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Twentieth Century Italian Historiography on the State in the Early Modern Period

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Il tema dello ‘Stato’ ha avuto fino a molto recentemente un posto centrale nella storiografia italiana. I risultati del lavoro compiuto dalla fine della seconda guerra mondiale fino al presente hanno fornito una massa di conoscenze e una nuova comprensione di come erano organizzati gli stati italiani del tardo medioevo e del primo periodo moderno. L’obiettivo di questo capitolo non è di fornire un catalogo dei numerosi importanti contributi dell’ultimo mezzo secolo in questo settore, ma piuttosto di indagare, attraverso un caso specifico, come una comunità storiografica sviluppa e ridefinisce gli oggetti del suo interesse, in stretto rapporto al contesto politico ed intellettuale.

INTRODUCTION

The theme of ‘the State’ in the early modern period until quite recently held a very important place in Italian historiography. The many who have worked in this area have not only written well-known and significant contributions; they have also conducted personally, directed and inspired massive programmes of archival research. The results of the work carried out from the end of the Second World War to the present has given us enormously greater knowledge and richer understanding of how Italian states of the late Middle Ages and the early modern period were organised. We know much more about a number of aspects: for example, to what political pressures they responded, how their organisation and the dynamics of their political life were related to developments in political thought of key importance, and how the states of the peninsula compared with those of other parts of Europe. We also have a much greater ability to conceptualise how the political space in which they operated was a dynamic system connected to and intertwined with other dynamic systems.

The aim of this chapter is not to catalogue the research done in this area, although we will mention and illustrate several key contributions. Rather it is to attempt to show how, in a specific national context, the historiographical community responds to the changing political context, in this case within and outside of Italy itself, and how it may take up with enthusiasm, develop, criticise or ignore important contributions from historians of other countries, or, rather, some aspects of their works.

The more general aim is to investigate how the selection of problems dealt with a national context is related to the development of national narratives; how historians at-
tempt to bring their knowledge to bear on matters of public concern; and how the preoccupations and debates of the national historiographical community influence the reading of the international historiographical debate.

Secondary aims are to sketch how the current phase of European integration – with the potential it offers for reciprocal knowledge and redefinition of historiographical problems – has modified the perception of national history and to touch on the way specialised historiographical research attempts to interact with the public view of the national history. Today it seems that we have diluted or dispersed into many rivulets and waterfalls the once majestic river of historiography on ‘the State’.

**Some Background**

First, for clarity, we must furnish a note on periodisation. The ‘early modern’ category to which we refer in the title is sometimes used for convenience by Italian historians, but is not traditional. The usual periodisation, common in school handbooks and in titles of university courses and chairs is ‘medieval’ from late antiquity until 1492-4; ‘modern’ until 1815 (or, for some, 1789); ‘contemporary’ from that date until the present. In practice, in the domain of studies on the state, the period that has attracted most attention is a ‘long’ modern period, beginning with the Black Death or even earlier, and ending, or tapering out, during the 17th century. This choice in itself is significant: the textbook division designates 1492-4 as a watershed or breaking point because of the nearly contemporaneous death of Lorenzo the Magnificent, the discovery of America and the French invasion of Italy by Charles VIII. It hence corresponds to the end of an imagined Italy of the Renaissance states (monarchies and city states), free of ‘foreign’ influence, and marks the beginning of the ‘Italian wars’, a period considered to run from 1494 to 1559, during which France, Spain and the Empire, subsequently the Habsburg and Valois monarchies, fought for hegemony over the peninsula. This latter periodisation, commonly used in textbooks and in the organisation of study programmes, was moulded by the idea of a ‘before’ when there were many rival ‘Italian’ states, and an ‘after’ when their lack of ability to unite led to ‘foreign’ hegemony and hence to Italian decadence.

Thus the idea of modernity to which this periodisation corresponds is multi-layered and ambivalent, including as it does the positive modernity of the discovery of America, and the negative modernity of foreign invasion. This idea, particularly in its negative form, is not new. It was eloquently presented and carefully documented by Francesco Guicciardini in his work, *Storia d’Italia* [History of Italy] written in the late 1530s and considered one of the foundations of modern historiography. Guicciardini was able to describe and propagate that most powerful and dramatic of visions: a peaceful, prosperous and even opulent past had been replaced by a violent and unhappy present, defined by the invading armies and political upheavals of early 16th Italy. Guicciardini’s view and his personal experience corresponded closely to a general perception of epochal change. The idea that medieval Italy had been at the forefront of European civilisation
in the later Middle Ages was difficult to contest, and was reinforced by the subsequent works of writers of various persuasions and of the calibre of Bayle and Voltaire. During the Italian enlightenment, Ludovico Antonio Muratori began an important publication of original sources for the history of Italian states: it was entitled *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, and, significantly, ended with 1500².

At the beginning of the 19th century Jean-Charles Léonard Simond de’Sismondi gave full expression to the republican city-state ideal, in his monumental *Histoire des Républiques italiennes* [History of the Italian Republics].³ Exiled from Geneva in wake of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic invasion, Sismondi – who believed himself a descendant of a noble Pisan family that had emigrated in the 16th century – did his best to convince Europe that if Italy appeared poor and politically decadent, in truth the Italian city-states (both pre-Roman and medieval) represented the most desirable form of political organisation. Only noble violence and enslavement to monarchy had led to their decline. Liberty was to be found not in the expansion of the *droits de l’homme* by force of arms, but in the political and economic context of free cities, such as the free Italian communes of the Middle Ages, or the city-states of ancient Italy. In Sismondi’s view, the defeat of republican cities and the loss of Italy’s freedom had both external and internal agents: armed monarchies based on the unwitting acquiescence of their populations, and riotous feuding nobilities, the domestic enemy of civic freedom.

The 19th century saw the ‘Risorgimento’ and Italian Unification. The word itself, *risorgimento*, from *risorgere*, to rise up again, contains within it a national narrative: it makes explicit not only that a presumptive Italian nation must rise, but also that something which existed in the past must rise again – including freedom from foreign domination and even political unity, although precedents for this unity could hardly be found after Roman times. In building consent around the idea of Italian unification, the creation and the retelling of national stories and myths had an important role. The intelligentsia of the age wrote historical novels having their fulcrum in the early 16th century. They made popular heroes of such figures as Ëttore Fieramosca and Francesco Ferrucci, the ultimately unsuccessful citizen defender of the Florentine republic besieged in 1530 by the combined forces of the Habsburg emperor Charles V and the Medici pope, Clement VIII⁴.

