Creating a New Historical Perspective: EU and the Wider World

CLIOHWORLD
Reader
VII

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World and Global History
Research and Teaching

A
CLIOHWORLD
Reader

edited by
Seija Jalagin, Susanna Tavera, Andrew Dilley

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Cover: *Shanhai Yudi Quantu* [Complete Terrestrial Map], early 17th century, from the *Sancai tuhui* encyclopaedia, adapted from A. Schottenhammer, R. Ptak (eds.), *The Perception of Maritime Space in Traditional Chinese Sources*, Weisbaden 2006.

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Preface

We are very pleased to present *World and Global History. Research and Teaching*, CLIOHWORLD Reader VII. It is the result of the labours of one of the five Work Groups belonging to the CLIOHWORLD Erasmus Academic Network, whose general aim is to develop appropriate guidelines and new resources for learning and teaching History in a broader context than is usual in current European higher education programmes.

CLIOHWORLD is an Erasmus Academic Network, supported by the European Commission through its Lifelong Learning Programme. Its full title is "Creating a New Historical Perspective: EU and the Wider World". More in general, it is part of the family of 'CLIOH nets', networks and projects devoted to "Creating Links and Innovative Overviews for a New History Agenda". The specific role of CLIOHWORLD is to bring the history of Europe, European integration and the European Union itself into a new perspective, in which Eurocentrism can be seen for what it is: a constricting and restrictive way of looking at the world that leads at best to a very partial view, and more often to significant and even dangerous misunderstandings.

An important and delicate part of the Network's task has been taken on by Work Group 2, dedicated to World and Global History. In most European universities, world or global history is often mentioned, but even a brief inquiry into the course descriptions and the syllabi usually shows that what is on offer follows national trajectories, projecting a set of highlights and shadows linked to each country's history onto 'the world'. The world is normally seen through national lenses, with emphasis on former empires, on countries of emigration, on non-European trade partners or rivals. It is striking to see how anything non-European can become the 'contents' of 'world history' courses, whether or not these are able or even intended to build a broader historical perspective.

Moreover, the theoretical and practical distinctions between 'world' and 'global' history are often lost. In many cases there is inadequate awareness of the state of the art, and scarce acquaintance with the political and cultural coordinates of the debates that underlie the various recipes for looking at the world and its peoples as an interconnected whole.

In order to address these difficulties, and provide novel learning and teaching material suitable for overcoming them, the more than twenty members of the CLIOHWORLD Work Group on World and Global History decided to prepare this volume. It contains introductory material to clarify the nature of the debate on methodologies and categories; it contains a number of very useful chapters showing how the world has appeared in different times to people living far from Europe. The objective of the Reader is not to

furnish exhaustive descriptions, but to give examples which can be used to jolt students (and their teachers) out of their usual ways of thinking. The volume also contains a Toolkit, formed of two parts: classical texts showing how people in different times and places have created their own world picture; and a series of maps, again from different periods and different continents, to illustrate changing ways of picturing the globe.

The cover illustration is inspired in part by the 'map' section, and in part by the Reader's more general aim of shifting our usual, normally Eurocentric, points of view. It reproduces, on a coloured background, a Chinese world map known as the *Shanhai Yudi Quantu*, printed in the early 17th century in the *Sancai Tuhui* encyclopaedia. It is thought that it shows some influence of Matteo Ricci's cartographic principles, but the result is quite independent. This map for us symbolises the complex processes of elaborating a world view, in which the creativity, inventiveness and curiosity of many people and cultures all have a role.

It is to be noted that the other very interesting readers published by CLIOHWORLD are based on recent research from the CLIOHRES Network of Excellence. The materials in those cases have been chosen and rearranged to produce useful tools for learners and teachers. In contrast, *World and Global History* is entirely composed of materials elaborated specifically for this volume – drafted, presented and discussed during the Work Group meetings.

A first edition of *World and Global History. Research and Teaching* was printed in a limited number of copies and was presented at the Sixth Plenary Conference of CLIOHWORLD, held on 17-18 June 2011 at the Faculty of Social and Human Sciences of the Nova University of Lisbon. This second, slightly revised, edition is to be printed in a larger number of copies so that it can be used extensively in real-life learning and teaching, not only by CLIOHWORLD members, but also by others. It will also be placed on-line for free download from the www.cliohworld.net website.

We especially commend and thank the Work Group 2, its leaders and the authors for their stubborn determination to make this Reader a reality, and for the very hard work that has brought their plan to fruition. We also thank Răzvan Adrian Marinescu for his editing work and the Pisa team in general for supporting the group's publishing project in a variety of ways.

We are particularly grateful to the book editors, Seija Jalagin, Susanna Tavera and Andrew Dilley, for their untiring proofreading and attention to detail, even in the last rush to prepare the volume. We are sure that the results justify the efforts that have gone into it.

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Introduction

This reader takes as its starting point the fact that the researching and teaching of world and global history often are not brought together in the most fruitful way, despite the all-embracing idea that all teaching in higher education should be based on research. Why is this? Partly it is a result of various definitions of the terms world and global history. As in the case of most terms, 'world' and 'global' convey meanings that are dependent on time, place and culture, i.e. they are culturally and temporally specific and determined by diverse scholarly traditions, which in turn creates diverse understandings of their relevant use in history teaching and learning.

In some languages the terms global history and world history are difficult to differentiate, if this can be done at all. To give just a few examples we may mention that both terms translate into the Dutch language as *wereldgeschiedenis* or *Mondiale geschiedenis* (and the same goes to globalisation: *globalisering* or *mondialisering*). Yet, in English the use of these terms signify a difference: while global history would mean a focus on the interconnectedness of the various parts of the world and an attempt to avoid hegemonic representations of the West in particular, world history could mean either a history of the world, or a more encompassing history with the same purpose as global history (although the suspicion of Eurocentricity is stronger in the older term). In Catalonia contemporary historians usually oppose a centralist – Spanish – interpretation as well as a global perspective (linked to the concept of globalisation) to the national nature of local and Catalan histories, whereas *historia del món / historia del mundo* [world history] usually refers to universal history with a strong Eurocentric bias. Interestingly in Poland, the most widely used terms are *historia powszechna* [general/universal history] and *historia świata* (world history, divided in periods and focused on certain regions and aspects), which are both somewhat Eurocentric but still aim to encompass the history of the whole globe and, while following traditional periodisations, seek to be sensitive to regional and local events and divisions. *Historia globalna* [global history], on the other hand, is a rather new invention in Polish language and used very rarely. In Japan historians mostly used the term *sekaishi* for world history. Here *sekai* is the equivalent to 'world' and was originally derived from Buddhist cosmology, signifying the universe, whereas *shi* is 'history'. Until mid-nineteenth century the common word was a geographical concept *bankokushi* (*bankoku* is literally 'thousands of countries'), which was gradually replaced by *sekai* as the word for the real world. From the 1990s, global history began to appear in Japanese academic literature in the form of a phonetic translation *gurobaru shi* or *gurobaru hisutori*. Those who use this term do so to stress the novelty of their historical approaches, particularly an attention to transnational linkages and movements, and the dynamism of history, while they see *sekaishi* as static and referring to a sheer compilation of individual national and regional histories[1].

In order to have an idea of how world history and global history are understood and integrated in history education in European universities the members of a working group in Erasmus Network CLIOHWORLD[2], historians from over ten European countries and Japan, decided to map the situation. They sent their colleagues a questionnaire in order to receive detailed information on how the teaching of world history or global history at European universities is conducted. One of the questions was how they defined the concepts of European history, world history and global history. The responses from our colleagues in European history departments made abundantly clear that world and global history teaching is scattered and appears under various names, ranging from non-European history to Western Civ; from the lumping together the histories of different parts or cultures in the world to global history courses with rather specific topics (e.g. environmental history, trade networks, etc.). Perhaps more generally, it is considered "too large to teach". The situation in higher education resonates with the situation in secondary education and bears witness to the continuing Eurocentrism of history teaching and learning. Even a quick look in most secondary school history curricula is enough to give an impression that the so called 'world history' or 'international history' is often taught only when related to the national or local history of one's own country or region. Take for example the Finnish National Core Curriculum for Upper Secondary Education (2003)[3] and its associated history textbooks. Although the history of Finland has rather limited space (1 obligatory course out of 4, and 1 out of 2 optional courses), the emphasis in the 3 other compulsory courses (38 lessons each) is on European history, whereas the rest of the world is treated as 'non-European', i.e. worth attention only when its history is linked to European history, as at the age of discovery, mercantilism, imperialism, colonialism, the two world wars, decolonisation processes, and the supranational cooperation and systems (NATO, the Warsaw Pact, UN, EU, etc.).

These kinds of notions and also the good practices we detected in some universities eventually led us to prepare this reader to inspire and assist ourselves, our colleagues, students and other interested parties around Europe and the wider world to enhance teaching and learning of world history and global history.

In an era of globalisation and 'cultural confusion' professional historians as well as history students need to be familiar with the world and global levels of historical development. At present the need to understand one's own place and identity in the world is probably much greater than it has ever been before in human history because new technologies in travel and communications mean that we may move from one place and culture to the other in a few hours, while information from all over the world travels to our screens, phones and other wireless equipment virtually instantaneously. All this makes us question the globality and dimensions of the concept of 'world' and the relationship between global and local in history, equally in our own history be it national, European, Asian, Eurasian, American, African, or any other, as well as in the histories of other regions and cultures in the world.

Solid knowledge of world and global history should therefore equip us with a more complex view of interconnectedness in history as well as with better understanding of local and national interpretations of world history. In order to succeed in this we need to master our own national and regional history in relation to the developments of world history and wider historical processes. Only by doing this we can recognise the patterns and phases of globalisation in local contexts and respectively avoid the over-nationalisation of historical narratives.

Despite such aspirations, we by no means suggest that this reader is an exhaustive presentation of the field of world history and global history. Rather it is intended as a selection of scholarly texts and source materials for teaching and learning. This reader is accompanied by an extensive online and open-access bibliography from 16th century to the present (http://www.cliohworld.net/). Together they form, we believe, a useful starting point for anyone interested in studying and teaching the field.

This book begins with two important discussions by Janny de Jong of the key concepts in the field: world history and globalisation as a field of study for historians, i.e. global history. These are followed by a case study of an early world empire, where Stefan Halikowski Smith asks whether the early modern Portuguese system was a form of globalisation before globalisation. We have also struggled to take seriously the pitfalls of traditional Eurocentrism (as implied by the old term 'universal history') and to offer critical reflection on European and American history curricula and collections of scholarly books on world and global history. Valuable assistance has been provided by colleagues from Japan. Arakawa Masaharu discusses traditional Chinese and Takenaka Toru the Japanese ways of seeing the world and world history. Klaus van Eickels presents global history from a Sub-Saharan African perspective and Sebastian Stride introduces Central Asian perspectives on world history as viewed from Samarkand.

Just as Japan, China, Africa, Samarkand, pre-modern and modern European empires provide examples of how world history may be seen or how it contests the historiographies of different cultures or nations, we need to surpass national and cultural borders in order to be able to review the biases in national historiographies and place countries, regions and cultures into wider, world and global history contexts. For that purpose this reader includes chapters that discuss the relationship between European national historiographies and world or global history, including: Jakub Basista on Russian and Soviet historiography, Halina Parafianowicz on the idea of America in East-Central Europe, and Andrew Dilley on British imperial historiography. Finally, the last chapter by Maria Efthymiou introduces a less known point of view: two historical attempts to write the world history for young readers, i.e. to grasp what is still sometimes considered "too large to teach" in a way that highlights the complexity of world history as an important approach to the past and to understanding the present, and to relate this to those of school age.

The 'Toolbox' in this reader reflects our intention to offer original source materials in the form of classical texts and historical maps for further discussion, elucidation and for

exploring approaches to learning and teaching world and global history. The 'Classical Texts' section thus consists of ancient Greek and Roman extracts, medieval Chinese and Japanese excerpts, as well as early-modern and modern Arabic, Japanese and European texts, which are accompanied by short introductions. 'World Views and World History on Maps' is composed in a similar way as a selection of more than fifteen maps with commentaries. These range from Ptolemy's globe to an 8th-century Chinese cartography of the world, and through Medieval and Christian views of the world, to those of the Moroccan geographer Al-Idrīsī's world map in the 12th century, and the naming of America in early 16th century to more modern maps that depict the different parts of the world that gradually came to intensifying contacts with one another. The authors who contributed to the 'Toolbox' include Arakawa Masaharu, María Jesús Cava Mesa, Gerhard Dohrn-van Rossum, Maria Efthymiou, Janny de Jong, Takenaka Toru and Susanna Tavera. While preparing this reader we have cultivated an idea that the classical texts and maps with introductions and commentaries could be translated into other languages for more efficient use on different levels of history education and for various age groups of learners, all the way from primary and secondary education through to lifelong learning in open universities. For further inspiration we have listed at the end of this book academic journals and reviews on the themes of world and global history as well as teaching and didactic materials online.

This book would not exist without enthusiastic and motivated historians that rose to the challenge of authoring studies and texts to compose a collection of insights into world and global history teaching and learning. We especially wish to thank Gerhard Dohrn-van Rossum for initiating and developing this reader as the co-chair of the CLIOHWORLD work group and for compiling the online bibliography of world and global history. The other members of the 'Work Group on World History' made invaluable contributions by suggesting additional readings, historical maps, classical texts, authoring chapters and participating in vigorous and fruitful discussion in meetings in Salzburg, Bochum, Pisa, Oulu and Adana. We all learned a lot from each other in terms of different traditions and ways of thinking about history teaching and learning in diverse national contexts; we hope that other history teachers and learners from many countries will find this reader useful for their purposes. Furthermore, we look forward to future cooperation and research in this very important field of history. Finally the editors would like to thank the CLIOHWORLD coordinators Kathy Isaacs and Guðmundur Hálfdanarson both for creating the Erasmus network which made this reader possible, and for their tireless work to bring the project to fruition.

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Please note: in this volume the Japanese personal names are written in the Japanese way in which the surname precedes the given name.

Notes

[1] The editors of this book wish to thank Janny de Jong, Sebastian Stride, Takenaka Toru and Jakub Basista for their informed descriptions about the uses and meanings of 'world history' and 'global history' in the Netherlands, Catalonia and Spain, Japan and Poland respectively.

[2] See http://www.cliohworld.net (accessed 12 May 2011).

[3] National Core Curriculum for Upper Secondary Schools 2003, Finnish National Board of Education, http://www.oph.fi/english/publications/2003/National_Core_Curriculum_for_Upper_Secondary_Schools_2003 (accessed 12 May 2011).

World History: A Brief Introduction

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Abstract

In this brief introduction the main issues in studying, teaching and researching world history, particularly since 1945, are presented. How should world history be defined and which perspectives and methodologies have been used? The growth of the field of world history since the 1990s is sketched, as well as the inclination to use new terms to mark the difference with earlier, often Eurocentric, forms of world history. Debate about Eurocentrism is continuous: can it always be avoided?

De inleiding behandelt de belangrijkste problemen met betrekking tot het onderzoek en onderwijs in de wereldgeschiedenis, met name na de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Hoe moet wereldgeschiedenis worden gedefinieerd en welke perspectieven en methodologieën zijn gebruikt? Sinds de jaren 1990 heeft wereldgeschiedenis een grote groei doorgemaakt. De neiging bestond nieuwe termen te gebruiken om onderscheid te maken met vroegere, vaak Eurocentrische vormen van wereldgeschiedenis. Eurocentrisme is een steeds terugkerend thema: in hoeverre kan dit worden vermeden?

When in 1997 *Asia in western and world history*, a comprehensive guide of almost 1000 pages for teaching Asian history in a global perspective, was published the editors seemed a bit embarrassed. Their optimism about the relative easiness of the project to introduce "Asia" into the core curricula of undergraduate teaching institutions had proven to be somewhat naive. Not only had the definition of world history changed dramatically, because schools and scholars had tried to "reframe the subject in suitably late twentieth-century terms", the same held true for the content of courses on Western civilisation. Also the historical profession itself had undergone important changes under the influence of cultural and social approaches[1].

This example shows the tremendous changes in the domain of world history. Indeed, to say that it is "dynamic" would be a gross understatement. Especially since the early 1990s, debates on what world history is and what should be its focus and methodology have received new impulses. At that time, a great many studies on "globalisation" were

undertaken, which were much inspired by recent developments in various fields, ranging from communication technology to politics and economics. Historians discovered that globalisation could be a fruitful and interesting field of study. To mark this new approach, terms like "global history", or even "new" global history, and "globality studies" were used. Because world history has a long record and earlier world histories often were Eurocentric, based on the rise of the West, the notion of global history seemed less tainted. This does not mean, however, that the purpose of understanding global conditions from a historical perspective with careful exploration of a variety of cultural traditions did not meet resistance as well. In 1994 the United States Senate, for instance, voted against a world history plan for High Schools, being afraid that it might downgrade the specific qualities of Western civilisation[2].

A separate chapter in this book will discuss globalisation as a field of study for historians; the purpose of this introduction is to explore briefly the main issues in studying, teaching and researching world history. The first question that requires an answer is how world history should be defined and which perspectives and methodologies are and have been used.

World history: definition and approaches

Simply defined, world history is the study of history from a global perspective. The focus lies on connections between people and communities through trade, migrations, other networks and institutions. World historian Patrick Manning, who in 2003 published *Navigating World History*, an important book that at the same time is a critique, an overview and guide for teaching and researching world history, defined world history very broadly as "the story of connections within the global human community"[3]. Quite recently, the concept of "connections" seems to have eclipsed the earlier dominant theme for investigation: civilisations. For example in 1995 two American historians still summarised the two key approaches in a state-of-the-art review on "world history in a global age" as studies focusing on the history of civilisations versus what they called a much less easy to define but more "adventurous" approach, centred on topics like mobility and mobilisation, diaspora, borderlands, hybrid and mixed identities[4]. By using the term "connections", it is possible to combine these two strands into one.

Thus, the term world history is fluid and ambiguous, due to its own history and the various approaches that can be used. In the following a short summary will be given, focusing on the period since World War II. After the two World Wars, there were efforts to write universal histories with special attention to a religious or spiritual meaning in world history (this for instance is very clear in the work of Christopher Dawson). Another project with a particular goal was the multivolume history of mankind, funded by UNESCO. The idea was to produce a set of six textbooks that would treat the various cultural traditions of the world on an equal basis and by doing so promoting mutual

understanding and therefore world peace. Though the intention was laudable, the idea that comparisons ought not to be made – to avoid ideas about high and low cultures – and every culture should be given equal space, led to distorted history too. As one of the critics at the time commented: "history of all people equally was no history at all"[5]. It was simply impossible to create a text that would accommodate or please everyone.

Mention should also be made of the "Global History Project" that was established at Northwestern University, Illinois, in 1957. Its intellectual father, L.S. Stavrianos (who in 1981 was to publish an influential and much reprinted book on the origin and development of the so-called Third World) had been concerned about the lack of knowledge in American higher education about the outside world. Area studies, he argued, were not a sufficient answer to that need because understanding non-Western peoples "in their own context", as the usual phrase ran, was considered to be parochial as well. Therefore Stavrianos maintained that a truly global perspective was necessary, one that transcended cultures and states[6].

Yet despite these initiatives, due to the fact that world history had been the playground of meta-historians and advocates of cyclical theories like Arnold Toynbee or Oswald Spengler, world history as such was considered somewhat suspect and certainly unprofessional. Arnold Toynbee in particular, at first was highly instrumental in raising interest in the topic in a large audience[7]. Especially when D.C. Somerville's abridgement of the first 6 volumes of his *A Study of History* was published in 1947, Toynbee himself became very famous, even turning into a media star whose advice was sought on almost any kind of international of cultural problem. The short version sold more than 300.000 copies within the first decade of its publication in the United States and Great Britain[8]. Yet, his fame in academe quickly vanished when the many inconsistencies, factual errors and his rather mystic views on world history were attacked by a host of historians, sociologists and political scientists of repute. This severe criticism cast a long shadow over world history as a field not fit for scholars: unprofessional, even foolish[9].

It was nevertheless an admirer of Toynbee, William McNeill, who wrote a book, *The Rise of the West* (1963), that is generally regarded as the real starting point of contemporary world history for it gained worldwide attention of both a general reading public and professional historians[10]. McNeill was inspired by Toynbee's global perspective and by the approach of taking civilisations as the point for departure[11]. In contrast to Toynbee though, McNeill understood civilisations to be open to influences and cultural borrowings. His importance was that he constructed a synthesis of civilisational connections in world history, which until then, to quote the words of Patrick Manning, had existed as "a marshy mix of narratives, compendia, theories and pronouncements"[12]. Furthermore, and especially in the United States, McNeill's ideas fitted very well in the political context of the Cold War at that time and with the modernisation theory that was very much in vogue. As McNeill himself reflected 25 years later, *The Rise of the West* corresponded neatly with the "postwar imperial mood" of the United States, building

on the notion of cultural diffusion, and employing contacts with strangers as the main "motor" of social change[13].

As the title suggests, McNeill perceived the past in global perspective, but through the prism of the West as the central and dominant mover. This does not mean that at that time there did not exist other analytic traditions as well, that were not intrinsically Eurocentric. As Tony Ballantyne, a specialist in South Asian and British Imperial history, points out, it was especially historians studying larger regional units (for instance focusing on "Eurasia" or the "Indian Ocean World") who offered an alternative point of view. The work of Marshall G.S. Hodgson, an influential American historian of Islam, is of particular importance in this respect. Hodgson even perceived world history as an antidote against Eurocentrism[14].

In McNeill's work, "civilisations" eventually swapped places with "connections", as his book *The Human Web* (2005), co-written with his son, an environmental historian, attests[15]. As was already noted, this perspective now constitutes one of the main approaches in contemporary world history. Obviously world historians do not use only one paradigm or specific methodology. Nevertheless it is possible to make a very general division between the methodologies that make comparisons and those focusing on connections.

The method of comparing two or more units, originating in different backgrounds or environments to illuminate similarities and differences, can be applied to regional, national, transnational and world history. Comparative history therefore is not necessarily global, as the journal "Comparative Studies in Society and History", founded in 1958 by economic historian Sylvia Trupp, attests. With regard to a multidisciplinary comparative approach, mention should be made of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilisations, founded in Salzburg in 1961, involving a host of different disciplines[16]. Already comparative studies have been written on a range of topics including the family, marriage, food, religions, gender and long term economic growth[17].

The paradigm of connections and (cross-cultural) interactions includes integrationist approaches and the use of developmental concepts. Phenomena like the development of trade relations and the rise of capitalism are often employed to understand worldwide historical developments and trends. Of course the name of the French "Annales" historian Fernand Braudel comes to mind, who stressed the importance of long term social economic processes. The "Annales" school stimulated a different form of historical research and writing, with more attention paid to the lives and circumstances of ordinary people, and the introduction of topics like climate, demography, trade, agriculture, transportation, and mentalities. Braudel's emphasis on problem-oriented, analytical history and on breaking down the barriers between the various disciplines (*histoire totale*) was very much in line with other approaches to world history. This especially is visible in his textbook on civilisations of 1963, which was translated into

English almost three decades later[18]. Another integational approach to world history can be found in the concept of a world-system, put forward by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein amongst others. Wallerstein took economics as point of departure for an analysis of the construction of "worlds". The world was depicted as one unit, divided into sub-regions defined as core, semi-periphery and periphery[19].

Both the approach through connections and the comparativist paradigm have been criticized for being Eurocentric. When in the 1980s and early 1990s "globalisation" emerged as the key word to understand world-wide processes and developments, this had also effect on the practice of world history. To mark the difference with world history, "new" terms were used like "global history", "new global history", and "globality studies".

Though the concept "global" actually had a long pedigree, from the 1990s onwards it seemed as if "global consciousness" had become stronger. Some employed the notion of "new global history" to stress the current time frame (globalisation since World War II) as well as the interdisciplinary methodology [20].

Once again, parochial views were a matter of concern and once again global historians consciously professed that they tried to avoid a narrow-minded, Eurocentric perspective. Patrick O'Brien, specialist in global economic history at the London School of Economics, described the task for global historians as being, "to craft new, more inclusive and persuasive general narratives that might hold together without the fishy glue of Eurocentrism"[21]. This does not mean that "global history" is necessarily less biased. Especially since American scholars play a rather dominant role in global history and in globalisation research, the accusation has been uttered that global history is too submissive to the "metropolitan North" and turns a blind eye to outside voices[22].

"The Journal of Global history" (2006) started off with Patrick O'Brien's interesting prolegomenon in which not so much the newness, but the timely "restoration" of global history was emphasized. A globalizing world required histories that tried to untie the bonds to national, regional, religious and ethnic traditions. O'Brien illustrated also how long world history's pedigree was in historiographical traditions[23]. Therefore differences between world history and global history should not be exaggerated; in fact the words have been employed as synonyms from the beginning. "The Journal of World History", being the official journal of the World History Association, for instance started off in 1990 with an editorial called, "A new forum for global history".

World historians increasingly borrow methodologies from a wide range of other sciences like biology, geology, paleontology, archeology, social sciences as well as linguistic and literary studies. Concepts, like civilisations, that played a substantive role especially in the early forms of world history, are still in use but are re-defined. A good example is Felipe Fernández-Armesto's *Civilisations*. By viewing civilisations as a type of environment; a relation between "one species and the rest of nature", Fernández-

Armesto shows that an approach built on the concept of civilisation is not Eurocentric by definition. This book points to the growing multidisciplinary approach[24]. There is still another, even more inclusive approach, which is that of the "big history". This is a specific type of world history: a macro-history that starts at the "big bang", and makes use of a very large variety of other sciences as it includes also the position of the earth in the universe[25].

Therefore it is stating the obvious to say that there are a great many different forms of world history. Some world historians try to write a comprehensive history of the world, around a chronological path with components like agriculture, classical civilisations, monotheistic religions, expansion, industrialization/world economy, and globalisation. Other studies are centred on specific phenomena; they analyze global patterns and connections through the perspective of a specific topic, like migration, gender or the environment. Of course there are also books that focus on a specific period, like the studies of Christoper Bayly and Jurgen Osterhammel that both discuss the 19th century, or on a particular issue, for instance Kenneth Pomeranz's work on the role of China in the modern world economy[26].

Growth of world and global history: a success story?

The field of world history/global history has expanded tremendously since the last two decades of the 20th century, something apparent in the large number of newly established historical journals and associations. Besides the American-based World History Association, founded 1982 and its journal, that started in 1990, there is the European Network in Universal and Global History (ENIUGH) founded in 2002[27]. ENIUGH publishes the journal "Comparativ". In 2008 an Asian Association of World Historians was established. Besides the already mentioned "Journal of World History" and "The Journal of Global History", there is "Global Networks. A Journal of Transnational Affairs" (2001), the internet-based "World History Connected" (2003, that became an official publication of the World History Association in 2004), "Globalisations" (2004), the interdisciplinary "Globality Studies Journal" (2006), and the "Global History Review"(2006) which is published in China[28].

Yet the growth of interest in global and world history is not a simple success story. Though courses in world history are popular in America, where they have eclipsed the popularity of Western Civ, there are relatively few graduate programs in world history[29]. Also publications on world history until recently were for the most part meant for use in introductory undergraduate or high school textbooks. And then the aforementioned vote in the United States Senate (99:1) against a world history plan for High Schools, showed that world history had detractors as well as admirers. Moreover, the controversy about what history education should be about was and is not confined to the United States: in many instances national or regional history is promoted as a reac-

tion against global developments[30]. On the one hand the aim of understanding global conditions has led to some concern by those who were afraid that the national or regional focus would disappear completely, meaning also a loss of emphasis on the specific qualities of that particular history. On the other hand, debates within world history continue about the field's supposedly Eurocentric predisposition and political roles of world history. Criticisms of the western bias of world history have been inspired in particular by postcolonial theorists, anthropologists, and practioners of subaltern studies. Heather Sutherland, specialist in Indonesian history, argued in 2007 that a debate on the philosophical premises of world history is badly needed. Employing a postcolonial perspective, she argued that world historians use themes and concepts firmly rooted in western history, like the nation-state[31].

These discussions very much resemble the debates in the 1950s and early 1960s when the question was raised whether it was possible at all to write for instance Asia-centric histories, given the fact that many sources were biased, because they had been written by colonial administrators, and because of the dominance of the western scientific historical tradition. This gave rise to debates on the universal or particularistic character of this scientific historic tradition and the possibility to apply paradigms and traditions of scientific rationality everywhere[32].

In an issue in "The Journal of World History", Arif Dirlik, specialist in Chinese history and communism, sketched the course world historians ought to take if they wanted to avoid writing biased history. World history would have to account for "processes of commonality and difference, unity and fragmentation, and patterns in motion of homogeneity and heterogeneity"[33]. It is perhaps fitting then to end this brief overview with a reference to a recent attempt to do just that, by Jürgen Osterhammel, a German historian who is versed both in Chinese history, and in the broader study of globalisation and colonialism. In his highly acclaimed monograph history of the 19th century, *Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* [The Transformation of the World: a History of the 19th century] he uses five associated perspectives to analyse the 'long' 19th century: 1. an asymmetric increase of efficiency; 2. mobility; 3. an asymmetric compression of "references" (*Referenzverdichtung*) which points to the increase of intercultural contacts and transfers; 4. the tension between equality and hierarchy; and 5. emancipation. These perspectives encompass all elements that are usually put forward to describe this period, such as industrialization, urbanization, the building of the nation-states and imperialism. However, by employing these key features, Osterhammel thinks it is much easier to avoid the trap of Eurocentrism as well as the opposite, an extreme relativism[34]. At the same time, he admits that there is no such thing as the neutrality of a world perspective: of course his book is influenced by both the author's expertise and his nationality, as well as by the reading public he addresses.

Books like this show that world history does not necessarily address the whole of mankind through the ages. As noted earlier, world historians employ various methodologies,

perspectives and timeframes. But that does not matter. Even if the only common ground should be the effort to create a deeper and better understanding of history that is not limited to a national framework, this task remains a much needed and important one.

Notes

1 A.T. Embree, C. Gluck (eds.), *Asia in Western and World History: A Guide for Teaching. Columbia Project on Asia in the Core Curriculum*, Armonk NY 1997.

2 P.N. Stearns, *World history: The Basics*, London - New York 2011, pp. 3-5.

3 P. Manning, *Navigating World History*, 1st ed., New York 2003, p. 3; Id., *William H. McNeill: Lucretius and Moses in World History*, in "History and Theory", 2007, 46, 3, pp. 428-425, esp. p. 428.

4 O. Geyer, Ch. Bright, *World History in a Global Age,* in "American Historical Review", 1995, 100, pp. 1034-1060.

5 G. Allardyce, *Toward World History: American Historians and the Coming of the World History Course*, in "Journal of World History", 19901, 1, pp. 23-76, esp. pp. 31-37.

6 *Ibid.*, pp. 23-76, esp. pp. 42-43. See also L.S. Stavrianos, *Global rift. The Third World Comes of Age,* New York 1981; Id., *Lifelines from Our Past: a New World History*, New York 1989.

7 G. Martel, *The Origins of World History: Arnold Toynbee before the First World War*, in "Australian Journal of Politics and History", 2004, 50, 3, pp. 343-356.

8 Martel, *Origins* cit., pp. 343-344.

9 Geyer, Bright, *World History* cit., p. 1034.

10 The acclaim of fellow historians did not come immediately though, at first 'polite but basic disinterest' was the rule, which according to McNeill was partly a side effect of the general distaste for Toynbee in academic circles. Quote from an interview, July 1978. F. Broeze, P. Reeves, *The Rise of the West in retrospect: William McNeill*, in "Itinerario", 1979, 3, 1, pp. 17-31, esp. 30.

11 W.H. McNeill, *Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life,* New York 1989. See also Ch. Brewin, *Research in a Global Context: A Discussion of Toynbee's Legacy*, in "Review of International Studies", 1992, 18, 2, pp. 115-130.

12 W.A. McDougall, *"Mais Ce N'est Pas l'Histoire!": Some Thoughts on Toynbee, McNeill, and the Rest of Us*, in "The Journal of Modern History", 1986, 58, 1, pp. 19-42, esp. pp. 20-28; P. Manning, *William H. McNeill: Lucretius and Moses in World History,* in "History and Theory", 2007, 46, 3, pp. 428-445, esp. p. 428.

13 W.H. McNeill, "*The Rise of the West" After Twenty-Five Years*, in "The Journal of World History*",* 1990, 1, pp. 1-21.

14 T. Ballantyne, *Putting the Nation in its Place?: World History and C.A. Bayly's The Birth of the Modern World*, in A. Curthoys and M. Lake (eds.), *Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective,* Canberra 2005, pp. 23-44, esp. 28; M.G.S Hodgson, *Rethinking World History: Essays on Europe, Islam, and World History*, ed. and trans. Edmund Burke III, Cambridge 1993, esp. pp. 38-40.

15 J.R. McNeill, W.H. McNeill, *The Human Web: a Bird's-eye View of World History,* New York 2003.

16 The society moved to the US in 1970 and though international, the majority of its members are American: http://www.wmich.edu/iscsc/about.html. Accessed on 28 May 2010.

17 See H.G. Haupt, *Historische Komparistik in der internationalen Geschichtsschreibung*, in G. Budde, S. Conrad, O. Janz (eds.), *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, Göttingen 2006, pp. 137-149; P.K. O'Brien, *Global History: Universal and World*, in *International Encyclopedia of the Social& behavioral Sciences*, Elsevier science LTD 2001, pp. 6237-6244; a further form of comparative

history is '*histoire croisée*'. See M. Werner, B. Zimmermann, *Beyond comparison: Histoire croisée and the challenge of reflexity*, in "History and Theory", 45, 2006, pp. 30-50.

[18] See especially F. Braudel*, A History of Civilisations*, New York 1993, translation by R. Mayne of Braudel's *Grammaire des civilisations*, Paris 1987.

[19] I.M. Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, 3 vols., New York 1974-1989.

[20] B. Mazlish, *The New Global History*, New York - London 2006, p. 12.

[21] P. O'Brien, *Historiographical Traditions and Modern Imperatives for the Restoration of Global History*, in "Journal of Global History", 2006, 1, 01, pp. 3-39, quote on p. 33.

[22] M. Hughes-Warrington, *World and Global History,* in "The Historical Journal", 2008, 51, 03, pp. 753-761, esp p. 761.

[23] O'Brien, *Historiographical Traditions* cit. See also his entry *Global history: universal and world* in N.J. Smelser, P.B. Baltes (eds.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, Oxford 2001, pp. 6237-6244.

[24] F. Fernández-Armesto, *Civilisations*, London 2000, p. 4.

[25] David Christian is probably the best-known historian in this field. See his *Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History*, Berkeley 2004; and *Stepping Outside the Scholarly Comfort Zone*, in "Historically Speaking", 2010, 11, 2, p. 7; see also the forum on big history of *World history connected*, http://worldhistoryconnected.press.illinois.edu/6.3/index.html, accessed 24 April 2010.

[26] K. Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, Princeton 2000.

[27] ENIUGH is a transformation of the earlier Karl-Lamprecht-Gesellschaft, an affiliate of the World History Association.

[28] See also the bibliography in Manning, *Navigating* cit. This bibliography is organized in four parts: the writings of historical philosophers until 1900, the period 1900-1964, 1965 to 1989, and from 1990 onwards. Over half of the titles included in this bibliography were published since 1989. Compare P. Manning, *Navigating World History: A Synopsis*, in "World History Connected", 2003, 1, 1, 36 pars. http://worldhistoryconnected.press.illinois.edu/1.1/manning.html, accessed 27 April 2010.

[29] Manning, *Navigating* cit., pp. 330, 338-342.

[30] Stearns, *World history* cit., pp. 2-6.

[31] H. Sutherland, *The Problematic Authority of (World) History*, in "Journal of World History"*,* 2008, 18, 4, pp. 491-522.

[32] I refer in particular to the debate between John Bastin and John Smail in 1959-1961. J. de Jong, G. Prince, H. s'Jacob, *Niet-westerse geschiedenis. Benaderingen en thema's*, Assen 1998, pp. 34-36; compare G.G. Iggers, *Modern Historiography from an Intercultural Global Perspective*, in Budde, Conrad, Janz (eds.), *Transnationale Geschichte* cit., pp. 83-93, and in the same book, N. Zemon Davis, *What is Universal about History?*, G. Budde, S.Conrad, O. Janz (eds.), *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, Göttingen 2006, pp. 15-20.

[33] A. Dirlik, *Performing the World: Reality and Representation in the Making of World Histor(ies),* in "Journal of World History", 2006, 16, 4, pp. 391-410.

[34] J. Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt: eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts,* Munich 2010, pp. 13-21, 132-148; the five perspectives are elaborated on pp. 1286-1300.

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Globalisation as a Field of Study for Historians

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Abstract

Globalisation became a catchphrase in the end of the 1980s and early 1990s but, as many historians have argued, the phenomenon of interconnectedness on a global scale is much older. In the following chapter, the role of historians in the globalisation debate is analysed. To what extent has this debate influenced the historic profession? Attention is focused on two issues: firstly the role of historians in the debate on the nature and origins of globalisation; secondly and closely related to the previous question, what resonance the "global turn" has had on how historians see their task. The analysis of what globalisation entails has inspired new historical research and also led to questioning existing schemes of periodisation. Because theories on global transformations and intercultural and cross-cultural contacts necessarily generalise, the role of historian also implies the testing of these theories by supplying case studies and more detailed information about the specific time and place.

Globalisering is een veel gebruikte term om de toenemende vervlechting en intensivering van sociale, politieke economische en culturele verbanden in de wereld aan te geven. Hoewel het woord globalisering vooral opgang deed eind jaren 1980, begin jaren 1990, is het fenomeen al veel ouder. In dit hoofdstuk wordt de rol van historici belicht in het debat over de oorsprong en het karakter van globalisering. In het verlengde hiervan ligt de analyse van de mate waarin globaliseringsvraagstukken nieuw historisch onderzoek hebben geïnspireerd en bestaande vooronderstellingen, bijvoorbeeld over periodisering, op losse schroeven hebben gezet. De taak van historici is ook om algemene, generaliserende theorieën over het ontstaan van interculturele contacten en transformaties op wereldschaal te verifiëren door middel van specifieke historische informatie over tijd en plaats en via case studies.

Introduction

> Few subjects are more important for understanding the contemporary world, and few are more contested and more in need of careful empirical investigation.
>
> *Jürgen Osterhammel, Niels Petersson*[1].

Enter the word "globalization" in world.cat.org, the world's largest digital library catalogue, and the search result, which by the way takes less than half a minute to deliver, is 131,534 hits. Combined with the search result for the British English spelling "globalisation", this number rises to 170,332 hits[2]. Though today it seems hard to imagine that there was a time that the interconnectedness in the world was not explained by globalisation, the popularity of this concept dates only from the late 1980s and early 1990s. But from then on the topic was eagerly seized by newspapers, journals, books, television, movies and, of course, internet sites. Globalisation became a "buzzword" and the term was quickly adopted by the general public and integrated into numerous languages.

Globalisation entails various dimensions and analytical perspectives, so much so that seems impossible to agree on one single analytical framework. One of the problems is that the concept globalisation is used for both the *condition* of interconnectedness, and the *processes* that lead to such interconnections on different levels[3]. So far it has been described, analysed, and experienced in very different ways and from very different perspectives. A definition like "an unprecedented compression of time and space reflected in the tremendous intensification of social, political, economic and cultural interconnections and interdependencies on a global scale" seems to cover the process aptly[4]. But its author, keen on emphasizing the normative and ideological dimensions of globalisation, hastens to add that this general definition does not fully encapsulate the various ways globalisation affects people in different parts of the world. Especially contested is the association of globalisation with neoliberal ideas and values[5].

Sociologist Malcolm Waters, who published a very influential book on globalisation in 1995, focused on globalisation as a social process: the crucial element in globalisation was the growing mental awareness of people that geographical limitations receded[6]. The awareness in itself can be positive (an outlook that seeks to transcend parochialism and ethnocentrism) or negative, for instance the fear of homogenisation and destruction of local cultures. While optimists point to the opportunity of new forms of cooperation and ways of nations to prosper in peace, the pessimists point to cultural imperialism by using names like Coca-Colonisation or McWorld[7].

No matter from what perspective globalisation is perceived, it is obvious that it has become a very concrete, tangible phenomenon in the daily life of people all over the world, ranging from economic and financial effects to social and cultural influences.

Never before has social networking been so easy: sitting at your desk it is possible to make friends – and subsequently "defriend" them again – all over the world. A simple video of less than one minute of a toddler biting the finger of his elder brother ("Charlie bit my finger") can turn into YouTube's most viewed and number 2 top-favourite video ever with no less than 166 million hits between May 2007 and March 2010[8]. The novelty of internet or worldwide broadcasts of sport or concerts is indubitable. The spread of digitisation in the so-called *new* media affects every aspect of life. Of course this also affects the circumstances of historical research, such as the quick accessibility of an ever growing corpus of primary sources on the internet, and the Web turning into an important forum for research and intellectual exchange[9].

Does this all mean that globalisation limits itself to a contemporary process? No; the globalisation of today's world can be compared to other, earlier, patterns of contact. Also the sense of the world as a whole definitely is not new. In 1924 the Secretary of the League of Nations, Maxwell Garnett, described how technological developments like the telephone, aeroplane, and the wireless were "welding the world into a whole"[10]. This is where historians come in, though as we shall see, their contribution to the study of globalisation, both as a condition and a process, is not unambiguous.

In the following the role of historians in the globalisation debate will be further analysed. To what extent has this debate influenced the historical profession? Because the scope of this chapter is limited, the attention will focus on two issues: firstly the role of historians in the debate on the nature and origins of globalisation; secondly and closely related to the previous question, what resonance the "global turn" has had on how historians see their task.

Historians and globalisation: the debate on theory and origins

Frederick Cooper, a specialist in African history, seemingly wanted to throw the whole concept into the trash bin when he added a chapter about globalisation in his book on colonization that starts with the following sentence: "There are two problems with the concept of globalization, first the 'global', and second the 'ization'"[11]. At first sight this criticism seems too extreme and brings back to memory the famous and often quoted caveat of Keith Hancock who in 1940 dismissed the concept imperialism for its emotional significance and imprecision. Hancock complained in vain, and, despite the difficulties of definition, and its frequently polemical overtones, imperialism remained within the scholarly lexicon in the second half of the 20th century[12]. Though Cooper's objection to the concept globalisation will not banish the concept either, he certainly has a point that globalisation both as a analytic tool of the process ("isation") and of the condition ("global") needs further refinement. Globalisation should not imply a self-propelled, autonomous process. Nor does he stand alone in this particular criticism. "Globalisation", Colin Hay wrote, "is not an entity or thing. It is not a self-contained

process with its own causal powers. It is, at best, a tendency to which there are (or are likely to be) counter-tendencies"[13].

Cooper's other objection to employing the concept globalisation is the implication that a single system of connections permeates the whole world. Very crucial questions are ignored concerning the limits as well as the structures of the interconnection, and the areas where for instance, capital markets are off limits. In his own field, African history, the story runs not from a stage of isolation leading to interconnection. The picture renders a much more varied and diffuse image of territorialising and deterritorialising drives. In other words, cross-border connections, and the movement of people and capital, do not simply follow a linear scheme. In addition, the big stress on current developments overlooks much earlier forms of trading networks, like the 17th-century Dutch East Indies Company with links between Europe, Asia and South Africa[14].

This opposition to a "presentist" view on the development of globalisation is widely shared among historians. A great deal of their contribution to studies on globalisation therefore is to provide a historical perspective, showing on the one hand that processes of globalisation have a long history, and on the other hand that globalisation is a less global than the word seems to signify. It has left large areas untouched. Globalisation has various dimensions (political, cultural, economic, etc.), moreover it can be studied from different angles. Its effects sometimes contradict the usual signification of globalisation, producing less unity and producing a stimulus to destabilizing dynamics and growing inequality.

Historians who expressed uneasiness about the supposedly causal power of globalisation do not stand alone. Assumptions about the homogenisation of culture, the loss of power of nation-states, as well as the integration of the world economy, have been met with scepticism more widely. In fact, in globalisation theory it has become common to speak of three "waves": the globalist, the sceptical and the transformationalist[15]. The first wave sees globalisation as a sweeping force, especially because of the integration of the global economy, with important political effects on the nation-states and the national cultures. The second wave, of the sceptics, disputes the global inclusiveness of the phenomenon or argues that there have been other forms of globalisation in the past. An example is a study by two economic historians, Kevin O'Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson, who maintain that the late 19th century globalisation had more impact than the recent one[16]. A third wave, that of the transformationalists, argues that globalisation in itself is old, but that the current form is unprecedented. Globalisation has transformed the nation-state, national culture and economy but, contrary to what globalists in the first wave thought, these have not lost significance[17]. This strand is also known as "post-sceptic". Historians usually feel more comfortable with the second and third wave.

One of the most interesting studies of globalisation, written by historian Robbie Robertson, also employs a "wave" metaphor, but with a different meaning: here the notion of

wave stands for different stages within globalisation. Robertson's key years are the 1750s, 1850s and the late 20th century. Determining precisely when globalisation started in history is contentious though: Peter Stearns, in his overview *Globalization in World History,* devotes more attention to earlier examples, especially the trans-regional network that came into existence around 1000. He employs the turning points 1000, 1500, 1850 and the recent decades. But there are even examples of studies on the origins of globalisation that start in the period 3500-2000 BCE[18]. In a concise overview of globalisation, two German historians, Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels Petersson, one a specialist in Chinese and world history, the other in imperial history, argue that today's globalisation in fact should be seen as a long process of transformation. They define globalisation as "the development, concentration, and increasing importance of worldwide integration"[19]. Through the use of the concept of "networks" of social interaction, they show that through time the relative importance of networks with a wider, even global range has gradually increased. This may sound familiar, and the authors do not pretend any originality for the term network, nor the method of network analysis. They are not blind to the dangers of generalisation: when social categories are combined with a spatial dimension, power differences and intensity of relationships are all too easily minimalised or even ignored[20].

Antony Hopkins, a historian of Africa and British imperialism, correctly notes that the answer to the question whether globalisation has origins that lie in a distant past, is dependent on a definition of terms and on the use of historical evidence. Especially this last is needed to put more flesh on the bones of the general statements on globalisation in history. What certainly should be avoided is the pitfall of a repetition of the linear "stages of growth" in the modernisation theory, ideas that were very popular in the 1960s[21]. In 2002 Hopkins edited an important collection of essays in which the contributors did their best to provide some of this historical evidence: phenomena like religions, trading systems, and empires were explored to determine whether they are precursors of the modern globalisation. Also, and perhaps even more importantly, the non-western dimensions of globalisation were made clear. In doing so, a number of the general assumptions were countered, notably the common notion that globalisation originates in the West, or thinking in bipolar categories. This is one example of the important contribution historians can add to the study of globalisation[22]. Inspiration also works the other way around: both the history and process of globalisation constitute important and exciting fields for historians.

Globalisation research and its predecessors

Globalisation studies have inspired new historical research on the origins of the process, and also challenged the presuppositions of the historical profession. On the one hand it was put forward that by viewing the world as a whole, without using Europe or the western world as point for departure, it was possible to avoid a regional bias, in particular Eurocentrism. Yet this is only part of the story. Globalisation has also been perceived as

precisely the opposite, namely the triumph of the free-market economy and it most successful proponent, the United States. For this perspective the work of one of the most important gurus of globalisation, Thomas Friedman, is of special interest. In a *Manifesto to the Fast World*, published in the "New York Times" in 1999, he was first of all crystal clear about the specific American interests in the globalisation processes. Secondly he pointed to the necessity of military power, the "hidden fist" behind the economy's invisible hand. America, though being the "truly benign superpower", had a special duty to fulfil in the world. The global system needed an activist American foreign and defence policy[23]. It is publications like these that Geoff Eley, a British specialist in German and comparative history, takes as examples to prove the need of historical analysis that goes much further than purely focusing on the imprecision of the term globalisation. The current political framing of the concept makes it a matter of political and intellectual urgency to capture what globalisation is[24]. Important fields for historians are periodisation, development of globalisation, and the way in which the present is globalised. Periodisation ought not be confined to drawing developments in time centring on industrialisation or resemble earlier work on the so-called transition stages of modernisation theory; but it should include research on topics like slavery, migrants and transnational labour markets. In other words, non-western voices and influences should be included. Hopkins also very clearly warns of the danger involved when the debate is too much centred on the West, in particularly the United States. This might lead to the term globalisation becoming a "euphemism for the perceptions, aspirations and anxieties solely of one country"[25].

The references to modernisation theories are important. It reminds us of the fact that globalisation is not the only approach that has been employed to analyse and describe worldwide connections and relations. In the years of decolonisation and the Cold War, the modernisation theory of the American economist Walt Rostow (and earlier sociologists like Talcott Parsons), stressed the importance of a linear development that in principle fitted the whole world. Rostow's study *The Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-communist Manifesto* (1960) pointed straightforward to the American, capitalistic model for the world to copy in order to gain prosperity and become "modern". Here also the name of the comparative sociologist S.N. Eisenstadt should be mentioned. Eisenstadt's comparative studies on modernisation and development substantially changed through time. In the early 1960s he concluded that the optimism of the modernisation theory was unfounded because democratic institutions in recently decolonised states often gave way to authoritarian regimes. In 1980 the single pattern model of modernity was exchanged for "multiple modernities"[26]. As the assumptions in the 'classic' theories of modernisation had proven to be incorrect, the history of modernity would have to be seen as a complex construction and reconstruction of a multiplicity of cultural programs.

