



Creating a New Historical Perspective: EU and the Wider World

# CLIOHWORLD

## READERS

### VIII

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# Regional and Transnational History in Europe

*A*  
*CLIOHWORLD*  
*Reader*

*edited by*  
*Steven G. Ellis and Iakovos Michailidis*

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Preface

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# Preface

We are very pleased to present *Regional and Transnational History in Europe*, edited by Steven G. Ellis and Iakovos Michailidis. It is the eighth in the series of Readers produced by the Erasmus Academic Network for History, CLIOHWORLD. CLIOHWORLD is an Erasmus Academic Network, supported by the European Commission through its Lifelong Learning Programme. Its full title is “Creating a New Historical Perspective: EU and the Wider World”. More in general, it is part of the family of ‘CLIOH nets’: Networks and projects devoted to “Creating Links and Innovative Overviews for a New History Agenda”. The specific role of CLIOHWORLD is to bring the history of Europe, European integration and the European Union itself into a new perspective, in which traditional ways of approaching European history can be seen in a different light, and more meaningful paths taken. This Reader is designed to provide teachers and students with a novel and valid tools for exploring an important and timely topic.

A new or revived interest in ‘regions’ and in transnational history is clearly connected to the slow but decisive transformations which are taking place in the European Union. The cultural frameworks and the university systems which largely shape the historiographical agenda, in research as well as in learning and teaching, still tend to be national. Students’ interest in the local, the daily and the facility of using nearby libraries and archives has led in recent decades to an expansion of studies on territories which are not coterminous with nations. Whether or not this process has led or can lead to a new and scientifically useful cultivation of ‘regional’ and/or ‘transnational history’, is a question discussed by the editors in the Introduction and explored in this Reader. Can the useful insights which emerge from the cultivation of local history in its various forms be brought to shed light, in a comparative and connected framework, on Europe and its history in general?

The question is not abstract, and a glance around us shows that it is far from being resolved. For deep historical reasons, the European Union is an entity characterised by experimentation with various combinations of national, supranational, international and – if we may – sub and transnational ways of organising power and consent. It is a unique polity, born from the hope that the devastating conflicts of the first half of the 20th century could be avoided in the future; for good reason, probably, it tends to maintain a relatively low profile, although its laws, policies and the opportunities it gives had unmistakably changed the face of our societies.

At the beginning of last century, the idea that each ‘national’ – cultural and linguistic – group could obtain its own state and control its own destiny both contributed to and resulted from the demise and transformation of the continent’s great empires: the Austrian, the Russian and the Ottoman. The promise the nation-state seemed to hold played out tragically for many those hopeful peoples. Nonetheless, nations, national organisation, and national sentiment are historical and political facts in Europe; the

tension that they and the will to overcome their negative valences generate is what defines Europe, gives it life and makes it matter. The European Union is much more than a new, medium large state that seems to require a prolonged gestation: it is a complex, tightly structured, expanding community or mosaic of communities where debate takes place continuously, within, between and among national and other entities. The co-existence of strong national traditions with a sometimes wavering, but often stronger will to cooperate, leads to permanent and probably inevitable political tensions within the European Union. The multilayered stratification of territorial power is not new in history, quite the contrary. What is new is the desire to cooperate and operate for the common wellbeing while preserving, as part of that goal, strong national traditions, and largely autonomous national political systems.

But what about regions? what are they? there is no single definition, although – as the first chapter in this volume shows – they can be grouped approximately according to type. Some are very small: what are considered regions by some would be at the most ‘provinces’ in other parts of Europe. Some are medium sized entities, often with a history of independence or statehood behind them, whether or not with exactly the same borders. Regions may also be ‘macro-regions’, and here again there are different ways of dividing them. Does it make sense to talk about ‘central’, ‘southern’ or ‘northern’ Europe? can such areas be seen as regions? what about the Mediterranean, or the New East, or even the Euro-Asian land-mass? in some contexts each of these is considered, rightly or wrongly, a region.

And what does transnational mean? are we speaking only of phenomena that involve more than one nation-state? perhaps trade across a border? Or do we wish to focus on phenomena that have their own, ‘transnational’ logic, and that operate without or with little reference to state borders? This question too is addressed in the introductory chapters.

With this volume, we wish to bring these general questions, and the means to begin to address them, into learning/teaching programmes. The volume contains a selection of studies based on new research results grouped so as to encourage a necessary critical look at what regional and transnational history are and what insights they can generate. Experience shows that what goes under the name of regional or transnational history in schools and universities is in fact the history of the area where the school or university is located. With this volume we hope that the study of the ‘own’ area can lead to a more general scientific understanding of the phenomena and the questions involved.

The Reader has been prepared by one of the five Work Groups belonging to CLIOHWORLD Erasmus Academic Network. It has been elaborated and tested by Work Group 5, whose area of endeavour is precisely Regional and Transnational History. The chapters included have been chosen from the studies prepared by the CLIOHRES Network of Excellence. We thank the book editors, the authors and the researchers who prepared the chapters, for their excellent and useful work.

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# Note

*Regions in European history* by Stephen Jacobsen (editor), Andres Andersen, Branko Bešlin, Wolfgang Göderle, Zoltan Györe, Mario Muigg, was originally published in *Layers of Power: Societies and Institutions in Europe*, edited by Saúl Martínez Bermejo, Darina Martykánová, Momir Samardžić, Pisa 2010, pp. 95-150.

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*Regional history and the regional agenda in Romania, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia* by Miloš Řezník, Mirela Ciuchea, Elena Mannova, Ewelina Szpak, was originally published in *Frontiers, Regions and Identities in Europe*, edited by Steven G. Ellis, Raingard Eßer with Jean-François Berdah, Miloš Řezník, Pisa 2009, pp. 55-75.

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*Local and Regional Identity in Medieval Tuscia*, by Mauro Ronzani, was originally published in *Nations and Nationalities in Historical Perspective*, edited by Gudmundur Hálfðanarson and Ann Katherine Isaacs, Pisa 2001, pp. 199-209.

*Trade and Politics in the Medieval Baltic: English merchants and England's Relations to the Hanseatic league 1370-1437*, by Frederic Pedersen, was originally published in *Public Power in Europe. Studies in Historical Transformation*, edited by James S. Amelang, Siegfried Beer, Pisa 2006, pp. 161-181.

*Region and Frontier in the English State: the English Far North, 1296-1603*, by Steven G. Ellis, was originally published in *Frontiers, Regions and Identities in Europe*, edited by Steven G. Ellis, Raingard Eßer with Jean-François Berdah, Miloš Řezník, Pisa 2009, pp. 77-101.

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*Regional History without a Region: the Peculiar Case of Post-1945 West German Historical Research into the Former German Territories in the East*, by Martin Moll, was originally published in *Frontiers, Regions and Identities in Europe*, edited by Steven G. Ellis, Raingard Eßer with Jean-François Berdah, Miloš Reznik, Pisa 2009, pp. 245-271.

*Transformations of Regional History in the Polish "Western Territories" since 1945: Legitimization, Nationalization, Regionalization* by Miloš Reznik, was originally published in *Frontiers, Regions and Identities in Europe*, edited by Steven G. Ellis, Raingard Eßer with Jean-François Berdah and Miloš Reznik, Pisa 2009, pp. 223-44.

All of the above volumes are available at [www.clio-hres.net](http://www.clio-hres.net) or [www.clio-hworld.net](http://www.clio-hworld.net).

## INTRODUCTION: REGIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL HISTORY IN EUROPE

Region is a geographical term, normally denoting a medium-size area, smaller than the whole. Politically, regions may constitute a unit of government, but their relationship with the centre is critical and frequently changes over time. And historically, regions may include erstwhile independent entities – kingdoms, duchies, or city republics – which have been absorbed into centralizing states, but which are liable to break free again if central authority weakens. This is particularly so in the case of frontier regions; but the defence and policing of territorial frontiers has in any case proved a perennial task of government, regardless of whether the unit of political organization was a medieval kingdom, an early modern multiple monarchy, or a modern nation-state<sup>1</sup>.

While, as has been claimed, national identities are determined by ‘hard’ as well as by ‘soft’ variables – internationally-agreed state borders, passports, national law on the one hand, and on the other, language, heritage and culture – regional identities seem, at first sight, far more flexible, multilayered and hybrid. The policy of the European Union over the last decades has also challenged traditional assumptions about the nation state. It requires academics as well as policy makers and European citizens to rethink the relationship between national and regional identities and the borders between them. The authors of the chapters assembled in this reader likewise address concepts of regionalism and the relationship between state and region from a historical perspective<sup>2</sup>. That the focus of this book is history, rather than, for instance, geography, ethnography or sociology, is partly the result of the specialisms of the authors whose writings are assembled here: but partly it also reflects, so it may be argued, the important role of a historical consciousness and memory which shapes many aspects of regional identity formation. History, perhaps more than any other aspect of human life, has been and still is evoked to create a sense of belonging to a geographical entity, a region, whose borders were in many cases not fixed by strict political lines of demarcation, and, in the case of border regions, were usually also contested by markers of ethnicity, religion, economy or geography. Moreover, versions of what was within and what was outside a region have often changed with the changing parameters of historical narratives produced by politicians, pressure groups, history societies and artists. The task of analysing regions and identities is therefore approached by applying the distinction which was recently suggested by Anssi Paasi between the identity of a region and regional identity (or regional consciousness)<sup>3</sup>. While geographers, historians and others, he argues, chart and define the identity of a region, applying different criteria and analytical tools to a specifically circumscribed area, regional identity is created by the people living in a region or outside it.