This literature was designed to convey a central theme: that brave and loyal citizens of Italian states had opposed treacherous invaders, Spanish and French, and their henchmen, particularly the eminently untrustworthy mercenary captains. Although they had been defeated, the moral superiority belonged to the Italians. Particular emphasis was placed on those passages of works by Dante and Machiavelli that appeared to make a strong appeal for Italian unity.

The emotional value of such a national narrative in organising the diplomatic and war efforts that lead to the foundation of the Kingdom of Italy (1861) and the subsequent conquest of the Papal State (1870) cannot be doubted. It cast the foreign powers that had held sway on the peninsula, especially Spain and Austria, in the role of oppressors.
and villains. The questions asked were why Italian states had succumbed, why they had not united to fight the invaders, and what role the universal powers of the Papacy and the Empire had had in ‘delaying’ the birth of the Italian nation-state.

Showing that such questions were anachronistic and had little to do with the political realities of the 15th and 16th centuries – and that all was not negative in Italian states after 1492 – constituted some of the main tasks of several generations of 20th century Italian historians.

‘Renaissance’ and Modernity

Sismondi held up the medieval city-state as a model in post-Napoleonic Europe, showing that Italy (no less than Greece, because of its classical heritage) deserved the support and respect of other European countries. The years around 1860 saw the elaboration of a strong and in part contrary view of Italian history: a visionary and emphatic Renaissance took form in the hands of Jules Michelet and Jacob Burckhardt. Burckhardt was irresistibly attracted to a number of aspects of Italian society and culture in the late Middle Ages and early modern period which were in contrast with the austerity of his Protestant upbringing in Basel. For Burckhardt, not only had the modern individual – the modern European man – been born in Renaissance Italy; he had first appeared in a precise political context, that of the Italian Renaissance state, in which Burckhardt saw “the state as a work of art”.

With this formula Burckhardt wished to describe not only the small and medium signorie [lordships] where such personalities as Bernabò Visconti or Sigismondo Malatesta were able to live according to rules light years away from those revered by the burghers of Basel, but also the great republics of Florence and Venice. In his view the political formations of Renaissance Italy had shown the path towards modernity. The small and medium lordships with their lack of scruples; Florence with her vocation for public debate and the exercise of the rights of citizenship; Venice with her majestic and efficient collegial state machinery, her development of statistics and diplomacy; all these together led the way. With the phrase ‘work of art’, Burckhardt meant that the Italian states of the Renaissance were built according to the logic of power, of their own power; that they were built through the use of untrammelled rational intelligence and did not depend on dynastic tradition, on antiquated hierarchies or on ethical or religious considerations, extraneous to the imperatives of power. Burckhardt’s state represents the apotheosis of Machiavellian realism, which included the realisation that the political world is a distinct sphere and has its own rules which do not necessarily coincide with those of Christian charity.

Sismondi’s resolute republicanism, hailing back to a golden age of city states and Burckhardt’s visionary or ‘contemplative’ view of a Renaissance Italy with its strong, contrasting colours was read more enthusiastically by non-Italians than by Italians, or better, different aspects interested the cultivated publics of various countries. The chiaroscuro panoply of characters which Burckhardt constructed contributed much to the ‘blood,
poison and dagger’ image of the Italian Renaissance, but did little to place the study of Italian states on a concrete and realistic basis. Even today it is something of a surprise to find Burckhardt’s word painting, *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien* [The Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy] indicated in other countries as required reading for courses – not on Burckhardt, but on Italy. Nonetheless, in debates on continuity or the lack of it between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, Italian historians as others widely accepted the fact that there was a period of remarkable political and cultural ferment which represents a landmark in the history of world civilisation as well as in that of the Italian peninsula. But this is seen as a landmark based on scientific, cultural and political modernity rather than on a Machiavellian willingness to operate outside established moral codes.

**From Croce to Gramsci and the Quaderni del Carcere**

During much of the 19th century, in Italy as elsewhere, historiography and particularly historiography on the state was entwined with political events and aspirations; history was a protagonist in the intellectual battles between positivism and idealism. Pasquale Villari, Gaetano Salvemini and Gioacchino Volpe, with different accents and perspectives, all began their professional careers with studies of the early stages of Tuscan communal government. A new synthesis came in the work of a major figure, the philosopher and historian Benedetto Croce, who published prolifically on the history of Italy, particularly on that of southern Italy. Croce’s exposure to Marxism through his teacher Labriola and his dissatisfaction with history as pure erudition led to the well-known idea that history is a creative act, akin to art, and subsequently to his ethical-political concept of history. Along with his studies on the Kingdom of Naples (such as the *Storia del Regno di Napoli* [History of the Kingdom of Naples] (1925), there came, at the height of Fascism, *Storia come pensiero e azione* [History as thought and action] (1938). For Croce, for his followers and for Italian culture in general, history, philosophy and politics were tightly linked. Notwithstanding his generally anti-Fascist stance, Croce thought that Fascism was an accident, an illness, of an otherwise healthy state. History at the highest level was history of the state – a history of the state that was also continually redefining relevant problems, and engaging in the political process. Coming from Southern Italy and a key figure in the Neapolitan intelligentsia, Senator of the Kingdom, and invited to be President of Italy at the end of World War II, Croce contributed to the understanding of the economic and political history of the Kingdom of Naples by breaking down the thesis that Spanish domination had automatically meant loss of liberty and decadence in every sense. Rather, in his view, the Kingdom of Naples continued to have its own very significant history, before and after becoming part of the Spanish empire. The roots of the difficulties experienced in Southern Italy lay not in Spain, but in the Kingdom itself, and particularly in the relationship of the dominant classes to the state. This provided stimulus for a new view of national history where the problem was not loss of independence, but an entrenched baronial class, which was not even overturned by the French Revolution.
At the end of the Second World War, after the disasters of Fascism and defeat, and on the wave of enthusiasm and desire to rebuild a democratic republic justified by the Resistance movement, queries about the course of Italian history and deeper concerns about the possible weaknesses of her state structure came to the fore. The single most important factor in shaping the historical agenda was the publication of Antonio Gramsci’s *Quaderni del Carcere* [Prison Notebooks] which began in the late 1940s. Gramsci, a Sardinian, had been a key figure in the socialist movement and one of the founders of the Communist Party of Italy (PCd’I). Elected to Parliament in 1925, he was tried by the Fascist ‘Special Tribunal’ and died in 1937, after more than a decade as Mussolini’s prisoner. But after the war the notes he wrote during the prison years constituted a revelation for the literate public and for professional historians alike. Here were queries and considerations about history, culture and the role of intellectuals in politics that would engage minds for a generation. And here was a vision of the history of Italy which overturned accepted clichés, and provided the leftward leaning with a still to be completed version of a new national narrative. The notebooks were organised in a complicated fashion, and contained a mixture of plans for research, reading notes and historical reflections. Passages which seemed to fit together and to have bearing on particular themes were hastily gathered together and published. Historians of the later Middle Ages and of early modern Italy were among the luckiest. The very few succinct pages which Gramsci had dedicated to their period appeared at the beginning of the volume entitled *Il Risorgimento*. Here was a map for research and for re-reading the history of Italian states with only a very few indications: a nearly empty canvas.