Modernity studies have received a bad press because of their supposedly one-size-fits-all pattern. Global historians should not avoid the topic though, simply because some economic growth theories portrayed modernisation as a clear-cut success story of the

west. Furthermore, overdoing the opposite, a complete negation or relativism of the dynamic role of Europe in for instance 19th-century modernity or of the US in contemporary globalisation, is biased history too. Also, "the West" and "Europe" are of course not simple geographical places but should rather be seen as clusters or networks. In fact within Europe there are many regions and peoples that have held a semi-colonial position. Therefore it is more the multi-centeredness that should be stressed than bipolarity. In conclusion of his major study, *The Birth of the Modern World*, C.A. Bayly claimed: "the origins of world history remained multi-centered throughout. We need not so much to reorient world history as to decentralise it"[27]. This last remark was a reference to André Gunder Frank's study, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* in which he had argued that it was China and not Europe that long had dominated the Eurasian economy. Therefore there was no such thing as Asian stagnation versus Western dynamism. The rise of Europe only started in the 19th century[28].

Frank's evolution as a writer on the role of Europe and the West in general in the world economy is interesting in itself. In *ReOrient* he played down the Western dominance, yet he is best-known because of his earlier critical examination of the effects of colonialism and the world capitalistic system as a whole. In these earlier studies he stressed the detrimental role of contacts with the West for non-western societies, especially Latin America. He provided intellectual fuel to dependency theory and the world systems approach of Wallerstein[29]. Dependency theories in general saw contacts with the West especially through capitalism, colonialism and imperialism as the main reason for the underdevelopment of large parts of the non-western world. In the scope of this chapter, it is of course impossible to do justice to this strand of scholarship. In fact, so much has been written on dependency that one of the authors, trying to survey the field, even compared it to being confronted with a Tower of Babel[30]. For now it is most important to note that in these theories the role of the West was as seen as dynamic but also as detrimental.

Dependency theories and world-systems theories were inspired by Marxism and strongly based on the development of trade and economy. Gradually attention shifted to other perspectives: not only was tracing the origins of Western capitalism criticised as too Eurocentric, also it was too much based on solely the material conditions. So-called "Subaltern studies" that originated in the very complex turmoil in India in the 1970s, pointed to the rift that existed between the westernised elite and the mass of the peasant population. In a broader sense they touched upon problems of historical research methodology in the study of subordinate people[31]. In general, post-modernism and post-colonialism employed a predominantly cultural approach, pointing to underlying concepts of power in comparative world histories, in literature, art, etc. Globalisation is also of interest in this respect: from the perspective of subaltern studies it can be criticised as a process that enhances the already powerful, yet in what has been called "counter-hegemonic globalisation", the possibility of worldwide international contacts and organisations also gives social organisations new strength[32].

Globalisation and history

So what is possible to conclude about the question what globalisation can mean as a field for research for historians? In the introduction on world history already attention was paid to the great many historical journals, founded in the last two decades, which took globalisation or global studies as their starting point. In that sense it really gave an important impetus to new research. Historians usually tend to shy away from using theories as basis for their research and prefer empirical studies. Yet global and world historians profit from insights and concepts that have been developed in social, geographical and economic studies, and at the same time add nuance and further dimensions to the field for instance by putting contemporary globalisation in a larger timeframe.

Global processes are and have been interactive, so they should be studied in their specific political, social, economic, and cultural contexts. Historic questions are of great significance to trace how and why changes in contacts between peoples, regions or economic systems occur and what similarities and differences in time and space can be defined. A continuing problem, which rises time and again in both world history and the history of globalisation, is to find ways of dealing with multi-angled perspectives. A comparative approach, studies of cross-cultural and intercultural contacts and global transformations in their historical dimension is necessary. Grand theories about global transformations and intercultural and cross-cultural contacts necessarily generalise: detailed historical knowledge about time and place, case studies and substantive fine tuning is now most needed to test them[33]. This perhaps forms the major challenge for historical research in this vast, stimulating field.

Notes

1 J. Osterhammel, N.P. Petersson, *Globalization: A Short History*, Princeton NJ 2005, preface.

2 Search performed on 28 March 2010. http://www.worldcat.org. Of course a search in different languages, for instance in French (19.870 hits for 'mondialisation') increases this number significantly. The word 'global' alone renders 1.401.198 hits. Note however that these numbers contain various duplicates for instance due to a different spelling of the name of the author (full name or initials) or various printings and editions of the same book.

3 See M.B. Steger, *Globalization: A very short Introduction*, Oxford 2003, p. 7. Steger suggests the use of 'globality' for the social condition, and 'globalisation' to analyze the set of social processes that transform the present condition into one of globality.

4 M.B. Steger, *Globalism. The New Market Ideology*, Lanham 2002, pp. ix, 14, 148-150.

5 Steger, *Globalization* cit., chapter 7.

6 M. Waters, *Globalization*, London1995, p. 5.

7 See for instance B.R. Barber, *Jihad Vs. McWorld*, New York 1996; S. Flusty, *De-Coca-Colonization: Making the Globe from the Inside Out*, New York 2004.

8 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_OBlgSz8sSM, 167,458,568 views as of 10 March 2010. The statistics of this particular video show very clearly that it is most liked in the western, especially English-speaking world.

[9] For instance H-World, that hosts over 100 discussion networks. URL: http://www.h-net.org/~world.

[10] Quoted in M. Cuddy-Keane, *Modernism, Geopolitics, Globalization*, in "Modernism/modernity", 2003, 10, 3, pp. 539-558.

[11] F. Cooper, *Colonialism in Question. Theory, Knowledge, History*, Berkeley 2005, p. 91.

[12] M.F. Proudman, *Words for Scholars: The Semantics of "Imperialism*, in "Journal of the Historical Society", 2008, 8, 3, pp. 395-433. Proudman is mistaken in saying Thornton misquoted Hancock though; in 1950 Hancock may have written that imperialism was "a pseudo-concept", but his famous sentence about imperialism as "no word for scholars" dates from 1940.

[13] C. Hay, *What's globalization Got to Do with It? Economic Interdependence and the Future of European Welfare States*, in "Government & Opposition", 2006, 41, 1, pp. 1-22.

[14] Cooper, *Colonialism* cit., pp. 91-94.

[15] L. Martell, *The Third Wave in Globalization Theory*, in "International Studies Review", 2007, 9, pp. 173-196.

[16] K.H. O'Rourke, J.G. Williamson, *Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy,* Cambridge MA 1999; K.H. O'Rourke, J.G. Williamson, *When did Globalization Begin?*, NBER Working Paper No. 7632, available in the SSRN eLibrary (2000).

[17] Martell, *Third Wave* cit.

[18] P.N. Stearns, *Globalization in World History,* London 2010, pp. 4-5; R. Robertson, *The Three Waves of Globalization: A History of a Developing Global Consciousness,* London 2003; K. Moore, D. Lewis (eds.), *The Origins of Globalization*, New York 2009.

[19] Osterhammel, Petersson, *Globalization* cit., p. 26.

[20] *Ibid*., p. 23. World historian J.R. McNeill and his son William, in *The Human Web. A Bird's eye View of World History*, New York 2003, employed a similar concept, named "web", defined as "a set of connections that link people to one other"(p. 3). Through time they described *metropolitan webs*, the *Old World Web*, a single *cosmopolitan web* and in the last 160 years a single *global web.*

[21] A.G. Hopkins, *Introduction: Globalization - an Agenda for historians* and *The history of Globalization - and the globalization of history?*, in A.G. Hopkins (ed.), *Globalization in World History*, London 2002, pp. 1-10, 11-46.

[22] Hopkins (ed.), *Globalization* cit., p. 36. See in the same book the contribution by Amira K. Bennison on *Muslim Universalism and Western Globalization*, pp. 74-97.

[23] Th.L. Friedman, *A Manifesto for the Fast World*, in "New York Times", 28 March 1999: http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/172/29945.html, accessed 20 May 2010. See also, by the same author, *The World is Flat : A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century,* New York 2005, and *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, London 2000.

[24] G. Eley, *Historicizing the Global, Politicizing Capital: Giving the Present a Name*, in "History Workshop Journal", 2007, 63, pp. 154-188, esp. pp. 161-163.

[25] Hopkins, *History* cit., p. 36.

[26] S.N. Eisenstadt, *Breakdowns of Modernization*, in "Economic Development and Cultural Change" 1964, 12, 4, pp. 345-367; Id., *Multiple Modernities,* in "Daedalus", 2000, 129, 1, pp. 1-29; Id., *Multiple Modernities in an Age of Globalization*, in "The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie" 1999, 24, 2, pp. 283-295.

[27] C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914 : Global Connections and Comparisons*, Malden MA 2004, p. 470. See also P. Gillen, D. Ghosh, *Colonialism & Modernity*, Sydney 2007, pp. 52-58.

[28] A.G. Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, Berkeley 1998.

[29] See for a selection of important texts on this matter through time: J. T. Roberts, A. Hite (eds.), *From Modernization to globalization. Perspectives on development and Social Change*, Oxford etc. 2000; A.G. Frank, *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution: Essays on the Development of Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy*, New York 1969.

[30] C. Kay, *Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment*, London 1989, p. 126.

[31] D. Ludden, *Reading Subaltern Studies: Critical History, Contested Meaning and the Globalisation of South Asia*, Delhi 2001.

[32] See for instance B. de Sousa Santos, C.A. Rodríguez-Garavito (eds.), *Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality*, Cambridge 2005.

[33] Compare the plea for ' Ecumenical' history in D. Sachsenberg, *World History as Ecumenical History*?, in "Journal of World History", 2008, 18, 4, pp. 465-489, esp. p. 485.

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Globalisation before Globalisation: The Case of the Portuguese World Empire, 1415-1808

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Abstract

Theorists have been discussing the nature of globalization prior to modernity, and whether the phenomenon was as far-reaching or deep as it is today. The case of the Portuguese empire, which came into being over the 15th century, is sometimes held up as the 'first global village'. A case is made here both for and against such a contention, and issues underpinning like available resources, and the ideology of identity addressed. The politicised rhetoric of *pioneirismo* must at any rate be avoided. Case studies of colonies 'at the end of the world' are provided for readers to determine for themselves to what extent empire was a functioning entity, and whether a downturn in fortunes from the 1620s jeopardised the project, and justified the frequent tone of fatalism used to describe imperial realities.

Globalisation is a phenomenon that has captured the western imagination over the last twenty-year upturn in the economy, although it has perhaps been eclipsed in the current climate of recession over the last two to three years. It has become a controversial phenomenon, in the sense that highly visible protests have erupted against the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, first in Seattle in 1999, and then successively in Washington DC, Genoa, and New York. Globalisation has seen the 'outsourcing' of many tertiary service industries such as call-centres to areas of the world with cheaper labour costs, generating a barrage of domestic vitriole and discontent. Theorists define the problem as lying with a breakdown over the last twenty-five years in the Fordist compact between capital, labour and state[1]. While on the one hand, capital has been reorganised on a global scale, state regulation and labour organisation has remained trapped within national frameworks. The 'economic' and the 'social', which used to map onto the same territory are now separated and this has led to a crisis of representation and meaning on one side, and a crisis of regulation on

the other. Other discussion debates whether shifting labour pools or capital constitute the primary indicators of globalisation[2].

Historians argue when it might have been that globalisation came to the fore. Eminent scholars such as Eric Hobsbawm have insisted that it is a 19th-century phenomenon, suggesting that immigration to the West took place in comparable numbers to today[3]. If differences do emerge between the two periods, then they may turn on the nature of that immigration, which in the 19th century was around fifty percent European, whereas today it is chiefly extra-European[4]. Other scholars like Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton argue that if one weighs the extensiveness, intensity, velocity and impact of global interconnectedness, then the period before European empire was characterised by 'thin globalisation'[5]. The age of empire is, however, only conventionally ascribed as beginning in 1824[6].

'Thin globalisation' is contested by other scholars like Akhil Gupta, who insists that from the perspective of the Indian Ocean world, the period between the 12th and the 14th centuries rather constitute the zenith of the 'long history of connection' in the Indian Ocean World[7]. Communities such as the Hadrahmi moved wholesale from southern Yemen, where they left their ancestors in whitewashed domed tombs, on a remarkable diaspora as far afield as the Celebes[8].

The case of Portugal is often held up as the example of the first global empire in the sense that previously empires had grown over geographically contiguous territory rather than established sovereignty via what K.N. Chaudhuri has called 'action at a distance', namely a kind of remote control mechanism over thousands of miles of the earth's oceans[9]. Here were settlements of a single nation, some captured, some acquired by treaty, others pre-existing or built afresh, cities as far-flung as Macao, Larantuka, Goa, Mombasa, Funchal, Luanda, Bahía, Arzila and all connected by ocean-going *carreiras.* Not all of the Portuguese population resided securely under the Portuguese flag, and in many parts of the world they resided as a constituent population of multi-national heterozygous trading states, as with the Portuguese in the 'Bandel de Sião' in Ayutthaya, Siam, as one of the many international trading '*naties*' of Antwerp, and in 'non-places' such as Malacca. Elsewhere, the Portuguese constituted subaltern colonial populations of dominant powers, as was the case with the Portuguese under the British residing in the 'Black Town' in Fort St. George at Madraspatnam, or the Portuguese *peruleiros* in Hispanic Lima[10].

In this sense the problematic overlay between economy and polity so clearly recognised by Immanuel Wallerstein finds its reflection in the porousness of an empire that some historians remain loath to accept at face value, preferring to speak of 'networks of spaces', 'informal empire', even 'civilising missions' and such like[11]. For it was clear that politically the 'empire' struggled to operate as a carapace offering a high degree of security for its constituent population, even a regular channel for funds and population,

given the huge distances, involved the institutionalised corruption and the shipwrecks plaguing long-distance voyaging. So, rather than an empire, we should look to an entity of intertwining personal stories, a diaspora of 'people on the move' at a frenetic pace, globe-trotters with varied sets of ideas in their heads, whether to make a living as a merchant, soldier, missionary, spy, or even those searching for freer forms of living, escapees from the carapaces of conventional society[12].

This population was extremely widely spread, but nevertheless gathered at great nodes, places like Goa which functioned as more than just a colony, a terminus of trans-oceanic *carreiras*, a seat of government, the head of the Church in the Orient, the largest military concentration to be found in the East, and home to specialised industries such as shipbuilding (using the hardwoods of the tropics), as well as diamond-polishing where considerable value was added to the product's gentle progression through the Global Commodity Chain (GCC)[13]. Here too was gathered in the appreciative words of one who was otherwise an enemy, Jan Huyghen van Linschoten, the "unparalleled wealth of Arabia, Armenia, Persia, Cambaia, Bengal, Pegu, Siam, Malacca, Java, China etc.". Currencies and their requisite moneychangers were equally numerous. Slaves from Abyssinia and Coromandel were commonly found here, as well as Chinese traders and many a European passer-through. Linschoten, the Dutch clerk at the service of the Portuguese Estado da Índia finishes his description of 'Golden Goa' with an encomium urging Antiquity itself to "no longer stand in awe of Corinth or Alexandria as the leading cities of the maritime powers, because it is bound to admit that it has been outstripped by the greatness of the wealth and the sublimity of the empire and brilliance of this city"[14].

The four fundaments of Portuguese identity

What was the glue that kept these people together and preserved the notion of a Portuguese identity? My answer to this question would be four-fold: there was language, reverence to the Church, loyalty to the Portuguese King, and a set of maritime preoccupations that made Portuguese everywhere known as either the 'Gods from the Sea', as was the case in the Reino de Dancali off the Horn of Africa, as 'sea kaffirs' further down the African coast or, as in Macao 'fish' which would "die if brought ashore"[15]. Given the substantial creolised population, with its distinct variants from the *português padrão* spoken in the metropole, the matter is thus more complicated than the charismatic ex-president of the Portuguese Republic Mario Soares would have it recently; to him "language is the bond. To speak Portuguese is to be Portuguese"[16]. There were further complications in the tricky world of the politics of identity. In the East, Portuguese identity carried with it status implications, which made many of very dubious blood links proclaim their Portuguese identity, individuals who had never been to Portugal and neglected even the basic principles of that identity, such as wearing shoes, eating

Map 1
The Portuguese overseas world (*ultramar*). Adapted from John Russell-Wood, *The Portuguese Empire, 1415-1808. A World on the Move*, Johns Hopkins Paperbacks Editions 1998.


THE PORTUGUESE WORLD
ASIA
JAPAN
Nagasaki
Bungo
Ningpo
Hormuz
Muscat
ARABIA
BENGAL
Hooghli
INDIA
Diu
Damao
Bassein
Chaul
Goa
Mangalore
Cannanore
Calicut
Cranganore
Cochin
Quilon
Nagappattinam
Jaffna
Okanda
Mannar
Colombo
Mattural
CEYLON
S. Thome de Meliapor
CHINA
Macao
PHILIPPINE
ISLES
Manila
Malacca
SUMATRA
BORNEO
Ternate
Tidor
Macassar
BANDA
ISLES
JAVA
TIMOR
FLORES
Malindi
INDIAN OCEAN
MADAGASCAR
AUSTRALIA
TASMANIA

Fig. 1
Mural detail from Po-Win Taung caves, *Central Burma*, adapted from Anne-May Chew, *The cave-temples of Po Win Taung, Central Burma*, Bangkok 2005.

bread rather than rice, and maintaining links with the motherland. British visitors to India could remark dismissively how: "any man of colour, however dark, who wears a hat, passes for a descendant of the companions of the renowned Vasco da Gama"[17].

Furthermore, some historians have emphasised the commonalities to an Iberian identity that stretched across the splintered kingdoms of the peninsula. They can draw on the fact that 'Hespanha', for example, in the view of the German cosmographer Sebastian Münster, did not relate to 'Spain' but to all the territories of the peninsula[18]. But despite an obvious interchange of ideas and historical trajectories, rivalry constituted the dominant feeling between Castilians and Portuguese across the early modern period.

Admittedly, the boundaries of Portuguese identity were porous and as Stuart Schwartz has acknowledged, a tremendous propensity to adaptation lay at the root of Portuguese

Fig. 2
Mural detail from Po-Win Taung caves, *Central Burma*, adapted from Chew, *The cave-temples of Po Win Taung, Central Burma*, cit.

success overseas[19]. There are plenty of examples of 'Portuguese' who even in the eyes of foreigners, were hardly recognised as such. There were examples of those who 'went native', Portuguese seen presenting offerings at Buddhist stupas and shrines in central Burma, and depicted in the cave paintings at Po-Win Taung (Fig. 1)[20]. Carole Myscofski has argued that the gendered dynamic of inquisitorial persecutions in Brazil against men targeted lapses of religiosity, lapses of civilisation, an atavistic reneging of identity in favour of a *nostalgie de la boue*, going off into the *sertão* often on the great *bandeiras* that served to open up Brazil to the outside world[21]. Examples of 'going native' are all too common. In 'Zambézia', the explorer David Livingstone discovered Portuguese communities who had rejected Christianity and adopted instead the animist beliefs of local tribesmen, conducting rituals around revered baobab trees, for example[22]. Some of the

bandeirantes like Jorge Domingos Velho, who had otherwise served Portuguese state interests by extending the territorial reach of Brazil, were described as follows by the Bishop of Pernambuco: "This man is one of the worst savages I have ever met. When he came to see me he brought an interpreter, for he cannot even speak correctly. He is no different from the most barbarous Tapuia, except in calling himself a Christian. And although recently married, seven Indian concubines attend him – from which one can infer his other habits"[23].

Renegades, who had all too often abandoned their religious faith and went over to Portugal's enemies, providing them with services related to gun-making and military command, were further examples of the shifting boundaries of Portuguese identity[24]. The loss of identity through 'going native' was something the prescient court poet of the king John II, Garcia de Resende, had foreseen: he warned that "we have seen the Portuguese, decidedly numerous, going off to live everywhere, settling Brasil and the islands, setting up in India, and even forgetting their natural roots"[25]. Local art forms provide valuable clues to this phenomenon, such as the cave paintings at Po Win Taung in Central Burma, which depict bearded Portuguese paying homage to the local ruler, himself wearing a black Portuguese felt hat, and presenting offerings at the *stûpa* (see Fig. 2).

Organs of social control such as the Inquisition, official embassies and regular church visitations tried to ensure some degree of social conformity, partly by restricting the upper echelons of the power structures (for example, through the right to hold municipal office) exclusively for '*reinoes*' or those who were 'kingdom-born'. But this only drew resentment from the host populations. The 'native clergy' controversy – whether to ordain local priests, or rely on clergy brought out from Europe – remained a political hot potato for the ecclesiastical authorities right through the early modern period[26].

But globalisation is not just about the movement of people, and capital, perhaps the most easy to demonstrate, as Fernand Braudel did on his 'journey around the world', a famous one page odyssey beginning with the textile crisis in Florence between 1383-1385[27]. Globalisation is also about the spread of ideas and culture, artistic taste and social mores. We can bear witness to this second flow with a remarkable letter written by an African local ruler on 22 February 1688, who signed himself 'Dom João Manoel Grilho, who treads on the lion in his mother's belly'. The letter was written from the town of Lemba on the lower reaches of the Congo River to an Italian Capuchin priest somewhere in the vicinity: "Praised be the Most Holy Sacrament. Christ preserve you. I received with great pleasure your loving letter. For my part as your spiritual son, I remain most ready to receive your commands, and the same is true of your [spiritual] daughter, my mother Dona Potenciana. I do not know when you will come to save the souls of my sons"[28]. Here we have an example of an African king converting to Christianity, learning Portuguese (though in all likelihood the letter was written for the king by an intermediary) and expressing his respects to the representatives of this foreign

presence in his very own kingdom. The 'Congo experiment', as James Duffy called this period of Portuguese empire building in Africa, did not last for very long, and the Kongolese cities that adopted Portuguese names, like São Salvador, were enigmatic ruins by the time Henry Morton Stanley visited them in 1874-1877[29]. But for a brief time, ambassadors were sent to Europe, letters were directed to the Pope, and black bishops were appointed to newly established Catholic sees in Africa. Cynics would be tempted to argue that this was a subtle orchestration of colonial power for the sake of regular supplies of slaves to take to the Americas, but the debate as to how much European interference broke traditions of Kongolese politics and culture is still an open one. Out in the villages, the occasional visiting missionary priest with his prayers, his ceremonies, his crosses to set up or give away usually was seen as a holy man of a somewhat novel type in contest with the indigenous ones, but not radically different[30].

Outposts at the end of the world

Macao, known to the Portuguese as 'the City of the Name of God', is another case of a resilient and enduring Portuguese settlement situated at the end of the world, surrounded on all sides by the overwhelming numbers of Chinese population, and frequently hemmed in by them during times of political strife and disagreement. To be sure, the city bore a heavy imprint of the Chinese world, from the junks that congregated there, to the substantial service population, the interpreters (*jurabaços*), household *major domos* and concubines and wives (the partners of choice for Portuguese globetrotters like Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo and António de Albuquerque)[31]. Dogged protests from historians and tour-guides keen to uphold the dignity of the local people, who argue that there was no sexual miscegenation, at least not until the 19th century, seem to have ideological axes to grind rather than to argue from common historical truths[32]. But Macao also retained formal features of the Portuguese world, from the two convents "for married Women to retire to, when their husbands are absent, and orphan Maidens are educated in them till they can catch a husband" to the nunnery "for devout Ladies, young and old, that are out of Conceit with the Troubles and Cares of the World"[33]. The hospital, the *Santa Casa da Misericórdia*, erected by the Bishop of Ethiopia, Dom Belchior Carneiro in 1568, is another example of a strong home-grown institution, although over the course of the 18th century the only person they could find to serve on the city council was a former convict[34].

Macao was a training colony for the Church Militant at the end of the world. Here the seminaries were amongst the best in the Catholic world, attracting not just Portuguese but Italians, Frenchmen and Germans in equal measure. These were no plain patriots, or convinced Eurocentrists. The orders were open to the ablest and the best, from across the Catholic world. The four-tiered stone Madre de Deus college founded by the Jesuits in Macao in 1593 became one of the city's most splendid ornaments, although today



Fig. 3
António Bocarro, *O Livro das plantas de todas as fortalezas*, publ. 1635, repr. Lisbon, Impr. Nacional - Casa da Moeda 1992.

only the façade of the accompanying church of S. Paulo remains[35]. The raison d'être of the focusing of missionary strength in Macao was as a launching-pad for conversion in China, after the closure of Japan in 1639 undoubtedly the most hoped-for of the Portuguese missionary fields, where the harvesting of souls seemed to offer not just quantity but quality. Even during the stagnant 18th century – a time when enlightenment ideas put Catholicism on the back foot, and the city struggled through poverty – new monasteries and training colleges such as São José were opening their doors to would-be missionaries[36]. In time, some of the bishops sought positions closer to home, even in Brazil as was the case with Dom Bartolomeu Mendes dos Reis, Bishop of Macao confirmed as Bishop of Mariana in 1772. Other bishops and rectors of the St. Joseph's Jesuit seminary, however, disseminated into the south-east Asian region, as was the case with Thomas Valguarnera, on two occasions head of the church in Siam (1654-1671, 1675-1677), but also others, who were influential in southern China, Tonkin, Cochinchina, Laos, Cambodia, Siam and Pegu. Although loyal ultimately to the Pope, by way of the *quarto voto* (a vow of obedience that was tagged on to the usual trio), the Jesuits were the privileged order of the Portuguese monarchy and remained dogged defenders of the Portuguese Padroado, or Crown Patronage, in the face of usurpers and new arrivals such as the Missions Étrangères de Paris, which arrived on the Asian scene in 1662, having won the support of the influential counter-reformation instrument for spreading the faith, the Propaganda Fide in Rome. Disputes between the rival orders, and their allies, reverberated across the Asian missions right through to the first half of the 18th century and almost certainly prejudiced the success of the Christian proselytizing drive, as Nola Cooke has recently shown[37].

Macao, as we have just seen, was in many ways the springboard to mission-fields in yet more isolated spots of the world, or trade in the various products of the South China Sea. Of these, the Lesser Sunda Islands must take the accolade for being the most remote of all. There was the issue of distance: if it took as little as six months to sail from the Tagus to Cochin or Goa[38], then it took Galeote Pereira almost eighteen months to sail from Cochin to Ternate in the Moluccas in 1529. Then, from the Moluccas it was possible, Pires informs us, to sail to Timor "in six or seven days", whilst paying close attention to the navigational hazards: there "are reefs between the lands of Bima and Solor, and [they say] that the junks are lost unless they go through the channel, and there is this risk for about half a league, and that it is good to enter by day"[39].

Luxury trade goods were the lure. Pires relates how "The Malay merchants say that God made Timor for sandalwood and Banda for mace and the Moluccas for cloves, and that this merchandise is not known anywhere else in the world, except in these places [...]". But the lure of profits was balanced not only by the distances and navigational hazards involved, but the inhabitants who dwelled in lands of heathen robbers; according to Pires, there were "fairs for robbers, who come to sell what they have stolen from the other islands".

Corruption more easily spread to these remote outposts, where conspiracies and intrigues kept them in a continual ferment. Gonçalo Pereira, for example, who was appointed captain of the Moluccas in 1529, discovered serious deficiencies in the revenue accounts at Ternate on his arrival from Cochin. After the departure of the previous factor and *alcaide-mor* (mayor), the Portuguese officers responsible for the misappropriations conspired with the Queen of Ternate to murder Pereira. In his place, they elected Vicente da Fonseca, one of their number. His assumption of office was followed by a series of conspiracies and intrigues which kept the Moluccas in a continual ferment[40].

Lack of governmental control was another problem, whether from the Viceroyalty in Goa, or the Bishopric of Malacca in whose diocese the islands lay, or the islands' primary trading partner, Macao. The Dominicans had built a fort initially in Solor; in 1593, missionaries went on to establish a permanent station in Timor, although both Portuguese and Dutch control was "largely nominal until first decade of the 20th century"[41]. To these distant outposts, remissive clergy were occasionally banished from far afield. Following the tensions within the community of European missionaries in Ayutthaya regarding two Augustinians for some time, the headman, Domingos de Santa Anna, wrote letters to the Viceroy including an excommunication order "to summon Friar Joseph Correia and Friar Pedro Martyr off immediately to Solor or Timor"[42], evidently some sort of penal colony for remissive men of the cloth 'at the end of the world' (*ás derradeiras do mundo*), as it was used for criminals from Mozambique throughout the 19th century[43].

Too limited an impact to globalise

Arguments to contradict the case of a Portuguese 'globalisation prior to globalisation' might be summoned from available numbers. If at first around 2000 Portuguese left the realm over the course of the 15th century, with the expansion and opportunities of both Brazil and the Índico this figure rose to 3500 for the sixteenth and by the first decades of the seventeenth we can estimate a departure figure of around 5-6000 p.a.[44]. These figures accord to between 1.5 and 3.5 individuals per 1000 inhabitants. If anything, however, this amounts to a little more than contemporary Polish emigration during its peak year of 2006, which the Central Statistical Office's *Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland 2010* estimates at 46,900 individuals, or in other words around 1.22 people per 1000.

But if the numbers do not differ so greatly proportionally, then in terms of the nature of emigration the Portuguese diaspora was qualitatively different from the Polish working diaspora today. For if Poland is little more than two hours' flight away from any provincial British airport, and workers can come and go as they please, the Portuguese population often went out on a one-way ticket. The journey was expensive, Pyrard de Laval estimated it at 300 *pardoas,* which was too much for the poet Luís de Camões,

who was forced to make the journey in two legs, with a lengthy two year stopover in Mozambique, and it was only thanks to his friends' generosity that he could finally purchase his return. It was even harder for men of the cloth, since the King was of the opinion – as he explained in a letter to the Viceroy of January 1598 – that "those who take the frock there are deficient in such education and qualities as are required for the improvement of society by their example and conversion", and that consequently, "professed clergy who go out to India are not to return thence"[45]. The Viceroy was instructed to communicate this forthwith to the prelates of India.

The resources at the disposal of the Portuguese can also be brought to bear on the scale of the purported globalisation: a document, the *Lembrança das Cousas da Índia* [Memorandum on India Affairs], anonymously authored in 1525, gives us data on the shipping available to the Portuguese governor at the time. In the entire Bay of Bengal there was only a single vessel, the round-ship *Pamtoso*, in which Ambrósio do Rego, captain of Coromandel, had left for Pulicat. There were six *naus*, of which three were stationed in Hormuz and of the eleven galleons, five were under repair[46]. One might well ask, what kind of physical control could be exerted by such scant resources over the vast spaces of the Indian Ocean World?

Another criticism that can be made is that while the Portuguese Empire was undoubtedly a remarkably mixed, globalised entity, its overall global importance remained rather limited, what Felipe Fernández-Armesto dismisses as a "feeble affair"[47]. Despite the prestige that went with being the 'Porta de China', for example, Macao was scarcely recognised by the Chinese authorities and had to lobby in vain over the course of many years for an embassy to be conceded it. In terms of trade, more trade went on at the seasonal *feiras de Cantão* than in the sleepy Inner harbour[48]. Even ashore a small polity, like Japan, the newly united Tokugawa dynasty remained keener on waging war in Korea than addressing the newly formed settlements of Europeans along its shore, which went anyway associated with Christians *(kirishitan*) than some distant polity, Portugal, of which it retained only a vague and imprecise knowledge (*namban-ji*, the southern barbarians). As Ronald Toby has shown, Portuguese were more immediately associated with India (*Tenjiku*) than with any other entity, perhaps thereby the foreigners were exaltedly ascribed to a sacred land, the land of the Buddha[49].

A closing world from the 17th century?

While the global aspect of the Portuguese empire has been widely recognised, and historians have worked to differentiate parts where its sway held more forcefully than others (the so-called 'Shadow Empire' east of Cape Comorin)[50], less attention has been devoted as to how the empire changed over time, particularly how the openness and generosity of the golden age (*idade aurea*), gave way to a long period of suspicion, hostility and closure, which seems to coincide with the passage of the Portuguese pos-

sessions to the Spanish Crown (1580-1640). We see the new tone in the government decree (*alvará*) of 9 February 1591, reissued in ever sterner language from Valladolid on 18 March 1605 and 16 June 1606. Nor was this a case of that classic colonial reality of '*obedecer y no cumplir*', to obey metropolitan injunctions, but not to carry out. Francesco and Antonio Carletti, for example, were thrown into jail in Macao (c. 1593) for having violated immigration laws and were only released on payment of 2000 escudos[51]. A royal decree of 28 November 1606 underlined the illegality of foreigners conducting any kind of trading venture within the Portuguese Empire, and as Pyrard de Laval observed the prohibition extended even to those foreigners desiring "to be amongst them [the Portuguese]"[52]. This was repeated in 1623, again on the King of Spain's instruction[53]. Those targeted were principally 'heretics' from northern Europe that had operated within the interstices of empire for the course of the previous century (in Pyrard de Laval's paraphrasing of the edict "they only went there to become acquainted with India, and to spy out the land"), but the laws held for all foreigners other than subjects of the King of Spain on pain of being sent as 'convicts to Africa without release' (*degradados para Africa para sempre sem remissão*)[54]. Exile from Goa to south-east Africa was, as Timothy Coates reminds us, otherwise reserved for the most serious criminals, including a number of murderers. Language tests were conducted in the presence of the Viceroy to determine the Dutch spies (*Hollandsche spien*) from the Catholic German community (*Hoochduitse*) in the Portuguese midst: Sanjay Subrahmanyam's supposition that "the distinction between an Augsburg-born German and a Hollander could not have been all that clear on the face of it to Portuguese of the period" cannot thus hold, although feelings in Goa ran high with the appearance offshore of the Anglo-Dutch Fleet of Defence between 1622-1624[55]. Illegal trade was only to be risked 'under pain of death'. Even good works (probably donations to church coffers and participation in local *irmandades* or brotherhoods) were not enough to prevent the Flemish Coutre brothers from being deported from Goa in 1623, for example, on counts of spying for the Dutch. However, on 22 December 1624 a memo was submitted on the Coutre brothers' activities in Goa. The king had it examined by the Consejo de Portugal. Only eight years later, however, was a sentence pronounced clearing the Coutres, and they were in this manner restored to good name even if the overturning of the expulsion order would not bring the brothers and their economic activities back to Goa[56]. The case is similar to that of the German, Ferdinand Cron, who was subjected to massive inquisitorial investigation, but was ultimately cleared and restored to good name a few years earlier, in 1620. His was a high profile case, because in return for transferring letters from Venice and contributing to the costs of arming Portuguese *naos*, he had been made knight of the royal household and of the Order of Christ[57].

I do not know of any European nationals sent to Africa from Goa as convicts by the Portuguese authorities at this time, but a good number were returned to Lisbon in chains. Pyrard de Laval recounts the story of the French 'Comte de Monfar', who was

returned to Portugal at the end of 1609, whereafter he was kept prisoner in the Castle of Xàtiva until 1613, when he was liberated by the 'good offices' of Monsieur de Mayenne, on his way to Spain for the double royal marriage between the royal families of France and Spain (Élisabeth de France was to marry the Prince of Asturias and her brother Louis the Spanish Infanta Ana Maria Mauricia)[58].

In 1642, the King forbade the entry of all non-Portuguese missionaries into the eastern lands administered under the Padroado. Those missionary orders like the Theatines, who failed to gain prior royal approval for their intended pastoral activities in the East, and who entered the Portuguese Padroado via the Middle East rather than the approved route from Lisbon around the Cape, faced immediate deportation, as we can find in the deportation orders served Padre António Ardizone Spínola and his two brethren in 1646[59]. Two French Capuchins, Fr Ephraim de Nevers and Fr Zeno or Zenon, were simultaneously detained in the city of Madras, en route to the Kingdom of Pegu, and prevented from reaching their destination[60]. These deportation orders on missionaries working under the Propaganda Fide continued to be served right through the 18th century, and were often presented to the tributary or friendly kings of the Portuguese, the Reis Vizinhos, as was the case with the King of Sonda, who was threatened with an end to existing amicable relations if the expulsion order was not carried through[61].

Portugal as pivot, or conduit in world history

'Globalisation', then, seems to have been particularly a phenomenon of the early period of imperialism, and once instituted as an empire, the Portuguese world seems itself to have been challenged by a far more suspicious and protective ethic governing both trade and acceptance of outsiders. Of course, by the 1620s the Estado da Índia was coming under concerted pressure from other European powers, who increasingly conquered, married into and bought ailing Portuguese colonies across the Indian Ocean world. Portugal consequently came to be seen as a 'hanger-on', a political dead-letter in evolving imperial politics in the Orient. Of course, this is an enormous oversimplification, obscuring successful efforts to reinvigorate and strengthen remaining imperial structures, as well as moments when the Portuguese played out a vital role as intermediaries or supporting population. In the 18th century, Portugal became known pejoratively as the 'Kaffir of Europe', to economic historians an example of 'dependence' or 'periphery', a status which changed little over the following centuries despite the country's embarking upon a third wave of empire building, this time in Africa[62].

It is nonetheless a heavy historical irony that what was once arguably the world's first globalising nation is often now understood itself to be at the receiving end of globalisation, as we are to judge from some recent literature on the growth of the banking sector in Lisbon and some reflections on how that has changed the urban environment[63]. But

beyond these ironies and indeed glaring historical short-sightedness, we might strive to conclude like Martin Page that "the [historical] role of the Portuguese has not been as conquerors, let alone the conquered, but as a pivot, a conduit, by means of which ideas, knowledge and technologies have moved through Europe, and the world"[64]. This is something I have tried to show through set pieces of my own research, for example the evolution in European artistic representations of the elephant, where the elephants carved on King Manuel and Sebastian's tombs in Portugal's Bélem during the 1560s are of a far higher order of reality than the illustrations produced in Central Europe by Konrad Gesner, and which hark back to the 15th century imaginings of Martin Schöngauer[65]. More broadly, we can confirm that the vocabulary of Portuguese historical agency is one of exploring pioneers and intermediaries rather than overbearing *conquistadores*, who remain circumscribed to a Spanish (Castilian) milieu. This is a vocabulary that broadly encompasses Portuguese *bandeirantes, lançados, anunciadores, compradores*, and *navegadores*, those who forged the early modern Portuguese overseas world.

Notes

1 D. Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, 1989, chs. 8-9.

2 A. Gupta, *Global Movements of Crops since the 'Age of Discovery' and Changing Culinary Cultures*, in D. Ghosh, S. Muecke (eds.), *Cultures of Trade*, Middlesex 2007, chapter 14.

3 Following Hobsbawm, K.H. O'Rourke and J.G. Williamson have argued that a global market only came into existence from the last quarter of the 19th century on the basis of price and salary convergence, K.H. O'Rourke, J.G. Williamson, *Globalization and History: the evolution of the nineteenth-century Atlantic economy*, Cambridge MA 1999.

4 For relevant statistics, please consult the Migration Policy Institute's website, http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/countrydata/data.cfm, accessed on 30 March 2011.

5 D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, J. Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*, Stanford 1999.

6 D. Abernethy, *The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415-1980*, New Haven - London 2000.

7 Gupta, *Global* cit.; cf. Fernandez-Armesto F., *The Indian Ocean in World History*, in Disney A., Booth E. (eds.), *Vasco da Gama and the Linking of Europe and Asia*, Oxford 2000, pp. 11-30.

8 E. Ho, *The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean*, Berkeley 2006.

9 K.N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean*, Cambridge 1985; actually he is borrowing here an idea from C. Renfrew, *Trade as Action at a Distance. Questions of Integration and Communication*, in J. Sabloff, C.C. Lamberg-Karlovsky (eds.), *Ancient Civilization and Trade*, Albuquerque 1975. J. Nascimento Rodrigues, T. Devezas, *Portugal. O pioneiro da globalização (A Herançā das Descobertas)*, Lisbon 2007, is very weak on what is meant by globalization.

10 S. Halikowski Smith, *Creolization and Diaspora in the Portuguese Indies: the Social World of Ayutthaya, 1640-1720*, Leiden 2011; H. Pohl, *Die Portugiesen in Antwerpen*, Wiesbaden 1977; for Malacca see M. Ganesan, *Eurasians. An Identity in a Nonidentity*, in "Asean Review", 1976, 12 (June), pp. 24-25; for Madras, see G. Winius, *A Tale of Two Coromandel Towns. Madraspatnam (Fort St George) and São Thomé de Meliapur*, in "Itinerario", 1994, vol. 18, part 1, pp. 51-64; a lot can also be gleaned from the biography of one of Madras's governors, Thomas Pitt, see C. Dalton, *The Life of Thomas Pitt*, Cambridge

1915. For the *peruleiros*, see R.A. Molina, *Las primeras experiencias comerciales del Plato: El Comercio Marítimo, 1580-1700*, Buenos Aires 1966, pp. 65, 88-122.

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[12] For the escapees, see M.A. Lima Cruz, *Exiles and Renegades in Early Sixteenth Century Portuguese India*, in "The Indian Economic and Social Historical Review", 1986, 23, pp. 249-262; see also the *cantiga* in H.H. Hart, *Luis de Camões and the Epic of the Lusiads*, Norman 1962, p. 82.

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[14] Cited in E. van den Boogaart, *Civil and Corrupt Asia. Image and Text in the Itinerario and Icones of Jan Huyghen van Linschoten*, Chicago 2002, pp. 62-63.

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[16] Quoted in M. Page, *First Global Village: How Portugal Changed the World*, Lisbon 2002.

[17] J. Blakiston, *Twelve Years' Military Adventures in three quarters of the Globe; or, memoirs of an officer who served in the armies of his Majesty and of the East India Company between the years 1802 and 1814, in which are contained the Campaigns of the Duke of Wellington in India, and his last in Spain and the South of France*, vol. I, London 1829, p. 270.

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[24] See, for example, the story of the two Milanese who went over to the Samorin of Calicut, *The Travels of Ludovico di Varthema, in Egypt, Syria, Arabia Deserta and Arabia Felix, in Persia, India and Ethiopa, A.D. 1503 to 1508*, Cambridge (reprint) 2009.

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[26] C.R. Boxer, *The Church Militant and Iberian Expansion, 1440-1770*, Baltimore 2001, p. 2ff.

[27] F. Braudel, *On History*, Chicago 1990, p. 13.

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[32] 'Henriette', our Macanese tour guide, 9 April 2011; T. De Souza, *Goa: Lusotopic, Lusophonic or Lusophilic?*, in Havik P.J., Newitt M., *Creole Societies*, Bristol 2007, pp. 235-251.

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[36] Reverend Eusébio Arnaiz Alvarez, *Macau, Mãe das Missões no Extremo Oriente*, Rome 1957 (trans. from Spanish Fr. Artur Augusto Neves); A. Vale, *Macau: porta da China*, in "Revista Além Mar", December 1999.

[37] N. Cooke, *Strange Brew: Global, regional and local factors behind the 1690 prohibition of Christian practice in Nguyễn Cochinchina*, in "Journal of Southeast Asian Studies", 2008, vol. 39, 3, pp. 383-409.

[38] P.J.A. Guinote, *Ascensão e declínio da Carreira da Índia (Séculos XV-XVIII)*, *Vasco da Gama e a Índia*, Lisbon 1999, vol. II, pp. 7-39, section 3 entitled *O Calendário das Viagens*.

[39] A. Cortesão, A *Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires*, vol. 1, Coimbra 1978, p. 204. For more on this author, see S. Halikowski Smith, *Tomé Pires*, in *Great Lives from History, 1451-1600*, Pasadena CA 2004.

[40] F.C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, vol. I, London 1894, pp. 412-413.

[41] C.R. Boxer, review of F.J. Ormeling, *The Timor Problem: a Geographical Interpretation of an Underdeveloped Island*, in "The Journal of Asian Studies", 1957, vol. 17, 1 (November), pp. 159-160.

[42] L. Da Silva Diaz de Seabra, *The Embassy of Pero Vaz de Siqueira to Siam (1684-1686)*, Macao 2005, fl. 235.

[43] Scandals relating to the laxness of the missionaries in Timor and their living in concubinage "without heed for the manifest scandal they gave to the people and the disgrace and ruin their immodest actions brought to their cloth" went reported in the memos of the Conselho Ultramarino in Lisbon and correspondence between Crown and Viceroyalty, see Historical Archives of Goa [Panaji], Livros de Monções, 30, fls. 273-274 and G. Pereira Fidalgo da Silveira, *Parecer do Conselho Ultramarino sobre diversos assuntos relativos a Timor*, Lisbon, 22 February 1704, repr. in Artur Teodoro de Matos, *Timor português (1515-1769), contribuição para a sua história*, Lisbon 1974, p. 302.

[44] V.M. Godinho, *L'Emigration Portugaise Xve-XXe: Une constante structurale et les résposes aux changements du monde*, in "Revista de História Economica e Social", 1978, vol. 1, pp. 5-32. None of this seems to have depopulated the realm, as the poet Francisco de Sá de Miranda (1481?-1558) so feared, in that population figures for Lisbon remain stable other than in exceptional cases, from the end of the 15th century through to the Restoration of 1640.

[45] *Archivo Português Oriental*, J.H. da Cinha-Rivara (ed.), New Delhi, Asian Educational Services, 6 tomes in 10 vols., repr. 1992, fl. 3, no. 304.

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[48] R. D'Avila Lourido, *Os europeus e a feira de Cantão durante as finais da dinastia Ming*, in "Portuguese Studies Review", 2001, vol. IX, 1-2, pp. 140-170.

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[50] G. Winius, *Embassies from Malacca and the 'Shadow Empire'*, in *Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Portuguese and the Pacific*, F. Dutra and J. Camilo dos Santos eds., Santa Barbara 1995, pp. 170-178.

[51] F. Carletti, *Ragionamenti del mio viaggio intorno al mondo*, Milan 1593 (repr. 1941).

[52] Laval de P., *The Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval to the East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas and Brasil*, vol. II, 1619, New York 1887, p. 272. The 1606 decree also contradicts the concessions recently granted trading communities like the English by the Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1605, see *A Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Alliance between Philip the III. King of Spain, and the Archduke and Archdutcheß Albert and Isabella on the one side, and James the I. King of England on the other side. Made in the Year 1604*, in S.W., *A General Collection of Treatys, Manifesto's, Contracts of Mariag, renunciations and Other Publick Papers from the Year 1495 to the Year 1712*, London 1732, vol. 2, pp. 131-146.

[53] "*Lei para que não possão ir navios dos estrangeiros á India, Brazil, Guiné e Ilhas, nem a qualquer outra conquista, só ás Ilhas dos Açores e Madeira, e isto sendo nações amigas. Nem nos navios portuguezes possam ir alguma pessoa estrangeira, e os estrangeiros não possão viver nas conquistas*", in J.F.J. Biker, *Collecção de Tratados e Concertos de Pazes que o Estado da Índia Portuguesa fez com os Reis e Senhores com que teve relações nas partes da Asia e Africa Oriental: desde o principio da conquista até ao fim do século 18*, Lisbon 1881-87, 14 vols., vol. IV (original in Archivo da Índia, liv. 2 da Alvarás, fol. 14v).

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[55] T. Coates, *Convicts and orphans: forced and state-sponsored colonizers in the Portuguese Empire, 1550-1755*, Stanford 2001, p. 76.

[56] Jacques de Coutre, highlighted in Coutre, *Vida* cit.

[57] The most recent summary of his story is in P. Malekandathil, *The Germans, the Portuguese and India*, Münster 1999, pp. 97-112. See also, S. Subrahmanyam, *An Augsburger in Ásia Portuguesa: Further Light on the Commercial World of Ferdinand Cron, 1587-1624*, in R. Ptak, D. Rothermund (eds.), *Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c. 1400-1750*, Stuttgart 1991, pp. 401-425.

[58] De Laval, *Voyage* cit., pp. 279-280.

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[63] K.C. Schwartzman, *Globalization Hits Lisbon: the Rise of Banks from 1970 to 2000*, in "Portuguese Studies Review", 2001, vol. IX, 1-2, pp. 511-519.

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[65] S. Halikowski Smith, *Perceptions of Nature in Early Modern Portuguese India*, in "Itinerario", 2007, 31, 2, pp. 17-49.

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Samarkand: The Peripheral Core of World History

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Abstract

For the great civilisations of Afro-Eurasia, Samarkand is as a city between worlds. Sometimes claimed as part of their sphere, sometimes perceived as a real world Shangri La, Samarkand is the oasis per excellence of the Silk Road and, in many ways, a metaphor for World History. This chapter will give some examples of the way in which ethnocentric perspectives of world history attempt to appropriate the city. By contrasting these historical narratives it will show that the history of the city (and of Central Asia in general) only make sense as part of World History and that this is true not only for the post-1492 history but for all periods.

Per a les grans civilitzacions d'Afro-Euràsia, Samarcanda és una ciutat entre diferents mons. Algunes vegades reclamada com a part de la seva esfera, d'altres percebuda com a Shangri La, Samarcanda és l'oasi per excel·lència de la Ruta de la Seda, i, en molts aspectes, una metàfora de la Història Global. Aquest article pretén donar alguns exemples de com les perspectives etnocèntriques de la història global pugnen per a apropiar-se de la ciutat. Contrastant aquestes narratives històriques es demostra que la història de la ciutat (i de l'Àsia Central en general) només té sentit com a part d'una història global. Aquest és el cas no només per a períodes posteriors al 1492 sinó que per a qualsevol període històric.

Introduction

Sitting under my favourite mulberry tree in Samarkand, I often have the impression of being in the middle of nowhere. This is not surprising: Samarkand is in Uzbekistan, which is a country twice removed from the sea, surrounded by five other countries whose names end in -stan. It is situated in an area which is nowadays usually called Central Asia, but which is also known as Central Eurasia, Middle Asia, Inner Asia, Turkestan, the Turko-Iranian world, Serindia and Transoxiana[1]. Like "Europe" or "South East Asia", these different names refer to supposedly geographically, historically and culturally coherent areas but their definition is so variable that they can be used to

Fig. 1
The ever changing borders of Central Asia (Soviet definition, current definition and UNESCO definition).

cover areas stretching from a few oases around Samarkand to over half of Eurasia[2]. One of the few things on which most scholars agree is that Moscow, Baghdad, Delhi and Beijing are not in Central Asia. Although, during the last millennium and a half each of these cities have ruled Central Asia and Central Asians have ruled all these cities.