Regional history has long been a dynamic branch of research<sup>4</sup>. This interest has been further stimulated by the European Union’s vision of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ – a concept that has been so eloquently propagated by intellectuals such as Denis de

Rougemont since the 1930s<sup>5</sup>. De Rougemont and the probably better known other great advocate of postwar European federalism, Jean Monnet, designed their idea of Europe as an antidote to the aggressive and exclusivist nationalisms whose devastating effects they had witnessed. It might even be argued that the European concept of federal states outlined above is in certain respects being overtaken by the parameter of 'regionality'. The dichotomy, if not antagonism, between 'nation' and 'region' that the architects of the European Union had detected still seems to overshadow the public as well as the academic debate about what is meant by a region today. The notion of a distant, *dirigiste* state versus a "warm, personal localism"<sup>6</sup> has gathered further momentum from the fall of macro-, transnational, systems such as Communism in Eastern Europe and Central Asia<sup>7</sup>. It has also been argued that dramatic events in recent history such as the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 further stimulated a retreat into a regional and local arena<sup>8</sup>. This retreat into the seemingly known and therefore secure area of regional (and local) identity also seems to offer a shield against globalizing forces which are frequently perceived as a threat to the clear demarcations between 'them' and 'us' that have underpinned nationalist ideologies since the Long Eighteenth Century<sup>9</sup>. Regionalism, therefore, has become a marker of what has been labelled the 'Zweite Moderne'<sup>10</sup>. Despite the ever-increasing presence of 'regions' and 'regionalism(s)' in contemporary discourse, however, the term itself still remains rather open-ended. A closer look at the definition of 'region', as presented in its Wikipedia entry offers a variety and, it seems, a growing number of areas and parameters which may be used to describe the concept. They reach well beyond the political sphere and the shadow of the concentration camps in which the idea of European regionalism was conceived by thinkers and politicians of the European Movement. These definitions include geographical, historical, social, cultural and administrative markers, to name just a few criteria which immediately spring to mind. These categories in some way transgress the above-mentioned dichotomy between 'region' and 'nation'. At the same time, there are transnational, macro-regions, such as the Baltic and the Mediterranean, which cross national boundaries and which are defined by academics, bureaucrats and politicians through a common economic or geological outlook and a more or less common culture – a perspective which seems to be shared by the people living in these areas<sup>11</sup>. Regions may also be constructed as areas on either side of national borders and they may be defined through a common heritage which precedes current national divisions<sup>12</sup>. Regional identity has also been used as a marker for what may perhaps be more accurately labelled as 'would-be nations'<sup>13</sup>, such as Scotland, Wales, and for some observers, Cornwall in Great Britain; the Basque Country or Catalonia in Spain; and Flanders and Wallonia in Belgium. It might be argued that the nomenclature used by policy makers, political parties and interest groups in these areas has proved very useful in negotiations with the European Union, particular in regard to its financial initiatives to support regions and their distinct cultural markers such as language or dialect, architecture, heritage or outstanding natural features.

In the context of regional history, the case of frontier regions may seem to require particular attention. It is a truism to say that each generation is condemned to rewrite its own history, but the replacement of a Europe of competing nation-states through the development of the European Union in the direction of a federation of states has transformed the context in which both regions and territorial frontiers are studied. For instance, the Schengen Agreement of 1985 has led to the abolition of systematic border controls between the participating countries, now numbering twenty-eight, with the removal of internal border posts and checks in the member-states of the Schengen area, the creation of a common visa for visitors to the area, and the harmonization of external border controls. In these circumstances, the erstwhile frontiers of the member states may seem to have been reduced to little more than the status of regional boundaries, mere administrative borders, separating different areas of jurisdiction. Thus, while territorial frontiers and their associated system of border controls still survive on the margins of Europe, for many Europeans what had been a familiar aspect of everyday life extending back over many centuries is now gradually disappearing.

The downgrading of European frontiers calls in question central aspects of Europe's traditional national historiographies. These include issues of cultural and social perceptions of frontier regions, perceptions of frontier societies, and most especially perceptions of alterity, a key issue in regard to military frontiers – attitudes to those 'other' peoples dwelling on the far side of the frontier. Different types of frontier have conjured up different connotations in different societies but in the historiographical master narratives of Europe's competing nation-states there was a reductionist tendency to oversimplify these differences in terms of 'them' and 'us'. Commonly, these competing historiographies themselves drew on a 'national agenda', exaggerating the frontier's significance by deploying a rhetoric of difference, or 'otherness' (more rarely, a rhetoric of identity or unity), which reflected the aspirations of the state, or more particularly of the centre.

The recent development of European federalism thus affords an opportunity for its historians to take stock of these inherited perspectives on a Europe of frontiers. Detached from their national historiographies, can the different types of territorial frontier be compared in a more meaningful way? Indeed, can the two sides of longstanding frontiers be reassembled historiographically into a more coherent whole, a cross-border region? One type of frontier was indeed the military frontier, but military frontiers were by no means the norm throughout history. Frontiers between generally friendly nations might require, at particular times, no more than a boundary marker across the one region: in this sense, the Schengen Agreement may be seen to consolidate multilaterally what was an accepted pattern of frontier development.

Another important area of regional studies concerns the agents of regionalism: who or what promotes regional identity? Interest in regionalism(s) has spanned many arenas. More, perhaps, than many other concepts, it has transgressed the boundaries between

academia and the public. It has become an important tool of policy makers across Europe, but it has also been extensively exploited by the heritage industry, by amateur history societies and by the media in general. The approaches of these various actors have, however – and this does not come as a surprise – differed markedly. Politicians in search of votes have promised regional autonomy to their constituents – very successfully in the case of Scotland and Wales, which now have their own parliament and regional assembly respectively, but with limited success in the case of the North East of England<sup>14</sup>. Historians have constructed regions as heuristic instruments to tackle specific research questions in search of facets of or counter-arguments against a national ‘master-narrative’<sup>15</sup>. Volunteer groups and schools have been and are involved in community-based projects such as the Heritage-Lottery-funded “England’s Past for Everyone”, which aims to connect a local population with the past of its region, town or village<sup>16</sup>.

The following essays address questions of regional identity from a historical perspective charting a wide geographical and chronological area. Taken as a whole they aim to outline and to understand the different interpretations of regionality and its role in the different national historiographies represented by the authors of the volume. The definition of a region not only differs in terms of the arena in which it is used, it also differs substantially in the understanding of politicians, historians and the public in different countries of Europe (and outside Europe). A key question, therefore, is to identify the different agents of regionality in the different national contexts. While, for instance, England has a very well developed academic and ‘grass-roots’ infrastructure for regional history but a very poor political response to a regional agenda, regional research in the Slovak Republic is still very much in its infancy. In practice, regional agendas have developed very differently in the different national contexts. In post-war Eastern Europe, it reflects a national agenda which reduced regionalism and regional research to a field occupied by academics which did not fit into the ‘master narrative’ of socialism and progress. In France, by contrast, research into regions blossomed in the 20th century with the rise of the *Annales* School and its multidisciplinary approach to research. A comparison of the different agents of regionalism and their role within their respective national contexts may thus permit the development of a first, tentative typology of regionality and its political environments.

Although it has been argued that globalization has eroded the distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’ which was so prevalent in the development of national identity, the encounter with the ‘other’ as a marker of identity seems to have returned through the back door in regional identity formation. Pat Hudson has argued that “as outside influences get stronger, regional and local character and differences tend to be transformed... They are as likely to be reinforced as reduced”<sup>17</sup>. It is important, as will be argued here, that historians address these questions with their tools of academic research and deconstruct

all too comfortable myths and stereotypes about regional identities, lines of demarcation and attitudes towards perceived insiders and outsiders.

The emphasis on regionality as a concept as well as an area of historical investigation is, of course, not the product of the political developments of the last thirty years or so. Ever since the antiquarian publications of the late 16th and 17th centuries, researchers have viewed their immediate and medium-range environments as a distinct area of study with clearly recognizable borders. Members of the *Antiquitates*-movement operated largely within their own networks, received support and recognition from urban and regional elites, but collaborated, where possible, with academic historians. So far, the relationship between academics and antiquarians has not been adequately discussed in studies on early modern European historiography. On the contrary, antiquarians' contributions to the development of the discipline of History have, so far, either been belittled or ignored<sup>18</sup>. Antiquarian research has largely been perceived as an approach to the acquisition of the past which was distinctly different from the research agenda of the academy and remained separate from university studies until the more recent developments of local and regional history as academic fields of investigation<sup>19</sup>. One of the key criticisms of antiquarian, and therefore, 'traditional' regional and local studies has been their lack of analysis and contextualization, in essence, their parochialism, which has seemed to reduce their value to being a mere quarry of factual information rather than offering interpretations of change over time<sup>20</sup>. Such an approach would, indeed, be useless in the present context. The aim is therefore to address a number of questions in the case studies which form the major part of the present book. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the relationship between the nation and the region forms a substantial part of this investigation. It has been argued that the relationship between regional and national identity is constructed, negotiated and has to be understood as a performative discourse<sup>21</sup>. How, for instance, do regional agents at various levels respond to 'weak' or 'strong' states? What is the relationship between regions and composite states? How do regions, or rather, regional players and inhabitants react to the collapse of a state? How is a region created as a consequence of new border arrangements, of immigration or emigration or of economic changes? Can we detect common patterns across Europe and over time? Addressing these questions horizontally, how may relations between regions in the one state be characterized? Are they shaped by competition for resources, prominence and political power, or do they 'usually' form alliances against the political and economic centres in London, Paris or Amsterdam and their prosperous hinterlands?<sup>22</sup> How does the vicinity to a national border shape regional identity in contrast to (or in comparison with) a region that is geographically embedded within the nation state and has no national borders? This agenda also suggests the need for a closer look at regional consciousness, that is, regional identity as perceived by its inhabitants at various levels of society. Is identity "often easier to recognise by its absence than for its presence"<sup>23</sup> – in other words, through opposition to 'the other'? Or can we understand

regional identity as kaleidoscopic, as suggested by Peter Sahlin and, more recently, by William O'Reilly, and adaptable to different times and circumstances?<sup>24</sup> What are the markers of identity, if any? How important, for instance, are confessional or religious homogeneity, or its absence, ethnicity, a homogenous economy or language, a distinct geography, for the identification process of inhabitants of spaces labelled and defined as regions? How can and is history used to construct or to deconstruct this entity, and how do historical back-projections change over time according to present-centred agendas? Who are the agents of these processes and constructions, and where do they operate? What is the relationship between regionalism and localism? Are the perceived distinctions between 'them' and 'us' based on a regional framework, or is a perceived identity focused rather on a city, town or village but simply uses a discourse of regionality in its arguments? Likewise, are categories of who belongs and who does not belong based on a distinct geographical space, or is regionality simply an easier and (currently, or at distinct times in the past) a more convenient label to disguise economic differences – for instance between rural and urban areas, centres and peripheries, metropolises and small(er) towns? Some of the questions enumerated here have been addressed in the case studies of this reader.