In Gramsci’s view, the explanation for Italy’s troubles at the deepest level lay in the fact that she had not been able to form a proper nation state (such as those of France, Spain or England), at the proper time. This failure was related to the lack of a proper bourgeois revolution. But this too was linked to earlier problems. Gramsci believed that Mussolini’s emphasis on the heritage of the Roman Empire was misguided: aside from all the other negative aspects of Fascist rhetoric and Fascist policies, the celebration of the Roman empire was wrong. For Gramsci imperial expansion had reduced Italy herself to a marginal position in the ancient world. The senatorial class lost its pre-eminence, and was replaced by a cosmopolitan imperial elite. Italy’s finding itself at the centre of the world empire of the Catholic Church in the modern period had an analogous negative result: energies were used on a world scale to the detriment of the formation of a strong peninsular state. Gramsci’s reflections led him to identify the turning point in the fate of Italy in the moment in which the ‘backward spirit’ entered her bourgeoisie, that is when, during the time of the city republics, the wealthy started to invest in land, abandoning their manufacturing and commercial activities. Gramsci pointed to the ‘corporate’ spirit of the dominant groups of citizens: instead of becoming a true political class, able to defend and promote the interests of the entire population of their states, they had acted for their personal advantage and that of their kind. In Gramsci’s view, the communal state (so praised by Sismondi as the place where human liberty could exist) had basic weaknesses which made it an obstacle on the path of the development of a
nation state. This iconoclastic interpretation was summed up in a famous passage where Gramsci stated that the defeat of the Florentine republic in 1530 and the death of her citizen hero, Francesco Ferrucci, was in reality a step forward: Charles V’s conquering army and Maramaldo, the treacherous captain who betrayed the besieged city, were on the side of progress, representing, at least to a certain extent, the ‘modern state’.

Here then were a complex of stimuli and themes which were indeed transferred into historiographical debate and research.

Was it possible for a city-state to grow and create a territorial state? Was there really an intrinsic weakness which made city-states responsible for Italian decadence? Was it true that the dominant classes had shifted from the production of goods to investment in land? This formula fit in quite nicely with the debate of the time around the ideas of Dobb and Sweezy on the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Perhaps Dobb and in the final analysis Marx were right, that if the ‘capitalist’ is a merchant rather than a producer he will never be able to make the final break away from feudal society. One serious and respected historian, Giorgio Candeloro, wrote a *Storia dell’Italia moderna* [History of Modern Italy] in 11 volumes, filling in the large blanks in what Gramsci had sketched out while in prison.

Italian city-states certainly had their share of merchant capitalists, and it was easy to look at the end of the Middle Ages as a crisis, resulting in foreign domination. Perhaps Gramsci’s views corresponded to reality and city-states and the opulent society that developed in them were not simply lost glories, but rather themselves responsible for Italy’s subsequent weakness. Was it a matter of a structural weakness of the communal state, ready in final analysis to succumb to the regressive forces of feudalism? Even Machiavelli could be enrolled to support this interpretation. He too had identified the problem when he praised Rome for granting citizenship to conquered cities, as the cities of his own age were not willing to do.

**The Empire and the Mediterranée**

Further influences on Italian historiography on the state in the postwar years came from Federico Chabod and Fernand Braudel. Federico Chabod, who had studied under Meinecke in Berlin, had the privilege of participating in the ‘Egidi mission’ to Simancas in the late 1920s. It is not without emotion that one observes photographs of the narrow unpaved road that Chabod travelled to reach the castle where the 16th century archives of the Spanish Crown are largely held. Today an incongruously broad and busy *carretera* passes under the castle’s walls. The aim of the mission was to investigate the documentation regarding Spanish Italy and particularly the State of Milan. It was possible to finance a large number of photographs, a veritable treasure, long before the time of microfilm and the internet which today allow us to access such documents from afar.

Chabod’s studies of Charles V’s empire from an Italian perspective formed the basis of several of his university courses and numerous studies published in specialised jour...
nals. Subsequently these were collected and published in well-known volumes. Chabod’s findings were directly relevant to understanding how the Empire was actually built in political and institutional terms. Chabod was able to show how each ‘piece’ of the Empire – kingdoms, duchies, counties, imperial fiefs and so forth – continued to live under its own laws and to have its own institutions. Even when ruled by imperial agents, ‘pieces’ of the Spanish empire such as the state of Milan, might pursue their own policies, even at times in contrast with those of other ‘pieces’ of the empire. In the case of Milan, policies and interests going back to the former lordships of the Visconti and the Sforza still influenced Milanese policy under the Spanish Crown. A new view of the empire and of Italian politics in the 16th century was forming: it was no longer possible to imagine that history in terms of defeat at the hands of ‘foreigners’.