Difficulties of definition, difficulties of access, historical relevance, all have concurred to turn Samarkand into one of the world's mythical cities and maybe the only one, which has acquired such a status independently in China, Europe, India, the Middle East and Russia: from the fancy yellow fruit, large as goose eggs and with a colour like gold, that the kingdom of Samarkand sent to the Chinese court of Chang'an in the 7th century up to the Golden Road sung by Flecker, from the roses of the gardens of Samarkand, for which Babur would have given up India up to Corto Maltese, Samarkand has made men dream.

But dreaming is not the same as writing history and approaching the history of Central Asia is not easy. Unlike cities such as Rome or Chang'an (near contemporary Xi'an) for which numerous written sources exist in one language (Latin/Chinese), there are few texts about Samarkand or Central Asia prior to the 19th century and these are written in all the main languages of Eurasia (Arab, Armenian, Bactrian, Chaghatai Turk, Chinese, Greek, Latin, Persian, Sogdian, Spanish, Syriac, Tibetan, etc.). Furthermore, large parts of Central Asia have been inaccessible for much of the last century; there are few specialists and these specialists belong to totally different historiographical traditions.

This chapter will not propose a new History of Central Asia, nor will it re-place Central Asia within World History. It will simply give a few examples of how archaeologists and

Fig. 2
Questioning the provinciality of Central Asia: The golden stater of Eucratides (Greco-Bactrian ruler), the largest golden coin of Antiquity (169.2 grams, diameter 58 mm), minted in what today is Afghanistan.

historians have approached the study of a specific period, Classical Antiquity, and how their approaches have been shaped by their scholarly tradition, before concluding that the history of Central Asia only makes sense within a large scale framework, usually called "Silk Roads" and which can be considered as equivalent to World History.

Classical Archaeology in Central Asia

French archaeologists first started digging in Samarkand in 1987, when the Soviet Union still existed[3]. The team that did so was lead by P. Bernard, who had been director of the excavations of Aï Khanum, the great Hellenistic city of North East Afghanistan, until work came to an end with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Most of the team was composed by people who were "following the footsteps of Alexander", men who could read Greek and Latin, part orientalists and part classicists who felt they were standing at the edge of the known world (Central Asia is where Alexander founded *Alexandria Eschate*, Alexandria the Furthest). Years after starting work in Afghanistan, they still systematically compared their discoveries to the Greek model: classifying capitals according to their resemblance to the Attic, Doric and Ionic styles, each variation a sign of decadence, of provinciality, of distance from the centre[4]. For these archaeologists, the framework was clearly defined: the Hellenistic world and, in a larger sense, the classical world.

Defining the purpose of their work was therefore not difficult. By delineating the limits of the Hellenistic World and tracing its influences they were also helping to define Europe, for was Greece not the origin of Europe and France the successor of Greece, the heart and soul of Europe? It is not surprising that the archaeological expeditions are still financed by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. Indeed, some would say that it



Fig. 3
A Central Asian Ruler: Alexander the Great in a 15th-century Persian miniature painting from Herat (Afghanistan).

is the continuation of a tradition initiated by Napoleon who "dreamed of being a new Alexander" and invaded Egypt with an army of scholars.

Of course, this caricatures the work of these archaeologists. Most of it is of extremely high quality and does not have a hidden political agenda. However, well over a century of this type of approach has led to some very questionable assertions becoming unquestionable truths. One of the best examples of this process is the appropriation of the figure of Alexander by Western Europe. Alexander did not found a new empire; he conquered the existing Achaemenid empire and then, as often happens to usurpers, faced a series of revolts, which forced him to lead his army round the different provinces. Because of the transformative effects of his reign, he was widely remembered in Central Asia and Iran where hundreds of toponyms (lake, bridge,

mountain of Alexander) myths and legends recall his adventures (Alexander the Great is even twice mentioned in the Qur'an).

Since the 19th century, the power of the West has enabled the appropriation of his figure by historians first, then by politicians, and finally by popular culture (most recently in the 2004 film by Oliver Stone) and this appropriation has been so deeply internalised in Iran and Central Asia that there too Alexander is considered to be a western European invader rather than one of their own main historical figures. Despite not having put a foot beyond the limits of an empire created by Cyrus and consolidated by his successors, despite having no connection with Western Europe, his story is taught in all European schools and universities, whereas almost no courses on Cyrus, the true founder of the empire, exist.

What is interesting is that the approach of French archaeologists was perfectly compatible with one of the paradigms of pre-revolutionary Russian archaeology: Moscow as the third Rome, the successor of Byzantium. As well as searching for warm seas, the Russian empire also searched for roots in classical antiquity and found them around the Black Sea and in Central Asia. Soviet archeologists played on these Mediterranean links in order to squeeze the region into a Marxist framework: classical antiquity giving way to the medieval period, slavery to feudalism[5]. The great Soviet archaeologists, educated in Francophile surroundings, then set about constructing a classical Central Asia, exemplified by G.A. Pugachenkova's contribution to the art, history and archaeology of the area.

In the 1960s and 1970s French and Soviet scholars met during their respective archaeological excavations in Afghanistan. They became colleagues, friends and went on to organise conferences and joint expeditions in Central Asia throughout the 1980s, at the height of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Despite their similarities, Soviet archaeologists emphasised the specificities of Central Asia in a much more pronounced manner. Firstly, this was because historical evolution was viewed by the Soviet Union to be the result of social tensions, not of outside influences, and this meant that although influences and conquests occurred and were duly studied by historians, the main focus of their work was clearly directed towards local processes. Secondly, after the break-up of Russian Turkestan and the creation of the new Soviet Socialist Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (between 1924 and 1936), archaeologists and historians were enlisted to create a new history for each of these Socialist Soviet Republics. Thus G.A. Pugachenkova, along with other colleagues, was entrusted with the history of Uzbekistan[6]. This approach, along with the creation of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Archaeology of Uzbekistan, and other similar institutions, was meant to enable the emergence of a new nation-state, which would then be able to merge into the Soviet state as part of the dogmatic Marxist interpretation of historical evolution. The result was the opposite, since it enabled the creation of a national history, which was then

re-appropriated by the post-Soviet state and which now confines archaeologists and historians to a specific national interpretation.

G.A. Pugachenkova and her colleagues were furthermore prone to accentuate Central Asian specificities because the most stunning examples of classical art they excavated came not from Greek archaeological layers (comparatively poor) but from the slightly later Kushan period sites and mores specifically from Buddhist monasteries of the 1st centuries CE. Surprisingly, on these sites, they found that their main collaborators after independence were not European archaeologists but Japanese ones.

The first Japanese archaeologist to work in Central Asia, K. Kato was a former prisoner of war in Siberia, an exceptional man who speaks Russian with an accent from the Gulag and worked at Soka University. Soka University is the private university of the Soka Gakkai, one of the most influential Buddhist movements in Japan and one which has often been criticised for its sect-like activities and political influence. Both K. Kato's team and other more orthodox Japanese archaeological missions such as those led by K. Tanabe, were deeply interested in the historical importance of Buddhism in this part of the world and its role in the eastern diffusion of the religion from India, to Central Asia and on to China and Japan. In this they joined a wider group of scholars led in the Soviet Union by B. Staviskij and later by T. Mkrtychev, whose work on Buddhist sites of Central Asia has led to the emergence of a view of the region's place in World History at odds with the Hellenistic one.

Various other countries have attempted to promote their own agendas through the region's history. In 1998, for example, the Indian Embassy in Tashkent organised a conference on "Pre-Islamic contacts between India and Central Asia", to which only Central Asian, Russian and Indian scholars were invited. At the coffee break, the Indian Consul realised that a European student was present in the room and immediately ordered the Uzbek scholar in charge of the conference to expel this student or face the threat of the Indian Embassy renegating on all its financial guarantees[7]. This was part of a much larger plan by certain members of the Indian Government of the time to promote a new indo-centric view of World History, closely related to the Hindutva movement and violently anti-islamic[8]. More recently, Chinese archaeologists have started working in Uzbekistan and it is likely that they will emphasise the Chinese presence (Samarkand paid tribute to the Tang Empire in the 7th century), just as they have in Xinjiang where the Han conquest and colonies created after the journey of Zhang Qian serve as the main argument against the independence of this majority Uighur region.

Pulled between European, Indian and Japanese scholars, and formed by the Soviet school, scholars from Central Asia have been forced by their newly independent states into rewriting history as National History and specifically as national history at odds with the history of the neighbouring state. However, the need to define history as the history of a single ethnic group is particularly problematic in Central Asia because the

ethnic groups were themselves invented by the Soviet Union along with the countries in the 1920s[9]. By extending these groups' origin into the distant past each country has appropriated part of what is a common heritage. Thus the Uzbeks have appropriated the Turk legacy, but have decided to identify this legacy with cities and high culture and have chosen the figure of Amir Timur (Tamerlane) as their figurehead, despite the fact that he conducted a number of campaigns against the Uzbeks in the steppes of Semirech'e. Amir Timur is both conqueror of the world (from the Mediterranean to Delhi and the borders of China) and unifier of the world (Samarkand, city of light). Conversely, the Samanid dynasty has been appropriated by the Tajik State despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that the old Samanid capital, Bukhara, is situated in contemporary Uzbekistan. The Samanids have thus become the defenders of civilisation and by extension of the Aryan race[10]. Meanwhile the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs have promoted their nomadic origins and the key role of the steppe in history. This approach extends to all periods including Classical Antiquity, which is claimed as the moment when civilisation emerged and notably to Samarkand, which after celebrating the 2500 anniversary of its foundation in 1970, celebrated its 2750 years in 2007 – an anniversary, which archaeologists were forced to justify and for which they produced books presenting the city as the birthplace of the Uzbek state. All of this means that any article on the history of Central Asia will be effectively censored (by the author himself, by the editor or by the state) so as to ensure the propagation of a correct ethnocentric history, which is then projected into World History.

Caught between these conflicting views of, and claims about, the place of the region in World History archaeologists and historians find their work constantly instrumentalised. The articles they produce are often of excellent quality, however it is difficult if not impossible for them to escape from the metahistorical framework in which they are working. This is true because of their individual formation but also because of their professional obligation: when the Japanese and the French both ended up excavating early medieval layers, they obtained stunning results but were criticised by their respective funding agencies for not fulfilling the original aims of their work. When a Catalan team first started work in Uzbekistan, they justified it in part by the need to analyse the whole of western Afro-Eurasia during classical antiquity so as to understand better the specificities of the western Mediterranean. None of these facts is necessarily negative, so long as they do not lead to the appropriation of the past by those promoting a specific historical framework. The problem, as we have seen is that whilst archaeologists and historians usually do not intend this to happen, it sometimes does.

Samarkand and Central Asia in world history

Specialists of Central Asia are, of course, conscious of the situation which we have just described and have a major advantage compared to other areas: they are few and they have been formed within very different scholarly traditions. The result is that schol-



Fig. 4
A schematic map of the Silk Roads, showing the three main routes.

ars from different countries constantly work together and are forced to confront their world view of Central Asia. And, although few are particularly interested in theoretical frameworks, a general consensus has arisen about the need to systematically reconceptualise Central Asia within a larger framework, because whatever their period of specialisation, the larger Eurasian dimension is almost always necessary. Let us take an example from Classical Antiquity (from Bactria, south of Samarkand): around 140 BCE, the Greco-Bactrian kingdom was conquered by groups of nomads, the main one of which, the Yuezhi, were expelled from West-Central China by the Xiongnu during the 2nd century BCE. They are mentioned by the Greco-Roman historical sources and by the Chinese who sent an ambassador, Zhang Qian, in 130 BCE to visit them in Central Asia as part of a Chinese attempt to find allies against the Xiongnu. Later they conquered northern India and founded the Kushan Empire, described by a 3rd century Chinese spy as one of the three sons of God alongside the Roman and Han Chinese Empires. Their inscriptions are mostly in Bactrian (an Iranian language) written in the Greek script and it is under their rule that the Indo-Greek Art of Gandhara flourished and Buddhism first expanded towards China[11]. Obviously, neither the Mediterranean, nor the Chinese, nor the Steppe, nor the Indian, nor a local framework enable a satisfactory analysis of the preceding paragraph: it is necessary to take them all into account and to do this is to do World History, because it means no longer writing the history of Central Asia but analysing Eurasia as a single interconnected historico-cultural block.

As has just been pointed out, specialists on Central Asia are not used to using theoretical frameworks, but the term which they do use is almost a synonym of World History: the Silk Roads.

The Silk Roads are usually represented visually as a series of trade routes linking Eastern Eurasia (mainly China) with Western Eurasia (the Mediterranean) and Southern Eurasia (India) and extending down to South-Eastern Asia (Indonesia) and Eastern Africa. They are sometimes subdivided into three different routes: (1) the Steppe Routes, which are the routes used by nomads across the vast Eurasian steppes (from Beijing to Budapest), (2) the Sea Routes or Spice Routes, centred on the Indian Ocean, and (3) the Oasis Routes or Silk Roads in a narrow sense, which link the Mediterranean cost with central China via oases such as Samarkand.

The date at which these routes start being used is disputed by scholars and politicians. The Kazakhs argue that the Silk Roads were opened by nomads plying the Eurasian steppes at least as early as the first half of the First Millennium BCE, probably much earlier. The Chinese refuse to consider the possibility of the Silk Road predating Zhang Qian's journey in 130 BCE[12]. These two points of view perpetuate two traditional world views, which we have briefly mentioned, and respectively emphasize the organic, continuous nature of contacts on the one hand and the importance of institutional relations between states on the other. One thing that no one contests is the fact that contacts existed at some point and that these contacts (when they existed) were important. Furthermore the importance of these contacts lies not in their volume (very few Roman or Han objects having been found on archaeological sites of Central Asia) but in their influence on art, urbanism, religion and indeed on the basic economical, political and social structures of Central Asia, none of which can be interpreted without referring back to the Eurasian scale. This fact is not unique to the period which we have discussed in this chapter, indeed it is even more valid of the early medieval period when traders from Samarkand plied the routes between Constantinople and Chang'an[13], and it is also true much before when the war chariot spread simultaneously to Greece and China by the end of the 2nd millennium BCE after having been invented in the Eurasian steppes at the end of the 3rd millennium BCE[14].

Seen from Samarkand, the idea that a single world system only emerged in 16th century Europe thus seems ridiculous: Abu Lughod's clear arguments in favour of an earlier date, and even André Gunder Frank's claims of world systems stretching back to the 4th millennium BCE make much more sense[15]. Yes, the scale is different – of course. But the scale and intensity also changed between Antiquity and the Early Medieval Period, and between the 19th and the 20th century. Yes, of course various systems co-existed, they always have and they still do but this does not mean that no world system can be detected before the 16th century.

In the middle of nowhere

Although I would love to claim the opposite, the truth is that Samarkand cannot be compared to Baghdad, Chang'an or Rome. It is a fairly small city, in the midst of a small oasis, described in a few dozen texts. Today half a million people live there and it is unlikely that half that number ever lived there in the past (despite the many claims to the contrary). This is hardly surprising: Central Asia is in the middle of nowhere, a land of oases separated by vast steppes, deserts and mountain, 60 million inhabitants in 3.5 million square kilometres. However, for historians this situation has major advantages because it means working in an area where the great scholarly traditions are not overwhelming, where we are forced to constantly confront very different research frameworks and where any analysis of an event or an object requires a global view of Eurasia. This is the only way to make sense of history. The mulberry trees of Samarkand may thus be a long way from the streets of Paris or Tokyo but they are not a bad place to start our search for a common history.

Notes

1 Many authors defend the term they use with almost fetishist fervour but seeing that these terms change meaning from language to language, from scholarly tradition to scholarly tradition and even from one author to the same author, I will not discuss their respective merits. The most common term at present is that of Central Asia, even though it makes little sense from a geographic, historical or cultural perspective. For a recent discussion on the term see S. Gorshenina, *De la Tartarie à l'Asie centrale: le coeur d'un continent dans l'histoire des idées entre cartographie et géopolitique*, Paris (in press 2011).

2 Central Asia can include the 5 former Soviet Republics, the Chinese Autonomous Republic of Xinjiang, Afghanistan and Eastern Iran, or even the Caucasus, the Turkic Republics of the Russian Federation, Tibet, Mongolia, North-West Pakistan, and a long etc.

3 I start with the example of French archaeologists in Central Asia, simply because I have spent most of my academic career working in this framework and this criticism can therefore directly be addressed at myself. Interestingly enough, a French archaeologist, naturalised as a Russian (Joseph-Antoine Castagné) had already dug in Samarkand in the early 20th century. Of course, French excavations in surrounding countries such as Afghanistan started much earlier.

4 Logically, most of the main articles by the teams working within this tradition have been published in the *Compte Rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres* or in similar classical academic journals. One of the articles for the general public is actually entitled: "At the edges of the barbarian orient: Ai Khanum, a Greek colonial city". P. Bernard, *Aux confins de l'orient barbare: Ai Khanoum, ville coloniale grecque*, in "Archaeologia – Dossiers de l'Archeologie", 1974, 5, pp. 99-114.

5 S.P. Tolstov outlined this chronology in an article published in 1949, which included a line stating that those who did not agree with this model were bourgeois reactionaries.

6 Some of her most famous and influential books are entitled: *The Art History of Uzbekistan*, *The Architectural History of Uzbekistan*, *The History of Uzbekistan*, etc.

7 I was myself the victim of this episode, which took place despite me being officially employed as a junior scholar of the Uzbek Academy of Arts, in the team of the director of the conference.

[8] This movement led, for example, to a court case being launched in California against the State's School Books. P. Bose, *Hindutva Abroad: The California Textbook Controversy*, in "The Global South", 2008, 2.1, spring, pp. 11-34.

[9] For a brief description of the invention of ethnic identities in Central Asia see S. Stride, *Espacio e identidad en Asia Cental*, in "Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals", 2005, 70-71, pp. 9-33.

[10] Like others, I have been greeted as a fellow member of the superior Aryan race by Tajik scholars. However once again, I stress that this fact should not be extrapolated – most of my Tajik friends find it as comical as I do.

[11] The best general introduction to the history of Central Asia is probably the *History of civilizations of Central Asia* published by UNESCO; for the Yuezhi and Kushan periods see B.A. Litvinsky (ed.), vol. III, *The crossroads of civilizations: A.D. 250 to 750*, Paris 1996. The quality of the articles is however quite variable.

[12] An excellent example of this is provided by the ongoing discussion on the nomination of the Silk Roads as part of the World Heritage List. In recent meetings held in Turfan and Samarkand, both Kazakhs and Chinese refused to budge.

[13] See E. De la Vaissière, *Sogdian Traders. A History*, Leiden 2005.

[14] See D.W. Anthony, *The Horse, The Wheel and Language: How Bronze-Age Riders from the Eurasian Steppes Shaped the Modern World*, Princeton 2007.

[15] P.L. Kohl, *The Making of Bronze Age Eurasia*, Cambridge 2007, for a detailed analysis; Wallerstein himself seems now to accept an earlier date, I. Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, Durham NC 2004.

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China's View of the World

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Abstract

In examining China's view of the world, the idea of *tianxia* plays a key role. This idea generally refers to the world as a whole. It is important to understand what the idea specifically signified. The word *tianxia* has been used in two different ways. Firstly it can represent the whole globe. In this all-embracing usage, *tianxia* stretches out beyond China, and the one who rules it is the lord of the world. Alternatively, it is confined to China. Consequently, its extension is limited to the area which actually stood under the rule of the Chinese dynasties.

Most Chinese historical sources, in particular those since the time of the late Former Han (202 BCE - 8 CE) and the early Later Han (25 CE - 220 CE), use the word in the latter meaning. In pre-modern China, *tianxia* often signified the state. Meanwhile, non-Han countries and peoples around China were seen as not belonging to *tianxia* and the inhabitants were called "barbarians". The Chinese differentiated this area depending on the distance from China: (1) the "neighbouring regions", to which the Chinese rule extended, and (2) the "remote regions", which stood completely outside Chinese influence.

At times, in particular when the territory of the dynasty expanded dramatically, as under the Han, the Tang or the Qing, *tianxia* was taken to include the "neighbouring regions". Still, the idea of *tianxia* was related to the sovereignty of the emperor. It delimited the area that he effectively governed by means of the central administration as well as the census registration and the map in the provinces and counties.

There were two views about what relation *tianxia* had with the vast surrounding area including the "neighbouring" and the "remote regions". One regarded the dynasty's capital in which the emperor resided as center of the whole world. The other, which equally existed through the ages, saw it in the Kunlun Mountains to the West of China and positioned *tianxia* to their southeast. The former perspective is often seen as typifying Chinese perspectives on the world, but it is interesting to note that there was also a competing relativistic paradigm.

中国が世界をどう捉えてきたかという問題を解明するにあたって、鍵となるのが「天下」の観念である。「天下」は世界を意味する。したがって、その内容を正確に理解することが中国の世界観を解明するうえで決定的に重要である。

従来、「天下」について二つの見方が並び立ってきた。一方は、地球上のすべてを包含するという包括的な理解である。すなわち、それは天の下の地上をすべて含み、中国を越えて広がるものである。したがって、「天下に王たる」ことは、全世界に君臨することになる。他方、「天下」は中国国家そのものの謂いだという理解がある。これによれば、「天下」は中華王朝が支配する、東西南北に限界をもつ限られた領域に限られることになる。

漢籍史料に伝えられる「天下」は、基本的には後者の意味であった。こうした「天下」観が形成されたのは前漢末から後漢初の時期である。したがって、中国の前近代社会にあっては、「天下」とは今日の国家に近い意味をもっていたと言ってもよい。一方、中国の周囲に存在した外国や異民族は、「天下」から外れた存在であり、夷狄と呼ばれた。もっとも、夷狄の世界にも中国との距離によって区別があり、（1）中国の支配がおよぶ地域（蕃域）と、（2）それがおよばない地域（絶域）とに分けられていた。

たしかに、漢、唐、清朝のように大きく中国の領土が拡張した時代には、「天下」は蕃域を含むように理解されることもあった。しかし、その場合にも「天下」はあくまでも中華王朝の支配が及ぶ範囲のみを指していた。つまり、現実に共有される法令にもとづき、王朝の統治機構と州（郡）県の戸籍・地図によって具体的に掌握される実効支配の領域を意味していたのである。

では、周辺の蕃域・絶域を含めた広大な世界に対して、「天下」はいかなる関係にあるのだろうか。これについては、二つの構想が存在した。一つは天子の統治する王城をこの広大な領域の中心と見る。これは中国を中心として構想される世界観である。他方、中国の西方にある崑崙山を世界の中心とし、その東南に中国の「天下」を位置付ける世界観があった。中国の世界観と言えば、中国が世界の中心となる中華思想的な世界観だけを思い浮かべるが、それを相対化する世界観が、中華思想的世界観の形成時期においてすでに存在していたのである。

How have the Chinese viewed the world? There has been much discussion about this question, all of which has been underpinned by a certain perception shared by the Chinese. According to this shared perception, China conceived of itself as a place where a virtuous person who had received the mandate of Heaven ruled all under Heaven (*tianxia*), and viewing its own sphere of rule as the centre of the world, it called this Zhonghua; further, it espoused "civilized/barbarian thought", looking upon the regions surrounding this Zhonghua, or China, as the world of barbarian peoples and considering itself to be in a position to bring civilization to the culturally backward

world of barbarian peoples. The traditional tributary relations between Zhonghua and the surroundings were formed naturally on the basis of the Chinese dichotomic view of the World[1]. This understanding is in itself basically not mistaken, but in order to gain an accurate grasp of China's perception of the world, it is necessary to elaborate on this in a little more detail. In the following, I wish to present in brief the worldview espoused by traditional China.

What is *tianxia*?

In China the word *tianxia*, or "(all) under Heaven", is used to refer to the "world". It was frequently used in an already well-established meaning during the Warring States period (403 BCE - 221 BCE) before the start of the Common Era, and thereafter it continued to be used throughout successive dynasties right down to the end of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) in the early 20th century. In order to consider how China has historically viewed the world, it is first of all necessary to have an accurate understanding of the world as denoted by this term *tianxia*.

Broadly speaking, there have until now been two different interpretations of the word *tianxia*. One interpretation considers *tianxia* to refer to the world extending beyond the borders of China. This was first pointed out by Tazaki Masayoshi (1926), the first person to undertake a systematic examination of the notion of *tianxia*. He argued that *tianxia* signified the whole world and referred to limitless land. This understanding of *tianxia* was subsequently adopted by many researchers. For example, Hiraoka Takeo (1951, etc.) considered *tianxia* to signify the world and to represent an idea transcending ethnicity and regionality, while according to Nishijima Sadao (1983, 1985), *tianxia* was literally the world below (*xia*) heaven (*tian*), i.e., everything on earth, and corresponded to the world itself, and being the ruler of *tianxia* was equivalent to ruling over the entire world. Nishijima also pointed out that when this Chinese notion of *tianxia* was introduced to Japan, it no longer signified the entire world and changed into the reduced and limited meaning of all of Japan. He thus argued that the notion of *tianxia* differed in China and Japan. This view of Nishijima's could be said to have exerted a tacit influence on subsequent researchers of ancient Japanese history and Chinese history.

In contrast to the above interpretation, there is also the view that would understand *tianxia* as referring to China itself. A representative proponent of this view is Watanabe Shin'ichirô (2003). Having carefully summarized past research on the notion of *tianxia*, he examined this notion on the basis of actual historical sources and argued that *tianxia* is a concept referring to China's traditional state. In other words, according to Watanabe, *tianxia* refers to a delimited area circumscribed in the north, south, east, and west and is confined to the area over which China's dynasties had effective control.

It is clear from Watanabe's examination of actual historical sources that *tianxia* appearing in Chinese sources is basically used in this second meaning, and China's successive

dynasties also took it in this sense. According to this standpoint, foreign countries and other peoples living on the periphery of China were basically excluded from China's *tianxia*, and China referred to them as barbarian peoples. But a distinction was drawn in this barbarian world depending on the distance from China. That is to say, it was divided into (1) neighbouring states and peoples under the control and influence of China and (2) states and peoples over which China had no control or influence. In particular, it is considered that in the case of (1) China regarded them as states and peoples that had come under the civilizing influence of Chinese culture and so permitted them to bring tribute to China and entered into political relations with them, whereas the states and peoples falling under (2) were regarded as states and peoples to which Chinese culture had not spread and these were left to their own devices. In other words, using the degree of acceptance of its own superior culture as a yardstick, China ranked the barbarian peoples in the surrounding world of barbarians under the aegis of *tianxia* centred on China. In the following, I shall refer to the area covered by (1) as "neighbouring regions" and (2) as "remote regions"[2].

As we have seen in the above, in China's pre-modern society *tianxia* may be regarded as a term that was used in a sense close to the modern word "state". From the Warring States period through to the end of the Qing dynasty, it was the designation that defined most comprehensively old China's political society in spatial and structural terms.

We have so far focused on the discussion about the theme in Japan, but it goes without saying that it is being dealt with intensively among Chinese historians as well. They are interested particularly in the aspect of ethnicity of the theme, that is, what the boundary was between the Han Chinese and the non-Han over time. Moreover, it is a big issue how the extension of the "State in the Middle" (*Zhongguo* or *Zhonghua*), changed in the whole course of Chinese history. It seems, however, that the discussion among Chinese scholars leaves something to be desired. First of all, they are apparently not giving enough thought to the exact definition of *tianxia*. Q. Edward Wang (1999), for example, takes it to signify the entire human world in the concluding remarks of his work. In the introduction, however, he argues that the concept refers to a united Chinese world, based on moral conformity of the society. Similar incongruities can be found with other researchers.

The extension of *TIANXIA* to neighbouring regions

As was explained above, *tianxia* corresponded to the area over which China's dynasties had effective control, but on occasion it also encompassed the neighbouring regions immediately outside China. Historical sources indicate that this expansion of the notion of *tianxia* occurred during the time of the Qin (221 BCE - 206 BCE) and Han (202 BCE - 220 CE) dynasties. This was because, unlike the Warring States period when the term *tianxia* began to be used, the area under China's effective control expanded dramatically during the Qin-Han period, and under the rule of the emperor, once the uni-



Fig. 1
China's view of the world.

fied Qin-Han state was established in the 3rd century BCE, its territory clearly came to include neighbouring regions. In particular, following the active strategy towards other countries adopted by Wudi of the Han, the Han state used investiture to win over foreign countries in neighbouring regions as vassals and positioned them as outer vassals in contrast to inner vassals within China. The emergence of these outer vassals on the outer periphery of China had a decisive effect on the expansion of the notion of *tianxia*.

During the Tang dynasty (618-907) too, which acquired an enormous territory, as had the Han, *tianxia* clearly extended to surrounding regions. In other words, in times when the area controlled by China expanded, there were instances in which *tianxia* went beyond China and encompassed neighbouring regions.

Hori Toshikazu (1993), taking note of this phenomenon of the extension of *tian-xia* to neighbouring regions, argues that *tianxia* was a world made up of China and barbarian peoples arranged concentrically and that it became a reality in the form of a Sinocentric world empire during the Sui-Tang period (581-907). Like Hori, Ishigami Eiichi (1996) has also clearly pointed out that *tianxia* represented a conception of the world as an empire made up of China and barbarian peoples.

But even though the territory designated by *tianxia* may have extended to neighbouring regions, *tianxia* was still basically confined to the area under the effective control of Chinese dynasties. For instance, even in the case of the Tang, which brought a vast area

under its control, its *tianxia*, which had extended to the world of barbarian peoples, was composed of prefectures and counties located within China and prefectures and counties that had been newly established in areas inhabited by barbarian peoples. *Tianxia* referred, in other words, to the area of effective control that was secured in a concrete form by the dynasty's governing structure and the household registers and maps of prefectures (or commanderies) and counties on the basis of actually shared laws. The area encompassed by *tianxia* fluctuated during the course of history in accordance with the ebb and flow of dynastic power, and there were times when the existence of barbarian peoples within the *tianxia* was sanctioned[3], but its base should be understood to have remained in China.

Therefore, it is not correct to understand *tianxia* as a notion that encompassed barbarian peoples as one of its inherent constituent elements. *Tianxia* corresponded to the area of established effective control governed autocratically by the dynastic authorities through the system of prefectures (or commanderies) and counties.

Tianxia and the world of remote regions

As was explained above, *tianxia* was not a limitless world, but a delimited area. At times *tianxia* also included neighbouring regions, but beyond these neighbouring regions there was envisioned a vast area where China exercised no control or influence whatsoever. This corresponded to the "remote regions". This idea developed from the late Former Han (202 BCE - 8 CE) to the early Later Han (25 CE - 220 CE) around the start of the Common Era, which also coincided with the period when the formulation of the notion of *tianxia* was brought to completion. It is to be surmised, in other words, that together with the notion of *tianxia* there was also developed a view of the world that extended beyond *tianxia*. Since *tianxia* possessed a delimited area, the establishment of the notion of *tianxia* conceptually demanded of necessity the existence of a world extending beyond it.

It is often said that China's attitude towards this world of remote regions lying far beyond *tianxia* was one that pitied and looked down on it as representing the ends of the earth unreached by Chinese culture. But this has not in any way been proved historically, and it can be inferred from China's official histories that China actually adopted the opposite attitude towards these regions.

For example, it is recorded in the *Hou Hanshu*, an official history, that during the Later Han, when the formulation of the notion of *tianxia* was brought to completion, there existed a foreign country called Daqin. This corresponded to the eastern part of the Roman empire, i.e., Egypt and Syria, which clearly belonged to the remote regions. As well as recording that Daqin produced plentiful gold, silver, and rare and precious goods, the *Hou Hanshu* also includes the following information:

> The king of the country of Daqin always had an attendant holding a bag follow his chariot, and if anyone wished to express his opinion about something, he was made to place his written opinion in the bag. After having returned to the palace, the king would take it out,

> examine it, and decide on the merits of the opinion. In addition, there are in this country thirty-six generals, who all gather together to discuss state affairs. The position of king is never hereditary, and wise men are always selected and made king. Moreover, the people are all easygoing, upright, and orderly in appearance and conduct. They resemble the people of China, and that is why this country is called Daqin.

It is evident from this account that the writer had no disdain or pity at all for the country of Daqin, which belonged to the remote regions, and there has in fact been projected in this account the image of a civilized or utopian country similar to China. It is be surmised that since China was constantly receiving elements of an advanced culture from the west via the Silk Road, it sought in the remote regions of the west, about which little accurate information reached China, a civilized or utopian country similar to China.

A Non-Sinocentric view of the world

As has already been explained, a vast area called the remote regions was envisioned outside *tianxia*, and there existed two views regarding the position of the area corresponding to *tianxia* within this worldwide area. According to one view, the royal capital governed by the son of Heaven, or emperor, was the centre of the world, which extended outwards in a multistratified fashion to encompass in succession China, neighbouring regions, and remote regions. This was a worldview conceived of with China at its centre, and it may be described as a Sinocentric view of the world. The diagram "China's view of the world" presented earlier was based on this view.

In contrast, there also existed a view of the world that relativized this worldview. This was a worldview that placed the Kunlun Mountains to the west of China at the centre of the world and positioned China's *tianxia* to the southeast of these mountains. Zhang Heng, a renowned man of letters who lived in the first half of the Later Han and was also well-versed in astronomy, wrote a treatise entitled *Lingxian* in which he set forth his own views on the world and the universe, and in this work he writes about China in the following terms:

> To the southeast of the Kunlun Mountains [at the centre of the world] there lies Shenzhou (China). Here there are wind and rain with each season, and heat and cold are suitably regulated. Outside this region, the heat is excessive in the south, the cold is excessive in the north, wind is excessive in the east, and clouds are excessive in the west. Therefore, the sage-kings [of China] do not live in these regions.

According to this account, Shenzhou, governed by the sage-kings of China, lies to the southeast of the Kunlun Mountains and is the only region in the world blessed with a harmonious climate. The Kunlun Mountains were mountains that had been widely believed from the Warring States period through to the Qin-Han period to lie to the far west of China, and they were regarded as the source of the Yellow River and also as a jade-producing area where the Queen Mother of the West, a mythological goddess,

lived. Although China's *tianxia* is here extolled for its fine environment, it is clearly not the centre of the world.

As was noted earlier, it is to be surmised that in the late Early Han and early Later Han there developed together with the notion of *tianxia* a view of the world that extended beyond *tianxia*, and this conception of a worldview centred on the Kunlun Mountains dates from the same period. This means that at a time when a Sinocentric worldview developed there also existed a view of the world that relativized this Sinocentric worldview.

Especially interesting in this regard is that once Buddhism was introduced to China in the 1st century during the Later Han, Mount Sumeru, the centre of the world in the Buddhist worldview, came to be identified with the Kunlun Mountains. In fascicle 10 of the *Shiyiji* composed by Wang Jia of the Former Qin (351-394) in the 4th century it is stated that "in the west the Kunlun Mountains are called Mount Sumeru".

Mention of China's view of the world usually brings to mind only a Sinocentric worldview in which China lies at the centre of the world. But it should not be forgotten that, even though it did not become a mainstream view among intellectuals, there also existed alongside this worldview another view of the world that relativized this Sinocentric worldview.

Officially, contemporary China rejects the traditional worldview. Under the leadership of the Communist Party regime, the state adheres to a worldview based on Marxist concepts. Yet it can be claimed that in reality the traditional worldview, especially Sinocentric one, far from having disappeared, continues to exist as an undercurrent within the thinking of the country's ruling elite.

Notes

Please note: The Japanese personal names are written in the Japanese way in which the surname precedes the given name.

1 Many scholars such as Fairbank, Mancall or their like have concentrated their attention on discussing the Chinese tributary systems to make clear the Zhonghua world order. See J.K. Fairbank (ed.), *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Relations*, Cambridge Mass. 1968; M. Mancall, *China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy*, New York 1984; Yihong Pan, *Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan: Sui-Tang China and its Neighbors*, Washington 1997.

2 Tan Sitong (1865-1898), an eminent revolutionist and advocate of liberal reform in the late Qing times, also divided the world into three groups in the same way. See his "治言*zhiyan*" (1898). He adhered to strong Sinocentrism under the influence of Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692), who at the end of the Ming times had harshly denounced the rule of the rising Qing dynasty of the Manchus as that of barbarians.

3 In the reign of non-Han dynasties, the idea gained ground that *tianxia* was made up of the "barbarians" as well. See "大義覺迷錄 *Dayijuemilu*" by the Qing-emperor Yongzheng.

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The Idea of World History in Japan

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Abstract

For a long time, the Japanese felt the world to be alien to themselves, and that their country was outside or barely on the periphery of the world and susceptible to impacts from its centre. That is certainly because Japan is located in close vicinity to major civilizations like China, India and the West and stood under their enormous cultural influence all the time. Their peculiar world view tinged their understanding of world history. It should, they believed, rather deal with what historical relationship Japan had with the outside world than being about the world's historical development per se.

When the Japanese came to perceive the scope of the real world in the mid-19th century, they introduced the mono-linear universalism of the Western Enlightenment. Its underlying assumption that the historical trajectory leading up to the Western civilization was the single path of evolution of mankind fitted in with the conventional Japanese world view. This viewpoint, along with the notion that Japan was just on the way of progress to the final goal, was later shared by the Marxists. Meanwhile, there were moves among nationalist circles to denounce the Eurocentricism in favour of Japanese specificity. But in terms of the basic pattern of thinking, the nationalists did not break with the universalist assumption either.

In the 1970s universalism was challenged by new approaches that advocated a multitrack standpoint on history by including spatial components. The new trend certainly reflected in its subtext Japan's remarkable rise to an economic power in the post-war time, which strengthened the self confidence of the Japanese. They now felt uneasy about the idea of being a "nation in the making" on the way to a goal and instead thought that Japan could well be one of the world's goals itself.

In the 21st century, we can imagine the Japanese understanding of world history will change again because circumstances in and around Japan again have changed in the meantime.

日本人の元来の世界観念では、日本は世界の外部もしくは外縁にあって、世界の中心からの影響を受ける立場にあるとされた。それは、日本がつ

ねに優越した文明（インド・中国、西洋）の近隣にあって、その影響を受けてきたという歴史的事情によるところが大きい。世界史認識も同様の構造をもっている。世界史とは、他者としての世界に対して日本がいかなる位置関係に立つかを説くものと了解されてきたのである。

日本人が現実世界と向き合ったのは、19世紀半ばのことであった。当初の世界史認識は、福沢諭吉に代表される、啓蒙的自由主義の西洋普遍主義にもとづいていた。西洋文明に至る進歩を唯一の歴史的発展の経路と捉える見方は、発想のパターンとしては、その後のマルクス主義者にも該当した。一方、これとは逆に、西洋普遍主義に異を唱えようとする衝迫も日本近代に一貫して伏流していた。その好例は、第二次大戦期の「近代の超克」グループである。ただ、彼らも単線的な普遍史観というパターンを破ることはなかった。

1970年代になって、梅棹忠夫の生態史観のような、空間的要素を組み込んだ複線的世界史理解が現れた。その社会的背景には、経済大国への日本の躍進があったと見られる。もはや、他から与えられたゴールへの発展途上ではなく、日本自らがゴールになりうるという自信がこうした見方を生んだのである。

21世紀を迎えて、日本の内外の情勢はまた変わりつつある。それに応じて、日本人の世界史認識もまた変化するだろう。

In analyzing how the Japanese grasp world history, we first need to delineate a distinctive feature of the Japanese notion of the world. It is safe to say that, curious as it may sound, the world was originally something alien to the Japanese. In their view, it signified a space separated from their own and located somewhere outside their living sphere. In other words, Japan itself was not included in the world, but stood aloof from it. Even when the world was so extensively understood as to subsume Japan, their country was thought to be barely on its periphery. The epicenter that controlled the world's affairs was somewhere beyond their horizon, wielding benevolent or threatening influence with its overwhelming power. The Japanese outlook was thus characterized by a dichotomical, not an inclusive, notion of relations between Japan and the World.

Apart from a primitive cosmology that contained ethnocentric aspects, the sense of extraneousness has been one of the determinants in Japanese perceptions of the world throughout history, even if its significance has lessened over time. This makes it unique as compared with the dominant European world-view. For Europeans, the world was the place where they lived, and they were its masters. Even though the world was perceived to cover a wider area, it would always be extended around its centre: the West. This is clearly shown in the writings of classical thinkers such as Polybius' *Histories* or Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*, that is, in both the Greek-Roman and the Christian tradition. Naturally, each people in Europe had a different idea about its position within the

Western cultural sphere. But so far as they perceived themselves to be part of the West, the West itself was indeed in the centre of the world.

The peculiarity of the Japanese world-view can be certainly attributed to geographical-historical circumstances. The country was always in close vicinity to far more developed civilizations and thus was strongly susceptible to their cultural hegemony. Since the dawn of its history, Japan stood under Chinese influence and owed the foundations of its cultural life to its gigantic neighbour, who for her part always claimed to be the centre of the world. Items adopted from China ranged from classical philosophy and literature, state institutions and urban planning, through to ink and brush. From the widespread adoption of Buddhism, Japanese religious life was also much indebted to India. Together with Confucianism from China, Buddhism established the spiritual framework for the Japanese. It is telling that in pre-modern Japan, '*kara-tenjiku*' (literally: China and India) was used synonymously with the cosmos. In modern times, the West has replaced both as a cultural teacher. Japan's modernization was, as was the case with other Asian and African countries, nothing but Westernization. Advanced natural science and their associated technologies were eagerly introduced and modern institutions extensively adopted. Since Japan was always a recipient of cultural assets, it has hardly been in the position to dispatch cultural messages of its own to others. As a result, among the Japanese the mindset has taken firm roots that sets 'us' against the 'world'.

It is natural that the Japanese view of world history is structured in a similar way. To deal with world history means to understand the relation between world and Japan in historical perspective. World history should thus give a fixed point with which the Japanese orient themselves in and with respect to the world. The specificity of Japanese historical understanding comes to the surface for example in history teaching. In Japanese higher education, domestic and foreign history are usually separated institutionally. In history departments, the Japanese section is as a rule divided from those for Asia and the West. This has been the case ever since the modern university system was founded in the late-19th century. That indicates the basic assumption that the course of history in Japan can be singled out without any connection with the outside world.

Reactions to the West in Japanese historiography

It was one and half a centuries ago, when Japan's modernization began, that the Japanese first became definitely aware of the scope of the real world. The increasing pressure from the expansion of the Western powers brought home to people in the Far East that there was another, much mightier centre of the world beyond the familiar sphere of China and India. Industrial superiority, embodied in the fire power of the American battleships that forced the long isolated country to open up in 1853, moved the Japanese in the initial years of the Meiji era (1867-1912) to ask how the Westerners had realized such a high level of material power and affluence. Some tried to trace

the historical roots of the West's success. This was done in an intellectual environment in which Enlightenment liberalism of an Anglo-American mould was prevalent. The thinker and educationalist Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901) and the journalist Taguchi Ukichi (1855-1905) for example both subscribed, under the strong influence in particular of Henry Thomas Buckle's *A History of Civilization*, to the universalist idea of historical development. In their view there was a single law of evolution for society, valid in any time and place. For them, the world referred to the political and economic order of the globe under Western hegemony, and world history meant the mono-linear course of mankind's progress leading to the single destination of Western civilization. The liberals tried to plot Japan's current position and its future course within this universal scheme. In his *Bunmei Ron no Gairyaku* [An Outline of a Theory of Civilization] published in 1875, Fukuzawa defined his country as '*hankai*' (literally, half developed), and placed it midway between the West and the underdeveloped non-West. Japan, he continued, had to climb the ladder of evolution to the upper end. Japan, he concluded, should entirely break with its backward Asian neighbours – who allegedly denounced progress and wanted to remain in stagnation – and join the developed circles of the Europeans and Americans.

The view of Fukuzawa and his fellow Enlightenment-inspired thinkers may seem to be too simplistic and, furthermore, to be simply echoing Western ideas. Nonetheless, such a view would not do justice to their significance. Their Eurocentric frame of reference was to form one of the main elements that shaped the Japanese understanding of world history. This has been true regardless of ideological standpoint. Hence Japanese Marxists were no exception, drawing on the same elements though they were against capitalism and the market economy that the liberals upheld. The inter-war period in Japan saw a rapid upsurge of socialism and organized labour. This happened as the industrialization that had begun at the end of the previous century accelerated during and after the World War I, and exacerbating class conflicts significantly. In the wake of the Russian Revolution, Marxism gained increasing influence particularly over the educated public because it seemed to address the core of social distress. The new intellectual climate touched historical studies and a socio-economic approach challenged the conventional politics-centred historiography. Not only in empirical research, but in macro-historical understanding as well, Marxism made a significant contribution. This is well shown for example by a controversy over Japanese history in the 1930s. As Hoston's monograph shows, two camps of Marxist historians fought with each other about Japan's place in world history. At issue was above all the Meiji Restoration (1868), which ended particularism under the Shogunate, ushering Japan to modern statehood. Sakisaka Itsurô (1897-1985) and his comrades argued that the regime change was essentially a bourgeois revolution. Like the French Revolution, it abolished the feudal estates and privileges, gave birth to centralized administration and the rule of law, and brought a civic society into being. This all laid the institutional groundwork for a capitalist economy to

flourish. Their opponents, like Noro Eitarô (1900-1934) and Yamada Moritarô (1897-1980), countered that this argument paid too little attention to the oppressive character of the Meiji regime. The undemocratic, authoritarian practices in political life remained intact and the old elite survived in a modern disguise. The restoration had bought about only cosmetic changes, but had hardly transformed the basic structure of society. For them, the Meiji state was primarily absolutist and Emperor Meiji was an equal to Louis XIV.

No matter how polemical the controversy was, we should not overlook the common ground between the two camps. Neither of them ever doubted the inevitability of a revolution and both agreed that evolution from capitalism to socialism was a universally valid law of mankind. And they all saw Japan midway on the road that would ultimately lead to Soviet-type socialism. In so far as the Marxists had a universalist worldview, they had a meta-level historical outlook in common with liberals like Fukuzawa, despite their political differences. That can be, to be sure, ascribed to a large extent to the congruence resulting from the teleological structure that is common to both of the political allegiances. On the other hand, it might also reflect the self-perception of being 'in progress' to an externally defined destination which ran through the Japanese intellectual history in modern times.

Naturally, Western universalism now and then triggered a backlash. Almost at the same time as the Marxists were dedicating their efforts to the controversy over capitalism, a group of nationalist academics under Kôsaka Masaaki (1900-1969) tried to lay out a new standpoint of world history, as Harootunian shows. Most of them were university professors studying European humanities (e.g. Kôsaka was an expert of German philosophy and Suzuki Naritaka [1907-1988], another leading protagonist, a historian of European medieval age). As students of Western learning, they were very familiar with the deep sense of crisis that had prevailed in Europe after the catastrophe of World War I. Actually, many of them experienced this crisis firsthand while studying in Europe, mostly in Germany. As Japan's expansionism caused criticism in the international community, they turned Europe's own internal critique into anti-Westernism. Kôsaka and his peers insisted that modern Western civilization had reached its limits and plunged the whole world into an existential crisis. To get out of the crisis, they said, a new world order was needed, which should be based on a new historical outlook. In their eyes, it was Japan that would achieve this historic mission. Obviously the members, who had a pronounced historical consciousness, were caught up in the excitement of experiencing an important juncture of history. That is why they used the phrase world history so frequently in their discourse.

Oddly enough, however, they did not bother to give much thought to the structure of world history itself. For all the high-minded tone, it was basically synonymous with the course of history on a global scale. Or rather, it seems that they were content with tacitly borrowing Western understandings, which they had internalized in their study. For be-

hind their vague idea of the course of history, we recognize a historical world-view which was mono-linear with a single goal at its end. The goal was naturally no longer the West, but Japan. But the academic group elaborated neither whether nor what universal values Japan could present to substitute for Western ones. We may conclude that all they envisioned was, instead of reviewing the world-view's structure fundamentally, to reverse the western-oriented image of world history into a Japanese universalism. Viewed this way, it is understandable that the group left little impact in Japanese historical awareness. Because of their hawkish discourses during World War Two, they were to be written off as warmongers soon after the war's end.

Yet, successful or not, they meant to form an counterweight to Western universalism. In Japan's modern intellectual history in general, we see two contrasting attitudes toward the West at play: indiscriminate commitment on the one hand, and absolute antipathy on the other. That goes for historiography too. So Kôsaka's group represented the second, if less significant, element underlying the Japanese notion of world history.

Consciousness of the global

The defeat in 1945, by bringing about fundamental changes to the nation, again changed Japanese views of world history. For one thing, Marxism gained an unshakable ascendancy in intellectual circles. The experience of military dictatorship before and during the war, and a reform-oriented mood of national rebirth thereafter, increased the plausibility of the leftist ideology. Its influence spread quickly once the ban on socialism imposed by the pre-war dictatorship had been lifted. It impressed historians in particular so deeply that it was almost treated as a canonical credo. For Marxists who believed in a single law of historical development on a world scale, the notion of world history was self-evident and indispensable. Furthermore, the interest in world history grew conspicuously in the public at large. It was almost a boom; publishers produced one series after another with 'world history' in the title and they all sold well. Based on the reflection that the narrow-minded nationalism and monarchical loyalty of the pre-war era (which fed a version of history which formed the basis of indoctrination in schools) had paved the way for the catastrophe, many thought a more open minded and broad ranging approach to be the essential foundation for the democratic rebirth of the nation. In their eyes, world history seemed to be the perfect antidote against historical bigotry. The boom in public interest resulted in a tangible change in history education. In the wake of the sweeping reform of school system under the American occupation after war, the subject of history at high school was divided and world history became an independent subject taught alongside Japanese history.

