuses on fourth-party action within the conflict, without any pretense of directly contributing to new theoretical formulations. It will be apparent all the same that the qualitative research under discussion is based on certain theoretical assumptions regarding ethnic conflict regulation by impartial external actors.

THE EUROPEAN FACTOR AS THE FOURTH ELEMENT IN THE EQUATION

In the mid-1990s, the sociologist Rogers Brubaker published his now famous triadic relational nexus thesis, which approaches inter-ethnic tensions as a triangular formation comprising a nation-state or “nationalising state”, a national minority, and the latter’s historical homeland in an-

other (usually neighbouring) country. Application of this theoretical model leads one to regard the content of the national question in multi-ethnic eastern and central Europe as one of dynamic interplay. Seen in Brubaker's terms, the participants in it are: 1) new or newly reconfigured nationalising states which look on themselves as nation-states in the traditional sense, despite their ethnically heterogeneous population; 2) the numerous, self-aware, and to varying degrees organized and politically alienated national minorities within such states, who resist either real or imagined processes of assimilation or discrimination, and whose political leaders demand ethnically-based autonomy; and 3) the external national "homelands" of the minorities, whose elites render them material and moral assistance, pay close attention to their situation, and consider the protection of those sharing their ethnic identity to be their right and even their duty¹⁴.

Estonian social scientists have suggested that in Estonia such a situation mostly marked the period between 1991-1994¹⁵. However, Brubaker's examination of the shaping of post-Communist east and central European identity politics neglects the wider international context and the role of influential international organisations. D. Smith's study of relations between nationalising states, minorities, their ethnic homelands and Euro-Atlantic institutions cites Estonia as an example of the preferability of thinking along the lines of a quadratic nexus, rather than a triangular model¹⁶. Notwithstanding, it should be remembered that in the 1990s, the EU, the CE and OSCE entered Brubaker's classic triangle as a fourth variable rather than a constant¹⁷. Thus, this approach has conceded scant importance to all these problematic issues. At the same time it failed to refer to the impact of the international dimension. Omitting the international aspect makes it hard to examine not only ethnopolitical developments in post-Communist countries such as Estonia, but also even broader discursive concepts such as 'Europeanisation' and 'westernisation'¹⁸.

Since the late 1980s, the latter trends have been closely related to global-economic and political-security questions and to the continuous progress of European integration. In order to promote democratic reforms and the protection of human rights, the West has utilised political conditionality in its relations with eastern European countries¹⁹. Political conditionality, as understood by the EU, "entails the linking, by a state or international organization, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid, trade, concessions, co-operation agreements or membership of an international organization) to the fulfilment of conditions relating to the protection of human rights and the advancement of democratic principles"²⁰.

The 'Estonian return to Europe' that followed the Republic's restoration rested on a fairly strong domestic consensus shared by the political elite and the population at large²¹. Full EU membership had been among the principal Estonian political goals throughout the 1990s. Estonia applied for EU membership in 1995 and was the first former Soviet republic to negotiate accession with the EU starting in 1998. Integration into the West was seen as necessary not only on grounds of cultural affiliation and the need to re-structure the Estonian economy, but also because of Estonia's sensitive geopolitical position in regard to its adjacent Russian neighbor.

The Estonian political scientist R. Taagepera has said that Estonia is "the world's smallest continental nation-state with its own distinct language and fully developed modern culture in this language"²². There are numerous ways to interpret terms such as superpowers, great powers, middle powers, weak states, or mini-states²³. However, it seems obvious that Estonia, considering its population size, would be categorised as a mini-state or weak power. The Norwegian security analyst Olav Knudsen suspects that the Baltic states "fall outside all other geographical and political contexts apart from the Russian and to some extent the German one"²⁴. In the early 1990s, Russia was perceived by Estonian politicians and security experts as the only tangible foreign threat. Similarly, Estonian political thinking, due to centuries-old co-existence and historical experience, was deeply sceptical about the prospects of Russian democratisation²⁵.

Consequently, the potential threat from Russia has been continually highlighted in Estonian security discourse, which regards it as menacing enough to join NATO and the EU in order to obtain further security guarantees²⁶. On the basis of claims of impending military and economic threat, Estonia's foreign and domestic policy options were "moulded into a binary framework in which Estonia either rapidly integrates into EU and NATO or falls back into the Russian sphere of influence"²⁷. The Russian threat is perceived as both an external aggression, and the internal threat posed by the large Estonian Russian-speaking population. The internal threat is articulated primarily in cultural terms, through arguments about ethnic Russians' inherent and culturally determined pro-Russian political views²⁸. On the one hand, the fear of Moscow's imperial machinations stems from historical experience. On the other, the Russian administration has done little to alleviate such anxieties and has treated Estonia more as an ex-vassal than an equivalent partner state.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation faced economic and political depression and painful processes of nation and state re-building. A number of radical Russian nationalist political groups, parties, and ideologues continue to consider the breakdown of the Soviet Union as an historical mistake. The so-called *derzhava* ideology of empire restoration, has been a common cause for many anti-democratic, political movements. The desire to reconstruct Russia as a super power is, for instance, reflected in a concept which claimed former Soviet territory as part of the sphere of Russia's vital interests. Furthermore, as a result of domestic political struggles, Russian foreign policy has become more radicalised. This has led to an intensification of rhetoric calling for the defence of the Russians living in neighbouring countries. Formally, the objective of Russia's 'near abroad' policy has been to protect the human rights of the Russophone minorities, and strategically to gain control over former Soviet territory and deny outsiders any role in former Soviet Union affairs. The question of alleged discrimination of the Russian-speaking population in the newly independent Baltic countries has served as a pretext to try to lock the region within a Russian sphere of influence. The minority issue loomed large in Russian policy toward Estonia and Latvia in particular, and made more difficult their integration into western political bodies such as the Council of Europe²⁹.

Russian hopes of maintaining direct control over the Baltic states proved ineffective, and were soon substituted by a multilateral foreign policy. At the same time, Moscow's attempts to take political advantage of the issue of the Russophone minority were successful. Russia used virtually every international forum to present its claims of violations of human rights in Estonia and Latvia. It also asked various international organisations to address these problems. For example, within the OSCE Human Dimension Mechanism, Russia demanded that Estonia invite a mission of experts to supervise the minority population's condition³⁰. At first, Estonia refused the Russian request, but several months later decided to invite a mission on its own initiative. This short-term mission paved the way for deeper IGO involvement.

By the close of the 20th century three international institutions were actively engaged in the defence of minority and human rights in Europe: the Council of Europe (CE), which formulates legally binding rules related to human and minority rights and monitors the settlement of juridical disputes through the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg; the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, until 31 December 1994 called the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe), which beginning in 1990 provided advice on writing constitutions and developing administrative practices in eastern Europe through its High Commissioner on National Minorities; and the European Union (EU), whose 1995 Stability Pact established the political ground rules for the post-Communist states interested in accession³¹.

Although most of the western countries, and especially Nordic states, had shown concern about Estonia's transition from the end of the 1980s, direct intervention could not begin prior to Au-

gust 1991, when Estonia regained its full sovereignty. On 10 September 1991 Estonia was admitted to the OSCE and seven days later to the UN. Preliminary discussions between the Estonian and Swedish Ministries for Foreign Affairs to consider the establishment of a OSCE long-term mission were held in September 1992. Sweden was particularly interested in stability in the Baltic Sea region and in January 1993 took over the chairmanship of the OSCE. A long-term mission started in February 1993. It was composed of six international members, recruited predominantly from western countries and Scandinavia. Its headquarters were located in Tallinn and the branch offices in the north-eastern cities of Narva, Jõhvi and Kohtla-Järve. The mandate from the OSCE Council of Ministers called for the mission to promote dialogue, stability, and mutual understanding between nationality groups³².

As membership in organisations like the UN and OSCE was granted almost automatically to Estonia as a sovereign state, the CE also launched an accession process at the end of the 1991. However, it linked accession to intensive visits, reports, and inspections of legislation. Estonia finally became a member of the CE on 14 May 1993³³. This was undoubtedly a significant victory for Estonia, especially in its uneven propaganda battle with Russia, since in this way the democratic nature of the Estonian state was further confirmed. In short, authoritative international organisations had become involved in the Estonian transition process during its initial phase. Thanks to this, the facilities for monitoring, early-warning work, crisis management, and for exerting international pressure on Estonian legislation and ethnopolitics had been created.

CRISIS FORMATION

The post-Communist Republic of Estonia responded to this complicated political and demographic situation with a fairly rigid citizenship and language policy. To some extent one can see here the importance of the inter-war period of sovereignty for Estonian (as well as Latvian) nation-building strategies. The question was seen not so much as founding independent states as restoring what were still occupied countries, through national re-building. The source of state legitimacy rested on the principle of legal continuity, and the idea of restitution (*restitutio in integrum*) appeared as part of political discourse.

As a result, in legal terms only residents who were citizens before the Soviet occupation and their descendants were regarded as Estonian citizens. All other permanent residents, if they applied for citizenship, were obliged to undergo a naturalisation process. Leaving aside Estonia's small centuries-old Russian minority population, the Russian-speakers who settled in Estonia after World War II from a legal point of view possessed the same status as other recent immigrants. The Estonian authorities ruled out a "zero-option" formula and, unlike post-Communist Lithuania, did not offer citizenship to all permanent residents, arguing that this failed to comply with Estonian restitutional principles. Non-citizens were barred from certain occupations and could not directly acquire ownership of land. The Law on National Elections, adopted on 6 April 1992, also stipulated that only citizens could vote and run for office in national elections.

The Estonian Constitution of 1992 states that no person may be discriminated against on the basis of nationality, race, colour, gender, language, origin, religion, political or other beliefs, or other reasons (Art. 12). Every person shall also have the right to preserve his or her ethnic identity (Art. 149). Since autumn 1992, none of the numerous international expert reviews of the legal order and human rights situation of Estonia has detected any remarkable violations. Estonian legislation is in conformity with international norms and does not restrict the human rights of the non-citizens, as will be discussed below. Non-citizens have been granted all social rights on an equal basis with citizens. Moreover, unlike in most democracies, legal resident non-citizens in Estonia are permitted to vote in local elections³⁴. Experts at the Council of Europe also scrutinised the Constitution

prior to its adoption in June 1992. The CE supported the restitutorial concept that underlined the special legal status of the Baltic states and ruled out its suitability to other ex-Soviet Union nations. The selective approach to the Baltic states was a comparatively acceptable scenario for the western countries of that time because it relieved anxieties in regard to a possible domino effect. The majority of western countries had never accepted the USSR's *de jure* incorporation of the Baltic states, and therefore quickly acknowledged their status as "restored citizen-polities"³⁵.

Most immigrants from the Soviet era, however, saw the division between citizens and non-citizens as artificial and discriminatory, because they had arrived in Estonia in accordance with Soviet law, and they now felt they were being deprived of a citizenship they had already earned. Similar tensions arose from changes in individuals' social status. Despite the 1977 USSR Constitution, which stipulated that citizens of the Soviet Union from different racial and national origins had equal rights before the law, Russophones and their culture had enjoyed a privileged position, just as the Russian language dominated throughout the empire. Also, many material advantages had been more readily available to the Russian-speaking population³⁶. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the recent Russian immigrants found themselves formally in the position of being aliens in Estonia. They had to obey Estonian laws and in order to remain legally in the country had to apply for permits as residents. This was not only a shift in their personal legal status. It also constituted a social and psychological shock for tens of thousands of Estonian Russophones. For this reason a large proportion of them, at first, rejected many fundamental socio-political reforms³⁷.

This threatening state of affairs reached a peak in summer 1993. On 16 June 1993, the *Riigikogu* [the Estonian Parliament] adopted a law on primary and secondary education which stipulated that by 2000 secondary education would be conducted partly in the Estonian language. The new Law on Privatisation of 18 June, stipulated that in the process of privatisation, certain restrictions would be applied to non-citizens. The crisis peaked on 21 June, when the Parliament passed the draft Law on Aliens³⁸, which many non-Estonians considered as discriminatory. An essential goal of the new law was the determination through legislation of the legal status of non-citizen residents. This law defined an alien as a person who is not a citizen of Estonia, i.e. a citizen of another state or a stateless person. (The great bulk of non-citizens in Estonia – at that time almost 80% – were ethnic Russians). The law provided a one-year period during which non-citizens who had migrated to Estonia prior to 1 July 1990, and were permanent residents of the former Estonian SSR, could apply for temporary residence permits. At the same time they could also apply for permanent residence. Following delays and confusion in implementation, as well as international criticism, the application deadline was extended several times³⁹.

The Aliens Act evoked large-scale protests by non-citizens, who feared that the government (under the guise of a re-registration of non-citizens) would eliminate their status as permanent residents. As most of the non-Estonians without citizenship found themselves in a position equal to foreigners, rumors circulated during the summer of 1993 concerning their possible repatriation. This antagonistic atmosphere was rife with rumors of a hidden agenda involving different forms of expulsion⁴⁰. According to some opinions, the goal of the draft Law was meant to create extreme uncertainty among non-citizens about their future status in Estonia. For instance, during parliamentary discussions of the law, the member of parliament K. Põldvere made the notorious statement that: "By means of the present law we have to create a situation where the colonists feel the earth shaking under their feet"⁴¹. By 19 June, nearly 10,000 supporters of the radical Russian Community demonstrated in the streets of Narva against putting the Law on Aliens to the vote. The demonstrators declared that the final endorsement of the Law on Aliens would be interpreted as declaring war on the Russian community. The protesters threatened to blockade the railway and suspend the supply of electricity from Russia via Ida-Virumaa⁴². Hundreds of signatures were collected in petitions appealing to the OSCE to intervene.

Reaction by Russia was to be expected. Since Estonian re-independence, one of the constant components of the Russian Federation's formal and informal foreign policy has been to accuse Estonia and Latvia of violating human rights. Following the implementation of the draft Law on Aliens in 1993, a massive and highly emotive propaganda campaign directed against Estonia picked up steam. Estonian citizenship and language policy were lambasted as discriminatory and as subjecting the Russian-speaking population to "social apartheid", "ethnic cleansing" and "moral genocide". The former President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, declared in a speech on 24 June 1993 that "we can remind Estonia of its geopolitical and demographic situation"⁴³. Yeltsin also said that economic, political, and other sanctions would be applied "to protect the honour, dignity, and legitimate rights of our compatriots". Economic sanctions began the next day. The St. Petersburg-based supplier of natural gas, Lentransgas, received an order from Moscow to put into effect an energy embargo. On June 28, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev stated that "Russia would halt all oil and gas deliveries to the country [Estonia] if it did not change its course"⁴⁴. The rhetoric of human rights abuses was also used in a thinly-veiled attempt to maintain military pressure in the region. From October 1992 on, primarily due to the domestic political scene, President Yeltsin experimented with new tactics and linked the withdrawal of Russian armed forces from the Baltic region to the protection of the rights of Russian-speaking communities⁴⁵. The continuing presence of troops in the Baltic was justified as protecting the local Russian-speaking population. The ratification of the border treaty between Estonia and Russia was also held up by this problem.

In Narva, political spokespersons for the Russian community warned of mass unrest and armed opposition if the Law on Aliens was accepted without changes. Rumours spread of armed bands awaiting the signal to cross the border from Russia in order to aid their brethren⁴⁶. One last-minute protest action against the new legislation involved proposals for the autonomy of north-eastern Estonia, a notion that previously had only been discussed in extremist circles. On 28 June 1993, the municipal authorities in Narva and a few days later in Sillamäe, both northeastern cities with large Russophone populations, decided to organize local referendums on "national-territorial autonomy" for their region. There was a significant risk that friction between the two communities could escalate into open conflict. The Estonian government confidentially requested urgent assistance from the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, in Sweden.

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY IN ACTION

In ethno-political interactions, mediation and crisis management mean facilitating political turning points, during which ethnic leaderships have to cope with circumstances of high social tensions. Conflict dynamics can result in the escalation of violent confrontations. According to Aklaev, "crisis management can be metaphorically conceived of as the emergency room in a conflict management hospital"⁴⁷. At first, conflict must be stabilised to a pre-crisis level. Constructive patterns of crisis management rely primarily on techniques such as negotiations, mediation by third parties, arbitration, and adjudication. Constructive crisis management requires integrative bargaining or problem-solving negotiations, which are considered to be fundamentally different from other forms of bargaining⁴⁸. Taking these steps reduces the danger of escalation and encourages a search for compromises that satisfy the interests of both parties.

Fourth parties like IGOs are widely seen as playing a crucial role in regulating ethnic conflicts, similar to that of external ethnic homelands⁴⁹. C. Neukirch has suggested that an international mission's scope for manoeuvre is considerably larger in the case of conflict prevention than in that of conflict management. However, to understand clearly the work of international agents careful analysis of relevant context-factors is needed, as will be demonstrated in the following example⁵⁰.

Although the OSCE does not have any clearly systematised prevention mandate, it still has developed a flexible and distinctive strategy of prevention, which covers both the areas of civil conflict prevention and crisis management. The OSCE's long-term on-site missions are allowed to function only with the consent of the host country. The OSCE also undertakes short-term fact-finding, reporting and expert missions. The long-term missions are integrated with the other OSCE conflict management institutions, such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)⁵¹. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) is in charge of OSCE conflict prevention with regard to situations involving national minorities. This position was created as an "instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage" at the 1992 OSCE Helsinki summit. The HCNM does not have the authority to impose compulsory solutions and therefore the effectiveness of this post depends largely on the co-operation of the parties involved. Thus, the OSCE tries to act as an impartial third party, serving as a go-between or facilitator of compromises for the principal parties to discuss. It may also function as a political-diplomatic interposition force when parties are unequal in size and power, as on the occasion of Russia and Estonia⁵². Together with its monitoring, reporting and early warning functions, OSCE intervention may be regarded as a form of preventive diplomacy.

The first OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities – a former Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, Max van der Stoep – made his earliest visits to Estonia in January 1993. The OSCE actively established contacts with members of the government and Parliament, international organisations and diplomats, and representatives of the Russophone population⁵³. During the summer crisis of 1993, the HCNM collaborated closely with the Swedish Foreign Ministry; there was also considerable co-operation between the USA and the Swedish Foreign Ministry. The Swedes were active with regard to Estonia because of their strong interest in regional stability, and thanks to the Swedish Foreign Minister Margaretha af Ugglas' tenure as OSCE Chairperson-in-Office. In a similar way, informal negotiations between the different parties and officials of the Council of Europe were arranged⁵⁴. Van der Stoep also kept in close contact with the 'kin-states' of the Russophones. Besides the Russian government other significant concerns included developments in Latvia, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan. During the 1993 crisis, the HCNM retained unofficial ties with Russian functionaries, including the Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev⁵⁵. The perennial presence of the OSCE in the politically sensitive district of north-east Estonia and the city of Narva allowed it to monitor the situation and provide valuable early warnings of unrest, as well as proposing action to prevent serious conflict. For example, through the meetings with the Narva radical Russian political leaders, the OSCE and HCNM found out about a planned civil disobedience campaign and warned the leaders of the negative consequences the plan would lead to were it put into action⁵⁶.

The draft Law on Aliens adopted by the Riigikogu on 21 June 1993, while still subject to proclamation by the President of the Republic, immediately attracted the attention of the world press. Twelve governments of the European Community expressed their concern in a diplomatic letter to the Government of Estonia. After consultations with the HCNM, Estonia's President Lennart Meri decided not to ratify the Law. Instead, he sent it to the HCNM and specialists of the CE for consultation.

Domestic and international consultation regarding Estonian legislation was nothing new. Beginning in autumn 1992, various OSCE/ODIHR, UN and CE expert missions visited Estonia at the government's request to monitor the human and minority rights situation. No signs of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, language, or religion were detected. The Estonian Constitution, along with the citizenship and language laws, were certified as corresponding to international standards⁵⁷. Also, in August 1993, a mission conducted by the US-based non-governmental human rights organisation Helsinki Watch did not discover any systematic, serious abuses of human

rights in the area of citizenship legislation⁵⁸. On 6 April 1993 OSCE High Commissioner stated that “there is no convincing evidence of systematic persecution of the non-Estonian population since the re-establishment of Estonian independence, and moreover, that there have virtually been no incidents pointing to inter-ethnic violence”⁵⁹. Non-citizens in Estonia were guaranteed basic rights under the Estonian Constitution, including the right to unemployment benefits and social services.

After the inspection of the Law on Aliens, both Max van der Stoep and Catherine Lalumière, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, declared that most of the legal provisions were very similar to legislation in other states. In their view, existing legislation did not need a drastic overhaul. Instead, they called for a number of additional steps for improving relations between the various population groups in Estonia. The IGOs’ recommendations to the Estonian government fell into two general categories: firstly, regarding the overall policy towards non-Estonians, and secondly, in relation to specific pieces of legislation. The section on general policy concentrated on the themes of information and transparency, legal certainty, and the establishment of channels of communication. The latter included, for instance, the need to provide non-Estonians with prompt information and complete legal transparency, thereby mitigating non-citizens’ suspicions and uncertainty about governmental policies concerning them⁶⁰. After the HCNM’s visits in spring 1993, it was pointed out that both parties should demonstrate willingness to promote integration between different communities, and that non-Estonians should acquire at least a basic knowledge of Estonian vocabulary in order to be able to conduct a simple conversation in the local language. To this end reform of linguistic education to make it more effective was also proposed. In the area of legislation, Van der Stoep suggested the acceleration of the naturalisation policies by simplifying the language requirements for elderly people and disabled persons, as well as reducing the examination fees. The HCNM also advised reducing the number of non-citizens through greater application of the *ius soli* principle regarding children born in Estonian territory, who would otherwise become stateless. Similar criticisms were levelled at the wording of the Law on Aliens, which was vague in parts and thus open to arbitrary interpretation by the authorities⁶¹.

Although the OSCE’s commitments are not binding from a legal point of view, these recommendations are nevertheless regarded as politically binding ‘soft’ laws, and their political prescriptive force is generally accepted by the OSCE states. Considering the Estonian need for western security guarantees regarding Russia, Estonia had little choice but to observe the western recommendations. After further consultations, President Meri vetoed the Law on Aliens and sent it back to the Riigikogu. Taking into account the HCNM and Council of Europe’s legal suggestions, the Parliament amended the law and passed a revised version of the bill on 8 July 1993. The amended law came into effect on 12 July 1993⁶².

Agenda-setting is considered to be particularly important in crisis management; it is the process of policy co-ordination between different parties⁶³. In this vein the OSCE mission had constantly exerted pressure to create some kind of agency for an institutionalised dialogue. This was eventually set up as the Presidential Roundtable on National Minorities. The project of establishing a Roundtable had been devised in April 1993, and it was put into practice in a communiqué issued by President Meri on 25 June. The goal was to discuss issues that affected non-citizens and ethnic minority communities, and to safeguard the domestic peace essential to re-building the Republic of Estonia. The Presidential Roundtable met for the first time during the peak of the crisis in Tallinn on 10 July 1993. It initially consisted of fifteen individuals, five representatives each from the Parliament, the Russian Representative Assembly, and the Association of National-Cultural Minorities. In 1993, the OSCE mission had initiated the Roundtable project, formally as an observer, but in reality it also played an active and formative role. The USA and Sweden also helped to cover the Roundtable’s 1993 material and administrative expenses. Thereby the mission

encouraged the foundation of an on-site mediation mechanism at a time when Russian-speakers was not represented in Parliament, and when the Government was also reluctant to promote dialogue with them⁶⁴. In addition to making up for the lack of dialogue, the mission's object was to reduce conflicts by inducing the Government publicly to offer future guarantees for the Russianophone community⁶⁵.

Attempts to carry out a referendum on local autonomy could have led to destabilisation and confrontation. For that reason the OSCE launched intensive 'shuttle diplomacy' between Tallinn and north-eastern cities. From June 30 until July 7, the HCNM met with the representatives of the City Council of Narva and tried to dissuade them from continuing with the referendum, or to persuade them to delay it until the Estonian National Court had decided whether it was in accordance with Estonian laws. This proposal was rejected⁶⁶. Nevertheless, the consultations between the Estonian government, Prime Minister Mart Laar, President Lennart Meri, leaders of the Russian-speaking organisations and local authorities in the north-east led to an important compromise. In a document dated 12 July, the representatives of the Russian community promised the High Commissioner they would respect the territorial integrity of Estonia and abide by a forthcoming ruling of the National Court on the legality of the referendum. The Estonian authorities assured they would not use force to prevent the referendum from being held⁶⁷. The National Court declared the referendum illegal, on the grounds that the constitution stipulates that Estonia is a unitary state. It was then renamed as a public opinion poll. The resolution was accepted by the authorities of Narva and Sillamäe and the immediate crisis began to lose strength. In this case, the OSCE could look on its intervention as a success.

The Estonian Government kept its word, and the referendum was conducted on 16-17 July without any conflict. Adult voters in Narva and Sillamäe were asked whether they favored "pro-ethnoterritorial autonomy in Estonia". In both towns over 97% of voters approved the referendum, but its legitimacy remained relatively low thanks to the turnout of 54 percent and 61 percent, respectively. The process is also said to have been fraught with irregularities and fraud in ballot-counting, so the real turnout might have been even lower. Estonian observers argued that less than 50% of the eligible voters participated⁶⁸. It is widely held that the referendum was an attempt not so much to secede from Estonia as to exert pressure on the central government to modify its policies towards the settler community. Seen in this light, it can be interpreted as a reaction to sudden economic and political changes which many people had not been ready for. Thus, it functioned mainly as an escape valve to release tension within the Russian ethnic community. The tensions in the north-east resulted primarily from the vanishing power of the old *nomenklatura* and its desperate attempt to bypass the criteria of local election law, which barred non-citizens from standing as candidates. For the Premier Mart Laar, such events were precipitated by "former Communist functionaries" who feared "losing their current power at the forthcoming local administrative elections"⁶⁹.

The European Union also played a constructive role, which significantly widened the scope of action for the OSCE Estonian mission, especially in the later 1990s. For a relatively weak organisation like the OSCE, it needed the support and co-operation of other actors to give its missions the necessary political status. The EU, which was interested in resolving citizenship issues in the post-Communist states, provided diplomatic support for the OSCE's legal amendment suggestions and financial assistance for the integration programmes the OSCE called for. It was also implied to Estonia that eventual membership in the EU would be linked to the fulfilment of the OSCE High Commissioner's recommendations⁷⁰. Without the EU, the OSCE would have had less effect on Estonian minority policy. Such political conditionality has been one important cause of mixed reactions to IGO activities in Estonia. If the OSCE's mission was subsequently considered moderately effective⁷¹, it remains to be answered why different Estonian communi-

ties were frequently dissatisfied with its work. What were the main sources of discontent? Since extensive analysis of these issues has yet to be undertaken, the following discussion can only briefly consider some of the basic causes of this resentment.

The sources of popular discontent can be divided into three groups. Firstly, the certain issues led the West to be perceived as applying double standards. To begin with the EU and other IGOs undertook missions to monitor minority rights not because of any actual unrest but due to a widespread concern to prevent violence similar to that then taking place in former Yugoslavia. It was also argued that the rules established for potential central and eastern European EU member states to reduce ethnic strains were not required of earlier applicants to the Union. At the same time, in older EU member states such as Spain, France, Britain and Ireland, there were still serious conflicts and latent tensions between discontented ethnic groups and the central authorities. A related issue was that the High Commissioner's mandate, set out by the OSCE, was to identify potential conflict and develop early warning strategies for states and minority groups in the entire OSCE region, not just in eastern Europe. Yet historically the western countries have not been subject to the same level of scrutiny as their eastern counterparts⁷². Moravcsik and Vachudova clearly stated concerns that the accession process "imposes something of a double standard in a handful of areas, chiefly the protection of ethnic minority rights, where candidates are asked to meet standards that the EU-15 have never set for themselves"⁷³. One explanation for the existence of these double standards is that these conflict prevention operations were often large-scale undertakings funded mainly by the richer countries of the West; hence, the OSCE has avoided criticising the "hand that feeds it". In addition to this, western member states of the OSCE have allegedly been reluctant to consent to any dilution of their own sovereignty. Hence the belief that a qualitatively different level of intervention in domestic affairs has taken place in eastern as opposed to western states⁷⁴.

Secondly, the missions were considered irrelevant. In the eyes of many Estonian politicians and prominent public figures, the missions of the IGOs interfered both indirectly and directly in their country's internal affairs and unfairly criticised the state of democracy and human rights⁷⁵. The government complained that as soon as one issue was addressed, another would be raised, and that Estonia was being stigmatised and singled out for 'violations' that were significantly worse in other countries. According to Estonian officials, the minority situation has been not sufficiently investigated in Russia (or also in the Netherlands), while the HCNM Van der Stoep played great attention to the Estonian Russophone minority. It was often suggested that the OSCE should instead concentrate on the conditions in Chechnya⁷⁶. At worst, the international human rights organisations were depicted as an accomplice of Russia. During the 1990s there was a widespread perception in Estonia that Russia wielded excessive influence on the HCNM Mission. One MP from the national-Pro Patria conservative party declared that "OSCE recommendations" should be read as "Russia's demands"⁷⁷. Another MP similarly maintained in February 1994 that the OSCE was a "meaningless organisation for Estonia, since it was created by the Soviet Union to conduct its imperialist interests...The OSCE representatives in Estonia have shamelessly advanced Russia's business in Estonia, interfered in Estonian internal affairs and instigated international tensions in Narva"⁷⁸. Altogether, on occasion the Estonian media and politicians sharply accused the OSCE mission of acting as an indirect instrument of Russian imperialism. On the other hand, non-Estonians claimed the OSCE mission was pro-Estonian⁷⁹.

Thirdly, concerns were raised about the perceived threat to Estonian cultural identity and security. It was argued that in their juridical recommendations, the supranational organisations did not sufficiently consider the legacy of Soviet genocide and Estonia's critical demographic and cultural situation. The OSCE and European powers were accused of ignorance, naiveté, and of being influenced by Russian propaganda. While European integration was looked to as bolstering

Estonia's image and identity as a western country there was also a concern that liberalising legislation would facilitate the growing influence of supranational institutions, which in turn could undermine Estonian cultural and national identity. Concerns about the loss of Estonian cultural identity figured simultaneously in political debates, academic research, and public opinion polls. Increasing instability and the loss of control over ethnopolitical processes were seen as resulting from the IGOs' intervention. Therefore, paradoxically, integration into international organisations has also been the source of discord in Estonian discourse on security⁸⁰.

Awareness of these three sources of discontent also explains a certain reluctance on the part of the Estonian government to amend its legislation⁸¹. Nevertheless, from 1992 to 1994, the majority of Estonian mainstream political parties favoured multilateral approaches towards minorities and human rights issues and supported the ongoing presence of the IGO missions, as well as the open monitoring of Estonian legislation. In general the Russians in Estonia have tended to view the European institutions as defending their rights in Estonia, whereas the Estonians see European institutions as defending them against Russia. This is one reason why Estonia accepted practically all the recommendations made by the OSCE High Commissioner⁸².

The terms of the OSCE mission did not include monitoring the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from the Baltic states. However, OSCE resolutions formally backed the Estonian Government's insistent demands for such a withdrawal. Although Russia succeeded in obtaining a compromise regarding the continued residence of Soviet military pensioners in Estonia, its strategy of internationalisation was unsuccessful with regard to slowing down its troop withdrawal. An attempt to connect virtually two completely different issues – the situation of minorities and the departure of Russian forces – failed to win international acceptance. In reaction to Russia's harsh critique in the first half of 1994, the OSCE again explicitly stated in its reports that there were no large-scale human rights abuses in Estonia. Major western countries, led by the USA, had increasingly insinuated to Moscow that the financial aid it badly needed depended on speeding up its troop withdrawal from the Baltic. Corresponding treaties were signed by Presidents Meri and Yeltsin on 26 July 1994 at Moscow. On 31 August 1994, the last Russian military units located in Estonian territory since October 1939 left. With their departure the Estonian security situation improved significantly⁸³.

CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVES

It has almost become commonplace to note that the results of conflict prevention are impossible to measure because one cannot determine when the violence would have broken out had the proper measures not been taken. We cannot know for sure whether a bloody conflict would have been unleashed in Estonia without the involvement of the international forces in 1993. However, most researchers believe that the international community, represented by disinterested international governmental organizations and human rights experts, positively influenced developments in Estonia. Although many issues are still not fully resolved, crisis was successfully avoided.

Fundamental to this was the fact that the civil preconditions for crisis management were favourable. Firstly, state parties accepted involvement of the international community as "fourth actors"; secondly, the conflict had not escalated into an overt struggle between a defence of territorial integrity and a demand for external self-determination; thirdly, the concerned parties had not resorted to violence; and finally, there was the opportunity to convince both parties that observance of the IGOs' guidelines was in their interest.

According to one analysis, one main reason behind the moderately effective outcome was the perceived impartiality of the IGOs. The various fact-finding missions had presented reports that offered all concerned parties substantive legal and political arguments that were open to diverse

interpretations. Furthermore, criticism from the IGOs was frequently ambiguous, which ensured that none of the positions taken by any one party had been established as a 'fact'. Both interest groups could point out details most convenient to them and concentrate on legal disputes instead of violence. As a result the multitude of voices being heard contributed to the perceived balance of the mediation process⁸⁴.

Since the restoration of independence Estonia has been under strong international pressure to liberalise its citizenship and language laws to integrate non-Estonians into local society. However, international pressure has also provided the governments of post-Communist states with an opportunity to avoid responsibility for unpopular changes in minority policy and has facilitated implementing new strategies of national rapprochement and social integration. "Thus, a government could pose as defender of nationalizing projects, while implementing integrationist policies by referring to the objective of EU membership as national consensus and its conditionality as *force majeure*"⁸⁵.

The new states needed resources, international legitimacy, and security. Taking account of Estonia's wish to 'rejoin Europe' IGOs such as the European Union or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development provided incentives and leverage with which to influence Estonian policies. For instance, organisations that could not offer substantial material aid or security, such as Helsinki Watch and Freedom House, were not notably successful in promoting their 'zero-option' policy. In this context, the HCNM served as a crucial institutional gatekeeper, holding out the prospect of eventual integration into western economic and security organisations in return for compliance with international standards of human and minority rights protection. The success of the High Commissioner certainly depended not only on organising and funding international actors, but also on the political activity of the state authorities and the restraint of the Russian-speaking community. Civil conflict was prevented thanks to the co-operation of internal and external forces, even if the wide range of external actors makes it hard to highlight any single contribution.

That said, the fact that the OSCE worked in tandem with the HCNM to provide information and assistance for his visits to Estonia, may be considered a key factor. The long-term OSCE mission was also the only institutional presence that was permanently on the ground and had close all-level contacts with Estonian officials, as well as with representatives of the Russophone communities and ordinary people. The mission, in conjunction with other observers, monitored elections and language exams and tried to foster dialogue between the different sides through organising the Roundtable, seminars, and workshops. The involvement of international mediators and the establishment of official contacts probably helped to improve the position of moderate forces on both sides.

Compared to the early 1990s, the separatist and antagonistic tendencies are undoubtedly on the wane at present. According to the 1993 inquiry, approximately two-thirds of Estonians and three quarters of non-Estonians evaluated ethnic relations in Estonia as problematic. Research conducted in 2000 indicates that inter-ethnic tensions have lessened. The pursuit of political and linguistic-cultural integration by the Russian-speaking population has steadily increased since 1993⁸⁶. From 1993-94 on, the structures of EU, as well as the Nordic countries, USA and Canada have also funded various language immersion programmes to accelerate the adaptation of non-Estonians living in Estonia.

Considering the above, one can conclude that the active participation of the international community in Estonia was a substantial force for stabilisation through promoting integration and modifying legislation. The comparative effectiveness of Estonian democratic institutions and the constructive involvement of European organisations helped to rebut hostile Russian rhetoric, ease tensions and resolve the crisis. In the future, it is by no means impossible that ad hoc diplomatic

mediation and structural guidance by IGOs to defuse the ethno-political crisis of Estonia will figure as a 'textbook case' of successful conflict prevention.

NOTES

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- ⁵ R. Vetik, *Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Post-Communist Estonia*, in "Journal of Peace Research", 1993, 30, p. 273.
- ⁶ W. Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, Princeton 1994; E. Berg, *Estonia's Northeastern Periphery in Politics: Socio-Economic and Ethnic Dimensions*, Tartu 1999.
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- ⁸ M. Heidmets, *The Russian Minority: Dilemmas for Estonia*, in "Trames", 1998, 2, pp. 266-269.
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- ¹¹ Such as S. van Evera, *Hypotheses on Nationalism and War*, in "International Security", 1994, 18, pp. 5-39, and L. Barington, *The Domestic and International Consequences of Citizenship in the Soviet Successor States*, in "Europe-Asia Studies", 1995, 47, pp. 755-756.
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- ¹³ See A. Haas, *Non-Violence in Ethnic Relations in Estonia*, in "Journal of Baltic Studies", 1996, 27, p. 48.
- ¹⁴ R. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge 1996, pp. 4-6, 60-70.
- ¹⁵ M. Heidmets, M. Lauristin (eds.), *The Challenge of the Russian Minority: Emerging Multicultural Democracy in Estonia*, Tartu 2002, p. 320.
- ¹⁶ D.J. Smith, *Framing the National Question in Central and Eastern Europe: A Quadratic Nexus?*, in "The Global Review of Ethnopolitics", 2002, 2, pp. 3-16.
- ¹⁷ E. Berg, W. van Meurs, *Borders and Orders in Europe: Limits of Nation- and State-Building in Estonia, Macedonia and Moldova*, in "Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics", 2002, 18, p. 51.
- ¹⁸ Smith, *Framing the National Question* cit., p. 9.
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- ²³ For example: M.I. Handel, *Weak States in the International System*, London 1990, pp. 3-65.
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- ³³ Regarding the influences of the CE see M. Roth, *Der Einfluss des Europarats auf die demokratische und menschenrechtliche Transformation der Baltischen Staaten*, Frankfurt am Main 2004.
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SOURCE

Office of the President Republic of Estonia – Communiqué*

"The Law on Aliens", adopted by the Riigikogu on June 21, has given rise to various interpretations. The situation that has emerged around it is partly accounted for by inadequate information among the Russian-speaking population, or, here and there, by misinformation.

In this connection the President of the Republic deems it wise to announce that before taking a decision in favour or against the promulgation of the said Law, he will apply to the Council of Europe, the OSCE and other organisations for an expert opinion in order to obtain an unbiased professional assessment of the said Law. The President of the Republic refers to the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, which grants everybody rights and liberties in conformity with European norms.

In order to secure domestic peace and a balanced policy essential for the reconstruction of the Republic of Estonia, the President of the Republic has decided to initiate a Round Table of non-citizens and ethnic minorities. The Round Table will present the conclusions of their discussions to the President in written form. Depending on the nature of each problem, the President of the Republic will forward them for examination to the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the Riigikogu, or for settlement by the pertinent state bodies.

At Kadriorg 25 June 1993

*From R. Zaagman, *Conflict Prevention in the Baltic States: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*, Flensburg 1999, p. 68.

The Effects of the Dissolution of Yugoslavia on Minority Rights: the Italian Minority in Post-Yugoslav Slovenia and Croatia

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Prispevek obravnava posledice razpada Jugoslavije za položaj italijanske manjšine na območju današnjih držav Slovenije in Hrvaške. V obdobju med obema svetovnima vojnama je na območjih, ki so med obema vojnama pripadala Italiji, po letu 1947 oziroma 1954 pa pripadla Jugoslaviji, živel okrog 230.000 Italijanov. Ob spreminjanju meja in deloma nasilnem deloma pa prostovoljnem preseljevanju prebivalstva se je njihovo število do leta 1961 zmanjšalo na okrog 25.000.

V obdobju socialistične Jugoslavije so Italijani od srede šestdesetih let. 20. stoletja uživali kot narodnost uživali vse manjšinske pravice in so dejansko služili kot "most" za sodelovanje med Jugoslavijo in Italijo. Tudi po letu 1991 se njihov položaj avtohtone manjšine ni spremenil, saj še naprej – in to tako na Hrvaškem kakor tudi v Sloveniji – uživajo manjšinsko zaščito, ki je "nadstandardna" v primerjavi z zahtevami Sveta Evrope. Zaščito manjšinskih pravic uživajo le pripadniki italijanske manjšine v Koprskem Primorju v Sloveniji ter v Istri na Hrvaškem, medtem ko Italijani v kontinentalnem delu Hrvaške (v občinah Pakrac in Lipik) manjšinske zaščite niso deležni. Omeniti je potrebno še, da so hrvaške oblasti v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja na območju Istre naselile večje število hrvaških beguncev (v glavnem iz Bosne in Hercegovine, Vojvodine in Kosova), z namenom okrepitve hrvaškega elementa v Istri.

INTRODUCTION

Thousands of books have been written on the dissolution of former Yugoslavia and the wars that followed in the 1990s. Most of them, however, deal with relations among the main ethno-nations of former Yugoslavia, i.e. Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosniaks (Muslims) and Albanians and the effects of the dissolution and wars on them. Italians of former Yugoslavia also suffered, and the wars affected their destiny; but they have rarely been mentioned in the context of this history. It is the aim of this chapter to fill the gap.

The international boundaries of former Yugoslavia as they were formed after World Wars I and II were not identical with ethnic borders. This was also true of the international boundaries created in the region in the 1990s. Therefore, parts of numerous ethnic groups lived as 'national minorities' outside the boundaries of their homelands. These groups were defined as 'nationalities' in the 1974 Constitution of former Yugoslavia, because the term 'minority' meant something less; and the politicians and ideologists who wrote the Constitution wanted to prove that nationalities constituted equally important parts of the society.

Among minorities in the region, Italians deserve special attention because after World War II – after almost all of the Germans left – they remained the only Western European ethnic minority in the country. Soon after World War II, the Italian minority became the subject of attention and partnership in political and economic cooperation, within Yugoslavia itself as well as in cooperation with their motherland (this distinguishes it from the Albanian minority of former Yugoslavia, which was the object of inter-ethnic conflict during the entire post-World War II period).

AREAS OF SETTLEMENTS OF ITALIANS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Italy after World War I gained extensive territories in what today is western Slovenia (*Primorska*), Istria and part of Dalmatia/Dalmazia in what is today Croatia in accordance with the secret Treaty of London of 1915. After World War II, Italy lost these territories. For different reasons, most of the Italians of Istria and Dalmatia/Dalmazia emigrated to Italy after the boundaries were drawn in 1947 and later in 1954. Today most of the Italians of Slovenia live in three cities on Slovene coast.

Italians settled on the coast of Istria (and in the hinterland), in the Kvarner Islands/*Isole d'Carnero* (Cres/Cherso and Lošinj/Lussino) and on the Dalmatian coast between Zadar/Zara and Split/Spalato. Within Istria, people changed their ethnic identity; and today people talk about an Istrian regional identity. Italians settled the cities and were historically, from the Middle Ages on, employed in the non-agrarian sector. Due to the economic power of the bourgeoisie, even Slavic immigrants to the cities from the hinterland already began to 'romanize' in the first generation. Most of the Italians of former Yugoslavia today live in Croatia, with approximately 90% of them located on the coast and the remainder in the continental area. While the Italians in the coastal belt of Croatia are part of an old historical (autochthonous) group, the Italians in the continental part of Croatia are exclusively immigrants.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE ITALIAN POPULATION IN SLOVENIA AND CROATIA ACCORDING TO THE CENSUSES OF 1991 AND 2001/02

The demographic development of the Italian minority in the regions of their settlements in Slovenia and Croatia is very complex and it can be explained – in spite of the trend towards a slow decrease in numbers in all states that developed after the dissolution of former Yugoslavia – as a result of outside factors (geographic features of their settlement areas, e.g. natural change, migration) and internal factors (statistical methods of registration, national policy of the state, mixed marriages, changes in the identity of the population, and natural assimilation).

The majority of the Italians in Slovenia and Croatia are partially an autochthonous and partially a subsequently resettled population that arrived between 1918-1943, when *Primorska* and Istria, Rijeka/Fiume, part of Dalmatia/Dalmazia, and the islands of Cres/Cherso, Krk/Veglia, Lastovo/Lagosta, and Palagruža/Pelagosa became part of Italy. Italian Fascists forceably assimilated Slovenes and Croats or forced them to leave. The Italian 1936 census¹ indicated approximately 230,000 persons who listed as Italian as their lan-

guage of communication in the territory of Slovenia and Croatia, which was then part of the Italian state (ca. 194,000 in today's Croatia and ca. 36,000 in today's Slovenia). Most of them left after the above-mentioned territory became part of Yugoslavia in accordance with decisions of the Paris Peace Conference in 1947.

From the end of World War II until 1953, according to different data, between 250,000 and 350,000 persons emigrated from the above-described regions. Two-thirds of them were ethnic Italians, one-third of them were Slovenes and Croats who opposed the Communist regime in Yugoslavia. Approximately 15% of all emigrants left without migration permits, while the majority left with the approval of the authorities. These are the so-called *optanti* emigrants, i.e. those who were living permanently in this region on 10 June 1940 and who expressed their wish to obtain Italian citizenship and emigrate to Italy. The emigration of Italians reduced the total population of the region and altered its ethnic structure.

So in 1953 only 36,000 Italians lived in the region of former Yugoslavia, i.e. 16% of the Italian population before World War II. Italians also emigrated in later decades (most of them to the Australia, Canada, South America or the USA). Therefore their population declined in each subsequent census until 1981.

Table I. Italian Population in Former Yugoslavia, 1953-2001/02².

		1948 ^a	1953 ^b	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001/02
Slovenia	No.	25,451	n.a.	3,072	3,001	2,187	3,063	2,258
	%	1.77		0.19	0.17	0.12	0.17	0.11
Croatia	No.	85,803	n.a.	21,103	17,433	11,661	21,303	19,636
	%	2.27		0.51	0.39	0.25	0.45	0.44
Former Yugoslavia	No.	113,278	n.a.	25,615	21,791	15,132	26,108	No data
	%	0.72		0.14	0.11	0.07	0.11	

Comments:

^a Data for Slovenia and Croatia, i.e. for the region of former Yugoslavia, are recounted for regions after final boundaries were drawn in 1954; the data are counts of the results of the 1953 Census of Population and data of the Statistical Office of the Istrian Regional People's Committee for Koper and Buje Counties/*Comitato popolare circondariale dell'Istria per i distretti di Capodistria e di Buie*, which were then part of the Free Territory of Trieste/*Territorio libero di Trieste*;

^b There are no data for the regions that were part of the Free Territory of Trieste/*Territorio libero di Trieste* for 1953 and therefore there are no data for ethnic affiliation of the population for Slovenia and Croatia nor for the region of Former Yugoslavia.

We have to emphasize that the data of the Yugoslav censuses are unreliable in relation to the real number of Italians, since many members of the Italian minority, for various reasons, chose 'Nationally Undeclared' or their regional identity (mostly as 'Istrians').

The number of Italians also changed in the last two decades of the 20th century. In the 1991 census there was a relatively large increase of Italians, compared to the 1981 census. Many Italians who in previous censuses did not declare as such, declared themselves 'Italians' in 1991 because they counted on the help of Italy in forthcoming crises in the region. Once the situation in Slovenia and Croatia was pacified after independence (and

especially after the end of the war in Croatia), there followed a decrease in their numbers in both countries.

According to the Croatian Census of 2001, most of the Italians lived in communes of the Istrian county/*Distretto di Istria* (*Istarska županija*), their number being ca. 14,300, or 6.92% of the whole population. In the communes that belonged to the Free Territory of Trieste/*Territorio libero di Trieste* until 1954, they still today are a significant percentage of the population: Grožnjan/Grisignana (51.21%), Brtonigla/Verteneglio (37.37%), Buje/Buie (29.72%), etc. More than 3,000 Italians live in Rijeka/Fiume and surroundings.

Italians also live in continental Croatia, in several settlements in the Pakrac (559 persons or 6.31%) and Lipik (208 persons or 3.12%) municipalities in Western Slavonia. They came from the Upper Tagliamento during the period from 1880 to 1909 and were stock farmers. In the new homeland each family received eight acres of land from the count

Table II. Changes in the Number and Percentage of Croatian and Italian Population According to Regions of Settlement in the Republic of Croatia, 1991-2001³.

Regions	C r o a t s				I t a l i a n s			
	1991	2001	Changes in number	Index 2002/1991	1991	2001	Changes in number	Index 2001/1991
Istria	111,596	148,328	+ 36,732	132.92	15,306	14,284	- 1,022	100.98
Rijeka/Fiume and surroundings	180,537	192,678	+ 12,141	106.72	3,907	3,478	- 429	93.57
Regions of autochthonous settlements of Italians – Total	292,133	341,006	+ 48,873	116.72	19,213	17,762	- 1,451	96.92
Continental Croatia	9,896	10,954	+ 1,058	110.69	869	767	- 102	88.26
Regions of settlements of Italians – Total	302,029	351,960	+ 49,931	116.53	20,082	18,529	- 1,553	94.58

(generally forests), which they had to clear within thirty years. They proved quite industrious and paid off their debts in a shorter period. Like the members of other nationalities of this region, the Italians were subject to the process of urbanization, but even today most of them are still involved in agriculture. They blended into the life of the area and did not, like the Italians of coastal Croatia, emigrate after the Second World War.

During the period of war in Croatia (1991-1995) their number decreased by only 10%, in spite of the fact that their settlement areas were war zones. As a comparison, the number of Hungarians who lived in approximately the same region of western Slavonia decreased by almost 42%.

During the war for Croatia there were no military battles in Istria. Therefore the Croat Government settled in Istria ethnic Croatian refugees from the regions that were under control of the Republic of Srpska Krajina, Herzegovina and central Bosnia. Many of those refugees settled permanently in Istria. These settlements were politically motivated, to “strengthen the Croatian stock” in Istria, because during the decade 1981-1991 the number of Italians in Istria statistically increased more than 80% as a result of new political conditions in Croatia. The Croatian political leadership was then worried because of political pressures from Italy, where demands for revisions of the Treaties of Osimo surfaced in extreme nationalist circles. On the other hand, the Croatian leadership was also worried because Istrians – both Croat and Italian – demanded autonomy within Croatia. That politics was involved with the settlement of ethnic Croatian refugees in Istria can be ascertained as well from the fact that the number of Croats increased the most in the region where the percentage of Italians was the highest, i.e. in the region of the former Buje/Buie commune (from 9,422 to 14,411). In all of Istria the number of Croats increased from 111,516 to 148,328 (i.e. by 32.9%).

Only scattered individuals of Italian nationality lived in northern Bosnia. Noteworthy is the change in population of Italians in Bosnia and Herzegovina. More than two-thirds lived in the commune of Prnjavor (ca. 18 miles northeast of Banja Luka). According to general statistical data, we can assume that their number decreased because it followed the patterns in Slovenia and Croatia from 1961 to 1991, when their number decreased first from 717 in 1961 to 616 in 1981, and then increased to 732 in 1991. Before the wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, in the village of Šibovska, Italians had their own school, with Italian as the language of instruction. In mid-1980s the school had 91 pupils and employed eight teachers⁴.

While in other parts of former Yugoslavia conditions of war prevailed throughout the 1990s, Slovenia maintained ‘normal’ conditions and, we should emphasize, also the standard census techniques and methodology. Thus, the decreases found in the number of minorities in the war areas resulted not only because of forced assimilation and war conditions, but also because of the techniques and methodology used for the counts.

The most recent population census in Slovenia (2002), which shows a significant decrease in numbers of members of the Italian minority, caused unrest among Italians as well as in the general populace of the country. According to that census, however, even the number of Slovenes had significantly decreased. We must look for the reasons for the decrease in numbers of italians mostly in changes in methodology of the census.

For example, in 1991 and previous censuses, one member of the family identified nationality for the whole family; while in 2002 every person who was more than fifteen years old had to tell the enumerators his or her nationality. At the time of the census many people were not available to tell their nationality to the enumerators. It was possible to send a statement on their nationality, but many did not send it to the census commission. Therefore, more than 126,000 persons (6.42% of the population of the Republic of Slovenia) are included in the rubric ‘nationality unknown.’ Also emigrants who were temporary workers abroad were not taken into account in the 2002 census. In previous censuses, someone who had his residency formally in Koper/Capodistria or Lendava was

counted even though he/she had lived for a decade in Trieste or Hungary or any place else in the world. The census of 2002 counted only those who really lived in the place of their permanent settlement.

There is a problem also with having to choose one nationality at the census, because many people in ethnically mixed territories are from ethnically mixed families. It is possible, therefore, that some minority members did not want to (or could not) answer the question on their nationality. In the Slovenian census of 2002, more than 60,000 did not answer this question. The census of 2002 asked also for the mother tongue, and the number of persons whose mother tongue was Italian (3,762 persons) was significantly higher than those who identified themselves as Italians (2,256 persons) by nationality. The decrease in ethnic identity was significantly lower if mother tongue is taken into account.

This example shows that we have to be careful when talking about and explaining the results of the population censuses according to nationality, so that we do not try to explain reduction of an ethnic group only by assimilation or emigration but look at all factors.

MINORITY RIGHTS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND IN THE POST-YUGOSLAV STATES OF SLOVENIA AND CROATIA

During the period of Communist Yugoslavia (1945-1991), the equality of ethno-nations and national minorities and how to handle inter-ethnic relations was one of the key questions of Yugoslav internal politics. With the creation of the multi-ethnic autonomous regions (Kosovo and Vojvodina) in Serbia, the federation of Yugoslavia was proclaimed by the second Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) Assembly in November 1943. The fourth paragraph of the proclamation stated, "National minorities in Yugoslavia shall be granted all national rights..." These principles were codified in the 1946 and 1963 constitutions and reaffirmed again, in great detail, by the last federal constitution of 1974.⁵ It declared that the nations and nationalities should have equal rights (Article 245). It further stated that "... each nationality has the sovereign right freely to use its own language and script, to foster its own culture, to set up organizations for this purpose, and to enjoy other constitutionally guaranteed rights..." (Article 274)⁶.

In spite of the fact that the federal constitutions (1946, 1953, 1974) and the constitutions of the republics and autonomous provinces, as well as different laws, emphasized protection of national minorities, there was – as in other East Central European 'Socialist' states – an ever-widening gap between theory and practice. In theory, Yugoslav standards were even higher than the standards in other European states.

Slovenia has been an example of how to protect autochthonous national minorities. Already the Constitution of the SR of Slovenia of 1963 guaranteed the Italian and Hungarian minorities equality and the possibility of development and progress in all fields; equality of their languages in ethnically mixed territories; and care for the development of education, printing presses, radio and cultural education (Article 77)⁷. The importance of both minorities was emphasized also in a chapter on the special rights of Italians and Hungarians in the last Slovenian Constitution in Former Yugoslavia (1974, Articles 250 and 251). Both articles guaranteed to both minorities free usage of their languages, ex-

pression of their national culture, usage of symbols and establishment of special organizations. In ethnically mixed territories, the languages of minorities were proclaimed equal with the Slovene language, and members of minorities were guaranteed the right to bring up and educate their children in their own language⁸.

Slovenia put special emphasis on protection of its autochthonous minorities, in part because of its international obligations after World War II, but also because that was in keeping with the process of decentralization and democratisation of the then Yugoslav federation and the "opening of frontiers" (i.e., Yugoslav citizens were given the right to travel abroad and tourism became one of the most important Yugoslav 'industries') at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s. Slovenians started to see "ethnic minorities on both sides of the frontier as a connecting factor". An especially important factor in determining the levels of protection of autochthonous minorities was also the care for the well-being of Slovene minorities in neighbouring countries, in spite of the fact that the level of minority protection was then and is still today significantly lower in those countries than in Slovenia⁹.

The Constitution of independent Slovenia (1991) kept and upgraded the level of protection of the Italian and Hungarian minorities. Two rules were new: (a) the level of protection and rights is not dependent on the number of members of minority groups in proportion to other groups, and (b) laws and other ordinances that deal with granting constitutional rights and the situation of national minorities can not be accepted without the consent of representatives of the national minorities. It is a type of 'absolute' veto in the hands of representatives of the national minorities (both deputies in the Slovene parliament and municipal council members)¹⁰. Compared to the other Council of Europe and EU member states, Slovenia enacted very broad minority protection.

Minority protection in Slovenia is based on two principles: the principle of territoriality and the principle of collectivity. The first means determining the territory of autochthonous settlement, which includes all the settlements where Italians and Hungarians have been settled for centuries. The second emphasizes the collective nature of minorities and their needs in addition to general and special individual rights. In those territories, the official language in addition to Slovene is Italian or Hungarian. These ethnically mixed territories are recognizable at first sight because of bilingual signs and inscriptions for names of settlements, towns and cities. Visible bilingualism is not restricted to signs on the streets and official buildings like courts, county and municipal buildings, etc.; this right is ensured also for signs on the streets and buildings of private and state-owned enterprises¹¹.

Bilingual documents are compulsory for all inhabitants of ethnically mixed areas, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation. In addition to personal identity cards and passports (which are trilingual in Slovene, English, and Italian or Hungarian), the following documents are bilingual: drivers' licenses, vehicle registration documents, medical insurance booklets and army service booklets.

Bilingual procedures are also prescribed for judiciary institutions; courts are obliged to guarantee the equality of the minority language. The court proceedings may be conduct-

ed monolingually if only one party appears or if both parties in the proceedings use the same language. Once the judicial process has been started on a bilingual basis, it will be conducted bilingually in higher courts also, even when the seat of the higher court lies outside an ethnically mixed area. Of course, members of the minorities must demand the right to have the court proceedings, as well as other administrative procedures and correspondence in their languages or bilingually. Employees are entitled to higher pay for their knowledge of the Italian or Hungarian language¹².

Members of the Hungarian or Italian minority in the ethnically mixed territories also have the right to use their languages in municipal administration. It is important to stress again that the above-mentioned rights are on paper; the actual use of them depends on everyday practice by the members of elected bodies and the other citizens. Similarly, the right to use Italian and Hungarian mother tongues is ensured by the Catholic or the Evangelical churches. In the bilingual territories, religious services in Hungarian or Italian are held weekly in both Evangelical and Catholic churches. Masses are said by Slovene priests, for the simple reason that at this moment there are no Hungarian or Italian minority priests in Slovenia.

Slovenia is implementing the rights to education in a minority mother tongue in two different ways. The compulsory bilingual education system in the ethnically mixed area of Prekmurje and the monolingual schools for members of the Italian ethnic minority area have developed as a result of two totally different historical situations¹³. In the ethnically mixed area of the Slovene Coastland (so-called *Koprsko Primorje*), in the 2000/01 school year, 264 children were enrolled in Italian-language kindergartens, 435 students were in nine central and affiliated primary schools, and 278 students were in three secondary schools¹⁴. In schools where Italian is used for instruction, it is also the language of communication with parents and the language of administration. In these schools, learning Slovenian is compulsory; Italian is compulsory in the ethnically mixed territory on the Slovene coastland for students who are attending schools where Slovenian is the language of instruction. Schools with Italian as the language of instruction are not limited to members of the Italian minority. The parents decide which school their children will attend; there are already quite a few children whose mother tongue is not Italian who are attending the 'Italian' schools.

Due to the small number of members of the Italian minority, it is not possible to organize university education in their mother tongue in Slovenia. Study of Italian language and culture is possible at the University of Ljubljana and at the University of Primorska (in Koper/Capodistria). At the University of Primorska education of kindergarten governesses and primary schools teachers in the Italian language is taking place. Because of the limited opportunity to study in the languages of autochthonous minorities in Slovenia, Slovenia already in 1960s signed agreements with Italy that enable members of minorities on both sides of the border – Slovenes from Italy; as well as Italians from Slovenia – to study at universities in Italy and Slovenia.

A radio station in the Italian language was established in 1949. It transmits fourteen hours of broadcasts in Italian per day. In 1971 a TV station was added. It broadcasts eleven hours a day in Italian and one hour a day in Slovenian. Both provide information for the Italian population in Slovenia and Croatia. The Italian-language radio and TV stations

function as part of the organizational framework of the National Radio and TV but have broad autonomy in programmatic as well as organizational matters¹⁵.

The Italians in Slovenia and Croatia publish their own newspapers together. The publisher is "Edit", located in Rijeka/Fiume (Croatia) and a special correspondence office in Koper/Capodistria. Its chief publication is the daily "La Voce del Popolo", printed in 3,750 copies; the weekly "Panorama" in 2,200 copies; the tri-monthly literary magazine "La Battana" in 1000 copies and a children's newsletter, "Arcobaleno" (2,500 copies). Since 1992 the newspaper "La Voce del Popolo" has been sold together with the Triestine daily paper "Il Piccolo" in a sandwich arrangement: two papers for the price of one. The Republic of Slovenia supports the publishing of printed media with suitable financial grants. The amount represents 20% of the sum allocated for these activities in the Republic of Croatia.

With the help of different grants-in-aid on the initiative of the members of the Italian (and Hungarian) minority, the minorities are making use of their right to their own cultural development¹⁶ in six Italian and twenty-two Hungarian cultural societies. The Republic of Slovenia financially supports cultural exchange of minority organizations and institutions. The Italian and Hungarian minorities also have the constitutional right to fly their flags on the territories of their autochthonous settlements¹⁷.

According to the Constitution of Slovenia, minority members have the right to two votes in the elections of members of the State Assembly as well as in elections of the organs of local self-government (city councillors)¹⁸. They may use the first vote in accordance with their political affiliation and the second vote to elect special minority representatives. In the State Assembly, a body with ninety seats, two seats are reserved for the representatives of the Hungarian and Italian national minorities. The Republic of Slovenia has authorized the self-governing ethnic communities to compile electoral registers of citizens who are their members. The deputies of the Italian and Hungarian minorities are elected by all members of the ethnic minorities who have voting rights, irrespective of whether they live in the ethnically mixed areas or elsewhere in Slovenia. In the National State Assembly a Permanent Commission for Minorities has been established as one of its four permanent commissions¹⁹. A similar situation exists on the local level²⁰.

Self-governing ethnic communities were established in every municipality inhabited by members of the autochthonous ethnic minorities²¹. The municipal ethnic communities then join together to form the Italian or Hungarian ethnic community. The two communities are the key partners in relations with the Republic of Slovenia. When they decide on matters affecting the status of ethnic minorities, state bodies must acquire the prior opinion of the self-managing ethnic communities. A similar provision also applies on the local level. The members of self-governing ethnic communities also cooperate with international organizations and participate in the preparation of international agreements relating to their status at the local, state and even international level²².

As a member of the Council of Europe and member of the European Union, Slovenia also has to obey all of the rules and different regulations that are part of European laws²³.

In spite of the fact that Slovenia is legally giving its autochthonous minorities more rights than prescribed by European standards, in enforcing those laws of minority protections,

problems are surfacing that are primarily explainable by lack of a culture of law enforcement. Measures to cut state spending at all levels also extend to minority protection. The high level of minority protection created numerous minority institutions that are financially more or less dependent on state support. In this sense, the minorities also became part of the market economy, and this represented a shock for them. Both minorities are quite small in numbers and do not have the economic base to self-finance their institutions and activities.