In the discussions on the nature of the ‘modern’ or the ‘Renaissance’ state that took place in the 1950s, Chabod made a strong and clear contribution, well summarized in two texts based on seminars he held in Paris in 1959. The gist of his argument was that Burckhardt’s old formula, the “state as a work of art”, while striking, had come to mean all and nothing, and was no longer useful. Chabod made short shrift of the nationalistic lament that ‘Italian’ states had not been able to unite against ‘foreigners’ in the wars of Italy. Realistically, in the period in question, unified ‘nation states’ were nowhere to be seen, and in the political reality of the early 16th century, it was the ambitions of the Venetian superpower, not those of France or Spain that worried Italian princes and republics. Chabod had Weberian categories in mind and held that to find ‘Renaissance’ states, one had to examine the development of states’ ability to wield power concretely: he looked to their bureaucracy, diplomacy, ability to tax and to deploy military force. In this area, Italian states were pioneers. Chabod freed the historiography on the state from an anachronistic sense of guilt over Italy’s not being unified when, in spite of nationalistic rhetoric, there really were no such states in Europe. He led the way towards a specific and careful reconstruction of political life and institutions in 16th century states: of relevant interest whether or not they were also part of broader power systems.

In the same postwar years, Fernand Braudel’s grand fresco of the Mediterranean world in the time of Philip II was also read with interest. Human and political sympathy went to Marc Bloch, but Braudel’s study was chronologically and geographically more relevant to the concerns of Italian historians of the early modern period. His proposal for and his example of a ‘total’ history, in which structures, processes and events coexisted and could be illustrated and depicted together, reassured those who were endeavouring to elaborate a different sort of total history, linking economic, social, political and religious aspects organically, although with a more limited geographical range and on a shorter timescale. Braudel’s work also comforted those who had noticed that 16th century Italian states and society were hardly in a steep and dramatic decline caused by the substitution of traditional Euroasian and Mediterranean trade with the newly discovered oceanic routes; Italian ‘decadence’ could at least be considered a product of a later age, and not directly linked to Columbus or to the loss of ‘Italian liberty.’
CITY-STATES AND THE ‘BACKWARD SPIRIT’

On the other hand, here lay an opportunity to shift the discussion on ‘liberty’ back to its Sismondian and republican roots, looking to how the true explanation of Italian decline in the early modern age was the political weakness of Italian city-states, and especially the egoistic myopia of their most powerful citizens.

It is instructive in this regard to compare three fundamental works on Italian republics, or city-states, which appeared in the 1950s and early 1960s, showing both strong affinities and significant differences. The first of the three was the work of the Swiss historian Rudolf von Albertini. Von Albertini’s study, announced the subject matter in the title: *Das florentinische Staatsbewusstsein im Übergang von der Republik zum Prinzipat* [Florentine Consciousness of the State in the Passage from Republic to Principality]. It examined the dramatic stages of Florentine history from the death of Lorenzo the Magnificent to the consolidation of Medici hegemony under Cosimo I, duke and later Grand Duke of Tuscany. The book was published in 1955 in Bern, and in Italian translation in 1960. Von Albertini saw in Florence’s fate a parallel with the dangers he perceived at the beginning of the Cold War. The risk for small states was to be crushed between giants, especially if political extremism led to insurmountable internal contrasts. The volume’s originality did not lie in this assonance, but in the contextualisation of the great works of the Florentine ‘political thinkers’ of the 16th century. Von Albertini accompanied the narration of each phase of political events with an illustration of the works written in the same years by Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Donato Giannotti and their like. Rather than theorists, they could now be seen to be citizens deeply and directly involved in the political debates of their city. Von Albertini published a number of texts by exponents of the Florentine political world (including reports and comments written by advisers to the Medici and by members of the families of ‘optimates’, the wealthiest stratum of Florentine citizens). These allowed him to trace the slow decision of the oligarchs to abandon republican citizenship for the Medici Principate. By 1537 they thought it the lesser of evils, with respect to popular ‘demagogy’, and in any case presumed, wrongly as it turned out, that that they, through the republican city magistratures and councils, would continue to command even under a Medici duke.

Thus von Albertini was able to clarify the immediate political reasons for the splendid flowering of republican thought and historiography and to illustrate the intellectual and political context in which Florentine aristocrats shifted their allegiance to the emerging Grand Duchy. Significantly, the Swiss historian’s contribution regarded almost exclusively the city of Florence. Her state was of no interest to him and played no part in his conceptualisation of the forces at play in the Italian wars.

Quite the opposite was true of the pair of monographs published respectively by Marino Berengo and Angelo Ventura in the early 1960s. Berengo’s work, *Nobiltà e popolo nella Lucca del Cinquecento* [Nobility and ‘Popolo’ in 16th-century Lucca] took up the theme of the effects of the Italian wars on the evolution of Italian society and on its city-based republican states in the context of Lucca. Berengo, a Venetian, had a deep love
for republican city states, nurtured by a value system linked to Sismondi and to Carlo Cattaneo. The monograph on Lucca was the first piece of an historical and conceptual mosaic that Berengo composed during the entire course of his life, and which took full form in 1999, with the volume *Europa delle Città* [The Europe of Cities]. For Berengo, Europe was distinguished, from the 12th century to the Peace of Westphalia by its great cities, which – although differing because of the political and economic contexts in which they operated – nonetheless shared many traits: the liveliness of their social, economic and political life, and of their governing collegiate bodies. City life, for Berengo, before monarchies and nation states became predominant, was the place of ‘liberty’, political and personal independence: the privileged place where the eminently human dimension of society could develop17.

Berengo’s *Lucca* showed how the pressures of the Italian wars created a context in which the republic, territorially minuscule but important for silk-production and active in the international money-market, had veered towards oligarchy. With an eye to the dangers of internal strife, the city’s governing councils repressed the protests of the textile workers and denied the demands of the less wealthy for continuing representation. Thus Berengo was able to introduce the theme of the emergence of an aristocratic culture in 16th century Italy as an autochthonous product. Rather than a direct import from French or Spanish society, it appeared to be the result of a strategy adopted by the ruling citizens to align with the realities of the Habsburg-Valois struggle, while preserving their own predominance, at whatever cost to the lively social and political exchange that had characterised the communal world.