Finally, it is worth considering carefully here some of the more purely methodological and conceptual problems surrounding regional and transnational history. As an organizing principle of historical narrative, nation-centred history still holds pride of place in the history world, in Europe as elsewhere. Alongside histories organized around the rise of the nation and the development of the nation-state, an established tradition of regional history (whether subnational or transnational) exists in many – but not all – parts of Europe. Within this tradition, regional history is normally approached in terms of a specific case study understood in a particular national context: in so far as general concepts and methodologies of regional history have been developed and studied, they are case specific, as the foregoing remarks imply. They reflect the experience of particular regions and a specific national context, rather than regions in the abstract.

In the circumstances, therefore, it is scarcely surprising that there is at present no agreed terminology or agreed definitions in regard to the different forms of regional and transnational history. There are regions as 'sub-national units', here called 'micro-regions'; and there are 'trans-national' and 'supra-national' regions, and 'meso-regions', here described as 'macro-regions': in eastern Europe, the term 'region' more normally denotes a macro-region, whereas in western Europe it denotes a micro-region. Another vexed question is that of 'who or what defines a region?' Regions may be defined on grounds of environment or climate; commerce and the economy; language, culture and religion; history and identity; or administration. Very often, they are constructed or imagined internally by the population of the region, but in some cases external perceptions are equally important (as in the case of the Baltic states), or even more important (as with the Celtic fringe)<sup>25</sup>. What this diversity suggests is the need for closer consideration of



theory, concepts, and methodologies of regional history, the idea of regional history *per se*, as opposed to further case studies of more regions.

The preference for macro- as opposed to micro-regions within the different national systems reflects to some degree the character of individual states. For a small state like Malta, for instance, the Mediterranean as a macro-region makes far more sense than Gozo as a micro-region; but the case for micro-regions is stronger in larger states like Italy which, however, is also readily studied in the context of the Roman empire or the Mediterranean World. Nonetheless, the status of regional history in the different national systems seems to a considerable degree to reflect what may be described as 'the national agenda,' viz. the past (and sometimes future) political and cultural contexts in each country which have shaped the national grand narrative.

This seems particularly to be the case in regard to micro-regions. There is, for instance, an established tradition of regional history in those countries like Germany and Italy in which historical, pre-unification states supplied the building blocks of a process of political unification. In much of eastern Europe, however, regional history is less developed, in part because under socialism a focus on regional identities was generally viewed as subversive of national identity or of socialist solidarity and so was actively discouraged. In those cases where, exceptionally, regional history was actively encouraged under socialism, such as in that part of Moldova acquired by the Soviet Union from Romania in 1940 (now the Republic of Moldova), there were specific political reasons for this. Similar political constraints in regard to the national question militated against the development of regional history in Ireland; and in Spain a regional perspective is strongly contested in historic territories like Catalonia and Galicia which have pronounced separatist identities and where the term 'region' is seen as hostile to the nationalist aspirations of the peoples in question. In some contexts, regional history is also seen as problematic in the United Kingdom: among the four historic national territories, the description as regions of, at the least, Scotland and, for different reasons, Northern Ireland, two territories which lend themselves most readily to a regional approach, would in part be contested by their populations.

It should also be pointed out that, to the outside observer unfamiliar with the particular national agenda within which a specific micro-region is most commonly studied, the significance and operation of political constraints of this nature are by no means necessarily so obvious. This is apparently a characteristic of the genre: the reasons why, for instance, the English Pale in Ireland is so rarely studied as a distinct region of the English state, despite the apparent conduciveness of the evidence to such an approach and perspective, is not at all obvious to historians working outside Irish and British history. And there are at present no studies of micro-regions which also address this type of general problem. Such political considerations are perhaps less apparent in regard to macro-regions, although Macedonia (divided between four states) remains a battleground, as is the New British History (viz. the British Isles) in relation to Ireland.

Otherwise, the study of macro-regions like the Baltic, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean (and also wider units like Western Europe, or East-Central Europe) is fairly well-established and relatively uncontentious.

In the circumstances, the need for a reader of the kind assembled here hardly needs to be laboured. In compiling the reader, no attempt has been made to prescribe a common approach to, or definition of, the subject, which seems unnecessary. The study of regional history is open-ended: it does not have a fixed set of learning outcomes. Rather, a major aim of the reader is to illustrate the wide variety of approaches to the subject. A substantial resource for this is provided by individual chapters in the volumes prepared for two projects sponsored by the European Commission – CLIOHRES.net, a Network of Excellence of the Commission's Sixth Framework programme; and one of its predecessors, Clieh's Workshop – and published within the past ten years. These include important works on regional and transnational history by university teachers and doctoral students. The Group's aim in preparing this reader of fifteen chapters has been to offer a geographically and chronologically broad spectrum of short studies illustrative both of work on micro- and macro-regions in the different parts of Europe, with some wider excurses of a more comparative nature.

The first part of the reader consists of three highly collaborative chapters, on the concept of regions and on transnational dimensions respectively, followed by a chapter which focuses on the agents of regional identity. The remaining twelve chapters are single-authored case studies, organized in roughly chronological order from ancient times to the present. Academic research into regions has traditionally been strong for the medieval and early modern periods when nation states were either absent or still in their political infancy<sup>26</sup>. This tendency is reflected in some of the contributions to this reader, focusing on western Europe. Regionalism as a political force played a much more decisive role in the turbulent history of central and eastern European states in the 20th century. Again, this is reflected in chapters included here, and also in the collaborative chapter on agents of regional identity<sup>27</sup>. The modern section also includes chapters which treat of different kinds of transnational history. In any case, it is hoped that this collection will help to illustrate the differences and also underlying similarities of regional and transnational history across a spectrum of national European historiographies.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> This introduction is a compilation based on remarks in two papers which were previously published separately: S.G. Ellis, R. Eßer *Introduction: frontiers and regions in comparative perspective*, in S.G. Ellis, R. Eßer, J.-F. Berdah, M. Řezník (eds.), *Frontiers, regions and identities in Europe*, Pisa 2009, pp. xiii-xxii; and the Report of Working Group 5 of CLIOHWORLD, an Erasmus Academic Network, *Regional/Transnational History in European Higher Education*, in: *Europe and the Wider World: towards a New Historical Perspective*, Pisa 2010, pp. 40-45.

- <sup>2</sup> While Adrian Green and Anthony Pollard define regionalism as “seeking self-government”, we apply here a broader definition including forms of identity formation which extend the political arena implied in Green/Pollard. See A. Green, A.J. Pollard, *Introduction, Identifying Regions*, in Id. (eds.), *Regional Identities in North-East England, 1300-2000*, Woodbridge 2007, pp. 1-27, at p. 8.
- <sup>3</sup> A. Paasi, *Region, and Place: Regional Identity in Question*, in “Progress in Human Geography”, 2003, 27, 4, p. 478.
- <sup>4</sup> See, for instance, H. Mommsen, *Die Nation ist tot, es lebe die Region*, in G. Knopp, S. Quant, H. Scheffler (eds.), *Nation Deutschland?*, Munich 1984, pp. 35-38; R. Lindner (eds.), *Die Wiederkehr des Regionalen: Über neue Formen kultureller Identität*, Frankfurt 1994.
- <sup>5</sup> See also D. de Rougemont, *Vers une fédération des régions*, in “Naissance de L’Europe des régions: Bulletin de la Culture”, Geneva 1968, 2.
- <sup>6</sup> C. Applegate, *A Europe of Regions: Reflections on the Historiography of Sub-National Places in Modern Times*, in “The American Historical Review”, 1999, 104, 4, pp. 1157-1182, at p. 1158.
- <sup>7</sup> It seems that the term region is defined in Eastern Europe as a macro-region often embracing several states of the former Soviet Union. In this context, the concept of “regional families” on the Eurasian continent describes a useful analytical tool to understand politics in this area. See M.A. Molchanov, *Regional Promises in State Social Identity Construction: The Rhetoric of a Single Economic Space*, paper presented at the 6th Pan-European IR conference, Turin, Italy, 12-15 September 2007. The opposite effect, a renewed and very volatile nationalism, however, might and may still be witnessed in the former Yugoslavia and adjacent areas.
- <sup>8</sup> K. Dyson, *The Challenged Consensus, The 1987 German Federal Elections*, in “Political Quarterly”, 1987, 58,2, pp. 152-166.
- <sup>9</sup> M. Castells, *Das Informationszeitalter*, Opladen 2004, pp. 373, 409. More critical, however, on the EU’s vision of regionalism is R. Dahrendorf, *Auf der Suche nach einer neuen Ordnung*, Munich 2003, p. 40.
- <sup>10</sup> S. Hummel, *Kulturpolitik der Zweiten Moderne*, in “Neues Archiv für Niedersachsen”, 2006, 2, pp. 28ff.
- <sup>11</sup> See, for instance, the initiative *Ars Baltica*, inaugurated in 1991 by the Ministries of Culture of the Baltic Sea Region in order to shape a common Baltic cultural policy. <http://www.ars-baltica.net>
- <sup>12</sup> See, for instance, the five Euregios in the German-Belgian-French-Dutch border areas.
- <sup>13</sup> Applegate, *Europe of Regions*, cit., p. 1171.
- <sup>14</sup> See M. Sandford, *English regionalism through the looking glass: perspectives on the English Question from the North-East and Cornwall*, in “National Identities”, 2006, 8, 1, pp. 77-93.
- <sup>15</sup> W. Freitag, *Landesgeschichte als Synthese – Regionalgeschichte als Methode?*, in “Westfälische Forschungen”, 2004, pp. 291-305.
- <sup>16</sup> [http://www.englishspastforeveryone.org.uk/webdav/harmonise?Page/@id=12&Session/@id=D\\_E46758O1drsSWu86HR34uk](http://www.englishspastforeveryone.org.uk/webdav/harmonise?Page/@id=12&Session/@id=D_E46758O1drsSWu86HR34uk)
- <sup>17</sup> P. Hudson, *Regional and local history: globalisation, postmodernism and the future*, in “Journal of Local and Regional Studies”, 1999, 20, 1, pp. 5-25, at p. 9.
- <sup>18</sup> M. Völkel, *Geschichtsschreibung*, Cologne 2006, pp. 204-206. For Britain, see also R. Sweet, *Antiquaries: the discovery of the past in eighteenth-century Britain*, London 2004.
- <sup>19</sup> In England, most notably since the development of Local History as a distinct branch of History with its own academic departments such as the English Local History Department at the University of Leicester (1948), the Centre for East Anglian Studies at the University of East Anglia (1967), and others. It is, perhaps, symptomatic that these initiatives were developed in what were then new universities, while older academic establishments initially harboured traditional reservations against what was then still perceived as an interest for amateurs rather than academics.