Representatives of both minorities in the State Assembly (Slovene Parliament) have therefore many times called attention to their troubles and urged recognition that the situation of the Italian and Hungarian minorities is extremely critical²⁴. In early January 2004, when the state and its special organs did not react properly, the deputy of the Italian minority in the Slovene Parliament, Roberto Battelli, decided to resign as president of the special Commission of the State Assembly for Nationalities²⁵. The resignation of Battelli also echoed in neighbouring Italy. The former Italian Foreign Minister, Gianni de Michelis – who, at the end of 1980s, was already against Slovene independence – issued a statement:

In Slovenia I recognize very negative things... The protest of the deputy of the Italian minority, Roberto Battelli, represents a very bad sign. I knew Slovenian circumstances very well, I criticized them and I did not change my opinion and what is happening is a continuation of the short-sighted vision of the Slovene political class, which does not realize the new reality it is entering...²⁶

Other representatives of the Italian minority in Slovenia also emphasized the problems of non-implementation of minority protection laws²⁷. The debate in the Slovene parliament showed that the Hungarian deputy thinks the same with regard to the situation of Hungarians in Slovenia.

Members of the Slovene minority in Italy showed solidarity with the Italian minority in Slovenia, although their legal situation as well as the actual enforcement of the law are much worse compared to that of the Italian minority in Slovenia²⁸.

Even before it became independent, Croatia had relatively good laws in place to protect its national minorities. In addition to Hungarians and Italians, also Czechs, Slovaks, Ruthenians, and Ukrainians enjoyed protection of their minority rights (Serbs enjoyed the status of a constitutive nation of Croatia). All the above-mentioned national minorities had their special institutions in the fields of education and culture, which helped them to retain their identities.

Croatian politicians tried to regulate inter-ethnic relations on their territory. In 1990, when it was still a part of SFRY, they declared in a special resolution that Croatia would protect its national minorities²⁹. The 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (amended in 1997) declared that Croatia "... is the national state of the Croatian nation and members of the other nations and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, and others to whom equality with citizens of Croatian nationality is guaranteed ..."³⁰ The Constitution also declared Croatian as the official language and the Latin alphabet as the official alphabet, except in the regions of settlement of minorities, where their languages and alphabets are official in

addition to Croatian. This statement was repeated in the “Declaration on Independence and Sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia”³¹ and in the special “Decree on the Rights of Serbs and Other Minorities in Croatia”³².

Protection of minorities is also treated in the Constitutional Law of December 1991 (amended in 2000). Regulations in it are general and deal with all the minorities in Croatia. The law cites the international obligations of Croatia and generally valid international norms, and specifically regulates the protection of minorities, including their right to development and cultural autonomy; prohibits discrimination; regulates the rights of members of minorities to be adequately represented in representative and other bodies of the Republic of Croatia; defines regions with special status; allows for international surveillance on implementation of regulations of this law with the aim to ensure that human rights will be respected; and prohibits all activities that would threaten general human rights and the rights of minorities³³. A special law defines official usage of languages and alphabets in the Republic of Croatia³⁴. Croatia also signed and ratified some bilateral and multilateral agreements aimed at protection of minorities. Already in 1992 it concluded a *Memorandum on Understanding* with Italy. It signed similar agreements with Hungary and Ukraine, and it took until 1997 to accept and ratify the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages and other international documents as part of its accession to the Council of Europe.

It was much easier to give minority rights to the Italian minority in the region of Istria and Rijeka, where that minority was well organized. Partially financed by the Italian state, it developed very effective programs in the fields of culture, education and media. There were quite a few problems between the Croatian state and local authorities in Istria. The Croatian Constitutional Court in February 1995 declared null and void eighteen of thirty-six articles of the Statutes of Istria County (*Statut Istarske županije*); most of them dealt with the question of Italian language usage. In its explanation, the Constitutional Court wrote that those articles were not under the jurisdiction of local authorities.

On the other hand, Italians in the Lipik and Pakrac communes do not enjoy any protection from the Croatian state.

The Italian minority also felt neglected; and the fact that, after Yugoslavia's dissolution in 1991, its unified territory of autochthonous settlement was divided between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia created more problems. Once the new Slovene-Croatian border was established, the seats of most of the organizations of Italian minority remained in Croatia (the publishing house “Edit”, editorials of the daily “La Voce del popolo”, and the weekly “Panorama”, the tri-monthly literary publication “La Battana”, the special publication for children “Arcobaleno”, and the seat of the most important political organization of the Italian minority, the Italian Federation (*Unione Italiana*)). Members of Italian minority in Slovenia remained without a substantial number of their organizations which they could not – because of their small number – replace with a new one. Therefore they tried to continue to act as one entity. This would be the only way to establish a “critical mass” necessary to be able to operate within their organizations, to maintain their cultural and economic projects and to sustain Italian culture and language in both Countries.

The coordination of members of Italian minority in Slovenia and Croatia was taken over by the Italian Federation (*Unione Italiana*). Its registration in Slovenia – due to the fact that it had its seat in Rijeka/Fiume, in Croatia – encountered quite a few difficulties. The authorities claimed that the *Unione Italiana* wanted to become the ‘exclusive’ representative of the Italian minority in Slovenia and Croatia, at the same time forgetting that Slovenia and Croatia are two sovereign states. The authorities however could not prove that. Some also claimed that the *Unione Italiana* had a privileged status in connection with financial support from Italy. We have to emphasize, however, that the *Unione Italiana* is not final recipient of the money. It serves only as a middleman. Final recipients were minority schools, minority media, other minority organizations and those members of Italian minority who received stipends. Due to the above mentioned problems, it took many years for the *Unione Italiana* to register in Slovenia. Representatives of the *Unione Italiana* first reached an agreement on the division of responsibilities with the representatives of the Coastal Self-Managing Community of the Italian Nationality (*Comunità autogestita costiera della nazionalità Italiana*) so that the latter should take care of political and basic questions of fulfilment of the rights of Italian minority while the *Unione Italiana* ought to take care of unification on the basis of interests. Later the *Unione Italiana* wrote several amendments to its constitution in order to make it compatible with Slovene law and thus it was finally registered in August 1998 as a federation of associations³⁵. This however did not better the situation of Italian minority in Slovenia.

CONCLUSIONS: MINORITY FUNCTIONS ALONG THE BORDERS

Minorities settle for the most part in frontier regions, which are mostly on the periphery. The structural disadvantages of frontier regions are damaging for the minorities: those regions are demographically disadvantaged and also economically worse off than the central areas of the states. Minorities were and are potential objects of conflict. In more developed regions, especially in the most recent decades, members of minorities are accepted as an advantage because of their bilingualism, biculturalism, and knowledge of people and situations in frontier regions. Members of minorities are often involved in transborder activities and connections, from different trade and cultural activities to economic co-operation in the fields of business, management, banking etc. For those activities, highly qualified and motivated people who are integrated in the majority environment and who also have connections in the mother-state are needed.

Minority protection can show positive economic results here also. This was evident in the case of Slovenes in Italy and Austria. Italians and Hungarians in Slovenia did not show such good results in promotion of economic cooperation between Slovenia and their mother states. A high level of minority protection may be counterproductive, if the network of educational, cultural and political minority organizations that are state funded give jobs to a majority of the qualified members of the minorities and, therefore, no people from minorities are available to work in the economy.

When language and culture became part of the market economy, the Italian and Hungarian minorities had a shock which they were not ready for. Cutbacks in state funds are a trend occurring throughout Europe. If minorities want to survive, they will have to de-

velop more civil service institutions and will have to develop their initiative at home and become better partners there. The state has to give them institutionalised support as well. In the context of today's information society, the human factor is more important than ever in history.

NOTES

- ¹ *VIII. Censimento della popolazione 21. aprile 1936. Vol II, Fasc. 24: Provincia del Friuli; Fasc. 31: Provincia del Carnerio; Fasc. 32: Provincia di Gorizia, Fasc. 22: Provincia dell'Istria, Fasc. 34: Provincia di Trieste; Fasc. 35: Provincia di Zara*, Rome 1936.
- ² *Statistika prebivalstva Istarskega okrožja po stanju z dne 15. decembra 1947* (Koper: Statistični urad Istarskega okrožnega ljudskega odbora, 1948) – Archive of Institute for Ethnic Studies in Ljubljana; *Statistički ljetopis Istre, Primorja i Gorskog Kotara 1992* (Data only for former Buje Commune); *Konačni rezultati popisa stanovništva od 15. marta 1948. godine, Knjiga IX: Stanovništvo po narodnosti*. (Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1954); *Popis stanovništva 1953. Knjiga XIII: Stanovništvo i domaćinstva*. (Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1959); *Popis stanovništva 1961. Knjiga VI: Vitalna, etnička i migraciona obeležja – rezultati za opštine* (Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1967); *Popis stanovništva i stanova 1971. Statistički bilten 727: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama* (Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1972); *Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova u 1981. godini. Statistički bilten 1295: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama – konačni rezultati* (Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1982); *Prvi rezultati popisa stanovništva, domaćinstava i poljoprivrednih gazdinstava 1991. godine. Statistički bilten broj 1934: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama* (Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1995); *Popis stanovništva 2001. Stanovništvo prema narodnosti, po gradovima/opštinama* (Zagreb: Državni zavod za statistiku, 2002), at: http://www.dzs.hr/Popis%202001/Popis/H01_02_02/H01_02_02.html (16 November 2003); *Popis prebivalstva, gospodinjstev in stanovanovanj, Slovenija, 31. marca 2002. Statistične informacije no. 93: Prebivalstvo* (Ljubljana: Statistični urad Republike Slovenije, 2003), p. 23; *Popis stanovništva 2002* (Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku, 2004), at: <http://www.kanjiza.co.yu/nepszamlalas2002/popisst2002.htm>, (20 January 2004).
- ³ *Prvi rezultati popisa stanovništva, domaćinstava i poljoprivrednih gazdinstava 1991. godine. Statistički bilten broj 1934: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama* (Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1995); *Popis stanovništva 2001. Stanovništvo prema narodnosti, po gradovima/opštinama* (Zagreb: Državni zavod za statistiku, 2002), at: http://www.dzs.hr/Popis%202001/Popis/H01_02_02/H01_02_02.html (16 November 2003).
- ⁴ S. Novak-Lukanović, *Some Yugoslav Experiences in Asserting Equality of the Nations and Nationalities in the Field of Education*, "Razprave in gradivo" 18, 1986, p. 75.
- ⁵ *The Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia*, Belgrade 1946; *The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, Belgrade 1963.
- ⁶ *The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, Belgrade 1989.
- ⁷ *Ustava Socialistične republike Slovenije* [The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia], Ljubljana 1963.
- ⁸ *Ustava Socialistične republike Slovenije* [The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia], Ljubljana 1974.
- ⁹ C. Ribičič, *Italijanska in madžarska narodna skupnost v Republiki Sloveniji: Ustavnopravni položaj. Posebna skrb Slovenije za obe manjšini že pred osamosvojitvijo*, "Republika", 6, 4, 1997, p. 4.
- ¹⁰ L. Ude - F. Grad - M. Cerar Jr., *Ustava Republike Slovenije: z uvodnim komentarjem dr. Lojzeta Udeteta, dr. Franca Grada in Mira Cerarja ml. in stvarnim kazalom*, Ljubljana 1992.
- ¹¹ *Pravilnik o določanju imen naselij in ulic ter o označevanju naselij, ulic in stavb* [Regulations on Determining the Names of Settlements and Streets and the Marking of Settlements, Streets and Buildings], "Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia" (further: "Official Gazette") 11, 1980; *Zakon o imenovanju in evidentiranju naselij, ulic in stavb* [Law on the Naming and Registering of Settlements, Streets and Buildings], "Official Gazette", 8, 1980.
- ¹² *Zakon o sodiščih* [Law on Courts], "Official Gazette", 19, 1994; *Zakon o notariatu* [Law on Notaryship], "Official Gazette", 13/94, 48/94, Ljubljana 1994; *Zakon o državnem tožilstvu* [Law on the Office of Public Prosecutor], "Official Gazette", 63/94, 1994.
- ¹³ The international legal obligations of Slovenia towards the education of members of ethnic communities in their own language may be found in the following: (1) *Special statute of the Memorandum of Understanding* from 1954, points b and c of Article 4; (2) *Sporazum o zagotavljanju posebnih pravic slovenske manjšine v Republiki Madžarski in madžarske narodne skupnosti v Republiki Sloveniji* [Convention on the Providing of Special Rights of the Slovenian

- Ethnic Minority in the Republic of Hungary and the Hungarian Ethnic Community in the Republic of Slovenia], "Official Gazette", 6/93, 1993; (3) *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*, Article 12-14; *European Charter for Regional or Minority Language*, Article 8.
- ¹⁴ M. Komac, *Varstvo narodnih skupnosti v Sloveniji* [Protection of ethnic communities in the Republic of Slovenia], in M. Polzer - L. Kalcina - M. Žagar (eds.), *Slovenija in evropski standardi varstva narodnih manjšin/Slovenia and European Standard for the Protection of National Minorities*, Ljubljana 2002, pp. 38-39.
- ¹⁵ *Statut Javnega zavoda Radiotelevizije Slovenija* [Statute of the Public Institution RTV Slovenia], "Official Gazette", 66/95, 1995.
- ¹⁶ *Zakon o uresničevanju javnega interesa na področju kulture* [Law on the Realization of Public Interest in the Area of Culture], "Official Gazette", 75/94, 1994.
- ¹⁷ *Zakon o grbu, zastavi in himni Republike Slovenije ter o slovenski narodni zastavi* [Law on the Coat of Arms, Flag and Anthem of the Republic of Slovenia, and on the Slovenian National Flag], "Official Gazette", 67/94, 1994.
- ¹⁸ See Article 64 of the *Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia*.
- ¹⁹ *Zakon o evidenci volilne pravice* [Law on the Records of Voting Rights], "Official Gazette", 46/92, 1992; *Zakon o volitvah v državni zbor* [Law on Elections to the National Assembly], "Official Gazette", 44/92, 1992.
- ²⁰ *Zakon o lokalni samoupravi* [Law on Local Self-government], "Official Gazette", 72/93, 1993.
- ²¹ *Zakon o samoupravih narodnih skupnostih* [Law on Self-governing ethnic communities], "Official Gazette", 65/93, 1993.
- ²² *Ibid.*
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- ²⁶ L. Kante, *Solidarni z manjšino* [Solidarity with Minority], "Delo", 46/8, 2004, p. 2.
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The German-Slovene Language and State Border in Southern Austria: from Nationalist Quarrels to Friendly Co-Existence (19th to 21st Centuries)

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ABSTRACT

The chapter focuses on the former Habsburg crown lands of Carinthia and Styria, the present provinces of the Federal Republic of Austria. Both are located in the south of today's Austria, facing the border with Slovenia and, prior to 1991, with Yugoslavia. Around 1900, both crownlands were inhabited by a considerable Slovene population, 80,000 in Carinthia and 400,000 in Styria. This study addresses the border changes after World War I as well as the political discourse which surrounded them. At least up to 1945, the recurrent theme of this discourse was the endeavour to demonstrate the superiority of German culture in its confrontation with what was held to be "Slavic barbarism". Slovene national emancipation had started around 1850: the movement later argued not only for equal rights within the Habsburg realm but also for a genuine Slovene crown land and, towards the end of the First World War, for separation from the Habsburg Monarchy. In 1919, Styria lost one third of her area and population to the new state of Yugoslavia, while in Carinthia a plebiscite was held in the contested zones which resulted in success for Austria. The ongoing discourse surrounding the revising of the border culminated in National Socialist racial policy towards Lower Styria between 1941 and 1945. The last part of the chapter shows how former tensions diminished more or less after the Second World War, leading to peaceful co-existence between Austria and Slovenia after 1991. The ongoing quarrels over minority rights in Carinthia, however, are also treated here.

Dieser Beitrag vermittelt einen Überblick über die Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen den Slowenen und der deutschsprachigen Bevölkerung in Österreich vom frühen 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart. Behandelt werden die an Slowenien angrenzenden Bundesländer der heutigen Republik Österreich, Kärnten und die Steiermark. Um 1900 lebten in diesen habsburgischen Kronländern beträchtliche slowenische Minderheiten, rund 80.000 in Kärnten und 400.000 in der Steiermark. Der Aufsatz stellt die wechselseitigen Beziehungen unter das Generalthema der Entwicklung vom Nationalitätenkonflikt hin zu einer friedlichen Nachbarschaft im Rahmen der Europäischen Union. Auf das Erwachen des slowenischen Natio-

nalbewußtseins im späten 19. Jahrhundert reagierte die sich kulturell überlegen fühlende deutschsprachige Bevölkerung in Kärnten und der Steiermark mit einem defensiv verstandenen Abwehrkampf, den sie als Verteidigung der mitteleuropäisch-deutschen Kultur gegen slawische Barbarei deklarierte. Obwohl die nur rund 1,5 Millionen Menschen umfassende slowenische Bevölkerung innerhalb der Habsburgermonarchie keine Bedrohung für die deutsche Dominanz darstellte, breitete sich bei den Deutschsprachigen eine Weltuntergangsstimmung aus. Vor allem durch die während des Ersten Weltkrieges ausgeübten Repressalien gegen die habsburgtreuen Slowenen wurden diese der Doppelmonarchie entfremdet. Die Folge war die Abtrennung der mehrheitlich slowenisch besiedelten Untersteiermark im Frieden von St. Germain 1919, während eine im zweisprachigen Gebiet Südkärntens 1920 abgehaltene Volksabstimmung dank der slowenischen Stimmen zu Gunsten Österreichs ausfiel. Trotz dieses Erfolges blieb in Kärnten der Mythos vom "Abwehrkampf" gegen Jugoslawien weiter lebendig, teilweise bis in die Gegenwart.

In Kärnten und der Steiermark bildete sich in der Zwischenkriegszeit ein extrem nationalistischer, aggressiver Diskurs heraus, auf den die Nationalsozialisten nach ihrer Annexion Österreichs 1938 bzw. nach der Besetzung Jugoslawiens im April 1941 zurückgreifen konnten und in dessen Zentrum die Forderung nach einer Revision der Friedensregelung von 1919 stand. Zwischen 1941 und 1945 wurde versucht, die ehemals steirischen Gebiete zu germanisieren, wobei davon ausgegangen wurde, dass die Mehrheit der Slowenen sich relativ mühelos in dieses Konzept einfügen würde. Die mythische Landeseinheit von einst drängte somit rassistische Konzepte zurück.

Nach 1945 stand jede Erinnerung an die ehemaligen deutschen Positionen im nunmehrigen Jugoslawien Titos unter dem Verdacht des Nazi-Revanchismus. Mit dem Staatsvertrag, den Österreich und die Siegermächte des Weltkrieges 1955 abschlossen, wurde die Staatsgrenze zu Jugoslawien völkerrechtlich festgeschrieben. Zugleich erhielt die in Kärnten verbliebene slowenische Minderheit weitgehenden Schutz zugesichert, dessen Umsetzung bis heute von Konflikten begleitet und daher nicht vollständig verwirklicht ist. In der Steiermark, wo es keine Slowenen mehr gab, wurde früh versucht, die Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen zu Slowenien bzw. Jugoslawien zu verbessern, um die wirtschaftlich nachteilige Isolation in der Südostecke der "Freien Welt" zu überwinden. Diese Politik, an der Slowenien interessiert war, zeitigte seit den 1960-er Jahren Erfolge. Konsequenterweise unterstützte Österreich die slowenische Unabhängigkeit, die 1991 erreicht wurde, nachdem es zu Kämpfen an der Staatsgrenze zwischen slowenischen und serbischen Truppen gekommen war.

Die heutige Situation zwischen beiden Staaten kann, sieht man von der fortschwellenden Minderheitenproblematik in Kärnten ab, als weitgehend konfliktfrei beschrieben werden. Zu diesem Zustand von Harmonie und guter Nachbarschaft gehört, dass in Österreich das Wissen um die gemeinsame Geschichte unter der jüngeren Generation weitgehend verschwunden ist. Im nördlichen Slowenien, der ehemaligen Untersteiermark, gibt es Tendenzen, diesen Landesteil als eine historisch gewachsene, von Kernslowenien (dem ehemaligen Krain mit Ljubljana) verschiedene Landschaft zu konstituieren. In den drei betrachteten Einheiten: Kärnten, Steiermark und Slowenien, übt die Grenze und deren historischer Wandel im 20. Jahrhundert eine völlig divergierende Funktion aus.

PRECONDITIONS

This essay focuses on the former Habsburg Duchies of Styria and Carinthia in the southern part of Austria and their successors, the Austrian provinces of the same name. Since the situation in Carinthia is better known and well researched, I will concentrate on Styria¹. In 1910, this Habsburg crownland was inhabited by roughly one million German-speaking Styrians and 400.000 Slovenes². Both ethnic groups had lived peacefully together in one administrative entity since the Middle Ages. Starting in the late 19th century, this coexistence was more and more questioned in favour of a future separation of German-speaking Austrians and Slovenes in the region. In the south of Styria a separation between German-speaking Styrians and Slovenes formed by geography never existed. In Carinthia, however, the Karawanken Mountains constituted a natural border, if not a wall against Slavic people settling in the south of them. The recurrent theme of discourse was the endeavour to demonstrate the superiority of German culture in order to legitimize the leading role of the German population in the fields of politics, economy, and culture. Thereby, the existing borders including half a million Slovenes into the German-dominated crownlands of Styria and Carinthia could be justified. After the territorial changes of 1919, it could be argued for a border revision.

This discourse was determined by the internal composition of the Habsburg state and regulated by social and cultural power relations. At the end of the 19th century, the discourse on the Slavs would finally merge with a second one on imagined boundaries between Western and Central Europe on the one side, and eastern and south-eastern Europe on the other side. The Slovenes were located within a cultural frontier which marked the German core lands of the Habsburg Monarchy and separated them from south-eastern Europe. Shortly after 1800, when no border existed within the Duchy of Styria, contemporary observers described not primarily a language border (which really existed) but a cultural one, which was more or less connected to the ethnic pattern. One of these observers was the famous poet Franz Grillparzer, who in 1819 wrote about his impression of a changing landscape when he left the “beautiful” German-dominated region of Southern Styria and entered the “unpleasant and poor” Slovene part of the Duchy. Grillparzer pointed out the ways in which town planning, architectural styles and the very landscape itself confirmed the unique German character of the region as far as a German settlement prevailed. Later, German nationalists would transform Grillparzer’s rhetoric, using spatial metaphors that attributed a national identity to the landscape itself³.

In Styria, power and chances were distributed unequally: the Germans established as a nation and in control of political and economic power for a long time, the Slovenes the awakening nation fighting for a share of influence. This struggle for participation was inevitably directed against the elements already in possession of power. Everything the Slovenes intended to gain had to be taken from the German *Besitzstand* [sum of German possessions]⁴. The German element controlled Styria, but the Duchy was part of an Empire theoretically offering equal rights to all its peoples⁵. The Imperial government in Vienna was not outwardly hostile towards Slovene emancipation and even

backed it during some periods⁶. Germans in Styria fighting Slovene demands could not count on Vienna as their ally. As a consequence, German defence was only partially, if ever, conducted by central administrative authorities, but emerged within the society and used social, cultural, as well as political tools⁷.

STYRIA WITHIN THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

To defend their positions, the German-speaking elites in Styria had to draw a virtual boundary between their own nation and the Slavs. This boundary was determined by the perception of backwardness and underdevelopment⁸. Contemporary statisticians like Richard Pfaundler from the University of Graz argued for what we now call a clash of civilizations. Scholars like Pfaundler were the first to make observations of real or imagined Slavic threats for the Germans within the Habsburg Monarchy. Subsequently, a new approach in the domain of geography concentrated on the construction of cultural borders. For geographers the border was not at all created by chance. Nature itself had drawn the separating lines. Any attempt for a change came near to a crime against God's will⁹. At first sight such a theory was able to serve as an argument against German expansionism, too. But in the Styrian context, where the Slaves were imagined as the attackers, this assertion quickly lost its neutrality¹⁰.

The new nationalism of the late 19th century developed primarily among activists located in ethnically-mixed provinces like Styria and Carinthia. It has often been argued that nation building processes in modern Europe tended to create images of an enemy¹¹. Historical evidence from Styria leads to somewhat different conclusions. During the first 70 to 80 years of the 19th century, German speakers in the Austrian Empire had constituted themselves as a nation without necessarily regarding the Slovenes, roughly one million in number, as their enemies. German attitudes towards the latter had been friendly and paternalistic, not hostile. But when Slovenes came up with demands for equal rights later in that century, images of the enemy began to emerge¹².

An explicit discourse on the Slovenes appeared rather late among Styrian Germans. Even in the periodical publications of the Styrian Historical Society (*Historischer Verein für Steiermark*) only three contributions had dealt with Slovenes and their territory prior to 1892. Up to that time, Styrian Germans showed a warm understanding for Slovene national emancipation that would never occur again. Local authorities in Styria did not hamper Slovene mass meetings in the late 1860's¹³. Up roughly to 1870, their German colleagues welcomed members of Slovene gymnastic unions, a nucleus of every national movement, at the railway stations. Since the turn of the century, on the contrary, similar meetings caused massive German protests using the phrase of a Slavic invasion onto German soil. Such meetings frequently resulted in riots¹⁴. These developments, however, more or less remained within the average framework in Central and Eastern Europe in the latter half of the 19th century.

Eric Hobsbawm and others have argued that the swing to radical right-wing ideologies among the elites of already established nations can best be interpreted as resistance against

modernization conducted by social groups with backward orientated attitudes¹⁵. But in Styria the most radical spokesmen of Germanism (lawyers, doctors, and teachers) did not belong to the losers of modernization at all. The Styrian example makes it more likely to argue that at the beginning Slovene emancipation simply was not regarded as a threat to German privileged positions. Prevailing romantic traditions of 1848 made German speakers even to welcome the first Slovene footsteps promising to lead the underdeveloped, agrarian parts of Lower Styria towards modern times. This step forward was even perceived as a chance to overcome the existing cultural boundary.

One might expect that the stiffening of German resistance since the 1880s ran parallel to the enlargement of Slovene demands. But at first, this was only partly the case. The claim for a unified Slovene crownland within the Monarchy comprising Carniola, Gorizia and Gradisca, Trieste, Istria, and the Slovene inhabited parts of Carinthia and Styria, made no progress at all¹⁶. But the Viennese government was willing to make concessions regarding other fields, for example relating to schools and language questions.¹⁷ Resisting that policy, German Nationalists blocked all measures intended to increase the acceptance of the Slovene language. Rather trivial problems of only local importance were blown up to a fateful question for 100 million Germans in Europe¹⁸. Slovene school classes in the southern Styrian town of Cilli/Celje, for example, meant nothing else than a sinister attack on German positions in the South of the Habsburg Monarchy, the first pretended obvious step for a Slavic advance into the heartland of Styria. An advance like that was perceived as an indication of an attempt to divide the Duchy in the near future¹⁹.

The front lines in that battle were drawn clearly: Styrian Slovenes, in a coalition with the government in Vienna, fought against all patriots defending the alleged interests of their homeland²⁰. Even in a more benevolent view the central government was inactive and, out of carelessness, tolerated Slavic assaults upon the German speakers' positions in the Duchy. The more Vienna became the symbol for an ally in the Slaves' struggle for domination, the more Styrian Germans seeking support elsewhere turned to Wilhelmine Germany²¹. In Styria, there were neither provincial compromises with the Slovene minority nor state patriotism directed at the Habsburg Empire²².

With regard to the demographic situation in the Duchy, the census of 1890, 1900, and 1910 showed no considerable increase in the number of Slovenes. On the contrary their share of all Styrian inhabitants decreased from 32.04 % to 29.37 %. From 1890 to 1910, the German speaking population increased by 135.000, while on the Slovene side only a rise of 9.000 persons took place²³. In the major towns in the South, German positions were even strengthened²⁴. There was no doubt that assimilation worked against the Slovenes²⁵. The massive propaganda stressing Slavic advance from the Balkans due to the enormous number of the Slaves ran contrary to the facts. Contemporary statisticians, arguing from the German point of view, admitted these developments without hesitation²⁶. Forced to visit German dominated high schools and universities, many Slovene academics were germanized. In the economic field there was no challenge to German domination. In 1910, the Germans in Lower Styria, 10 % of the population there, possessed around 80-90 % of

all economic values²⁷. Strangely enough, one of the most radical propagandists of Germanism argued that the economic strength of his fellows was the most convincing reason for preserving the German character of Lower Styria²⁸.

When the situation as a whole showed no threat to German domination, a look at the local level may lead to different conclusions. The Slovene political takeover of Carniola during the 1880's meant that the German-Slavic front line had made a significant move to the north and in the meantime had reached the southern border of Styria²⁹. Germans living there now interpreted their existence as standing face to face to the enemy. Successfully defending the major towns, they realized their total isolation when they took a look beyond the walls of their cities: In 1910, roughly 80 % of the population of Marburg/Maribor spoke German, but only one third of all people living in the district (*Bezirk*) Marburg. The numbers for Pettau/Ptuj are 79 % (town) and 8 % (district), while the German share for Cilli (67 % in the city) dropped to only 6 % in the surrounding district³⁰. German speakers, however, reacted rather to a danger perhaps real in the future than to a present-day challenge. Even German nationalist propaganda argued for the necessity to stop Slovene emancipation from the start, not for a "roll back". Nevertheless the Duchy was estimated to be the next target of Pan-Slavism. That movement was believed to follow a subtle strategy by concentrating all available means to the conquest of one region thereby splitting the weak forces of the defenders. Numerically and socially isolated amid a Slovene surrounding, German speakers felt obliged to protect the outposts of Germanism. A strange mixture of arrogance and fear characterized their attitude: bearers of superior German culture forced to deal with backward Slaves on the one side and feelings of an impending defeat by Slavic masses on the other side.

With the background impression of having been given up by Vienna, German speakers in Lower Styria began to organize defence on their own. Organizations like the German School League and the *Südmark*, the protective association for the southern German territories, saw a significant increase of their local bases. *Südmark* tripled the number of its Styrian members during only one decade (1899-1910). More than 80 % of them lived outside Lower Styria – a striking hint that the atmosphere of German-Slovene struggle was not limited to the regions concerned³¹. Nationalist circles around the *Südmark* abandoned much of their former socially elitist heritage because they attempted to mobilize a broader constituency defined more by national self-identification rather than by education, property ownership, or social status³². German nationalists in Styria viewed Germaness as a relatively open identity, accessible to anyone who adopted its principles and lived according to its norms. These activists increasingly worried about numbers and, therefore, aimed to defend their political power by mobilizing superior numbers and new social groups into the public political sphere³³. Yet activists spent more time trying to instil this national consciousness among their own linguistic brothers and sisters than in fighting some national enemy³⁴.

Südmark started a planned policy of bringing German settlers to Lower Styria. These farmers were given the task to connect the language border to the German speaking islands

within a Slovene surrounding, especially in the Marburg region. Not only because of the need to raise funds to finance these ambitious plans did the association conduct a massive propaganda campaign. Its main topics were the allegedly threatened German position in the South and appeals to all Germans from the Baltic to the Adriatic to contribute with financial or spiritual support. Nationalistic organizations like the *Südmark* acted as tools of the ethnic struggle and intensified it. This observation is true for both sides, because German unions found their Slovene counterparts. Even more important was the resulting complete separation in social life; even the Catholic Church made no exemption. Each nation constituted its own sphere closed for members of the other nation – *everyone is to join his fellows*. But the Germans had two options: They could build a wall around themselves thereby accepting the language border or maintain the entity of all Styrians not regarding their nationality. This older tradition centred on a regional identity had no chance from 1900 on. The concept of nation turned out to be a totalizing matrix within a multi-ethnic context. In this guidebook one was either a German ally or an enemy³⁵.

Recognizing the impossibility to fight against the Slovene minority in general – there were too many – German activists concentrated on their leadership. The Slovene peasants, they stated, were peaceable, not interested in politics, but they were seduced by panslavistic clergymen and other intellectuals; only under their influence the peasants started to question German domination³⁶. A collaborationist movement called *Štajerc* [The Styrian] propagated the importance of maintaining the entity of the Duchy. Thereby Slovenes could profit by sharing the superior German culture and by participating in the developed economic sphere of the crownland. A new border separating Styria, *Štajerc* argued, would be contrary to Slovene interests.