Angelo Ventura, observing a more complex institutional and territorial entity, the Venetian *terraferma* (the part of the Venetian state located on the Italian mainland), came to similar conclusions18. There too the overall picture was one of a shift to an oligarchic, anti-democratic and corrupt society in what had once been an area of flourishing communes, that is of free medieval city-states. This could be seen as an explanation of the political orientation of the Veneto area in the present day. Resolutely ‘white’ (Christian Democrat) at the time, as opposed to the Communist and Socialist orientation of Emilia Romagna and Tuscany, the Veneto was involved in corruption scandals which seemed to find a basis in the lack of ethical public behaviour of its local rulers in the past. Ventura’s narrative began with a critique of the thesis of Francesco Ercole, Minister of Education under Mussolini who, in 1929, had propounded the theory that the transformation of medieval Italian communal states into lordships [*signorie*] had been a democratic development, against oligarchy, desired by the people. This interpretation naturally was congenial to the Fascist regime. Ventura instead defended the idea that the ‘signori’ had only been formally acclaimed by the ‘people’, and in practice defended the interests of the oligarchs. More important, during the 15th century (true to Gramsci’s idea) Ventura found that the commercial and productive activities which had made Northern Italian cities flourish began to be replaced by landed wealth, and those who formerly had sat in their shops, quite willing to show their bolts of cloth to potential customers, were now ready to make the leap towards a
new value system. Becoming aristocrats, they would henceforth consider such ‘work’ beneath them.

This general social and political transformation (analogous to what von Albertini and Berengo had found in the Tuscan context) came about in what was beginning to be called the ‘territorial state’. In the case of the Veneto, the evolution of state power seemed to confirm the structural weakness of the republican city-state. Venice, it was true, had continued its splendid existence until the invasion of the Napoleonic armies (as had Lucca). But what did its republican freedom amount to when seen from its subject cities? In Ventura’s view, the Venetian nobility considered itself to be the collective sovereign, the owner of its state. During the late 14th and early 15th centuries the Senate decided that in order to protect itself from invasion, it must create a state on the Italian mainland, in addition to its existing maritime state. It carried out its decision, conquering, over the period of a very few decades, all the previously independent city-states from Treviso to Padua, Verona, Vicenza and on to Brescia and Bergamo – the privileged periphery of the Venetian state and its bulwark against Milanese expansion. For Ventura, the significance of those events lay in the fact that Venice systematically deprived the local ruling elites of their ‘liberty’, making them subjects of the Venetian republic, but at the same time, she gave them a free hand to exploit and oppress the other social groups in their own territories. While she took real political responsibility away from the ruling groups in the cities of the Veneto, Venice compensated them by not interfering except in extreme cases in the way they governed their own ex-city states. Thus Venice continued to appear to be the supreme guarantor of justice within her state, while actually she guaranteed injustice for most of her subjects by empowering the local elites.

In all three volumes we see an emerging theme, that of the ‘aristocratisation’ of Italian society in the late Middle Ages and in the early modern period. In von Albertini’s Florence, everything relevant takes place in the city. In Berengo’s and Ventura’s we meet another protagonist: the territory. How the sovereign city ruled its domains, including its subject cities, was becoming a central issue. 16th century Lucca had a small state, with only one ‘quasi-city’, Camaiore, in it. However, Berengo was able to depict the very different economic and social environments of the central, fertile, relatively flat area around the city, known as the ‘Six Miles’, under the direct administration of the city and that of the *Vicariati*, the mountainous areas where free villagers were landowners and partners in managing the common pastures and chestnut forests. Ventura’s entire book was on the *terraferma*, not on the *Serenissima* ['The Most Serene'] – not on Venice, the dominant city, but on a part of its state.

These works did not appear in a vacuum, of course. Alongside von Albertini, other non-Italian historians were engaged in important work, particularly on Florence and Venice, the two great city-states praised by Burckhardt. Of the many worth mention were Felix Gilbert, whose comparison of Machiavelli and Guicciardini was translated in response to the prompting of his Italian friends, and Nicolai Rubinstein, whose studies on the government of the Medici provided a model for analysing the concrete workings of
republican government. Eric Cochrane also deserves to be remembered for his research on Florence in the centuries following the Renaissance, at that time largely ignored by both Italian and foreign historians.  

**Mapping Administrative Structures: The Territorial State**

In the Italian context, interest in the territorial organisation of power did not derive from, but was strongly encouraged and given direction by Jaume Vicens i Vives’ vigorous and well-known paper, delivered just after his untimely death, to the Eleventh International Congress of Historical Sciences, held in Stockholm in 1960. It is not by chance that Italian historians of the later Middle and early modern ages found a deep resonance in the Catalan historian’s reflections. Like Vicens, they too were attempting to study and understand states which had very little to do with the mythical ‘modern state’ as elaborated in France or in Castile. Vicens’ contribution was read on many levels. Vicens recognised the importance of Chabod’s studies on the administration of the State of Milan, and on such themes as how officials were paid and how they acquired a bureaucratic mentality. He proposed the idea that the Spanish monarchy had been able to find adequate administrative solutions for its world empire thanks to the experience of the Crown of Aragon – not to the much simpler centralist Castilian scheme – and specifically to its development as a highly articulated western Mediterranean maritime state, or aggregate of states and of kingdoms, in which the Kingdom of Naples under Alfonso the Magnanimous had a key role. The concept of ‘territorial polysynody’, as a western Mediterranean invention, was attractive. More important were three further aspects. Vicens noted that the hold of the nobility on state power ‘at least’ in the Mediterranean area had not disappeared in the early modern period: it seemed to be in good health and even growing. He also noted that the changing balance of different social components did not develop in linear fashion, and that specific social groups could experience comebacks as well as defeats. War, wrote Vicens, in that time was not the frontal clash of two consolidated states, but rather, always, a deep and devastating attack, partly external and partly civil war, in which each side sought to find social and political allies, quite outside of such later schemes as the idea that monarchy tends to ally with the bourgeoisie against the nobility or vice versa. In the Italian context, these indications made much more sense than did the stereotypes of the modern state that Vicens was criticising.

The Catalan historian’s most influential contribution was his striking image of the reality of the exercise of power in the early modern age. He visualised this as organised in three strata, of different relative strengths in different parts of Europe. These ‘areas’ or ‘strata’ (the metaphor oscillated between the two) limited the exercise of royal power, and were, first, the area corresponding to agrarian society where royal power was limited by the powers of those exercising jurisdictional powers, including but not restricted to feudal seigneurs; the second corresponding to cities, where urban councils and corporate bodies could refuse to condescend to royal requests, including but not restricted
to fiscal and financial requests; and third, the ‘princely’ level itself, which included the court and all those who represented the prince or the central power, and who might be more or less willing and more or less able to carry out central policies.