Let us take a close look at the situation in the post-war period. Because of the Marxist trend in the academia, the consciousness of the global among historians had never been stronger than in this period. Following the conviction that every monograph be

written with an eye to its macro-historical laws, many researchers tried to connect even narrow case studies to the universal course of history. Debates on large-scale themes got in full swing as well. One of the most heated discussions centred on the timing of the beginning of the middle ages in Japan. This amounted, according to the Marxist periodization, to the question of when the land system based on slavery which characterized antiquity, perished. Alongside meticulous local studies, a lot of theoretical and methodological speculation was done to bring empirical findings into line with the universal law. To obtain a concise overview of the dynamism of the historical community at this time, the work of Tôyama Shigeki and Naruse Osamu's survey are very useful, both being experts of Japanese and German modern history. Nonetheless, research and debates, no matter how lively, always stayed within the compass of Marxist dogma. Not a few historians put the course of Japanese history into the Procrustean bed of the ideology's mantra, which sometimes led to bizarre conclusions. There were not a few debates in which both sides tried to outdo each other in correctness in interpreting passages in Marx's works. It is true that Marxism contributed greatly to the re-activation of Japanese historical studies after 1945. The subsequent few decades were among the best times for the discipline in quantitative as well as qualitative terms. It is equally true, however, that its dogmatic standpoint narrowed historians' vision and prevented them from doing justice to Japan's unique trajectory within world history.

Alongside academic discussions, Arnold J. Toynbee's theory on world history was introduced in Japan in the 1950s and the 1960s. His voluminous work, *A Study of History*, was completely translated and resonated strongly. Indeed, Toynbee came across better to the general public than among academic historians, who tended to consider his work to be sterile ostentation. Still, some historians, such as Uehara Senroku (1899-1988), were inspired by the Briton and tried to lay down a similarly panoramic scheme. Uehara, European medievalist, attempted to construct an overall view of world history in his later years. In it, he divided the whole world into 13 sub-worlds and insisted that *a* world history as such came into being as a result of interactions between sub-worlds. This single world history came into being in the 13th century, when Occident and Orient were connected by travellers like Pian del Carpini, William of Rubruck and Marco Polo. As his vision shows, however, Uehara failed to free himself substantially from Toynbee's influence. Besides, unfortunately he died before he could transform his schematic sketches into detailed historical works.

Since the 1970s moves began among Japanese scholars to propose new concepts of world history of their own making. The first and most outstanding example was the so-called ecological approach of history by Umesao Tadao (1920-2010). In his book, *Bunmei no Seitai Shikan* (An Ecological View of History) in 1974, the anthropologist made an original suggestion about how to interpret world history. The author divided the world into two regions according to their natural-geographical conditions. Zone One contains Europe as well as Japan, while China, India, and the Islamic empires in

the middle of the Eurasian Continent make up Zone Two. The latter was successful in realizing a highly developed civilization early in mankind's history in Egypt, Mesopotamia, India and China, but had to succumb to repeated destruction by invading nomadic peoples. The region embraces a vast arid zone in the Eurasia's center, and could not effectively protect itself from the highly mobile peoples based there. Meanwhile, Zone One enjoyed relative peaceful time in the lee owing to their location at both ends of the continent. Even though the region fared pretty poorly compared with Zone Two, peace and stability enabled its countries to engage in economic transactions easily and to create robust citizenry. As a result, Europe and Japan alone developed feudal society, which ushered in a market economy in modern times. This cumulative progress did not happen to Zone Two, which saw the endless play of construction and destruction. In early modern times, the region indeed managed to cope with the endemic nomadic threat by building autocratic empires like the Ming and the Qing, the Mogul, the Ottoman and the Romanov, but was soon exposed to the colonialising pressure from the industrialised Zone One in 19th century and left stagnant. Thus the natural-geographical conditions of both regions made a huge difference in their historical development.

The uniqueness of Umesao's theory is its spatial components. The idea of world history had so far been mono-linearly structured by time alone. Variances between societies/nations were translated into temporal differences on a universal scale of development, whether it was the Enlightenment thinkers of the Meiji era, the pre-war Marxists or nationalist scholars in the 1930s. In contrast, Umesao presented multi-track courses of history by taking the factor of space into account, which maybe was obvious for him because of his specialty in anthropology. With that, anyway, he widened the perspective of world history decisively. At the same time, it should be pointed out that the new approach was linked in its subtext to the social environment of Japan in the 1970s. That was an age of amazing economic growth that resulted in the nation's rise to become world's second largest economy. Umesao's multi-track view made it possible to include Japan in the same category as the West and to set it free from the position of being a country 'in the making' that was developing on the way to a goal, whatever it was. Japan was now elevated to one of centers of world. It is not hard to see the boosted self-confidence of the Japanese reflected here.

In his multi-track understanding of history, Murakami Yasusuke (1931-1993) shared the basic layout with Umesao. This versatile economist tried to establish the fundamentally different logic of development in Japan and Europe by tracing it back to medieval times. Kawakatsu Heita (b. 1948) elaborated spatial components in history from the perspective of economic history. In his opinion, it was mainland Asia that had occupied the pivotal position in world trade since the end of the middle age. It was the supplier of various novelty goods like cotton that were in strong demand elsewhere. Japan and Europe as consumers had nothing but precious metal to offer in exchange for the goods they craved. Japan could counted on its own production of gold and silver, while Europe had to fetch it from afar, e.g. from the New World, but both were soon

faced with the problem that their source of wealth would run dry in due time. That moved Britain to import substitution by setting up cotton industry of its own, leading to the Industrial Revolution. Japan's alternative was not much different. It set out to industrialise – though relying on advanced technologies from the West – in order to roll back imported cotton manufactures, finally depriving India of the initiative in the East Asian trade. Kawakatsu thus emphasizes the indigenous character of Japanese industrialisation as a reaction to a pattern of world trade dominated by mainland Asia, rather than portraying it as a mere imitation of Western industries. In his view as well as in Umesao's, Japan was an independent actor in a multi-track world history.

Meanwhile, the World Systems Theory of Immanuel Wallerstein found remarkable echo. His works were translated in the 1980s and his all-embracing conception often taken up for discussion in historians' workshops and conferences. It can be noted that the American sociologist had much in common with the above mentioned Japanese authors since his theory stresses the spatial concepts of 'centre', 'semi-periphery', and 'periphery'. Still, it is doubtful whether Wallerstein contributed much to the Japanese understanding of world history. This is particularly because his theory centred on the dichotomy between the advanced West and the undeveloped Third World, while semi-periphery plays a transitional role. The Japanese could therefore not properly find their place in his picture of world. Wallerstein's paradigm threw little light on their central concern, the relationship between Japan and the outside world. That is why World Systems Theory attracted attention mainly from western historians, but left most Japanese historians cold. That makes a stark contrast to Marxism the reception of after World War Two. Being a theory introduced from the West likewise, Marxism seized a majority of scholars on Japanese history.

The place of the Japanese in world history?

World history is still favoured in the vocabulary of Japanese historiography today. Many books and articles refer to the term, often just to imply that the work in question is no mere case study, but has a wider perspective. This fondness is confirmed by the reception of new trends of global and transnational history in the USA and Europe, which have had repercussions among Japanese researchers. Quite a few works have already been translated. It is reinforced further by history education at school. World history is a compulsory subject in secondary education; every high school student is obliged to learn it. Indeed, since Japanese history is not mandatory, the bizarre situation sometimes arises that students are more knowledgeable, say, about Napoleon than about shoguns in the Tokugawa era. Yet for all that, it seems that the idea of world history has lost its significance. This is probably because there have hardly been any significant attempts since to grasp world history as a whole. Naturally, such an attempt would be highly challenging. The vast amount of historical knowledge that is available today makes it almost impossible for a historian to construct a macro-historical picture. Still the fact remains that studies on various individual themes, put together, do not focus into one image.

In the Japanese case in particular, we may take other circumstances into account. It is probably not going too far to say that for the Japanese, engagement in world history has always been a search for themselves in the world. Knowing where they stood was inseparable from knowing what they were. Whether as a disciple of Chinese civilization or a follower of Westernization, they relied for centuries on an mono-linear image of world history within which to orient and identify themselves. Japan's success in the late 20th century changed it dramatically. The confidence of economic power engendered a multi-track idea in which Japan could accordingly take on an autonomous role. Today, when circumstances in Japan have changed again and will still change further, do the Japanese need a new chart in unknown waters? It remains to be seen what kind of perception the 21st-century-Japanese are going to have about where they are located and what relations Japan has to the world.

Please note: The Japanese personal names are written in the Japanese way in which the surname precedes the given name. In the bibliography, English translations of the titles appear in parentheses after the transliteration of the original Japanese ones.

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Sub-Saharan Africa's Place in Global History

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Abstract

In teaching global history, Sub-Saharan Africa is often treated as a mere outlet for Arab and European trade and as an object of colonial exploitation. In more than one respect, the history of Africa and its active role in global networks are still perceived along the lines of political controversies of the 19th and 20th centuries. Consequently, questions such as the statehood of precolonial Empires (e.g. Ghana, Mali, Dahomey, Benin and Munhumupata), the active participation of African rulers in the slave trade, the importance of the Trans-Atlantic African diaspora, or the acceptability of anthropological comparisons in the writing of cultural history gained particular and sometimes disproportionate importance. In addition, particular methodological problems arise in the context of global history: the regional diversity of the African continent, the constructed nature of African tribalism, the variability of the oral traditions which constitute the most important type of sources, the lack of a terminology to label African regions and its inhabitants which can be universally recognized as politically correct. The history of precolonial exchanges, of colonization and decolonization, should not present Africa's inhabitants as mere objects of European oppression and exploitation. On the contrary, it should be demonstrated what freedom of action remained to them within those frameworks of dependency and how they used it.

Im Rahmen der Globalgeschichte kommt das subsaharische Afrika zumeist nur als Ziel des arabischen und europäischen Handels und als Objekt kolonialer Ausbeutung in den Blick. In mehrfacher Hinsicht wird der Blick auf die Geschichte Afrikas und seine aktive Rolle in globalen Zusammenhängen bis heute von politischen Auseinandersetzungen des 20. Jahrhunderts geprägt, die einigen Fragen eine besondere (und teilweise unangemessene) Bedeutung verleihen: der staatliche Charakter der präkolonialen Großreiche (z.B. Ghana, Mali, Dahomey, Benin, Munhumupata), die aktive Beteiligung afrikanischer Herrscher am Sklavenhandel; die Bedeutung der transatlantischen afrikanischen Diaspora; die Erlaubtheit ethnologisch-anthropologischer Vergleiche in der Kulturgeschichte. Im Kontext der Globalgeschichte stellen sich zudem besondere methodische Probleme: die regionale

Diversität des afrikanischen Kontinents, der Konstruktcharakter des afrikanischen Tribalismus, die Wandelbarkeit oraler Traditionen als wichtigster Quellengattung, das Fehlen einer allgemein als politisch korrekt anerkannten Terminologie für die Bezeichnung der afrikanischen Regionen und ihrer Bewohner. Die Geschichte der präkolonialen Austauschbeziehungen, der Kolonisierung und der Dekolonisierung darf die Bewohner Afrikas nicht auf ihre Rolle als Objekt europäischer Unterdrückung und Ausbeutung reduzieren; vielmehr ist neben den Abhängigkeitsverhältnissen auch aufzuzeigen, welche Handlungsspielräume sich ihnen boten und wie sie genutzt wurden.

Curricula of Global History often remain blurred and undefined as to the active role of the black continent in the history of globalization as well as in the comparative history of mankind. Since Antiquity foreign merchants came to Sub-Saharan Africa to seek gold, ivory, other primary materials and especially slaves. The importance of this Trans-Saharan as well as coastal trade for the economic development for the Arab world in the Middle Ages as well as the Atlantic world in early modern period is beyond dispute. However, it remains an open question to what degree Africa actively participated in these exchanges as an equal partner before the age of colonization. The questions that have been discussed in this context are by no means innocent and are to a large degree informed by nineteenth and twentieth century political issues (such as the struggle against slavery, against racism and against the exclusion of the African contributions to America's cultural heritage) and by the internal structure of academia itself (especially in the relationship between history and cultural anthropology).

Racism and the question of African statehood

Are people of black complexion ("negroid races" in the terminology of the time) capable of state and nation building? Much more than a specialist of premodern European history would expect, research on African history has focussed on the question, to what degree state-like kingdoms and empires existed on African soil before the colonial period. Over the last few decades, scholars of the Middle Ages in Germany and elsewhere have seriously called into question the traditional point of view that the Empire and the kingdoms of the medieval Latin West can be adequately described as "states"; the idea of the medieval ruler exercising political power defined by constitutional rights and privileges has been replaced by models of conflict resolution, which are to an important degree informed by models developed by social anthropologists describing societies without state structures in Africa or the Pacific World. Even for the early modern period the idea of the modern state imposing itself on its subjects and erasing the autonomy of local communities has largely been replaced by a more nuanced view of a competing and often contradictory top-down and bottom-up developments.

A similar analysis could be applied to precolonial African kingdoms and empires; however, the historian who does so in a global perspective should be aware that he is entering a theatre of war still mined by the pitfalls of Eurocentric racism and Afrocentric (over)reaction. Cheik Anta Diop and other black historians during the era of decolonisation had to deconstruct the racist view that the negroid race as such lacked the intelligence and political instinct which is a prerequisite of successful statebuilding. From the Eurocentric perspective of the 19th and early 20th centuries, African culture (as opposed to European civilisation) was perceived as ahistorical, not subject to political or social change; the lack of literacy supposedly hindered them to conceptualise time as linear and confined them to a circular vision linking the past inextricably to the present in cycles of eternal repetition and largely defined by the rhythms of nature. The formation of states and empires on African soil was not ignored, but attributed to immigrated aristocracies that belonged to a supposed superior "hamitic race" of dark complexion, but of Caucasian origin[1].

Scholars promoting Afrocentrism in order to overcome racial prejudice (Diop, *Nations nègres et culture*; Bernal, *Black Athena*)[2] insisted on Egypt being a part of Africa and the Pharaohs being of black origin (even going as far as proving it by means of melanin analysis of Egyptian mummies). They even tried to link the culture of present day Africa directly to the cultural traditions of ancient Egypt claiming that these had survived in the empires of precolonial Sub-Saharan Africa. Evidence for this theory, however, remains scanty at best.

The limitations imposed by the racist discourse can be overcome much more easily when state authority and empire building is not put into the foreground as a marker of civilisation. Rather, a curriculum of global history should underline that the idea of the modern state emerged in Europe in the later Middle Ages only and that it always remained a strategy to legitimise centralized power rather than an all embracing reality even in Europe.

Africa and the Atlantic world

Were the African rulers victims or equal partners in the slave trade? While the economic importance of the slave trade is beyond debate, the question who promoted it has far reaching moral and political implications. The question in how far African rulers took part in the slave trade as equal partners (and, if yes, for how long they continued to do so) has direct implications for the present day political discussion in how far Europe and the West are historically "guilty" of having exploited Sub-Saharan Africa for a long time (and therefore morally responsible to repair the damage caused). Within this framework, it is a potentially dangerous insight that the kingdoms that provided slaves developed into state-like structures precisely because they needed these structures in order to make war on neighbouring populations in order to get captives which

they could sell to intermediate (mostly Arab) traders who would use them to meet the demand created by the European outposts on the coast.

Another question concerns the African Diaspora in the Atlantic World: to what degree did the slaves exported to regions outside Africa (and some free black migrants who took part in the transatlantic trade) contribute African elements and traditions to the societies that received them? Global history needs to take into account the importance of African individuals and communities outside Africa and the fact that their presence did not leave unchanged the societies in which they lived[3]. Yet, the quest for black traditions in white North America and the post-colonial Caribbean can be limiting and misleading, when it reduces the relevant historical knowledge about the experiences of black men and women in the Atlantic world to a prehistory of the twentieth century struggle of African Americans for equality.

On the other hand, the attitude of *négritude* that emerged in the 1930s among intellectuals of French West Africa can only be understood as a transatlantic phenomenon. Two of the three founding fathers of this early intellectual African equivalent of the US-American black pride movement came from French territories in the Carribean (Martinique and Guyana) and only one from West Africa (Senegal). The movement emerged in Paris where all three of them lived in the 1930s, and it drew its inspiration not only from the Harlem Renaissance in US-American literature, but also from *De l'égalité des races humaines* [On the Equality of Human Races], a book published by the Haitian anthropologist Anténor Firmin in 1885 as a refutation of Arthur de Gobineau's seminal racist *Essai sur l'inegalite des races humaines* [Essay on the Inequality of Human Races][4].

Panafricanism equally was a transatlantic phenomenon. While drawing on earlier ideas by the Liberian Edward Wilmot Blyden and looking to Ethiopia as model of African identity and black liberation, the organisational driving force that initiated the movement was the Jamaican shipowner Marcus Garvey and his Universal Negro Improvement Association that advocated the return of the black population of the Americas to their continent of origin[5].

History and Cultural Anthropology

How and to what extent can ethnological insights contribute to historical understanding? Despite the recent influence of anthropological models in medieval and early modern history, the relationship between historians and ethnologists still can be regarded as a burden when analysing the part of Africa in Global History. When Ethnology/Social Anthropology emerged as an academic discipline in the later nineteenth century, historians strongly opposed the attribution of academic resources to the new field. By arguing that only state building civilisations were worthy of academic research they created the focus on state and empire building that hinders us from appreciating

the full range of African cultures as object of historical research. In addition the exclusion of ethnology from sufficient academic funding reinforced public prejudice toward African cultures. In Berlin and elsewhere ethnologists gained the money needed for their research by organizing an "exhibition of primitive people" at the local zoo. Presenting specimens of non-European populations like zoo-confined animals in an environment that imitated their "natural habitat" was by no means uncommon in the later nineteenth century, but a standard element of world and colonial exhibitions[6].

The tendency to see Africans and their history as the "exotic and less developed other" is deeply rooted in the history (and the prehistory) of both disciplines. Already Hegel had declared that African cultures need not be taken into account in the history of human thought since they were illiterate[7]. Schiller had mentioned them in his explanation of the term "universal history", albeit as representing the "childhood of mankind"[8]. It might therefore seem dangerous to compare well documented present day or nineteenth/twentieth century African societies to premodern European culture. Yet, such comparison is objectionable only within the framework of development theory which take it for granted that present day Western culture is "normal", whereas the primitive other who has not yet achieved the same degree of perfection needs to be explained. If we take into account, however, that the values of Western societies are by no means universal and that Western culture is by no means more perfect than others (despite its superior technical functionality in some fields), cross-cultural comparison transcending the borderlines of epochs becomes a legitimate and even necessary instrument which can help us to explain why premodern societies of Europe were constructed the way they appear in the sources. Overcoming the dichotomy of developed and underdeveloped (or developing) countries and the limitations of the development discourse in this way will not only help us to appreciate the social functionality of seemingly irrational premodern ways of thought and social action, but it also constitutes a powerful shield against racism, since it shows that these ways of thought and social action existed in European and many non-European cultures alike (and in African cultures in particular).

Regional diversity, African tribalism, oral traditions, and the language of political correctness

Beyond these methodological pitfalls, teaching African history in the framework of global history has to address a number of problems in order to enhance student awareness for a number of methodological problems, such as regional diversity, African tribalism, oral traditions as sources, and the problem of appropriate terminology.

The diversity of African civilisations can only be understood when we take into account the different geographical and climatic conditions that prevail in different regions of Africa (Sahel region, the coastal zones of tropical Africa, the forest zone, the mountain regions, etc.). In addition, climatic change has to be taken into account, especially for

the northern part of Black Africa, since the Sahara region became a desert that separated Black Africa from the Mediterranean only during the early Middle Ages. Conditions for agriculture, stock raising and fishing are not the same in all parts of Africa, and neither are the conditions for the preservation of food. Societies that cannot preserve their agricultural products for a long period of time, however, necessarily develop social structures that base authority on the immediate redistribution of wealth rather than on control of reserve structures that mitigate the seasonal difference between times of plenty and times of need as well as between fat and meagre years.

Moreover, West Africa must be seen as a part of the Atlantic world, while East Africa participated in the exchange system of the Indian Ocean. Western Africa and the northern part of East Africa where profoundly influenced by their ties to the Muslim world (Trans-Saharan in the West, coastal in the East), whereas the southern part of Africa developed along other lines. In present day Zimbabwe the Munhumutapa (Monomotapa) kingdom with its important fortification and urban structures shows us that this part of Africa was by no means isolated; although the history of the kingdom, which had existed for centuries and was already in a state of division and decline when the first Portuguese emissaries arrived in the sixteenth century, remains largely unknown because of the lack of written sources. Archaeological finds, however, show that luxury products were imported from the Arab world, India and China; the remaining traces of technologies show similarities with India rather than adjacent regions of Africa, so that some archaeologists even assume direct contact across the Indian Ocean rather than that of isolated imported objects which found their way to Africa through the Arab trade along the East African coast[9].

From the end of 15th century onwards, the influence of European outposts must be taken into account: the Portuguese not only installed bases all along the African coast in order to secure the way of their ships to India, but also succeeded in converting local rulers to Christianity (e.g. in Congo) already in the sixteenth century. Later, trade companies from England, France, the Netherlands, Denmark and other countries active in the Indian trade followed. European settlements remained scattered along the coastline and did not penetrate deeply into their hinterland; nonetheless, they brought their African environment into contact with European culture and knowledge about Africa to Europe.

Also the apparently perennial fragmentation of Africa into a great number of small tribes is at least in part an illusion. Some scholars even maintain that "tribes" are a European invention: a construct of anthropologists forged into reality by colonial administrators who believed in it. Yet, linguistic difference is an unreliable criterion for ethnic distinction. Oral societies do not need a standardised common language, but let dialects emerge freely. How far these varieties must be different for them to be called languages is always a matter of debate (and often a matter of political decision, in Africa as elsewhere: "Serbian" and "Croatian", "Czech" and "Slovak", "Macedonian" and "Bulgarian" are now recognized as separate "languages", whereas the mutually incomprehensible

varieties of spoken Arabic continue to be referred to as "dialects" of the mainly written "Modern Standard Arabic"). European scholars described African tribes as distinct unities according to the model of European nations. Moreover, the division of Africa into seemingly independent tribes does not take into account the complicated systems of alliances which often constitute far reaching networks of exchange and conflict resolution. Tribal conflicts that shake many African states today often originated during the colonial period only. Unable to understand the functioning of "societies without rulers" or finding it difficult to deal with them, colonial administrators often installed one of the respected elders as "chief" in order to have a responsible partner for negotiations. By negotiating with all chiefs separately, they strengthened the position of the chief within his community and destroyed systems of conflict management within and between the tribes (especially where these transcended the artificial boundaries of colonial administration). In other cases, the European colonisers re-defined pre-existing socio-economic distinctions as ethnic boundaries (as in the case of peasant Hutus and aristocratic pastoral Tutsi in Rwanda).

Much knowledge about precolonial African history is based on oral traditions. Oral societies can preserve historical knowledge over many generations. Yet, historical as well as medico-psychological research has shown the malleability of human memory. Oral traditions can be useful to fill gaps left in a framework of fragmentary written sources; however, oral traditions always tend to adapt the past to the present and in an oral society they can do so without leaving traces. The historiography on precolonial Africa therefore stems from an uneven source base: written accounts are usually from outsiders (Arab and European writers), whereas the historical tradition of the Africans themselves are based on oral traditions.

When talking about people of African descent, it is almost impossible to define a politically correct language which can be applied without risk (cf. the debates about "Black Africa" vs. "Sub-Saharan Africa"; "tribe" vs. "ethnie"). Yet, global history and comparative approaches cannot avoid using generalizing terminology which might appear objectionable in other contexts. "Race", for example, has been proven to be an inadequate concept as to explaining cultural diversity, since genetic differences between the races are insignificant compared to genetic diversity within each racial group. Yet, it remains helpful as a historical concept when it comes to describing how visible differences between human beings were perceived in the past and how the corresponding patterns of perception developed in a certain society. Moreover, the problems of terminology differ considerably from language to language; e.g. many words that are widely used in French (*nation*, *ethnie*) are foreign words with a much narrower meaning in German. Rather than imposing a recommended terminology, teaching global and comparative history should enhance the awareness of students that academic terminology is never merely descriptive, that it has developed over time, and that the terminology used today is burdened with a long history of connotations.

Colonisation and decolonisation

African history cannot be taught without addressing the problem of colonisation and decolonisation. Nearly all parts of Africa underwent a long experience of colonisation in the nineteenth and twentieth century, with only two, however, mentionable exceptions: Ethiopia, which as an old Coptic (i.e. Christian) kingdom with a long tradition of centralised power was in a better position to resist attempts at European conquest, and Liberia, that emerged as a state in 1838 (diplomatically recognised since 1848) from colonies founded since 1822 by the American Colonization Society in order to create a homestead for repatriated slaves whose ancestors had come from Africa. For all other parts of Africa, the "scramble for Africa" in the 1880s marked a watershed. Within a few years the colonial powers, who had demarcated their zones of interest in the Berlin Conference of 1883-84, expanded their trade bases and settlements scattered along the African coast into administrative colonial structures covering the whole surface of the continent, much of which had been explored only shortly before.

Despite its success, the colonial expansion remained a matter of debate in the motherlands, especially in France, where Jules Ferry and Georges Clémenceau expressed their opposed point of views in an exemplary parliamentary debate in July 1885[10]. On the side of those who advocated large scale colonisation in Africa and South East Asia, expectations of economic gain and the civilising mission (*mission civilisatrice*) of the European nations were equally important arguments neither of which could be dismissed without putting at risk public acceptance for the colonisation project as a whole. Economic exploitation and forced labour were a reality in most colonies; excessive atrocities as committed in the Congo Free State under Leopold II of Belgium, however, caused an outcry of indignation when they were made public by the Congo Reform Association in 1904[11]. In 1908, shortly before dying as one of the most hatred men of Europe, King Leopold was forced to hand over the Congo Free State to the Belgian State which soon replaced Leopold's system of maximum gain by an ostentatiously paternalistic colonial policy with a strong accent on basic public health and elementary education.

The nature of the European grasp and impact on Africa's social and economical structures varied considerably (direct rule in the French colonies as opposed to the British policy of indirect rule via agreements with traditional authorities). Yet, these distinctions should not be overestimated: even the French had to rely on existing structures of powers in order to cover their vast, but scarcely inhabited territories in West Africa, while the British by no means left the traditional structure of societies under their rule unaltered. In most African colonies colonial administration remained foreign rule with white administrators maintaining colonial order for a small number of white merchants, investors, farmers and missionaries. Only South Africa (including Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and German South West Africa/Namibia) with their less health-threatening climatic conditions could attract European settlers on a sufficiently large scale to

develop into self-governing white communities that transformed colonial rule into a regime of racial segregation ("apartheid").

To what degree the African colonies contributed to the wealth and economic development of Europe remains a matter of debate. The revenues from the system of exploitation (euphemistically called *mise en valeur* in French) were at least in part counterbalanced by the expenses for maintaining and enforcing colonial administration. These costs were a severe burden for the national budgets of the colonising nations, and this explains why all colonial powers (with the exception of the dictatorial military regime of Portugal) granted independence without much resistance when local elites demanded it with increasing insistence at the end of the 1950s, a self-enforcing process described as the "wind of change blowing through (the African) continent" by the British Prime Minister McMillan in his famous speech first delivered in Accra in January 1960 (and a few weeks later before the South African parliament in Cape Town where it was met with much less enthusiasm)[12].

The independence granted to the former African colonies implied full recognition of sovereignty, but this remained nonetheless limited, because formal and informal economic, cultural and military cooperation maintained and even reinforced the ties between former colonies and former colonisers.

Creating national identity and coherence proved to be a most difficult task the nation states. Their borders followed the administrative boundaries of the former colonies as they existed in the late 1950s. Many ethnic groups found themselves divided between several nation states. Almost all new nation states were multiethnic. In many cases, a functional democracy failed to develop as voting followed ethnic allegiance rather than political programmes. In this context, historical research focussing on national history and the history of populations (i.e. the question of ethnic origins and migrations) were as much an academic exercise as an attempt to create, reinforce and patrol boundaries of socio-political inclusion and exclusion. Some states took the names of precolonial Empires in order to claim historical legitimacy. The British Gold Coast adopted the name of the tenth-century kingdom of Ghana which had had its centre in the west of present day Mali (based on largely unhistorical theory of migration which reminds the European scholar of the theory of *translatio imperii* in the medieval Latin west). French Sudan took the name of the late medieval Mali Empire, and Southern Rhodesia borrowed its name from its most important archaeological site, the big stone buildings which had once been the capital of the medieval Munhumupata Empire. Marking a new beginning by referring to the distant past was paramount in these endeavours: Dahomey had been a famous kingdom from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century (not at least because of its regiment of Amazon warriors); yet, its name was tainted by the fact that it had also been used by the French colony founded on its soil. In 1974, the new Marxist government therefore renamed the state "Benin", thus adopting the name of another kingdom, although the latter had its centre in present day neighbouring Nigeria.

Some states later deliberately Africanised their names (e.g. Upper Volta becoming Burkina Faso, i.e. "the home of the honourable people", in 1984; former Belgian Congo being called "Zaire", i.e. "Water", from 1971 to 1999). Others tried to give essence to their new identity as a nation by creating specific ethno-nationalist concepts like *ivoirité* in Ivory Coast. These ideologies reinforced national unity and self-esteem, but also created new tensions by excluding immigrants from neighbouring countries as well as nomads of the frontier regions who constantly migrate between two national territories and marry on both sides of the border (thus invalidating "place of birth" and "origin of parents" as qualifiers determining an individual's nationality).

The elites of the emerging nation states had been trained in Europe. Their hybrid culture and identity made it difficult for them to develop a clear "African" (in the sense of "non-European") identity. Rather than deploring the loss of "authentic" African traditions and culture, historians teaching global history should try to appreciate the enriching achievement of cultural adaptation and development contained in this appropriation of European and African knowledge, values and attitudes.

Present day political discourses on development and globalisation tend to perpetuate the colonial image of African inferiority by construing the Africans as perennial victims of colonisation, their societies as underdeveloped and their political order destabilised by perpetual ethnic conflicts. The problems of present day Africa that need to be explained by external as well as internal factors are numerous: corruption and neo-patrimonialism, façade democracies and failing states as well as the general politico-economic dysfunctionality that the "gate keeper states" of present-day Africa inherited from the colonial administrative structures from which they emerged[13].

In teaching African history in the context of global history, however, historians should not limit their analysis to these problems. They should equally insist on developing their student's understanding of cultural difference (including the inherent rationality and social functionality of African cultures) and stress the particular achievements of African societies beyond the political sphere (including the structures of solidarity that, while hampering economic growth and development along the lines of Western models, have been able to cope with some of the most dramatic consequences of rapid demographic growth in many African countries). In any case, it remains the historian's task to restore agency to those Africans of the past whose voices have been silenced and marginalised by the discourse of white European superiority.

Notes

[1] W.M. Evans, *From the Land of Canaan to the Land of Guinea: The Strange Odyssey of the 'Sons of Ham'*, in "American Historical Review", 1980, 85, pp. 15-43; E.R. Sanders, *The Hamitic Hypothesis: Its Origin and Functions in Time Perspective*, in "Journal of African History", 1969, 10, pp. 521-532; C.G. Seligman, *The Races of Africa*, London 1930.

[2] C.A. Diop, *Nations nègres et culture*, 1954. Id., *The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality?* [Engl. edn.; translation of sections of *Antériorité des civilisations négres* and *Nations nègres et culture*], New York 1974; Id., *The African Origins of Western Civilization*, in R.O. Collins (ed.), *Problems in African History: the Precolonial Centuries*, Princeton 2005, pp. 28-36; cf. F.-X. Fauvelle, *L'Afrique de Cheikh Anta Diop: histoire et idéologie*, Paris 1996; M. Bernal, *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization*, 3 vols., London 1987-2006; cf. M.R. Lefkowitz (ed.), *Black Athena revisited*, Chapel Hill 1996; J. Berlinerblau, *Heresy in the University: the Black Athena Controversy and the Responsibilities of American Intellectuals*, New Brunswick 1999; M. Bernal, *Black Athena Writes Back. Martin Bernal Responds to his Critics*, ed. D.C. Moore, Durham 2001.

[3] J. Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800*, Cambridge 1998; cf. also K. Mann (ed.), *Rethinking the African Diaspora: the Making of a Black Atlantic world in the Bight of Benin and Brazil*, London 2001.

[4] G. Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Négritude and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars*, Chicago 2005.

[5] J.K. Dagnini, *Marcus Garvey: A Controversial Figure in the History of Pan-Africanism*, in "The Journal of Pan African Studies", 2008, 2, 3; online: http://www.jpanafrican.com, accessed 15 April 2011; T.E. M'bayo, *W.E.B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, and Pan-Africanism in Liberia, 1919-1924*, in "The Historian", 2004, 66, pp. 19-44.

[6] A. Zimmermann, *Geschichtslose und schriftlose Völker in Spreeathen Anthropologie als Kritik der Geschichtswissenschaft im Kaiserreich*, in "Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft", 1999, 47/3, pp. 197-210; cf. A. Dreesbach, *Gezähmte Wilde: Die Zurschaustellung "exotischer" Menschen in Deutschland 1870-1940*, Frankfurt am Main 2005; N. Glick Schiller, D. Dea, M. Höhne, *Afrikanische Kultur und der Zoo im 21. Jahrhundert: Eine ethnologische Perspektive auf das "African Village" im Augsburger Zoo*, online: http://www.eth.mpg.de/cms/en/people/d/mhoehne/pdf/africanZooVillage.pdf, accessed 15 April 2011.

[7] O. Taiwo, *Exorcising Hegel's Ghost: Africa's Challenge to Philosophy*, in "African Studies Quarterly", 1998, 1, 4, http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v1/4/2.htm, accessed 15 April 2011.

[8] F. Schiller, *Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte? Eine akademische Antrittsrede*, in "Der Teutsche Merkur", vol. 4, p. 114 (available online at de.wikisource.org).

[9] S. Mudenge, *A Political History of Munhumutapa 1400-1902*, Harare 1988.

[10] D. Spurr, *The Rhethoric of Empire*, in L.D. Kritzman (ed.), *The Columbia History of Twentieth-Century French Thought*, New York 2005, pp. 329-334.

[11] N.C. Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics. Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention*, Cambridge 2002.

[12] F. Myers, *Harold Macmillan's, 'Winds of Change' Speech: A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Policy Change*, in "Rhetoric and Public Affairs", 2000, 3, pp. 555-575.

[13] F. Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The past of the present*, Cambridge 2002.

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Russian/Soviet Historiography on World History (and its Impact on Historiographies in the Soviet Satellite States)

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Abstract

This chapter is devoted to the problem of writing and teaching world history in the Soviet Union under the rule of the Bolshevik party. The author presents an overview of the dominant paradigm based on materialist methodology, with the huge personal influence of the leader of the state – Stalin. This paradigm, which often left no freedom to researchers and led to the falsifying of history was the only permissible one till 1956. Soviet historiography after that date did not change significantly either. The same model was implemented in the central and east European countries after World War II. The situation changed only after Gorbachev's *perestroika*.

Artykuł poświęcony jest przeglądowi i zarysowi paradygmatów pisania historii w ZSSR od rewolucji, poprzez czasy stalinizmu aż po przemiany związane z pierestrojką. Autor porusza również wpływ sowieckiego modelu historiografii na sposób pisania historii w krajach satelickich ZSSR.

"The problems of Soviet historiography are the problems of our Communist ideology"[1].

When thinking about the Russian contribution to the study and writing of world history, one must consider certain conditions, which led Russian historians to make a very specific contribution to our understanding of the past of our planet. The beginnings of world historiography in Russia were similar to other countries and in many ways trivial. Yet with the emergence of the new totalitarian system in the second decade of the 20th-century, the conditions under which history was studied changed dramatically and so did the effects of those studies. Political systems, in particular the totalitarian ones of the 20th century, have influenced the researching and writing of history since the invention of the alphabet and the science of history. However the absolute domination of the study of the past by one political ideology, and one political party, has not been that

common prior to the 20th century. With the emergence of Leninism and its later evolution towards Stalinism, scholars were limited in their work and subject to absolute ideological party control both in the sphere of methods utilized and contents of their research. In effect, a single paradigm of world (and indeed all other forms of) history was imposed from above. The rare discussions, debates and conflicts among historians, even those carried out after the "Thaw" of 1956, did not change the fact that the overall historical agenda was directed by ideology and squeezed into a tight Marxist-Leninist methodological corset. It was only during the late-1980s that the corset was loosened, allowing a certain freedom in the choice of topics, methods utilized and – last but not least – varied conclusions in history research and writing. All this was true for all historians, and in particular for those working on world history. Yet the changes implemented by *perestroika* were far from sufficient, not to say satisfactory.

In the present chapter, I will sketch the beginnings of the study of world history in Tsarist Russia, analyze the Marxist-Leninist paradigm and its meaning for world history, and comment on the state of world history in Soviet historiography under Stalin. These comments are also very applicable to the states, which – following the Second World War – had the misfortune to find themselves behind the 'iron curtain' and were subject to pressure, instructions, or 'hints' from Moscow. The application of the Stalinist corset to world history brought some interesting, albeit unexpected results, especially in the *peoples' democracies* as the countries of the Soviet bloc were often referred to. Finally I conclude with a short reference to the post-*perestroik*a activities of the Russian historians.

World history: a case study

Three thick volumes lie in front of me. Titled *Modern History* (vols. I, II, and III) they are a translation from the Russian language and were first published in Moscow in the years 1953-1958 (the first volume in 1953, next two in 1958). The authors include: B.R. Porszniew, J.S. Galkin, F.W. Patiomkin and others. In fact these names are not important since the authors did not determine the structure and the character of the volumes. Volume one deals with world history from the English bourgeois revolution of the 17th-century through to the French revolution one and a half centuries later[2]. The nineteen chapters cover mostly European history, with one chapter devoted to North America and one touching on the history of Far Eastern Asia. Thus they do not cover the entire world and we can clearly detect a strong Eurocentric twist in the work, which would not be surprising in this type of textbook during this period. What is much more fascinating, and what makes these books differ from western world histories is the methodological approach of the authors. Every chapter brings information and comments on the class struggle and the growing role of the international working class. Thus, chapter six offers a subsection on the class struggle in the USA following the war of independence[3]; chapter eleven talks about the situ-

ation of 'peoples masses' in Holland[4]; chapter eighteen discusses the colonial policy of the bourgeois states[5]. Even though the volume brings a considerable body of information to bear, it is soaked in a strong and spicy Marxist-Leninist sauce. Perhaps the most telling is a visit to the index of names, where Montesquieu is said to be quoted/mentioned on 5 pages, Pascal but once, Voltaire as many as 9 times, while the fathers of the Bolshevik revolution dominate. Thus Stalin is mentioned and quoted on 25 occasions, Lenin on 12 pages, Marx on 72 pages and his colleague, Engels on almost as many. All historical events and processes are interpreted in a Marxist-Leninist methodological framework. Interestingly, removing these additions and reading just the bare historical text leaves us with a modest, albeit acceptable history of a large part of the world. This is a typical textbook from the 1940s and 1950s, which was approved by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for school and university use, and was translated into Polish (and probably other languages as well). It emphasises not so much information about historical facts and processes, but their righteous interpretation in accordance with the prevailing orthodoxy. They offer a form of history where facts were chosen and interpreted to fit the interpretation, not interpretation derived from discovered and determined facts.

Volumes II and III were published in Poland in the years 1962 and 1964[6]. Let us repeat the exercise. A short look at the tables of contents reveals a magnitude of topics from 19th century world history covering almost all important issues from all continents. A visit to the index of persons reveals an even more fascinating phenomenon than we found in volume I. The most quoted names in the book are: Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Since volumes II and III were published in the USSR in 1958 there was no place for Stalin anymore, but the other masters of dialectical materialism are still present. Thus we get a complete history of the world in the period, yet again all seen through the prism of class struggle, capitalist and socialist conflict, imperial colonialism and alike. Volumes II and III do not differ much from volume I with respect to their value for the study of history. They too bear the burden of ideology and the necessity to offer a doctrinally correct reading of the past. Even though 1956 did bring about considerable changes in USSR and the Soviet-controlled countries, one cannot spot any signs of these changes in the volumes, save – of course – for the absence of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin.

Stripped of ideology these three volumes would form a good, if not excellent study aid covering many aspects of world history in a relatively condensed yet balanced way. In its present form the three volume work is practically unreadable due to the notorious Marxist interpretations of various events and processes, and the addition of elements of the Marxist and Leninist visions of history.

The elimination of Stalin and his brilliant thoughts from volumes published after 1956 is extremely telling in itself. The overall vision of historical development has been preserved, with the stress on class struggle and the development of 'the colonial policy of

the imperialist states' retained. The "Thaw" did not bring about fast and visible changes in the historiographical paradigms in the USSR.

The beginnings

The first steps of Russian historiography do not differ much from the history writing of its neighbours and indeed the other European states. It did commence a little bit later, but its beginnings were quite typical of many other European countries. It is generally agreed that Russian historical writing started in the age of Peter the Great. On the monarch's order the historical writings of selected western historians were translated into Russian. Samuel Pufendorf, political philosopher, economist, and historian, was among the first to have his writings published in the Russian language. Later Russian writers used their pens to describe the deeds of their monarch, among others: Feofan Prokopovich; Petr Shafirov; and the author of the first periodisation of Russian history, Vassily Tatischev (*Istoriia Rossiiskaia*). The creation of new scientific institutions such as the Academy of Sciences, as well as the inflow of foreign, mostly German, scholars further enhanced the development of Russian historical studies.

It is Vladimir Ivanovich Ger'e (1837-1919) who is generally considered to be the founder of the Russian school of world history[7]. Having said this, we must be aware of the fact that Ger'e's work was not devoted in any way to the description of world history as such. He was, however, one of the first Russian historians to choose topics concerning 'outside' history, the history of the 'others'. Thus his work can be considered to be world history because it was in a way opposed to domestic, Russian history. Even though he studied and taught the philosophy of history[8], the author himself did not advocate any specific theory of world history.

Ger'e had numerous students and his courses were widely attended, one could even consider him the father of a historical school, particularly on matters of periodisation. This school sought to examine history of the world in various epochs from antiquity, through to the present (first the 19th then the 20th century). In all cases, these historians researched and published on various aspects of non-Russian history, i.e. what was generally perceived as world history. It is in this light that we should view the activities of the only chair in world history at the Moscow University[9]. In those days no attempts were undertaken to discuss the meaning of world, global or universal history. Much more attention was devoted to Russian history and numerous historians presented alternative views on what Russian history was and how it developed. Often these theories were constructed in comparison, or opposition, to models built for western European countries. In particular, M.S. Kavelin understood the growth of the Russian state as a process instigated "from above" as opposed to the western European states, which were built "from below"[10]. All comparative approaches included foreign (i.e. outside) history, but can hardly be considered a truly world history. Rather they sought to illuminate Russia's own development through those comparisons.

The changes of 1917

A dramatic change took place in Russian academia with the October Revolution of 1917, not least in the study of history, including world history. The by-now well developed traditional histories were banned from schools and most universities by the Bolsheviks. The study of the past continued in an unchanged manner for a few years at the Academy of Sciences. This relative freedom was to end after the so-called Academic Affair and mass repressions against historians in the years 1929-1931[11]. Meanwhile, the years immediately following the revolution were utilized to construct a Soviet model of historical science (part of a broad reconstruction of all of the social sciences), which was to be in the service of the revolution and directly under the control of the Communist party. First of all historical study was centralized. The narrow autonomy of various institutions ended, as all were placed under the direct control of party institutions. More importantly, a new theoretical and methodological model of historical materialism was introduced as the only one permissible. Historians had to be re-educated in the new model, or ousted from the study of history. The new model altered the range of permissible research topics as well[12]. At the same time, teaching programs in history were changed and, at an institutional level, Philosophic-Historical Faculties were replaced by Faculties of Social Studies, strongly politicised and under Party control.

The change which was to take place, in particular the overwhelming and binding reference to historical materialism, should be traced back to the emergence of Marxist historiography, which – 'enriched' by Lenin – became the only acceptable historical methodology in the new Soviet state controlled by the Communist party. One of the fundamental paradigms of this understanding of human past has been described by Enteen, Gorn, and Kern:

> Marxism-Leninism, if not Marxism itself, postulates human history as a single revolutionary process. That process is the unfolding of a designated series of what are called socioeconomic formations: primitive communism, slave-holding society, feudalism, capitalism, communism. The process is motored by conflict; especially in the transition from one formation to another[13].

Thus the reading and understanding of history cannot be executed freely, but has to be done within the general model devised by Marxists and Leninists. On the one hand it was impossible to speak of any society from the past, or indeed any contemporary one, without evaluating and explaining it through one of these socioeconomic formations. If a certain historical phenomenon did not fit the Marxist-Leninist model it was either ignored, or reinterpreted and changed to fit the right approach. On the other hand, the search for conflicts among the social classes became one of the motors of the study of history. These principles laid the foundations for the orthodox Marxist-Leninist framework of historical sciences in the 20th century. These principles were applied to world history as well.

In the direct aftermath of the revolution it was Lenin himself who exerted huge influence on Russian/Soviet historiography. As the authors of the passage quoted above write: "Seeking to accommodate Russia to a schema of world history caused him to attend to some features of the past and neglect the others"[14]. History as a collection of stories of individuals, and even groups was neglected as not being worth Soviet scholars' attention or study. The study of the past was worthwhile as long as it could be utilized for the future transformation of society towards full communism. Hence history was depersonalized and many of its significant moments omitted. The history of the world was to be perceived through the filters of class struggle and the changing epochs of human development. This history was soon to be re-divided in new ways, in particular to reveal progressive societies working towards socialism, conservative capitalist ones, and third world countries, which in many cases were the victims of imperialist policies, and thus were worthy of the attention (and assistance) of the newly born leader of world communism. The history of the world was also to be the history of class struggles. Soviet historians, following the political engagements of their leaders (Lenin and later Stalin), set out on a crusade against all reactionary students of the past, who included monarchists, liberals and socialists. Institutional and program changes in the existing institutions were supplemented with new, party-based institutions, such as the Socialist Academy of Social Studies, called to life in 1918[15].

At the same time Communist dogma prevented the study of national histories, at least in their own right[16]. This is true not only for the Russian national history, but equally true for all Soviet republics, whether they be in the European or Asian part of the empire (a similar approach was presented by Communist in Central European countries and the Baltic states after they ended under Soviet domination) in favour of the international (in fact world) workers' movement.

It is extremely important to remember that in the Soviet system historical research and history writing were under direct directives from the party and its members. Historians did not have a choice of the methods and subjects to study; they were told what and how to do, or ... perish. The materialist approach, together with Marxist-Leninist ideology were not a choice, but were the only allowable path, a path which was ruthlessly imposed by the party organs, secret police, and censorship.

Stalin's decrees on history writing

Soon it became obvious that historical study and writing was bound by the methodological and ideological paradigms of Marxism-Leninism. These restrictions became more explicit when Lenin's successor, Joseph Stalin, together with Andrei Zhdanov and Sergey Kirov prepared and put into effect special decrees on writing history[17]. In a number of speeches, articles and polemics Stalin presented his concept of history being based on the analysis of deeds and achievements, not sources and archival materials.

He decidedly objected to any study of history, which was non-Marxist and non-materialistic, but also which questioned his own vision of history, in particular the history of the Communist movement, the party and its achievements. The elimination of historians who were not conformist enough, as well as the ban on a whole range of 'bourgeois' topics, hindered the development of the historical research. Even the older Marxist historians faced the threat of removal from their positions, including physical extermination. This situation was soon made even worse by Stalin's personality cult and its consequences for the study of history[18].

The years 1928 and 1929 mark a very important turn in Soviet historiography and thus historical study and writing in the USSR. Among others it was political factors outside the sciences, such as the collapse of the NEP, Stalin's acquisition of full power, and his struggle with the left (Leon Trotsky) and the right (Nikolai Bukharin), which had consequences on what was to be permissible and what was to be banned in the sphere of scholarship (as well as in other spheres).

The Sixth Congress of Comintern (1928) came up with a new division of the world, which was based on the evaluation of the degree of capitalism developed in that country and its readiness (ripeness) for communism. This classification led to the division of the world into 1) those which have achieved the highest capitalist development; 2) those which achieved a middle level of development; and 3) colonial and semi-colonial countries with little or no capitalism[19]. Such a division naturally called for a new approach to history, and to world history in particular. Russia was claimed to fall into the second category, while countries, which were declared to be colonial and semi-colonial were evaluated as those, which had no possibility of, and no desire to, staging a socialist revolution on their own. The everyday policy of the Communist Party started to have a direct impact on history writing and teaching. One year later Joseph Stalin publicly complained that in the USSR theory of history lagged behind practice[20]. This did not result in a new, communist model of history writing, but allowed for personelle changes among the leading historians.

The new approach meant, that the hitherto leading historian, Pokrovskii, found many enemies and serious attacks from, among others, A.L. Sidorov and I.I. Mints. Simultaneously another event disturbed historians. The First All-Union Conference of Marxist Historians was held in Moscow between 28 December 1928 and 4 January 1929. This meeting brought together a large number of historians of various professions (teachers, journalists, propaganda activists). It was accompanied by the intensification of the state party/campaign against non-Marxist historiography and historians. Non-Marxist historians were removed (at times killed) and all remaining non-Marxist institutions were either taken over by communists or closed. Thus, "The triumph of Stalin resulted in the pathetic servitude of scholarship [...]. The historical profession, as far as one can see, suffered as much as any other"[21].