These arguments had some credibility on their side, as there can be no doubt that the sparsely industrialized districts in the south profited from trade with the north as well as from investments in the infrastructure carried out both by the Empire and the Duchy³⁷. At the same time, however, it was tolerated that extreme nationalists launched a boycott campaign against national enemies, thereby threatening to disrupt industry and business. When *Štajerc* started its activities in 1900, Slovene national emancipation had already made too much progress. Furthermore, German nationalists in Styria hesitated to stress a self-consciousness based on a regional Styrian identity. Such a concept, convincing as it may be, was not at all compatible with their strong emotions towards the German nation. In Carinthia, however, the implementation of the concept of *windisch* as a distinguished national existence separated from Germans as well as from Slovenes was more successful. The Slovene speaking population was split up into a pro-German group and a second, smaller one with an explicit Slovene national consciousness³⁸. The main reason for the difference between the two provinces described above seems to be the absence of a broad intellectual leadership among the Carinthian Slovenes – almost all of them were peasants, while the towns in Lower Styria saw the emergence of a Slovene elite, however limited.

The more Slovenes emphasized their spiritual community with other Slavic peoples the more negative attributes attached, for example, to the Serbs were transferred to them³⁹.

In German eyes Slovene ceremonies and meetings permanently showed an anti-patriotic character insofar as South-Slavic unification was demanded. The participation of guests from Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or Serbia was a good argument to construct theories of a conspiracy⁴⁰. Perfidious activities directed from a headquarter in the Serbian capital had reached the Styrian border. The outbreak of World War I showed the immense potential of hate and aggression. Mass arrests in the summer of 1914 were the answer to the claim of a few Slovene politicians, "Away from Graz"⁴¹. No wonder that Slovene politicians became open to the idea of a South-Slavic unification under Serbian leadership⁴². This was an important step towards drawing a new border, because up to the World War Slovene demands had concentrated on transferring Lower Styria to Carniola, to govern this region from Ljubljana, not any longer from Graz, but to remain within the Monarchy. The suppression of Styrian Slovenes was a Pyrrhic victory for German nationalists. At the end of World War I, one of the most loyal, Habsburg-orientated people within the Monarchy had not only lost its traditional devotion to the throne but had adopted hostile feelings and wished to separate. Drawing consequences from their experiences during the war, the majority of the Slovenes no longer distinguished between a tolerant Empire with a benevolent Monarch on the one side and an aggressive German enemy on the other side. As both images fell into one, this was also a success for Allied propaganda telling the "suppressed peoples" of Austria-Hungary that this state was not theirs but a means of oppression in the hands of Germans and Magyars.

THE DISSOLUTION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE INTERWAR-PERIOD

In fall 1918, after the break-up of the Habsburg Monarchy, the Republic of German Austria, as it called itself, and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (SHS) and other new states emerged on the territory of the former Empire. Since Styria and Carinthia had a mixed population, these two provinces were contested zones in the years following 1918. Experts on the Austrian and Yugoslav sides had different suggestions how to draw the new state border, since there were no clear linguistic boundaries. Fighting between SHS-troops and Austrian volunteers started in late 1918 and lasted until the summer of 1919⁴³. SHS-units occupied parts of the two provinces which they demanded for the Kingdom of SHS. Finally, the peace conference in Paris decided to give Lower Styria as a whole to that Kingdom, while in the southern parts of Carinthia a plebiscite was implemented⁴⁴. Although southern Carinthia was populated mostly by Slovene speakers the plebiscite, which was held in October 1920, favoured incorporation into Austria. As roughly 40 % of the minority voted for Austria, one has to ask about their motivations. Slovene peasants were interested in maintaining their traditional markets centred round the towns of Klagenfurt and Villach. Austria in 1920 had no general conscription and a far more developed social security system compared to Serbia. In addition, Serbia had a different religion than Austria and Serbian troops had behaved in a hostile manner during their brief occupation of Carinthia. Whatever the reasons, the result of the plebiscite reflected not only very effective national assimilation of Slovenes within the German ma-

jority, but showed that mother tongue and national affiliation need not be identical. So a relatively large Slovene minority remained in Carinthia⁴⁵.

In contrast, Lower Styria was handed over to the Yugoslav state by the St. Germain peace treaty in 1919. Styria lost one third of her space and her population, nearly half a million, among them more than 70.000 Germans. Styrian Germans vigorously rejected that they themselves had driven the former loyal Slovene population away from Austria. The Republic of Austria accepted the heritage of the Monarchy by arguing that the perished state had always conducted a friendly treatment of the Slovene minority⁴⁶. This perspective deeply influenced public opinion in Austria, not to talk about the German speakers from Lower Styria who left their homeland after 1918. They did not stop arguing that Lower Styria still was German soil and that the peace treaty should be reversed, the sooner the better⁴⁷. There were good economic arguments, too, because the harmony of Styria was destroyed, to the disadvantage of the peoples living on both sides of the new border. Austria's railroad lines to the South, especially to the Adriatic port of Trieste, were cut off⁴⁸.

The demand for a revision of the peace treaty can also be interpreted as a compensation for the complete lack of organized military defence in Lower Styria during the decisive months following the armistice in November 1918. In Carinthia, volunteers tried to stop the advance of South-Slavic troops into the crownland. The provincial government at Klagenfurt supported this endeavour. In Styria, however, the regional government decided to renounce any military resistance. The main argument for doing so was that otherwise the Yugoslavs would have cut off Styria from heavily needed food supplies coming from the South. When German nationalists later talked about the lost province and the new border as a bleeding wound, they also meant the cowardice of their government then dominated by the Catholic and the Socialist Party.

Especially in the Austrian province of Styria the border was perceived as the "tearing apart of Styria". This was the title of a very popular pamphlet written by a prominent Styrian historian, Arnold Luschin-Ebengreuth⁴⁹. The border was tearing apart the Styrian mainland from the German minority now living under Slavic rule⁵⁰. Repeating old arguments that Germans had taught the Slovenes culture, Luschin included new arguments: his setting was not any more the Monarchy. Speaking about Slovenes became a matter of foreign policy, of national territories, of ethnic separation, and border drawing. His purpose was to disprove the Yugoslav pretensions which had been accepted at the peace conference. Historiography finally joined geography, ethnography, and statistics as the fourth discipline which was engaged in the drawing of real and/or cultural boundaries. The given situation after 1919 meant the end of a long period of living together without state borders dividing German speakers and Slovenes.

STYRIA AND CARINTHIA IN THE AGE OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM

After Hitler's accession to power in Germany in early 1933, the Austrian discourse of mourning about the 1919 peace regulations changed. German historians as well as research and propaganda institutions in the Reich backed the Austrian arguments. For the

first time since the break-up of the Habsburg Monarchy, Styrian German nationalists received strong assistance from outside when the concept of German *Volksgemeinschaft* [Peoples Community] was used to include the German minority living in Yugoslavia⁵¹. After the annexation of Austria in March 1938, the National Socialist provincial government of Styria founded the so-called *Südostdeutsches Institut* at Graz⁵². Its task was to equip the political authorities with background knowledge about south-eastern Europe. Actually, the Institute financed pilot studies in the Styrian borderlands, since its task was to plan the reconquest of that part of Yugoslavia⁵³. That moment came in April 1941, after the German army had overrun Yugoslavia. Lower Styria was not formally annexed to the Reich, but put under the administration of the Styrian Gauleiter and provincial governor. Together with the SS, he deported some 10.000 Slovenes mainly to Serbia and Croatia. The germanization taking place was similar to events in Poland, only on a smaller scale. The intellectual stratum of the Slovenes was arrested or deported. The given task was to make the border of 1919 disappear once and for all. The final goal, however, was not a simple restoration of the pre-1918 conditions, which would have meant to maintain a living space for the Slovenes. On the contrary, they were to be germanised as soon and as far as possible in order to constitute re-united Styria as an exclusively German province of the Greater German Reich. But for the agents of the Third Reich a racial border between Germans and Slovenes did not exist in Lower Styria with the exception of a minority of so-called fanatic Slovenes who had to be deported. Although the guidelines of Nazi racial policy were formulated in Berlin, the Styrian Gauleiter managed to keep in control of the concrete implementation on the spot. He even succeeded in reducing Himmler's enormous deportation plans to a considerably smaller scale.

In Carinthia, a very similar policy with identical goals was conducted. Deportations of the Slovene minority were cancelled after roughly 1.000 persons had been transferred to the heartland of the Reich. It goes without saying that in both provinces every expression of a Slovene identity was ruthlessly suppressed. The authorities even banned the use of the Slovene language from the public sphere. Naturally enough, a partisan movement emerged. As the underground movement operated mainly under the command of the Communists, the Nazis had some success in organizing a Slovene Home Guard (*Domo-branci*) for combat against the partisans. Although only some small, mountainous regions of Carinthia, Styria, and Slovenia came under permanent control of the partisans, Styria and Carinthia were the only *Gaue* of Hitler's Empire where the *Wehrmacht* was forced to deploy regular troops for fighting the underground. At the same time, both provinces – strongholds of the Nazi party long before the annexation of Austria to Germany – ranked at the top of all German *Gaue* with respect to the proportion of party membership⁵⁴. As partisan warfare was conducted with utmost brutality from both sides, the civilian population suffered most. May 1945 saw the revenge of the victorious partisans. Their retaliation was mainly directed against collaborators among their fellow countrymen, but also some German speaking civilians in Carinthia and Styria, not all of them Nazi officials, disappeared forever after the partisans had taken them as prisoners.

AUSTRIA AND YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1945

After the Second World War, prospects of a border revision agitated Austrian-Yugoslav relations for a decade. Josip Broz Tito, the leader of the Communist partisans who became Yugoslavia's head of state in 1945, demanded parts of Carinthia inhabited chiefly by a Slovene speaking population for his country. Tito's proposal meant nothing less than a complete overthrow of the 1920 plebiscite. Yugoslavia received no support from the Western Allies who had occupied Carinthia since May 1945; Tito even lost Stalin's backing in 1948. In 1946, the Paris Peace Conference decided to reject Yugoslavia's claim for Austrian territory, but it promised a protection of the minorities in Austria. The majority of the Slovenes in Carinthia never favoured incorporation into Tito's Yugoslavia. A deep gap separated the predominantly Catholic Slovenes in Austria from the Communist regime and its few supporters in Austria⁵⁵. Tito finally gave up his claims as wishful thinking and agreed to the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 which maintained Austria's borders as they had existed in 1937⁵⁶.

The State Treaty freed Austria from the Allied occupation and in its 7th Article laid down minority rights for the Slovenes in Carinthia and Styria and the Croats settling in the Burgenland (a province of Austria neighbouring Hungary). In the ensuing decades, quarrels about the interpretation of the treaty's minority clause and the actual treatment of the Slovenes in Carinthia disturbed neighbourhood relations from time to time. Border questions, on the contrary, completely lost their former importance. One could argue that Austrian-Yugoslav relations after 1945, if not after 1918, practically had been reduced to Austrian-Slovene or even predominantly Carinthian-Slovene relations. Diplomatic contacts at the highest level, between the two central governments in Vienna and Belgrade, always had been friendlier than regional ones between Klagenfurt and Ljubljana⁵⁷.

The focus of mutual disagreement still is the question whether Austria has fulfilled all her obligations deriving from the minority regulations of the State Treaty. Since the treaty had been signed, among others, by Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, Austrian diplomacy tried to challenge the validity of the pact by arguing that two of the signatory states had perished in 1990-91. In early 2005, Austria formally rejected the claim of the independent Slovene Republic to be the legal successor of former Yugoslavia with respect to the State Treaty. The chairman of the Austrian parliament, Andreas Kohl, a university professor of public law, described the State Treaty as a product from the Cold War period. This argument has some credibility on its side; the Slovenes, however, interpreted Kohl's statement as an attempt to free Austria from all duties the Republic had taken over by signing the 1955 treaty. When the Austrian ambassador to Ljubljana, a prominent representative of the minority in Carinthia, agreed with Kohl, Slovene newspapers called for his dismissal⁵⁸. Within Slovenia, a discussion arose whether the protection given to the minority in Carinthia after 1945 was sufficient or not⁵⁹. Recently politicians in Slovenia even argued for bringing the case to the European Court for Human Rights.

Latest events demonstrate that the former dichotomy between German speakers and Slovenes has changed considerably. The Viennese government and public opinion throughout Austria, supported by a dominant mood even in Carinthia itself, pressed the Carinthian regional government to find a final solution for the question of bilingual topographic inscriptions that Austria had promised to install more than 50 years ago. When a consensus between the Slovene organizations, the German *Heimatsdienst* [Patriotic League of Carinthia], and the government seemed imminent, Carinthia's governor Jörg Haider withdrew his approval of the deal, mainly for reasons of domestic politics. At the end of the year 2006, the question of bilingual topographic inscriptions is still unsolved. Most observers, however, agree that the effect of Anti-Slovene slogans upon German speakers in Austria's south is now much smaller than during previous decades when such slogans were suited to decide elections. For a broad majority of Austrians, independent from their political attitude, verbal attacks on the remaining 15.000 Slovenes in Carinthia (a fully integrated minority) appear more and more anachronistic as the country faces the problem of integrating hundred thousands of foreign immigrants, many of them with a Muslim background.

After 1945, the Carinthian development again differed considerably from the Styrian one. The Styrian provincial government was among the first to engage for better co-operation across the border as early as in the 1960s. It was Austria's only border with a communist country where no Iron Curtain existed. Travel restrictions were abolished in the early 1950s. New bridges across the river Mur, which constitutes a part of the Styrian-Slovene border, were opened with huge ceremonies in the presence of Marshal Tito and the Austrian head of state. These bridges were not a mere traffic installation but a symbol for peaceful coexistence. In the 1960s, the Styrian government intensified its policy towards Yugoslavia and, especially, the Federal Republic of Slovenia. It was an attempt to overcome Styria's isolation in the south-eastern corner of free Europe. Every Austrian region situated alongside the Communist world suffered economic setbacks because the exchange of goods, capital, technical know-how, and people across such a border was rather limited. Austrian efforts to break up that isolation by establishing better relations with Hungary and Czechoslovakia earned very little results, especially after the Soviets had crushed the uprisings in those countries in 1956 and 1968 respectively. The only exception to that rule was Yugoslavia.

For Austria, good neighbourhood with Yugoslavia served as a proof to the Soviet bloc that friendly coexistence of a capitalist and a communist country was possible. Vienna hoped that Prague and Budapest, maybe even Moscow, would listen to that message. For Yugoslavia as a non-aligned country since the late 1940s, Austria literally was the country's door to the western world. Tito was one of the few communist leaders who could not rely on Soviet troops in the case of domestic unrest. Establishing economic exchange with the capitalist countries was one way to stabilize his regime. From around 1960, hundreds of thousands of Yugoslav *Gastarbeiter* [foreign workers] left their home country for labour in Germany and Austria. They exported Yugoslav unemployment and transferred western money to the backward regions of southern Yugoslavia. This was one of the reasons

for Yugoslavia's ability to participate in world economy. Yugoslavia's borders were open in both directions and since the late 1950s, many Austrians travelled to their southern neighbour to spend summer holidays at the Adriatic coast. Winter tourism was to follow later. The effects on both countries are not easy to determine, but it is clear that on the Yugoslav side the main profiteers were Slovenia and the coastal regions of Croatia⁶⁰. With respect to Austria, Styria gained most, because south of her borders lay a densely populated part of Slovenia. People living there tended to buy rare goods in Austria thereby facilitating the economic situation of the border region. Everybody who uttered doubts concerning the mutual advantages of the open border simply had to look to those parts of Lower and Upper Austria neighbouring Czechoslovakia, where the Iron Curtain had created a depopulated zone on the Austrian side.

This fate the Federal government of Styria worked hard to avoid. Working groups like "Alpe-Adria" were given the task of intensifying contacts among all their members, were they neutral, non-aligned like Yugoslavia, members of the NATO or the Warsaw pact. The driving force behind this endeavour was the Styrian government, not the central government in Vienna⁶¹. What remains open is the question to what extent the population in both countries was aware of the policy conducted by their respective governments. Many Slovenes, frustrated by the backwardness of Yugoslavia's southern provinces, were happy to maintain contacts to the capitalist world, whether political, economic, cultural, or human. For the Austrians, the result is ambivalent. Tourism contributed to create an image of a friendly neighbour (and a cheap holiday destination) with access to the wonderful coastline of Dalmatia and Istria. On the other hand, since the 1960s the *Gastarbeiter*, originating mainly from the southern and underdeveloped parts of Yugoslavia, became a synonym for all Yugoslavians including the Slovenes. It was a negative, sometimes even hostile image that motivated the Slovenes to distance themselves even more from their fellow countrymen in the south. Austria became a catalyst for a split inside Yugoslavia that ran along the separation line of central and south-eastern Europe one more time.

NEW NEIGHBOURS: AUSTRIA AND THE INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA

Taking into consideration the early successes of the policy of good neighbourhood, it seems not astonishing that Austria was among the first countries in Europe which decided to encourage Slovene requests for independence after the death of Tito in 1980. In the summer of 1991, when the Federal Republic of Slovenia intended to gain full independence by separating from Yugoslavia, the state border caused anxiety again. Serbian troops, nominally under the command of the Yugoslavian 'Peoples Army', tried to occupy the installations alongside the border. By achieving this goal, the Serbs would have been able to cut off the new Republic of Slovenia from the western world. For the first time since the 1968 Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia, there was fighting along Austria's borders; her troops were dispatched to defend Austrian territory if necessary. This was not the case, after one week the Serbs gave up and the border region became calm again.



Fig. 1

A scene that shocked the Austrian public in late June 1991: an Austrian light tank at the Austrian-Yugoslav border near Spielfeld (Styria) watches the Yugoslav 'Peoples Army' and Slovene volunteers fighting a few metres away.

Austria nowadays has no significant conflicts with Slovenia. Logically Vienna strongly supported the wish of her southern neighbour to become a member of the European Union, a goal accomplished in 2004. In Austria, there had existed fears of being overflowed by eastern and south-eastern immigrants increasing Austria's crowd of unemployed, but Slovenia was not regarded as the main threat because it is a small country with less than two million inhabitants. One basis for the good relationship between Styria and Slovenia was the continuance of the mutual assumption established in 1945 that no national minority existed any longer on the two sides of the border, no Slovene one in Styria and vice versa. There were limited remnants of the former strong German minority in Yugoslavia after 1945, but the Austrian government during the existence of Tito's Yugoslavia never formally claimed to be the protecting power for the so-called Old Austrians who had been expelled from their homes by force following the end of World War II. That Austrian reluctance to engage for those Old Austrians would change slightly only after the dissolution of multiethnic Yugoslavia in 1991.

After 1918, very few Styrians claimed to belong to a Slovene minority. They received no public response at all and the federal government at Graz, the Styrian capital, did not acknowledge them as a minority in spite of the fact that they were explicitly mentioned in the Austrian State Treaty of 1955. Nevertheless, Slovene cultural, but not political, activities on a very limited scale received sponsoring with Styrian public funds. Curi-

ous enough, those activities proved to be a significant contribution for overcoming the state border, because most participants originated from Slovenia, not Styria. During the 1990s, a heterogeneous group of scientists located at the University of Graz started to detect their Slovene origins. They described the Slovenes in Styria as a forgotten minority and started investigations into its history as well as its actual situation⁶². Since the three areas with residuals of Slovene settlement in Styria are geographically isolated from each other and since there was never any communication between them, it is impossible to outline a joint history of the Slovenes in Styria. Heterogeneity and isolation distinguishes the Styrian Slovenes from the more homogenous and much larger Slovene minority in Carinthia. The same fact, however, facilitated relations between Slovenia and Styria⁶³. For Styria, the census of 2001 showed 4.250 persons using Slovene as their daily language. But approximately 50 % of them live in the Graz region, a fact indicating that these people are immigrants from Slovenia, not an autochthon minority which one would expect to settle near the border. In the Republic of Slovenia, for a short period in the 1990s concerns arose because of official Austrian attempts to detect, define, and protect a German-speaking minority in Slovenia. One drawing printed in a Slovene newspaper showed what is held for a typical Austrian and writes: "We are back again!"⁶⁴. Subsequently, a bilateral commission was installed and through research in the field found less than 2.000 German speakers in Slovenia, too small a number to be acknowledged as a minority. Meanwhile the topic disappeared from public attention.


Since 1945, every mention of former German positions in Lower Styria was discredited. It could easily be interpreted as a call for a border revision. As a consequence, knowledge about the former co-existence of two nations within Styria disappeared from public remembrance. The younger generation today does not know anything about it. A monument erected at the main square of Graz in 1879 shows symbols for the four main rivers of the Habsburg crownland, two of them nowadays flowing through Slovenia. People passing by that monument are unaware of the background. The same is true for the official Styrian hymn, composed in 1844. No wonder that this hymn mentions rivers and landscapes in Lower Styria. The text had never been modified up to the present; every Styrian pupil is obliged to learn it. But as late as 1929, then years after the cession of Lower Styria, the Provincial Diet declared this song the hymn of Styria. Recently there were discussions about a new text which should be adapted to the present borders. Up to now, these considerations have not brought about a modified text.

CONCLUSIONS

After World War II, the German speaking population of Austria has undergone a second process of nation building which made them Austrians. The former Austrian desire to belong to a Greater German Empire is dead once and forever, but there are some residues of the former nationalistic conflicts in Carinthia, where the existing Slovene minority is sometimes still treated as a threat to Germanism⁶⁵. As the myth of the *Abwehrkampf* [protective fighting] of 1918/19 against the invasion of South-Slavic

troops into Carinthia is very vivid, the minority is identified with the enemy, notwithstanding its predominantly pro-Austrian behaviour during the 1920 plebiscite. In this view, the minority seems to question the present state border, which, according to a popular slogan, “has been drawn with blood” after the First World War. Recently, right-wing organizations in Carinthia like the *Kärntner Heimatdienst* made a curious change in their arguments. They now blame the European Union as an imminent threat, precisely because of current attempts of Carinthia, Slovenia, and a province in northern Italy to create a European Region *Alpe-Adria* [Alps-Adriatic].

Today, Styrian people enjoy travelling to the border region into Slovenia for shopping, dining, and visiting the opera at Maribor. One reason is the fact that prices are still lower in Slovenia than in Austria. Usually on those occasions Austrians express their feelings of nearly being at home. But they have a clear attitude of superiority, not only due to their higher standard of living. Every Slovene is expected to speak German, but almost nobody in Styria shows any interest in learning Slovene language. Attempts to establish Slovene voluntary language courses at Styrian schools received almost no response from the target groups. Is this a heritage from the Monarchy? The myth of Slovene ingratitude for the benefits which came to them from the German-speaking parts of Styria has nearly vanished, a feeling of superiority remains. Images of Yugoslavia's



Map 1

The former Duchy of Styria (borders until 1918: ---). The grey line (—) marks the German-Slovene language border and, more or less, the Austrian-Yugoslav state border created in 1919/20.

(and that meant also Slovenia's) backwardness created during the decades after 1945 prove to be long-living. Styrians aged 30 or more still do not strictly distinguish between the former state of Tito and the current Republic of Slovenia. On the other side of the border, many Slovenes in former Lower Styria nowadays describe their homeland, the northern part of Slovenia, as a distinguished entity, referring to the borders prior to 1919 and calling this region *Štajerska*, which means Styria. This is obviously more than nostalgia, but it should not be misunderstood as a desire for a border revision. However, it may or even must be interpreted as a sign that changed state borders separating historical unities need a long time to modify peoples' minds. We observe in Carinthia as well as in Styria a *long durée* of mentalities and opinions surviving the change of generations.

The aim of this chapter was to demonstrate that nationalism as a driving force of history only partially explains the historical development in the two provinces under consideration. Styria and Carinthia started from a nearly identical spot around 1900. One century later, each province looks back to a rather different history and present situation. Studying conditions alongside a state and/or language border, therefore, needs a more sophisticated instrument than describing images of enemies. Even during the 'hottest' period of nationalism at the end of the 19th century, local and regional constellations were responsible for considerable deviations from the 'model case'. One may doubt whether such deviations, numerous as they were all over Europe, can ever be integrated into a valid theory of nationalism. In ethnically-mixed provinces, especially at the geographic and cultural periphery of the Cisleithanian half of the former Habsburg Monarchy, the complex relationship between regionalism and nationalism is awaiting further research.

NOTES

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- ³ Quoted after G. Reckzeh, *Grillparzer und die Slaven*, Weimar 1924, p. 24.
- ⁴ Cf. H. Rauchberg, *Der nationale Besitzstand in Böhmen*, 3 volumes, Leipzig 1905.
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- ⁷ For a theoretical framework see M. Rösler, T. Wendl (eds.), *Frontiers and Borderlands. Anthropological Perspectives*, Frankfurt am Main - Berlin - Bern - Brussels - New York - Vienna 1999; E. Pelikan, H. Uhl, *Culture, Identity and Politics: Cultural Aspects of National Politics in Graz and Ljubljana at the End of the Nineteenth Century*, in B. Sträth, N. Witoszek (eds.), *The Postmodern Challenge: Perspectives East and West*, Amsterdam - Atlanta 1999, pp. 219-241.
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- ¹⁰ See H. Uhl, "Bollwerk deutscher Kultur". *Kulturelle Repräsentationen nationaler Politik in Graz um 1900*, in H. Uhl (ed.), *Kultur – Urbanität – Moderne. Differenzierungen der Moderne in Zentraleuropa um 1900*, Vienna 1999, pp. 39-82.
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- ¹² V. Melik, *Zur Entwicklung der slowenischen Nation*, in H. Lemberg, K. Litsch, R.G. Plaschka, G. Ránki (eds.), *Bildungsgeschichte, Bevölkerungsgeschichte, Gesellschaftsgeschichte in den böhmischen Ländern und in Europa. Festschrift für Jan Havránek zum 60. Geburtstag*, Vienna - Munich 1988, pp. 113-143; E. Mousson-Lestang, *Les Slovènes et la Question nationale (1850-1920)*, in "Etudes Danubiennes", 1996, 12, pp. 73-90.
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- ²⁴ E. Brix, *Die Umgangssprachen in Altösterreich zwischen Agitation und Assimilation. Die Sprachenstatistik in den zisleithanischen Volkszählungen 1880 bis 1910*, Vienna - Graz - Cologne 1982.
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An Administrative Ethnically Discriminatory Action

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Tako državljanska kot republikanska družba trdita, da njuna relacija med državljani in nedržavljanji temelji na pravicah. Kakšna je torej relacija med pojmom državljanstva, državljanom, državo in pravicami? V prvem delu pričujočega članka sem pokazala, da naravne oziroma človekove pravice niso univerzalne in ne temeljijo na enakosti, saj imajo ekstrinzično vrednost in so variabilne. Če ta deontološki poskus upravičitve pravic ni uspešen, je lahko ena izmed alternativ konsekvencialna upravičitev pravic, kjer lahko le-te razumemo kontekstualno, i.e. njihova upravičitev je lahko odvisna od kulture, religije ali narodnosti, iz česar sledi, da ne moremo govoriti, kot bi želeli liberalci, ki zagovarjajo deontološki pristop, o pred-politični upravičitvi državljanskih pravic. Kakšno je razmerje med pravicami in državo, se v najčistejši obliki pokaže na primeru ljudi brez državljanstva, kjer je razvidno, da članstvo v državi ni vezano izključno na »polity«. Še več, tako imenovano politično članstvo je, kot kažejo ti primeri, podrejeno kulturnemu članstvu, posledica česar je nepravilna in neupravičena porazdelitev dobrin, ki je utemeljena na državljanskih vrlinah in identiteti. S pomočjo primera "izbranih", ki se dogaja v Sloveniji od osamosvojitve naprej, tj. od leta 1992 in še vedno ni zaključen, je razvidno, da je porazdelitev dobrin bila oziroma je utemeljena na lojalnosti povezani z narodnostjo. Obstoj 18.305 ljudi brez stalnega prebivališča in brez državljanstva ni posledica nenamerne pravne napake, temveč namernega etnično diskriminatornega administrativnega dejanja.

V drugem delu članka me je zanimalo, kakšno vlogo imajo oziroma bi naj imele vrline in vrednote pri konceptu državljanstva in državljanih samih. Pri tem sem primerjala odgovor republikancev in odgovor liberalcev, ugotavljala, kdo se približa Sokratskemu pojmu državljanstva, in kam lahko umestimo Slovenijo, tj. med liberalno ali republikansko usmeritvijo države. Glede na to, da pri liberalizmu ne moremo govoriti o univerzalni in fundamentalni vrlini, da je politično članstvo nad kulturnim, in da je zdrava in upravičena kritika dobrodošla, lahko zaključim, da je Sokratov koncept državljanstva in države bližje liberalizmu. Kar se tiče manjšin, odnosa do državljanov in pojma državljanstva, igra Slovenija dvojno igro. Je liberalna, ko govorimo o pravno priznanih manjšinah, kot so italijanska in madžarska manjšina, ali ko govorimo o tujcih, ki ne prihajajo iz držav bivše Jugoslavije. Kadar pa imamo opravka z relacijo med pojmom državljanstva in ljudmi, ki so se rodili v eni izmed bivših republik SFRJ (ali pa so se rodili v Sloveniji, a eden izmed staršev po narodnosti ni Slovenec), je izrazito republikanska.

INTRODUCTION

Globalisation is not a process limited to the economic sphere. Its tentacles also spread out into the political and social spheres. Consequently, it can affect traditional understanding of key points upon which we judge a state, i.e. nationality, identity and citizenship¹. Before conducting research about how these concepts are actually affected by globalisation, one should have a clear picture of what they are all about. Since an important relationship between an individual and a state is shown through citizenship, I have examined the following issues: (i) If we include rights and obligations in the legal status of citizenship, are rights universal or not? and (ii) What influence should underlying virtues and values have on citizens and on the concept of the citizenship?² Foucault said that we should take an interest in authority's extreme limits in its final aims at those points where it becomes capillary. I believe this is also true for concepts. Consequently, the third part of my research, spread throughout the whole chapter, deals with an actual case where identity and a connection of virtues with respect to citizenship have played a central role in distributing benefits and rights. This is the so-called "case of erased people", i.e. people erased from the national register of permanent residence in Slovenia in 1992 who belonged to particular groups of people that did not apply for citizenship. The consequence was grave in that they became stateless.

What I have attempted to do in this chapter is to present the following: (i) in liberal societies one can choose which virtue has priority over another, and hence the decision depends on the context. There is no universal or fundamental virtue coupled to a punishment for not having or practising that virtue. Liberal societies should be neutral concerning language, history etc., so it may be inferred that political membership has priority over cultural membership. One should think about society and try to be a good citizen, but this does not exclude having healthy critical insights into the state's actions. This suggests that a Socratic sense of citizenship is more closely related to a liberal than a republican society. (ii) It is my view that happened in Slovenia was not the consequence of an unintentional legal error, but rather of an intentional administrative ethnically discriminatory action. In relation to people from former republics of SFRJ, the concept of citizenship is extremely republican. (iii) The case of the stateless people together with other similar cases makes it clear that human rights that are supposed to be inalienable are at risk: in practice they are often unattainable, and that cultural membership is sometimes responsible for an unjust distribution of goods on the basis of civil virtues or identity, as happened in the case of the "erased" in Slovenia, based on nationality, religion and loyalty.

RIGHTS AND CITIZENSHIP

An elementary description of the concept of citizenship is that it presents the most important relationship between a state and an individual. For the purposes of this chapter, I am going to distinguish between two concepts of citizenship, i.e. republican and liberal³. The former represents a citizen whose duty is to participate actively in politics, to place the public above the private and has to accept a collective determination of personal choices. Liberalism takes the opposite view. It tries to separate private and public life as far as possible in such a way that the state does not interfere with people's private lives.