Vicens declared that mapping these three areas would constitute a revelation. In Italy this concrete operational suggestion for research on the state was taken up with enthusiasm. The initial ambition was to make actual maps of territorial and even central jurisdictions, both lay and ecclesiastic, in different regions and periods, in order to understand the character and dynamics of the development of administrative structures in Italian states. This very large scale project went under the name of *Atlante Storico Italiano* [Italian historical atlas]²³. In the end it yielded only a few completed studies and maps, but nonetheless it consolidated the territorial administrative perspective as a key to the study of state organisation and power. Particularly important was a monograph by Elena Fasano Guarini on the administrative structures of the Florentine state at the time of Cosimo I de’Medici, published in 1973, and followed by an actual jurisdictional map in 1978²⁴. Fasano Guarini would continue her research, publishing numerous well-known studies.

The problem facing historians of the state was clearly no longer why ‘Italy’ had not united against its ‘foreign’ invaders. Instead, it was how the Italian states of the early modern period exercised power, how they organised their territorial domains, and which effects their administrative structures had on the character of Italian societies and on the evolution of political life and value systems. In this context, a young medievalist working at the University of Milan, Giorgio Chittolini, began to publish the results of his research. Chittolini first obtained what then appeared to be a surprising result. In mapping the jurisdictions of the late medieval duchy of Milan, he found that immediately after receiving imperial investiture, the Visconti dukes had begun to grant numerous feudal investitures in their turn. Careful identification of the individuals who received *merum et mixtum imperium*, and the circumstances surrounding the concessions, showed that the recipients where often people who, in practice, had already become *de facto* lords of the lands and villages over which they now received jurisdictional powers, *de iure*. The feudal relationship was being used to consolidate central power, disciplining existing territorial powers and linking them to the centre. The new legal framework legitimised the informal power structure and allowed the prince to secure his influence in the peripheries of the state. It was noteworthy that the *de facto* lords were often descendants of families whose fortunes were rooted in the Lombard cities²⁵. This was not a ‘residual’ feudal nobility; rather, it was a ‘second’ jurisdictional feudalism, created by the state.

Interestingly enough, when Chittolini turned his attention to the Florentine state, the picture was completely different. Here the dominant city had resolutely enforced its rule over rural lords, and when at the beginning of the 15th century it achieved direct dominion over other Tuscan cities, such as Pisa and Pistoia, it transformed the previous administrative structures drastically, sending its own citizens as *giudicenti* [officials exercising legal and administrative jurisdiction] in the place of the citizens of Pisa or Pistoia who had previously held office²⁶.
Peasants and Contadini

It was now clear that various Italian states had indeed been organised on different administrative and social bases, and that republican city states were not timid about destroying their social and political rivals. The late medieval and early modern political space had gained new levels of interest and complexity. Anthologies on the early modern state appeared and were widely read: for example, *Lo stato moderno* (1971), in three volumes, consisted of texts selected by Ettore Rotelli and Pierangiolu Schiera. Further collections were published by Elena Fasano and Giorgio Chittolini.27

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the political climate was tense. The events of 1968, the war in Vietnam, and the coup in Chile formed a context in which the sympathies of many students and professors leaned strongly towards the left, toward both the Italian Communist Party which obtained more than a third of the vote in 1975 and 1976 and the ‘extra-parliamentary’ or extreme left, in part of Maoist inspiration. Many were engaged actively in politics.

This atmosphere was conducive to looking for new actors and forces in the Italian states of the early modern age, in particular for ‘contadini’, peasants. In one sense, this meant continuing Croce’s line of thought. It was not Spain that had created the problem of the Italian Mezzogiorno [South]; the poverty and the backward political culture were the result of economic and political oppression generated by Neapolitan society and exacerbated by the incapacity of the Spanish monarchy to control the violence and greed of the baronage. Giorgio Giorgetti had shown that there was a fundamental difference between the great landholdings of the Po Valley, where while peasants were oppressed day workers, great capital investments were made, preparing the way for high agricultural productivity and industrial development, and the great landholdings of the South. The latter were exploited by demanding *terratici* [rent in kind] from peasants who cultivated grain extensively, with very limited resources.28 Giuseppe Galasso had mapped feudal holdings in Calabria during the 16th century: the Spanish monarchy, perpetually strapped for funds, sold the jurisdiction over the ‘università’ (as the southern municipalities were called), impoverishing them, while it did nothing to impede the expansion of the holdings of the baronial families. Notwithstanding the abolition of feudalism, Pasquale Villani showed how during the 19th century the heirs of the feudal barons held greater estates than before, thanks to the privatisation of common lands and to other advantages conceded the rich by the new ‘bourgeois’ society. Rosario Villari turned to the archives to understand when and how the South became detached from the rhythms of development of the rest of Europe. He concluded that there had been the beginnings of a reasonably florid agricultural bourgeoisie during the 16th century; whereas by the mid-17th century noble oppression had set the stage for the anti-Spanish revolt. Villari’s influential book, *La rivolta antispagnola di Napoli*, appeared to permit new and deeper understanding of the ‘southern question’; it was soon followed by a successful set of school history textbooks which moulded the outlook of a generation.29
The themes of Villari’s book were appropriate to the political culture and concerns of the time. It was in harmony with Boris Porchnev’s *Les soulèvements populaires dans la France du XVIIème siècle* [Popular uprisings in 17th century France]. Originally published in 1948 in Russian, Porchnev’s work was not unknown to Italian historians, although it became more accessible when it appeared in French in 1963, followed by an abridged version in Italian. Porchnev’s reading of the peasant revolts, intertwined with the international debate on the crisis of the 17th century, offered new inspiration for interpreting the Neapolitan revolution of 1647. In Porchnev’s view, French monarchy was a military structure destined to preserve the control of the nobility over the peasants. The Fronde could only be understood by keeping in mind that the bourgeoisie was part of that power structure and in the final analysis was not willing to turn against it. Was this model relevant to Italy? What was the social and political context of the Kingdom of Naples? How had belonging to the Spanish monarchy influenced the social and political structure of the Kingdom? Debate was lively. True to the teachings of Croce and Gramsci, historians studying the roots of the problems of Southern Italy looked not to Spanish oppression, but to the development of political and economic structures and their relationship to the state. It was not the Spanish who were at fault; rather the autonomy of the Neapolitan Kingdom’s barons had created a revolutionary situation. Peasants were exploited not only by violent nobles and absentee landlords, but also by even more ruthless central and northern Italian bankers who had acquired fiefs in the Kingdom.