- <sup>20</sup> See, for instance, J.D. Marshall, *The tyranny of the discrete: a discussion of the problems of local history in England*, Aldershot 1997.
- <sup>21</sup> C. Tacke, *The Nation in the Region: National Movements in Germany and France in the 19<sup>th</sup> century*, in J.G. Beramendi, et al., *Nationalisms in Europe: Past and Present*, Santiago de Compostella 1994, 2, pp. 691-703. See also Applegate, *Europe of Regions* cit., pp. 1177-1179.
- <sup>22</sup> See, for instance, R. Eßer, 'Concordia res parvae crescent'. *Regional Histories and the Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century*, in J. Pollmann, A. Spicer (eds.), *Public Opinion and Changing Identities in the Early Modern Netherlands. Essays in Honour of Alastair Duke*, Leiden 2006, pp. 229-248.
- <sup>23</sup> D. Newton, *North-East England, 1569-1625, Governance, Culture and Identity*, Woodbridge 2006, Introduction, p. 7.
- <sup>24</sup> P. Sahlins, *Boundaries: the making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees*, Berkeley - Los Angeles 1981, p. 271; W. O'Reilly, *Border, Buffer and Bulwark. The Historiography of the Military Frontier, 1521-1881*, in S.G. Ellis, R. Eßer (eds.), *Frontiers and the Writing of History, 1500-1850*, Hannover 2006, pp. 229-244,
- <sup>25</sup> S.G. Ellis, *Why the history of "the Celtic fringe" remains unwritten*, in Topical Issue, 'Geschichtsregionen': Concept and Critique, in "European Review of History/Revue Européenne d'Histoire", (2003), 10, no. 2, pp. 221-31.
- <sup>26</sup> The *Annales*-School has, perhaps, been the most important motor for this development.

# What is a Region? Regions in European History

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## ABSTRACT

*This chapter outlines a fresh approach to the historical study of regions in Europe. We propose that the study of regions should take into account three factors: (1) economy, environment, and geography; (2) the construction of identity; and (3) juridical and administrative structures. The chapter includes five case studies: Catalonia, the Baltic Region, Vojvodina, South Tyrol, and the French regions. Each of these represents a different 'type'. Catalonia was a medieval principality that has since been incorporated into a larger entity. The Baltic is a geographically defined territory, which, despite being divided by political frontiers through the ages, has been home to various groups which have undergone similar historical experiences. Vojvodina represents a borderland that has been the place of destination and departure for waves of migrants over the centuries. South Tyrol exemplifies those cases in which native inhabitants are converted overnight into an irredentist minority due to geopolitical negotiations far removed from the territory itself. Finally, the last section examines the birth and evolution of the regions of modern France.*

In 1882, Ernest Renan gave a famous address at the Sorbonne University entitled, "What is a Nation?" Since then, few debates have attracted the attention of so many scholars. The content of the speech was theoretical, but Renan, his audience, and his countrymen were absorbed by a specific question. The region of Alsace-Lorraine, which had been part of France for centuries, had been annexed by Germany during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) and had been renamed Reichsland. The territory would remain under German control until it reverted to France as a consequence of the Treaty of Versailles after World War I, which, as is well known, redrew the map of Europe in a failed attempt to 'resolve' a number of territorial conflicts. Were such a speech to be delivered today, its title would be different, something like "What is a region?" or, even better, "How should the regional question of Alsace-Lorraine be solved?"

When Renan delivered his address, the nation – rather than the region – was on his mind. The 19th century was the great era of the nation state and questions about nationhood were at the heart of politics, diplomacy, and war. From 1848, nationalist movements had been gathering steam within the Austro-Hungarian Empire; the unification of Germany and Italy had featured the mobilization of the continent's largest armies; Irish home rule had long been dominating British politics. Within this ambience the region of Alsace-Lorraine constituted an ideal theatre in which to test theories. According to the German philosophers Johann G. Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, a state was an artificial construct, the product of the fortuitous mix of wars and dynastic marriage alliances. The 'nation', however, was a more authentic expression of the people, defined by ethnicity, language, customs, traditions, and other organic bonds that held humans together. Renan disputed this definition. Reinterpreting Rousseau, he argued that a nation reflected the will of the people to live together, or, in his famous phrase, a 'daily plebiscite'. These two theories offered opposite solutions to Alsace-Lorraine. In 1882, the vast majority of people in the region were German-speaking, so, according to Herderian or Fichtean definitions, the territory belonged to Germany. However, its inhabitants considered themselves French. Had a plebiscite been held in 1882, the population would have likely voted to return to France.

Today, a social scientist addressing the question would choose to sidestep the thorny, and ultimately unsolvable, question of nationhood. When attempting to design political solutions to regional problems, the terrible experiences of the 20th century have shown that history usually cannot, and should not, offer conclusive answers to the question of whether a region belongs to one state or another. The Treaty of Versailles redrew the map of Europe by assigning disputed regions based on a combination of the theories of Fichte and Renan, bundled together in Woodrow Wilson's inherently contradictory principle of national self-determination. In some cases, linguistic or ethnic criteria were used to redraw borders, whereas in others, a referendum was called. Many of these experiments ended in disaster, exacerbating tensions, provoking migration and violence, and sowing the seeds for future disputes. The implementation of Rousseau's principle of majority rule for the 'general good' in ethnically and religiously plural territories often resulted in discrimination against (or even persecution of) minorities<sup>1</sup>. In addition, academic scholarship as developed over the past quarter of a century has taught the lesson that nations do not have ethnic origins, but, like states, are also products of fortuitous circumstances that cause 'identities' to shift over time. Today, a social scientist addressing a question resembling that of Alsace-Lorraine would focus on regional dimensions, and seek to design laws and institutions that would address the presence of a linguistic or religious minority within a state, and, as is often the case, within a region itself. In many cases, such as Northern Ireland today, this involves a tradeoff between democratic 'majoritarian' principles and the rights of minority groups to conserve their culture, maintain their dignity, and find political outlets for their concerns.

By asking 'What is a nation?' Renan sparked a scholarly debate in which supporters and critics throughout Europe advanced arguments that either fortified or weakened political positions on whether a given territory belonged to one state or another. Academic theories fueled political debates and justified polemical decision-making. The subsequent history of Alsace-Lorraine was one of tragedy. After World War I, the region was returned to France, but German speakers grew uncomfortable with the centralist Third Republic and pushed for linguistic, religious, and legal privileges, as well as self-government. During and after the Second World War, Alsace-Lorraine suffered mass migration and ultimately ethnic cleansing. The case of Alsace-Lorraine is by no means exceptional. At various points during the 20th century, similarly tragic events have taken place in other regions, including the Sudetenland, the Polish Corridor, Schleswig-Holstein, southern Slovenia, Transylvania, Krajina, Vojvodina, Kosova, Northern Cyprus, and Smyrna.

Since Renan's time, many professional historians have chosen to stoke the fires of tension rather than to extinguish the flames. Until the past few decades, many such regions have been battlegrounds for historians who have dug into the ancient, medieval, and modern past and employed creative hermeneutics in order to legitimize political claims and to redress grievances, while cloaking themselves in the garments of objectivity. It is only in the past two decades or so that regional historiography has begun to break free from nationalist shackles. Only recently have some of the above territories become fertile ground for 'regional history'. Here, historians study the social, economic, and cultural interactions and conflicts of various national, linguistic, and religious groups throughout the ages<sup>2</sup>. Nationalist narratives have prevailed not only in disputed regions with irredentist minorities. In places where contemporary history has been dominated by nationalist questions, such as Ireland, regional history has also been given short shrift<sup>3</sup>.

The purpose of this exercise is not to berate Renan and the scholars who have followed him by accusing them of having asked the wrong question. After all, it only becomes evident with the benefit of hindsight that Alsace-Lorraine was as much a regional as a national conundrum. Still, contemporary scholars are well aware of the dangers of writing nationalist histories. The 21st century is unlikely to be another great era of the nation state; instead, new challenges await. To be sure, the nation state is on the retreat, as it cedes sovereignty to larger multinational – arguably imperial – entities, and devolves powers to regional ones. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the European Union, which has progressively downgraded the significance of national borders, a tendency that has had the effect of 'federalizing', or even 'regionalizing' the member states<sup>4</sup>. It has also recognized the presence of regional interests through the creation of the Committee on the Regions, a body with limited powers which has, nonetheless, grown in importance over time.

Member states have also followed the general tendency toward increased 'regionalization'. Following the disasters of the Second World War, politicians from the right

and left saw the need to rethink the foundations of the nation state. Even notoriously 'centralist' countries incorporated regional administrative divisions. France and Italy – which were constructed upon Jacobinist and Bonapartist principles of political and administrative centralization in the 19th century – created regional bodies in 1955 and 1970 respectively. In the postwar period, the republics of Germany, Austria, and Switzerland retained their federal structures. During the past few decades, Spain, Belgium, and the United Kingdom have created regional parliaments with considerable powers. The state of Bosnia is the most highly regionalized political entity in Europe, divided into three zones, each reflective of a dominant ethno-religious majority. In many respects, what political scientists have called 'asymmetrical federalism', is now the rule rather than the exception within Europe<sup>5</sup>. In sum, there is an indisputable tendency toward increasing regionalization. Even though the violence witnessed in places such as Alsace-Lorraine, central Europe, and the Balkans is behind us, recent political developments continue to demand that scholars develop a more theoretically robust response to regional history.