Short course of writing history

According to Stalin, historians were not supposed to research the past and uncover the truth, but were directed to create it. Facts were not important, and – if necessary – they could be omitted or rewritten for the sake of the party and the nation[22]. 1938 brought the publishing of *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course*, which was edited by a special commission of the CPSU. "Hailed as 'the encyclopaedia of Marxism-Leninism' by Kaganovich, the *Short Course* was the codified culmination of the merciless '*auto-da-fé*' against the historians"[23]. This book set a certain standard according to which all other history books had to be written. As Roger Markwick states: "it was more than a falsification of facts; it was a method, a 'method of omission' [...]. Historiography was nonexistent outside the Party directives"[24].

Thus the model of writing history was set and faithfully executed by several generations. If I write about it in reference to world history, it is because this very paradigm was applicable to all types of history, and world history in particular. World history could only be written and presented as an element, or a segment, of the Marxist-Leninist model of historical development with class struggle, capitalist development, and the inevitable march of historical-dialectic changes. These methods and models were applied to historical facts and processes from Mongolia, through Southeast Asia to Australia; from Africa, through Brazil to Canada. If the historical facts did not fit the proscribed model, too bad for the facts. They were either destroyed, changed, or simply omitted. It was to be history as perceived by the Party; as understood by the Party, as interpreted and changed by the Party.

"*Partiinost'* (party spirit) as advocated by Stalin meant far more than Lenin's injunction that a class perspective was necessary basis of objective knowledge. *Partiinost'* meant that the leadership of the Communist Party was the sole arbiter of historical truth; 'deeds', not documents unearthed by 'archive rats', should be the only test for Party history; certain principles, such as Lenin's Bolshevism, should be axiomatic, not problems open to further interrogation"[25]. These words encapsulate the essence of Soviet history writing, which – along with other constituent parts of Stalinism – was not challenged until the 20th Congress of CPSU in 1956. Thus, as Roger Markwick has observed, "By the time of the Twentieth Congress the social status of history and historians had reached a nadir; 25 years of inquisition, intimidation and enforced intellectual autarky had seen to that"[26].

In the Soviet Union there were no independent historians, there were no independent histories, and there was no independent history. All was controlled by the Party and its apparatus, which had a leader and first executioner in the person of Joseph Stalin himself. The force of the mechanism, as well as fear, subjugation, lack of personal freedom and will, outlived the creator of the method. Joseph Stalin died in 1953, yet nothing seemed to happen during the following three years.

Soviet historiography after Khrushchev's revision

At the congress of February 1956 Nikita Khrushchev condemned Stalin, his methods and the personality cult of his predecessor. What did it mean for historians of USSR? The "Thaw" did bring about some change among scholars and allowed for a change in research, approach and thinking about history. What did not follow was a fundamental split with past methods, in particular with the Marxist-Leninist model. Stalin himself was now excluded, but his mentors – Marx and Lenin – retained their standing.

In his work on *The Uses and Abuses of History*, Marc Ferro gives a very simple, if not oversimplified, vision of Soviet historiography[27]. Opening with a quote from Khrushchev in 1956[28], he maintains that history in the USSR had always been treated instrumentally and was always subject to a very strict control. What distinguished it from other authoritarian regimes, if not from George Orwell's dystopia, is the fact that it was not the state, but the Party which controlled what was researched, what was published and most importantly, what was taught to society.

He claims that there were four important turning points in the USSR's historiography after the revolution. The first came in 1927 with the stopping of communists in Europe and China. For example, this political turning point deeply affected the interpretations of Russia's relationship with imperialism before 1914 which were considered acceptable. Up until then, N.N. Vanag and N.M. Pokrovsy had considered imperialism in Russia to be subordinate to western capital, whereas a group gathered around Arkady Sidorov maintained that the Russian imperialism was autonomous. However, if Russia was a 'dependent imperialism' this, as Ferro points out, implies that "she was too backward to establish a form of socialism on her own". This, he continues, "simply gave arguments to the Trotskyites. Thus Sidorov's theory was seen as right, and those of N.N. Vanag and N.M. Pokrovsky wrong. They turned into 'bourgeois falsifiers' and both died, it seems, in the camps, whereas Sidorov joined the Academy of Sciences"[29].

The second turning point came with the year 1933-1936. This time it was connected with the growth of Fascism and Nazism in Europe and the need to seek compromise with countries opposing Hitler, as well as playing the role of helper to the small countries. Thus the semi-colonial model became mandatory, Vanag and Pokrovsky were rehabilitated, and history was understood differently again.

The third, and more general, turn is that of 1956 and de-Stalinization started by Khruschhev at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. The theories promoted by Stalin were to be neglected, yet Soviet history remained in the grasp of politics and a specific understanding of patriotism (country patriotism, but also joint interests of all working people, often more strongly emphasised than those of national/ethnic groups)[30].

The last turn came with Mikhail Gorbachev and *perestroika*. Old, ideological instructions were abandoned, but often nothing was proposed in their place. With the country

deep in crisis, the Chernobyl accident and confrontation with Reagan's USA, the Soviet establishment had more burning problems than rewriting and controlling history writing. Many historians and pseudo-historians took to their pens, and often their narrative was driven by their wallets (writing what would sell), rather than historical facts[31].

Turning to the problem of teaching world history to children Marc Ferro brings a very simple, and in a way optimistic, view concerning practices in the USSR and later. Even if this is not continued at the university level and is strongly biased by Marxist theory and Leninist ideology, we still get a very interesting model. Thus Ferro writes:

> At school, world history and Soviet history are taught in alternation. This combination produces a complete vision of countries' past which is the most systematic in the world. The Soviet textbooks are vaguely reminiscent of French works of the Malet-Isaac or Halphen-Segnac type. They are classical, even though they are designed to a Marxist pattern. The general historical works assign a relatively sizable part to extra-European cultures [...] and give a better balance between the histories of different societies, Africa, India, Asia, Europe, than do other such works. This is of course an effort to see societies' development within the framework of a large-scale Marxist periodization, and is not meant as a challenge[32].

Mikhail Gorbachev's *Perestroika* and history writing

Nikita Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalinist political methods, but also of his pseudoscientific paradigms did not result in a significant change in history writing in the USSR, not least for the writing of world history. Although historical practice was not as dominated and controlled by the Party, the only permissible methods and interpretations remained within the widely understood materialist-Marxist way of seeing of history.

The changes connected with *perestroika* and Gorbachev were different and more significant. They did not lead to an absolute and immediate shift from earlier approaches to Soviet and world history. The new political approach, the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the USSR all opened new possibilities for historians and researchers. In particular they were asked to explain the phenomenon through which the population has just lived. What needed to be done was an analysis of what had happened and why? As far as I know, such an analysis, full, reliable and honest, has not been carried out so far, although one does find some attempts to tackle this issue.

The article published by Vladimir Sogrin and Alexander Chubaryan in *Social Sciences*[33] in 1990 is far from what one would expect, but at least it is an attempt – though an utterly unsuccessful one. They write: "It seems that in Soviet historiography a simplified interpretation of socio-economic formations according to the theory of Marx and Lenin was widespread, the sources of which are found in the 'Short Course' of the History of the CPSU"[34]. The problem, according to Sogrin and Chubaryan, lies not in the Marxist interpretation of history and the concept of inevitable development, but

in this theory being taken without question and without interpretive nuance. Thus, Soviet historians did not, or could not, explore the idea that two of Marxist formations could exist and cooperate with each other. In effect many extremely important aspects of world history were neglected and lost. When discussing the periodisation of world history in Soviet times, Sogrin and Chubaryan point to the fact that history was divided into only three periods: from the beginning to the 1640 English revolution; from 1640 to the Great October Revolution and finally from 1917 to the present. All world historical phenomena had to 'fit' into this framework, and if they did not – too bad for the phenomena. Of course subdivisions existed (e.g. the Paris Commune), but since these subdivisions were also determined by ideology, they were not much more helpful[35]. In the remaining part of their essay, the authors discuss the role the individual played in Soviet historiography (as opposed to the masses), they assess the attitude of Russian historians towards foreign historiography, and finally concentrate on history of international relations.

The conclusion is worth quoting, as it shows a certain self-assurance on the part of the authors, in spite of the fact that they do not bring forth any facts to confirm it:

> We should clearly see those achievements, which our Soviet historical science has accumulated in the study of world history. This real contribution has been highly appreciated by world historical science, particularly at world historical congresses. Now the matter is that on the basis of the achievements we have to make a qualitatively new step forward, take a fresh look at the processes and phenomena of world history, renew our methodological instruments, overcome the simplification, dogmatism, include the mastering of the experience of the world history into those processes of renovation which form ideological and intellectual potential of the restructuring[36].

Possibly this was premature and could not point to any significant new developments. Five years later a more objective author stated that:

> The years since 1985, when *glasnost'* sparked off the first sustained public questioning of the Stalinist orthodox interpretation of Russian and Soviet history in the Soviet Union, have been stimulating times for all Russian and Soviet historians. The stream of revelations, discussions, conferences and writings has gradually begun to fill in the blank spots and shed light on a variety of topics and issues. The recent moves to open up the archives, and increased contact with scholars from the East, promise to make the next few years even more exciting[37].

As Roger D. Markwick rightly points out in his excellent work:

> [T]he success of Stalin's enterprise can be seen in the reluctance of professional historians to respond to the explosion of interest in Soviet history and historiography in the Soviet Union half a century later. In 1987 it fell to the party leadership to initiate discussion and to appeal for a radical reckoning both with the past and its mode of representation – an appeal answered at first only by writers and media historians and then, a great deal more cautiously, by professional historians[38].

One could add that it was the *Homo Sovieticus*[39] dwelling inside each scholar which prevented them from the immediate, fast, and radical challenging of the past methods. This in turn prevented any serious changes in the approach towards world history. When a new wave of historical writing really emerged with the introduction of more freedom in the countries of the former USSR, it concentrated on domestic and local history on the one hand, and sensational stories from the past, which sell well on street stands, on the other. World history was neither attractive for the media, nor needed in the process of *perestroika*; unless – of course – it was world history analyzing the position of the Russian Empire and later the USSR in world struggles.

Satellite states: the case of Poland

The Marxist-Leninist model was implemented in the Soviet Russia along with the revolution, and strengthened with the access of Stalin to power. There was no margin of freedom left and history, including world history, was rewritten according to Party directives. This model of history writing was imposed by force on USSR's satellite states as a result of Stalin's hegemony in central and eastern Europe after World War II. All Czech, Bulgarian, Romanian, Hungarian and Polish universities and research institutes had no option but to adopt the new paradigm. In Poland, the Stalinist model was propagated by the Polish Workers' Party (since 1948 the Polish United Workers' Party), and its glorious entrée took place during the 1st Congress of Polish Sciences in 1951, and at a specially organized First Methodological Conference for historians in Otwock at the turn of 1951/52[40]. Both meetings were manned by Soviet historians, who – in a relatively friendly manner – instructed Polish historians on history writing. As in the USSR all non-Marxist models and interpretations were criticized and were to be abandoned. World-renowned Polish historians, who did not wish to collaborate, were forced into non-existence. We do know, in the years immediately following the war, of cases of them being arrested and eliminated.

All sciences, all writing and publications, were put under the strict control of a specially-created Censorship office. Nothing could be printed and published without their permission and these rules were in force until 1989. The situation of historians, world historians included, in all Communist-ruled countries was placed in a similar corset to Soviet history writing[41]. The only permissible world history was that written according to Marxist principles and promoting the Soviet approach to history. The "Thaw" of 1956, as well as elements of the Prague Spring of 1968, or Poland's adventure with Solidarity in 1980-1981 were often a fresh breeze, allowing for much more freedom in research and expression of one's historical views, than experienced beyond Poland's eastern border.

Postscript

The overall picture painted above does not raise one's enthusiasm, nor does it leave much space for optimism. Such is the truth I am afraid, and one can only hope such historical writing will not return. At the same time Ferro's words about teaching history are right: school historical education, albeit Marxist in tone and interpretation, was broad and often solid. Knowledge, especially in the Soviet satellite states, when stripped of ideology, was often much more impressive than among the western students. One should also add, that after 1956 those areas of history, which had little, or no Marxist implications (e.g. history of Central Asia) resulted in some very good scholarship and excellent works.

Notes

1 A. Pankratova, *Konferentsiya chitatelei zhurnala "Voprosty istorii"*, 1956, vi, 2, p. 213; quoted in R.D. Markwick, *Rewriting History in Soviet Russia. The Politics of revisionist Historiography, 1956-1874*, Basingstoke 2001, p. 4.

2 B.F. Porszniew, S.D. Skazkina, *Historia Nowożytna* [Modern History], vol. I, *1640-1789*, Warsaw 1954.

3 *Ibid*., pp. 163-172.

4 *Ibid*., pp. 253-260.

5 *Ibid*., pp. 395-410.

6 I.S. Galukin et al. (eds.), *Historia Nowożytna* [Modern History], vol. II, *1789-1870*; vol. III, *1780-1918*, Warsaw 1962, 1964.

7 G. Varnadsky, *Russian Historiography. A History*, Massachusetts 1978, p. 201.

8 Ger'e even published on the philosophy of history: *The Philosophy of History from Augustine to Hegel* [*Filosofija Istorii ot Augustina do Gegelia*], Varnadsky, *Russian* cit., p. 202.

9 Held at the end of the 19th century by M.S. Kavelin and after his death in 1899 by R.Iu. Vipper. Varnadsky, *Philosphy* cit., p. 235.

10 A.G. Mazour, *Modern Russian Historiography*, Connecticut 1975, pp. 120-123.

11 Changing the Academy from a Russian into a Soviet one, the authorities sacked the majority of scholars. As if this was not enough, many of them – including historians – faced accusations of acting against the Soviet system and thus were put on trial, sentenced and in some cases even executed.

12 A.F. Grabski, *Dzieje historiografii* [History of Historiography], Poznań 2003, pp. 655-656.

13 G.M. Enteen, T. Gorn, C. Kern, *Soviet Historians and the Study of Russian Imperialism*, University Park 1979, p. 3.

14 *Ibid*., p. 5.

15 Grabski, *Dzieje* cit., p. 658.

16 As Sebastian Stride argues in this volume, in Central Asia national histories were created under the Soviets to facilitate their passage through the required 'stages' on their passage to communist utopia.

17 Enteen, Gorn, Kern, *Soviet* cit., p. 54, note 10. These decrees were phrased relatively early, at the turn of 1920s to 1930s, but were published for the first time in 1936.

18 Grabski, *Dzieje* cit., pp. 675-676.

[19] Enteen, Gorn, Kern, *Soviet* cit., p. 16.

[20] *Ibid*., p. 17.

[21] *Ibid*., p. 23.

[22] Markwick, *Rewriting* cit., p. 15.

[23] *Ibid*., p. 42.

[24] *Ibid*., p. 43.

[25] *Ibid*., pp. 38-39.

[26] *Ibid*., p. 41.

[27] M. Ferro, *The Use and Abuse of History, or how the past is taught to children*, London - New York 2003.

[28] *Ibid*., p. 163.

[29] *Ibid*., p. 172.

[30] *Ibid*., p. 174.

[31] The arrival of Putin changed the situation as once more, we see an attempt to rebuild official, state historiography, which closely resembles the old USSR patriotic model, but history writing under Putin is a completely different issue, which needs new research and is a living process.

[32] Ferro, *Use* cit., p. 177.

[33] V. Sogrin, A. Chubaryan, *Highlighting Some Problems of World History*, in "Social Sciences", 1990, 2, pp. 35-45.

[34] Sogrin, Chubaryan, *Highlighting* cit., p. 37.

[35] *Ibid*., p. 38.

[36] *Ibid*., p. 45.

[37] M. Sandle, *New Directions, New Approaches, Old Issues. Recent Writings on Soviet History*, in "The Historical Journal", 1995, vol. 38, 1, p. 231.

[38] Markwick, *Rewriting* cit., p. 4.

[39] *Homo Sovieticus* is a term invented by a Soviet sociologist Alexander Zinovyev. In a sarcastic and critical way it describes those people, who have a specific mindset that does not allow them to think creatively and freely, but makes them follow the Soviet paradigm created by the regime.

[40] Z. Romek, *Cenzura a nauki historyczne w Polsce 1944-1970* [Censorship and Historical Science in Poland 1944-1970], Warsaw 2010. The author devoted his whole work to the analysis of implementation of Soviet model of history writing in Poland, with special emphasis put on the role of censorship.

[41] J. Basista, *Soviet Influence on History Teaching and Textbooks in Poland*, in "OAH Council of Chairs Newsletter", 1997, 55, February, pp. 9-14.

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American Exceptionalism: The American Dream and the Americanization of East-Central Europe

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Abstract

In this chapter I would like to look at some historical aspects of the American exceptionalism, which is one of the most important concepts of American cultural identity and ways of thinking about the history of the USA. I will try to associate it with the image of a unique land and country of "boundless opportunity" and "abundance and plenty". The country, which became a "dreamland" and a "promised land" for millions of newcomers from East-Central Europe at the turn of the 19th century, who came to America with hopes to realize their dreams for a better and prosperous life. I will then consider US involvement in the First World War and global politics, which became a sort of American mission, according to President Woodrow Wilson, in the fight for "democracy, peace and justice" and a "better world". This was very important for world and global history. US policy and spreading its ideals, values and the "American dream" in the postwar Poland and Czechoslovakia (chosen as case studies for the region) affected the intensity of fascination about America and the Americanization of East-Central Europe in the 1920s.

Od zarania dziejów Amerykanie byli przeświadczeni o swojej wyjątkowości, co miało duży wpływ na kształtowanie ich tożsamości, jak i rolę odegraną przez nich w świecie. Amerykańska demokracja, ogrom możliwości i nieprzebrane bogactwa stawały się coraz częściej obiektem fascynacji i marzeń Europejczyków. Młoda republika intrygowała wielu podróżników, także Polaków, którzy po utracie własnej niepodległości pod koniec XVIII wieku widzieli w niej uniwersalne wartości – demokrację i wolności. Od drugiej połowy XIX wieku, podczas postępującej kolonizacji Zachodu i przyśpieszonej industrializacji, Stany Zjednoczone – jako uosobienie kraju dobrobytu, bogactwa i wielkich możliwości – stały się obiektem marzeń i krajem docelowym dla milionów imigrantów. W ostatnich dekadach wieku zaczęła się fala emigracji z Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, w tym m.in. Polaków, Czechów i Słowaków, w przeważającej mierze ludności wiejskiej. Udawali się oni do „zie-

mi obiecanej", „kraju niezwykłego i wyjątkowego", „krainy demokracji i wolności" z nadzieją na polepszenie swojej sytuacji materialnej. Wielu z nich zrealizowało tam swoje życiowe plany, stając się w przyszłości uosobieniem amerykańskiego sukcesu.

Amerykański udział w I wojnie światowej i zaangażowanie Woodrow Wilsona w rozwiązywanie problemów „Starego Świata" oraz jego poparcie dla idei państw narodowych przyniosły mu ogromną popularność w krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, a zwłaszcza Polsce i Czechosłowacji. Należy pamiętać, że jego polityka i promowanie przez agendy rządowe „American dream", jak również pomoc American Relief Administration wzmocniły przekonanie o przewadze gospodarczo-politycznej, technologicznej i cywilizacyjnej Ameryki nad „Starym Światem", a w niemałym też stopniu kształtowały wyobrażenie o jej altruistycznej misji w świecie. Czynniki rządowe USA, jak również Polski i Czechosłowacji, oraz emigranci z tych krajów przyczynili się w dużej mierze do propagowania mitu Ameryki i jej wyjątkowości, a w następstwie do fascynacji wszystkim, co amerykańskie. Wpłynęło to po I wojnie światowej na postępującą amerykanizację tych krajów i szerzej regionu, którą wyraźnie zahamował światowy kryzys gospodarczy.

In every period of American history we can find a lot of arguments about a very special place and destiny of its people to create a new (read: better) society in the "New World". The notion that America and Americans are chosen, special, and exceptional, because of the uniqueness of their historical experience has many historical explanations. The concept of American exceptionalism was used to search for the peculiar and unique in American identity, character and history, and to describe the "more perfect society", the "best political system", and its higher values of abundance, opportunity, superiority and the like. According to its supporters, America's unique political philosophy and its democracy provided the best model for other nations. The promotion of democratic ideals and institutions has been, and still is, a prominent part of American political ideas and declarations, not least in US foreign policy. This crucial and very complex theme has been extensively debated and reinterpreted[1].

It is worthy of notice that the meaning of exceptionalism is pretty capacious and Americans frequently redefine it. One of the better known ideas is the assumption that the United States has always been a country of "true democracy and freedom", of "opportunity, abundance and plenty", and a "promised land" for the newcomers.

Country of liberty, freedom and democracy

For centuries America was an exciting and curious land for many eager to discover the "New World", for travellers, and those who were searching for the adventure and the desire to get rich. From its beginnings America also was supposed to offer freedom, democracy, and an opportunity for many persecuted people. After the partition of Po-

land, and from the end of 18th century, many of its countrymen looked on the United States as a free and democratic republic, which became a dreamland for oppressed people. In pamphlets, newspapers and various other contemporary writings, America was presented as an exceptional democratic country and society, which offered hospitality and better life. Polish-American heroes, such as Tadeusz Kościuszko and Kazimierz Pułaski, became symbolic exponents of fighting for the universal ideas, "very special and dear" to both nations, namely "liberty and freedom"[2].

The perception of America as a "land of liberty", "a guardian of freedom" and "happy republic" had been shared by Americans since the "founding fathers", the declaration of independence, and the drafting of the Constitution. Soon this image of a democratic, free and exceptional country was disseminated by foreign travellers who admired the American system, its ideas, its ideals and the achievements of the newly established republic. One of them was Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz, the Polish writer and aide-de-camp to Kościuszko, who published his fascinating recollections and diaries from his visit in the young republic[3]. His writings reinforced the positive image of a new country "beyond the ocean" during the early decades of 19th century.

Many European visitors became propagators and defenders of the idea of US exceptionalism. The most famous among them was Alexis de Tocqueville, a perceptive and keen observer of America during his visit in 1831-1832. In his fundamental work *Democracy in America* (1835 and 1840), he focused attention upon the basic essentials of American civilization and its political system. He sympathized with and admired Americans, yet doubted that their institutions could be successfully adopted by other nations. In a sense de Tocqueville also thought about the American experiment with democracy in terms of exceptionalism[4]. Certainly, his writings strongly affected European perceptions of the American democracy.

Travellers' writings and 19th-century reportages about the "fantastic land" and a "great republic" strongly influenced Polish perceptions of America, creating a widespread fascination with a legendary country far away from Europe. Some of these were already published, first in the Polish newspapers and periodicals, such as "Gazeta Polska", "Kronika Rodzinna", "Kłosy", "Przegląd Tygodniowy", "Niwa", and later on in books about America[5]. Writers formed mainly positive opinions about America and Americans, although they also noted some strange and negative aspects. Above all they emphasized the uniqueness of the country and its system. Such descriptions of such a mysterious country, often based on personal experience, were intriguing, exciting and thrilling for many readers.

Henryk Sienkiewicz, the novelist and later Nobel Prize winner played a significant role in creating this image and popularizing America among Poles. He went there in February 1876 and spent two years travelling around the continent and sending impressions in the form of "letters" from America to the daily "Gazeta Polska" and later on had them published in book version with several editions[6]. Some "letters" appeared in the same

years, 1876-1878 in various newspapers and journals, such as the "Kurier Codzienny", "Przegląd Tygodniowy" and "Gazeta Handlowa". They received a lot of attention from readers eager to learn more about rather legendary America.

Sienkiewicz, who was familiar with de Tocqueville's book, focused a lot of attention on American democracy, freedom, and the political system. The writer was impressed enormously by America and its democracy, the more so when he compared it implicitly with autocratic regimes in Europe and oppressions experienced by Poles (censorship meant that he could not write about it openly). He was impressed by "democracy in practice" in every day life. He wrote:

> Here democracy applies not only to the affairs of state but also to customs and behavior. It exists not only as an institution and theory, but as practice. Here people from different groups are actually and truly equal: they can live together, they can be friends with one another, they belong to one society, they sit at the same table [...]. I have to admit that social happiness is incomparably greater in America than anywhere else in Europe, generally speaking, and that American democracy is closest to the social ideal for which we have been striving for ages[7].

Sienkiewicz became quite fond of the country – open, friendly and providing chances and opportunities not only for its citizens but also for the newcomers. Many times and in many ways he repeated that America is truly a rich country and promising for everyone who might come. He wrote about the abundance of land and real opportunities for a good job, explaining that in America "poverty in European sense" did not exist. According to him:

> That wealth of America is greater than anywhere in Europe is explained by a simple fact that at least a hundred times more land falls to one man here than in Europe, and that everyone can get an additional 160 acres of land almost for free, because it is to be purchased over ten years at 1.50 dollar an acre. At the same time, as I mentioned before, the same attitude toward land also brings a high price for labor while things for everyday use are cheap[8].

Such information about the opportunity for the economic betterment was much welcomed, especially by those whose resources in their own countries were relatively meager. Such people looked toward America as a potential place for emigration and a chance for a better life.

Letters from an America Journey, notwithstanding its subjective approach and some fictional aspects, is valuable as a picture of 19th-century America. It distributed to Polish readers information about the country beyond the ocean and created an image of it. Sienkiewicz's writings impressed readers tremendously and stimulated a lot of eagerness and fascination about the mysterious and rich country, full of farmland and promising opportunities for everybody. Moreover a few his *Letters* were devoted to the problems of emigration to America, the Polish colonies there and living conditions etc[9]. They still influenced Polish reportage in the 1920s[10].

Sienkiewicz also informed Polish readers about the debut on the American stage in August of 1877 Helena Modrzejewska (later known there as Modjeska), who at the California Theater in San Francisco realized her desire to play "Shakespeare in his own language". He predicted that the actress would conquer America, which indeed happened. Her later popularity and great career became a splendid example and proof that in America dreams come true[11]. A few decades later in the 1920s Polish actress Pola Negri (whose family name was Apolonia Chałupiec) became a Hollywood star and for millions of people from East-Central Europe she personified the American dream and a magic career from "rags to riches"[12].

A "PROMISED LAND" FOR MILLIONS

American democracy created an opportunity and possibility for a better life for its citizens, and also for foreigners, who for a long time were admitted to the "New Land" without restrictions. The United States is a country of immigrants. This unique ethnic, religious, and cultural mixture has always been enriching and seen as an "exceptional history of American society", making it – to a considerable degree – tolerant and open to other cultures[13].

With plenty of natural resources and abundance of land the United States was attractive to millions of foreigners. Since the mid-19th century, and especially as the colonization of the West and industrialization accelerated, America became a destination for many Europeans seeking economic opportunity. After the first huge wave of so-called "old immigration", in the last decades of the 19th century the next one started – "new immigration", predominantly from East-Central and Southern Europe. For many people from Austro-Hungary and Russia at the turn of the 19th-century America became almost a "sort of paradise" and a "fantastic society", the more so when they compared its freedom, and opportunity to the oppression, poverty and unjustice in Europe. Poles, Ruthenians, Slovaks and Czechs, but also Jews, Hungarian, Slovenes, and Italians had quite similar expectations and dreams about such a rich country, offering opportunities for work and a better life. Some of them escaped from the police oppression, religious persecutions, personal failures or family problems etc. but more were economically motivated. They simply wanted to earn some money and eventually to go back to their native countries[14].

The mass Polish emigration to the United States, called *za chlebem* ("for bread"), reached its peak in the last decade of the 19th century and then it continued, despite some restrictions, until the First World War. The immigrants were predominantly peasants from poor rural parts of partitioned Poland, mostly from Austria-Hungary and Russia. They were thrilled by the exciting stories from relatives' letters about the exceptionally rich country, which offered a great opportunity to everybody. As one emigrant recalled:

> They also sent photographs. They were so nicely dressed and it's hard to imagine that simple workers can afford it. I've been thinking a lot that America must be a strange country. Just ordinary people, yet look like clerks. From the photo you may judge they are well fed and, what's more, they send money to their relatives. [...]. After second thoughts I decided to risk my savings for the trip to America. I wanted to try my own luck beyond the ocean and to see with my own eyes the paradise of workers[15].

America ("Hameryka", as they incorrectly called it) was imagined to be unbelievably rich, truly exceptional country, with "dollars instead of leaves on the trees". This was very tempting, especially for the young, yet poor, people who were determined to experience the "great America" and earn a lot of money there. Certainly, such a wishful image of the unknown country was created, fed by the exaggerated, sometimes fictional, stories of their relatives and the positive experiences of others.

So then whoever heard about America wanted to go there for the "golden fleece", if needed or not. They went to America for money, a better life and a brighter tomorrow.

> There were villages in Galicia, where somebody from every house went to America. After a short time they started to send some money to those who had been left at home. The cousins, supported in such way by dollars, were improving their living conditions and some of them acquired more farmland. There were also people who sold their small homesteads and with the whole family went to America for good. That was the best thing to do[16].

Such stories raised eagerness of their relatives, who wanted to join them and repeat such a happy American experience in getting rich. For many Poles, Czechs and Slovaks at that time, it became an exciting dream to go to the "land of opportunity", "flowing with milk and honey"[17].

The majority of emigrants knew very little about America, which became rather a legendary than a real country. They idealized the country by comparison with their homelands. After arrival America made a profound impression upon many of them as a country of immense richness and variety, but also rather unfriendly surroundings and unimaginably hard work. Quite often they found that opinions of their relatives about a "wonderful, happy and comfortable life" were exaggerated and far from the truth. Some of them were cheated by the agents, who had promised them "good work and an enormous salary"[18]. The reality was less promising but many of them, thanks to their determination and hard work, improved their finances and comfort of living and stayed forever in America.

Spreading the "American dream" and Wilsonism

Since the First World War spreading American culture and values came under greater US governmental direction. The Committee on Public Information (CPI), created in 1917, constituted the first official effort to convert the world to "the Gospel of Americanism". Its director, George Creel wrote later on, "we did not call it propaganda". According to him it was "dissemination" of the American values; others named it "spread-

ing" or "selling the American dream". The real goal was popularization of America, its ideals, generosity, power, superiority etc. Posters, leaflets and pamphlets with brief information about American ideas and reasons for the intervention in Europe were disseminated around the fronts. This was Creel's immense contribution in promulgating American values and American dream widely[19].

However, the two million American soldiers in expeditionary forces in Europe, with their equipment, fancy gadgets, canned food and cigarettes became the most effective propagators of American wealth and abundance. They also became the visible symbols of superior America, its ideals, democracy and freedom under the guidance of the great leader, moralist in politics, and man of vision, President Woodrow Wilson. America and Wilson became for a time the chief exponents of democratic ideology and moral principles in politics, especially in the eyes of small East-Central European nations[20].

President Wilson, deeply drawn into international affairs, continued to seek more adequate and noble inspirations and motivations for the US policy. He very often declared that even small nations and states have a right to equal treatment and to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty. The president, often seen as a crucial exponent of national self-determination, saw in their creation part of the US mission and "the act of historical justice" in building the new international order. In his view, the First World War was a "war to end all wars" and a war to make the world "safe for democracy". His declarations were considered by Americans and many Europeans to be a part of US special mission in spreading the American values, e.g. individualism, liberty and democracy. Wilson declared for a just and permanent peace[21]. The President's fascinating phrases proved to be a mighty instrument of propaganda in the world. Such rhetoric, supported with the understanding by his countrymen, was appreciated in Europe too, and was connected closely with Wilsonian idealism in peacemaking[22].

Wilson's message of 8 January 1918 and especially the 13th point about the independence of Poland made him a hero in Polish eyes and encouraged his later legend as a moral leader and missionary devoted to establish a "justice, freedom and order" in the "Old World". Wilsonian self-determination became the strongest base for the mythologization of his policy, e.g. special mission and altruism in the US foreign policy. For Poles, Czechs and Slovaks Wilson symbolized the good will of America toward their native lands. He became a "defender of democracy", "new Messiah" "moral judge", "apostle of freedom", "founding father" and a "liberator" of Poland and Czechoslovakia for millions of grateful countrymen[23]. The Wilsonian legend survived there long after he had become unsuccessful and almost forgotten in his homeland in the 1920s. He became one of the most popular and cherished politicians in the region. Many streets, schools, buildings, and institutions were named after him, and monuments were dedicated to his memory[24]. This was extremely useful in the years to come in creating the image of America as a friendly power, a sort of "great sister republic" to their small friends in East-Central Europe, namely Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Certainly, the American president played an active role in the creation of the new states in East-Central Europe, but it was largely exaggerated. Nevertheless, he was presented consequently as a moralist, "judge with a vision" and a "devoted missionary" implementing the American ideals and ideas in the region. His idea of the League of Nations was also considered a part of his vision in building the post-war peace and the international order and was appreciated the most in Czechoslovakia. Wilson became the legendary hero for millions of people, mostly because of the sociological need for such a myth of the missionary (not a politician) who dedicated – in the name of great American republic – his activities to "justice", promotion of the "highest ideals" and "fighting for the humankind"[25].

Polish officials on many occasions emphasized Wilson's ideals and appreciated his integrity in politics and his great contribution to the independence and to the world peace. He was owed a special gratitude for the "friendship" and for "bringing the Gospel of freedom" to the oppressed people of East-Central Europe[26]. The propagation of America, its democracy, ideals and values, superiority of its economic and political system etc. resulted in the creation of a very positive image of America and spread its legend widely.

Similarly, in Czechoslovakia President Wilson was also a "special friend and hero". His portrait hung in all governmental offices in Czechoslovakia. The main train station in Prague and several buildings in the capital city, as well as in other towns were named after him. On many occasions Czechs and Slovaks showed their gratitude to America and Wilson for the moral and diplomatic support for their independence, as well as for the humanitarian aid they received[27].

Besides Wilson there was another American hero who was recognized and cherished in interwar Poland, Czechoslovakia and also to a lesser extent Hungary – humanitarian Herbert Hoover, director of the American Relief Administration (ARA). Its activities contributed a lot to the promotion of American uniqueness, e.g. charity, idealism, generosity, but also US economic power and superiority of its political system[28].

In the years to come Hoover was very popular, admired and almost worshiped by millions of East-Central Europeans, and also by Belgians, Finns and Italians. He symbolized and personified the best of America – its idealism, humanity, charity but also opportunity of the prosperous, abundant and wealthy country. Hoover himself was a poor boy, a Quaker, an orphan, who became a very successful businessman, millionaire and public servant, who shared his ideals and wealth with needy Europeans. His life was an excellent example of career from the "rags to riches", which was a powerful and significant part of the "American dream".

Fascination with America and the Americanization of the region

An overwhelming fascination with America and the conviction of its moral, economic, technological, and civilization superiority over the "Old World" was strong in East-Central Europe and particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the early-1920s. The "invasion of

Americanization" was usually associated with ideals and patterns of American democratic system, its financial power, wealth, mechanization, modernization, culture etc. The packages, food and medical supplies sent after the First World War and, above all, the "magic dollars" sent to the families and relatives of emigrants strengthened the extremely positive image of the abundant and rich United States where everybody could live comfortably.

After the Paris Peace Conference, English became the language of diplomacy, equal to French, and played an important role in spreading the "American dream" and in the Americanization of the whole world, including Europe. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, the daily press, occasional pamphlets, books on America and works of fiction, the literature about ARA, YMCA, YWCA etc. only strengthened the image of the best of America – its democracy, idealism, charity, and generosity in sharing of its wealth[29]. Such a belief that other nations could and should learn and replicate America's own ideas and experience were widespread in the countries of East-Central Europe. It was a part of American policy better known later on as a cultural diplomacy.

It should be also added that American diplomats, particularly envoys and consular officers in Warsaw and Prague (such as Hugh Gibson, John B. Stetson, Richard Crane, Lewis Einstein) played an important role in propagating everything American and spreading the "American dream". They promoted not only a positive image of America but also encouraged Poles and Czechs to learn "American business, its methods and efficiency", the political system, and even occasionally the American way of life. Poles, as well as Czechs, Slovaks and Ruthenians were very fond of American technology, American mechanization, and their embodiment: Ford cars. They thought highly of American efficiency, work methods and organization, professionalism etc. and they tried to implement some of them in their countries[30]. Also Herbert Hoover in the 1920s, as the head of the Department of Commerce, efficiently promoted not only American products but also American values and the superiority of its political and economic system. Obviously, the success of US food, money and technical know-how nurtured American prestige in Europe, especially in East-Central Europe[31].

Americans introduced into the European market Coca-Cola and chewing gum as well as cars, machinery, equipment, highly evaluated by customers as the best and excellent. The trademark "made in America" for many people in East-Central Europe stood for a high quality product. In the 1920s Hollywood films – the very embodiment of the "American dream" – became very popular in all of Europe, including the countries of the region discussed, which were heavily Americanized[32].

Fascination with America and everything American after the First World War became very strong and visible in Poland and, to a lesser extent, Czechoslovakia. Polish officials themselves – and above all, the great pianist and prime minister, Ignacy Jan Paderewski – further propagated a positive image of superior America and its system, and in consequence facilitated the Americanization of Poland[33]. In Czechoslovakia, a similar

role was played by President Thomas Garrigue Masaryk and his family fascinated in many ways by American values and culture. Masaryk used to recall his admiration for the "principles and practices of American democracy" and influence of Thomas Jefferson's and Abraham Lincoln's writings on his political philosophy. On many occasions Prague officials emphasized that Czechoslovakia's democracy, like that of the United States, was based on the principles of liberty and justice[34].

Some successful emigrants who returned to their homelands in Poland, Bohemia, Ruthenia, Hungary or Slovakia became local incarnations of the American dream, strengthening its hold on their neighbours. They could buy farmland, afford equipment and modern household and fulfil some other needs. In a very visible way they did improve the standards of living and did implement some innovations, modernization etc. Those successful returning emigrants were often nicknamed "Americans" in their native villages and they Americanized, intentionally or not, the neighbourhood. They were proud of their American experience and success and became the most effective propagators of America, its wealth, economic superiority, democracy, efficiency, even life style etc.[35]. With American dollars they fulfilled their own hopes for better life, and hence realized in practice their "American dream".

For many immigrants who improved their standard of living and economic status, the US became the new country, where dreams came true. American prosperity in the 1920s provided, in many ways, great opportunities for its countrymen and newcomers as well. Most of those who came earlier to the US saved money, brought relatives over and achieved domestic security and social status. They enjoyed the comfort of modern technology, such as electricity, cooking facilities, heating etc. They bought cars, houses with gardens, refrigerators, and radios and they were very proud of the fruit of their hard work. They came to believe in the superiority of everything American. For them, their families and relatives America became the "best place under the sun" and "very special dear country"[36]. Yet, for many people from East-Central Europe, because of US immigration restrictions in the early 1920s, America was an inaccessible dreamland – magic and desired.

The image of unbelievably rich and prosperous America was created mostly by the Polish, Czech, Slovak and Ruthenian immigrants, the returning emigrants and visitors from the United States who disseminated a lot of stories about their own careers from "rags to riches". For their countrymen who knew them as poor peasants from the neighbourhood this was a proof that America was truly unique – a country of opportunity and great possibilities, where success was possible for everybody. Some immigrants wrote about their successful and easy American life with a great satisfaction[37].

As one immigrant wrote:

> My wife was getting so used to America as if she were born here. She got very fond of all kinds of American gadgets. [...] She can't live without condensed milk and the kitchen equipment. The kitchen in America is a boon for women[38].

For thousands of them seeking a better life and opportunity, which inspired them to cross the ocean to get to America, their dream came true.

American Poles praised also the American system, democracy and freedom, especially in comparison to the situation in homeland. Anyway, the more they compared America with Poland, the more they admired the first as the best and exceptional. What is worth mentioning is the fact that about 100,000 Poles came back to Poland after the First World War, but shortly afterwards many of them returned again to the US[39]. Simply, they could not accommodate themselves to living in Poland any more. They preferred to stay and enjoy a more comfortable life in the rich, prosperous and abundant country, which also offered better prospects for their children.

Conclusion

The notion that the United States and its history are different from other countries is obvious. In a sense America is exceptional, the more so that the faith in the uniqueness of its experience, destiny and the idea of promotion of its ideas and progress in the world (e.g. mission) were inherent parts of American history.

From the turn of the 19th century and especially during the prosperity of the 1920s, as exemplified also by Seymour Martin Lipset, the promise of material success for everyone working for it became the fulfilment of the "American dream"[40]. This alone might somehow be enough to consider America superior and exceptional. For millions of immigrants – who realized their hopes for the better life, America became truly a unique country: a land of opportunity and freedom, abundance, progress and prosperity.

Many people in East-Central Europe and particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia were fascinated by the United States' economic, political and cultural power, and its mechanization, efficiency, mass production, openness, generosity etc. Exhausted by the war, disillusioned with their own societies, Europeans wondered whether they should not adopt the methods of prosperous Americans. Fascination with America and a certain cult of this democratic, wealthy and modern country, offering great prospects of financial success and career, functioned in countries of the region till the end of the 1920s, e.g. till the economic crisis.

Since the First World War and the spreading the "American dream" around Europe we may observe, especially in Poland and to a lesser degree also in Czechoslovakia, the growing fascination with America and the process of Americanization of these countries. President Wilson's moral leadership ("war to end all wars" and make the world "safe for democracy") was continued during the Second World War by Franklin D. Roosevelt ("arsenal of democracy"). After the war the concept of US exceptionalism was reborn again with astonishing strength, also outside of America. The assumption that the United States had always been different (read: better) from the "Old World" and, on the other hand, a real

fascination with its abundance and culture, was proved in many ways by a truly exceptional situation of America in the bipolar system after 1945.

Notes

1 Let me mention just a few books: B.E. Shafer (ed.), *Is America Different? A New Look at American Exceptionalism*, Oxford 1991; S.M. Lipset, *American Exceptionalism. A Double-Edged Sword*, New York 1996; D.L. Madsen, *American Exceptionalism*, Edinburgh 1998; A. Gutfeld, *American Exceptionalism. The Effects of Plenty on the American Experience*, Brighton - Portland 2002; E. Glaser, H. Wellenreuther (eds.), *Bridging the Atlantic: The Question of American Exceptionalism in Perspective*, Cambridge 2002; W.W. Caldwell, *American Narcissism: The Myth of National Superiority*, New York 2006; A. Bacevich, *The End of Exceptionalism*, New York 2008; G. Hodgson, *The Myth of American Exceptionalism*, New Haven - London 2009.

2 Z. Libiszowska, *Opinia polska wobec rewolucji amerykańskiej w XVIII wieku* [Polish Public Opinion on American Revolution in the 18th Century], Łódź 1962.

3 J. Ursyn Niemcewicz, *Podróże po Ameryce, 1797-1807* [American Journeys, 1797-1807], Warsaw 1959.

4 A. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. II, New York 1948, p. 36. He wrote: "The position of the Americans is therefore quite exceptional, and it may be believed that no democratic people will ever be placed in a similar one".

5 J. Gordon, *Przechadzki po Ameryce* [Walking in America], Warsaw 1866; S. Wiśniowski, *Listy z Czarnych Gór* [Letters from Black Hills], Warsaw 1875; K. Wolski, *Do Ameryki i w Ameryce. Podróże, szkice obyczajowe i obrazki z życia mieszkańców Ameryki,* Lwow 1876 (*American Impressions.* Trans. M. Moore Coleman, Cheshire 1968); R. Łubieński, *Z Ameryki* [From America], Warsaw 1900.

6 H. Sienkiewicz, *Listy z podróży do Ameryki* [Letters from an American Journey], Warsaw 1950. The English edition and translation by Ch. Morley is titled *Portrait of America: Letters of Henry Sienkiewicz*, New York 1959.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 185.

8 H. Sienkiewicz, in *America Through Polish Eyes. An Anthology*. Selected and with commentaries by B. Grzeloński, Warsaw 1988, pp. 191-192.

9 Sienkiewicz, *Listy* cit., pp. 368-406.

10 Above all Z. Dębicki, *Za Atlantykiem*, Warsaw 1921; J. Makarczyk, *USA. Obrazki z Ameryki powojennej*, Warsaw 1925. See also M. Piechota, *Jaka Ameryka? Polscy reportażyści dwudziestolecia międzywojennego o Stanach Zjednoczonych*, Lublin 2002.

11 H. Modjeska, *Memoirs and Impressions of Helena Modjeska. An Autobiography*, New York 1910. The actress after nearly 30 years in the United States, in her own words, "became Americanized in many respects". She admired and dearly loved the adopted country where also her son Ralph Modjeski achieved a great career as a civil engineer and bridge-builder.

12 P. Negri, *Pamiętnik gwiazdy* [Memoirs of a Star], Warsaw 1976.

13 Glaser, Wellenreuther (eds.), *Bridging* cit., p. 265.

14 A. Brożek, *Polonia amerykańska, 1854-1939* [Polish-Americans, 1854-1939], Warsaw 1977.

15 *Pamiętniki emigrantów. Stany Zjednoczone* [The Memoirs of Emigrants. The United States], vol. I, Warsaw 1977, p. 136.

16 *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 154, 159-160.

17 *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 362-364, 440. For more see H. Parafianowicz, *Inter-War America through Immigrants' Memoirs: Between Expectations and Experience*, in L. Klusáková (ed.), *"We" and "the Others": Modern European Societies in Search of Identity. Studies in Comparative History*, Prague 2004, pp. 211-220.

[18] *Pamiętniki* cit., vol. II, pp. 230-231.

[19] G. Creel, *How We Advertised America*, New York 1972, pp. 238-239; E. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream. American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945*, New York 1982, pp. 1, 79-81; F. Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion. American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933*, Ithaca 1984, pp. 169-173.

[20] See H. Parafianowicz, *Woodrow Wilson i jego legenda w międzywojennej Polsce* [Woodrow Wilson and His Legend in the Inter-War Poland], in "Dzieje Najnowsze", 2001, 1, pp. 59-70.

[21] J.M. Cooper Jr., *Breaking the Heart of the Word: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations*, Cambridge 2001.

[22] K. Clements, *Woodrow Wilson: World Statesman*, Boston 1991; J.W. Schulte Nordholt, *Woodrow Wilson: A Life for the World Peace*, Los Angeles 1991.

[23] In 1919 in Polish everyday press, e.g. "Gazeta Warszawska", there are a lot of articles and extremely positive comments on Wilson.

[24] H. Parafianowicz, *Restoration of Poland and Czechoslovakia in Woodrow Wilson's Policy: The Myth and the Reality*, in D. Rossini (ed.), *From Theodore Roosevelt to FDR: Internationalism and Isolationism in American foreign Policy*, Staffordshire 1995, pp. 55-67.

[25] *Czechoslovakia's Tribute to the Memory of Woodrow Wilson*, Prague 1924. Wilson's policy was critically examined and depreciated in Czechoslovakia after the Second World War, namely in S. Hájek, *Wilsonovská legenda v dejinách CSR* [The Legend of Wilson in the History of Czechoslovak Republic], Prague 1953.

[26] The newly established after the First World War Polish periodical entitled "Ameryka" ("America") was fully dedicated to "promotion of American ideals and everything American". Wilson and Hoover were frequently mentioned there.

[27] "Current History", 1921, 5, p. 844; R.J. Caldwell, *The Economic Situation in Czechoslovakia in 1920*, Washington 1921, p. 16.

[28] S. Špaček, *Herbert Hoover inženýr humanity* [Herbert Hoover: Humanitarian Engineer], Prague 1922. For more on it see my article *Mit amerykański i amerykanizacja Czechosłowacji po I wojnie światowej* [The Myth of America and the Americanization of Czechoslovakia after the First World War], in "Dzieje Najnowsze", 2000, 3, pp. 19-33.

[29] In 1921 a special edition of magazine "Świat" (The World) was dedicated to America and its values spreading around the world, such as democracy, peace and charity. Czechs were nicknamed the "Jankees of Central Europe".

[30] J. Kose, *America in Czechoslovakia*, Prague 1922; also H. Parafianowicz, *Czechosłowacja w polityce Stanów Zjednoczonych, 1918-1933* [Czechoslovakia in the US Policy, 1918-1933], Bialystok 1996.

[31] More about it: H. Parafianowicz, *Zapomniany prezydent. Biografia polityczna Herberta Clarka Hoovera, 1874-1964* [The Forgotten President: A Political Biography of Herbert Clark Hoover, 1874-1964], Bialystok 1993.

[32] Roman Dyboski, distinguished professor from the Jagiellonian University and Kościuszko Foundation scholar was critical about the impact of the Americanization of Poland and Europe in general (R. Dyboski, *Amerykanizm* [Americanism], Warsaw 1932).

[33] I.J. Paderewski, *Pamiętniki* [Memoirs], Warsaw 1951, pp. 270-318. He was also personally grateful to America for his music career established there at the end of 19th century.

[34] J. Carter, *Masaryk Is an Apostole of Democracy*, in "New York Times", 11 December 1927, IV, p. 5; E. Benes, *Democracy Today and Tomorrow*, New York 1939, p. V.

[35] There is a lot of information about it in *Pamiętniki* cit.; T. Radzik, *Społeczno-ekonomiczne aspekty stosunku Polonii amerykańskiej do Polski po I wojnie światowej* [Social-Economic Aspects of the American

Polonia Relation to Poland after the First World War], Wrocław 1989, pp. 109-111; A. Tezla (ed. and transl.), *The Hazardous Quest: Hungarian Immigrants in the United States, 1895-1920. A Documentary*, Budapest 1993.

[36] *Pamiętniki* cit., vol. I, pp. 184, 190, 217, 394, 405, 413; vol. II, pp. 191-192, 223, 305, 452.

[37] *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 217, 261.

[38] *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 81.

[39] Radzik, *Społeczno-ekonomiczne aspekty* cit., pp. 101, 110-111.

[40] Lipset, *American Exceptionalism* cit., pp. 77-90, 287. He also argues about the absence of socialism as an element of US exceptionalism.

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Id., *Woodrow Wilson i jego legenda w międzywojennej Polsce* [Woodrow Wilson and His Legend in the Inter-War Poland], in "Dzieje Najnowsze", 2001, 1, pp. 59-70.