**THE JURIDICAL TWIST**

The 1970s were the *anni di piombo*, the ‘leaden years’, in which bombings, political assassination and terrorist attacks were thought by many to be the reaction of secret services, both national and international, to the successes of the left and to the signs that Christian Democrats were ready to admit the Communist party to some form of collaboration in the government. After Aldo Moro, the principal mediator of a solution, had been kidnapped and murdered by the Red Brigades, it seemed clear that there was little immediate space for reform.

Historians of the early modern state at the time were in part engaged in describing the political and administrative histories of the multitude of Italian states. Giuseppe Galasso directed a large scale publishing project which included ample monographs on each state. Other Italian historians were engaged in debates more closely related to the fashions and preoccupations of other historiographies. The volumes of Pocock and Skinner discussed the great Italian republican writers of the 16th century as part of Atlantic or Western republicanism. At first they were largely ignored, because their approach and their concerns were not those of Italian historians. The idea itself that republicanism and the fruits of 16th century Italian political experience could migrate northward and westward with no further reference to the subsequent history of the peninsula was in its way bizarre. Republicanism did return periodically as a theme of Italian historiography, where today it again has an important and possibly growing role.
Italian historians of the state gave an original twist to the general linguistic turn of the time, by accentuating the juridical sphere. It was quite reasonable to look more closely at the conceptual and linguistic categories used by practitioners of politics in the late medieval period and in the early modern age. What better way to avoid anachronism than to observe the 16th century as the 16th century had observed itself? The conceptual world of those engaged in politics and statecraft was largely moulded by their studies in the field of law, both civil and canon. It might be surprising to consider that Alexander VI, Cesare Borgia, and Francesco Guicciardini had one thing in common: their university studies in jurisprudence. The 1980s saw a rapprochement between legal historians and historians of the state on the common ground of research on the administration of justice. There was joint interest in such questions as the production of statutes, the elaboration of legal codes and the creation of ‘supreme tribunals’. This interest was in part related to the international projects on the history of law promoted by the Max Planck Institute of Frankfurt, in part to a new attention to Foucaultian themes. The technical knowledge of the juridical culture of the early modern age was not easily accessible for general historians, but in return they were well equipped to analyse the political contexts in which statutes were compiled and tribunals instituted.

The juridical dimension in historiography on the state was not new; historians of law had long been active in the field of legal and institutional history; eminent Italian historians received their degrees in law and it was quite common for archivists to have completed their studies in the faculties of jurisprudence. However during the 1980s, the ‘history of justice’ enjoyed a moment in the limelight. Gaetano Cozzi, professor of Modern History in Venice, published an anthology of works on ‘justice’ in 1980, and a volume of studies, entitled *Politica e giustizia dal secolo XVI al secolo XVIII* [Politics and Justice from the 16th to the 18th century] in 1982. Here he not only illustrated the peculiarities of the practice and representations of ‘Justice’ in the Venetian republic, but also sketched a comparative analysis of the juridical systems of other Italian states. A large scale joint research project on the ‘Rota’ courts brought historians tout court and legal historians together to study the significance and functions of the ‘supreme tribunals’ of the Italian states of the early modern period. Once again, the overall result was the extension of knowledge about how the ‘ancient Italian states’, with their robust medieval and Roman law heritage, actually worked, and how educated strata of the population used the administrative structures for the advancement of their families and their fortunes. Paolo Grossi, a legal historian working in Florence, did much to create synergies between ‘jurists’ and ‘historians’. His review, *Quaderni fiorentini (Per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno)* [Florentine Notebooks. For the History of Modern Juridical Thought] was of interest to both, and led to a useful confrontation and rapprochement with the Iberian environment. This included lively interchange with António Manuel Hespanha, Bartolomé Clavero, Francisco Tomás y Valiente and their colleagues.

**Other Dimensions**

The incisive meeting with Spanish and Portuguese legal historians was part of a more general trend in the late 1980s and early 1990s – not only in Italy – linked to other as-
pects of the Europeanisation and internationalisation of higher education and research. Italian historians were involved in pioneering European projects and they began to interact more frequently and more incisively on an international scale. Two significant examples were the participation in the European Science Foundation project on the *Origins of the Modern State*\(^3\), and a joint conference of American and Italian historians of the early modern state organised by the Italo-German Historical Institute in Trent and the University of Chicago. The proceedings of conference, held in Chicago in 1993, were published, in part, in English, in a special issue of the “Journal of Modern History” and, in their entirety, in Italian\(^3\).

By that time it was evident that Italian states had robust and important institutional histories, with nearly infinite variations; that each had left a remarkable documentary record, providing nearly infinite possibilities for research in the political, administrative, judicial and fiscal spheres; that each had its roots in medieval city states, or in the case of Southern Italy, in medieval monarchy and empire; that most were conglomerations of several or even many medieval states, forged in the complicated and often dramatic upheavals from the Black Death to the Italian Wars.

It was now clear however that the debate was no longer primarily focussed on the institutional and political problems which had interested most researchers up until that time. In parallel with developments in other historiographies, sociological concerns and concepts introduced the themes of patronage and clienteles. Courts as centres of organisation of culture and of the elaboration of political discourse had their adepts. An association entitled “Europa delle Corti” promoted research, conferences and publications on court-related topics. Historians joined specialists in Italian literature and art history in exploring and describing the Renaissance court and court culture – a theme which was quite explicitly proposed as antithetical to the problems of republican states with their constitutional mechanisms, territorial jurisdictions and the history of justice that occupied their more institutionally minded colleagues\(^3\).