## HISTORIOGRAPHICAL APPROACHES

The historiography of regions is characterized by a central paradox. On the one hand, historians have long regarded the region as an important focus of inquiry. The shelves of libraries, and the hard drives of historians, are filled with numerous monographs, articles and PDF-files whose titles refer to Tuscany, Bavaria, Bohemia, the Midlands, Ulster, Andalusia, Flanders, and Brittany, to name just some of the most well-researched places. The best regional histories use local sources in order to tackle large, comparative questions. If one examines quantity alone, regional history appears to be one of the cornerstones of the profession. On the other hand, regional history is under-theorized. While historians of cities, families, states, and nations have striven to develop a sophisticated theoretical apparatus, regional historians have avoided doing so. One reason for this shortcoming has been that scholars, in order to avoid accusations of parochialism, have waxed apologetic about their endeavors. This was the case of Marc Bloch, one of the founders of regional history in France, who went to great lengths to explain that the history of the nation remained his primary concern. Bloch did not go as far as his mentor, the geographer Paul Vidal de la Blache, who in 1917 published *La France de l'Est*, in which he argued that the scientific principles of human and regional geography mandated the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France<sup>6</sup>. Bloch was not a nationalist but a socialist, concerned with the history of ordinary human beings within the diverse regions of the country. To him, regional historians were 'energetic gardeners' who set the groundwork for answering larger questions. Bloch's *Annales* School made wide-ranging theoretical contributions with respect to geography, demography, environmental, and agrarian and economic history. However, no *Annales* historian developed a robust conceptual framework for regional studies<sup>7</sup>.



Another reason for this under-theorization is that the 'region' is an ambiguous concept<sup>8</sup>. A region can include central polities or dominant entities within a state or larger region (Castile, Île-de-France, the English Pale of Ireland) as well as peripheries and borderlands (southern Slovakia, Friuli, Vojvodina)<sup>9</sup>. A region can be a territory within a state (Provence, the Scottish Highlands), or it can cross state borders (Scandinavia, the Mediterranean, the Baltic, the Balkans, central Europe, the Hanseatic cities)<sup>10</sup>. A region may trace its foundation to a historical principality that has left linguistic, juridical, religious and historic markers and memories (Moravia, Piedmont, Burgundy, Catalonia), or it can be an artificial entity created for administrative purposes (the administrative division of Graz, the autonomous community of Madrid). A region can contain irredentist minorities which appeal to a contiguous state (Transylvania, Kosova, Ulster, South Tyrol) or it can house an ethnic, linguistic, or religious minority within the confines of a larger state (Wales, Scotland). A region can describe a geographically defined territory (the Loire Valley, the Canary Islands), or it can refer to scattered territories which have undergone similar economic or political development (the Celtic Fringe)<sup>11</sup>. A region can be defined by culture, language, history, migration, geography, or other factors. What is more, regional borders are ambiguous, and identifying them depends on a multiplicity of historical approaches and perspectives<sup>12</sup>.

Difficulties of definition should not be an impediment to developing a theoretical framework. All the same, it is clear that an eclectic approach is needed. With regard to historiography, it is possible to identify three distinct methodologies. The first could be described as 'materialist'. This was the method of the *Annales* School, whose co-founder, Marc Bloch, was a pioneer of regional history, as noted above. His first book, *The Ile de France: The Country around Paris* (1913), was a monograph that formed part of Lucien Berr's pathbreaking series, *Les Régions de la France*<sup>13</sup>. Bloch and the next generation of *Annales* practitioners went on to write numerous regional studies that linked human history with the natural environment. These scholars approached France – and all countries – less as a singular, historically transcendent political entity than as a mixture of diverse regions, ethnicities, and geographies. Yet, as mentioned previously, *Annales* historians shied away from developing an explicit theory of regional history, even as they established the region as a primary subject of analysis. Their focus on the importance of human activity – birth, work, reproduction, family, social organization, and death – fit easily into a regional framework where material factors, such as geography and environment, strongly conditioned the lives of people. Although they concentrated their efforts on the Middle Ages and the early modern period, they influenced economic historians and historical sociologists investigating the 19th and 20th centuries who have tended to focus on regional patterns of industrial development and underdevelopment<sup>14</sup>.

A second approach could be described as 'constructivist' in so far as it has placed emphasis on the construction of ethnic, religious, and national identities. This field of

scholarship blossomed out of studies of historical memory, the ‘imagination’ of identities, and the ‘invention’ of traditions, as pioneered in the 1980s by the French historian Pierre Nora, the English social scientists Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner, and the Germano-British historian Eric Hobsbawm<sup>15</sup>. Originally, this school of thought found greatest acceptance in North American universities, where much of the historical profession was under the spell of post-materialist theories, such as cultural anthropology and linguistic and literary studies of narrative and discourse. However, with time, historians in Europe and throughout the world have joined the chorus. Numerous series of monographs and articles now explain how the construction of regional identities has contributed to creating, changing, undermining, and strengthening national ones<sup>16</sup>. Historians of regional identity have focussed on language, popular religious practices and celebrations, monuments, holidays and symbols, folklore, dance, song, and costume, historiography, and everyday political debate. A number of collected volumes have moreover brought together studies from different historical periods<sup>17</sup>. Thus the CLIOHRES Thematic Workgroup Five, which specializes in frontiers and identities, has produced in this regard an impressive volume distinctive for its broad scope and notable theoretical sophistication<sup>18</sup>.

A third approach could be broadly labelled ‘juridical’ and ‘institutional’. By ‘juridical’, we include private, public, civil and ecclesiastical law; ‘institutional’ encompasses both political and religious bodies. One of the places where this brand of regional history has been particularly strong is Italy, where many historians have strong legal training. In particular, early modern historians have challenged models of state-building based on the history of large and well-established states, such as France and Britain. They have conducted research into ‘regional states’ – such as Veneto, Lombardy, Tuscany, and Liguria – formed around large municipalities, some of which were so extensive as to be considered ‘regions’ themselves. Cities gained control over their hinterlands at times through conquest, but usually through brokering new legal arrangements with political elites in other towns or lords in their fiefdoms. In this respect, regional identities, religious practices and economic relations followed, or at least dynamically interacted with, the evolving relations between overlapping civil and ecclesiastical institutions<sup>19</sup>. Such historians do not focus exclusively on juridical and institutional factors, but also discuss economy, geography, religion, and culture. What is more, this approach is not limited to the study of Italy, but is also strong in places such as Germany and other places where state-building involved the retention and modification many regional institutions. As the historical sociologist Charles Tilly has observed, Europe in 1500 included some 500 independent political units, while by 1900 this number had been reduced to around 25. These 500 units did not vanish but were integrated into a variety of states which preserved regional laws and administration<sup>20</sup>. This analysis can be applied to other periods, including Antiquity and the Middle Ages, which also witnessed the expansion and contraction of states and empires.

We do not mean to assert that regional historiography can be neatly packaged into three methodological categories, each reflective of three distinct schools (materialist/French, constructivist/North American, juridical-administrative/Italian). This summary necessarily simplifies these historiographical traditions, which themselves were heterogeneous and multi-disciplinary. Furthermore, it ignores certain other long established schools, such as the Austrian *Landesgeschichte* or the Victorian County History of England. We nevertheless believe that our approach has the advantage of promoting a broad, eclectic theoretical framework. In the rest of this chapter, we incorporate much of the methodology of CLIORHES Thematic Work Group Five, which focuses on borders and identities. However, we complement their perspective with the focus of our own group, Thematic Work Group One, on laws, institutions, and states. To that end we examine five case studies. The first, Catalonia, represents what might be regarded as the dominant type of region in Europe: a medieval principality that became absorbed over time into a larger nation state. The second case study, the Baltic Region, exemplifies those trans-national regions which currently encompass a number of states, united by common geography and history. The third region we examine, Vojvodina, is a borderland with shifting internal boundaries that has experienced the vast migration of a number of different ethnic groups. The fourth, South Tyrol, represents an annexed region in which an ethnic group became converted into an irredentist minority overnight. Finally, the fifth section takes a look at the process of regionalization in contemporary France, in which post-war politicians created regions by legislative fiat based on a mixture of administrative, economic, and historical criteria. These studies obviously do not exhaust all the possible types of regions. Still, they do offer a broad, and roughly chronological, sampling of current approaches to regional history.

## CATALONIA

As is the case with many regions of Europe, Catalonia has had a complex relationship with larger political entities. The territory that roughly corresponds to the north of today's Catalonia – itself located in the northeast corner of Spain – began to emerge as an identifiable political entity within the so-called Spanish March of the Holy Roman Empire. Beginning in the 9th century, the Counts of Barcelona centralized power within of the territory today known as 'Old Catalonia' and gradually severed their feudal ties to the Carolingian monarchy. The 12th to the 15th centuries were years of expansion. In the 12th century, the Counts of Barcelona annexed the Kingdom of Aragon by way of marriage, and conquered Islamic territories to the south and west of Barcelona, today known as 'New Catalonia.' Thereafter what was increasingly known as the Crown of Aragon absorbed through conquest Valencia, the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, Sicily and the kingdom of Naples. In 1479 a dynastic union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile through the marriage of Isabel of Castile with Ferdinand of Aragon gave rise to what would become the composite monarchy of Spain. Given this history, a regional




Fig. 1  
The current autonomous community of Catalonia.

approach to Catalan history is useful since it helps explain the relationship of the territory to larger entities such as the Holy Roman Empire, the Crown of Aragon, the Hispanic Monarchy, and, most recently, the European Union.

For almost a thousand years the importance of Catalonia within these larger political entities has waxed and waned. During the 8th and 9th centuries, the territory was a typical borderland, contested by the Holy Roman Empire and the Islamic Caliphate known as Al-Andalus. Later, at the apex of its political power in the High Middle Ages, Catalonia was the central polity within the Crown of Aragon. In the 15th century, the region entered a period of stagnation brought about by domestic strife and civil war. Following its incorporation into Spain it became one of a number of regions in a vast empire that included numerous territories from Italy and Flanders to Peru and the Philippines. The Catalan Estates twice revolted against the monarchy, and both times came out on the losing side of pan-European conflicts. The Estates voted to leave Spain and join France during the so-called Reapers' War (1640-52), an outgrowth of Europe's Thirty Years' War. During the War of Spanish Succession (1702-14), the Estates reject-

ed the French candidate to the throne, and supported instead the Habsburg pretender, a venture which ended in the military conquest of Catalonia in 1714 and its forcible re-absorption into a newly-unified Spain.