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World, Global, and Imperial History in British Historiography

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Abstract

This short chapter considers in broad brush terms the dominant ways in which the history of the world has been written about within British academia. It suggests that although one can find attempts at synthetic world history by individual authors, prior to the 21st century the tendency has been to partition the world into discrete fields of study: British and European history, international history, imperial history, and Area Studies. Most of the world has fallen under the aegis of the last two, a legacy of empire and decolonization itself. It finally tracks the way in which a number of British historians, particularly those working on the British empire, have begun to shift to writing about global history. While this is less of a departure than it first appears, it is argued that this re-positioning is potentially fruitful.

This brief and speculative foray into 'meta-level' historiography began, innocently enough, with a request from the CLIOHWORLD history network to write a side of A4 on the tradition of world history writing in 'my country': the United Kingdom. What sounded on paper like a simple task proved surprisingly difficult. Two problems emerged. Firstly, while the United Kingdom has very long and rich traditions of writing about the history of the globe, these have until recently generally not been conceived of as 'world' history[1]. As I shall argue below, the writing of total accounts of the world have been rare and, crucially, did not generate debates on which a deeper specialised literature could rest. Rather, for scholarly (and especially teaching) purposes, the globe has been partitioned into different avenues of study – as often as not firmly separated analytically. In particular, writing about the vast majority of the globe was frequently but not invariably entwined with the writing of the history of empire, the British empire in particular, and with 'Area Studies' – the study of particular portions of the extra-European world. A second objection to my task (which I will illustrate selectively throughout this piece) was an uneasiness with the seemly contradictory idea of a 'national approach to world history'. In particular, ideas about different parts of the world in Britain have long been exchanged with other European countries, across the Atlantic,

and with many parts of the former British empire. Equally within the United Kingdom a number of traditions have co-existed. For example, Oxford, Cambridge and the University of London (and indeed their constituent colleges) each have their own distinct traditions of imperial history[2]. As John Mackenzie has recently suggested, Scotland (along with the other component nations of the UK) has had a separate, but often overlapping, tradition writing on the experiences and actions of Scots in the wider world[3].

This chapter seeks to provide an overview of Britain's *de facto* world history traditions. It focuses particularly on the historiography of empire in Britain, and on Area Studies, which, it is suggested, have been the primary (but not the sole) lenses through which historical research of the wider world has been generated. The first section sketches writing about the world prior to the mid-1950s, suggesting tentatively that, following the Enlightenment, the attempt at universal history became marginal in Britain and that 18th century authors, when they looked beyond Europe, more often had their concerns framed by imperialism. The second section traces historiographical trends in the second half of the 20th century. In the era of decolonisation and its aftermath, the study of the globe remained fragmented, although a number of rich traditions emerged, especially post-decolonization imperial history and Area Studies (again never sealed off from historiographical developments elsewhere). The final section observes that more recently and in different ways a number of historians, particularly those working on empire, have re-conceptualised their studies as global or transnational history.

Universal History divided: the age of empire, c. 1750-1950

Reflections on the wider world in the British Isles date back at least to the 16th-century voyages of discovery, to the travel literature they generated, and to attempts to construct knowledge of a global past on that basis. Yet a real point of departure came in the 18th century when, in dialogue with French *philosophes* and other continental thinkers, the leading denizens of the Scottish Enlightenment such as Alex Fergusson and David Hume engaged in attempts at writing universal history. At the same time Britain's position in the world transformed through the century, and increasingly reflections on the wider world became entwined with reflections about an expanding empire (and the loss of an older Empire in the American Revolution, finally confirmed in 1782). Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, when discussing international trade, devoted considerable attention and criticism to the imperial (or mercantile) systems which sought to shape that trade. Thus, Smith's work constitutes an early point at which the imperial and the global became intertwined in British writings[4]. In some ways, Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* continued this trend, offering the final demise of the Romans as a warning to the newly waxing modern *imperium*[5]. The link between classical precedent and the imperial present remained widely appreciated in the 19th-century[6].

Through the 19th-century world history (or the study of the wider world) continued to shed these enlightenment universalist pretensions and was moulded by the imperial project. Leading thinkers henceforth were more likely to write more specifically on the empire (on its merits or ills) than to seek to place that empire's history and peoples into universal histories. (Ironically, it was the German Karl Marx's pursuit of a historical materialist universalism in the reading room of the British Museum that was the most significant attempt to take place in 19th-century Britain!). This narrowing focus was reflected in the choices of subject when many leading thinkers looked overseas. For example, the utilitarian John Mill wrote a *History of India*; John Stuart Mill, his Liberal son, wrote on colonialism; while the Cambridge Regius Professor of Modern History J.R. Seeley's *Expansion of England* described imperial expansion, especially through migration[7]. Seeley was of particular significance (The *Expansion of England* only went out of print in 1956, the year of the Suez Crisis). He offered a critique of the dominant 'Whig' history focusing on internal progress in Britain, by arguing that it was the expanding 'Greater Britain' of the settlement empire (in Canada, Australasia, the Cape and the West Indies) which had been the greatest feature of modern British history. While Seeley hoped to launch a more expansive vision of British history, the unintended consequence of his work was to initiate the study of the history of the British empire as a separate, distinct, entity[8].

Equally important in some ways were dissenting traditions criticising imperialism, dating back at least to Smith, and to other late-18th century figures, in particular Edmund Burke's attacks on the East India Company and its governor-general Warren Hastings. Nineteenth-century radicals, such as Richard Cobden, John Bright, Goldwin Smith and J.A. Hobson criticised the costs of empire, thought it served only the interests of Britain's upper classes, were sceptical of its supposed benefits for those they ruled, and feared Britain would be corrupted by the vast despotism it presided over[9]. Hobson's classic *Imperialism: A Study* (1902) brought these concerns together and gave them new historical depth, arguing that a new imperialism emerged in the 1870s, driven by the interests of financiers, and affecting Britain, the continental imperial powers, and the United States[10]. Lenin's writings on imperialism drew on Hobson, while his interpretations influenced other 20th-century British critics, such as Leonard Woolf, and continue to shape debates on British imperialism today[11].

This focus on imperialism (whether to justify or criticise) limited the intellectual space for world history. Often there was a tendency to see world history as a tale essentially of expansion, something that remains embedded in the titles of courses in some British universities (classically in Cambridge's 'Expansion of Europe'). By the Second World War, the course of British imperialism (formal and informal) had touched virtually all corners of the globe and imperial history tended to stand as a proxy for much early modern and modern world history (or the history of Europe's interactions with most of the non-European world), while international history covered great power relations[12].

In the early-20th century, attempts at a thoroughly world history were often the preserve of mavericks or amateurs: H.G. Wells or Arnold Toynbee spring to mind[13].

Decolonisation, specialisation, and diversification, 1950-2000

By the 1950s, relatively sharp divisions existed between European History, International (diplomatic) history, and Imperial History (the rest). In that sense 'world history' as a distinct discipline tended not to be studied as a whole in the way it was in the US. There was no William McNeill operating in post-war British traditions (although there is a danger in drawing a sharp divide between the different anglophone historiographies, McNeill was a student of Toynbee's after all)[14]. International History tended to focus on the clashes of powerful states – exemplified in Paul Kennedy's *Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (with its emphasis on the economic and geographical foundations of global power)[15].

Meanwhile, the history of the large part of the world fell under the aegis of imperial history and, from the late-1950s, the emerging disciplines of Area Studies, and for that reason these fields will be discussed in some detail, to illustrate the richness with which large swathes of the world could be studied without consciously pursuing world history as such. Against the backdrop of decolonization, imperial history lost its triumphalist overtones (and its capital letter). Two Cambridge historians, Roland Robinson and Jack Gallagher were influential in reshaping the subject by emphasising the role played by extra-European actors and events in creating and sustaining empire; and by arguing that as well as the formal colonial empire, Britain had also possessed large swathes of 'informal empire' in particular in Latin America, China, and the Middle East. As a result, the remit of imperial history came to far exceed the boundaries of the British empire. Following Robinson and Gallagher, historical debates in the sixties, seventies, and early eighties often focused on issues of power, governance, and economics, at times inflected by the clash between Marxism and liberalism[16]. Robinson and Gallagher's emphasis on the role of non-Europeans in the construction of the British empire also promoted a deeper study of non-European societies.

This intellectual shift chimed with the rise of Area Studies which often deliberately sought to show that Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, China had their own autonomous histories (indeed Area Studies at times tended to marginalise the importance of imperialism to this end). African and South Asian history in particular have flowered in British universities, with concentrations in Oxford, London – especially the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS – which, despite the colonial overtones of its name, had a particular reputation for radicalism), and Cambridge; as well as Edinburgh, and for a time Aberdeen. Historians working on these topics did not form insular 'British schools' but divided amongst themselves, and along global historiographical fault lines. For example, many historians of South Asia responded rather to historiographi-

cal traditions in the subcontinent (particularly subaltern studies which sought to reconstruct the histories of India's 'subaltern' classes). Subaltern studies in turn reacted against a so-called Cambridge School of Indian History which it accused of an overly mechanistic and materialistic view of Indian politics[17].

Given the rise of Area Studies, and the sheer volume of specialised publication in the 1980s, one historian, D.K. Fieldhouse, wondered whether 'imperial history' could be reconstructed[18]. If such fears were, or indeed are, grounded, then the prospects for world and global history must, if anything, be bleaker! However it seems that Fieldhouse's worries proved premature. Debates in the imperial history tradition were revived in the 1990s by a new synthetic account by Peter Cain and Anthony Hopkins which (drawing on Hobson amongst other older thinkers) emphasised the role of the economic interests of the City of London in shaping the contours of British imperialism[19]. In the late-1980s and 1990s the study of decolonization also gathered pace[20]. In 1999 the publication the five volume *Oxford History of the British Empire* also demonstrated the vitality of British imperial history, not only through the scholarship it offered, but also by provoking a good deal of criticism[21].

This criticism came not least because new questions were being asked of the imperial past which the *Oxford History* was thought to have either overlooked or attacked. Many of these new approaches were directly or indirectly inspired by the writings of the Palestinian-American literary critic, Edward Said, who emphasised the way the west was constructed through representations of the orient: 'orientalism'[22]. In his wake, and drawing on other strands of post-modern thought, many 'post-colonial' theorists began exploring the cultural forces shaping and underpinning colonialism[23].

At the same time, many historians in Britain began to explore the ways that identity in Britain had been shaped by its empire[24]. One manifestation (the so-called 'new imperial' history) emphasised the role of racial difference, and explored in turn the links between constructions of race and gender, and the imperial project[25]. The links between empire and British culture were also tackled using the tools of empirically-grounded social history by John Mackenzie and his influential (and voluminous) 'Studies in Imperialism' series published by Manchester University Press; both of which emphasised both the depth and diversity of engagement with the empire in Britain[26]. Since the turn of the 21st century, the impacts of empire on Britain, have been a matter for debate, with Bernard Porter challenging both Mackenzie's work, and that of many 'new imperial' historians, re-stating the older belief that the British had been 'absent-minded imperialists', uninterested in their empire. Part of Porter's argument rests on a critique of a tendency among some new imperial historians, and followers of Mackenzie, to consider anything 'overseas' to be 'imperial'[27]. Thus, as Simon Potter has pointed out, this debate has highlighted how little we know of the impact of the world as a whole on modern Britain – the context in which any debate on the impact of empire must take place[28]. Again, a concern with empire has until recently occluded the global.

The exception to the rule, and the strongest attempt at a genuinely world, as opposed to imperial, international or European, history in late-20th century Britain came from the Marxist Historian of Britain and Europe, Eric Hobsbawm, in his great quadrology – *Age of Revolutions*, *Age of Capital*, *Age of Empires*, and *Age of Extremes*[29]. (Marxist history provided a strong dissenting tradition in Britain, but generally still bifurcated into British, European, and imperial.) This placed the birth of the world economy and struggles between capital and labour at the heart of a history which, although it started out as a European project, evolved to encompass the world. Inevitably it retained a certain Eurocentricity. More importantly, it did not spawn a broader literature dissecting the interpretation's components (except so far as it fed into more localised or regionalised debates), something which characterised the vitality of the different branches of imperial history and Area Studies. As far as interpretations on a truly world scale go, more sustained scholarly attention was probably paid to the 'world systems theories' of Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre Gunder Frank, and Samir Amin, all originating outside of the UK[30]. As often as not such theories, with their emphasis on the way the world's peripheries have been exploited and underdeveloped through unequal exchanges with the world's capitalist core, were (and often effectively) critiqued from the perspectives of imperial history or Area Studies[31].

Thus late-20th century scholarship saw rich and varied approaches to the study of aspects of the globe. The largest portion fell under the remit of imperial history and Area Studies; it was rare for British-based historians to shift beyond this to world history. Rather, world or global history primarily existed in Britain within international, imperial and extra-European history (nor have any of these things really been studied in a hermetically sealed national way). As far as teaching goes – while hard to generalize – British universities still tend to split the subject along these lines. Similarly, the clusters within History Departments and research seminars are often defined in these terms (particularly for the modern period). There remains no equivalent of 'Western Civ' or World History which is a staple of the US undergraduate experience. Such was the position at the start of the new millennium.

The twenty-first century: the global turn

Recently though the idea of global history has become more widespread, particularly as former 'imperial' historians and Area Studies specialists re-invented, or re-designated, themselves as global historians[32]. Since 2002 Cambridge's extra-European historians have taken up the term global history, particularly A.G. Hopkins (*Globalization and World History*, and *Global History*), and C.A. Bayly (*Birth of the Modern World*)[33]. This Cambridge School in many ways seeks to revive the old project of articulating a single world history by delineating stages of development, but present a multi-polar world and one in which non-state actors and processes form the core drivers of global history. P.K. O'Brien, an economic historian at the London School of Economics (formerly based

in both Oxford and Cambridge) has, after a career focusing on the political economy of empires, also taken a global turn, calling in the opening issue of the "Journal of Global History" for the unbounded pursuit by historians of connections and comparisons on a world scale[34]. In Oxford, John Darwin's *After Tamerlane* (and his recent *The Empire Project* on the British Empire, which also seeks to re-integrate imperial and international history) places the politics of competing empires at the heart of the narrative of global history – imperial history here becomes the driver of world or global history[35].

Imperial, global, and transnational history have collided in other areas of British historiography. Alan Lester (Sussex) and Zoe Laidlaw (Oxford, then Queen Mary, London), along with Tony Ballantyne (Auckland, NZ) have reconceptualised the British Empire as a series of transnational networks through which identities were constructed and (especially in Laidlaw's work), power contested[36]. It is a short step from this to an exploration of transnational connections more broadly – imperial networks become one amongst many forms of global connection. Similarly, the history of global Britishness, and Britain's relations with settler societies have been revived by British-based scholars (especially in London and Oxford) such as Carl Bridge, Kent Fedorowich and Phillip Buckner, as well as other scholars in the former dominions in a series of conferences and publications on the 'British World'[37]. Here the emphasis is on the 'globalisation from below', rather than the top down exercise of British power, particularly the way migration from Britain resulted in networks (and the emergence of multiple British identities) which bound a large part of the world together[38]. In different ways, James Belich and Andrew Thompson and Gary Magee have argued that 19th-century economic globalisation was fundamentally bound up with the emergence of this British world[39]. An earlier, but similar development has occurred in the study of the 18th century, although amongst scholars of the Atlantic World, it is the ocean not any particular ethnicity, empire, or identity, which forms the basic unit of analysis, with emphasis placed on the study of the oceanic circuits of exchanges of goods, people, and ideas, and their repercussions. The Atlantic World has been an Anglo-American project, although among its leading proponents has been the British-educated, US-based, historian, David Armitage[40]. In some ways these new literatures are all reviving the study of transnational and global history in the UK today in ways that more *explicitly* seek to 'think globally'.

These re-inventions of imperial history as world or global history arguably owe much to the universal adoption of the term globalisation in contemporary discourse, and, at times, debates in the US. This is particularly obvious in the Harvard-based Oxford-educated historian Niall Fergusson's defence the British empire, for all its warts, as an agent of economic globalisation and modernisation. In Gibbonian fashion (i.e. implicitly), Ferguson offers the history of the British empire as a parable for American policymakers, and has gone on to write histories of American imperialism and, most recently, an unashamedly populist and Eurocentric (and in many respects deeply old-fashioned) world history[41].

Conclusion

Many of these trends have arguably, been as much shifts in style and language as in approach. Area Studies and imperial history (new and old) had long overlapped in Britain, and long been committed to a multi-polar account of empire, and to decoupling imperial history from the history of the areas ruled. Similarly it was difficult to see how one could undertake the essential activity of analysing the histories of migration, trade, investment, missionary activity or most of the other activities that underlay the global role played by Britons in the 19th century without, implicitly if not explicitly, studying networks[42]. It is also doubtful that this is a uniquely British shift: the German historian Jürgen Osterhammel has trodden a similar path, publishing on 'informal empire' and colonialism before moving on to globalization[43]. The recent re-articulation and re-synthesis of Britain's tripartite traditions (imperial history, Area Studies, international history) to draw on the language of global and transnational history may not, then, be a true historiographical revolution. Indeed, the very ease and ubiquity with which imperial historians have embraced the global suggests otherwise. Nonetheless, the older traditions of world history which, implicitly have always been present in Britain, have much to offer as they take a global turn. Moreover the adoption of the term global leaves no excuse for the lazy equation of the term 'empire' with 'overseas'. Equally the formal stripping away of conceptual, disciplinary, and territorial barriers may allow new research agendas to emerge. Thus, and to end on a decidedly un-Gibbonean note, it looks likely that this global turn will prove a fruitful re-positioning as well as allowing historians to speak to contemporary concerns.

Notes

1 Here I take world history to be history seeking to encompass the world as a whole in its analytical frame. Its recent cousin, global history, seeks to produce histories unbounded by narrative or traditional specialist boundaries (through the pursuit of connections and comparisons) but perhaps without quite the totalising pretensions. See Janny de Jong's contributions to this volume for further discussion.

2 On the Oxford tradition, see for example R. Symonds, *Oxford and Empire: The Last Lost Cause?*, London 1986.

3 For an overview of the different 'national' historiographies on the British empire, see J.M. Mackenzie, *Irish, Scottish, Welsh, and English Worlds? The Historiography of a Four-Nations Approach to the History of the British Empire*, in C. Hall, K. McClelland (eds.), *Race, Nation and Empire: Making Histories, 1750 to the Present*, Manchester 2010. See also T.M. Devine (ed.), *Scottish Emigration and Scottish Society*, Edinburgh 1992; T.M. Devine, *Scotland's Empire, 1600-1815*, London 2003; M. Fry, *The Scottish Empire*, East Linton 2001.

4 A. Smith, *The Wealth of Nations:* books IV-V, 1st ed. 1776, London 1999. For a useful recent overview of universal history, see E. Rothschild, *Globalization and the Return of History*, in "Foreign Policy", 1999, 115.

5 E. Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, London 2005.

6 A. Parchami, *Hegemonic Peace and Empire: The Pax Romana, Britannica and Americana*, London 2009, ch. 6.

[7] J. Mill, *The History of British India*, London 1817; C.W. Dilke, *Greater Britain: A Record of Travel in English-Speaking Countries During 1866 and 1867*, London 1868; J.R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, London 1883. See also D. Bell, *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought*, Cambridge 2007; U. Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought*, Chicago Ill. - London 1999; D.S.A. Bell, *Empire and International Relations in Victorian Political Thought*, in "Historical Journal", 2006, 49; D.S.A. Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900*, Princeton NJ 2007; B. Semmel, *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy, the Empire of Free Trade and Imperialism, 1750-1850*, London 1970.

[8] D. Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire*, Cambridge 2000, p. 17; Id., *Greater Britain: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis?*, in "American Historical Review", 1999, 104, pp. 427-445.

[9] G. Claeys, *Imperial sceptics: British critics of empire, 1850-1920*, Cambridge 2010.

[10] J.A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study*, London 1902.

[11] For an overview, see N. Etherington, *Theories of imperialism: war, conquest and capital*, London 1984. On Hobson's continued relevance, see P.J. Cain, *Hobson Lives? Finance and British Imperialism 1870-1914*, in S. Groenveld, M.J. Wintle (eds.), *State and Trade: government and the economy in Britain and the Netherlands since the Middle Ages*, Zutphen 1992, pp. 90-102.

[12] Something reflected in the structure of the new Cambridge Modern History. The empire-commonwealth, by contrast, was treated as an essentially sealed and organic whole. See J.H. Rose et al., *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, Cambridge, 8 vols., Cambridge1929-1959; W.K. Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, vol. 1, *Problems of Nationality, 1918-1936*, 2 vols., London 1937; Id., *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Volume Two: Problems of Economic Policy, 1918-1939*, 2 vols., London 1942.

[13] H.G. Wells, *A Short History of the World*, London 1922; A.J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, London 1934.

[14] W.H. McNeill, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community*, Chicago 1963.

[15] P.M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, London 1988.

[16] J. Gallagher, R. Robinson, *The Imperialism of Free Trade*, in "Economic History Review", 1953, 6; R. Robinson, J. Gallagher, A. Denny, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*, London 1961; R. Robinson, *The Non-European Foundations for European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration*, in R. Owen, B. Sutcliffe (eds.), *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*, London 1972; R. Robinson, *The Excentric Idea of Imperialism: With or without Europe*, in W.J. Mommsen, J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities*, London 1986; J.C. Gallagher, G. Johnson, A. Seal, *Locality, Province and Nation: Essays on Indian Politics, 1870 to 1940*, Cambridge 1973. See also D.K. Fieldhouse, *Economics and Empire, 1830-1914*, London 1973.

[17] For a critique of the Cambridge school by an Oxford-based South Asian scholar, see T. Raychaudhuri, *Indian Nationalism as Animal Politics*, in "Historical Journal", 1979, 1. For subaltern studies, see R. Guha, G.C. Spivak, *Selected Subaltern Studies*, New York - Oxford 1988. Subaltern studies owed much to English social historians such as E.P. Thompson before taking an increasingly cultural turn through the 1980s.

[18] D.K. Fieldhouse, *Can Humpty-Dumpty Be Put Back Together Again? Imperial History in the 1980s*, in "Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History", 1984, 12.

[19] P.J. Cain, A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914*, London 1993; P.J. Cain, A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-90*, London 1993.

[20] The seminal studies were, J. Darwin, *Britain and decolonisation: the retreat from empire in the post-war world*, Basingstoke 1988; R.F. Holland, *European decolonization 1918-1981: an introductory survey*, Basingstoke 1985.

[21] W.R. Louis, *Oxford History of the British Empire*, 5 vols., Oxford 1999.

[22] E.W. Said, *Orientalism*, London 1978; Id., *Culture and Imperialism*, London 1993.

[23] For a sympathetic overview, see T. Ballantyne, *Colonial Knowledge*, in S.E. Stockwell (ed.), *The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives*, Oxford 2008. Once again this was not a solely British development, indeed some of the most influential work was produced in the US. See, for example, B.S. Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India*, Princeton NJ - Chichester 1996; P. Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton 1993; P. Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?*, London 1986.

[24] The connections between Said and 'new imperial history' are clearly seen in C. Hall, *Introduction*, in Id. (ed.), *Cultures of Empire: A Reader: Colonisers in Britain and the Empire in Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, Manchester UK - New York 2000; L. Colley, *Britishness and Otherness: An Argument*, in "Journal of British Studies", 1992, 31.

[25] For the key works, see C. Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867*, Oxford 2002; C. Hall, S.O. Rose, *At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World*, Cambridge 2006; A.M. Burton, *Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865-1915*, Chapel Hill - London 1994; A.M. Burton (ed.), *After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation*, Durham NC - London 2003; K. Wilson, *The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture, and Imperialism in England, 1715-1785*, Cambridge 1995; K. Wilson (ed.), *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660-1840*, Cambridge 2004; P. Levine, *The British Empire: Sunrise to Sunset*, Harlow 2007. Hall, Levine, and Burton came to the study of empire by way of gender history.

[26] J.M. Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960*, Manchester 1984; Id. (ed.), *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, Manchester 1986.

[27] B. Porter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain*, Oxford 2004. For intermediate positions, see A.S. Thompson, *The Empire Strikes Back? The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth Century*, Harlow 2005. See also P.J. Marshall, *Imperial Britain*, in "Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History", 1995, 23.

[28] S.J. Potter, *Empire, Cultures and Identities in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Britain*, in "History Compass", 2007, 5, pp. 51-71.

[29] E.J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848*, London 1973; Id., *The Age of Capital, 1848-1875*, London 1975; Id., *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*, London 1987; Id., *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991*, London 1994.

[30] For an overview, see A. Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey*, London 1990.

[31] See, for example, D.C.M. Platt, *Dependency in Nineteenth-Century Latin America: An Historian Objects*, in "Latin American Research Review", 1980, 15; D. Washbrook, *South Asia, the World System, and World Capitalism*, in "Journal of Asian Studies", 1990, 49.

[32] For an early instance of this shift, see A.G. Hopkins, *Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History*, in "Past and Present", 1999, 164.

[33] A.G. Hopkins (ed.), *Globalization in World History*, London 2002; C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons*, Oxford 2004.

[34] P. O'Brien, *Historiographical Traditions and Modern Imperatives for the Restoration of Global History*, in "Journal of Global History", 2006, 1.

[35] J. Darwin, *After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405*, London 2007; Id., *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970*, Cambridge 2009. For an important staging post, see Id., *Globalism and Imperialism: The Global Context of British Power, 1830-1960*, in S. Akita (ed.), *Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History*, Basingstoke 2002.

[36] A. Lester, *Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth Century South Africa and Britain*, London 2001; Id., *Imperial Circuits and Networks: Geographies of the British Empire*, in "History Compass", 2006, 4; T. Ballantyne, *Race and the Webs of Empire*, in "Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History", 2001, 2; Id., *Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire*, Basingstoke 2001; Z. Laidlaw, *Colonial Connections, 1815-45: Patronage, the Information Revolution and Colonial Government*, Manchester 2005.

[37] P.A. Buckner, R.D. Francis (eds.), *Rediscovering the British World*, Calgary 2005; C. Bridge, K. Fedorowich (eds.), *The British World: Diaspora, Culture, and Identity*, London 2003; G.B. Magee, A.S. Thompson, *Empire and Globalisation: Networks of People, Goods and Capital in the British World, c.1850-1914*, Cambridge 2010.

[38] C. Bridge, K. Fedorowich, *Mapping the British World*, in Id. (eds.), *The British World: Diaspora, Culture, and Identity*, London 2003, p. 6.

[39] J. Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939*, Oxford 2009; Magee, Thompson, *Empire and Globalisation* cit.

[40] D. Armitage, M.J. Braddick, *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800*, Basingstoke 2002; B. Bailyn, *Atlantic History: Concept and Contours*, Cambridge Mass. - London 2005.

[41] N. Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World*, London 2003; Id., *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire*, London 2005; Id., *Civilization: The West and the Rest*, London 2011.

[42] John Darwin's concept of the 'bridgehead' has close affiliations with the idea of the network, as Alan Lester acknowledges. See J. Darwin, *Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion*, in "English Historical Review", 1997, 112; A. Lester, *Imperial Circuits and Networks*, in "History Compass", 2006, 4, pp. 124-141.

[43] W.J. Mommsen, J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities*, London 1986; J. Osterhammel, *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, Princeton 1997; J. Osterhammel, N.P. Petersson, *Globalization: A Short History*, Princeton NJ - Oxford 2005.

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Introducing World History to Young Readers: The Case of Ernst Gombrich and Fernand Braudel

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Abstract

This chapter compares influential world histories published in the mid-twentieth century and aimed at school children. At the end of 1930s, F. Braudel, the famous French historian, wrote a book for French schools aiming to attract adolescents' attention to the beauty and richness of World History. With the help of maps, Braudel spoke in his *Le Monde actuel: Histoire et civilizations* about the different civilizations of the world, dividing them into "Civilizations outside Europe" and "European Civilizations" (the latter including the post- Colombian Americas and the English-speaking world, as well as the USA and Canada). This big book, with its rich and colorful information, was not favorably received by the French teachers and was, finally, withdrawn from the French Public Education syllabuses. It remains, though, a best seller, known in its English translation under the title *A History of Civilizations.* On the contrary, the book of the great Austrian art historian, Ernst Gombrich, *Eine kurtze Weltgeschichte für junge Leser* [A Little World History for Young Readers] written in the 1930s and translated into tens of languages, has always had a warm reception among its very young readers all over the world, due to the wise simplicity and the gentle humor of its narration.

Ο σημαντικός Γάλλος ιστορικός F. Braudel συνέγραψε, στα τέλη της δεκαετίας του 1950, ένα ιστορικό πόνημα για τους μαθητές των Γαλλικών Λυκείων, με στόχο να τους μυήσει στον πλούτο της Παγκόσμια Ιστορίας. Χωρίς την επιστράτευση εικόνων, παρά με την χρήση χαρτών και με κύριο όπλο τον λόγο, ο Braudel προσέγγισε στο Le monde actuel: Histoire et civilizations *τους πολιτισμούς του κόσμου διαχωρίζοντάς τους σε «Πολιτισμούς εκτός Ευρώπης» και σε «Ευρωπαϊκούς Πολιτισμούς»-εντάσσοντας, στους τελευταίους, την μετακολομβιανή Αμερική, την Αυστραλία, τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και τον Καναδά. Η ελεύθερη περιήγηση του μεγάλου ιστορικού στους πολιτισμούς της γης και η συναρπαστική σύγκριση των διαφόρων στοιχείων που τους συναπαρτίζουν δεν έπεισαν, τελικά, τους διδάσκοντες και το βιβλίο αποσύρθηκε από την δημόσια εκπαίδευση στην Γαλλία. Παρέμεινε, ωστόσο, ένα από τα ευπώλητα βιβλία*

Ιστορίας παγκοσμίως. Αντιθέτως, το εγχείρημα του Ernst Gombrich, του μεγάλου Αυστριακού ιστορικού της τέχνης, να συγγράψει, κατά την δεκαετία του 1930, ένα βιβλίο Παγκόσμιας Ιστορίας για μικρούς αναγνώστες, στέφθηκε από διαχρονική επιτυχία. Το βιβλίο του Eine kurze Weltgeschichte für junge Leser *μεταφράσθηκε και μεταφράζεται σε δεκάδες γλώσσες και διαβάζεται από εκατομμύρια μικρούς αναγνώστες που μαγεύονται από την ανάλαφρη – αλλά και στιβαρή- διήγηση, την απλότητα, την ευγένεια και το χιούμορ του κειμένου.*

Fernand Braudel (1902-1985), the foremost French historian of the post-war era and Ernst Gombrich (1909-2001), the well-known Austrian art historian have something in common: they both tried to compose World History books for young readers – Gombrich in the 1930s, Braudel in the 1960s. Both books were innovative and fascinating, their fate, though, was different: Braudel's book was not well received – at least in the beginning; on the contrary, Gombrich's book was warmly accepted from the start and remains popular among the very young readers it was aimed at. The story of the creation of these books is interesting for, among other things, the intellectual challenge they posed for their creators.

In September 1936 Fernand Braudel gave a lecture on "The Teaching of History", in the São Paulo Institute of Education. In this lecture he stressed the importance of how to turn "the educational story" into "a tale of adventure". The secret, he argued, was to avoid abstract terms; to "let history have its dramatic interest"; to know, above all, how to narrate it, using simplicity as the principal weapon:

> Not simplicity that distorts the truth, produces a void, and is another name for mediocrity, but simplicity that is clarity, the light of intelligence. Find the key to a civilization: Greece, a civilization of the Aegean, from Thrace to Crete – and not a Balkan peninsula. Egypt, a civilization that tamed the Nile[1].

Twenty years later, Braudel was called on to realize his views when the French Ministry of Education decided to change the secondary school history syllabuses in order to include gleanings from "neighbouring social sciences: geography, demography, economics, sociology, anthropology, psychology", as well as "the civilizations of the contemporary world" and "the major problems of today"[2].

Braudel, a former *lycée* teacher himself, accepted the challenge, since:

> It seems to me essential that at the age of eighteen, on the brink of preparing for whatever career, our young people should be initiated into the problems of society today, the great cultural conflicts in the world, and the multiplicity of its civilizations[3].

He immediately went to work. The result was originally published as the central part of a collective work with Suzanne Baille and Robert Philippe under the title *Le Monde actuel: Histoire et civilizations* (Librairie Classique Eugène Belin, Paris 1963). Twenty years later, in 1987, it was published in France by Les Editions Arthaud as an independent book under the title *Grammaire des civilisations,* with a preface written by Maurice Ay-

mard. Later on, in 1993, it was translated into English and published by Penguin Books under the title *A History of Civilizations,* with a preface written by Braudel himself[4].

In his "By Way of a Preface" to the English translation, Braudel specified how one should write history for young readers of diverse ages:

> The question is how the things to be taught should be spread over the successive – and very different – school years. At the beginning, the pupils are children: at the end, they are adults. What suits the former will not suit the latter. The curriculum must be divided: and this requires an over-all plan, a choice of priorities and needs, and a guiding intelligence.
>
> For children, I have always recommended simple narrative, pictures, television series and films – in other words, traditional history improved, adapted to include the media with which children are familiar [...]. They make a delightful, spontaneously spellbound audience, to whom one could show history unfolding as if with a magic lantern. The main problem is to help them, in the process, to discover a sense of perspective, of the reality of past time, its direction and significance, and the successive landmarks which first gave it a recognizable shape [...]. A feeling for chronology, gradually acquired, should help to dispel confusion [...]. And as pupils come to understand time, they need to learn vocabulary, so as to be precise about words, ideas and things. Plus some key concepts: a society, a State, an economy, a civilization. All of which should be done as simply as possible [...].
>
> And now we have crossed the dividing-line: we face young people, freer perhaps than we were at their age, yet less happy; rebellious, when in fact it is society, the world and life today that are changing around them – the real source of their movements, their constraints and their outbursts. They may be less intellectual, less bookish, than we were when we finished our apprenticeship, but they are just as intelligent, and certainly more inquisitive. What account of history are we to give them?[5]

What account of history did he actually provide in his *A History of Civilizations*? In the opening chapter, Braudel discussed "Changing Vocabulary", in which he tried to explain the various meanings and the different history of the key word *civilization.* The word lays at the heart of his second chapter "The Study of Civilization Involves All the Social Sciences", which consisted of the sub-chapters: "Civilizations as geographical areas"/ "Civilizations as societies"/ "Civilizations as economies"/ "Civilizations as ways of thought". These first two chapters, together with the third one "The Continuity of Civilizations" formed the first part of this big and long book (almost 600 pages). The next two parts then dealt with the civilizations of the world dividing them into two categories: "Civilizations outside Europe" and "European Civilizations". The latter included the post-Colombian Americas and the English-speaking world, as well as the USA and Canada. The book was heavily textual and included no photos or pictures, although twenty three maps helped the reader to locate the evolution of human history geographically.

The lack of pictures and photos and the emphasis on the text seems to be deliberate. Braudel wanted to attract young readers using a teacher's most powerful weapon: speech. He obviously believed that – as adolescents – his readers are mature enough to be en-

chanted by fascinating stories, data, texts, sources, memories, comparisons and thoughts that would nourish their need to understand the world. In his narration Braudel ranged widely temporally and thematically. For example, he discussed the "Turkish baths or hammams" that "are in fact a survival of ancient Roman baths, which the Arab conquests brought to Persia and elsewhere"[6]; examined the importance of Ethiopia which is "a world apart: its very individual civilization, its Christian religion (from AD 350 onwards), its mixed agriculture, based on stock breeding and arable farming, growing wheat and vines"[7]; commented on the vegetarian culture of the Chinese people, since: "98 per cent of the calories they consume come from vegetable sources: they use no butter, cheese or milk, and very little meat or fish"[8]; and reflected on the ways in which Christianity, Humanism and Scientific Thought have been combined in Europe[9].

Braudel did not narrate in chronological order, nor did he focus on one clear subject. As he commented in his lecture on "The Teaching of History", he wished to "turn the educational story into a tale of adventure", because he wanted "history to have its dramatic interest". As a result, an ocean of rich and colourful information confronts the reader – always with the assistance of Geography, which for Braudel, is a pillar for the understanding of human history.

The result is fascinating, but not necessarily effective, when one considers the intellectual and sentimental world of its target readers. The book seems too long, the text too dense, and the information too rich to win the young reader. It was perhaps due to these characteristics that "Braudel eventually lost the battle of the secondary schools" and that the teachers' councils considered his book to be "too hard for the students". The Ministry of Education eventually scaled back the "civilizations" syllabus. Finally, in 1970, Braudel's book was discreetly withdrawn from sale[10].

If Braudel's *A History of Civilizations* faced difficulties to get accepted as a school textbook, Ernst Gombrich's *Eine kurze Weltgeschichte für junge Leser* [A Little History of the World for Young Readers] has always had an easy and warm acceptance by the public. The book had its own story: in 1935, one year before Braudel's lecture in São Paolo on "The Teaching of History", Gombrich undertook, at the age of twenty six, a challenge. With a doctorate in art history from the University of Vienna and no prospect of a job, the young Gombrich was invited by a publisher to compile a History of the World for younger readers. He completed the task by writing intensively for six weeks. The book first appeared in 1936 and was soon translated into five languages. With war approaching, the young Gombrich sought refuge in England. At the end of the war, he reworked his book, correcting it at some points, and enriched it by adding new information and findings, resulting in a second German edition. In 2005 it was published for the first time in English[11]. It is now available in twenty five languages across the world and remains a much beloved and popular book – not only for those of a very young age – because, as the editor of the English edition writes on the front page: "In forty concise chapters, Gombrich tells the story of man from the Stone Age

to the atomic bomb. In between emerges a colourful picture of wars and conquests, grand works of art, and the spread and limitations of science. This is a text dominated not by dates and facts, but by the sweep of mankind's experience across the centuries, a guide to humanity's achievements and an acute witness to its frailties".

In contrast to Braudel's *A History of Civilizations*, Gombrich never considered *Eine kurze Weltgeschichte für junge Leser* as a book that could replace school textbooks. As his granddaughter, Leoni Gombrich, writes in the preface of the English edition of the book, Gombrich wanted "his readers to relax, and to follow the story without having to take notes or to memorise names and dates" promising playfully that "he shall not examine them on what they have read"[12].

It is obvious that Gombrich, when writing the book, never forgot the very young age of his readers-to-be. So, in the first chapter of the book, titled *Once upon a time*, he did what Braudel, later on, asked from those teaching history to very young persons: to give his readers "a feeling of chronology" in order to "understand time" [...] as well as "a vocabulary so as to be precise about words, ideas and things [...] with simplicity" so that history unfolds "as if with a magic lantern":

> All stories begin with "Once upon a time". And that's just what this story is all about: what happened, once upon a time. Once you were so small that, even standing on tiptoes, you could merely reach your mother's hand. Do you remember? [...] Your father and mother were also small once, and so was your grandfather, and your grandmother, a much longer time ago. [...] And so it goes on, further and further back ...[13].

Gombrich's concern to attract his young reader's attention is shown not only in the title of his first chapter, but in all of them, until the end of the book: "The Greatest Inventors of All Time" is the title of the chapter dealing with the inventions of the prehistoric period/ "I c-a-n r-e-a-d" is the one concerning the invention of the alphabet/ "An Unlucky King and a Lucky King" is the one dealing with England at the time of King Charles I and France at the time of the King Louis XIV/ "The Small Part of the History of the World Which I Have Lived Through Myself: Looking Back" is the title of the final, semi-autobiographical chapter in which he offered his intellectual and human greetings to his beloved little readers:

> It is one thing to learn about history from books, and quite another to experience it oneself. That is what I wanted to remind you of just now when I likened a glimpse into the past of mankind to the view seen from an aeroplane flying at a great height. All we can make out are a few details on the banks of the river of time [...].
>
> In my final chapter I would like to tell you a little about what I actually did experience. The more I think about it, the stranger it seems ...[14].

Gombrich addressed his readers in the first person, as a tender, honest friend who offers knowledge in a big embrace of love and intellectual excitement. Here is how he introduces Napoleon's story:

> What I have always loved best about the history of the world is that it is true. That all extraordinary things we read were no less real than you and I are today. [...] I am now going to tell you the story of one of the most astonishing of all those adventures, which was nevertheless as real as your life or mine. It took place not so long ago. My own grandfather was alive then, and he would have been about your age. It begins like this. Near Italy there is an island, mountainous, sunny and poor, called Corsica[15].

Throughout his book, Gombrich carefully avoided a sterile narration. He always remained a modest but engaged participant in the stories, smoothly commenting on situations, intentions, thoughts and acts. And he always tried to offer a simple clear view to help his young readers realize the interconnection of civilizations in order to protect them from intolerance and bigotry. Here is how he finishes the chapter concerning the Arabs, their faith, their conquests and their achievements – especially the introduction of Arabic numbers:

> Could you have come up with such a useful invention? I certainly couldn't. We owe it to the Arabs, who themselves owe it to the Indians. And in my opinion that invention is even more amazing than all *The Thousand and One Nights* put together. Perhaps it's just as well that Charles Martel defeated the Arabs in 732. And yet it was not such a bad thing that they founded their great empire, because it was through those conquests that the ideas and discoveries of the Persians, the Greeks, the Indians and even the Chinese were all brought together[16].

History for young readers: a consignment for a better future

A concern for human understanding, a deep sensibility for the journey of mankind, the importance of human deeds and the beauty of human exchanges all coloured Braudel's and Gombrich's offerings to young readers. The difference in the age of these readers affected the form, the organization, the subjects, the emphasis and, even, the size of the books. Scholarly accuracy notwithstanding, Gombrich tried to write a simple and compact World History in a form approaching that of a tale told by an older relative whose affection, knowledge and modesty children would trust. On the contrary, Braudel felt freer to touch a multitude of different subjects and to guide his readers along many new and fascinating paths of knowledge believing that an adolescent was ready to absorb – and get absorbed by – it. Having confidence in the importance of history for the formation of human personality they both chose their subjects and words carefully, so that their young readers could feel connected with the fate of mankind and grow, therefore, into more rounded individuals, members of their communities and of global society.

Braudel and Gombrich wrote their books in difficult decades of a difficult century. Gombrich wrote it in the 1930s, a few years before the Second World War and at a time when storm clouds had already appeared in the horizon. Braudel wrote it after the War, in the intense Cold War years. Neither of them would nor could deny that the history of humankind is marked by violence and intolerance, and the events of the 20th century could not have demonstrated this more clearly. But both thought that writing

history for young readers could be a weapon against the paranoia of hate, bigotry and misunderstanding; a consignment for a better future; an idealistic answer to a reality full of pain, despair and great expectations. To which they both wanted to contribute with what they were able to offer: their knowledge of History and their concern for mankind.

Notes

1 R. Mayne, *Translator's Introduction*, in F. Braudel, *A History of Civilizations*, London 1993, p. xxv.

2 Mayne, *Translator's Introduction* cit., p. xxvi.

3 *Ibid.*, p. xxvii.

4 *Ibid.*, p. xvi.

5 F. Braudel, *A History of Civilizations*, London 1993, pp. xxxii, xxxiii.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 42.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 118.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 158.

9 *Ibid.*, pp. 333-372.

10 Mayne, *Translator's Introduction* cit., p. xxvii.

11 L. Gombrich, *Preface*, in E. Gombrich, *A Little History of the World*, London 2005, pp. xv-xviii.

12 Gombrich, *Preface* cit., p. xix.

13 E. Gombrich, *A Little History of the World*, London 2005, p. 1.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 273.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 227.

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A Clash of Empires: Herodotus' Histories

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Herodotus is considered the 'Father of History' because he was the first historian to combine very different sources with personal experiences. He feels obliged to report his sources even if they are contradictory or hard to believe. The reader must judge for himself. He deals critically with established myths without rejecting them outright. He calls his work inquiries (*historíai*), a word that gave birth to the modern meaning of history.

His great subject was the origins of the war between the Persians in the East and the Greeks in the West. Based on written and oral records that he collected on his extensive travels, his work presents a great wealth of geographical and ethnographical information. Thus he also became famous as the "father of comparative anthropology and of ethnography". By his digressions on various peoples of the inhabited world known to him, together with his attempts to synchronize their respective chronologies, he laid the foundations of writing World History. According to the cosmological tradition of Thales and Anaximander, Herodotus still believed the earth to be a flat body levitating in the great ocean.

Biographical information about him is scarce and disputed. He was born in Halicarnassus in Caria (modern day Bodrum, Turkey) and lived in the 5th century BCE (c. 484 BCE - c. 425 BCE).

Text

I, 1 What Herodotus the Halicarnassian has learnt by inquiry is here set forth: in order that so the memory of the past may not be blotted out from among men by time, and that great and marvellous deeds done by the Greeks and foreigners and especially the reason why they warred against each other may not lack renown.

I, 4 This far it was a matter of mere robbery on both sides. But after this (the Persians say) the Greeks were greatly to blame; for they invaded Asia before the Persians attacked Europe. [...] The Persians claim Asia for their own, and the foreign nations that dwell in it; Europe and the Greek race they hold to be separate from them.

I, 5 [...] These are the stories of the Persians and the Phoenicians. For my own part, I will not say that this or that story is true [...].

For many states that were once great have now become small; and those that were great in my time were small formerly. Knowing therefore that human prosperity never continues in one stay, I will make mention alike of both kinds.

II, 4 But as regarding human affairs, this was the account in which they [Herodotus' Egyptian witnesses] all agreed: the Egyptians, they said, were the first men who reckoned by years and made the year to consist of twelve divisions of the seasons.

II, 15 I hold [...] that the Egyptians [...] ever existed since men were first made.

IV, 36, 2 And I laugh to see how many have before now drawn maps of the world, not one of them reasonably; for they draw the world as round as if fashioned by compasses, encircled by the Ocean river, and Asia and Europe of a like extent.

IV, 42 I wonder, then, at those who have mapped out and divided the world into Libya, Asia, and Europe; for the difference between them is great, seeing that in length Europe stretches along both the others together, and it appears to me to be beyond all comparison broader. For Libya shows clearly that it is encompassed by the sea, save only where it borders on Asia [...].

Source

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A Universal History of the Roman Empire: Polybius' *Histories*

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Polybius' *Histories* are a Universal History of the Roman Empire covering in detail the period of 264-146 BCE, i.e. from the First Punic War to the destruction of Carthage and Corinth.

Polybius (c. 200-118 BCE) was born in Megalopolis (Arcadia), the son of a prominent representative of the Achaean League in Greece. After the victory of the Romans over Perseus of Macedonia, he was brought as a hostage to Rome where he spent seventeen years as an educator in noble houses. As a counsel and friend of the younger Scipio he was present at the capture of Carthage (150 BC) before he returned to Greece.

Of his historical works, only the first five volumes of the *Histories* together with some fragments have survived. He is considered one of the founding fathers of Roman historiography because he attempted to present history as a sequence of causes and effects. Thus he succeeded in providing not simply annals of events or lists of battles but a unified view of history. Included in his *Histories* are famous digressions on the geography of the then known inhabited world (*Oikumene*) and on historiographical methodology. It has also been suggested that Polybius tried to explain the Roman world power to a Greek audience to convince them of the necessity of accepting the inevitable Roman rule.

Text

> [...] For the very element of unexpectedness in the events I have chosen as my theme will be sufficient to challenge and incite everyone, young and old alike, to peruse my systematic history. For who is so worthless or indolent as not to wish to know by what means and under what system of polity the Romans in less than fifty-three years have succeeded in subjecting nearly the whole inhabited world (*Oikumene*) to their sole government – a thing unique in history? [...]
>
> How striking and grand is the spectacle presented by the period with which I purpose to deal, will be most clearly apparent if we set beside and compare with the Roman dominion the most famous empires of the past, those which have formed the chief theme of historians. Those worthy of being thus set beside it and compared are these.

The Persians for a certain period possessed a great empire, but often as they ventured to overstep the boundaries of Asia they imperilled not only the security of this empire, but their own existence. The Lacedaemonians, after having for many years disputed the hegemony of Greece, at length attained it but held it uncontested for scarce twelve years. Macedonian rule in Europe extended but from the Adriatic region to the Danube, which would appear a quite insignificant portion of the continent. Subsequently, by overthrowing the Persian empire they also became supreme in Asia. But though their empire was now regarded as the greatest geographically and politically that had ever existed, they left the larger part of the inhabited world as yet outside it. For they never even made a single attempt to dispute possession of Sicily, Sardinia, or Libya, and the most warlike nations of Western Europe were, to speak the simple truth, unknown to them. But the Romans have subjected to their rule not portions, but nearly the whole of the world (and possess an empire which is not only immeasurably greater than any which preceded it, but need not fear rivalry in the future). In the course of this work it will become more clearly intelligible (by what steps this power was acquired), and it will also be seen how many and how great advantages accrue to the student from the systematic (pragmatic) treatment of history.

[...] Previously the doings of the world had been, so to say, dispersed, as they were held together by no unity of initiative, results, or locality; but ever since this date history has been a connected whole, and the affairs of Italy and Libya have been interlinked with those of Greece and Asia, all leading up to one end. And this is my reason for beginning their systematic history from that date. For it was owing to their defeat of the Carthaginians in the Hannibalic War that the Romans, feeling that the chief and most essential step in their scheme of universal aggression had now been taken, were first emboldened to reach out their hands to grasp the rest and to cross with an army to Greece and the continent of Asia. [...]

For what gives my work its peculiar quality, and what is most remarkable in the present age, is this. Fortune has guided almost all the affairs of the world in one direction and has forced them to incline towards one and the same end; a historian should likewise bring before his readers under one synoptical view the operations by which she has accomplished her general purpose. Indeed it was this chiefly that invited and encouraged me to undertake my task; and secondarily the fact that none of my contemporaries have undertaken to write a general history, in which case I should have been much less eager to take this in hand. As it is, I observe that while several modern writers deal with particular wars and certain matters connected with them, no one, as far as I am aware, has even attempted to inquire critically when and whence the general and comprehensive scheme of events originated and how it led up to the end. [...]