Therefore, in liberal free market states, citizenship means the relationship between the consumer of some benefits and the state which offers them. However, what are these benefits if the state does not wish to interfere with the people? They are minimal legal rights of citizenship derived from human rights. This claim leads to at least two concepts that should be examined. (a) According to the liberal pleaders of human rights, they have a pre-political justification, which also holds for citizenship rights and obligations. They are universal, general and based on equality. (b) Membership is therefore connected with “polity” rather than with “society”, so that in this case one can talk only about political membership.

(a) The pre-political justification of human rights consists of a justification that comes from the outside of an institution. Therefore, their first and only aim is to protect an individual from other individuals or institutions without limitations of state borders or time. This position results from the idea of *natural rights*. As Paola Cavalieri stated in her work *The Animal Question*, the word “natural” implies talking about moral elements that do not depend on any authority or institution. They are beyond them and are, as can be concluded from declarations of different countries, granted (or given) by God or nature⁴.

This interesting point can be made after an analysis of the above mentioned liberal idea. Deontological liberals traditionally talk about how these natural rights are granted and are therefore beyond any authority. But the idea that a person’s rights are “granted by” or “given to the other by someone or something” suggests that the person is this *Other*, which means that not only is this a relationship between someone or something and that person, but also that this someone is in a superior position. A person is not in a position to decide freely which rights they want. After they have been given the rights, no one can take them away. Therefore, they are not acquired. If they were, one would have to meet given requirements and then someone could decide which rights one would get. The only role institutions have with respect to natural rights is to protect them. This is now the Lockean connection between natural rights and citizenship rights, where the former are a basis for the latter. As Cavalieri further says “...and existing or in-the-making, societies are bound first to acknowledge [natural rights] and then to safeguard them”⁵. I do not agree with her claim about the “acceptance”. If something is given by nature or by God, such as race or gender, one does not have to accept or protect it legally because no one can take it away. What if it becomes possible in the future to change race, or as has already been done, to change gender? It seems that in this case someone has taken away something that had been given by God or nature. The aim of the state would therefore be to protect those features.

As for the rights, many of them were violated in several ways in the first half of the 20th century, so a need to protect these rights emerged. Since nobody wanted to include in the relationship between people and rights the fact that someone has given them, theoreticians started to use the phrase “human rights”. The question is on what grounds can they be justified? With respect to the theory of rights, one can talk about two kinds of justification, deontological and instrumental-consequential. Instrumental theories are based on consequential justification, where respect for particular rights is a means of bringing some optimal distribution of interest. They can be divided into utilitarian and non-utilitarian.

Status theories are based on the deontological justification. Their idea is that rights have a pre-political justification. Now, how can human rights be pre-politically justified? Once stress is laid on “human” it means that being a member of the species *Homo sapiens* has an intrinsic value and should therefore be protected. *Intrinsic value* is defined as the inherent worthiness of something, independent of its value to anyone or anything else. What is intrinsically good is non-derivatively good. It is good for its *own* sake, *in itself* or *as such*. What is not intrinsically good, but extrinsically good, is derivatively good. It is good, not (insofar as its extrinsic value is concerned) for its own sake, but for the sake of something else that is good and to which it can be related in some way. The notion of intrinsic value is usually connected to the concept of invariability. It means that the intrinsic value of a feature never changes, i.e. no matter what context one finds oneself in, the value of that thing remains. On the other hand, *extrinsic value* is changeable. It depends on the context or on a value of some other feature. Furthermore, this feature can be relevant in one context and not in another. A feature with intrinsic value is always morally relevant and relevant in the same way. The view about the stress on “human” leads to *speciesism*, so it can be discarded immediately because being a member of one species should not be a morally important fact. One may argue that there is a morally important difference between human beings and animals regarding their psychological capacities, but then according to this criterion there is no difference between babies and animals either.

Another thing that can have intrinsic value is the right of redemption from any acute physical pain⁶. If this is true, then firstly, rights refer also to non-human species and secondly, causing this type of suffering is always morally wrong. However, if we look at masochism, we can see that this is not true, and therefore we cannot talk about the intrinsic value of this right⁷. Therefore, the protected moral element has extrinsic value, which means that both are variants. If this is true, then there is no connection between rights and universalism, and rights and equality. There is nothing to which a pre-political justification of so-called natural rights can be linked. Now, if this deontological justification of rights is out of the question, one is left with consequential justification. One of the possibilities here is contextualism, where culture, religion, state or nation of a given society can play the main role. In this case, rights cannot be connected with universalism, but with particularism. David Miller writes: “The contrast between republicanism and liberalism is not that the liberal recognizes the value of entrenched rights whereas the republican does not, but that the liberal regards these rights as having a pre-political justification while the republican grounds them in public discussion”⁸. Accordingly, the republican view seems more conclusive.

(b) Take a street with five houses in which the owners acknowledge that people with green hair have the intrinsic feature of greenness for example. Why should I give people in my house special rights and obligations (in a sense that they are justified in having greenness)? Liberals would say that this feature should be protected because of its intrinsic value and not because of the discussion about it. Their answer to the second question would be that they have to satisfy minimal legal requirements, which are equal for everyone, i.e. they are not exclusive. The same applies to citizenship. Membership is connected to “polity” rather than to “society”. In this case, one can talk only about political membership. If this is true, why are there cases of stateless people or *apatrides* in liberal societies?

CITIZENSHIP AND THE CASE STUDY OF STATELESS PEOPLE IN SLOVENIA

The term *de facto stateless* was introduced during the Second World War in response to the situation of German Jews. They had their citizenship written on paper, but were without any rights and, consequently, without any protection. Nowadays, three categories of stateless people are recognised. First, those who live outside the country in which they have a permanent residence. Second, those who have had to flee from the country in which they have a permanent residence because of persecution, and third, those who have the nationality of the country they live in but are so marginalized that they cannot be counted as citizens⁹. As Arendt writes, you can expect denaturalisation of people in totalitarian or semi-totalitarian dictatorships, but you do not expect free democratic states to do it or think about doing it. However, the very same thing happened in contemporary Slovenian history after the downfall of the former Yugoslavia when a new democratic and liberal state was born. Due to its administration, stateless people who could not be placed in any of the previously mentioned three categories appeared. As a result, a fourth category, of stateless people, was created.

In former Yugoslavia, people had republican and federal citizenship¹⁰. The former referred to the republic they lived in or to the nationality while the latter was always Yugoslavian. Because there was a strong intention to restore the concept of "Yugoslavian", where primary nationality like Serbian or Slovenian would be of secondary importance, republican citizenship could not exist without federal. If you lost federal citizenship then you automatically lost republican citizenship as well, but it was not the other way round. Most people who lived in the former Yugoslavia did not know that since 1974 it was possible to have republican citizenship. This did not mean that one could have two citizenships, i.e. this was not the case of dual citizenship. It is called sub-citizenship without real value. Among other things, this enabled a soft and open migration policy. According to the last Yugoslav census in 1991, as many as 12.1% non-Slovenes lived in Slovenia. For the most part, the immigrants' children born in Slovenia kept the nationality of their parents. The procedure was that at the municipality a child's nationality was entered in the book and so was consequently the republican citizenship. In cases where parents were of different nationality, some civil servants left the decision of what nationality to enter to the parents, but in most cases they made the decision themselves. There was no attention paid to this because a citizen of SFRJ without Slovenian republican citizenship had the same rights as the citizen of SFRJ with Slovenian republican citizenship. The only material condition required to obtain republican citizenship was to have a registered permanent residence in the republic no matter where one had actually been born or what nationality one might have been¹¹. Matjaž Klemenčič stated in his work *Slovenes of Cleveland: The Creation of a New Nation and a New World Community Slovenia and the Slovenes of Cleveland, Ohio*, that in the late 1980s migrations were influenced more by politics than by economics. People moved primarily to consolidate ethnic or religious communities.

The Slovenian struggle for independence within Yugoslavia lasted only ten days and ended with the European Union sponsored agreement calling for the withdrawal of Yugoslavian federal troops from Slovenia and the demobilization of Slovenian troops. When Slovenia separated from Yugoslavia and proclaimed The Declaration of Independence of

the Republic of Slovenia (25 June 1991), a new polity was born. This Act created the need for a special procedure in order to become a citizen. The Citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia Act from 1991 made it possible for most of the people with Slovenian republican citizenship to obtain Slovenian citizenship automatically. However, all those citizens who were born in other republics of the former Yugoslavia on the day of the Slovenian plebiscite (23 December 1990), or were born in Slovenia but non-Slovenian sub-citizenship was entered in the register of births had to apply for the Slovenian citizenship within six months even though they were registered as permanent residents, in other words, they got their citizenship *ex lege*. There were around 174,000 applications filed, of which approximately 171,000 were granted and 2,400 were denied¹². Therefore, the majority of applicants were granted Slovenian citizenship.

The first problems were encountered on 26 February 1992 when the first Slovenian government (by the internal decree from the Ministry of the Interior without any legal authorisation – the government is not a legislative body, therefore the Slovenian Constitutional Court decided that it was against Constitution)¹³ – erased from public records several thousands of people that did not want, could not apply for or were denied citizenship of the newborn state. The exact number is still unknown. The official document from 1996 states the majority of 44,921 people labelled “alien” without a valid permit to residence, or those never trying to obtain it are people registered in the central register as seekers of permanent residence before February 1992. Nobody knows how exact the figure is because the data in the document are as on 31 December 1995. At the press conference on 19 June 2002, the Ministry of the Interior gave a statement, mentioning only about 29,064 people that were “erased” and one month later it was denied and stated that the number of “erased” persons was 18,305. The reason given for discrepancies was that they did not deduct 29,064 of those who unregistered themselves from the register of the permanent residence before the “erasure” (or after, not knowing about the “erasure” at all). Therefore, 18,305 remains an official number even though Society of Erased Residents in Slovenia and the Helsinki Monitor Slovenia think that in 1992 the number was much bigger¹⁴. It is a known fact that the question about the exact figure of deported cannot be answered because, as the Ministry of the Interior said, at that time there was no register to enter the names of deported persons. Therefore, the government gave the “erased” the status of foreigners, whose rights were set by the same Act, i.e. the Aliens Act¹⁵. However, those who were born in one of the four other former Yugoslavian republics (or were even born in Slovenia but based on the republican citizenship and birthplace of their parents remained SFRJ citizens of other Yugoslav republics) were erased from the national register of permanent residence without previous notice¹⁶. Most of them were not of Slovenian nationality, but were registered as permanent residents. In doing so, the government took away from them an already given right, which was done in one move, without previous notice or warning. Those people were in a worse position compared to other foreigners because the valid register for permanent residence in Slovenia was from 1982, but in 1991 they made a computer-based register for foreigners, those with a permanent residence (labelled ‘VNe’ – *vnos tujca* [enter alien]), and those whose residence is unknown or is somewhere outside the borders of Slovenia (labelled ‘SPT’ – *sprememba tujca* [change alien]). Therefore, the legal status changed mainly for those whose nationality was not Slovenian

but another possible nationality of SFRJ, and for those whose sub-citizenship was not Slovenian¹⁷. On 8 November 2002, a member of the Slovenian parliament, Miran Potrč, said that on 1 June 1991, the parliament promised that the legal status of people who were not going to apply for Slovenian citizenship was not going to change. However, it did. What happened is called “the mass erasure”.

The so called *izbrisani* [erased] suddenly became stateless. The former Yugoslavia did not exist anymore and they did not have any citizenship whatsoever. In a world of states, being stateless and being without permanent residence means civil death, which leads to the loss of one’s job, the right to residence, education, health insurance etc. That is exactly what happened to those people. The state performed an illegal action and pushed those people into an illegal status without any documents (There was war going on in the former Yugoslavia, so it was hard to get any papers. It was even worse if a person’s nationality was Croatian or Bosnian and they were eligible for military service, and from 1992 to 1996, on Croatian territory, there was a strong possibility that a person would be enlisted), but since they had to survive somehow they were pushed into illegal actions such as taking work without a proper permit. In compliance with the dispatch number 0016/4-14968 of 27 February 1992, the police had the authority to deport them if found, without any administrative decision issued by administration units.

Furthermore, the Citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia Act did not enable them to apply for the status of foreigners with a permanent residence. Only those who previously had the status of foreigner with a temporary residence were allowed to apply, and even then at least three years of residence prior to the application were required. Of course, they could not provide that since not so long ago they had been permanent residents (until they were erased from the national register of permanent residence by the Slovenian government). One third of the erased people left Slovenia. Some were deported by the police to countries at war (they were without any legal documents), some could not survive and were forced to migrate to Croatia, Serbia or Bosnia and Herzegovina and some of them committed suicide.

Was the existence of these stateless people the consequence of an unintentional legal error or the consequence of an intentional administrative ethnically discriminatory action? (i) On 3 June 1991, a member of the Slovenian parliament, Metka Mencin, suggested an amendment to the eighty-first article of the Aliens Act. She suggested that the parliament should give citizens of the former Yugoslavia with permanent residency or employment in Slovenia but who had not applied for a Slovenian citizenship within the given period of six months, a permanent residence license. The Executive Council rejected the proposal. In 1999, the Constitutional Court gave the verdict that the Act was unconstitutional because there was a legal vacuum concerning that type of citizen of the former Yugoslavia. (ii) When the sociopolitical chamber voted to accept a decree of the previously mentioned proposal, i.e. that the legal status of people who were not going to apply for Slovenian citizenship was not going to change, 26 members voted for, 13 voted against and 10 abstained. (iii) Not all foreigners were “erased”, but in order to clarify this, I need to explain what was meant by the “target” set, i.e. the set of ethno-national groups which had some members actually “erased”, and the “neutral” set, i.e. the set of “foreign” groups,

whose members were not in line for “erasure”. The “ethnic” nationalities of the target set were mostly Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian Muslim, Albanian and Roma. Because the legal status of other foreigners with a permanent residence in Slovenia did not change, there was a question about the grounds on which they made a distinction between the target set (e.g. Serbians, Croatians) and the others. The members of the target and neutral set were permanent residents whose nationality was not Slovenian, and who had not applied for citizenship at the critical point. On the other hand, they differed in nationality and religion. But only those people who formed the target set from the former republics of Yugoslavia (plus ethnic Roma) were problematic. If one counts the changed legal status of one set as the consequence, this consequence must have been based on elements which made a difference between those sets. The difference was their nationality and religion. Therefore, those elements played the main part in the game of “mass erasure”. (iv) In 2003, right-wing parties (who won the last elections in 2004) lodged an initiative for a preliminary referendum on the Draft Act, regulating the permanent residence of the aliens, i.e. citizens of the former Yugoslavia who lived in the Republic of Slovenia and had a registered permanent residence there on 23 December 1990 and on 25 February 1992, with the purpose for people to decide if they agreed with the Draft Act (with which Slovenia would acknowledge an error and would give a retroactive status of the permanent residence to the “erased” persons). They tried to persuade ordinary people by spreading false propaganda to vote against the Act by describing the “erased” as people who had returned to Slovenia after 1991 because of prosperity as war criminals and people who were against Slovenian independence etc. Some of them actually were. They often talk about approximately 100 officers of the former Yugoslav Army that did not fight side by side with the Slovenian armed forces. They did not obtain Slovenian citizenship even though most of them and their families lived permanently in Slovenia¹⁸. They also emphasized the possible consequence of the Act. To accept it would mean to admit an error and this would give the “erased” the right to claim damages, which could lead to a demand for payments up to 3 billion dollars. (v) In 1999, following a suggestion from the society of the “erased”, the Slovenian Constitutional Court gave the verdict that the eighty-first article of the Aliens Act was unconstitutional and should be amended. The parliament adopted Act on Regularizing the Status of Citizens of Other State Successors of the Former Yugoslavia in the Republic of Slovenia and as a result of this a total of 18,305 individuals were “erased” in 1992, some 12,000 had their permanent residence status restored, which only became effective from 1999 on¹⁹. In April 2003, the Slovenian Constitutional Court gave another verdict saying that the adopted Act was also unconstitutional²⁰. There was also a clear statement given by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Alvaro Gil Robles, on the human rights violation in Slovenia²¹. Even now, in 2006, this still has not been completely aligned to the Constitution and in accordance with the actual present situation. It is stated in the document of Amnesty International that “the Slovenian Ministry of the Interior has begun issuing permanent residence decrees with retroactive validity but, as of February 2005, only approximately 4,100 of such decrees have been issued”. This means that the state has taken seven years to admit its mistake (despite the fact that it was aware of it long before as is recorded in the dispatch from 1996, and another seven years to legally enable a restitution of those people’s legal state.

This is not a unique case: members of parliament in many countries tend to procrastinate on the problems of stateless people, who after all, by definition, do not vote. (vi) To paraphrase Hannah Arendt, Hitler told the rest of the world how to deal with ethnic minorities and stateless people. First, make them a non-accepted minority, then make them stateless before deporting them and finally send them to concentration camps. Slovenia of course did not do such a thing. Nonetheless, since some were deported to states in the war zone, although not collectively, we can see that the consequences of erasure were potentially very serious.

Therefore, citing (i) to (vi) as evidence, I conclude that what happened in Slovenia was not the result of an unintentional legal error that is going to be corrected as soon as possible, but the result of an intentional administrative ethnically discriminatory action.

It is obvious that the case of the Slovenian “erased” and stateless people is not an isolated case in contemporary history. It is sobering to think that of the tragedies that ensue when citizenship is not recognised, especially through policies of mass denationalisation. Cambodia (ethnic Vietnamese 1993), Myanmar (Rohingya Arakanese 1992) and Syria (Kurds 1962). Another group of countries also performed mass denationalisation, followed by mass expulsion, including Ethiopia (People with Eritrean affiliation 1998), Bhutan (*Lhotshampas* - ethnic Nepalis 1991), Vietnam (*Hoa* - ethnic Chinese ‘boat people’, 1978-1979)²².

The erasure came after the completion of a new constitution in which Slovenia committed itself to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. How was it possible that something like universal rights, based on equality and consisting of the intrinsic feature “being human”, was not respected, implemented and protected? I have already justified under (a) that human rights are not universal because there is no intrinsic feature that should be protected. Through the case of the stateless people and other similar cases it is clear that human rights that are supposed to be inalienable are actually unattainable. If they were attainable, a person without a state would still be part of a community with the expectation that their human rights would be protected. In any case, the feature of “being human” would not have been taken away from them. Instead, they lose those rights at the moment they lose a particular relationship, i.e. the relationship with the state (this can happen as soon as they are left without a permanent residence). “The reason why /.../ nowadays national states would like to have ethnically homogenous states is because they hope to be able to eliminate natural rights and always present differences and distinctions which make their own blind hate, distrust and discrimination.../”²³. Therefore, if citizenship rights have priority over other rights and are based on nationality, they are not universal nor equal. Accordingly, once again, the republican view, for example, that rights are grounded in public discussion, seems more conclusive. The same can be said about the concept of state membership. However, the liberal idea about membership which suggests that membership is or should be connected more to “polity” and less to “society”, and that therefore we should only talk about political membership, has not been proved in history. However, this clearly is a different picture. The case of the “erased” in Slovenia in 1992 shows the possibility of having, according to a Baubock schema, the concept of nominal citizenship that is incomplete (because of stateless people) and indiscrete (because of pos-

sibilities of dual citizenship) citizenship. This, together with articles in the last version of the Citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia Act that contain phrases such as “national interest” and “free judgement”, makes me think that at least in those cases cultural membership was the leading element for the unjust distribution of goods based on identity.

The success of non-violation of citizenship rights depends on a constitution, rationality, morality and virtues. A liberal society leaves substantial room for diversity and its members’ personal freedom. This is the reason that some authors like W. A. Galston claim that virtues are a necessary element of any notion of citizenship. If its interference with member’s personal life is minimal, then how can a good citizen exist? A possible answer is by education responsibilities that one has to society, but this is already the republican way of thinking.

VIRTUES AND CITIZENSHIP

In this part, I would like to elucidate the difference between a liberal and a republican approach to virtues, and answer the following questions: Is the Socratic concept of citizenship closer to republican society or liberal society? What influence should underlying virtues and values have on citizens and the concept of citizenship?

Take a public building with fifty rooms, for example. Some of the people that live in the building have bought their rooms and some have rented them. The contract signed in the act of purchase represents the relationship between the purchaser and others, and between the purchaser and the building. In doing this, the purchaser has political membership. To become a member, i.e. to get legal status in the building, there are several basic colour-blind rules²⁴, but because the most important feature for everyone in this building is to function normally and to live in a normal “society”, the following question may arise. Are these minimal requirements, or colour-blind rules, with respect to the huge diversity of members sufficient for such a life? The answer is either to eliminate diversity by deportation, which requires the basic rules not to be colour-blind and an explanation of the grounds on which some are discriminated as opposed to others, or alternatively to build a social cohesion between them. The cohesion can be built from virtues that a member has or should have, e.g. loyalty, courage and honesty. This analogy with the state shows why the concept of citizenship is connected to the concept of virtue. The question is how they are connected?

The first option is as follows. Since autonomy and personal choice are highly thought of and it is not desired to interfere with people’s personal lives more than necessary, those agents have an opportunity and an ability to think and decide in any case what to do, and which virtues, if any, they are going to pursue and so on. This option represents a liberal concept of citizenship, where the importance of cultural membership is secondary to political membership.

The difference between the republican and liberal approach to citizenship is that republicans require a member to promote the common interests of society and take an active role in all areas of politics. It can be inferred from this that in a competition between public and private, public always wins. In the case of the building, this would mean that no mat-

ter what one's interests are, one should participate in the community meetings and should work for the whole society, even though this may sometimes suppress one's own solutions to problems or even one's own interests for the good of the society interests. In actual republican states, cultural citizenship has the same importance as political citizenship, or at least it has a strong influence on it – see the debates in present-day France. Therefore, what is really important for a member is to be a law-abiding and good citizen, and then a good person, and the relationship between a state and an individual is, in this case, preserved on the basis of virtues. The virtue that would most enable this relationship to succeed is loyalty. In Sartre's case, where one should decide between two alternatives, i.e. loyalty to the state or loyalty to the family, a republican citizen must always choose the state. This implies two things:

(a) The Socratic concept of a good citizen. In *Crito* he says "...Both in war and in law courts and everywhere else you must do whatever your city and your country command..."²⁵. Republicans would agree with him. However, Socrates added: "If you acknowledge that a command is unjust, your duty and right is to persuade others that this is an error or an unjust action. Only in the case of failure do you have to obey the command". Therefore, the Socratic concept of being a good citizen was in contrast with the republican concept in three points. First, for the republicans, a good citizen is someone that is loyal, uncritical of the state and free of criticism to moral consequences. This is contrary to Socrates' view. A good citizen should be conscious enough, i.e. the guidelines of life or decisions about actions ought to be "never be unjust or never do injustice". This is, as Dana Villa called it, the subjective doctrine of consciousness, where following this guidelines is the priority of citizenship duties. For Socrates, being a good citizen did not necessarily mean being a good person, and the latter took priority over the former. Second, because he also spoke in favour of the distinction between private and public, where to live or to have a good private life were more important. In the context of morality, he was closer to the liberal than to the republican concept of citizens. Third, for Socrates, citizenship was based on political membership. The state allowed him to choose any polis, which means that even if we talk about loyalty in Socrates' case, this loyalty was based on the agent's own decision, which in turn was based on reasoning and not on nationality or religion. Therefore, cultural membership was not important, whereas the republicans justify or produce loyalty on the grounds of community interests. These interests can be read as interests of the majority, and in national states a common element of majority is nationality or religion, which means that cultural membership can have a strong influence on the political one.

(b) The case of the "erased" shows where the republican understanding of loyalty can lead. Following society's interests can sometimes mean not being colour-blind. (In most cases this means pursuing the interests of the majority.) Think about the "building" case. Everyone is renting rooms, but now there is an opportunity to buy the whole house. This is only possible if the majority of people living inside buy their rooms. The majority do it, but others do not. The reasons of others for not buying are different. They might already have their own rooms in other buildings and do not want to lose them (there is a rule that one can have only one room), or some of them might not trust this offer and would rather stay a tenant. They still meet all the requirements of being a tenant, since when the offer was submitted it was clear that their legal status was not going to change if they turned

it down. Is the invalidation of their contract justified? And for what reason? Let us put them into two groups. The status of the first group would not change whereas the status of the second would. The only reason for the changed status of the first group could be diminishing loyalty, i.e. the interests of the society were no longer their priority. Let us make an analogy with the case of the “erased” people in Slovenia. According to data, the most plausible interpretation would be that those people did not have, or show, at the particular time the most important virtue, i.e. loyalty to the state in formation. Their distrust and disloyalty were shown when they did not apply for the Slovenian citizenship. It is known that the consequence is the form of punishment in that cultural membership completely overcame political membership. Moreover, in the first part of this chapter I stated that the legal status of only one group had changed. If loyalty and trustworthiness had been the most important virtues, then the legal status of everyone would have changed. But it did not, so the only difference between them is their nationality and religion. The state was not neutral and interfered with private lives drastically. Again, if political membership is colour-blind and cultural membership is not, then in this case, the latter completely overcame the former and one cannot talk about a liberal state anymore.

At the beginning of the liberal state, individual virtues are not important. The state should interfere with its consumers the least possible. Due to globalisation and a huge expansion of individual, mostly in economic interests, some political theorists and historians talk about moral and intellectual immaturity of citizens. Therefore, liberals have realised that virtues are needed. They have realised that society also depends on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens, but not on any kind of qualities and attitudes, but those that are going to preserve liberalism in society. According to Galston, a responsible liberal citizenship requires four types of citizenship virtues: *general* – courage, law-abidingness, loyalty; *social* – independence and tolerance; *economic* and *political virtues* that include virtues of citizens (courage, loyalty, open-mindedness), virtues of leaders (the capacity to forge a sense of common purpose against the centrifugal tendencies of an individualistic and fragmented society, ability to resist the temptation to fear popularity etc.) and general political virtues (among others a capacity and disposition to engage in public discourse and virtues of political discourse)²⁶.

Many of the virtues mentioned here were also mentioned in connection with republican citizenship. What is the difference then? Firstly, in liberal societies, one can choose which virtue has priority over another and this decision depends on the context. There is no universal or fundamental virtue coupled with punishment (for not having or practising that virtue). Secondly, liberal societies should be neutral concerning language, history etc., so it can be inferred that political membership has priority over the cultural. Thirdly, one should think about society and try to be a good citizen, but this does not exclude having healthy critical insights into the state’s actions. Finally, Socrates’ sense of citizenship is therefore more closely related to liberal than republican society.

Judging by the cases of stateless people I have presented, and cases of not being naturalised that have happened in the contemporary history of countries that have claimed to be liberal, either this is not true, i.e. there is no liberalism since one cannot talk about equality, or another definition of the concept of liberalism is needed.

CONCLUSION

How does a state control the always present differences and distinctions of society? The state's concept of citizenship and the way the state deals with citizens or immigrants that would like to become citizens could be the answer. Since liberal as well as republican societies claim that their relationship to citizens and non-citizens is based on rights, I have explored the issues of whether (i) rights are universal and basic and (ii) what influence underlying virtues and values should have on citizens and the concept of citizenship. My conclusions concerning (i) are as follows:

- a. Status theories are based on deontological justification. Their idea is that rights have a pre-political justification. Consequential theories take the opposite stand. Their justification of rights is based on instrumentalism, i.e. on respect for particular rights as a means for bringing about some optimal distribution of interests.
- b. The deontological concept of natural rights traditionally implies their being "granted or given to the other by someone or something". This suggests that receivers of rights are this *Other*, which immediately implies not only that this is a relationship between someone or something and the receivers, but also that this someone is in a superior position. Because few people want someone to have given them rights, theoreticians started using the words "human rights".
- c. Once stress is given to "human", it means that being a member of the species *Homo Sapiens* has an intrinsic value and should therefore be protected. This view leads to *speciesism*, so it can be discarded immediately because belonging to one group of species is not a morally important feature.
- d. As a result of b. and c., the protected moral element (human rights) has an extrinsic value and is therefore changeable. If this is true, then there is no strong connection between rights and universalism. There is nothing to which a pre-political justification of the so-called natural rights can be tied, thereby leaving a consequential justification. One of the possibilities here is contextualism, where the culture or religion of a state or nation of a given society can play the main role. In this case, rights cannot be connected with universalism, but with particularism.
- e. Human rights and consequently citizenship rights and obligations do not have a pre-political justification, as claimed by liberals.
- f. The case of the "erased" that happened in contemporary Slovenian history after the downfall of the former Yugoslavia happened in a democratic liberal state and created a fourth category of stateless people, i.e. most of those people that were not born in the state, but in the sense of a wider context belonged to it.
- g. What happened in Slovenia was not the consequence of an unintentional legal error, but the consequence of an intentional administrative ethnically discriminatory action.
- h. The case of the stateless people and other similar cases make it clear that human rights that are supposed to be inalienable are actually unattainable.

- i. Membership should therefore be connected with “polity” rather than with “society”, so that in this case one can only talk about political membership, but because of different cases of stateless people in contemporary history this is in fact not so. In the case of the “erased”, cultural membership was responsible for the unjust distribution of goods on the basis of identity.

In the second part of the chapter, I focused on elucidating the difference between liberal and republican approach to virtues, answering the following questions: Is the Socratic concept of citizenship closer to republican society or liberal society? What influence should underlying virtues and values have on citizens and on the concept of citizenship? The results are the following:

- a. There are some important differences between the Socratic and republican viewpoint. For republicans, a good citizen is someone that is loyal, uncritical of the state and free of criticism to moral consequences, which is opposite to Socrates’ view. Another difference is that Socrates spoke in favour of a distinction between private and public with where to live or to have a good private life being more important in a context of morality. The difference also emerges when examining the grounds for citizenship. Loyalty in Socrates’ case was based on the agent’s own decision, which in turn was based on reasoning and not on nationality or religion. What was important was political membership.
- b. In the case of the “erased” in Slovenia and the available data it is usually claimed that those people did not have or show the most important virtue at the particular time, i.e. loyalty to the state in formation. In this chapter, I have proved that since the legal status of only some people who showed disloyalty changed, there must have been a further and crucial difference between them. The difference was their nationality or religion. If political membership is colour-blind and cultural is not, then, in this case, the latter completely overcame the former.
- c. The differences between the liberal and republican concept of citizenship’s virtues. In liberal societies, one can choose which virtue has priority over another and that decision depends on the context. There is no universal or fundamental virtue coupled to a punishment for not having or practising that virtue. Liberal societies should be neutral as far as language, history, etc. are concerned, so it can be inferred that political membership takes priority over cultural. One should think about society and try to be a good citizen, but this does not exclude having healthy critical insights into the state’s actions. The last point suggests that the Socratic sense of citizenship is therefore more closely related to liberal than republican society.
- d. Slovenia has played a double game as far as the concept of citizenship, citizens and minorities is concerned. While it is liberal with respect to legally acknowledged minorities like Italians and Hungarians, or to foreigners not originating from other republics of former Yugoslavia, in relation to people from former republics of SFRJ the concept of citizenship is extremely republican, or, perhaps, totalitarian.