The modern period witnessed a 'rebirth' of Catalonia in Spain and Europe. In the late 19th century, a political movement known as 'Catalanism' began to clamor for home rule. Political activists based this claim on two central arguments. First, like 'nationalists' throughout Europe, they argued that the region continued to house its own language, laws, culture, and history, and hence deserved its own political structure. Second, they contended that Catalonia had become the richest and most industrialized territory within the peninsula and, for this reason, it needed to be governed by a native elite familiar with the tensions and stresses of industrial society rather than by oligarchs of the central state who were chiefly recruited from agrarian milieux. In 1901, the first regionalist political party, the *Lliga Regionalista*, won elections and sent deputies to the Spanish parliament. Shortly thereafter, *Lliga* leaders and other 'Catalanists' embraced the label 'nationalist', even though their goal remained home rule rather than outright separation. Catalonia first achieved a large degree of self-government in 1931 during the Second Republic (1931-36), and, in 1934, the regional government unsuccessfully tried to separate from Spain by issuing an ill-fated declaration of independence. After defeating the Republic in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), the Franco regime (1939-1975) subjected Catalonia to fierce repression, one of whose main features was political, linguistic, and cultural centralization. Since the coming of democracy in 1975, however, Catalonia has obtained substantial, even growing levels of self-government. Its ability to add new powers since the Statute of Autonomy of 1979 has prompted devolution to other regions within an increasingly decentralized Spain. A recent survey suggests that a majority of Catalans are relatively (or perhaps grudgingly) content with Catalonia's status within Spain as an 'autonomous community', the term the current constitution uses to designate regions. The same study shows only 15.7 percent supporting independence<sup>21</sup>.

The historiography of Catalonia reflects all of the tendencies mentioned in the introductory section. The materialist studies of the *Annales* School have had a great influence. This tradition was launched with the French historian Pierre Vilar's monumental *Catalogne dans l'Espagne moderne: Recherches sur les fondements économiques des structures nationales*, first published in Paris in 1962 and later translated into Catalan (1964-1968) and Spanish (1977)<sup>22</sup>. This impressive work contained three volumes covering geography, agriculture, and commerce up to the late 18th century. The British economic historian J.K.J. Thompson later filled in the missing gap on the early phases of industrialization with a monograph that can be read as a complementary fourth volume<sup>23</sup>. Other scholars have carried the narrative forward by explaining how agrarian and commercial revolution provided the impetus to industrialization in the 19th century<sup>24</sup>. Writing at the height of modernization theory, these historians argued that

Catalonia had undergone a distinctive process of development, which demanded that it be analyzed as a single, though by no means insular, region. To Vilar, the rise of modern regionalist and nationalist movements was not only the consequence of deep-rooted linguistic and historic differences. After all, old principalities with dying languages could be found throughout Europe, and not all such places underwent political and linguistic revivals. In his view, the modernization of Catalonia, contrasted with stagnation in the rest of Spain, was the chief reason why the region turned nationalist. Vilar's goal was to trace the origins of the "take-off of a region toward a modern, industrial and bourgeois structure" in order to contribute to discussions concerning "the relationship between 'national' claims and the structure of societies", the 'large question' that this *Annaliste* historian sought to address<sup>25</sup>.

Catalan historiography is also replete with constructivist approaches to identity. As might be expected, these studies have addressed the origins of Catalan nationhood and nationalism. As is the case with similar literature on countries and regions elsewhere in Europe, this field has been marked by fierce debates between those historians who, in accordance with Ernest Gellner's famous maxim, argue that nationalisms made nations, and those who believe that nations made nationalisms<sup>26</sup>. On the one hand, 'primordialist' historians have emphasized that a distinctive sense of Catalan nationhood developed in the Middle Ages and underlay anti-centralist and autonomous political movements from the 17th to the 20th centuries<sup>27</sup>. 'Modernists' on the other hand argue that 'national identity' was a more recent phenomenon, a product of the agonizing experience of modernization and the breakdown of traditional social bonds during the industrial age<sup>28</sup>. Over time a middle ground has emerged. Most historians now agree that Catalan identity has been constructed, reconstructed, and reinvented from medieval times to the present, even if political nationalism is most certainly a modern phenomenon<sup>29</sup>.

It must be noted that these constructivist studies suffer from one serious shortcoming; few scholars have traced the construction of 'Spanish' identity within Catalonia<sup>30</sup>. Recently, a majority of Catalan residents, when responding to a survey, opined that they felt equally Catalan and Spanish<sup>31</sup>. It is impossible to say what the response would have been to a similar questionnaire in previous centuries, but there is no doubt that Spanish identity was on the rise in Catalonia beginning as early as the 16th century. In fact, in the early modern period it was common for Catalans to complain that they were not being sufficiently regarded as 'Spaniards'. As early as 1557, the scholar Cristòfor Despuig regretted that "Castilians enjoy saying publicly that our province is not Spain"<sup>32</sup>. In the 17th century, the jurist Francesc Ferrer expressed his annoyance over this same problem: "They [the Castilians] are not the only Spaniards," he wrote, "We are also Spaniards, and it could be that we deserve the title more"<sup>33</sup>. With time, however, few questioned the 'Spanishness' of the Catalans. This is how the Catalan scholar Antoni de Capmany saw things during the Napoleonic Wars. "What would become

of Spaniards, if there had not been Aragonese, Valencians, Murcians, Asturians, Galicians, Extremadurans, Catalans, Castilians ... Each one of these names shines bright and looms large. These small nations make up the mass of the Great Nation”<sup>34</sup>.

During the 19th and 20th centuries, Spanish identity continued to rise despite the appearance of Catalan regionalism and nationalism. Most Catalan nationalists did not argue that Catalans were not Spaniards, just that they were different from other Spaniards. The presence of such dual, and at times competing, identities often gave rise to low-level political conflict. All the same, these dual identities were just as often mutually reinforcing as antagonistic<sup>35</sup>. In the 20th century, the arrival in the region of millions of Spanish-speaking migrants tipped the linguistic scales to such an extent that there are now more residents who speak Spanish at home than those who speak Catalan<sup>36</sup>. Nowadays, many residents consider both Catalonia and Spain ‘nations’, while others consider Spain a ‘state’ and Catalonia a ‘nation’, while yet others consider Spain a ‘nation’ and Catalonia a ‘region’<sup>37</sup>. In short, a mature regionalist history of the construction of identity would have to incorporate the histories of all these concepts in Catalonia over time. Constructivist studies on the Catalan ‘nation’ have not yet been balanced by analyses of these other identities.

The third area of regionalist historiography consists of juridical and institutional approaches. Public law in Catalonia, like most regions in Europe, was (and remains) extremely complex. The region’s relationship to larger entities, from the Holy Roman Empire, the Crown of Aragon, and Spain, to the European Union, has consisted through the ages of a labyrinth of laws and institutions only fully understood by specialized jurists. The most important of these institutions was the *Generalitat*, the standing body of the three Estates in parliament, which originated in the late Middle Ages and remained functioning until the outset of the 18th century. It is often common to refer to Catalonia as a ‘principality’ – or a ‘former principality’ – since the *Generalitat* governed the *Principat de Catalunya*<sup>38</sup>. Interestingly, no individual held the title Prince, King or Count of Catalonia, since the Counts of Barcelona were the Kings of Aragon. Hence, the region was technically a principality without a titled prince. Of course, this entity was not solely defined by public law. Catalonia was also a geographic place known to be the home of the ‘Catalans’. The term thus also described an ethno-linguistic group, the etymology of which can be traced back to Pisan chronicles in the 11th century. Yet, the definition of what was Catalonia and who were Catalans became juridically circumscribed. The first recorded domestic use of the word ‘Catalonia’ comes from the 1170s, when a clerk at the court of Alphonse I drafted a legal opinion in support of the count-king’s dynastic right to the southern French city of Carcassonne. The clerk wrote that his forebear Ramon Berenguer I had “bequeathed Catalonia to his two sons” in the year 1076<sup>39</sup>. Later, medieval ‘citizenship’ laws determining eligibility for public employment specified who could be considered Catalan. The parliamentary session held in Montblanc in 1333 adopted the *jus soli* and considered anyone a native who was

permanently domiciled in Catalonia or the Balearic Islands. In 1422, *jus sanguinis* was added. A man could also hold public office in Catalonia if either his father or grandfather had been a native<sup>40</sup>.

In addition to public law, private law has also served to define and demarcate the region and its inhabitants. Catalonia possessed (and possesses) its own private law, which, in fact, has proved more durable than its public law. The public laws of Catalonia and the Crown of Aragon were abolished in the early 18th century following the arrival of the Bourbons to the Spanish throne. The so-called New Foundation (1716) implanted absolutist principles in Catalonia, and put an end to representative institutions including the parliament, the *Generalitat*, and municipal governments which included guildsmen and other representatives of the popular classes. However, private law, later known as 'civil law', remained intact. Catalonia – like Aragon, the Balearic Islands, Navarre, Viscaya, and Galicia – preserved its own private laws, which covered a plethora of relationships: legitimacy, adoption, majority, contract, property, marriage, separation, the family economy, inheritance, and the like. The Catalan *Generalitat* published compilations in 1485, 1588, and 1704, all of which contained both private and public laws dating back to the 11th century. During the 19th century, Catalan law underwent a revival. In the mid 1830s, one jurist glossed and ordered the last compilation of Catalan law. (Ironically, in order to make it easily applicable in court, he translated it into Spanish<sup>41</sup>.) Thus a professional literature emerged consisting of treatises and guidebooks designed to facilitate the smooth application of Catalan law in and out of court.

During the 19th century, the preservation of 'native' private law became the subject of a drawn-out political controversy which pitted Catalan politicians and associations against the state. In 1851, the Spanish government attempted to implant a version of the Napoleonic code in Spain, a measure which would have created a uniform law for all Spaniards and would have wiped out all distinctive private law. Catalan jurists, property owners, and politicians led a successful campaign against the draft code. Individuals and associations launched another protest in the 1880s when a project for another Civil Code again threatened Catalonia's legal regime. In the end, the Spanish Civil Code that was finally approved in 1889 preserved the regional diversity of law in Spain. It conserved Catalan private law along with the other distinctive private laws in the country. From this date on, no Spanish political regime ever again attempted to eliminate these bodies of regional private law. In 1959, at the height of Francoism, a commission of regime-appointed jurists wrote an updated compilation of Catalan law. Following Spain's transition to democracy beginning in 1975, the regional government – again known as the *Generalitat* – replaced much of the compilation with a 'family code', an 'inheritance code', and other laws.