We can no more hope to perceive this from histories dealing with particular events than to get at once a notion of the form of the whole world, its disposition and

order, by visiting, each in turn, the most famous cities, or indeed by looking at separate plans of each: a result by no means likely. He indeed who believes that by studying isolated histories he can acquire a fairly just view of history as a whole, is, as it seems to me, much in the case of one, who, after having looked at the dissevered limbs of an animal once alive and beautiful, fancies he has been as good as an eyewitness of the creature itself in all its action and grace. For could anyone put the creature together on the spot, restoring its form and the comeliness of life, and then show it to the same man, I think he would quickly avow that he was formerly very far away from the truth and more like one in a dream. For we can get some idea of a whole from a part, but never knowledge or exact opinion. Special histories therefore contribute very little to the knowledge of the whole and conviction of its truth. It is only indeed by study of the interconnexion of all the particulars, their resemblances and differences, that we are enabled at least to make a general survey, and thus derive both benefit and pleasure from history.

I shall adopt as the starting-point of this Book the first occasion on which the Romans crossed the sea from Italy [proceeded outside Italy]. This follows immediately on the close of Timaeus' History and took place in the 129th Olympiad [264-261 BC].

[...] The starting-point must be an era generally agreed upon and recognized, and one self-apparent from the events, even if this involves my going back a little in point of date and giving a summary of intervening occurrences. For if there is any ignorance or indeed any dispute as to what are the facts from which the work opens, it is impossible that what follows should meet with acceptance or credence; but once we produce in our readers a general agreement on this point they will give ear to all the subsequent narrative.

Source

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Xuan-zhuang, Bian-ji and *Da-Tang Xi-yu-ji*

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Xuan-zhuang (玄奘, 600-664) was a famous Buddhist monk who left China for India in 629 to study classical teachings there. On his way, he crossed the desert in Central Asia and reached Kashmir in northwest India. In India, he not only studied Buddhism but also traveled around widely. Nineteen years later, in 645, he came back to China, bringing over 600 Buddhist scriptures with him. In translation of the Sanskrit-written scriptures into Chinese, Xuan-zhuang counted on the assistance of learned brethren, who were commissioned by the emperor Tai-zong (太宗) to help him. Bian-ji (辯機), a monk of Hui-chang (会昌) Monastery, was one of them.

Da-Tang Xi-yu-ji, a collection of reminiscences by Xuan-zhuang about his travels in Central Asia and India, was probably not written by the Buddhist master himself. Rather, he told facts to Bian-ji occasionally, who recorded them and finally wove them into coherent stories. On completion, Xuan-zhuang dedicated the book to Tai-zong in 646, i.e. the twentieth year of the Zhen-guan period (貞観).

The quoted passage represents Xuan-zhuang's worldview as a Buddhist. It sees the world divided into four parts. The land of "the lord of elephants" means India and that of "the lord of treasures" Persia. The land of "the lord of horses" refers to a nomadic country, and finally that of "the lord of men" signifies China. The text unmistakably shows the Chinese sense of superiority to the other three parts. Still, it also tells us that, besides the Sinocentric worldview, there existed another standpoint in China, which relativized the mainstream view.

Text

Xuan-zhuang (玄奘) and Bian-ji (辯機), *Da-Tang Xi-yu-ji* (大唐西域記 *Records of the Western Lands of the Great Tang period*), Preface:

> At the time when there is no paramount wheel-monarch, then the land of Jambudvipa (this human world) has four rulers.
>
> On the south 'the lord of elephants', the land here is warm and humid, suitable for elephants. On the west 'the lord of treasures', the land borders on the sea, and abounds in gems. On the north 'the lord of horses', the country is cold and hard,

suitable for horses. On the east 'the lord of men', the climate is soft and agreeable (exhilarating), and therefore there are many men.

In the country of 'the lord of elephants' the people are quick and enthusiastic, and entirely given to learning. They cultivate especially magical arts. They wear a robe thrown across them, with their right shoulder bare; their hair is done up in a ball on the top, and left undressed on the four sides. Their various tribes occupy different towns; their houses are built stage over stage.

In the country of 'lord of treasures' the people have no politeness or justice. They accumulate wealth. Their dress is short, with a left skirt. They cut their hair and cultivate their moustache. They dwell in walled towns and are eager in profiting by trade.

The people of the country of 'the lord of horses' are naturally wild and fierce. They are cruel in disposition; they slaughter (animals) and live under large felt tents; they divide like birds (going here and there) attending their flocks.

The land of 'the lord of men' is distinguished for the wisdom and virtue and justice of the people. They wear a head-covering and a girdle; the end of their dress (girdle) hangs to the right. They have carriage and robes according to rank; they are very earnest in work, and divided into classes.

With respect to the people belonging to these three rulers, the eastern region is considered the best; the doors of their dwelling open towards the east, and when the sun rises in the morning they turn towards it and salute it.

Please note: The Japanese personal names are written in the Japanese way in which the surname precedes the given name.

Source

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Du You: The *Tongdian*

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Du You (735-812) was a Chinese scholar and historian and once served the Tang dynasty as prime minister. Born of a government official's family in what is today the city Xi-an, Shanxi, almost twenty years before the rebellion of An Lushan in 755, Du devoted thirty six years, from 766 till 801 to the compilation of the *Tongdian*.

The huge work, which contains 200 volumes and about 1.7 million words, is an institutional history of China and also an encyclopedia at the same time. It deals with various topics from high antiquity through to the year 756. Still, the author's greatest interest lies in the Tang dynasty, to which a quarter of the book is dedicated. The book is therefore often regarded as the most representative contemporary historiography of the dynasty. In compiling the work, Du You relied on many other sources and incorporated their material into his own work. One of them was a book by his nephew Du Huan, who was taken captive in the famous battle between the Chinese and the Arabs at the river Talas in 751 and kept in the enemy's hands for ten years thereafter. *Tongdian* was held as a masterpiece, in high esteem for centuries and used later as a model by scholars like Zheng Qiao and Ma Duanlin.

The chapter VIII of Administrative Geography quoted below reflects Du You's worldview very well and thus portrays that of a high-level bureaucrat of the Tang times. According to this description, hegemony is not conceived of as that over the entire world, which would be unlimited in extent; it is instead understood to be separable and bound by the sovereign territorial jurisdiction under the Monarch. In this territory there live peoples descended from heaven, whose inhabited area is demarcated from that of the barbarians living around them. Since the time of the Qin and Han dynasties the Chinese empire's territory has 0expanded, which means that China proper has grown with it.

Text

Du You (杜佑), the *Tongdian* (通典[Comprehensive Institutions]), Chapter VIII of Administrative Geography:

> Long ago the State was established under Heaven (*tianxia*) for the government of human beings [...]. Heaven has given birth to many peoples and has set the Monarch to rule over them. Hegemony is administered through the Monarch, yet

> Heaven does not bestow hegemony on the Monarch as his personal property. The Monarch grows anxious about the degree of progress of virtue, but cares nothing for the achievement of territorial expansion. However, from the time of the Qin and the Han Dynasties, the State grew rich through heavy taxation, increasing the size of its armies and strengthening its military capabilities. Territorial expansion was regarded as accomplishment, and tribute from afar was regarded as proof of splendor and virtue.

Please note: The Japanese personal names are written in the Japanese way in which the surname precedes the given name.

Source

D.C. Twitchett, *The Writing of Official History under the T'ang* (Cambridge Studies in Chinese History, Literature and Institutions), Cambridge 2002.

Kitabatake Chikafusa: *A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns* (c. 1343)

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Kitabatake Chikafusa (1293-1354) was a high-ranking Japanese aristocrat in the medieval Nanbokuchô period (Northern and Southern Courts period, 1336-1392), when the imperial court was split into two family lines and plunged the whole country into a civil war-like turmoil. Kitabatake was the central figure in the southern court and took the initiative in the fight against his opponents in the north, who, backed up by samurai like the Ashikaga family, got the upper hand. To demonstrate the legitimacy of the southern line in the long ancestry of the imperial house and, with it, to justify the hegemony of the aristocracy over the rising warrior classes, he wrote *A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns,* a representative work of the historiography in the Japanese middle ages.

The following text is taken from the first chapter that deals with the mystical beginning of the country and will serve us as a good example for a longstanding Japanese worldview. According to this, the world basically consisted of just three countries: India, China and Japan. The tripartite idea prevailed in the Japanese outlook as common-sense since the ancient times till it was replaced with the modern geographical notion in the mid-19th century. In this passage, Kitabatake stresses the uniqueness and divineness of his country as opposed to India and China and tries to ground his point by referring to Japan's alleged unbroken monarchical succession from the founding gods to date. The aristocrat historian can indeed been seen as untypical in his notion of Japan's superiority over the two big Asian civilizations, which were generally credited with unchallengeable cultural authority. It should be noted that he contrasts both countries to with Japan in order to establish the latter's unique significance. Thus, despite the author's unconventional thinking, his work confirms how self-evident a tripartite world view was as a frame of reference.

Text

> According to the Buddhist scriptures, there is a mountain called Sumeru, which is surrounded by seven other concentric, golden mountains. Between these golden mountains flows the Sea of Fragrant Waters, and outside them are four great oceans [...]. To the south of Mount Anavatapta [an imaginary mountain in the Buddhist cosmology] are the Himalayas, and to the north are the Pamirs. North of

> the Pamirs is Tartary, and south of the Himalayas is India. To the northeast of India is China, and to the northwest of India is Persia [...]. India is in the exact center of the continent, and thus is the middle country of Jambu [an imaginary continent in the Buddhist cosmology] [...] China is thought to be a large country, but compared to India it is a remote and small land on the periphery of Jambu [...]. [O]ur country is situated in the ocean to the northeast of both India and China. As a land apart, it has been independently ruled by a divinely descended line of sovereigns. (p. 54f.)
>
> In India the first sovereign, the people's lord, was selected by the people and was succeeded by his descendants. But in later generations many members of the lord's line perished and even a man of mean origins, if he possessed the military power, could become king – or rise to be ruler of all India. China is also a country that tends strongly toward disorder. In early times, when life in China was simple and the right way prevailed, men of wisdom were selected to occupy the imperial office. But no single, immutable dynastic line was founded, and whenever the country lapsed into disorder, people mustered their forces and contended for hegemony [...]. In our country alone, the imperial succession has followed in an unbroken line from the time when heaven and earth were divided until the present age. Although, as is inevitable within a single family, the succession has at times been transmitted collaterally (*katawara yori*), the principle has prevailed that it will invariably return to the direct (*sei*) line. This is entirely the result of the immutable mandate of Amaterasu [the goddess from whom the imperial family was said to be descended according to the ancient Japanese myth], and is the reason why Japan differs from all other countries. (p. 60f.)

Please note: The Japanese personal names are written in the Japanese way in which the surname precedes the given name.

Source

Kitabatake Chikafusa, *A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns*, trans. H. Paul Varley, New York 1980.

Tomás de Mercado and a World Wide Economy (1571)

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It used to be thought that the economic sciences and in particular analytical economic reflections started with the *Tableau Economique* of François de Quesnay (1694-1774), a leading French advocate of physiocracy (the belief that all wealth is ultimately derived from land). However, since the publication of Schumpeter's seminal work in 1954, historians of economic thought have emphasised the pioneering contributions made by Spanish theologians and government planners from the mid-16th century to thinking on the morality of wealth and economic activities.

Tomás de Mercado (1523?-1575), is considered the most important of these contributors, particularly due to his *Summa de Tratados y Contratos* [Manual of Deals and Contracts, 1571]. The *Summa* is a theoretical discussion of the economic consequences that the arrival of precious metals from the American possessions and the incorporation of new markets have had for the Spanish economy; an economy characterised by its predominantly agrarian base and its limited diversity. From the end of 15th century, Spain had created one of the first world empires and also one of the first world economies. However, Spain lacked the necessary demographic, economic, social, and military resources to meet the structural demands of the new imperial realities, at least in the mid and longer term.

Tomás de Mercado wrote about the dynamics of this new imperial economy from the knowledge generated by his observations of Spain's imperial economy. Mercado lived in Seville, the port-city at the epicentre of these developments, and was, therefore, well placed to comment on these changes and their impacts. In order to increase Spain's wealth he, like many other early economists, proposed laws to avoid the leakage away from Spain of the precious and rich metals which arrived from America: to increase Spanish wealth they should have been kept inside Spanish boundaries. At the same time he noticed that these measures produced the opposite effects by creating an enormous increase of prices that affected the whole economic stability and development of the imperial Spanish economy. By doing so, he established the foundations of later theories of Spanish imperial decadence.

The extracts also show how the Spanish empire widened the world scope of European markets and by incorporating both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, and establishing trade across the Pacific, had created an early world market or global economy. Mercado un-

derlined that the pioneering role played by traders and bankers in a worldwide process of economic and social change was undermining existing civil and natural laws. He also highlighted the dangers of global market processes and in particular their effects on Spain where the worldwide exchange of precious metals caused a rapid depreciation of prices with profoundly negative structural effects on the development of what was still essentially a pre-capitalist economy. As Mercado put it, "a banker of this republic puts his arms around the world and embraces more than the Ocean but sometimes he squeezes so tightly that he exposes himself to the risk of losing all".

TEXT

On the author's intention

In the West Indies, where native peoples are now successfully administered under Spanish rule, those coming from the peninsula have become gold and silver miners and traders, while others deal with fabrics and clothes imported to the West Indies from Spain. The New Continent is extremely rich in precious minerals, such as metals like gold and silver; but there is a complete lack of manufactured products and goods. No sheer, silk or linen clothes can be found in the New World, nor such essential things for Spanish people as wine or olive oil [...].

However, since the West Indies were discovered seventy years ago, many merchants have seen an opportunity to make money by trading with the New Continent. Many provinces need to be supplied with fabrics, clothes and products of all kinds: La Española, Cuba, Honduras, Campeche, Nueva España, Guatemala, Cartagena, Tierra Firme, Perú [...].

At present, the *Casa de Contratación de Indias* in Seville is one of the world's most important and active houses of trade. It is a central point for merchants from all over the earth. Andalucia and Lusitania, which were once at the end of the world, are now a central location, halfway to and from the New Continent [...]. That is the reason why all types of business flourish in the city.

On the beginning, origin and antiquity of merchants

When God created man, he made him sovereign in his own person, absolute ruler of this lower world, and of all the treasures and fruits, which were in it and which it produced [...]. But in sin he lost this common, shared empire, and it was divided into parts, applying to each his rightful inheritance, and propriety appeared, and with propriety this typical language of "mine" and "yours" first began to be used. [...].

However, because there were not enough [goods] for each to have some of each type, but of different ones, some found themselves with vineyards, others with olive

groves, others livestock, others clothing and canvas and cloth. One came to say that he needed that of the other and because he could not and should not deprive him of it: they began to barter one for another [...].

Truth is that despite all its inadequacy, this way of doing things lasted for a long time in many areas: and even in the era of Plato, Socrates and Aristotle, many nations of barbarians employed it (as stated in *Politikos*) and even in our era the Western Indies used it [...]. But the ancients (amidst whom ingenuity and common sense flourished) were compelled to seek another able to give them access to the necessary things with ease, and abundance.

And they invented the market, buying and selling at a fair price, appreciating, and evaluating each thing in itself, to the extent it could serve man. And they made silver and gold the common and general price [...]. (This was the origin of sale and purchase, and the invention of coins as is testified in the laws) [...].

This new way of doing things developed further over the course of time, especially after the great flood, when the world began to be repopulated. Some provinces and kingdoms were sterile, and lacked an entire type of produce, supplies or clothing [...]. To supply a kingdom or city, large quantities could not be brought. And it was hard to carry so many clothes there to barter, and great costs were incurred.

This was the origin of sale and purchase, and the invention of coins as is testified in the laws [...]. And for this reason, men agreed to select a pair of metals, which would be equivalent to the price of that which could be sold, so that with little bulk and volume the value of much could be carried, and all chose gold and silver for many and significant reasons that Pliny explains in chapter 33 of his natural history [...].

And everyone minted this metal and used it to exchange against that which he required for his family. And seeing that many times it was lacking in the land, many started importing it from outside at their cost, and then selling it to their neighbours at a profit on the costs and expenses they had incurred. Because of their continuous exchanging and selling, the people started calling these people merchants. Their art and profession (as St. Gregory says) is to market the clothes, and without being transformed or improved in any way, to resell them, or carry them out of town, or take them to another part of the Kingdom, or to another realm. The merchant does not seek, nor look to change the substance or quality of their clothing, but the time, and with the time the price or place.

In this last chapter, it is licit and maybe even profitable, to speculate a bit about this so dangerous and yet so little feared crossing, from Europe to the Indies [...].

These people do not understand how true and valid the sentence of the Greek author Hesiod is. He says that only the fool ignores that half is more than the whole

> [...]. If the merchants aimed to earn little, then this little would be more than the much that they claim, they would load their boats with products, would pay in cash, would leave in good weather and by proceeding this way, losses would be very rare. But when there is no moderation in what is desired, there is no way of negotiating and the excess can precipitate those involved into the depths of poverty. Because for all, merchants and ships, money changers and bankers, insurers and treasures the rule of Hesiod is very profitable.

Translation by Susanna Tavera

Source

Mercado Tomás de, *Suma de Tratos y Contratos* [1571], Madrid 1975, pp. 127-129, 289-290.

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Evliya Çelebi and Passages from his *Seyahatname*

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In recent years, historians have paid increasing attention to travel writings, in part as sources on the histories of societies different writers visited, but also to understand how the writer's own culture and society was constructed through the observation of 'others' overseas. Generally the travel writings of Europeans have attracted most attention, however they have by no means been the only ones afflicted by wanderlust, nor the only ones to put pen to paper. These extracts come from the 'book of travels' or *Seyahatname* written by Evliya Çelebi in the 17th-century.

Çelebi was a Turk who lived in Istanbul, the capital of the vast, and still expanding Ottoman empire. At its height, the empire commanded the allegiances of a vast territory stretching out from its core in Asia Minor (modern Turkey) across the Mediterranean to the North Coast of Africa and Egypt, around the Red Sea and across the Middle East to Baghdad, north to the Caspian, around the Black Sea and deep into south-eastern Europe. Çelebi was born into a well-positioned family in the empire's capital, where he received a broad education focusing on the Islamic sciences and arts. Complementing this, from an early age, living in the capital of a vast, multi-cultural empire, Istanbul continuously exposed Çelebi to tales of far-flung corners of the globe. Indeed, the capital's cafes abounded with professional story-tellers, or *meddahs*, who earned a living by recycling and embellishing these tales.

Çelebi's education, and a certain flair, secured entry into the Sultan's court, and he was subsequently sent with various Pashas around the empire; a career path he described simply as 'travel'. The *Seyahatname* was a ten-volume compilation of these travels which creatively blended observation and fiction. Its accuracy is at times questionable – not least claims to have burned Amsterdam with 40,000 Tartars; or to have visited the Mountains of the Moon. Less extraordinary claims, for example, to have visited countries beyond the empire such as Sweden, Germany, and Switzerland, are also questionable. Nonetheless the *Seyahatname* provides valuable insights into much of the empire, and perhaps more importantly, the way it was perceived from the Ottoman Empire's core, and indeed defined what it meant to live in that core. For example, such issues can be seen in Çelebi interests in the marvelous, especially the miracles of Sufi saints; in his preference for the urban over the rural; or his interest in food and music. As with all travel writers, he formed firm views on his subjects, and displayed a fondness

for Greeks, and an antipathy towards Jews and Persians – although his writings were sprinkled with Greek and Persian words.

In short, these extracts give a flavour of the world-views of one man living at the heart of a much earlier vast empire and in one of the most important cities of the world.

Text

IN THE NAME OF THE GOD, THE ALL-CLEMENT, THE ALL-MERCIFUL! To GOD, who ennobles exalted minds by travels, and has enabled me to visit the holy places [...]

It was [...] in the year A.H. 1041 (A.D. 1631) that by making excursions on foot in the villages and gardens near Istanbul, I began to think of extensive travels, and to escape from the power of my father, mother, and brethren. Forming a design of travelling over the whole earth, I entreated God to give me health for my body and faith for my soul; I sought the conversation of dervishes, and when I had heard a description of the seven climates and of the four quarters of the earth, I became still more anxious to see the world, to visit the Holy Land, Cairo, Damascus, Mecca and Medina, and to prostrate myself on the purified soil of the places where the prophet, the glory of all creatures, was born and died [...]

Description of the Land of the Abáza

It forms the northern shore of the Black Sea, begins at the mouth of the Phasus, and ends at the castle of Anapa near the island of Tamán. The following tradition is related of the origin of Abáza. According to the most authentic historians Adam was created in Paradise in the true Tátár form, and having after his exile met Eva on Mount A'arafát, they begat forty thousand children all in the forms of Tátárs. Adam having spoken Arabic in Paradise, forgot it when on earth, and began to speak Hebrew, Syrian, Dehkili (?) and Persian, which languages were spoken till the deluge, after which mankind divided into seventy-two nations and as many languages. The first who invented new languages was Edrís (Enoch) who first wrote and bound books, and hid them in the pyramids, whence they were taken out after the deluge by the philosophers, who by this means multiplied the languages to the number of one hundred and forty-seven [...]

Journey to the Crimea

I left Assov [...] and crossed the Tanais [...] opposite to the western side of Assov, a branch of the Don flows in its way to the sea of Assov [...]: the complexion of the inhabitants on its shores is yellow, and they have a kind of excrescence or crop on the

neck [...] It was here I ate horseflesh for the first time [...] Their horses are extremely fat, and their flesh can hardly be distinguished from roe's flesh, and is easy to digest.

Colleges of Tabríz

There are forty-seven large Colleges, where lectures are held on all sciences [...] There are seven houses for reading tradition (Dár-ul-hadíth), but the doctors of tradition are not much renowned, because they confine themselves to the tradition of Alí and the twelve Imáms, and have some thousand books on the tradition of Alí alone; [...] The town is besides furnished with seven canals of water, and there are one thousand and forty Sebíls, or places for distributing water, which are well covered [...]

Bad and reprehensible things in Irán

It is a bad custom in Persia that only twelve classes of the troops and as many of the Ulemás and the other ranks of society are allowed to have regular kitchens in their houses; all the rest eat from the market, therefore, although their dinner is cheap it is very bad.

[...]

People say that in Persia there are still those who do it. As God is my witness [...] I never saw anything resembling "extinguishing the candle". But the people of this world are slanderers and libelers and cavilers. It is also reported about the province of Sivas [...] that they extinguish the candle and that everyone embraces another man' s wife and lies with her in a corner – God forbid! This humble slave has traversed those regions often [...] and I never observed anything like that. [...]

A comparison between the Hungarians and the Austrians

The Hungarians are Lutherans while the Germans (or Austrians) are Catholics. Therefore these two infidel groups are opposites to one another, despite their both being Christians [...] Even though the Austrians are in control, from fear of the Hungarians they never venture into the region of Esztergom and Stolnibelgrad, whether armed or unarmed, except in large force. They communicate at the point of a spear, and never cross one another [...]

[...] compared to the Hungarians the Austrians are like the Jews: they have no stomach for a fight and are not swordsmen and horsemen. Their infantry musketeers [...] they shut their eyes and shoot at random. They wear large hats and long pointed shoes with high heels, and they never remove their gloves, summer or winter.

> The Hungarians, on the other hand, though they have lost their power, [...] they are true warriors. Like the Tatars, they ride wherever they go with a span of horses, with five or ten muskets, and with real swords at their waists. Indeed, they look just like our frontier soldiers, wearing the same dress as they, and riding the same thoroughbred horses. They are clean in their ways and in their eating, and honor their guests. They do not torture their prisoners as the Austrians do. They practice sword play like the Ottomans. In short, though both of them are unbelievers without faith, the Hungarians are more honorable and cleaner infidels. They do not wash their faces every morning with their urine as the Austrians do, but wash their faces every morning with water as the Ottomans do.

Source

The passages from *Seyahatname* and the information about Evliya are quoted from:

Mashita H. (ed.), *Narrative of Travels in Europe, Asia and Africa in the seventeenth century by Evliyá Efendí (Evliya Çelebi),* translated from the Turkish by Joseph von Hammer (with a new introduction by Robert Irwin), in the series of The Royal Asiatic Society Classics of Islam II, *The Muslim World 1100–1700; Early Sources on Middle East History, Geography and Travel*, London 2007, pp. 3, 4, 41, 548, 549, 561, 631, 632, 637.

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Friedrich Schiller: What Is, and to What End do We Study, Universal History? (1789)

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Johann Chr. Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) was a German poet, playwright, philosopher and historian. Together with Herder and Goethe he formed the intellectual group now called Weimar Classicism. Famous for his theatrical pieces advocating liberty and republicanism (*The Robbers*, *Don Carlos*, *Maria Stuart*, *William Tell*) he also wrote historical novels like *History of the Thirty Years War*. In 1789, at the age of twenty-nine, he was appointed as an unpaid professor of philosophy by the University of Jena. His inaugural lecture was a great success with the students, though not with his colleagues.

According to Schiller, the Age of Explorations marks the beginning of World History. By reports about distant peoples we learn about the early stages of our own historical development which should be conceived in analogy to the ages of the individual. Looking around the world we are able to observe the synchronicity of different historical times. As with any historical phenomenon, the cultural development of European societies is to be seen as the culmination of their history. Now European nations are connected by the bonds of cosmopolitan citizenship and their community resembles a peaceful family.

Since our knowledge of the past is restricted by the absence, the incompleteness, and the corruption of written documentation, our narration of the world history is different from the sum total of all past events. We have to fill the gaps by conjectures and to integrate our fragmentary knowledge into a coherent system. Doing this we have to assume a reasonable and teleological course of the history of mankind.

Schiller offers a representative example of the conceptions of World History current in the Enlightenment. His text is obviously influenced by Kant's *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* (1784) in his reference to the common benefits of the "unsocial sociability", in emphasizing Universal History as a project for the future, in the firm belief in the intellectual progress of mankind and in education through the study of history. Schiller's conception of World History is manifestly as Eurocentric as all comparable schemes of the late-18th century, and it shares the assumptions of the 'possessive individualism' typical of early modern social theory.

Text

Inaugural Lecture Held on 26-27 May 1789

[...] I can now draw closer to the conception of universal history itself, the topic of today's lecture.

The discoveries which our European mariners have made in distant oceans and on remote coastlines, present us a spectacle as constructive as it is entertaining. They show us tribes which surround us at the most diverse levels of culture, like children of different ages gathered around an adult, reminding him by their example of what he used to be, and where he started from. A wise hand seems to have preserved these raw tribes for us down to our times, where we would be advanced enough in our own culture to make fruitful application of this discovery upon ourselves, and to restore out of this mirror the forgotten origin of our species. But how shaming and sad is the picture these people give us of our childhood! And yet the level at which we see them is not even the first. Mankind began even more contemptuously. Those we study today we already find as nations, as political bodies: But mankind first had to elevate itself by an extraordinary effort to political society.

Now what do these travellers tell us about these savages? They found some without any knowledge of the most indispensable skills, without iron, without the plow, some even without the possession of fire. Some still wrestled with wild beasts for food and dwelling, among many language had been scarcely elevated from animal sounds to understandable signs. In some places, there was not even the simple bond of marriage, as yet no knowledge of property, and in others the flaccid soul was not even able to retain an experience which repeats itself every day; one saw the savage carelessly relinquish the bed on which he slept, because it did not occur to him, that he would sleep again tomorrow. War, however, was with them all, and the flesh of the vanquished enemy was not seldom the prize of victory. Among others, acquainted with various leisures of life, who had already achieved a higher level of culture, slavery and despotism presented us a dreadful picture of them. Once we find a tyrant in Africa trading his subjects for a gulp of brandy; another time they would be slaughtered on his grave to serve him in the underworld. Where once pious simplicity prostrates itself to a ridiculous fetish, another time it is to a terrible monster; mankind portrays himself in his gods. Where over there we see denigrating slavery, stupidity, and superstition bow him down, yet another time we see him utterly miserable on the other extreme of lawless freedom. Always armed for attack and defence, startled by every noise, the savage strains his cautious ear into the desert; everything new is the enemy, and woe to the stranger whom a storm has cast upon the coast! [...]

So were we. Caesar and Tacitus found us not much better eighteen hundred years ago. What are we now? – Let me linger for a moment at this epoch in which we are now living, at this present shape of the world we inhabit.

Human diligence has cultivated it and subdued the resisting land through persistence and skill. In one part of the world we see, that mankind redeemed the land from the sea, somewhere else he opened rivers into the arid land. Mankind has intermingled the regions and the seasons, and has toughened the weak plants of the Orient to his own harsh climate. As he brought Europe to the West Indies and the South Seas, so he also let Asia arise in Europe. A merrier sky now laughs above Germany's forests, which the powerful hand of man tore open to the rays of sunshine, and in the waves of the Rhine are mirrored Asia's grapevines. Populous towns arise on its banks, which swarm with vigorous life of pleasure and work. Here we find a man secure in peaceful possession of his acquisitions among millions of others, whom previously a single neighbour had robbed of his slumbers. The equality he lost upon entering the community, he regained through wise laws. He escaped from the blind constraint of pure chance and poverty under the more gentle constraint of treaties, and surrendered the liberty of the beast of prey to redeem the more noble freedom of the human being. Prevailing need compels him no longer to the plowshare, no enemy any longer demands of him, that he leave his plow to defend home and fatherland on the battlefield. With the arm of the husbandman he fills his barns, with the weapons of a warrior he protects his territory. The law keeps watch over his property – and that invaluable right remains for him to decide for himself what his duty is.

[...] The boundaries are breached which isolated states and nations in hostile egoism. All thinking minds are now bound together by the bond of world-citizenry, [...].

Finally, our nations: With what intensity, with what art they are intertwined with each other! How much more durably fraternal through the charitable force of need, than in earlier times through the most ceremonious treaties! The peace is now guarded by a permanently bridled war, and the self-love of one nation makes it the guardian over the prosperity of the other. The European community of states appears to be transformed into a great family. The family members may treat each other with hostility, but hopefully no longer tear each other limb from limb.

What very different pictures! Who would suspect in the refined European of the 18th century only an advanced brother of the modern Canadian, or the ancient Celt? [...]

Through which conditions did man wander until he ascended from one extreme, from the unsociable troglodyte, to the ingenious thinker, the cultured man of the world? Universal world history gives the answer to this question.

These same people present themselves on this same tract of land so immeasurably different when we view them in different periods of time. No less striking is the difference offered us by the contemporary generation in different countries. [...] Here two distant nations, separated by an ocean, transformed into neighbours by force of necessity, diligence of arts, and political bonds; there are adjacent residents of one river immeasurably distant in their different liturgies! What led Spain's power

across the Atlantic Ocean into the heart of America, and not even across the Tajo and Guadiana? What preserved so many thrones in Italy and Germany, and in France let all, except one, disappear? Universal history solves this question.

Even that we found ourselves together here at this moment, found ourselves together with this degree of national culture, with this language, these manners, these civil benefits, this degree of freedom of conscience, is the result perhaps of all previous events in the world: The entirety of world history, at least, were necessary to explain this single moment. [...]

Even in the most everyday activities of civil life, we cannot avoid becoming indebted to centuries past; the most diverse periods of mankind contribute to our culture in the same way as the most remote regions of the world contribute to our luxury. The clothes we wear, the spices in our food, and the price for which we buy them, many of our strongest medicines, and also many new tools of our destruction – do they not presuppose a Columbus who discovered America, a Vasco da Gama who circumnavigated the tip of Africa?

There is thus a long chain of events pulling us from the present moment aloft toward the beginning of the human species, the which intertwine as cause and effect. Only the infinite understanding can survey these events wholly and completely; for man, narrower limitations are set.

I [...] The entire epoch prior to speech, however momentous it may have been for the world, is lost to world history.

II [...] all events prior to the use of the written word, therefore, are as good as lost to world history.

III But the written word itself is not eternal, either; countless monuments of ancient ages have been destroyed by time and accidents, and only a few ruins have been preserved from the ancient world into the time of the art of printing. Most of them, by and large, are lost to world history, together with the information they should have provided us.

IV Among the few monuments, finally, which time has spared, the larger number has been disfigured by passion, by lack of judgment, and often even by the genius of those who describe them, and have been rendered unrecognizable. [...] The small sum of events remaining after all these deductions have been made is the substance of history in its broadest understanding. Now, what, and how much, of this substance of history belongs to Universal History?

Out of the entire sum of these events, the universal historian selects those which have had an essential, irrefutable, and easily ascertainable influence upon the contemporary form of the world, and on the conditions of the generations now living. It is the relationship of an historical fact to the present constitution of the

world, therefore, which must be seen in order to assemble material for world history. World history thus proceeds from a principle, which is exactly contrary to the beginning of the world. The real succession of events descends from the origin of objects down to their most recent ordering; the universal historian ascends from the most recent world situation, upwards toward the origin of things. [...]

Because world history depends on the wealth and poverty of sources, there must arise as many gaps in world history as there exist empty passages in written tradition. However uniformly, necessarily, and certainly the changes in the world develop out of each other, they will appear disconnected and accidentally connected to each other in history. Therefore, between the course of the world and the course of world history, a remarkable disparity is evident. One might compare the former with an uninterrupted, continually flowing stream, from which, however, only here and there will a wave be illuminated in world history. [...]

As such, our world history would never become anything but an aggregation of fragments, and would never deserve the name of a science. But now the philosophical understanding comes to its aid, and while it binds these fragments together with artificial connections, it elevates the aggregate to a system, to a reasonably connected whole. Its authority for this lies in the uniformity and invariant unity of the laws of nature and of the human soul, which unity is the reason, that the events of most distant antiquity return in the most recent times under the coincidence of similar circumstances from the outside, as also the reason, that, therefore, from events most recent, lying within the field of our observation, a conclusion can be drawn and some light shed, in hindsight, on events which faded away in prehistoric times. The method of drawing conclusions by analogies is as powerful an aid in history, as everywhere else, but it must be justified by an important purpose, and must be exercised with as much circumspection as judgment.

The philosophical mind cannot dwell on the material of world history long, until a new impulse striving for harmony becomes active in him, one which irresistibly stimulates him to assimilate everything around him into his rational nature, and to raise every phenomenon he sees to its highest recognizable effect, to thought. The more often, and the more successfully he thus repeats this attempt to connect the past to the present, the more he is inspired to connect that, as means and intent, which he sees to be interlocked as cause and effect. One phenomenon after the other begins to shed blind caprice, lawless freedom, and to add itself as a well-fitting link to an harmonious whole (which, admittedly, exists only in his imagination). Soon he finds it difficult to persuade himself, that the succession of phenomena, which achieved so much regularity and the quality of being intended in his imagination, does not have these qualities in reality; he finds it difficult to surrender that to the blind rule of necessity, which had begun to take on such vivid form under the borrowed light of the understanding. He thus takes this harmony from out of himself, and plants it outside

of himself into the order of things, i.e., he brings a reasonable purpose into the course of the world, and a teleological principle into world history. [...]

Man changes himself, and flees the stage; his opinions flee and change with him: History alone remains incessantly on the scene, an immortal citizen of all nations and all times. Like the Homeric Zeus, it looks with an equally bright view down upon the bloody work of war, and upon peaceful nations which innocently feed themselves from the milk of their herds. However lawlessly the freedom of man may seem to deal with the contest, it calmly gazes upon the confused play, for its far-reaching view already discovered in the distant future the way where this lawlessly roaming freedom will be guided by the reins of necessity. What history keeps secret from the reproachful conscience of a Gregory and a Cromwell, it rushes to proclaim to mankind: "The egoistic man may indeed pursue baser ends, but he unconsciously promotes splendid ones".

[...] By dissecting the fine mechanism by which the silent hand of nature methodically develops the powers of mankind from the very beginning of the world, and while it [History] precisely indicates in each period of time what has been achieved on behalf of this great plan of nature, at the same time it restores the true standard of happiness and merit which prevailing delusion distorted in a different way in every century. [...]

All preceding ages, without knowing it or aiming at it, have striven to bring about our human century. [...]

Source

Friedrich Schiller, *Poet of Freedom*, vol. II, 1988, trans. C. Stephan, R. Trout, published by The Schiller Institute, http://www.schillerinstitute.org/transl/Schiller_essays/universal_history.html, accessed on 30 March 2011.

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Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels on World History, on Historical Change, Transnational History, Interconnectedness, and on Periodization

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Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels sought to integrate philosophy, history and economics into a system of thought known as Marxism, which laid heavy emphasis on the inseparable connections between the political, economic and social worlds. They did so by integrating classical German philosophy with what Lichteim has called the "great historical drama which had brought about the emancipation of Western society from its medieval fetters"[1].

Born into a Jewish family, Karl Marx (1818-1883) was largely influenced by the radical Enlightenment. He studied in Bonn and later in Berlin where he had active contacts with the so-called Young or Left Hegelians. In 1843 he moved to Paris where he was converted to revolutionary militancy. Expelled from France by the French politician Guizot, Marx settled in Brussels where he started a lifelong collaboration with Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), the son of a German industrialist who had witnessed at first hand the misery that industrialism produced for many unskilled industrial workers and clearly reflected this in his influential work of 1844, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*.

In 1845-1846, Marx and Engels wrote *The German Ideology*, a study that was only published in 1932. It contained the basic ideas of historical materialism as a Marxist theory of society. As Marx clearly later stated, "social, political and intellectual processes of life" have their real and unique foundation in the "material forces of production". The English historian E.P. Thompson has used some of Karl Marx's other words to summarize this same and crucial conviction: "the hand mill gives you society with the feudal lord: the steam mill, society with the industrial capitalist"[2].

Some Marxist social scientists have criticised these basic assumptions of Marxism as being "too closely bound up" with European social perspectives and political problems, notably with the ones derived from the mechanization of industrial production. Passages such as the one selected above from *The German Ideology* show on the contrary that the early historical convictions of Marx and Engels clearly took into account the economic and social interconnectedness of historical events on a worldwide scale.

These connections were perhaps too closely associated with British imperialism but they fused western and eastern productive experiences into a common worldwide social logic. This was what Marx established in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, a work of 1859 which marked the final and definitive separation of Marxist thought from Hegelian philosophy and the establishment of critical materialism as a systematic scientific contribution based on universal laws.

Both Marx and Engels recognized separately that *The German Ideology* had a dramatic specificity which linked it with English historical examples. In the preface of the *Contribution* Marx came back to his materialistic conception of history with the intention of substituting the existing and accepted history by a complete view of global historical interconnectedness. His global or integrated world history was the result of his study of "the enormous material" – economic and historical – kept in the British Museum. "The [...] conscious research" allowed him to establish that the conflict between social classes had always been the motor of history and that its evolution followed a concrete materialistic pattern: "at a certain stage of their development the material forces of production in society come into conflict with the existing relations of production [...] then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed".

But by doing so, Marx also transformed the succession of historical conflicts into a materialistic periodization of social life: "in broad outlines we can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois methods of production as so many epochs in the progress of the economic formation of society [...] the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of this antagonism"[3].

Finally, our selection of Marx's texts includes a newspaper article published in 1853 by the *New York Daily Tribune*, about world history events and more specifically about the effects that, after the first "Opium War", the Taiping rebellion against the Manchu dynasty in China could have on European politics and on the revolutionary attitudes of European proletarian classes.

The French Marxist historian Pierre Vilar has summarized Marx and Engels's historical materialism using Marx's own words: "after approaching a sociological, economic and historical theory on capitalism, after establishing the dialectics of productive relations, 'history as world history is a result'" [4].

Notes

1 G. Lichtheim, *The Origins of Socialism*, New York - Washington 1969, p. 188.

2 E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* [1963], London 1968, p. 208.

3 L.S. Feuer (ed.), *Marx and Engles, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, London 1969, pp. 84-85.

[4] P. Vilar, *Marx y la historia*, in E.J. Hobsbawm et al. (eds.), *Storia del marxismo*, vol. 1, *Il marxismo ai tempi di Marx*, Turin 1978, pp. 158-161.

Texts

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, 1845-1846

History is nothing but the succession of separate generations, each of which exploits the materials, capital and productive forces handed down to it by all the preceding generations. On the one hand, it thus continues the traditional activity in completely changed circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a completely changed activity. This can be speculatively distorted so that later history is made the goal of earlier history, for example, the goal ascribed to the discovery of America is to assure the outbreak of French Revolution. History then obtains its own aims and becomes a 'person ranking with other persons', while what is designated with the words 'destiny', 'goal', 'germ' or 'idea' of earlier history is nothing more but an abstraction formed from later history, an abstraction from the active influence which earlier history exercises on later history.

The further the separate spheres that interact on one another extend in the course of this development, the more the original isolation of the separate nationalities is separated by the developed mode of production, commerce and division of labour between various nations naturally brought forth by these and the more does history become world history. For instance, when a machine is invented in England to deprive countless workers of bread in India and China and revolutionize the entire life of these empires, it becomes a world-historical fact. Sugar and coffee proved their world historical importance in the nineteenth century when the lack of theses products, occasioned by the Napoleonic Continental System, caused the Germans to raise against Napoleon. Lack of sugar and coffee thus became the real basis of the glorious Wars of Liberation of 1813. Hence the transformation of history into world history is not a mere abstract act of the "self-consciousness", the world spirit, or of any other metaphysical spectre, but a completely material, empirically verifiable act, an act for which every individual furnishes proof as he comes and goes, eats, drinks, and clothes himself.

Source

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, in *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, ed. and trans. Easton L.D., Guddat K.H., New York 1967, pp. 403-473.

Karl Marx, *A Contribution to The Critique of Political Economy*, 1859

In broad outlines we can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois methods of production as so many epochs in the progress of the economic formation of society. The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production – antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but of the one arising conditions surrounding the life of individuals in society; at the same time the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of this antagonism. The social formation constitutes, therefore, the closing chapter of the prehistoric stage of human society.

Source

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, in Feuer L.S. (ed.), *Marx and Engels, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, London 1969, pp. 85.

Karl Marx in "New York Daily Tribune", 14 June 1853

Whether the "contact of extremes" be such a universal principle or not, a striking illustration of it may be seen in the effect the Chinese revolution seems likely to exercise upon the civilized world. It may seem a very strange, and a very paradoxical assertion that the next uprising of the people of Europe, and their next movement for republican freedom and economy of Government, may depend more probably on what is now passing in the Celestial Empire – the very opposite of Europe – than on any other political cause that now exists – more even than on the menaces of Russia and the consequent likelihood of a general European war. But yet it is no paradox, as all may understand by attentively considering the circumstances of the case.

Whatever be the social causes, and whatever religious, dynastic, or national shape they may assume, that have brought about the chronic rebellions subsisting in China for about ten years past, and now gathered together in one formidable revolution the occasion of this outbreak has unquestionably been afforded by the English cannon forcing upon China that soporific drug called opium. Before British arms the authority of the Manchu dynasty fell to pieces; the superstitious faith in the eternity of the Celestial Empire broke down; the barbarous and hermetic isolation from the civilized world was infringed; and an opening was made for that intercourse which has since proceeded so rapidly under the golden attrac-

tions of California and Australia. At the same time the silver coin of the Empire, its lifeblood, began to be drained away to the British East Indies. [...]

Under these circumstances, as the greater part of the regular commercial circle has already been run through by British trade, it may safely be augured that the Chinese revolution will throw the spark into the overloaded mine of the present industrial system and cause the explosion of the long-prepared general crisis, which, spreading abroad, will be closely followed by political revolutions on the Continent. It would be a curious spectacle, that of China sending disorder into the Western World while the Western Powers, by English, French and American war-steamers, are conveying "order" to Shanghai, Nanking and the mouths of the Great Canal.

Source

Marx-Engels Library, URL http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/06/14.htm, accessed on 30 March 2011.

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Fukuzawa Yukichi: *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization* (1875)

Takenaka Toru
Osaka University

Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901) was a Japanese writer and educationalist in the latter half of the 19th century. He acquainted the Japanese public with western thought through his extensive writings, relying mainly on Anglo-American liberal authors. Particularly by pleading for the ethos of individualism and criticizing feudal customs, Fukuzawa enjoyed great popularity as a leading Enlightenment thinker in the formative years of modernization. *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization* is one of his major works and a good example of such Japanese Enlightenment historiography. In this book, the influential author laid out his view on the history of civilization in detail.

The text below, cited from one of the first chapters, spells out Fukuzawa's basic view of the world's structure and its law of development. In his view the world had a hierarchic order consisting of the "primitive", the "semi-civilized" and the "civilized" countries. He thought that civilization proceeded through this hierarchy upward according to a mono-linear law of development. Significantly, he fully admitted western values to be the sole criterion for measuring a nation's level of civilization. With his absolute orientation to the West, Fukuzawa represents the universalist way of thinking, which is one of the characteristics of the Japanese understanding of world history.

Text

> When we are talking about civilization in the world today, the nations of Europe and the United States of America are the most highly civilized, while the Asian countries, such as Turkey, China, and Japan, may be called semi-developed countries, and Africa and Australia are to be counted as still primitive lands. These designations are common currency all over the world. While the citizens of the nations of the West alone boast of civilization, no citizens of the semi-developed and primitive lands are willing to submit to being designated as such. There is not one who would rest content with being branded semi-developed or primitive, take pride in his own country or consider it on a par with nations of the West. This attitude is bad enough. Not only this: the more those with some intelligence become aware of this situation, the more convinced they become of the situation of their own countries; the more convinced they become of the situation of their own countries, the

> more they awaken to the distance separating them from the nations of the West. They groan, they grieve [...]. (p. 17.)
>
> Yes, we cannot be satisfied with the level of civilization attained by the West. But shall we therefore conclude that Japan should reject it? If we did, what other criterion would we have? We cannot rest content with the stage of semi-development; even less can the primitive stage suffice. Since these latter alternatives are to be rejected, we must look elsewhere. But to look to some far-off utopian world thousands of years hence is mere daydreaming. Besides, civilization is not a dead thing; it is something vital and advancing. As such, it must pass through sequences and stages; primitive people advance to semi-developed forms, the semi-developed advance to civilization, and civilization itself is even now in the process of advancing forward. Europe also had to pass through these phases in its evolution to its present level. Hence present-day Europe can only be called the highest level that human intelligence has been able to attain at this juncture in history. Since this is true, in all countries of the world, be they primitive or semi-developed, those who are to give thought to their country's progress in civilization must necessarily take European civilization as the criterion in making arguments, and must weigh the pros and cons of the problem in the light of it. My own criterion throughout this book will be that of Western civilization, and it will be in terms of it that I describe something as good or bad, in terms of it that I find things beneficial or harmful. (p. 20.)

Please note: The Japanese personal names are written in the Japanese way in which the surname precedes the given name.

Source

Fukuzawa Yukichi, *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization*, trans. Dilworth D.A., Hurst G.C. III, Tokyo 2008. (The translation is slightly adapted.)

Noro Eitarō: *A History of Development of Japanese Capitalism* (1930)

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Noro Eitarō (1900-1934) was one of the leading Marxists of the interwar period. Along with political activities as a member of the Japanese Communist Party, Noro made a name as editor of the series *Nihon shihonshugi hattatsu shi kôza* [A course on the history of Japanese capitalism] (1932-1933). This seven volume series, offering an overview of Japan's modern development on the basis of the Marxist historical philosophy, had huge impact on social sciences at the time, which stood under strong Marxist influence, owing particularly to the heated controversy it set off amongst historians. It is safe to say that the historiographical frame of reference that these debates set forth remained effectively unchanged until the 1960s.

Nihon shihonshugi hattatsu shi [A history of development of Japanese capitalism] was the only major work of the young communist, who fell victim to oppression by the authoritarian regime. This is typical of Marxist historiography with the use of specific terminology and many citations from Marx's works. It is also typically Marxist in that the author tries to interpret political events from the angle of the socio-economic structural change at the basis of society and the resulting class struggle. It is safe to say that Noro focuses too much on applying a rigid Marxist scheme of succession of various historical stages to Japan's course of development. Consequently, detailed historical facts are not sufficiently taken into account and the country's specificities are not duly addressed. The text will serve as a good example for another type of universalist thinking which was prevalent in modern Japan.

Text

> The Meiji restoration was obviously a violent political revolution, and at the same time – no, just because of that, it was also a sweeping social change. It was neither *mere reinstatement of the monarchy*, as is generally assumed, nor *just a power struggle* between rivaling feudal ruling classes. Naturally, however, that is not to say that the Meiji restoration signified a bourgeois revolution – in the sense that bourgeois classes took over power through it. It was indeed an *epochal social transformation* that *heralded* the *dominance* of the capitalist relations of production over the old feudal ones and therefore the dominance of the capitalists and (capitalist-like) land-

> owners over the old feudal rulers. Consequently, the change contained extremely far-reaching and complex political, economic and social contents. (vol. 1, p. 223.)
>
> The political power is still under the grip of the block formed by the capitalist class and the landowner class. It should be noted, however, that the former's power is based on the prevalent capitalist relations of production, while the latter keeps its dominance by retaining the old relations of production that it inherited from the already downfallen social class. Given the present state of affairs that the capitalist mode of production has risen to be prevalent in Japan and that agricultural production is also subordinate to the overwhelming influence of capital, even the landowners, who still keep exploiting the direct producers in feudal manner, cannot now be free from the general influence of capital. (vol. 2, p. 79.)

Please note: The Japanese personal names are written in the Japanese way in which the surname precedes the given name.

Source

Noro Eitarô, *Nihon Shihonshugi Hattatsu Shi*, 2 vols., Tokyo 1983. (Emphasis as in the original.)

Umesao Tadao and *An Ecological View of History: Japanese Civilization in the World Context* (1974)

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Umesao Tadao (1920-2010), belonging to the first generation of Japanese anthropologists, started his academic career with research into the nomadic life in Mongolia. Later he extended his scope to ecology, animal sociology, comparative studies of civilization etc. He and his fellow scholars (who were mostly based in Kyoto and therefore often called the "Kyoto School") opened new horizons in humanities research that had long stood under the strong influence of Marxism.