NOTES

- ¹ The definition of citizenship that I am going to use in this paper is from the European convention on citizenship where it is stated in the paragraph a) of Article 2 that 'citizenship' means legal relationship between an individual and a state and does not imply ethnic origin of the individual.
- ² When one talks about a legal status of citizenship, one includes rights and obligations, but universality is usually applied only to rights. Consequently, I am going to use the term "rights", but to include positive as well as negative rights.
- ³ David Miller distinguishes between three concepts of citizenship: liberal, libertarian and republican. He defines liberal citizenship as a set of rights enjoyed equally by every member of society. Libertarian represents a citizen as someone who chooses between different bundles of public goods and services, and republican represents the citizen as someone who plays an active role in shaping the future direction of the society through political debate and decision-making.
- ⁴ The Declaration of Independence of the United States and La Declaration des Droits de l'Homme.
- ⁵ P. Cavalieri, *The Animal question: Why NonHuman Animals Deserve Human Rights*, Oxford 2001, p. 129.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 134.
- ⁷ See the concept of enablers in J. Dancy, *Ethics without Principles*, Oxford 2004, pp. 38-52.
- ⁸ D. Miller D., *Citizenship and National Identity*, Cambridge 2000, p. 59.
- ⁹ A.T. Aleinikoff - D. Klusmeyer (eds.), *Citizenship today: Global perspectives and practice*, Washington D.C. 2000, p. 187.
- ¹⁰ SFRJ citizenship and republican citizenship were regulated with the following acts: 1964 - New Act on SFRJ Citizenship; 1974 - the new SFRJ Constitution was formed where federation of six republics was established and consequently two citizenships - federal and republican (The constitution of SFRJ, 1974, Paragraph 2, Article 249); 1976 - Article 10 of the Act on Citizenship of SFRJ states that the federal citizenship is derivative from republican. (J. Dedić, *Diskriminacija v postopkih pridobivanja državljanstva v RS* [Discrimination in the Process of Obtaining Citizenship in RS], Ljubljana 2003, pp. 26).
- ¹¹ Considering the fact that irrespective of the sort of republican citizenship one has, as long as one has a permanent residence, one has all rights and benefits, I can conclude that at least in SFRJ rights were more tight to the permanent residence than to the republican citizenship. With regard to this fact it is easier to understand what it means for someone to lose this legal status.
- ¹² *Ministrstvo za notranje zadeve* (2002). *Tujski in državljanski statusi - Tiskovna konverenca urada za upravne notranje zadeve*, 19.6.2002 Ljubljana [Ministry of the Interior (2002), Press Conference, 19 June 2002, Ljubljana].
- ¹³ Odločba Ustavnega sodišča RS (*Uradni list RS*, št. 14/99), št. U-I- 284/94 (on line). Dostopno na: <http://www.us-rs.si/index.html/> [Provision of Slovenian Constitutional Court (Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia Act, no. 14/99), no. U-I-284/94 (online). Access on: <http://www.us-rs.si/index.html/>].
- ¹⁴ Helsinki Monitor Slovenia, statement, no. 9, Restitution of Permanent Residence Permit to the Erased Citizens, 11 December 2000. Organizations like UNHCR are talking about a bigger number, around 62,816 or even 130,000, but nothing has been proved.
- ¹⁵ ZTuj-1, *Uradni list RS*, št. 61/99; [Aliens Act (AA-1, Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia Act, no. 61/99)].
- ¹⁶ Without prior notice they labelled some people who did not apply for a citizenship or were denied it but had a legal status of permanent residency in Slovenia SPT, i.e. unknown residence or having a permanent residence in other state which was ignored. They actually had a permanent residence in Slovenia.
- ¹⁷ Mekina B., Izbrisala jih je depeša št. 0016/4-14968 [They were erased by dispatch no. 0016/4-14968], Maribor 25.02.2004. Accessible on: <http://www.vecer.com>.
- ¹⁸ M. Klemenčič, *Slovenes of Cleveland: The Creation of a New Nation and a New World Community Slovenia and the Slovenes of Cleveland, Ohio*, Novo Mesto 1995, pp. 46.
- ¹⁹ Amnesty International Press Release, AI Index: EUR 68/001/2005 (Public); News Service No: 053; 4th of March 2005.
- ²⁰ Verdicts of the Constitutional Court are obligatory but without legal force. Odločba Ustavnega sodišča o ustavnosti Zakona o urejanju statusa državljanov drugih držav naslednic nekdanje SFRJ v Republiki Sloveniji (*Uradni list RS*, št. 61/99 in 64/01), št. U-I-246/02 (on line). Dostopno na: <http://odlocitve.us-rs.si/ursr/us-odl.nsf/> [Provision on

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- ²¹ COE, Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Report by Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, on His Visit to Slovenia, 11 – 14 May 2003, CommDH(2003)11, 15 October 2003, Paragraph 28.
- ²² J. Fussell, *News Monitor for Slovenia 1998 – 2004*. (<http://www.preventgenocide.org/europe/slovenia/>).
- ²³ H. Arendt, *Izvori totalitarizma* [The Origins of Totalitarianism], Ljubljana 2003, pp. 355–376.
- ²⁴ To have colour-blind rules, interests, rights, citizenship or institutions means to have a common set of something (e.g. rules, rights etc.), and not give special status or make group-specific exemptions according to ethnic, racial or ethnic-religious groups.
- ²⁵ Platon, *Apologija, Kriton* [Plato: The Apology and Crito], Ljubljana 1967, p. 66.
- ²⁶ W.A. Galston, *Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State*, Cambridge 1991, pp. 220–227.

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The Theatre of Historical Sources. Some Methodological Problems in Analysing the Post World War II Extreme Rightwing Movements in Belgium and in Hungary

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A tanulmány a II. világháború utáni magyar népbíróági tárgyalások jegyzőkönyveinek és a belga szélsőjobboldalról rendelkezésre álló titkosszolgálati források elemzésével arra a kérdésre keresi a választ milyen módszertannal lehet ezeket a forrásokat történeti kutatás számára hasznosítani. A tanulmány középpontjában a forrásokhoz való hozzá nem férés, és a források értelmezésének politikatörténeti pozitivistá episztemológiájának megkérdőjelezése áll.

Met “Het theater van de historische bron” wilden Andrea Peto en Klaartje Schrijvers een comparatief onderzoek verrichten naar de methodologische problemen die opduiken in onderzoek naar het extreem rechts verleden in Europa. Twee case studies werden onder de loep genomen: extreem rechtse netwerken in België met roots in het verzetsverleden in plaats van de collaboratie met Nazi Duitsland, en vrouwelijke militanten van de Hakenkruis Partij in Hongarije tijdens de oorlog. In beide gevallen gaat het om nieuw onderzoek, dat bovendien indruist tegen de traditionele historiografie in respectievelijk België en Hongarije. In deze eerste aanzet tot een vernieuwend comparatief onderzoek in de Europese geschiedenis werd vooral gefocust op de problematiek van de ontbrekende bron, de ontoegankelijke bron en de bronnen die nooit de intentie hadden om te worden ontdekt. In de verschillen binnen beide nationale geschiedenissen – een voormalig communistisch land (Hongarije) en een westers land, de facto anticommunistisch tijdens de Koude Oorlog (België) – werden ook gelijkenissen aangetroffen. De creatie van de bron en de weloverwogen politieke strategie achter deze creatie bleek alvast grensoverschrijdend te zijn. Maar vooral het positivistisch credo van de ‘truth claim’ vormde de rode draad. Welk verhaal kunnen we immers vertellen als een geschiedenis zich niet wil laten zien?

INTRODUCTION

In post-war Europe many countries have been confronted with the revival of extreme rightwing tendencies. These tendencies originated both in the extreme right with roots in the collaboration with Nazi Germany and in the extreme right that went into the resistance movement during the Second World War. Some of the latter continued their underground activities even during the Cold War, as they were called to serve in the numerous stay-behind networks in Europe, patronized by the CIA and by NATO.

Much has been written about the revival of the extreme right in Europe, but not all the cases have been studied yet. The participation of women in the Hungarian Nazi Party and their role and perception in transitional justice for instance has never been examined before. Research into the extreme rightwing networks in Belgium originating from the resistance movement is almost completely absent from Belgian historiography. These two cases are now being studied by Andrea Pető (for Hungary) and Klaartje Schrijvers (for Belgium) respectively.

In this chapter we give initial impetus to our research by comparing the two cases. At first sight our proposal might seem methodologically and theoretically far-fetched, but the chapter's initial aim is to underline what there is in common in doing historical research on such material in a former Communist country and in a western and *de facto* anti-communist country in the context of the Cold War.

The focus is on the methodological problems the researcher must deal with, the accessibility or inaccessibility of the sources, and the ways these sources should be interpreted, while questioning the positivist epistemological context of writing political history. By placing the Belgian and Hungarian cases side by side, the two researchers also try to explore a different kind of comparative research in European history. Besides the concrete facts as they appear in different European contexts, the methodological and political problems that the historian must deal with are especially emphasized.

On the fringe of this focus, both cases also deal with gender. Through its power to form identity, political and social discourse became homogenous and exclusive. Therefore a gender analysis is especially problematic. In the Hungarian case, gender is explicitly presented, since the focus is on the story of women in a tribunal predominantly run by men. The Belgian case deals more implicitly with gender because of the silent absence of women in a quasi exclusively male dominated professional elite; namely that of industrialists and bankers.

Professional identity, however, is clearly not the only factor that moved these people towards an extreme rightwing ideology. In both the Hungarian and the Belgian cases we notice how a social identity had been constructed in the broader political, economic, social and even gendered context of the Second World War. Social identity thus is not restricted to professional identity. In the comparison between two different countries and two different histories, it becomes clear how a social identity can be constructed on the ruins of a battle lost; namely the battle against democracy.

SEARCHING FOR THE RED INK

In an old joke from the defunct German Democratic Republic, a German worker gets a job in Siberia; aware that all mail will be read by censors, he tells his friends: "Let's establish a code: if a letter you get from me is written in ordinary blue ink, it's true; if it's written in red ink, it's false". After a month, his friends get the first letter, written in blue ink: "Everything is wonderful here: the shops are full, food is abundant, apartments are large and properly heated, cinemas show films from the West, there are many beautiful girls ready for an affair – the only thing you can't get is red ink"¹.

This often quoted anecdote sheds light on one of the problems this chapter wants to address: namely the secrecy of the sources or rather how to use sources that were aimed to remain secret forever. These sources were not written in order to keep a record as inventories or newspapers do, but they were consciously aimed to construct a meta-reality, a duplicity or even triplicity of realities. For historical research, where the dominant narrative of political history is still to write 'what really happened', this constitutes a problem.

In the case of Belgium, extreme rightwing networks actually did (and do) exist, but they were rarely seen or heard. In Communist Hungary the extreme rightwing networks did not exist as such (high profile extreme rightwing politicians left the Soviet Occupational Zone) but they were made visible and heard by the Communist secret police. In both countries the collaboration with Nazi Germany was very strong, but while Hungary was essentially interested in putting the collaborationist past into oblivion, the Belgian authorities organised a true witch-hunt for collaborators. The context of the Cold War alienated both policies even more. In Hungary the Communist Party occupied the discursive space and the rhetoric of democracy which was made equivalent to anti-fascism, while in Belgium the rhetoric of democracy was considered identical to anti-communism. In their hunt for everyone who was supposed to be Communist and on the other hand everyone who was suspected of collaboration, the Belgian authorities for a long time remained blind to the extreme rightwing tendencies originating from the resistance against Nazi Germany.

The red ink story illustrates how difficult it is to tell the truth, and how impossible it is to find out what is true if we do not possess the code to decode and transform the lie. In order to make an adequate analysis of the methodological problems we are dealing with, it is, however, necessary to have a deeper knowledge of the institutional background of both countries. Therefore, in the next section we compare the Belgian and Hungarian archives and institutions and analyse the differences and similarities in the production of documents later used by historians².

INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: INSTITUTIONS PRODUCING DOCUMENTS. SIMILARITIES IN DOCUMENTING OCCUPATION AND RESISTANCE

Horthy's Hungary was a reluctant ally of Nazi Germany. As it became more obvious that the Germans would not win the war, the regime was considering dropping out of

the conflict³. To halt the Hungarian political elite's flirtation with the Allies, the German forces occupied the country on 19 March 1944. The quickest deportation in the history of the Holocaust took place in Hungary after that⁴. On 15th October 1944 the Arrow Cross Party took over as the Hungarian Quisling government, led by Szálasi. Looting and killing started in the country. The total number of war losses consisted of around 600,000 Jews.

People's tribunals were instituted in Hungary in 1945 in order to provide justice after World War II⁵. However, the Law of 1946 VII on "Protecting the Republic Protecting the State Order and the Republic" changed the character of the jurisdiction in the sense that the People's tribunals also became a tool of the class struggle. As to the documentation resulting from the trials, we know that approximately 30% of the records produced by the Budapest People's Court and People's Tribunal were transferred from the Budapest Court to the Budapest Municipal Archives. From 1975 until 1989 the Ministry of Interior transferred files to this archive as well. When the Budapest People's Tribunal ceased to exist the files were given to the state protection authority (ÁVH). The files have been organised and inventoried there. After 1989 the Historical Authority was formed in order to handle the documents of the former secret services. During this process files from the People's tribunals were also transferred to them. However the list of the documents transferred is not known even today, unlike the case of the documents kept in the Municipal Archive of Budapest, where out of 70,000 perpetrators 6,300 female perpetrators and war criminals are listed.

During the trials in the People's tribunals, influenced by the Hungarian Communist Party, it was a vital interest to undermine publicly the previous regime⁶. In the case of Hungary the label: *nyilas* (a member of the Hungarian Arrow Cross Party) was used more freely both in public discourse and in the trials. Arrow Cross Party cards were only rarely found during house searches, so in most cases if someone was seen with an Arrow Cross armband that was already enough for them to be labelled a "member of the Arrow Cross Party" by the People's tribunals⁷. Furthermore almost anybody could get access to an Arrow Cross armband, so neither formal membership nor admission procedures were needed, or even possible, since the Red Army was quickly approaching. So *nyilas* became a political label rather than a category of actual party membership.

Belgium was founded in 1830 under the severe restriction that it must preserve absolute neutrality. The First World War, however, obliged the Belgian government to abolish its rigorous neutral status because of German invasion. In the interwar period many people pursued a revision of the neutrality policy. On the eve of the Second World War, both the government and King Leopold III considered neutrality the best solution for keeping Belgium out of the war. The expansionistic politics of Germany, however, forced them to change their point of view⁸. On the other hand, danger also emerged from within their own society. 'Activism', originating in the First World War, and pursuing the annexation of Flanders with the Netherlands, developed during the interwar period into an extreme pro-Nazi German movement, namely the *Vlaams Nationaal Verbond* [Flemish National League] (VNV)⁹. In Wallonia there was also a strong ex-

treme rightwing movement, REX, that sympathized with Nazi Germany and pursued an annexation of the entire country by Germany¹⁰. In these political movements one could hardly speak of neutrality. On the contrary, they formed an intrinsic danger for the neutral status that the Belgian government was trying to maintain.

In May 1940 the German army invaded Belgium and both the government and the king were forced to choose sides. The government left for London and joined the Allies. The king, however, remained in Belgium as a *de facto* prisoner of war in his own country. Here the seed was sown for the later Royal Question since the government blamed the king for those actions¹¹. Furthermore, various military circles also regretted the king's quick capitulation, although they were very much aware of that they had little chance of defeating the German army. A couple of months later, underground resistance armies were created with the knowledge of Leopold III. In close contact with the British secret intelligence services, diverse Belgian intelligence and action services operated behind the scenes of occupied Belgium. But the underground resistance movement had to deal with many difficulties. Due to the presence of the king, Belgium was given only a military government under Nazi control and not a civil government, as was the case in the Netherlands¹². Consequently, military control was very intense, and diverse collaborating Belgian organisations were allocated both military and police tasks. Their purpose was to infiltrate the resistance movement and finally to defeat them. In September 1944 the Allies finally succeeded in liberating Belgium. From that moment on the government started hunting down the thousands of people who had collaborated with the Germans. For Belgium, the history of the Second World War was determined by the shadow of this collaboration¹³.

Consequently, most research has focused on these black pages in Belgian history. Only at a latter stage was the resistance movement dealt with (especially the communist *Onafhankelijkheidsfront* (*Front de l'Indépendance*) [The Independent Front] because it was the largest resistance group during the war)¹⁴. Economic collaboration and the (extreme) rightwing resistance movements both during and after the war received less attention. The topic of collaboration is noticeably overrepresented not only as regards research but also because of the large quantity of written sources useful for research on this topic available to historians.

The documentation of the military tribunal of Belgium for instance contains a treasure trove of information about both the German occupation and the post-war repression. After the liberation several military tribunals in Belgium were responsible for the persecution of persons suspected of collaboration with the Germans. In total 235,413 acts of accusation were drawn up and eventually 57,000 people were convicted. Now, more than fifty years later, the archives are gradually being opened for consultation¹⁵.

The Centre of Study and Documentation on War and Contemporary Society (CEGESOMA) is well documented for matters concerning the Second World War, but mainly focuses on collaboration. This institution obtained the general documentation and persuasive letters of the Central Documentation Office, which from September 1944 on gathered a great number of files concerning the Germans and collaborating organisations. To a lesser

degree the leftwing (communist) resistance also has been dealt with. CEGESOMA contains the complete archive of the communist resistance movement *Front de l'Indépendance* (FI)¹⁶. Recently two CEGESOMA researchers managed to map the widespread sources of the resistance movement in Flanders, but unfortunately the Walloon sources are not included and the extreme rightwing resistance movement is underrepresented¹⁷. The Centre for Historical Documentation of the Armed Forces (CHD) contains several microfilms of foreign files about Belgian military politics. The records of the military intelligence service however cannot be consulted. The Belgian Museum of the Army contains files about the demobilized army, OTAD, and archives of reserve officers.

Finally, several other institutions, such as the General National Archives, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior and the Archive of the Royal Palace, also possess valuable records. But even in these institutions the focus is on collaboration and leftwing resistance. The common thread in the interest in the communist resistance was the alleged communist threat before, during and after the war. The government tried to intercept a possible assumption of power through espionage and the creation of a vast number of files.

In spite of the focus on the subject, research into collaboration was hindered for a long period of time. The archive law in Belgium allows access to the sources only after fifty years, or in some delicate cases even after 100 years. Moreover, many archives located in Germany were transferred to Moscow after the invasion by the Red Army. Only ten years ago were these archives returned to Belgium where they are now accessible for researchers¹⁸. Furthermore, many archives of the Belgian Court of Justice disappeared in the decades following the war, because of an inadequate policy¹⁹. Recently there has been a breakthrough concerning these sources, but research is still in its preliminary stage. Research on the resistance movement is much more difficult, as naturally it left fewer sources behind. From the beginning, also, studies were affected by stereotyped ideas about the Belgian resistance movement.

In the case of the Hungarian sources the right to gain access to sources relating to 20th-century history was not an issue until 1989. Before the collapse of the communist system, the right to do research in the archives was an issue of political confidence and reliability rather than of academic competence. However after 1989 the situation changed and the newly founded archive based on secret service files (first named *Történeti Hivatal* [Historical Office], and later *Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Irattára* [Historical Archive of the State Security Services]), still lacks a register of the material preserved there²⁰. Even if the question of access to information is periodically discussed in public, the issues considered are largely limited to asking who gave reports to the state security services and not who ordered and used those reports. Mirroring the Cold War division, the archive of the former Radio Free Europe moved to Budapest as Open Society Archives²¹. The OSA also contains the files of those who did receive their own files from the Archive of the State Security Service and they donated it to the OSA. The protection of the privacy of those who reported was given priority during the Hungarian transition²².

POLITICS OF THE SOURCES

To date the dominant myth influencing historical research on Belgium during the Second World War is an imagined dichotomy of a Flemish and Catholic collaboration versus a Walloon and leftwing (meaning communist) resistance movement. The story of a Belgian rightwing resistance consequently is missing.

The dichotomy originates in an artificial distinction created in Belgium after the war, and still maintained by several researchers. The conviction that Catholic Flanders especially collaborated and that left wing Walloon entered into the resistance still exists²³. Reality was much more complicated, but is seldom elucidated. In this dichotomy we can recognise the typical 'community' question in Belgium, namely the Flemish-Walloon opposition that in the 1970s resulted in the constitution of a Flemish and Walloon community and transformed Belgium into a federal state.

It is because of the focus on this dichotomy that economic collaboration has to date been largely ignored. Economic collaboration was primarily a Walloon matter, as heavy industry (i.e. steel, coal and the weapons industry) was located in the southern part of the country. This economic collaboration, however, was not mentioned after the Second World War, because it was held responsible for the so-called 'Belgian Miracle': that is, because of the fact that the Belgian economy was one of the few in Europe that came through the war almost intact²⁴.

Neither did the phenomenon of a rightwing and/or even extreme rightwing resistance fit into the dichotomy as it was conceived in the post-war period. Not only was the extreme right a synonym for collaboration, the extreme right resistance was above all a Belgian case and not restricted to one of the two parts of the country. To put it briefly, this is a Belgian story that goes beyond the Flemish-Walloon dichotomy, and herein probably lies the reason for which it has been neglected until today.

In the case of Hungary, where there was minuscule resistance but massive collaboration with Nazi Germany, the situation is different²⁵. In the post 1945 period, all political forces were interested in picturing the Arrow Cross Party as a party of nonentities and marginal social elements and to consider them the only ones responsible for the losses in the Second World War. The common aim of the Communist Party together with the former elite was to shift the responsibility for collaboration to the Arrow Cross. The Arrow Cross was portrayed by both of them as a marginal criminalised minority. Both groups also agreed to shift the responsibility to the Germans, who were labelled as exclusively responsible for what happened during the war²⁶.

WHO ARE WE DEALING WITH: A PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY?

A cursory prosopographic investigation into the Belgian extreme rightwing network revealed a remarkable continuity in the professional careers of the protagonists²⁷. Firstly, a very large group had a military career, often reaching the rank of colonel or general.

The number of reserve officers in this network was very large. Most had already made a career for themselves before the Second World War, for example in the National Legion, known as pro-New Order and pro-Mussolini. Secondly, most of the protagonists obtained Masters' degrees at university. A relatively high number even became professors. Those who had graduated in law studies were the most numerous. Furthermore Masters' or Doctors in Economics and Masters' in History were very common. The latter especially often developed careers in journalism, as directors or chief editors of diverse extreme right wing journals. Only a small percentage, but no less important, made careers in the church. Thirdly, and this is the most striking continuity, almost all of the protagonists involved in the extreme rightwing network had one or more positions on the board of an industrial or holding company or a bank. Moreover, most of these companies belonged to the four large financial/industrial families in Belgium; namely the Boël/Solvay/Janssen group, the Société Générale de Belgique group, the Lambert group and the de Launoit group. Furthermore these four groups were mutually connected through marriage and stock ownership. They cover the whole network examined here. Finally, some of the protagonists sooner or later accepted a political mandate, but always in the Conservative Catholic Party (PSC/CVP). This extreme rightwing network never engaged itself as a whole in an extreme rightwing party, a fact which fundamentally distinguishes them from the extreme right with roots in the collaboration with Nazi Germany. It is especially their professional identity that makes this network peculiar, because as a powerful economic elite the protagonists were never indicated as guilty of suspicious political leanings, nor were they identified as a danger to democracy.

As far as the professional identity of women in the Arrow Cross Party is concerned, it is worth underlining that this party was founded as a part of the misogynist tendencies of interwar Hungarian political life in which 'women' (especially the 'new woman' – the employed, non-married woman) were represented as unpredictable and dangerous for male hegemony in economic, political and cultural life. Hence there was a tendency to cut back women's participation in public life, and especially their access to education after the Second World War²⁸. The women who adhered to the Party constitute a heterogeneous group consisting of four different types of women with different professional identities.

The first female members of the Hungarian Arrow Cross Party were those who joined the first rightwing extremist parties. They were the disappointed professionals, who, as the first generation of employed women (typist, accountants) were mostly ethnic Hungarians who had migrated to Hungary from those parts of Hungary which were detached in 1919. These women did not have any other supporting social network but the newly formed political movement of the Arrow Cross. They were mostly single and as employed women they had found that their professional and social mobility were hindered by the political system.

The next group consisted of criminal redistributors of lower and lower middle class origin. These women represented the majority of the People's tribunal cases due to con-

crete reasons (financial or love); they wanted to take revenge using the Holocaust as a social policy to change the distribution of goods. Among these women there were some who were mentally ill or had obvious psychological problems.

However the third group consisted of rebellious revolutionary women of middle and upper classes origin. They had good schooling, wore men's uniforms and rode horses like men²⁹. This anti-modernist politics in modernist gesture of trans-dressing creates a space for activity in the public sphere previously closed to women. Their professional identities were based on rebellion.

The best known in public discourse and the most visible group is the fourth one, those who were family members of the leaders of the Arrow Cross Party, of middle and lower middle class origin. These women were without professional aspirations. Married or related to men (husbands, brothers, fathers) who had joined the Arrow Cross Party, they were driven because of these bonds to party membership. Their professional identity was that of 'wife', or supporter of their husbands or relatives in the public space.

In post 1945 public discourse, however, the criminal redistributors and the relatives of male party leaders were present because they fit into the public discourse shaped by a tendency to reconstruct the patriarchal gender contract challenged by the war.

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

Secret sources – secrecy of sources

In both the Belgian and in the Hungarian cases, we can note that the protagonists tried or even still try to keep their secret. Keeping their secret was and still is their main strategy. This fact produces great difficulties for research into extreme rightwing networks. The similarities with the difficulties of researching secret societies, such as free masonry, are striking.

Masonic organizations are not very open to historical research but in many countries research has been done with success. The real essence of being a mason has never been completely elucidated, but many questions about for instance the internal structure and the main activities of masonic secret societies have been answered. The methods utilized can be applied to research into extreme rightwing networks: such as infiltrating the secret society, interviewing those involved but with the condition of guaranteed anonymity, comparing one society of which there is a lot known with another that is less known and filling in the gaps with reasonable conjecture. However, it still remains a delicate task and the pitfalls are innumerable. The difficulties begin in deciding what questions should be asked, and above all what hypotheses can be made. When a researcher for instance postulates that free masonry has an important influence on political decision making, he will be confronted with a wall of complete silence. Such a presumed influence is actually a contradiction in terms with the oath that masons take at the moment of initiation. Nevertheless even a non-mason notices that many highly placed political persons are connected to masonic lodges. The question should automatically be asked, where can we

draw the line. Yet these incongruities keep on astonishing many researchers, and there is a high risk of ending up with a conspiracy myth. The lodge, however, cloaks itself in silence and is not obliged to give any justification. Silence constructs knowledge. Consequently, the researcher is left with many questions, and many speculations. Research into extreme rightwing networks deals with similar problems. Conspiracy theories especially should be avoided. The researcher who wants to penetrate to the core of these networks must maintain some distance, must avoid any commitment, and above all any prejudice if possible at all. The main problem is the interpretation of the sources. Any research into secret societies and underground networks forces us to turn to such interpretations, because of a lack of written facts for historical research.

Research into extreme right wing networks in Belgium after the Second World War needs to face even more specific problems. Firstly, this extreme right was not seen as such, by itself or even by the public, because it never belonged to an extreme rightwing political party. Secondly, this extreme right went into the resistance movement during the Second World War, so it escaped from the stigma that collaborationists had to deal with. Finally, this network developed from the industrial and financial elite, whose economic interests predominated over their political interests. Economic business was and is fully embedded in the global capitalist world. Consequently the Belgian network does not restrict itself geographically. In contrary, it is fully embedded in a European and Atlantic network.

Nevertheless the extreme rightwing networks left behind some traces. In the post-war period the extreme right attracted the attention of both the State Security Police and the Criminal Police for several reasons. After liberation the extreme right resistance refused to surrender their arms and therefore formed a threat to the laborious reconstruction of public order. Subsequently the extreme rightwing resistance went underground, where it continued its activities. Especially as regards the Royal Question, it took a leading position in stirring up public opinion³⁰. In the middle of the Royal Question, the State Security Police and the Criminal Police gradually made the underground activities of the extreme rightwing resistance their major target. In the beginning sporadically, but later on systematically, the activities of this 'sub society' were mapped.

The archive of the Counsel for the Prosecutor of Brussels, deposited at the General National Archives of Anderlecht, contains valuable information for this research. Important protagonists and several suspicious organisations were investigated. The archives of the Counsel for the Prosecutor of Ghent and Antwerp, deposited at the General National Archives of Beveren Waas, also contain interesting records. The archive of the Counsel for the Prosecutor of Liège unfortunately is not accessible, because most of the files were destroyed³¹. The State Security Police contains much information but unfortunately its doors are closed to researchers. In contrast to other countries (for instance in the Netherlands, Germany, the Scandinavian countries and France) the Belgian State Security Police refuses any access. No transparency has been achieved so far. At the end of 2005 the Belgian State Security Police opened an exhibition detailing 175 years of the State Security Police in Belgium, but nothing important was revealed.

Another possibility resource for researchers on extreme rightwing networks in Belgium originating from the rightwing resistance are foreign archives. The archives of the OSS and the CIA in the National Archives in Washington contain several records dealing with the post-war activities of this network, and especially in relation to the 'stay-behind' networks that were installed and 'left-behind' in Europe by both NATO and the CIA after the war. These networks especially recruited within the extreme rightwing networks, since it was evident that neither collaborators nor leftwing resistance members could be trusted. Above all, these networks had the purpose of parrying a possible invasion by the Russians.

The study by a Swiss investigator, Daniël Ganser in *Gladio. NATO's Secret Armies*³² shows us, however, that the CIA also refused access to their archive when there was any danger that the involvement of the CIA itself or of other institutions in forming the stay-behind networks might be revealed³³. When in 1990, first in Italy and subsequently in other European countries, the Gladio network was dismantled, both the CIA and NATO refused any cooperation. All parliamentary committees of inquiry were confronted with a stubborn silence. The ministers of Interior and Foreign Affairs, Defence and Justice who had been involved in Gladio suffered from collective amnesia. Gladio was founded in 1947 initially to parry a possible Soviet invasion, but derailed during the following decades into a rightwing terrorist organisation that blamed the extreme leftwing for all the assaults that it actually committed itself. By doing so the extreme right tried to shift national politics towards more repressive policies.

This is a Cold War issue *par excellence*, but from another perspective. The extreme rightwing resistance without doubt formed the major recruitment basis for the Gladio network. Unfortunately, the lack of 'hard' facts and their inaccessibility makes it difficult to prove exactly what happened.

MISSING SOURCES

"L'histoire se fait avec des documents. Pas de documents, pas d'histoire!"³⁴ [History is made by sources. No sources, no history!]

This positivistic credo of Langlois and Seignobos from 1898 was pronounced a long time ago, but in fact it still pursues the historian today. How to do research when no documents are available, or when the supposed 'hard' facts do not exist? What to do with an investigation where the sources are not accessible, or when the sources try to lie? What to do with research on opinions, ideas, rumours, so-called 'soft' facts, at least according to the positivistic credo?

Should we look at the Encyclopaedia of Hungarian State Security we will find that even the State Security Authority is imprisoned in the positivist paradigm defining data: "...news or information [presented] in an analysable and recordable way. Fact or detail, helps to get to know something or somebody. Data can be used if only the source of the data is not in danger. One of the most important tasks of the state security authority

is to obtain quickly reliable data about the enemy (collection of information). Active (operational) work can be done only based on checked data”³⁵.

Nevertheless, opinions and ideas crystallize around ‘real facts’. We find them expressed in chronicles, newspapers, memoirs, in private letters and in oral traditions. In many cases these opinions and ideas, however, are inconsistent with reality. Yet that is why they form a valuable object for research. After all, unintentional or intentionally formed representations of ‘facts’ or ‘data’ characterize the study of the mentality of people in specific periods of time. Moreover, this meta-knowledge or the conscious giving of false information has often been more important for the development of history than the real facts. These so-called ‘non-events’ sometimes have much more impact on public opinion than the real events themselves. Constructing events sometimes takes the attention away from real events.

The question of how to handle the ‘truth claim’ in historical research, actually shapes the way of our common understanding of the theoretical and methodological problems we face in analysing secret service documents and People’s tribunal trials³⁶. In both types of sources, the ‘truth’ is even more important than in historical criticism. In the case of the court, crime should be punished and in the case of the secret service documents, political and sometimes military strategy are based on the information. The question is what kind of analytical method can we use to get beyond the truth claim?

ORAL HISTORIES

Analysing court testimonies is complicated, because the testimonies are shaped and expressed according to imagined expectations and strategies. No person with any common sense would give testimony which would weaken his or her position in court. If the defendant testifies in court, he/she uses a cultural repertoire to choose from in order to express in the best way the content he/she wants to tell us. So in this section of our chapter we analyse which factors determine the choices made because we need to clarify the process of how individuals form statements about themselves, creating self-presentations based on their interpretation of their past decisions and activities in exceptional circumstances.