At present, the 2006 Catalan Autonomy Statute gives full authority to the autonomous government over all 'civil material'. The *Generalitat* has already passed key parts of a full Catalan Civil Code and the missing parts will soon follow<sup>42</sup>. No democratic govern-



ment in Spain today would dare to try to alter the region's regime of family law and inheritance. In contrast, public legal issues – budgets, public works, education, health and language policy – dominate the airwaves and newspapers. The respective powers of the Spanish state and the Catalan *Generalitat* remain subject to controversy, negotiation, and intra/inter-party agreements. In any event, laws and institutions remain at the forefront of politics. To return to Vilar's question about the relationship between "national claims and the structure of societies", one can conclude that it is necessary to research not only economic change and the construction of identities. It is also imperative to study the persistence and evolution of juridical and institutional forms of regional differentiation and sociability.

## THE BALTIC REGION

The Baltic represents a very different type of region than Catalonia, but one that is quite common in Europe. The 'Baltic' – like the 'Balkans', the 'Mediterranean', or 'Scandinavia' – refers to a geographical entity which has been home to various ethno-linguistic groups, which have formed part of different empires and which currently houses a number of independent nation-states. Following the emergence of the Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the aftermath of the First World War, the 'Baltic Region' came to refer to the three states on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea. Historians, for their part, have usually restricted the pre-World War I Baltic region to today's Estonia and Latvia. This perspective originates from the 19th-century (Baltic) German discourse, which confined the denotation of this term to the provinces of Estland, Livland and Kurland on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea, thus excluding what is now Lithuania. In any case, the term 'Baltic Region' is ambiguous, as the changing meaning of this designation over time suggests<sup>43</sup>.

Despite the obvious importance of geography to the definition and demarcation of the Baltic, the study of this region provides another example of just how important political, religious, and administrative approaches are for regional history. The origins of the Baltic region – the early modern and modern provinces of Estland, Livland and Kurland – are in themselves political. In the early 13th century, this territory became the target of a Danish-German crusade. It was mainly inhabited by the ancestors of Estonians and Latvians, including the Livonians, Latgallians, Kurshes, Selonians and Semigallians, peoples of diverse ethno-linguistic origins. The political outcome of the crusade was the formation of the Livonian Confederation, a loose union of four Roman Catholic bishoprics and the territory of the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order. The early modern history of the territory initially saw the disintegration of this loose religious-political union. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the various components of this 'Baltic region' were under the suzerainty of a number of larger states. The Livonian Confederation disappeared from the political map during the second half of the 16th century as a result of a series of wars fought among Sweden, Denmark, Poland-Lithua-




Fig. 2  
Estland, Livland and Kurland in the 17th century.

nia and Russia. In its place, a number of new political units emerged. The southern area of the former Confederation – the autonomous Duchy of Kurland and the territory of Pilten – came under the protectorate of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Between 1561 and 1645 all the rest of the former Confederation area – the Duchies of Estland and Livland and the province of Ösel – likewise came under Swedish supremacy. In addition, the cities of Tallinn (Reval) and Riga formed separate political units. In the 18th century, the ‘region’ again fell under the sway of a single imperial power. In the course of the Great Northern War (1700-1721), Estland, Livland and Ösel became

parts of the expanding Russian empire. Russia then annexed Kurland and Pilten during the Third Partition of Poland in 1795<sup>44</sup>.

The 20th century culminated in the definitive emergence of independent nation states following a half-century of harsh Soviet occupation, governance, and repression. But before that, during the last phase of the First World War, representatives of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians declared themselves to be three independent states. At the same time, the Baltic German *Ritterschaften* (the corporations of local noble landlords) tried to create a new state within the territory of the former provinces of Estland, Livland and Kurland. They proposed that the United Baltic Duchy (*Vereinigtes Baltisches Herzogtum*) should be a German-dominated state under the supremacy of the German Kaiser. However, in the wars of independence between 1918 and 1920 – fought predominantly against Bolshevik Russia but also against German troops – Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians laid the foundations of their national states. Following the wars of independence, all major European states recognized the newly born democratic republics<sup>45</sup>. This period of independence came to an end after the conclusion of the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 23 August 1939. The Nazis and Soviets occupied Poland in September, and in October, Soviet troops entered Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In June 1940, as Paris fell to Nazi Germany, the Soviets completed the military occupation of the three Baltic republics. As is well known, this occupation lasted until 1991. The Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians managed to defy the Soviet regime and, shaking off five decades of national repression, restored their independent republics<sup>46</sup>.

In order to understand the concept of *region* within this story, it is helpful to examine the institutional and legal aspects. As a starting point, it must be noted that both the 17th-century Swedish kingdom and the Russian Tsarist Empire were conglomerate states. Each consisted of various regions with different legal relations to the central government, located in the core area of the state. Under the Swedish as well as under the Russian crown, the political units on Baltic soil were formed, and were regarded as, distinct regions. The different political units of these regions, although displaying important differences, were similar in so far as they were relatively autonomous. The administrative and legal system of each political unit was largely based on the local tradition of governance and justice, much of which dated back to the Middle Ages. The language of administration was uniformly German. Until the second half of the 19th century, the *Ritterschaften* usually dominated home affairs. In the towns of Tallinn and Riga, the city council was the most important political unit. Under both Swedish and Russian rule, administrative power was divided between the state-run provincial government and the local self-administrating bodies of the Estates. During Swedish rule the noble Estate of the Duchy of Estland, as well as the burghers of Tallinn and Riga, enjoyed broader privileges than did the Estates of the Duchy of Livland and the province of Ösel. This was because the former territories had surrendered voluntarily to the Swedish king, while the latter ones had to be conquered. The implementation of

absolutist governance in the Swedish state at the beginning of the 1680s severely constrained the administrative autonomy of Livland and Ösel<sup>47</sup>. As Russian supremacy was established in Estland and Livland, the privileges of the higher Estates were restored and confirmed by the Tsar. When Kurland was incorporated into the Russian Empire the monarch confirmed the nobles' privileges. The contemporary Baltic Germans coined the notion *baltischer Landesstaat* (Baltic provincial state) to stress the autonomous nature of the Baltic provinces under foreign rule. It should be noted that during the 19th century, Russian governors put an end to their policy of tolerance toward such autonomy. The modern unitary nation state became the new ideal. A series of reform attempts aimed to administratively and culturally unify the Baltic region with Russia proper. This policy – famously known as 'Russification' – culminated in the 1880s and 1890s and greatly reduced the autonomy of the Baltic provinces. All the same, it did not achieve the desired level of unification and the Baltic provinces retained some degree of autonomy<sup>48</sup>.

In addition to political and administrative structures, religion has been the key to determining Baltic 'regionality'. As early as the 1520s, the Lutheran Reformation reached the major towns of the Livonian Confederation. However, only under Lutheran political supremacy could the new Protestant confession be fully implemented in the region. The Duke of Kurland enforced a new Lutheran church law in his territory in the 1570s. After the Uppsala Assembly of 1593 orthodox Lutheranism, based on the original Augsburg Confession, was strictly observed, established religion of the Swedish state. It was declared the official faith in the provinces of Estland, Livland and Ösel. Lutheranism continued to characterize the region even during the period of Tsarist domination. Within the Russian Empire, Russian Orthodoxy served as the established religion of the tsars and of Russia proper. For the Europeans of western Christianity, the presence of the Russian Orthodox Church was one of the major factors dividing 'us' and 'them' during medieval and early modern times. Furthermore, the Europeans had always considered 'them' to be alien and hostile. In contrast to the Swedish kings, the Russian tsars did not adhere to the policy of religious unity throughout the empire. Beginning with the efforts of Peter I to westernise Russia, all foreigners settling in the Russian state were guaranteed religious freedom<sup>49</sup>. Similarly in the 18th century the tsars did not try to force their own religion on the newly acquired regions like the Baltic. The absolute dominance of Lutheranism in the Baltic region ended with conversion movements during the second half of the 1840s which brought just under one fifth of the Estonian and Latvian peasantry in the province of Livland into the Russian Orthodox confession. For the first time a Russian influence entered the Baltic society on a wide scale. The reasons for the conversion turned out to be mostly social and economic.

Another contributing factor to Baltic regionalism was the presence of a specific ethno-linguistic group which dominated political, cultural, and religious matters in the territories until the end of the 19th century. The Baltic-German elite never consisted of

more than five per cent of society, but its influence was inversely proportional to its numbers. The most influential subgroups were the members of the *Ritterschaften* or the noble landlords, the Lutheran clergy and the burghers of towns. In the 19th century another social group appeared, the so-called literati (*die Literaten* in German), which denoted the academically educated. The Baltic Germans played an extremely important role in the higher bureaucracy of the Russian Empire, in its diplomatic corps as well as in its military leadership; thus they were able to influence the policy of the Tsars regarding the Baltic provinces. In contrast, most of the population of the Baltic region was made up of Estonians and Latvians, diverse ethno-linguistic groups of peasants and lower strata of townspeople. Moving up the social ladder was very complicated for Estonians and Latvians until the latter part of the 19th century, when major modernisation occurred in the Baltic region. Urbanisation and industrialisation started to reshape the economic and social outlook of the previously overwhelmingly agrarian society. The movements of national awakening among Estonians and Latvians created a desire to build independent nations. The late 19th and early 20th centuries witnessed growing diversification within both Estonian and Latvian societies.

The dominance of a German elite minority, then, fortified a sense of Baltic autonomy without destroying the ethnic and linguistic bonds that would later serve as the basis for nationalist movements. In the form of the *baltischer Landesstaat*, the Baltic region remained, even under Russian supremacy, a part of the German cultural sphere and, more generally speaking, part of western Christian civilization. Thanks to the autonomy of the Baltic-German Estates, Russian peasants did not migrate in large numbers to this region, which would have threatened the very existence of Estonian and Latvian nations<sup>50</sup>. The autonomy of the Baltic-German Estates formed a kind of defensive shield against Russian influence. The *Landesstaat* was not a favorable solution for Estonians and Latvians, but it protected them from worse, especially since the Baltic-German elite never tried to carry out a deliberate Germanisation of local ethnic groups.