Attention was now turning to what was beyond each individual state, what connected their histories, what was beyond the institutional aspects that had inevitably been at the centre of previous studies. Having elucidated the ‘power of command’ in each state, studied as a microcosm, historians were now interested in what connected different states and power structures. The Empire, war, shared legal systems, families, factions and the relations between political systems and ecclesiastical organisation all came to the fore.

None of these themes was in itself new. Relations with the Spanish empire were a more than consolidated topic for research; war (especially during the chaotic aftermath of the Black Death and in the 16th century Wars of Italy) had long been seen as a catalyst for political change; the shared legal and administrative systems had given rise, for one thing, to large-scale prosopographical studies of the *giusdicenti* employed in turn by different Italian states; clans and factions within cities, in the countryside, and on a regional or even broader scale (from the Guelfs and the Ghibellines on) were hardly

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novelties. What was new can be summarised in two ways. First, the energies dedicated to illustrating the development of Italian early modern states and delineating their place in the shifting organisation of power in Europe were now redirected towards other aspects, more in line with the sociological and textual concerns of many non-Italian historians of Italy. In the second place, the idea that Italian states were something quite different from other European states was attenuated. The main differences (the powerful cities with their extensive territories, the lack of anything resembling the present nation state) were now seen to be extremes, but hardly outside the coordinates in which all European states could be placed.

Some contributions were presented very explicitly as antagonistic with respect to the existing research on states: this was the case of the ‘debunking’ studies of Edoardo Grendi and Osvaldo Raggio, which aroused a lively debate. These volumes focusing on the Ligurian communities of Cervo and Fontanabuona represented the trend toward micro storia [micro-history], and tried to show that the flourishing studies on Genoa and its atypical but very important state had little relation to life within the territory of the ‘Superba’. Further developments of the study of non-state power emphasized connections, and how the multiple layers and forms of power, including those of clans and factions on the peripheries of states, were interrelated rather than mutually exclusive.

Other lines of research had their roots deep in established themes in research on the state, but brought new developments. Studies on the Spanish Empire now saw not only Southern Italy, but Northern and Central Italy as well, as protagonists rather than victims of the successes of Charles V’s armies. The question was no longer posed in terms of ‘states’ and their ‘independence’ alone, but rather of an ‘imperial system’ in which élites of different realms competed and collaborated. This path allowed useful synergies with developments in Spanish historiography.

A third topic, that of the relation between church and state, was of course not new. In synthesis, most studies on the organisation of church hierarchy and on the Papal state used the same tools used for any other Italian state or jurisdiction. For example, the provincial ‘rota’ courts of the papal state were studied in the same context as those of Florence or Genoa; among the many volumes of Galasso’s History of Italy, the Papal state had its volume like any other. The explicitly Catholic historian of the state, Paolo Prodi, adopted a different approach. From 1982 Prodi published a series of monographs that developed his historical reflections on the nature of the relationship between church and state in Europe. His complex thesis focuses around the idea that the evolution of Christianity, and more specifically of the doctrines and practice of the Catholic Church and the historical circumstances of the organisation of the Papal state, resulted in particular kind of separation of church and state, creating a space for individual freedom and ethical citizenship. In The Sovereign Pontiff, Prodi suggested that the Renaissance and Baroque papacy was a forerunner in developing absolutism as a way of representing and organising power. This thesis presents analogies, in a new context, with the idea that Italian states were forerunners of developments in the rest of Europe.
In conclusion we can observe that at the beginning of the third millennium, Italian historiography on the state builds on an established patrimony of knowledge and of serious research. It can profitably interact with other historiographies – not for the first time, but now in a more incisive way, through large scale international cooperation. Today, though, the energy and the urgency, the feeling of direct political relevance which once characterised those studies is no longer felt to the same degree. However the Italian state was built, however the Risorgimento came about, however Fascism used and abused past history, the aspects of the early modern period which seem relevant at present are of different kinds. Works on the early modern period which have engaged the interest of the general public are for example those of Adriano Prosperi, which explore the deep impact of Counter Reformation culture and religious practices on Italian and early modern society.40

Historiography is in transformation – as is politics. As in other countries, there is debate about new understandings of historians’ roles and tasks, once the teleology of the nation-state has been reviewed and set aside.41 It is reasonable to suppose that interest for themes of political organisation not constrained by single national narratives and debates will continue to develop.

But that is another story.

NOTES


7 Best known abroad for his philosophical works, such as *Estetica come scienza dell’espressione e linguistica generale* [Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic], Bari 1902, Croce wrote an remarkable number of influential books on history including those mentioned here: *Storia del Regno di Napoli*, Bari 1925; Id., *Storia dell’età barocca in Italia* Bari 1929; Id., *Storia come pensiero e azione*, Bari 1938.


For biographical data and bibliography, see the materials placed on line by the Fondazione Federico Chabod, www.fondazionefedericochabod.it

See particularly the works collected in F. Chabod, Carlo V e il suo impero, Turin 1985; Id., Lo stato e la vita religiosa a Milano nell’epoca di Carlo V, Turin 1971.


F. Braudel, Civiltà e imperi del Mediterraneo nell’età di Filippo II, Turin 1953, was the Italian translation of La Méditerranée et le monde Méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II, Paris 1949.

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A. Ventura, Nobiltà e popolo nella società veneta del quattrocento e cinquecento, Bari 1964 (Milan 1993)

The theme of aristocratization was developed particularly by C. Donati, L’idea di nobiltà in Italia. Secolo XIV-XVIII, Bari 1988.


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32 In particular historians of law such as V. Piergiovanni, R. Savelli, M. Ascheri and M. Sbriccoli collaborated closely with the historians of state tout court, and themselves contributed important volumes in which the centre of interest was at once political and juridical.


37 See, for example, for the close collaboration among Spanish and Italian historians, F. Cantù - M.A. Visceglie, *L’Italia di Carlo V. Guerra, religione e politica nel primo Cinquecento*, Atti del Convegno internazionale di Studi, (Rome, 5-7 April 2001), Rome 2003.


the same author, written with P. Viola, have also been successful: *Storia del mondo moderno e contemporaneo*, vols. 1, 2, Turin 2000, 2004.


**FURTHER READING:**


Kirshner J. (ed.), *The Origins of the State in Italy, 1300-1600*, Chicago 1996.