At first sight oral history seems to be an obvious choice for analysis. Oral history constitutes both a critical method and a genre of inquiry; therefore it offers a methodology for analysing changing forms of female subjectivity as expressed and constructed during the trials in Hungary. The process of remembering is always painful and difficult, influenced by changing power systems. During times when cultural codes are uncertain, such as those during transitions or in transitional justice, the process of remembering is even more problematic. This was the case during the times immediately after World War II. The shared political frameworks disappeared, previous reference systems turned out to be meaningless. In this political vacuum personal stories served as the only place of remembering and a possible place for constructing and redefining a new political framework. Nonetheless there are several methodological and theoretical considerations that need to be acknowledged before we can consider court testimonies to be oral histories.

The genre and the methods of oral history were developed in the 1960s; oral historians rejected the framework of an elitist history. They tried to develop an alternative to a top-down approach of history. Nobody had shown any interest towards the memories of ordinary men and women before; now their voices could be heard. This political agenda is problematic in the case of female perpetrators. Do they too have the right to be heard? Another problem arises when the paternalistic image of the researcher who 'gives voice' to the socially and culturally oppressed is questioned. Agency which at the first phase of developing oral history writing was considered as a 'given' exercised by the storyteller, turned out to be a product of the collaboration between the interviewer and the interviewee. The stories themselves – oral history specialists argued – are the result of constructing subjectivity by both the interviewer and the interviewee and a space for remembering.

The original revolutionary goal of oral history was to change the world by telling (true) stories. But if we are looking back through the continuous existence of Holocaust denial and revival of extreme right wing parties in Europe, it is clear that these aims were not achieved. Oral history literature is often characterized by the myth that from oral testimonies we get to know the hidden 'truth'. The interviewer is considered to be in a powerless social position. But during transition trials competing interpretations of the very same events came up, and they depended on power relations³⁷. Transitional justice produces transitional truths. The question of memory studies and oral history is to see how readings of present events can be translated in the future³⁸. This way we are dealing with issues of power and identity but not with the 'truth'. The memory work emerged as the most powerful element of transition, constructing a space for narrating new forms of subjectivity. In that sense the People's tribunals constructed a place where stories about atrocities were exclusively narrated. Silence is also a product of the 'conspiracy of silence' such as in the case of rape committed by Soviet Army soldiers in Hungary³⁹. It is well-known that women rarely write *memoires* because of the lack of available cultural repertoire and lack of welcoming audiences⁴⁰.

Oral history also helps to redefine the relationship between the self and the other in a way that emerges through constant communication. The court situation is similar to this. In the case of testimony, memory is created in the form of discussion: between the judge, lawyer, attorney and defendant, an inter-subjectivity is constructed. In the case of oral history the interviewee and the interviewer are envisaging different future audiences for the interview. Each of them has a different audience in mind. Answers to questions are given keeping that audience in mind. But the People's court was different. The audience was present and very much in power in the room. The judge, on whose decision one's life depended, the audience and the journalists all had different agendas, and interpreted the very same performance differently as they witnessed it at the public trial.

In the post World War II period which created power relations till extremes, stories of holocaust survivors were not listened to⁴¹. The unwelcoming audience silenced the narratives.

Experience is accessible through a linguistic act, because language provides the repertoire which enables the narrator to narrate a story⁴². Totalitarian states emphasised

control and dominating the linguistic space that was at that time the space for expressing thoughts. Meanwhile different groups created specific meanings in order to construct an identity via epistemological space. If we do not speak about the immediate past but the 'immediated' past, then we get closer to being able to solve the puzzle of how to look at these sources. And the site of this mediation was the family where law has neither access nor direct regulative power. The construction of identity was taking place in the family, as lines were drawn between 'us' and 'them', and between pro-Soviet Hungarians and the anti-Soviets⁴³. Those who identified themselves as 'non-communist' – and that was the cornerstone of any identification that referred to crimes or non-legal acts committed in the name of the Soviet law in Hungary etc. – consisted of those who defined themselves as victims of communism and created a victimized language, a counter-discourse that made their stories 'improvisable' in a communist dominated political discourse. After 1945 the language of 'communist crimes' became a minority discourse developed against the oppression by the majority and which offered points of identification⁴⁴. So those defendants in the trials whose 'cultural repertoires', to use the term by Lamont, were following the expected patterns of remembering, were not severely condemned. The 'master frame' of being a victim constructs the possibility for any improvisation. The definition of autobiographical remembering as "an improvisational activity that forms emergent selves which gives us a sense of needed comfort and a culturally valued sense of personal coherence over time" was challenged by traumatic events of the 20th century, especially the Shoah, which, as Barclays pointed out, made "metaphoric mappings" impossible⁴⁵.

Remembering takes the mythical route producing a more or less similar, but coherent, self-presentation. If, according to Barthes, the text is a self-contained security system, it gives an illusionary or imagined control to the narrator over the production of a life story, over her life⁴⁶. This is the control the defendants believed at least that they had. In the court they would try to construct a coherent self representation keeping in mind that if they make a mistake in this they would be sent to years of imprisonment. So a proper performance in court was a question of life and death.

ANONYMOUS TESTIMONY: SOURCES IN THE PRESS

Oral testimony as took place in Hungarian courts, however, forms just one kind of testimony. In fact, there exist different kinds of testimonies, all of which imply specific methodological problems. Two of them are of great importance for researching extreme rightwing tendencies.

First there is anonymous testimony as used by journalists, police officers and intelligence agents in their investigations. Here, the 'secrecy of the sources' gets an additional and more specific meaning. Journalists for instance are not obliged to reveal their sources in order to write a convincing article. Neither does the State Security Police have to reveal its sources in order to convince the government to proceed to action. In other words, at the same time as these testimonies (as oral sources) were given, a new kind of source was

created: namely an oral anonymous testimony that can seldom be double-checked. For the historian this is a minefield of delicate issues, but it cannot be neglected. Second, there is written anonymous testimony given in the press (in this case the extreme right-wing press). The word testimony is of uncertain application here, as these texts are more opinion papers than revelations of secrets. Nevertheless, these types of sources form the core object of discourse analyses, through which many thoughts and objectives can be discovered. Many of the extreme rightwing people in the Belgian network for instance wrote their opinion papers under a pseudonym, in order not to be discovered. Identifying the real author behind the diverse pseudonyms is thus another goal for the researcher. Anonymously written testimonies not only help a great deal in reconstructing the network, they also contribute to reconstructing how this history thought of itself. Both kinds of testimonies place the historian in a difficult situation, because both oral and anonymously written testimony must be taken for granted. They only gain their importance thanks to their context, and the 'correct' interpretation of that context. Again, in both cases the meaning has to be searched for between the lines, looking for that what is not mentioned, not written, because it was not meant to be revealed.

'INDIRECT ANALYSES'

In all the previous mentioned sources with their typical methodological problems, we notice a common thread: they all oblige the researcher to adopt a method of indirect analysis. In *Myths, Emblems, Clues* Carlo Ginzburg points out the importance of the indicia-paradigm as a method for dissolving the ideological clouds which increasingly obscure such a complex social structure as fully developed capitalism⁴⁷.

The urge for systematic knowledge does not imply that we must abandon the idea of a totality. "On the contrary, the existence of a deeply rooted relationship that explains superficial phenomena is confirmed the very moment it is stated that direct knowledge of such a connection is not possible. Though reality may seem to be opaque, there are privileged zones – signs, clues – which allow us to penetrate it"⁴⁸.

In researching the Belgian extreme rightwing networks we find these indicia in the *histoire longue durée* [long-term history]⁴⁹, in the repetition of events and in the repetition of phenomena. The repeated appearance of protagonists in places where they should not appear (in their capacity as industrialists or bankers) forms an 'indiciu' (or clue) here, as do the politically loaded manoeuvres of the protagonists carried out when they appear as non-political actors in society, for instance when they finance extreme rightwing newspapers.

However, this story contains many blind spots like the inaccessibility of the State Security Police and the CIA (concerning the stay-behind networks), or the absence of witnesses and testimony. Moreover many documents from the National Archives are often censored with the well known black ink that makes sensitive passages unreadable. Last but not least we often deal with the fact that it is impossible for the protagonists to give testimony.

In *Welcome to the Desert of the Real*, Slavoj Žižek paraphrases a revealing passage by Giorgio Agamben, which links perfectly to the indicia-paradigm of Ginzburg. In *Quel che resta di Auschwitz* Agamben stipulates a kind of ontological proof against the revisionists who deny the holocaust. “Let us indeed, posit Auschwitz, that to which it is not possible to bear witness, and let us also posit the *Muselmann* as the absolute impossibility of bearing witness. If the witness bears witness for the *Muselmann*, if he succeeds in bringing to speech an impossibility of speech – if the *Muselmann* is thus constituted as the whole witness – then the denial of Auschwitz is refuted in its very foundation. In the *Muselmann*, the impossibility of bearing witness is no longer a mere privation. Instead, it has become real; it exists as such. If the survivor bears witness not to the gas chambers or to Auschwitz but to the *Muselmann*, if he speaks only on the basis of an impossibility of speaking, then his testimony cannot be denied. Auschwitz – that to which it is not possible to bear witness – is absolutely and irrefutably proven”⁵⁰. In other words: far from hindering any proof that Auschwitz really existed, the very fact that it is impossible directly to bear witness to Auschwitz demonstrates its existence.

When we apply this theory to the research on extreme right wing networks in Belgium, we can stipulate the following points: that it is impossible to witness for example the Belgian engagement in the stay-behind networks after the Second World War; that it is impossible to witness the infiltration of the CIA in the Belgian State Security Police and to prove the Belgian support in the development of nuclear weapons, actually demonstrates the existence of it.

The difficulties with this kind of research are well known, however; some researchers have attempted reconstructing these events by using Ginzburg’s method of ‘indirect analysis’. Despite the inaccessibility of the CIA and NATO archives, Daniël Ganser managed to reconstruct a top secret network in his book on Gladio. Due to of the impossibility of having access to direct testimony, he was obliged to search for information in ‘secondary’ sources, such as parliamentary reports, censured testimonies of individuals involved, reports of the international press, etc. In spite of these restrictions he succeeded, through his analysis, in giving an impressive picture of an underground European network. And it was this analysis, more or less based on Agamben’s arguments, that made it possible to clarify some omissions.

The skilfully achieved ‘non-existence’ of hard facts, or the skilful way sources were made inaccessible, and the carefully erased traces actually prove the existence of the processes hypothesized. Moreover, the millions of euros given to the various parliamentary committees of inquiry, charged with inquiring into the rights and wrongs of the Gladio case, show that Gladio existed. The refusal of any cooperation from the CIA and NATO proves it even more.

FICTIONALISM

However, the story with the red and blue ink shows us that the problem is much more complicated than the distinction between legends and ‘real’ events. The problem of the

missing red ink illustrates the impossibility of representation to tell the truth, the impossibility to put the truth into words. In essence we are dealing here with the distinction between reality and fiction. Which 'reality' do we actually see, and which reality is invisible? Which fiction do we experience as real and which real as fiction? And last but not least: to what extent did some fiction become real and did some real become fiction?

Let us take the Belgian case as an example and put it in the same story frame as our tale of the red ink. The German workman going to Siberia now is an administrative general director of the Belgian State Security Police. His friends, to whom he might write, in this case is a privileged journalist. The man from the State Security Police promises the journalist to pass him some top secret information when possible. This is of course a tricky adventure, because of the delicate task of the State Security Police with its secrecy of sources, its censorship and so on. One day the man of the State Security Police surprises the journalist by delivering him information that will give him the scoop of his career. A large and violent demonstration of the extreme left is announced. The whole action is meticulous prepared, and the consequences will be incalculable. The State Security Police succeeds in infiltrating the message, but is not allowed to take any action against it. The rule is to act only after the facts already occur. The unsuspecting journalist publishes, not without pride, the secret report given to him. The scoop is all his, the state police is alerted, and the extreme leftwing organisations withdraw. What happened in this case is that a reality that could have taken place became an eternal fiction, in a really existing article in the newspaper and a really existing file of the State Security Police. The man from the State Security Police and the journalist, without realising it, were responsible for a piece of history which never took place. Yet, this too is history.

'Rumour'⁵¹ plays one of the key roles in creating of public opinion. Even when it is a 'false rumour', it still creates the basis of innumerable actions and reactions. The problem for the researcher, however, is that he can often examine the outcome of the rumour but seldom the origin of it, nor the intention of the 'non-event'. A particular research area for these 'non-events' is the changing effectiveness of rumours. To what extent do the effects vary based on affiliation with existing prejudices within a certain social and cultural context (such as the context of the Cold War), or do the effects vary because of a lack of information caused by censure or discretion (again the context of the Cold War can constitute an example).

When rumours accumulate around a coherent entity and become the collective patrimony of a group or nation, then we speak of legends. But to avoid misunderstandings, the Gladio network for instance was more than a rumour, it actually existed. Nor did the extreme right wing networks in Belgium, nor the Arrow Cross Party members at the Hungarian court testimonies, have anything to do with 'legends'. But visibility and their existence were stipulated by imagined and reasserted political interests determined by the Cold War.

SOURCES THAT GENDERED, AND NON-ACKNOWLEDGED AGENTS

Especially problematic is the gendered analyses of political and social discourse which through its power to form identity became homogenous and exclusive. In the case of wars women are portrayed as loyal mothers and citizens sending their sons to war or as subversive collaborationists who are dangerous for the morality of the soldiers. The question is where we find subjectivity in personal narratives. In sources related to criminal cases that are even more problematic since the 'legend', to use the term by Paul Thomson, is fixed and it follows rituals. The court creates a uni-linear hegemonic narrative and the defendant needs to place herself in that narrative. In the case of women they face double discrimination.

Feminist theorists are sensitive to the formation of different power relations and understanding its consequences. In the case of the court minutes power relations are very different. Not only because of the hierarchy and politics of legal systems but also because the defendant represents a different social status, class or gender and they have different degrees of access to social networks. The more access they had the more easily they managed to manipulate the court and then to abandon the court after acquittal.

The story, the confession, is born following questions. The questions were raised by men because at that time no women were employed there: lawyers, judges and attorneys were all men. The gender politics of the court is obvious as far as the numbers are concerned. Those female defendants received milder sentence who framed their stories as powerless victims who followed the suggestions and initiatives of men. The stories of female defendants are mute, because by using the generalised 'legends' it is possible to avoid the need to search for individual expressions, meanings and thoughts. The variability of legends and their usage opened a window of opportunity to get a milder sentence while individualized stories do not fit into the cognitive patterns of the court.

Concerning the Belgian extreme right wing network, masculinity is both absent and taken for granted. The extreme right wing elite, with roots in the resistance during the Second World War formed a perfect example for gender blindness. The absence of women in this history has never been questioned as the space of women is defined at home. 'Matriarchy born in need' was over. The resistance blurred the gender hierarchies and the post 1945 politics restored the male dominated public sphere ⁵².

When going underground, the post-war extreme right wing network, originating from the resistance, went into a battle for hegemony towards other men. In this internal hegemonic masculinity two main protagonists fought to obtain power: the extreme right wing network existing out of an industrial/financial elite and a segment of the nobility versus the political elite (at that time almost exclusively male). Not the question why women are absent here is relevant, but the question about the impact of this masculine predominance on the outcome of this history. Both the secrecy of the network and the final goal to move society into a more authoritarian (masculine) regime, were determined for the way these men operated behind the scenes and also for their actual influence. The other way round, the exclusive appearance of men (and consequently

the absence of women) in this network made these goals even more convincing. The gendered question has never been asked neither by themselves, nor by the politicians to whom they were fighting at that time. The gender blindness they imposed to themselves was inherent to their choice for an underground network. This 'nobility' was not interested in any emancipation of women, or in the emancipation of the commoners as a whole. Consequently no dialogue was pursued.

CONCLUSIONS

By placing the Belgian and the Hungarian cases next to one another we have tried to achieve a first comparison of research into extreme rightwing history in Europe. From the very beginning the differences were very evident. In Hungary, a communist country after the war, the extreme right was seen as an internal enemy that had to be prosecuted. In Belgium it was actually the Communists who were regarded as the internal enemy. The extreme right originating from the resistance movement was not even seen as such. Simultaneously, along with these differences a similarity between post-war Belgian and Hungarian historiography became apparent: namely the explicit focus on the collaboration with Nazi Germany during the war. In both countries the history of their own collaboration was very often studied and at the same time this history left most of the sources. However, some cases are lacking, such as the history of the Hungarian women who collaborated, and the history of the extreme rightwing resistance groups in Belgium who tried to achieve a large impact on post-war society behind the scenes of official politics.

The reason for this omission, we surmise, lies in a stubborn blindness concerning some specific histories and a stubborn prejudice concerning some deeply rooted national historiographical traditions. Women during the war are often regarded as the silent heroes who supported their husband and sons who were fighting for their country. The fact that a large group of them were actively collaborating with Nazi Germany disturbs this cliché. The same factor accounts for the attitude towards Belgian extreme rightwing resistance. To this day the resistance is mostly seen as a merely communist (or at least leftwing) affaire. The extreme right is almost always considered the domain of those who collaborated. The existence of an extreme rightwing resistance often is seen as a contradiction in terms.

These prejudices have many methodological consequences for the researcher. Not only must we deal with missing sources, as most historians must do sooner or later; we must also deal with the secrecy of the sources, which is especially crucial in this case. Whether we deal with oral sources, anonymous or written sources, we are obliged to use indirect analysis to find the key for decoding them. The fact that for many decades these histories were neglected makes this decoding even more difficult.

On the other hand we notice another striking similarity in the Belgian and Hungarian case. The political context in which the sources were created plays a predominant role in the way the sources appear to the researcher and how they must be interpreted. The paper-thin line between fiction and reality forms a common thread in this case.

Both the Hungarian and the Belgian cases form an example *par excellence* of what we call “the theatre of historical information”. It is the ‘non-event’ that, more often than the real event, determines the actions and reactions that occur in history and it has a deep influence on public opinion. For researchers on this ‘non-event’ it is a matter of finding out what was fictional and what was ‘real’. Therefore we must follow our intuition, that is an extremely rapid recapitulation of our rational processes.

The ‘hard’ facts or the hard evidence, as postulated by the positivists, must enter a dialogue with intuition. “Evidence is not a transparent medium... an open window that gives us direct access to reality. But neither is evidence a wall, which by definition precludes any access to reality”⁵³.

History can be compared with music. As in music where the *basso continuo* sets the pace, discrete in the background, barely audible, but fundamentally carrying everything, so the history of extreme right for its part determined the rhythm of official politics in the 20th century.

In comparing the Belgian case of extreme rightwing resistance with the Hungarian case of women in the Nazi Party, we hope to give an impetus to a possible future research agenda for historians in Europe. Instead of focussing on narrow-minded national historiographies and putting the facts beside each other, we have tried to achieve a kind of cross pollination by analysing the methodological similarities and differences that the Belgian and Hungarian historians are dealing with. We experienced this enterprise as an intellectual challenge, as an attempt to go beyond geographical borders in history and in the present, and to find a deeper connection in our mutual scientific goals. In our aim for achieving a true and nuanced reconstruction of the past, the confrontation with ‘the other’ is indispensable, and particularly very enriching.

Comparing two specific cases from two different countries not only opens new perspectives in (re)writing European history. Above all it opens a window for rethinking the way history has been thought of by itself.

NOTES

¹ S. Žizek, *Welcome to the Desert of the Real*, New York 2002, p. 1.

² See P. Carucci, *I servizi di sicurezza civili prima della legge del 1977*, “Studi Storici”, 4, 1998, No. 4. pp. 1031-1042, and G. Salvi, *Occulto e illegalità. Le gestione degli archivi e il controllo di legalità*, “Studi Storici”, 4, 1998, pp. 1043-1057. Thanks to Carla Salvaterra for this reference. And K. Molin, *Between scholarship and politics: experiences from the Commission on the Swedish Security Services*. Manuscript. Thanks to Gro Hagemann.

³ See more on this L. Kontler, *Millennium in Central Europe. History of Hungary*, Budapest 1999 and New York 2002.

⁴ R. Braham, *The Politics of Genocide. The Holocaust in Hungary*, Columbia 1994.

⁵ L. Karsai, *The People's Court and Revolutionary Justice in Hungary, 1945-1946*, in I. Deak - J.T. Gross - T. Judt (eds.), *The Politics of Retribution in Europe. World War II and its Aftermath*, Princeton 2000, pp. 233-252.

⁶ See more on this A. Pető - P. Chiantera-Stutte, *Populist Use of Memory and Constitutionalism: Two Comments*, “German Law Journal”, *Confronting Memories: European “Bitter Experiences” and the Constitutionalisation Process*, Special Edition 2005 (2), pp. 165-175. <http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=564>.

- ⁷ L. Karsai, *The People's Court and Revolutionary Justice in Hungary, 1945-1946*, in I. Deak - J.T. Gross - T. Judt (eds.), *The Politics of Retribution in Europe. World War II and its Aftermath*, Princeton 2000, pp. 233-252.
- ⁸ R. Coolsaet, *België en zijn buitenlandse politiek 1830-1990* [Belgium and its foreign policy, 1830-1990] Leuven 1998, pp. 191-200, pp. 281-304.
- ⁹ See more on this B. De Wever, *Griep naar de macht. Vlaams-Nationalisme en Nieuwe Orde: het VNV* [Grip towards the power: Flemish Nationalism and the New Order: the VNV], Tiel 1994, p. 701.
- ¹⁰ See more on this M. Conway, *Collaboration in Belgium: Léon Degrelle and the Rexist movement 1940-1944*, New Haven 1993, p. 364.
- ¹¹ See more on this M. Van Den Wijngaert (ed.), *'België tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog'* [Belgium during the Second World War], Antwerp 2004, pp. 45-62. [For more detailed information on the Royal Question see footnote 30].
- ¹² A. De Jonghe, *Hitler en het politieke lot van België (1940-1944): de vestiging van een Zilververwaltung in België en Noord-Frankrijk* [Hitler and the political destiny of Belgium (1940-1944): the establishment of a Zilververwaltung in Belgium and North France], Antwerp 1972, pp. 18-39.
- ¹³ See more on this L. Huyse - S. Dhondt (eds.), *Onverwerkt verleden. Collaboratie en repressie in België 1942-1952* [An unaccepted past. Collaboration and Repression in Belgium], Leuven 1994, p. 312.
- ¹⁴ J. Gotovitch, *Du rouge au tricolore. Les communistes belges de 1939 à 1944. Un aspect de l'histoire de la Résistance en Belgique* [From red to tricolour. The Belgian communists from 1939 to 1944. An aspect of the resistance in Belgium], Brussels 1992, p. 610.
- ¹⁵ P. Van den Eeckhout - G. Vanthemsche (eds.), *Bronnen voor de studie van het hedendaagse België, 19de-20ste eeuw* [Sources for the study of contemporary history in Belgium], Brussels 1999, p. 555.
- ¹⁶ Van den Eeckhout - Vanthemsche, *Bronnen voor de studie van het hedendaagse België* cit., pp. 543-547. See also www.cegesoma.be.
- ¹⁷ The two researchers are Karolien Steen en Jan Laplasse, both associated to CEGESOMA. Their findings are consultable on the website of the institute, and reveal a very disparate archiving of the sources relating to the resistance.
- ¹⁸ The Moscow Archives are spread around in different scientific institutions and archives like Military Museum, CEGESOMA, AMSAB, ... A consistent survey on the material of these archives is still lacking.
- ¹⁹ Many of these files were moved several times to another institute. During these removals many of the records were lost.
- ²⁰ See www.th.hu
- ²¹ See www.ceu.osa.hu
- ²² R. Béla, *Az állambiztonságtól a nemzetvédelemig* [From state security till protection of the nation], Szeged 2003, www.mek.oszk.hu
- ²³ See more on this R. Van Doorslaer, *Gebruikt verleden. De politieke nalatenschap van de Tweede Wereldoorlog in België, 1945-2000* [A (mis)used past. The political inheritance of the Second World War in Belgium, 1945-2000] in G. Deneckere - B. De Wever (eds.), *Geschiedenis maken. Liber Amicorum Herman Balhazar*, Gent 2002, pp. 227-249.
- ²⁴ Coolsaet, *België en zijn buitenlandse politiek 1830-1990* cit., pp. 342-247.
- ²⁵ I. Deak, *A Fatal Compromise? The Debate over Collaboration and Resistance in Hungary*, in I. Deak - J.T. Gross - T. Judt (eds.), *The Politics of Retribution in Europe. World War II and its Aftermath*, Princeton 2000, pp. 39-74.
- ²⁶ Very similar to 'Austria as the first victim' myth.
- ²⁷ See more on this in K. Schrijvers, *Underground. The roots and activities of extreme right wing networks in Belgium. 1917-1989*, unpublished working paper at the University of Gent, status quo of the doctoral research of Klaartje Schrijvers, 2005.
- ²⁸ More on this see A. Peto - J. Szapor, *Women and the 'alternative public sphere', towards a new definition of women's*

- activism and the separate spheres in East-Central Europe*, "NORA The Nordic Journal of Women's Studies", 4, 2004, pp. 172-182.
- ²⁹ Békefi Gabriela interview in 1956 Institute, Oral History Archive. Thanks to Tóth Eszter Zsófia for this reference.
- ³⁰ The Royal Question concerns the contested comeback of Leopold III, who initially was captured by Hitler (in 1944) but was accused of collaboration with the Germans by his own government. They blamed the king for clinging on to neutrality politics before and during the war, even in 1940 when Belgium was overpowered by the Germans. In 1950 Leopold finally resigned, and avoided by this the breaking out of a Belgian civil war. The Belgian right wing resistance had always been extreme royalist and after the war it clustered itself in Leopoldistic organisations. Important here to notice is that the rightwing resistance, faithful to their king as they were, hesitated a long time before developing an effective resistance during the war. Here another artificial dichotomy is elucidated: the differences between the rightwing resistance and the collaboration movement were often very small. Both were in favour of the New Order, were anti-democratic and anti-communistic. Both flirted with fascistic regimes like those of Mussolini and Franco. The only real difference was being pro or contra Nazi Germany.
- ³¹ A common procedure in Belgium, characterizing a complete lack of historical consciousness, is the destruction of important material by the institution itself because of a lack of space. This was unfortunately also the case in Luik.
- ³² D. Ganser, *Gladio. Nato's secret armies. Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe*, London-New York 2005, p. 315.
- ³³ Ganser, *Gladio. Nato's Secret Armies* cit., pp. 14-15.
- ³⁴ Quoted in W. Prevenier, *Uit goede bron. Introductie tot de historische kritiek* [Out of a reliable source], Leuven-Apeldoorn 1998, p. 117.
- ³⁵ Open Society Archives, Budapest, HU OSA 357, www.osa.ceu.hu
- ³⁶ On tribunals and use of hypnosis during the Cold War by both sides see Istvan Rév, *The Sugestion*, "Representations", 8, 2002, pp. 62-98.
- ³⁷ See A. Pető, *Writing Women's History in Eastern Europe. Toward a Terra Cognita?*, "Journal of Women's History", 3, 2004, pp. 173-183.
- ³⁸ A. Pető, *Perehodnij period pamjaiti ili pamjaty o prehodom priode* [Memories of Transition or Memories about Transition], in S. Shakirova (ed.), *Women's Oral History* Cszsity 2. ed., The Soros Foundation/ Kyrgyzstan, OSI Network Women's Program Bishkek, 2005. pp. 3-8.
- ³⁹ A. Pető, *Memory and the Narrative of Rape in Budapest and Vienna*, in Dirk Schumann, Richard Bessel (eds.), *Life after Death. Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe*, Cambridge 2003, pp. 129-149.
- ⁴⁰ A. Pető, *A Missing Piece? How Women in the Communist Nomenclature are not Remembering*, "East European Politics and Society", 3, 2003, pp. 948-958.
- ⁴¹ L. Passerini (ed.), *International Yearbook of Oral History and Life Stories*, Oxford 1992, Vol. I, pp. 145-165.
- ⁴² J. Scott, *Experience*, in J. Scott - J. Butler (eds.), *Feminists Theorize the Political*, New York-London 1992, pp. 22-40.
- ⁴³ About youth counter culture as a site of formation of resistance to communism seen and manipulated by the Hungarian secret services see G. Markó, *A Kalef - A Moszkva téri galeri 1964-65* [The Gang of the Moscow Square], Budapest 2005.
- ⁴⁴ G. Seidel, *Right-Wing Discourse and Power: Exclusion and Resistance*, in G. Seidel (ed.), *The Nature of the Right. A Feminist Analysis of Order Patterns*, Amsterdam 1988, pp. 7-17.
- ⁴⁵ C.R. Barclay, *Autobiographical Remembering: Narrative Constrains on Objectified Selves*, in D.C. Rubin (ed.), *Remembering Our Past: Studies in Autobiographical Memory*, Cambridge 1996, p. 95.
- ⁴⁶ Quoted in K.N. Denzin, *Harold and Agnes: A Feminist Narrative Undoing*, "Sociological Theory", 2, 1990, p. 213.
- ⁴⁷ C. Ginzburg, *Myths, Emblems, Clues*, London 1990, p. 231.

- ⁴⁸ Ginzburg, *Myths, Emblems, Clues* cit., p. 123.
- ⁴⁹ In this extreme rightwing tendency we notice continuity over a much longer period than only the decades after the Second World War. My research on extreme rightwing networks in Belgium therefore deals with the whole communist or anti-communist period, starting from 1917 until 1989. It is specifically in this *histoire longue durée* that a deeper coherence is revealed.
- ⁵⁰ S. Zizek, *Welcome to the Desert of the Real*, New York 2002, pp. 139-140.
- ⁵¹ Rumour as a political tool was used by all political forces in Hungary. Before 1945 the rumour that the occupying Red Army would rape women turned out to be a reality. The Communist Party systematically used female members of the party to spread rumours that the Hungarian prisoners of war would not be released if the Communist Party did not win the upcoming elections of 1947. See on this A. Pető, *Hungarian Women in Politics 1945-1951*, Columbia 2003, pp. 44-50.
- ⁵² See on this. C. Duchens - I. Bandhauer Schöffmann (eds.), *When the War was Over. Women, War and Peace in Europe, 1940-1956*, Leicester 2000.
- ⁵³ Arnold I. Davidson, *The Epistemology of Distorted Evidence*, in A.I. Davidson, *The Emergence of Sexuality*, Cambridge 2001, p. 149.

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Remembering the Forgotten, Forgetting the Incumbent: The Underside of the “Law of Historical Memory” in Spain

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ABSTRACT

This chapter brings together two issues that have gained much visibility and created a great deal of controversy in the Spanish media in recent times: the challenges posed by the exponential increase of migratory flows into the country and the opportunity given to the offspring of exiles of the Civil War to obtain Spanish nationality as a reparation for the injustices their parents or grandparents experienced. While the laws regulating the entry of foreign citizens into Spain have been extremely restrictive, the new amendment added in 2008 to the so-called “Law of Historical Memory” has opened the gate to a substantial number of non-national descendants of political exiles.

El presente artículo estudia la posible incoherencia inherente al solapamiento de dos políticas gubernamentales que han atraído la atención de los medios de comunicación en España estos últimos años. Como es bien sabido, la inmigración hacia nuestro país ha crecido de manera exponencial en las dos últimas décadas y este hecho ha causado enorme preocupación en diversos ámbitos. En general, la legislación para controlar y contener la llegada de contingentes extranjeros ha sido altamente restrictiva. Por otra parte, en diciembre de 2008 se añadió una enmienda adicional a la “Ley de Memoria Histórica” aprobada por el Gobierno socialista por la cual los hijos y nietos de los exiliados durante la Guerra Civil tendrán derecho a adquirir la nacionalidad española, incluso habiendo nacido en el extranjero. Aunque la mayoría de los teóricos de la memoria y de los traumas colectivos estarían a favor de este tipo de medidas, su aprobación en un momento histórico en que se está intentando reducir por todos los medios la llegada de inmigrantes resulta más cuestionable. Es en este punto en el que los dos temas se entrecruzan y dan lugar a todo tipo de reacciones dependiendo, no sólo de la percepción que uno tenga de la idoneidad y justicia de la medida, sino también de consideraciones más amplias sobre cuestiones de motivación, identidad, sentimiento de pertenencia, procesos de adaptación e integración social, etc.