An Ecological View of History is one of the results of Umesao Tadao's combining his multi-disciplinary interests with large-scale historical perspective. The book had a good reception not only in academia, but also in the general public because of its unique view of Japanese civilization and its relationship to world history. The author's view of a multi-track course of history was particularly innovative, that is he argues that historical development proceeds on various routes, depending on natural-geographical conditions, rather than along a single mono-linear track. Umesao's theory challenged the prevailing Japanese intellectual climate with its strong inclination to universalist thinking.

Text

> Within the 'Old World' (defined above as Eurasia and North Africa), only a few countries have managed to become advanced civilizations. The only countries that have completely attained a state of advanced civilization are Japan and a few Western European countries [...]. There is a marked difference between these few most advanced countries and countries such as China, India, Russia, the Southeast Asian region, the Islamic world, and Eastern Europe. To introduce my analysis of this phenomenon, I propose dividing the Old World into two regions and labeling them 'Zone One' and 'Zone Two'. If we think of the Old World as an ellipse, the smaller Zone One exists only around the eastern and western edges of the oval, the eastern portion being particularly small. Zone Two occupies the entire remaining area of the ellipse. (p. 47.)

> Indeed the history of Zone Two civilizations is largely one of conquest and destruction. Dynasties thrived only when they could effectively eliminate violence. Even then, they had to remain on guard, prepared for attacks from new sources of violence. This was a tremendous waste of productivity. It may be an oversimplification, but I believe that this never-ending cycle of construction and destruction was the defining nature of Zone Two. It was possible to build these grand societies, but only temporarily, because they could not mature sufficiently to allow mounting internal contradictions to work themselves out through revolutionary change. The conditions of the region dictated this outcome from the start. (p. 56.)
>
> It must now be clear that Zone One was fortunate in its environment. Located in the temperate zone, it received adequate amounts of rainfall, and consisted of highly productive land. Originally, it was mostly forested; hence when the standard of technology was low, it was less likely to become the fountainhead of civilization than the arid region. However, once a certain level of technological development was reached, the temperate forest posed no obstacles such as a tropical rainforest might present. Above all, this region was at the 'edge' of the world. The violence characteristic of Central Asia rarely extended there. With further good fortune, the societies of Zone One were able to build up their defensive capabilities sufficiently for those occasions when invasions did threaten. The German knights successfully fought in East Prussia against Genghis Khan and Hulegu Khan. The Japanese samurai triumphed against Kubelai Khan's forces in northern Kyūshū. (p. 57.)
>
> Societies within Zone One, sheltered and blessed with a favorable environment, were able to develop smoothly and pass through several developmental stages to reach the present day. If we apply ecological terminology, we can say that succession progressed in an orderly fashion. In Zone One societies, the motive force of historical development came from within the community: this is called 'autogenic' succession. In contrast, in Zone Two, history was often changed by forces external to the community: this is known as 'allogenic' succession. (p. 57.)

Please note: The Japanese personal names are written in the Japanese way in which the surname precedes the given name.

Source

Umesao Tadao, *An Ecological View of History: Japanese Civilization in the World Context*, ed. Befu H., trans. Cary B., Melbourne 2003.

Ptolemy: Mapping the Globe

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Κλαύδιος Πτολεμαῖος [Claudius Ptolemaeus], the famous Greek astronomer, mathematician and geographer, lived in Alexandria, Egypt, in the 2nd century CE. His astronomical work was preserved in his book *Η Μαθηματική Σύνταξις* (in Greek *He mathematike syntaxis* [The Mathematical Collection]) which became generally known under the title *Μεγίστη* (in Greek *Megiste* and later on, in Arabic pronunciation *Almagest*). *Megiste* was divided into thirteen books. In these books Ptolemy extended the theories of another important Greek astronomer, Hipparchus, and expressed his own geocentric system, according to which the earth is an immovable planet at the centre of the universe.

As a geographer, Ptolemy composed the only elaborate book on cartography for more than fourteen centuries, *Γεωγραφική Υφήγησις* (in Greek *Geographike Hyphegesis*, in Latin *Geographia* [Guide to Geography]). His *Hyphegesis* presents a gazetteer of some 8000 toponyms in Europe, Asia and Africa of which 6400 places are listed with their coordinates – measured or reported – within a uniform grid of vertical longitudes and horizontal latitudes to be used for drawing maps of the world and its principal regions. The text covers the then known inhabited world (*Oikoumene*) from the Canary Islands to China, from Scotland and southern Scandinavia to Central Africa and Indonesia. The circumference of the Earth – which had been, in the 3rd century BCE, accurately calculated by another Greek astronomer, Eratosthenes of Cyrene – is estimated at 25% short of its real size. Ptolemy's *Oikoumene* comprises three continents and he asserts that the land mass of the world extended indefinitely beyond the limits of knowledge at his time. His geographical outlines become more and more inaccurate the further they move from well known parts of the world. The eastern coast of Asia is bent to the south and the west so that the Indian Ocean becomes a lake. The existence of a *terra australis incognita* ('unknown land of the South') was stated by Ptolemy. Its existence (other than in the radically reduced form of Australia) was finally disproved by the second voyage of the British captain James Cook to the Pacific in 1772-1775.

Ptolemy proposed methods of drawing maps on plane and spherical surfaces. To represent a spherical earth on a flat surface one has to imagine a viewer looking at the globe from a point of considerable distance. A world map that displayed localities in relation



Ptolemaic World Map, 1482.

to a graticule (grid of intersecting lines) had to conform to a 'projection' to preserve the proportionality of distances. Ptolemy discusses a cylindrical (equal area) and two conical projections (cf. Berggren, Jones 2000, pp. 31-41).

Ptolemy also standardized the northward orientation of maps with east on the right, thereby placing the known world in the upper left, a standard that remains to this day. Though once disputed, we are now convinced that Ptolemy's texts originally were accompanied by an atlas consisting of a world map and 26 regional maps. Unfortunately these ancient maps are lost.

During the middle ages the *Geographia* was rarely mentioned. However, from the 9th century onwards Islamic cartographers used translations of the *Hyphegesis* to draw regional maps of the Islamic world. Al-Idrīsī's *Atlas* belongs to this tradition.

Around 1300 the Byzantine monk Maximos Planudes discovered a splendid manuscript of the *Geographia* complete with maps and the emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos arranged for a copy to be made. These early Greek manuscript copies started a Ptolemaic renaissance in the Latin West when in 1393 the Byzantine diplomat Manuel Chrysaloras brought the first copy of the *Geographia* to Italy, amongst other Greek manuscripts. He started a Latin translation which was completed in 1406 by his pupil Jacobus Angelus. Under the new title *Cosmographia* the work was an enormous success. We know of 80 manuscripts, many of them with magnificent maps, which ended up in princely libraries. Errors in Ptolemy's text and maps were soon corrected. People learned that the Indian Ocean was open to the south, but still Columbus was led by Ptolemy to believe that Asia was much closer to Europe than it actually is. 'Modern maps' e.g. of Spain, Gaul, Scandinavia, Italy and even town maps were added to the atlases. As it became more and more outdated the reverence for the classic text gradually diminished, but Ptolemy's cartographic tools stimulated extensive mapping, notably of the new discoveries.

Printed editions which helped to spread Ptolemy's *Geographia* appeared since 1477. The woodcut map shown here, published in Ulm 1482/86, follows a manuscript produced by Nicolaus Germanus about 1460. Still only 180 longitudinal degrees of the globe are covered; the discoveries alongside Africa's western coast are not there; the southern section of the globe is still an "unknown land according to Ptolemy" and the Indian Ocean remains a huge lake. Eurasia is oversized but Scandinavia and Greenland are added according to 'modern' tables.

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Seiiki no Chizu: Map of China and Westward (8th Century)

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The map reproduced on the following page, dating from the end of the 8th century to the mid 9th century, depicts the 22 countries established on the Eurasian continent at the time. Although described as a "map" this document displays the territories of the 22 countries in a simplified, rectangular form, enclosed by perpendicular lines. And the names of these countries were noted down in both Chinese and Tibetan characters. Chief among the 22 countries, which have not yet been identified completely, are, from the east to the west, the Tang China (No. 21), Uighur (No. 19), Tibet (No. 17), India (No. 11), the Islamic Caliphate (No. 3) and the Byzantine Empire (No. 5). This map focused on the countries of Asia with the exception of the Byzantine Empire, of which the Chinese name "払林" (in Tibetan characters "Pu-lim") was derived from Iranian language "From/Hrom" meaning Rome.

It is still unknown who drew the map, but there is a strong possibility that it was drawn by a Buddhist monk. The map was imported from Tang China into Japan in the Heian Period (794-1185). Unfortunately, the original of this map has been lost and it has been copied many times: it is uncertain to what extent the repeated copies reflect the lost original.

And what is worse, it is unclear where the last copy is kept now. We can only provide a blurred photo of the last copy. The plates below reproduce a photo of the last copy and a sketch of it, drawn by Japanese scholar Teramoto Enya and printed in his thesis. Nevertheless, the piece retains great value as a map of the world as conceived during the Tang dynasty.

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Please note: The Japanese personal names are written in the Japanese way in which the surname precedes the given name.

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

図1　寺本1931年論文の口絵より転載



図2　寺本1931年論文，p.76より転載

Map of China and Westward (8th Century).

The Osma Beatus Map: A Medieval and Christian View of the World (1086)

Susanna Tavera
University of Barcelona

This *Mappamundi* from a manuscript of the commentary on the apocalypse by Beatus of Liébana (c. 800), written in the year 1086 and now preserved in the cathedral-library of Burgo de Osma (province of Soria, Spain), is an exceptional example of the medieval "Beatus Maps". As D. Woodward writes:

> In the millennium that links the ancient and modern worlds, from about the fifth to the fifteenth Century after Christ, there developed a genre of world maps or map-paintings originating in the classical tradition but adopted by the Christian Church. The primary purpose of these *mappaemundi*, as they are called, was to instruct the faithful about significant events in Christian history rather than to record their precise locations (Woodward 1987, p. 286).

These medieval maps represent images of different aspects not only of geographical and historical but also fantastical knowledge of the world. *Mappaemundi* also had pragmatic uses in medieval societies: they were not used in the direct service of political power but to underline its character as pictorial analogies to medieval historical texts. They offer a clear example of the metaphorical capacity of language and communication that should be explored and linked to the hierarchical world view of Christian western European societies and to its philosophical and didactic purposes.

In spite of their schematic and often pictographic representation of what was believed to be the "Christian earth", the "Beatus" maps were not independent documents. They were included as brilliant miniatures in manuscript copies which contain and comment the *Apocalypse of St. John*. In particular, the "Osma Beatus" is one of the 35 surviving copies (26 with miniatures) of the so called Beatus of Liébana, the work of a monk who lived during the 8th century in the monastery of Liébana, Cantabria, or perhaps in that of Sahagún, Castille. Many of the surviving Liébana manuscripts contain Christian world maps and have become a kind of culmination of all Apocalypse manuscripts. As such they are medieval historical documents of prime importance (Williams 1992, vol. I, pp. 9-28).

The "Beatus of Osma" map covers one page of the manuscript where Beatus writes about the sending out of the Apostles to evangelize different regions according to



Map 1
Osma Map (c. 1086).

post-biblical traditions. It is certainly the most interesting of all the Beatus *Mappaemundi* because of its articulated view of the medieval Christian *Oikumene*. Looking eastwards with Paradise at the top, as the beginning of all history and thus reproducing the orientation of all Christian churches, the map is based on the so called late medieval quadripartite structure of the surface of the earth which was designed to replace the previous structure which reproduced the three continents known at the time: Europe, Asia and Africa. In the Burgo de Osma map the fourth section is occupied by the ocean and embraces a so called *terra incognita*. This quadripartite structure serves to articulate the role played by the twelve apostles who evangelised the different parts of the world but not the fourth part. Some apostles are represented in the middle of their respective sanctuaries or geographical areas of their activities so as to reinforce a "geography of Christian medieval pilgrimages": for example Saint Jacques in Spain. In spite of its Mozarab appearance, the map does not show any influence of Islamic art or culture. It is obvious that the manuscript and the map aimed to promote the idea of society as a conscious elaboration of a world view, an idea well established in Saint Augustine's *City of God* (books XV-XIX, pp. 397-530), where he traces how the parallel courses of the earthly and heavenly cities proceed from the time of Cain and Abel to the end of the world.

The manuscript with the map is kept in the cathedral of Burgo de Osma. The long silence between the first mention of the manuscript and the 1920s preserved it in the Osma Cathedral (notwithstanding King Philip II's search for manuscripts to be moved to the library of the Escorial). Although it was mentioned several other time from the 19th century on, the "Osma Beatus" was not properly rediscovered until 1929 and a complete facsimile was not published until 1992.

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Al-Idrīsī and His World Map (1154)

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Chemnitz University of Technology

Map 1
Al-Idrīsī's World-map, Ms. from Cairo 1456;
Oxford, Bodleian Library, Oxford. (Ms. Pococke 375 fol. 3v-4). South is at the top of the map.



Map 2
Reconstruction of Al-Idrīsī's World-map, assembled by Konrad Miller from Al-Idrīsī's sectional maps, cf. Miller 1927. South is at the top.

Working for eighteen years under the patronage of the Norman King Roger II Guiscard of Sicily, who gathered scholars from many regions at his court in Palermo, the Moroccan geographer Al-Idrīsī in 1154 completed a description and an atlas of maps of the known world. Officially titled *Entertainment for those wanting to discover the world* (or *A Diversion for the Man Longing to Travel to Far-Off Places*), the text was generally known as *The Book of Roger* (Arabic: *Kitab Rujar*) and the maps as *Tabula Rogeriana*. According to modern standards, it was the best cartographical work and the richest source of geographical information produced during the Middle Ages.

Muhammed al-Idrīsī (Abu Abd Allah Muhammad Al-Idrīsī Al-Qurtubi Al-Hasani Al-Sabti or simply Al-Idrīsī, c. 1100-1156) was probably born in Ceuta, then in the Empire of the Almoravids, and is thought to have studied in Córdoba. Under the Norman kings,



Sicily held a central position in the Mediterranean between the Byzantine, Islamic and Western Christian cultures. The capital city of Palermo was one of the great meeting places for sailors, merchants, pilgrims, crusaders, and scholars from many nations.

On its completion, the map was engraved on a large circular silver table which is now lost. The explanatory book accompanying this planispheric representation of the world and written on the order of King Roger was to contain whatever was not in the map:

> As to the conditions of the lands and countries, concerning their inhabitants and their possessions and places and their likenesses, their seas, mountains and measurements, their crops and revenues and all sorts of buildings, their property and the works they have produced, their economy and merchandising, both imports and exports, and all the wonderful things relating to each and where they were with regard to the seven climates and also a description

> of their peoples with their customs and habits, appearance, clothes, and language. (*Opus geographicum,* fasc. 1, pp. 6-7; cf. Ahmad, p. 160.)

The extensive text was accompanied by a set of some 70 regional maps – all oriented southwards – which remained the most accurate for centuries to come. Ten manuscripts are known today of which eight contain maps. Some of the latter contain an overview map of the world not mentioned in the explanatory text.

Al-Idrīsī's geography abandoned the Muslim tradition of drawing abstract and stylized regional maps of the Islamic world without mathematical coordinates. He followed the Greek mathematician and geographer Ptolemy (2nd century CE) and described the whole known world by giving geographical coordinates of single locations. Again following the Ptolemaic tradition, he portrayed the world as a globe, which he computed to be 22,900 miles in circumference and judged to remain stable in space like the yolk in an egg. Like Ptolemy, he divided the inhabited earth into seven climates according to latitudes. Each climate was then artificially divided by longitudinal lines into ten sections representing the world from the western coast of Africa to eastern coast of Asia. The resulting almost equal squares which result allowed the construction of a set of rectangular maps.

Ptolemy's geographical work was almost lost in medieval Europe but had been preserved through 9th-century and later Arabic translations. In addition Al-Idrīsī used the work of the Andalusian astronomer Al-Zarqali and his corrections of Ptolemy concerning locations in the western Mediterranean. He also gathered information from his very extensive travels as well as from reports of other travellers and merchants. He also passed down mythical and historical lore from different cultural traditions. On the lower left corner of the world map we see the land of the eschatological figures of Gog and Magog closed behind huge gates in Far East Asia which appear in biblical, popular texts of classical antiquity like the 3rd century Alexander Romance and Qur'anic books – a standard element in later medieval and some early modern maps.

Al-Idrīsī inspired Islamic geographers such as Ibn Battuta, Ibn Khaldun, Piri Reis and European navigators such as Christopher Columbus and Vasco Da Gama. However, his influence on European writers and cartographers, although much disputed, was obviously very slight.

Historical tradition

Ten manuscript copies of the *Book of Roger* exist today. The oldest is dated to about 1325. Five of them have a complete text, eight have maps and six contain at the start the – quite advanced – circular map of the world not mentioned in the text. The most complete manuscript, which includes the world map and all seventy sectional maps, is kept in Istanbul. Our image of a circular map is from a manuscript copied by 'Alī ibn Hasan al-Hûfī al-Qâsimī in Cairo in 1456, now preserved in the Bodleian Library in Oxford. (Ms. Pococke 375 fol. 3v-4) (Map 1).

Konrad Miller produced a transcription and a simulated assembly of all the regional maps copied from various manuscripts which results in a very large rectangular map of the world (Map 2).

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The Hereford World Map: A Medieval Encyclopaedic and Religious Representation (c. 1300)

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Among the most outstanding characteristics of the 13th-century Hereford world map are its size and its character as a masterpiece of medieval cartography. Today, the Hereford world map is the only surviving large scale *mappamundi*: a unique sample of medieval cartography. Two bigger maps existed in the past; however, the 13th-century Chalivoy-Milon map was destroyed in 1885 and the Ebstorf world map (from the same century) was destroyed during an air raid in Hanover in 1943 but reconstructed later (*Die Ebstorfer Weltkarte*, 2007).

Painted on a single piece of vellum, the Hereford map measures more than 1.50 by 1.30 metres and contains more than 1000 inscriptions. Its illustrative pictures depict an impressive number of animals, strange and monstrous creatures, cities, routes, itineraries and geographical representations. Like all medieval earth views, the Hereford map shows an image of the three continents then known (Asia, Africa and Europe) drawn inside a flat disk which symbolises what were considered to be the world's limits. In the Hereford map, though, the circular disk is not only surrounded by the sea, but also by a pictorial frame with an image of Jesus Christ in Majesty in the upper section, presiding over a representation of the Last Judgment. In the bottom left hand corner, the map includes inscriptions referring to the authoritative order by Caesar Augustus to make a worldwide geographical survey: "go forth into the whole world and report [...] on all its parts" (Luke 2,1.) (the geographical character of Augustus' command is disputed; nowadays it is mostly read as ordering a tax survey as in the Christmas story). Finally, in the bottom right hand corner of the disk's external pictorial frame, there is an illustration of a man hunting, which is taken as a symbol of medieval lifestyle and activities. In the Hereford map, the names of the winds – common in medieval maps – and a short description of their most distinct features as well as all the other peripheral quotations, are written in Anglo-Norman, the language which was spoken by the English aristocracy of the period.

The representation of the earth in the Hereford map, which is based on the Greek tradition of showing a flat disk surrounded by the sea, includes a wide range of geographical, zoological and botanical information. There are references to English towns – i.e. Hereford on the banks of the Wye river – and to the cities of the Holy Land, including a stylised plan of Jerusalem at the core of the internal circle and a plan of Rome, described as the "head of the world". The map also contains a detailed scheme of the Nile river delta and the lighthouse of Alexandria, as well as drawings of the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, Constantinople and the Danube river, among other pieces of geographical information. A wide set of images of fanciful beings is illustrated on the map, too, with pictures of part-human-part-horse centaurs and single-horned horses called unicorns. On the map there are also drawings of foxes, rabbits, hedgehogs and other animals commonly represented in medieval art; while others, such as camels, elephants and rhinoceros, are quite exotic from a western European point of view. However, all those figures show a close and paral-

lel relationship between the map's imagery language and the written content of the contemporary medieval bestiary texts. Contrary to the quotations written on the external part of the map, that endless list of figures and representations is accompanied by labels written in Latin.

Specialists in History of Art and History of Cartography believe that the Hereford world map was once the central part of a recently discovered Gothic wooden triptych, whose lateral panels used to show the images of the Angel Gabriel and the Virgin Mary. It is thought, too, that the triptych was placed in a side chapel at the Cathedral Church of the Blessed Virgin Mary and Saint Ethelbert in Hereford, where the map is still kept today in remarkably good condition.

An accurate interpretation of the Hereford world map is far more difficult to provide. Its encyclopaedic character has been underlined by specialists, either when they have approached their analysis with a focus on cartographic production or from that of its audience's social and cultural needs. Despite the methodological differences mentioned above, scholars also agree on the Hereford map's strong religious character. The main purpose of the Hereford map, though, was not the diffusion of the Twelve Apostles' words throughout the world – as used to be the case with the maps included in the medieval Apocalypse manuscripts. So there is a clear difference between the tradition established by the so-called *Beatus* maps and the significance of the Hereford map's high scale information. Both types of map refer to the *City of God* or offer a religious view of the world and the created beings. However, the primary ideological purpose behind the *Beatus* maps was the world's evangelisation, whereas the main objective of the Hereford cartographers – if they did exist in medieval times – was to show God as the creator of the world. As Evelyn Edson pointed out, the "geographical elements" of the map provide the structure which organises the rest of the information, while Naomi Reed Kline states that flat and circular world maps were "conceptual enclosures for stored information relating to all the creation" processes. The image of God as a creator – as noticed by Edson and Reed Kline as well – was commonly used in many artistic medieval productions, which was compatible with the wide and diverse use of geographical, zoological and botanical representations in the Hereford world map. The religious language of the map is not only about the origins or creation of the world, though. As other illustrative information all over the plan shows, the Hereford map incorporates clear representations of the historical processes that had taken place to that date, with indications of place and time from Babylon to the Roman Empire. And there are also clear references to secular and social medieval activities and facts, such as the construction of new fortresses and castles – i.e. Conwy and Caernarvon –, the foundation of cities – i.e. Prague and Worms – and the active functioning of wool trade fairs – i.e. Flanders.

To sum up, we can say that the Hereford world map is a structured compendium of encyclopaedic and religious medieval knowledge, which shows the role and the product of God as a creator, as well as human activities and social events, all of which should

perform according to Christian moral principles. That is why a scene of the Last Judgement appears as the end of human time.

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The Globe Divided: The Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) and Cantino's World Map (1502)

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The famous Cantino Map is the oldest surviving map showing explicitly the demarcation line negotiated between Spain and Portugal, and approved by the Pope, in the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494. It reflects the rivalry between the two nations over the 'wealth of the Indies'. The treaty separated two spheres of interest first in the Atlantic as it was then known and later was regarded as a "division of the globe". The map also shows the Portuguese discoveries along the African and the Brazilian coasts and the Spanish discoveries in the New World, which was initially believed to be an eastern part of Asia.

The map is named after Alberto Cantino, an agent for Ercole I, Duke of Ferrara, who brought it from the Casa da Índia in Lisbon to Italy in 1501-1502. It is also called Cantino planisphere because it presents a flat projection of the globe. In the Casa da Índia geographical information and maps were collected concerning the Portuguese explorations, and it later housed the *Padrão Real*, a secret master map of which the Cantino map probably is a copy. The Italian inscription on the back of the map reads "*Charta del navichare per le isole novamente trovate in la parte de l'India*". The Cantino map appears as a portolan map showing compass roses and criss-crossing straight (*rhumb*) lines that represent the directions of a mariner's compass. However, it was certainly not a portolan chart for practical navigation, but rather informed the Italians about the recently discovered territories overseas. The map still bears traces of the medieval cartographic tradition by showing the land of the eschatological figures of Gog and Magog in a distant region in Asia. Of particular interest in this respect are the lists of numerous coastal localities. The two horizontal red lines are the Tropics of Capricorn and Cancer. The black line between them is the equator. The vertical line labelled in red is the line of the Treaty of Tordesillas.

"Este he o Marco Mantre Castella y Portugall"

On his way back from the West Indies Columbus informed King John II of Portugal about his discoveries and the king immediately complained to the Catholic Monarchs of Spain about the violation of the Treaty of Alcáçovas which essentially gave the Portuguese free rein to continue their exploration along the African coast and towards the



The Cantino Map. Modena, Biblioteca Estense C.G. A.2.

"lands discovered and to be discovered [...] and any other island which might be found and conquered from the Canary islands beyond towards Guinea" while guaranteeing Castilian sovereignty in the Canaries. This settlement of spheres of control in the Atlantic, later ratified by the Papal bull *Aeterni regis* in 1481, was a landmark in the history of colonialism, because it implied the right not only to evangelize but to enslave the indigenous peoples. Columbus' voyage was an attempt to bypass the Portuguese control over the route to Asia and to the Spice Islands. By a number of Papal bulls the Spaniards managed to have their claims on all discoveries made in the western Atlantic confirmed. A north-south demarcation line was also proposed. The Pope acted as universal overlord entitled by God to rule over all the pagans in view of evangelizing them. He felt authorized to transfer this right of patronage to secular kings and thus making them legal rulers of their colonies.

In the Treaty of Tordesillas the Alcáçovas settlement was revised in favour of Spain. A new straight line (*una raya o linea derecha*) demarcation was fixed. It was to run 370 nautical miles (46°) west of the Canary islands from pole to pole. West of the line all rights of dominion over peoples and ownership of lands from discoveries should go to Spain, and by implication the same rights east of this line to Portugal. Consequently, although Spain claimed most of America, the Portuguese controlled the East Indies and Brazil. The Cantino map was clearly the work of a Portuguese cartographer; at a later period apparently some amendments have been made in the Brazilian portion, and half a dozen Italianized names written in.

Initially there was no explicit reference in the documents to an extension of the line around the globe or to a division of the world. Portugal's discovery of the highly valued Moluccas in 1512 caused Spain to argue in 1518 that the Treaty of Tordesillas divided the earth into two equal hemispheres. In the Treaty of Zaragoza (1529) and in defiance of the wishes of the Castilian Cortes, the Emperor Charles V agreed to cede to Portugal all rights of ownership and trade in the Moluccas and in all the lands and seas eastwards (as far as to the meridian situated 17 degrees east of the Spice Islands) in return for the payment of 350,000 ducats.

The fixing of that line was contracted in great detail but notwithstanding many negotiations in the following years was never achieved. The two powers confirmed the '*linea de partición*' in the following year and agreed that the line should be placed on all future sea charts (*cartas de marear*). Already the French King Francis I described these treaties as the division of the world between Spain and Portugal. The Treaty of Tordesillas settled for a while open hostilities between the two powers, but the exclusion of third parties was never accepted by the French, the English and the Dutch, who claimed and later successfully enforced the freedom of the seas and the freedom of trade.

The Cantino map reflected a transitional state of colonial dominion and was soon outdated. It nevertheless provides us with valuable geographical and historical information

on areas well known to the Spaniards and the Portuguese. The "Antilhas" (Antilles) appear here for the first time by this name with the statement that "these are the West Indies of the King of Castille, discovered by Columbus [...] Admiral of these islands [...] at the command of the most high and mighty King don Fernando [...]". The area in the mid Atlantic, labelled "Terra del Rey de Portugall", is one of the earliest detailed representations of Newfoundland and Labrador. It shows flags claiming possessions and gives descriptions of the voyages of Diogo Câo, Bartolomeu Dias, Vasco da Gama and Pedro Álvares Cabral, as well as information on the natural and political history of some areas. The gold crosses on the west coast of Africa mark the locations of the *padrôes* (stone pillars cut from Portuguese limestone) placed by the Portuguese explorers, particularly Câo and Dias. This large manuscript world chart by Cantino was drawn

Hans Holbein, "The Ambassadors", National Gallery, London.

in colour on three glued parchment sheets: The measures are 85.8 x 40.2 inches (218 x 102 cm). It is now in the Biblioteca Estense Universitaria di Modena, C.G. A.2. It is the second world chart depicting the New World. The first one is so called *Juan de la Cosa* map (c. 1500).

Hans Holbein's "The Ambassadors" (1533)

The representative painting now in the National Gallery (London) was commissioned by Jean de Dinteville, envoy of the French King Francis I to the royal court in London, and Georges de Selve, the learned bishop of Lavaur and envoy of the Emperor Charles V. The "Ambassadors" is famous, among other things, for the anamorphic representation of a human skull. Of the many 'state of the art' scientific instruments that make this painting so special, there is one of particular relevance. The terrestrial globe under the table shows the New World and the Tordesillas line in red ("Linea divisionis Castellanoru(m) et Portugallen") which is very similar to globe made by Johann Schöner in 1523. Magellan's circumnavigation of the world generated material riches but also led to growing envy on the part of other Christian rulers. In view of his relations with Emperor Charles V, it came as no surprise when François I gave a mandate to the mariners of Dieppe not only to explore in forbidden waters but to attack Spanish vessels as well. Spain and Portugal took counter action, and in 1530 François sanctioned raids on Portuguese shipping. An embassy from



Hans Holbein, "The Ambassadors", detail.

Portugal to François I soon struck a compromise. "In other words, Holbein's painted allusion to the treaty of Tordesillas would without question turn the thoughts not only of Dinteville but of his English hosts to what had become a thorny political problem". (North 2002, p. 156f.). Nevertheless, the Treaty of Tordesillas – signed on 7 June 1494 by representatives of the monarchies of Spain and Portugal, and approved by King Ferdinand II and Queen Isabella I on 2 July and by King John II of Portugal on 5 September – is one of the first examples of an agreement between two countries to delimit each other's areas of influence as a formula for avoiding clashes that could lead to damaging disputes. The Treaty was therefore recognized, despite all its defects, as a model of good diplomatic practice in the late 15th-century international system.

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The Waldseemüller Map: Naming America (1507)

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The famous Waldseemüller map of the world of 1507 is the very first to show America as a separate continent between the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean and thence it is sometimes called 'America's birth-certificate'. The name "America" is found on the lower part of the small silhouette of South America. Notwithstanding intensive research, the sources of its information – perhaps some secret Portuguese maps? – remain unknown. The first European who saw the Pacific – after crossing the isthmus of Panama in 1513 – was Vasco Núñez de Balboa, and the passage connecting the Atlantic and the Pacific was only found during the first circumnavigation of the globe in 1520, around Cape Horn along a sea-route named after its discoverer: the Strait of Magellan.

The map's creator, Martin Waldseemüller (c. 1475-1520), studied at the University of Freiburg, then joined the Gymnasium Vosgense, a humanist intellectual circle under the patronage of Renée II, Duke of Lorraine in Saint-Diè-des Vosges. The Gymnasium set up a printing business, where in 1507 Waldseemüller published a wall map of the world entitled *Universalis Cosmographiae Descriptio* printed from woodblocks on 12 sheets measuring 137 x 243 cm. On top we see an idealized portrait of Ptolemy looking eastwards on a hemisphere with the Old World (Europe, Asia and Africa). On the southern part of Africa we read "lands unknown to Ptolemy". Vis-à-vis there is a portrait of Amerigo Vespucci looking at a hemisphere with the New World. It is implied that the wisdom of the ancients and the adventurous spirit of the moderns should embrace the world as a whole.

The map was dedicated to the Emperor Maximilian I and the Habsburg coat of arms is placed prominently in the western Mediterranean. Under Maximilian's successors the Spanish Empire became the first modern global "empire on which the sun never sets". Looking at the map as a picture it bears resemblance to a double eagle, with the New World and the Far East stretching out and up from the Old World like wings, and whose eastward- and westward-looking heads are replaced with those of Ptolemy and Vespucci.

The 360° view of the globe is constructed according to the Ptolemaic second conical projection but much expanded areas at the periphery show the many new discoveries reported by travellers and mapped on the portulans of the navigators. Columbus' dis-

The Waldseemüller Map.



The Waldseemüller Map, detail.

coveries in the Caribbean are duly recognized, and the entire New World is shown as being divided between the kings of Spain and Portugal. Off the western coast of Africa the position of some Atlantic islands has obviously been corrected, probably relocated to the east of the Tordesillas line and consequently within the Portuguese zone of influence. The open Indian Ocean reflects the recent Portuguese voyages around the Cape of Good Hope.

The original publication by Martin Waldseemüller and Matthias Ringmann was a set containing a book *Introduction to Cosmography*, the map, and a set of paper gores to assemble a little globe. In an appendix the authors published a Latin version of the colourful, but highly unreliable and possibly fabricated letter of Amerigo Vespucci in which he claimed to have discovered a fourth continent surrounded by water, the "New World". Hence Ringmann in the introduction justifies the naming of this continent:

> [...] a fourth part [of the world], was discovered by Americus Vespuccius. I do not see what right any one would have to object to calling this part after Americus who discovered it and who is a man of intelligence, Amerige, that is, the Land of Americus, or America: since both Europa and Asia got their names from women.

Since Columbus set his foot on a Caribbean island in 1492 this naturally was disputed as an unwarranted claim. But in recent years it has again been defended on the ground that Columbus just hit a hitherto unknown piece of land (*las Indias*) and never realized that he encountered another continent, whereas Vespucci set the mental framework for the New World. On his later maps Waldseemüller recognized Columbus as discoverer and dropped Amerigo Vespucci's name. But the wide distribution of his *Cosmographia* ensured the irrevocable success of the name "America" which in the long run superseded the then common name "New World".

Despite its modern traits the Waldseemüller map passes down legendary material from ancient and medieval cartographic traditions: the campaigns of Alexander the Great, the tale of the eastern kingdom of Prester John, the oversized Taprobane full of gems (Sri Lanka), remnants of the deed of Hercules, fanciful beasts, man-eaters in Ethiopia and other regions, the killing of the Apostle Thomas in India etc.

1000 copies of the map were printed, but only one single copy has survived. It was found in 1901 in the library of the castle of the Prince of Waldburg-Wolfegg and Waldsee in Württemberg (Germany) by father Johannes Fischer SJ who published it a little later and it was immediately recognized as a sensation. In 2001 the Library of Congress in Washington DC bought it with special export permission from the German Government for ten million dollars. It is now on display in the Treasures Gallery of that Library.

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A digitized very high resolution image of the Waldseemüller map is found on the website of the Library of Congress, Washington DC, http://www.loc.gov/index.html, accessed on 30 June 2011.

Mercator World Map (1569)

Janny de Jong
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The world map that Gerardus Mercator (Gerard Kremer, 1512-1594) published in 1569, *Nova et Aucta Orbis Terrae Descriptio ad Usum Navigantium Emendata et accomodata* [A new and improved description of the lands of the world, amended and intended for the use of navigators], was a revolutionary invention of tremendous importance. Mercator's projection, as it is the usually called, meant a huge step forwards for a safe and precise charting of a route at sea. But his map was far more than just a map for navigators. Mercator tried to incorporate all the new knowledge that seafarers and discoverers had brought back to Europe. His map represented the world as it was known in Europe. Not surprisingly, he put Europe in the middle of the map. At that time, it also was the continent that was best known to European geographers and map makers.

Like all renderings of three dimensional objects into a two dimensional form, his map distorted reality. The effect of the projection was that the size of Europe was exaggerated whereas, for instance, South America and Africa were both downsized. That would become a bone of contention in the twentieth century when the Eurocentric 'mindset' of the map was questioned.

Gerardus Mercator

By 1569 Mercator already had a long experience as a maker of globes and maps. Born in a small town near Antwerp, he received his first education with the brethren of Common life in 's Hertogenbosch. In 1530 he moved to the University of Leuven, where he became a pupil of Gemma Frisius, the leading theoretical mathematician of the Low Countries who also was a cosmographer of repute. He joined Frisius' workshop of scientific instruments as well and aided him in constructing a globe in 1535. Later Mercator started his own business as an engraver and maker of instruments. His first map in 1537 depicted the Holy Land. A year later he produced a world map, or rather a map on which the southern and northern hemisphere were depicted in a double-heart shape. In 1541 he built a globe, replicas of which were much in demand, ten years later followed by a celestial globe (representing the stars in the night sky). In 1544 there was a setback when Mercator was arrested and imprisoned for 7 months on a charge of heresy by the inquisition. His frequent absences from Leuven to gather information had aroused suspicions. In 1541 he swapped Leuven for Duisburg, in the duchy of Cleve. In 1564 he was appointed court cosmographer to Duke Wilhelm of Cleve.



Map 1.
Source: F. Wilhelm Krücken[1].


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Mercator published various maps, for instance in 1554 he made an influential map of Europe, *Europæ descriptio.* Mercator was a scientific man, whose dream was to compile a work which contained the geographic knowledge of the universe as well as the history of geographical science. This dream was not fulfilled, but in 1569 he published the *Chronologia* (1569); a chronology of the world until 1568. Between 1585-1595 the first part of *Atlas, sive cosmographicae meditationes de fabrica mundi et fabricate figura* (1585-1595), containing 51 maps was published; after Mercator's death, his son Rumold completed the set in 1602 with another 34 maps. Though Mercator invented the term *Atlas* for such a collection of maps, he was not the first to publish the first, uniformly bound collection of printed maps: Abraham Ortelius of Antwerp had already done that in 1570[2]. In 1604 the cartographer Jodocus Hondius bought the original Mercator plates. Two years later he published a revised edition of the atlas, including new maps. Hondius also published an edition in a smaller size, the *Atlas minor*. These atlases became very popular and were translated into a great many languages.

Though Mercator's atlas is very important, it is his world map of 1569 that really constitutes a milestone in modern geography: for the first time in history the problem of direction was solved (explained below). The map consists of 18 individual sheets measuring in total 134 cm by 212 cm. Today, the only copy of the map as a whole, pasted together, is in the Bibliothèque National in Paris; two other copies are kept in Amsterdam and Basel[3].

Mercator projection

Of course Mercator's map was a distortion. Every flat map of a round form (globe) necessarily is. However, because his map solved the problem of direction, his map was more useful than a globe for the purpose of navigation. The world map allowed one to overview the whole route, even on long journeys, whereas a globe needed to be turned on its axis. The uniqueness of the map was that the straight lines were *rhumb* lines or *loxodromes* (lines of constant compass bearing): in other words it allowed to chart the route at sea as a straight line. When travelling from point A to point B, one could draw a straight line on the map and read the correct compass bearing.

Mercator's brilliant invention was that he rendered parallels and meridians as straight lines in a conformal projection; the angles remained constant. Mercator was familiar with earlier cylindrical projections; he adjusted them in such a way that the meridians of the globe were straightened. The meridians were represented as equally spaced, vertical lines. This meant that the North and South Pole could not be drawn anymore, because as he himself explained in one of the legends, his map seemingly ended in infinity. The next step was to extend the gap between the horizontal parallels of latitude, in the same proportion as he had done with the meridians. These were spaced farther apart with the increase of the distance to the equator. Map 2 shows the effects of this on a modern map.



Map 2
Mercator projection: globe of the Earth. Map. Encyclopædia Britannica Online http://www.britannica.com, accessed 11 January 2011.

The distortion increased when moving farther away from the equator. Greenland, for instance, in actual size is only one-eighth of the size of Latin America, while on the map it seemed just as large. For navigational purposes that did not constitute a problem, as long as the direction was accurate.

Mercator's solution to the problem of making a reliable world map may seem rather obvious in hindsight. "Any of the cartographers who had wrestled with creating a world map in the centuries since Ptolemy might have done the same", writes a recent biographer of Mercator[4]. It was no coincidence that this particular kind of map was made in an age in which more and more voyages of exploration were made, and yet reliable maps that covered the world were non-existent.

Europe received a place in the middle. That had not always been the case. A great many of the early medieval schematic world maps had had a tripartite form. Land was depicted as a round form (O) divided by a T into three parts, representing Asia, Europe and Africa. Usually in the T-O maps Asia was on top, Jerusalem was the centre. This of course had symbolised the role of Christianity. Now it was undoubtedly Europe that was the centrepiece of the map of the world. The name of Jerusalem was not even written in full but abbreviated to 'IRLM'.

Mercator's map reflected the knowledge that resulted from the travels of Spanish and Portuguese explorers to South and Central America. Much of North America



Map 3
Detail of Mercator's world map, depicting the Middle East. Source: http://www.wilhelmkruecken.de/, accessed 11 January 2011. See also note 1.



Map 4
Gall-Peters projection.
Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/77/Gall-peters.jpg, accessed 11 January 2011[7].

was blocked by a cartouche, though. This may have been done to avoid the question whether there existed a north-western route to Asia. Of course a lot of the geographical knowledge was still unknown, this for instance held true for rivers in Latin America. Also the great continent in the South Seas, *Terra Australis*, did not exist Furthermore the map included fables and myths such as Prester John, a mythical figure, who was depicted in Africa.

Mercator projection under attack

In the early 1970s, German historian Arno Peters (1916-2002) started to promote another map projection, one that supposedly was 'fair' to all peoples of the world because it used an 'equal-area' perspective[5]. Areas that are of equal size on the globe are equally sized on the map as well. Though Peters' projection distorts the shapes of Africa and South America significantly, this map became very popular. Not because it was the best projection, but because the map was actively promoted as an antidote to the dominating Eurocentric world view. The German Cartographic society opposed Peters; yet this map projection was supported by the German Independent Commission on Development Issues, chaired by former Chancellor Willy Brandt. The map was promoted by a great number

of relief organizations and pro-Third World groups all over the world such as Oxfam, the World Council of Churches, UNESCO, and UNICEF. By 1989 over 60 million copies of this map had been distributed by UNICEF and kindred organizations[6].

Academic cartographers and geographers have pointed to much better projections of this kind that distort the shape of countries and continents to a lesser degree. Also Peters certainly was not the first to try his hand at an equal-area map; the Scottish clergyman James Gall had already done that in 1851. Peters' attack on the cartographic profession for holding on to "old precepts based on the Eurocentric global concept", on the "racist" ideas of the Mercator map was the start of a long and fierce debate[8]. It makes fascinating reading, but need not concern us here.

At least in one respect Peters was right: indeed it is difficult to imagine the vast size of the African continent. In 2010 a map called "The true size of Africa", once again pointed to that fact. By projecting other parts of the world upon the map of Africa, its maker, Kai Krause, illustrated the fact that Africa is larger than the USA, China, India, Europe, and Japan combined[9]. However, it is very doubtful that Mercator more than four centuries ago deliberately had downsized Africa. More likely it was just a side-effect of the projection he had invented.

Notes

1 The website of F. Wilhem Krücken, *Ad maiorem Gerardi Mercatoris gloriam* is very helpful: the Mercator world map can be seen in full, but also divided in various parts to view details more clearly. It is also possible to read the 18 legends, in the original Latin and in German translation; http://www.wilhelm-kruecken.de/, accessed 11 January 2011. The English translation of the inscriptions were published in the "Hydrographical review" of 1932. M. Monmonier, *Rhumb lines and Map Wars. A Social History of the Mercator projection*, Chicago 2004, p. 4.

2 N.J.W. Thrower, *Maps and Civilization, Cartography in Culture and Society*, 3rd edn., e-book, Chicago 2008, p. 80.

3 Other copies are kept in Amsterdam, Scheepvaart Museum, and Basel, University Library. A. Taylor, *The World of Gerard Mercator*, London 2005, p. 201.

4 Taylor, *World* cit., p. 200.

5 *The Peters Projection: An Area Accurate Map*, http://www.petersmap.com/, accessed 11 January 2011.

6 Estimate made by "The Economist", cited in Monmonier, *Rhumb* cit., pp. 153-154.

7 A Gall-Peters projection of an image collected by the Earth Observatory experiment of the US Government's NASA space agency. The reticle is 15 degrees in latitude and longitude: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gall-peters.jpg, accessed 2 May 2011.

8 Monmonier, *Rhumb* cit., pp. 145-171.

9 K. Krause, *The True Size of Africa. A Small contribution in the light against rampant Immappancy*: http://static02.mediaite.com/geekosystem/uploads/2010/10/true-size-of-africa.jpg, accessed 11 January 2011. See for a slightly different projection, *Daily chart. The True Size of Africa*, in "The Economist", 10 November 2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2010/11/cartography?page=1, accessed 10 November 2010.

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Bankoku Sôzu: General Map of the World (1645)

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

Map 1

This map owes its outlines of the world to a European-style map like *Kunyu Wanguo Quantu* by Matteo Ricci, which was published in China in the late 16th century and brought to Japan soon afterward. That is why the map shows the equator, the regression lines and the dateline. It thus testifies to western influences on the Japanese visualisations of the world.

Works by Jesuit cartographers in late-Ming and early-Qing China were just one of the channels through which the Western geographical knowledge was relayed to Japan. The Japanese had had direct contacts with the Europeans since the mid-16th century, and it is known that the first Western-made globes were brought along at that time. Furthermore, the Japanese, for their part, were engaged in intra-Asian maritime trade until the seclusion policy abruptly ended such activities in the 17th century. There were naturally a lot of interactions with Western counterparts at Asian port cities.

This map was published in wood-block printing in early modern times and was probably the first of its kind. Maps were already a popular item on the printing market in early modern Japan and were mass-produced. That is also why the map is coupled with an encyclopaedic drawing of various human races with their distinctive outfits. This was probably meant as a feature to appeal to the curiosity of the general public.

Please note: The Japanese personal names are written in the Japanese way in which the surname precedes the given name.

Source

Kobe City Museum (ed.), *Kochizu serekushon*, Kôbe 1994, p. 16.

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Tenjiku no Zu: Map of India (1704-1711)

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This is a representative example of the "Buddhist-type" world map. The Buddhist cosmology was, along with the Chinese ethnocentric notion of world order, the central component on whose basis the Japanese built their own worldview in the ancient and medieval times. This kind of world map visualizes the Buddhist universe, although, particularly in its later versions, it also adds some geographical information on the real globe. This map, and others like it, were prevalent for a long time thereafter. In premodern times, it was published in various versions and circulated widely, even after western geographical knowledge was introduced and became quite popular.

In the middle of this map, the vast continent of India, the Holy Land of Buddhism, is drawn as center of the whole world, flanked by China on the right side and Central Asia on the left. On the farthest right fringe the western half of Japan is recognizable. The shape of the continents and their terrain are far from the real ones, thus primarily reflecting Buddhist dogma. Some specific information, however, is grafted onto the abstract representation of the philosophical viewpoint. In the upper left corner, reproduced in the detail, names like "Toichiranto", "Noruwiki" are visible on a number of islands, and certainly stand for Germany, Norway and so forth.

Please note: The Japanese personal names are written in the Japanese way in which the surname precedes the given name.

Source

Kobe City Museum (ed.), *Kochizu serekushon*, Kôbe 1994, p. 15.

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A Beginning of Global History?

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In this cartoon, the vibrant and irreverent wit of the famous satirist, James Gillray (1757-1815), turns to the global conflict between Britain and France which had continued intermittently since the late-seventeenth century, and had seen the gradual rise of British influence at the expense of the French, especially in India. Here, Gillray portrays a late episode in this long struggle during the wars following the French Revolution and

the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte to power. At the table, on two chairs decorated with coats of arms, the leaders of western Europe's two most powerful states at the turn of the nineteenth century are taking "un Petit Souper" consisting of a steaming plum pudding. The little "Empereur" (France's Napoleon Bonaparte) almost has to stand up to reach a chunk appropriate to his huge appetite. With his sabre he cuts out continental Europe without Scandinavia and Russia, his fork sticking in the Electorate Hannover which France had just seized. The haggard British Prime Minister, William Pitt the Younger, uses a big knife and a trident – the symbol of Poseidon and hence British naval power – to allot to himself the Oceans. Their respective spheres of interest are still separated, but the world will soon become too small for their voracity.

Gillray's famous caricature was occasioned by a peaceful note from Napoleon to King George III (2 January 1805), "the world is big enough for our two nations etc.". At the same time, the Emperor urged the king of Spain to take more aggressive action against England. In his speech of the throne 15 January 1805 George rejected Napoleon's foul peace proposal.

The cartoon highlights the global and colonial dimensions of the conflicts of the long eighteenth century. During the struggles Britain acquired an expanded empire in North America, lost the core of her American colonies, and acquired a hegemony on the Indian subcontinent, in Southern Africa, and began colonising Australia. By the period portrayed in the cartoon, France had all but lost her North American colonies. Quebec and Arcadia (in modern Canada) had been conquered by the British in the Seven Years War (1756-1763), the independence of the valuable former slave colony of Saint Dominique (Haiti) had been confirmed when an attempted re-conquest failed in 1802, and, in 1803, Napoleon sold Louisiana to the embryonic United States. This perhaps explains why, in Gillray's cartoon, Napoleon is focusing on Europe – reflecting his attempt to construct a 'continental system' which would exclude British trade. These wars also saw a fatal blow delivered to the Spanish empire in South America in the wake of a constitutional crisis precipitated by Napoleon's invasion in 1808. At the final termination of these world-wide struggles, the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Britain's hegemony was confirmed and her leaders sought to preserve this for the next ninety-nine years through the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe.

Certainly European, and especially British, relations with the wider world were transformed through a heightened expansionism fuelled by great power competition during the eighteenth century. But was this the beginning of global history, or a new phase? Are there dangers in overlooking the extra-European processes which also contributed to this transformation (particularly to the rise of the British in India)?

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Teaching and Didactic Materials

Bridging World history
http://www.learner.org/courses/worldhistory/

History Cooperative
http://www.historycooperative.org/

Hyper History Online
http://www.hyperhistory.com/online_n2/History_n2/a.html

World History Matters
http://worldhistorymatters.org/

World History Sources
http://chnm.gmu.edu/worldhistorysources/index.html

Internet Global History Sourcebook
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/global/globalsbook.html#General

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http://www.cliohworld.net/

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