INTRODUCTION: ON THE IRONIES OF HISTORY

There are historical junctures at which different forces come together to throw into relief elements and features of particular societies that would have otherwise remained invisible to the eye of the keenest observer. We sometimes interpret these moments of heightened sensibility as ironic turns of history which make people conscious of their limited power to control and give the right direction to processes whose aftermaths we can only very rarely foresee. With the multiplication of the factors that have a bearing on the course of these processes – is this not what globalization is all about?¹ –, it is becoming more and more difficult to monitor all those sites of human activity and inventiveness in which we believe our future is being carved. One would certainly like to think that there are institutions and organizations which have the capacity to make decisions that will make people's lives easier and more gratifying. Nevertheless, there is also a plethora of examples suggesting that, despite what we have learnt from the past, our ability to define the correct steps and the right objectives at a given moment is far from reaching the standards that one would consider desirable². This study offers an instance of just such a case, since it looks into some political and legal decisions taken in Spain that, although apparently well-intentioned and fair, may prove to have some undesirable effects as a result of some socio-economic conditions that complicate their smooth implementation and could radically alter their intended outcomes.

Although a number of decrees and laws had already been passed during the Transition period (1976-1996) trying to repair the damage and injustices suffered by those who had lost the Civil War – most of them related to the pensions due to them as victims –, nothing was said about the offspring of those who were forced to abandon the country to avoid the cruel reprisals of Franco's regime. However, as is the case in most trauma processes, the voices of their children and grandchildren soon began to be heard. These younger generations were especially important in pushing forward actions and laws that would allow them to locate and recover their progenitors' remains, and in securing an economic retribution to the "children of war", who were scattered all over Europe and Latin America³. In principle, most experts would agree that the exercise of recovering the historical memory of a country and assigning recognition and responsibility to the victims and perpetrators, respectively, would be welcomed by a majority of Spaniards today⁴, since more than seventy years have gone by since the dreadful events of the war took place. Nevertheless, reactions to the initiatives in this direction have varied widely, with some progressive and nationalist parties accusing the Socialist government of delaying the approval of the "Law of Historical Memory" in 2005, while others (such as the Popular Party and some conservative media and associations) have claimed that these initiatives revived old hatred and animosities that had already been forgotten⁵. Journalist L.M. Anson, for example, protested that Rodríguez Zapatero's intention in pushing the law "was to win a war that had already been finalized and buried during the Transition Period, and to establish the democratic legitimacy in 1931, instead of

1978”⁶. Despite the controversy, the Law was approved by the Spanish Congress on 31 October 2007⁷ – and nearly two months later by the Senate.

For a majority of legal and political scientists, this reform represents a long overdue attempt to respond to the requests made by many expatriates who, beginning in the early 1980s⁸, had been arguing for the creation of a “Special Law of Nationality” that would allow those who left the country in the first half of the 20th century and their children to obtain their Spanish passport. As noted earlier, one first point of contention has been that although the emigrants who wanted to recover their Spanish nationality had very diverse political sensibilities, the Additional Amendment explicitly privileges those who were exiled for ideological reasons. Furthermore, Álvarez-Rodríguez notes on this point that it will not be easy for many of them to gather the documentary evidence attesting to their elders’ motivation for leaving the country⁹. Other analysts have said that granting the Spanish “nationality of origin” to the applicants to this call may seem a comparative offence to those other migrants who have had to go through more demanding processes of regularization. This argument makes much sense if we take into account the kind of advantages that foreign-born individuals get by obtaining the “*nacionalidad de origen*” in terms of access to jobs in the public sector and a number of social benefits¹⁰. Still, one aspect that has slipped the attention of most politicians and experts – but which should be kept in mind in considering the possible consequences of the measure – is the current situation regarding migration flows into and out of the country. By focusing too narrowly on the historico-political rationales behind the convenience of the “Special Law”, they may have neglected other socio-economic considerations which will also be critical in determining the wisdom and effectiveness of the new regulation.

The historical irony I referred to above derives from the coexistence of a highly-restrictive immigration policy and the recent decision to open the national borders to the descendants of exiles, whose connection with their parents’ and grandparents’ homeland is sometimes hard to demonstrate. Estimates of the number of individuals who would be able to apply for the “recovery” of their Spanish citizenship range from half a million to almost one million – which interestingly coincides with the figure of irregular migrants living in Spain at the moment¹¹. As will become clear below, the situation faced by these irregular migrants, some of whom have been in the country for a fairly long period of time, is by no means stable and is likely to become even more vulnerable in times of economic recession. It is already evident that immigrants are among those most severely hit by declining opportunities in the labour and housing market¹², not to mention the increasing number of xenophobic and discriminatory episodes. Hence, the questions to be considered in this contribution are: Does it make sense to encourage the offspring of exiles to come into the country under these conditions? Will their integration in the societal structures be made easier by their alleged connections with the “motherland”? Is it fair to treat different types of migrants differently on the basis of past political and identity issues which are frequently irrelevant to their own motiva-

tions to move to a foreign country? In the following pages, I will dwell upon some of the problems raised by the assumptions made about this potential contingent of “new migrants” and the kind of conditions that they will be encountering upon arrival in Spain these next two years.

THE ABSENCE OF AN IMMIGRATION POLICY: FORGETTING THE INCUMBENT ON THE HOST SOCIETY

Migration Studies gained the status of a proper field of research in Spain only after the mid-1980s, when it became evident that migratory flows were changing direction dramatically. Up to that historical moment, the presence of foreigners in our country was deemed almost irrelevant and the migratory balance had always shown a significant surplus of nationals leaving the country to seek better opportunities abroad. As I have pointed out elsewhere, apart from the economic reasons driving large contingents of Spaniards to other parts of the globe, there were also ideological and social factors that impelled whole families to travel to other countries with the idea of finding broader horizons¹³. Predictably, some of these emigrants fared better than others, and for many of those others an eventual return to the motherland has remained a dream that, with the passing of the years, has become increasingly difficult to realize. On the other hand, the number of foreigners arriving in Spain these last two decades has grown exponentially, with many of them staying on in the peninsula for good and others moving on to other European countries after some time. While in 1995 the number of foreign subjects barely reached the figure of half a million people (slightly over 1 percent of the total population), ten years later it was nearing the figure of four million (approximately 9 percent of a population of 44,108,530)¹⁴. Most experts agree that a great deal of the economic boom the country enjoyed during that decade would have been unthinkable without the participation of all those immigrants feeding the labour market. Given the critical role foreigners have played in the economic progress and demographic balance of the nation, one would have expected an adjustment of the immigration legislation and policy to the new demands of the times. Yet, as Laura Díez notes, “a commonplace in the discussion of the regulation of the rights of foreigners in Spain is the utter absence of references to the matter in the laws found in the Spanish Constitution”¹⁵. Hence my suggestion that it is incumbent on the host society to incorporate a large segment of the population that has been mostly relegated to a marginal position and has rarely received the required attention from statesmen and legislators.

One of the founding fathers of Migration Studies in Spain, Antonio Izquierdo, observes that one of the reasons why the legal system has invariably lagged behind in terms of tackling the difficulties that the new phenomenon generated has been the “sudden and unexpected nature” of the change in migratory patterns¹⁶. Indeed, when the new Spanish Constitution was being written in the late 1970s, the issue of the status and

the rights of foreigners received very little attention in comparison with others. In this sense, it is not surprising that the first “Ley de Extranjería”, issued in 1985, should have concentrated its efforts on the delimitation of the rights of foreigners to take part in the public life of the nation, rather than on establishing paths for their adequate integration. According to Santolaya, this narrow-minded and restrictive law was the result of the incorrect initial assumption that our country was going to be just “a place of transit for migrants heading for other EU member states”¹⁷. In April 1991, a Proposition was passed by the Congress “concerning the situation of foreigners in Spain” which acknowledged the limitations of the earlier Law, as it had laid all the responsibility of controlling the entrance, residence, and expatriation of foreign individuals on the police forces. This Proposition advocated a more closely monitored model of immigration (by means of visas), the creation of an administrative infrastructure to manage the flows, the need to guarantee the proper social integration of immigrants, and an effort to reach some parity in the rights that nationals and foreigners enjoy. Although a Royal Decree was passed in February 1996, it was evident that these were just shy and insufficient attempts to compensate for the immense lacunae left in the Law of 1985¹⁸.

With the dramatic increase in the number of irregular migrants entering the country in the late 1990s, several social actors – NGOs, labour unions, entrepreneurs, associations, and even the Catholic Church – began to put pressure on the government to reform the legislation to place more emphasis on the proper incorporation of the migrants into the receiving society. As a result, a new Organic Law (4/00)¹⁹ was passed in 2000, substantially altering the immigrants’ legal status and their rights. Focusing more closely on those who had not yet managed to regularize their situation, the Law granted them a number of social rights that were no longer associated with their nationality but, instead, just required registration with a municipality; likewise, they could not be expelled on the basis of not having their work or residence permits in good order. This was also the year of the second extraordinary regularization, which tried to make the situation of some 150,000 foreigners legal overnight. Unfortunately, by March of that same year, when the general elections took place, it was clear that the new Law had a provisional character, since 60 out of its 70 articles were swiftly modified by the new conservative government to make it again much more restrictive and to permit expulsion in cases of certain irregularities. In this context, the Aznar government tried to come up with a more comprehensive immigration policy but, as Aja remarks, “it still remained unclear what the goals were behind the new strategies”²⁰. As was to be expected, in 2003 a new Law was passed with specific measures which quite explicitly connected some “social illnesses”, such as domestic violence and delinquency, with the increase in irregular migration. Moya Malapeira examines in great depth in his doctoral dissertation some of the effects of the legislation on the real situation of irregular immigrants²¹. To put it briefly, it could be said that they had become increasingly vulnerable as they were asked to renew their permits every two years in order to keep within the limits of the law. De

Lucas has maintained that integration and intercultural relations are impossible if the legal system of a country does not guarantee a set of basic rights to all its population so that they can take part regularly and freely in the social processes²².

The results of twenty years of legislation are far from satisfactory. In 2005, there were still over 700,000 foreigners attempting to regularize their situation in the country. It is true that the reform of the Civil Code (1990) concerning access to Spanish nationality, the three extraordinary regularizations (in 1991, 2000, and 2001), and the approval of the new “Ley de Extranjería” (2000) have had alleviating effects on the overwhelming pressure that immigrants have experienced. In Domingo i Valls’ opinion, it is still unclear whether the immigration boom the country has seen these two decades is in fact the result of a global trend affecting all countries in the developed world or whether the reluctant steps taken in Spain to control and regulate immigration may have produced exactly the opposite effects²³. In the mid-1990s, the socialist government was repeatedly accused of pushing laws that could be interpreted as welcoming or providing an easy path to those who entered the country illegally. Although the so-called “efecto-llamada” [call effect] theory can hardly account for the steadiness and the changes in constituency of the flows, there may be a grain of truth in the view that measures such as the extraordinary regularizations or the granting of universal health assistance may have encouraged some immigrants to opt for Spain instead of other candidate countries. What seems beyond any doubt is that the absence of a well-planned and long-term immigration policy has caused the state to become dependent on grassroots organizations and associations to help the newcomers who find themselves in dire straits. Specialists have argued that without the collaboration of organizations such as Cáritas, CEAR, the Red Cross or Medicos Mundi the situation of most migrant families would have been unsustainable²⁴.

It needs to be admitted, though, that not everything has been so gloomy concerning the arrival and settlement of immigrants in Spain in recent times. The new norms approved in 2004 offered new opportunities of regularization by demonstrating a number of years of residence in the country or by the existence of work contracts attesting to the legal activity of the holders. The number of foreigners paying their taxes and social security coverage has been on the rise and it is becoming less exceptional to meet foreigners in professions – medicine, education, technology, etc. – which only a few years ago were monopolized by national workers. Newspaper headlines in early 2007 announced that the number of immigrants had reached a ten percent of the total population, something that guaranteed the demographic stability of the country. It was also evident that the expansion of sectors like hospitality, construction care of children and the elderly would have been impossible without the presence of ready hands willing to take jobs in these often unappealing occupations²⁵.

Nevertheless, deeper analyses of the situation made clear that levels of ghettoization, discrimination, and exclusion among recently arrived immigrants were extremely high. To make things worse, by the late spring of 2008 the Spanish economy was already

showing signs of a fast deceleration. Economic activity, levels of spending and the employment rate slumped in a few months, and what only a year before had been self-congratulatory words about the incorporation of migrants into the national economy became bitter comments about the excessive generosity of the system. A headline from “Diario El Mundo” concerning immigration read: “Too Many and Too Often Related to Delinquency”²⁶. This article examined the results of a survey carried out by Sigma Dos among nationals inquiring about such issues as the implementation of stricter border controls, the submission of immigrants to an exam checking their language skills and knowledge of the Spanish Constitution, the rights of foreign workers in the labour market or whether they should enjoy equal access to social services. Of course, no one could fail to notice that the questions were notably biased by the assumption that public opinion was quickly shifting in regard to the effects of massive immigration.

In this volatile context, the Spanish Minister of Labour and Immigration, Celestino Corbacho, made a number of statements that were not well taken by even the most conservative representatives in the Spanish Parliament. Following on the tracks of the 2004 legislation, Corbacho insisted that the only way in which foreigners should get admission into the country would be by showing a work contract signed by a national employer. Furthermore, he said that family reunification processes, which had been one of the easiest ways to achieve Spanish nationality, especially for South Americans, were not to be approved so easily – only direct descendants would be permitted to enter. All these highly restrictive measures were being defended at the same time that other members of the same government were struggling to convince fellow congressmen from other parties of the fairness and convenience of passing a law that would bring over half a million foreign-born individuals into the country.

Again, one would need to be a strong believer in the fairness of promoting processes of historical revisionism and retribution, or a defender of differential treatment for people of particular bloodlines not to see the shadow of incoherence in these simultaneous “crusades”. If examined separately, both the measures to monitor more closely the admission of immigrants and the “Law of Historical Memory” would seem to make perfect sense. However, when one considers the real needs and challenges facing the country at this historical juncture, the justice and usefulness of either of the two becomes more problematic, especially when neither of them is completely free of fairly clear political interests.

THE RETURN OF (FOREIGN) GHOSTS FROM A TRAUMATIC PAST: REMEMBERING THE FORGOTTEN

When she was eighteen, Antonia Aristegui de Suárez ran away from Spain, a country that was then convulsed by the Civil War. She travelled on a boat called *Mexique* and carried with her a typewriter, so many of the other exiles asked her to write letters to

their families. She had studied journalism and typewriting in Barcelona before the fight between the Republicans and Francoist troops broke out and forced her, and her family, to depart for a place, Veracruz, in Mexico, which was 7,200 kilometres from her country of birth²⁷.

Hundreds of accounts and testimonies of this sort filled the pages of newspapers, magazines, and internet pages on the days following the approval on 4 November 2008 of the Additional Amendment to the “Law of Historical Memory”, which established that “*podrán optar a la nacionalidad española de origen las personas cuyo padre o madre hubiese sido originariamente español, así como aquellas cuyo abuelo o abuela español hubiera perdido o tenido que renunciar a la nacionalidad española como consecuencia del exilio*”²⁸. Memory and trauma scholars know well that experiences and stories like the above are likely to generate a “spiral of signification” around the recollections of the victims and survivors of any repressive regime²⁹. Young points out that, in this type of context, “historical inquiry” should combine not only the study of what happened and how it has been passed down to us but also “what is being done with it now”³⁰, for it is all these discourses that will feed the constant demand for information that is revived in institutions, organizations, and the younger generations. There was an almost morbid need to hear the voices of those whose lives were profoundly disrupted by a system that punished any shadow of dissent, and who now finally felt free to tell their stories. As mentioned earlier on, Spain has been privy to this accelerated process of memory retrieval these last ten years and the voices and experiences of the defeated have penetrated all kinds of public and private spaces³¹. One wonders, though, if setting some limit to the consumerist dynamics that surround the production and reception of these narratives, dynamics in which one can easily lose sight of the original purpose, would not be recommendable.

A true eruption of novels, films, documentaries, dissertations, and academic projects has taken place in Spain this last decade, all of which consider and reflect on the traumas left by Franco’s dictatorial regime in the psyches of many of the vanquished. Juliá has remarked about these reconstructions that they can only be fully understood when one delves deep into the signification of those fears and visions that haunt their minds³². In Gordon’s opinion, the social pressure exerted by those “ghosts” of the past “is not just a pre-modern superstition or an individual psychosis but rather a generalized phenomenon of great relevance” that can be observed to produce all kinds of serious effects³³. It also needs to be stated that those effects become all the more evident when there has been no attempt to heal the wounds left by that traumatic past and people have simply been told to get over their grievances as best they could. As several trauma scholars have shown, those troubling memories will return – with ever-growing intensity sometimes – when some dormant episodes of the past are unexpectedly reawakened or recuperated. In her prize-winning novel, Dulce Chacón speaks of *La voz dormida* [The sleeping voice] that can only express its long-repressed suffering when certain human collec-

tivities and social actors are mobilized, and some of the unspeakable truths are finally unsealed³⁴. As I see it, this is precisely what has happened in Spain these last few years, since the collective memories of the Civil War have been intensely revisited and revised by relatives and scholars who believe that this may well be their last chance to recognize and do justice to those who fell fighting for democracy.

One of the major achievements of these social groups has been the institutionalization of the trauma process by urging the different administrations – national, regional, and local – to provide resources to carry out a proper political management of the historical memory. This management started right after the turn of the century and, since then, several inter-ministerial committees have been working on laws and actions pursuing recognition for the defeated and retribution for their descendants³⁵. Important steps, such as the official condemnation of the military uprising and the removal of Francoist symbols from buildings and public spaces were taken between the years 2002 and 2004, and several regional governments – especially, those held by left-wing and nationalist parties – proposed other measures often involving the economic compensation for the damage caused to the victims or the identification and excavation of the mass graves of the missing³⁶. All these efforts have had positive effects in terms of visualizing and commemorating the sacrifice of partisans whom the regime had worked hard to erase from history, and also of repairing the moral and material injuries that the defeated had suffered. Haynes remarks that a true healing process and social reconciliation can only take place once the traumatic past is dealt with through these types of compensatory measures³⁷. Ferrándiz warns, on the other hand, that there is also the danger that the trauma process may grow so huge and visceral that “the gaps in the collective memory of the vanquished are filled too quickly and thoughtlessly” to be properly assimilated and to achieve its goals – mostly preventive, rather than retaliatory³⁸. We will see below that, in fact, some of the claims being made lately may reveal this undesirable character.

While the suitability and justice of the norm would be difficult to dispute from the point of view of the need to exorcise those “ghosts and spectres” from the past, it is arguable whether the moment chosen and the rationales used to justify it are correct. On the one hand, discussions of historical memory tend to eschew references to the socio-political trajectory of the country recently which, as Douglass and Vogler have recommended³⁹, should never be put completely aside in this type of debate. Although Anson and others may have stretched reality a bit in declaring that the socialist government is trying to erase the whole Transition period from history, one does suspect that a number of profound changes that the country has undergone during those two decades are being neglected. There is little question that the recuperation of a democratic system and the recognition of the outrageous crimes of the dictatorship have contributed a great deal to the normalization of the political life in the nation. Nevertheless, it would also be an unpardonable analytical blunder to overlook the transformation of the country from a nation of emigrants to a nation of immigrants. As has been shown

earlier on, this fact has caused not only a sea change in the composition of the population – in terms of race, class, gender, and age – but also an urgent need to create strategies to integrate newcomers into the existing societal structures⁴⁰. In this context, believing that the descendents of exiles are going to enjoy an easier path of integration because of some unfathomable links with the homeland or some initial administrative privileges seems, to say the least, rather naïve. Vromen and other social critics have argued that historical memory often takes on the different biases and values that colour all discursive modes when they set out to retrieve certain episodes⁴¹. Any analysis of the documentaries, fiction or even more scientific projects based on the Civil War and the dictatorship will reveal how hard it is to remain emotionally uninvolved in narratives which, as Raymond Williams observed, tend to avoid a critical examination of and engagement with their present⁴². In my opinion, the “Law of Historical Memory” and its various ramifications have failed to engage in a reflection on the present state of affairs, especially concerning immigration, something that may imperil its effectiveness and short-term objectives.

CONCLUSIONS: ON HISTORICAL MEMORY AND CONTEMPORARY HISTORY

Much has been written recently about the relationship between present-day history and historical memory, and the uses and abuses that both may be subject to in the public arena⁴³. In general, both areas of research have been severely criticized by more conventional schools of historiography due to what is thought to be an excessive dependence on other disciplines such as journalism, political sciences or sociology. According to the more traditional historians, those of us working on contemporary history run the serious risk of projecting our own preoccupations onto the past. Moreover, they maintain that we lack the necessary historical distance to analyze processes that, in fact, in most cases are still evolving and incomplete. Without wholly denying the validity of some of this criticism, especially if we bear in mind the ways in which historical memory and contemporary history may easily be turned into a consumerist product, it is difficult to see how the use of more traditional sources or the fact of enjoying a longer historical perspective may necessarily make descriptions and judgments less subjective. Hayden White has shown that traditional history writing has relied on rhetorical practices that inevitably mediated and coloured the incidents that were being reported⁴⁴. In this sense, using newspaper clippings, census statistics, oral testimonies or any other kind of socio-cultural artefact need not be detrimental to one’s research as long as these alternative sources are used in well-informed and commensurate ways. Indeed, if used correctly these less conventional methods of doing historical research may prove productive and insightful in ways that more orthodox sources and techniques could have never been. Arostegui has rightly noted that any history which excludes significant parts of the “cultural life” of a country is bound to disregard the global interactions and socio-political interests that invariably give shape to historical processes, and so to remain incomplete⁴⁵.

Nowhere does this fact become more evident than in analyses that bring together phenomena which, although still very active in the collective consciousness of the population, may also have gone through long periods of amnesia, and others which, although experienced daily by the people, have never been properly dealt with by the different institutions and administrations. This is definitely the case, on the one hand, of the historical memories associated with the Civil War and the Francoist regime and, on the other, of the management of immigration flows in Spain. The kind of paradoxes – or seeming inconsistencies – that have emerged at some points of my discussion are likely to produce Gordian knots not easy to untie by our future leaders. For, when the two policies are considered in conjunction, one becomes easily aware of the questionable character of dispositions that grant rights and privileges to individuals who have lived without much contact with a country that they now aspire to be admitted into, while others who have struggled for years to plant their roots in that same country are denied that right. Similarly, these measures tend to overlook the fact that in today's globalized world, one's identity and sense of belonging are not so much a question of descent and cultural heritage but, rather, of the kind of consensus that one wishes to reach with a host society⁴⁶. Of course, this does not mean that there are no diasporic communities around the globe which have preserved their links with and feelings of attachment to the old country, but not even this would be enough to assume that they are for that reason better equipped to incorporate into that new society. As a result, there is a pressing need for policymakers to look closely into the kind of differences and boundaries that they are likely to put up between and around particular groups of people and to, then, wonder with Frost's personae in his famous poem: "Before I built a wall I'd ask to know / What I was walling in or walling out, / And to whom I was like to give offense"⁴⁷.

NOTES

- 1 See S. Sassen, *Losing Control. Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, New York 1996. According to this scholar, "the coexistence of two very different regimes, one for the circulation of capitals and the other for the circulation of migrants, as well as two other different regimes for the protection of human rights and the protection of the sovereignty of the nation-state, poses problems that cannot be solved by using the old rules of the game", p. 15.
- 2 See D. Byrne, *Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences: An Introduction*, London - New York 1998.
- 3 See Madrid Office, *Descendientes de emigrantes españoles optarán a la ciudadanía*, in "El Universal", 28 December 2008, Venezuela, www.eluniversal.com
- 4 Historian J. Tussell holds this opinion in *La reconciliación española*, in "Claves de la Razón Práctica", 2003, 132, pp. 32-39. See also J. Rodrigo, *Los campos de concentración franquista: Entre la historia y la memoria*, Madrid 2003.
- 5 Newspapers such as "ABC" or "La Razón" published a number of articles alleging that these initiatives would "open old wounds" that most people felt were already cured.
- 6 L.M. Anson, *Resucitando viejos fantasmas*, in "La Razón", 4 October 2004; www.larazon.es
- 7 BOE, no. 310, 26 December 2007, Ley 52/2007.

- ⁸ Especially in countries like Cuba and Argentina, whole lobbies and associations such as “La Agrupación Hijos y Nietos de Españoles” (Argentina) have been created to push forward these demands. See also the chapter by M. Klemenčič, *Reaction of Slovene Immigrant Communities in the US to 20th Century Crises in the Homeland* in this volume, in which the influence of diasporic communities in the politics of their country of origin is discussed in depth.
- ⁹ A. Álvarez Rodríguez, *La opción a la nacionalidad española prevista en la Disposición Adicional Séptima de la denominada Ley de Memoria Histórica*, in “España Exterior”, 18 December 2007, 546, p. 7; www.espaexterior.com
- ¹⁰ NGOs and immigrant associations have protested recently in different regions of the country – Madrid and Andalusia, most notably – against these rights and privileges that usually condemn foreigners to remain for life in the lower echelons of the labour market, regardless of their qualifications.
- ¹¹ Neither of these two figures (Sources: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and INE 2008) is fully reliable since in both instances there will be a significant number of individuals who do not show on the statistics.
- ¹² M. Pajares, *Inmigración y Mercado de Trabajo. Informe*, in “Documentos del Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración”, 17, Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, Madrid 2008.
- ¹³ A. Ibarrola, *Discrepant Perceptions on Health and Education Issues in the Basque Country: Del dicho al hecho...*, in C. Westin, J. Bastos (eds.), *Identity Processes and Dynamics in Multi-ethnic Europe*, Amsterdam 2008, www.imiscoe.org. Although referring to an earlier period, Mark Häberlein’s ideas in *Overseas Migration and Identities* in this volume may throw some light on the motivations and processes herein discussed.
- ¹⁴ Source: INE 2008.
- ¹⁵ L. Díez Bueso, *Los derechos de los inmigrantes y sus garantías (1990-2004)*, in E. Aja, J. Arango (eds.), *Veinte años de inmigración en España: Perspectivas jurídicas y sociológicas*, Barcelona 2006, p. 205.
- ¹⁶ A. Izquierdo Escribano, *La inmigración inesperada*, Madrid 1996.
- ¹⁷ P. Santolaya, *Los inmigrantes en situación irregular: derechos, expulsión y regularización (1990-2004)*, in Aja, Arango (eds.), *Veinte años de inmigración en España* cit., p. 130.
- ¹⁸ See D. Moya Malapeira, *La evolución del sistema de control migratorio de entrada en España*, in Aja, Arango (eds.), *Veinte años de inmigración en España* cit., pp. 46-84.
- ¹⁹ BOE, no. 10, 12 January 2000, “Sobre los derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social”.
- ²⁰ E. Aja, *La evolución de la normativa sobre inmigración*, in Aja, Arango (eds.), *Veinte años de inmigración en España* cit., p. 34.
- ²¹ D. Moya Malapeira, *Las medidas de alejamiento de extranjeros en el ordenamiento jurídico español*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Universidad de Barcelona, Barcelona 2004.
- ²² J. de Lucas, *Sobre la gestión de la multiculturalidad que resulta de la inmigración: condiciones del proyecto intercultural*, in J.S. Bernat, C. Gimeno (eds.), *Migración e interculturalidad: De lo global a lo local*, Castelló de la Plana 2006, p. 42.
- ²³ A. Domingo i Valls, *La immigració actual a Espanya. Aspectes demogràfics*, in Bernat, Gimeno (eds.), *Migración e interculturalidad* cit., p. 96.
- ²⁴ See F.J. Álvarez de los Mozos, *Immigrant Organizations as a Factor of Social Integration*, in C.H. Firth, A. Ibarrola (eds.), *Migrations in a Global Context: Transitions and Transformations Emerging from International Human Mobility*, Bilbao 2007, pp. 27-62.
- ²⁵ The famous three Ds in English (dirty, dangerous, demanding) are transformed into three Ps in the Spanish literature on the topic: “*penosos, peligrosos y precarios*”.
- ²⁶ O.R. Sanmartín, *Demasiados y vinculados a la delincuencia*, in “El Mundo”, 17 August 2008, pp. 10-11.

- ²⁷ G. Olson, *Nietos de refugiados suspiran por España*, in "Vanguardia", 26 January 2008, my translation, www.vanguardia.com
- ²⁸ Translation: "[In accordance with the 7th Additional Disposition of the Law 52/2007] all those whose father or mother was originally Spanish, or whose grandparents had to give up or lose their Spanish nationality as a consequence of exile, may apply to obtain their Spanish nationality of origin". *BOE*, no. 258, 26 November 2008, "Sobre el derecho de opción a la nacionalidad española".
- ²⁹ See E. Jelin, *State Repression and the Labours of Memory*, Minneapolis 2003.
- ³⁰ J. Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning in Europe, Israel and America*, New Haven 1993, p. 17.
- ³¹ F. Ferrándiz, *Exhumaciones y políticas de la memoria en la España contemporánea*, in F. Gómez Isa (ed.), *El derecho a la memoria*, Colección Derechos Humanos 5, Bilbao 2006, p. 560.
- ³² S. Juliá, *Echar al olvido: Memoria y amnistía en la transición*, in "Claves de la razón práctica", 2003, 129, pp. 17-19.
- ³³ A.F. Gordon, *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination*, Minneapolis 1997, pp. 7-16.
- ³⁴ D. Chacón, *La voz dormida*, Madrid 2002.
- ³⁵ See J.A. Martín Pallín, R. Escudero (eds.), *Derecho y memoria histórica*, Madrid 2008.
- ³⁶ See Juliá, *Echar al olvido* cit., pp. 14-25; J. Rodrigo, *Los campos de concentración franquistas: Entre la historia y la memoria*, Madrid 2003.
- ³⁷ P.B. Haynes, *Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenges of Truth Commissions*, New York 2002.
- ³⁸ Ferrándiz, *Exhumaciones y políticas de la memoria* cit., p. 561.
- ³⁹ A. Douglass, T.A. Vogler, *Witness and Memory: The Discourse of Trauma*, New York - London 2003, pp. 35-42.
- ⁴⁰ C. Blanco Fdez de Valderrama, *La integración de los inmigrantes en las sociedades receptoras*, Bilbao 2006.
- ⁴¹ P. Aguilar, *Los debates sobre la memoria histórica*, in "Claves de la Razón Práctica", 2007, 172, pp. 64-68. See also S. Vromen, *The Ambiguity of Nostalgia*, in "YIVO Annual", 21; J. Kugelmass (ed.), *Going Home*, Evanston 1993, pp. 69-86.
- ⁴² R. Williams, *The Country and the City*, Oxford - New York 1974.
- ⁴³ See J. Tusell, *Historia y Tiempo Presente*, in "Claves de la razón práctica", 1993, 31, pp. 145-172; and also, F. Bedarida, *Definición, método y práctica de la Historia del Tiempo Presente*, in "Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea", 1998, 20, pp. 18-22.
- ⁴⁴ H. White, *The Historical Text as Literary Artefact*, in his *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism*, Baltimore - London 1978.
- ⁴⁵ J. Arostegui, *La historia vivida. Sobre la historia del presente*, Madrid 2004, pp. 198-199.
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