It must be emphasized, however, that a sense of 'regional identity' was in many respects solely the province of the German elite. Until the appearance of national movements during the second half of the 19th century, Estonians and Latvians expressed 'identities' that were limited geographically to the borders of the parish and the district. The national movements widened their perspective to the level of the nation, but not beyond it. Thus Baltic regional identity in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries can be associated with Baltic-German society only. In other words, the Baltic regional identity of this period formed one layer among the Baltic-German identities. According to Baltic-German authors of the 19th and 20th centuries, Baltic regional identity within the Russian Empire was founded on two main pillars: the German language, mentality and culture, often conveyed by the German notion *Deutschtum*; and the Lutheran confession, which was also a very strong symbol of German culture. The role of religion in Baltic-German identity increased dramatically after the establishment of Russian

supremacy<sup>51</sup>. In this respect, the emergence of nationalist movements threatened the existence of a common Baltic regional identity. The provinces of Estland, Livland and Kurland could exist within the institutional and legal framework of foreign powers only until the local indigenous nations were able to assert their identity and establish their own national states. It is not possible to identify among the population of the republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania a strong and well-articulated feeling of common Baltic identity before or after the Second World War.

Still, a common historical experience – that of occupation followed by independence – has stirred some loose notions of identity among the Baltic peoples. Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians found common cause during the struggle for independence from the Soviets in the late 1980s. The most powerful manifestation of this united effort was the so-called Baltic Way. On 23 August 1989, a human chain of over 600 kilometres was formed across Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by about 2 million people to mark the 50th anniversary of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, which divided eastern and northern Europe into spheres of influence between Nazi Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union. It would seem that threats to nationhood can indeed bring into being a transnational sense of regionality.

## VOJVODINA

Vojvodina represents another common regional model in Europe, namely that of a borderland. This area has traditionally found itself caught between two empires (Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian) and two states (Hungary/Byzantium, Yugoslavia/Serbia and Hungary). As a result of having experienced various waves of migration, it is one of the most ethnically plural regions in Europe. Today, it forms the northern part of the Republic of Serbia. Occupying 21,506 km<sup>2</sup> its 2,031,992 inhabitants represented slightly more than a fourth of the population of Serbia in 2002. Vojvodina as a whole is composed of 65% Serbians, 14.3% Hungarians, 2.8% Slovaks, 2.8% Croats, 2.45% self-declared Yugoslavs, 1.75% Montenegrins, 1.5% Rumanians, 1.41% Gypsies, and 1% Bunjevacs. There are also smaller numbers of Ukrainians, Sokacs, Germans, Macedonians, Albanians, Slovenes and others<sup>52</sup>. Its topography is mostly flat plain, with two mountains (*Vršacki breg*, 641m and *Fruška Gora*, 539m) and three main rivers (Danube, Tisa and Sava). Its territory is divided into three geographical-historical sub-regions: Bačka, Banat and Srem.

The multi-cultural nature of the region is evident in the proposed text of the new Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (2008), which defines its legal status as follows:

Vojvodina is an autonomous province of citizens ... an integral part of Serbia, established on the basis of specific national, historic, cultural and other characteristics; it is a multinational, multicultural and multi-confessional European region. Vojvodina represents an integral part of the unique cultural, economic and geographic space of central Europe<sup>53</sup>.

This formulation is widely cited in relation to the present-day political turmoil in Serbian politics. The ratification of the Statute by the Parliament of Serbia has led to controversy because of the wording that strongly stresses its 'European' rather than 'Serbian' identity. Beside this phrase, the most disputed clauses regard the legal status of Vojvodina, its degree of self governance, and the extent of jurisdiction of regional administration. To be sure, at the core of this dispute is the issue of whether Vojvodina can be regarded as a special region. Two questions are involved here. First, should it have an autonomous status of its own, or should it be treated only as one of the administrative regions of Serbia with strictly limited autonomy? And if Vojvodina is a 'real' region, what in particular determines its identity? The answers to these questions are extremely important to Serbian politics today. Naturally, both the supporters and the opponents of the idea of substantial autonomy for Vojvodina refer to history. Yet, the definition of territorial, ethnic, cultural and political identity is a hard and demanding task. All of these 'identities' are closely interdependent and if we try to analyze them in historical perspective things become predictably complicated thanks to this territory's long history of changing state formations, identities and even civilisations. Now as before, multiple and overlapping identities characterise Vojvodina.

From the point of view of constitutional law the territories of today's Vojvodina belonged mostly to the Hungarian state from its foundation up to 1918-1920, excepting the period of 1521-1699, when it was annexed to the Ottoman Empire. Vojvodina was an integral part of Hungarian county-system (Bács-Bodrog, Torontál, Temes, Krassó-Szörény and Szerém), but none of the counties included the whole of the presentday region. In fact, until 1848-1849 this area had never existed as a single administrative unit.

As such, from a strictly administrative perspective, the territory of Vojvodina does not have deep roots, at least when compared to other European regions. Even its name (Vojvodina means 'duchy' or 'dukedom') is relatively new, in that it was first used some 160 years ago. With respect to geography, Vojvodina is distinguished from much of Serbia due to the fact that it is characterized by long and flat plains, which contrast with the mountains for which the Balkans are famed. Even so, it is hard to carve out a geographically defined region with identifiable borders. Hence the tendency to delimit the area by joining together the historic sub regions (Bačka, Banat and Srem) which do have firm geographic borders, as well as topographical and economical particularities.

It is worth dwelling on these sub-regions, since each could make a greater claim to 'regional' status than Vojvodina as a whole. Each has its own distinctive economic and communication orientation. Banat, bordered on three sides by the Maros, Tisa and Danube rivers, and open to Transylvania in the east, has always had intense economic relations with the latter. In fact, 2/3 of its territory, together with Transylvania, became part of Rumania in 1920. Srem, bordered by the Danube and Sava rivers, and open toward the west, has traditionally enjoyed close relations with Slavonia. Because of this close historical link, the Viennese court did not reintegrate it into the state ter-

territories of Hungary after the liberation of this area from Ottoman rule, but added it to Croatia. The sub-region of Bačka gravitated mostly toward Budapest in terms of its economy, communications, demography and politics. Because of these differences between the three sub-regions, the territories of today's Vojvodina have never been part of an integrated economic area with a single predominant industrial or trading centre. In addition to the five county seats (Sombor, Vukovar, Nagybecskerek, Timișoara and Lugoj), there exist a number of significant urban commercial centres, such as Baja, Novi Sad, Subotica, Vršac and Reșița. In short, Vojvodina is far from centralized, and each of its sub-regions has strong historical ties to other countries and regions – Transylvania, Slavonia, Croatia, and Hungary – in addition to Serbia.

If we expand our analysis from the sub-regions to central and southeastern Europe as a whole, Vojvodina first appears in history as a predominantly agricultural region that formed an integral economic part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was connected to the markets of Baja, Budapest or Vienna by the Tisa and Danube rivers as well as the Franz I and Franz Joseph canals, and in the 19th century by railway. Grain, livestock, wine and other agricultural products from Vojvodina was well known and appreciated throughout the Monarchy and even beyond. Products and merchants from Vojvodina played a significant role also in the transit trade with the Balkans, and most of all with Serbia. Not surprisingly, the second half of the 19th century witnessed the rapid development of agricultural processing and industrial milling. Textile, electrical, building, chemical and engine-building industries, as well as banking, had their beginnings in the same period. The relatively developed and solid economy of Vojvodina, Croatia and the Slovene territories became the driving force of industry and finance in the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, which was proclaimed on 1 December 1918<sup>54</sup>.

The territory of Vojvodina, taken as a whole, has favourable transport conditions. The Danube, Sava, Tisa and Muris rivers connect it on all sides, respectively toward Croatia, Slovenia and the Alps; Belgrade and the Balkans; Transylvania and the Carpathian mountains; and at last but not least toward central and eastern Europe via Budapest, Vienna, and Prague. This openness had important consequences in terms of trade, strategic considerations, and cultural influences/affiliations. The region's borders not only straddled those of nearby states, but also the borders between differing cultural areas: the Roman Empire vs 'barbaricum', Latin vs Greek linguistic domains, and the Balkans vs Middle Europe.

The economic, geographical, and administrative historical attributes of Vojvodina suggest only loose ties with 'regionalism'. However, if we move on toward ethnic questions, a different picture appears. At the beginning of Vojvodina's history, the presence of diverse peoples was important only from a demographic, and not a political point of view. In the 19th century, however, Vojvodina acquired 'ethnic' attributes linked to wider European constellations of power. These were decisive for the destiny of the



area in terms of its state affiliation and its prospects of being recognized as a region. In short, Vojvodina roughly came to correspond to those lands in southern Hungary with a substantial Serbian population. Conversely, when it was absorbed into Yugoslavia, it proved distinctive in that it was a part of Serbia with not only a different geography and historical experience, but also a substantial Hungarian and German minority along with various other smaller ethnic groups. Retracing this ethnic composition leads on back to the battle of Kosovo in 1389 and the Ottoman conquest of what remained of the Second Bulgarian Empire in 1396. As a result, the southern parts of Hungary, including Vojvodina, became direct neighbours of the Ottoman Empire. In the next century and a half southern Hungary became the target of Ottoman attacks and received numerous refugees, mostly Serbians. In contrast with the other parts of Hungary, the region experienced important changes including the prolonged devastation of economy and manpower, immigration of peoples of other faiths and ways of life, and an exposure to military risk that required substantial construction of defensive works on the borders with the Ottoman Empire. Immigration increased following the decisive victory of the Turkish army over Hungary at Mohács in 1526; in fact, the influx of new migrants became one of the major features of this area for the next four centuries. Until the mid-15th century, the Serbian population of the territories of Srem, Bačka and Banat grew, while the Hungarians slowly migrated north. The ever-larger number of Serbs in southern Hungary led the Hungarian kings to issue laws granting them certain religious privileges<sup>55</sup>.

Ottoman military successes endangered the legal status of Serbs in southern Hungary, who reacted by creating their own military force and political structures which briefly took the form of a self-proclaimed Serbian Empire (1527-1528). Beginning in the mid-16th century the Serbs won recognition within the Ottoman Empire as members of the Greek millet or religious minority, subject in spiritual and certain civil matters to the Orthodox Patriarchs in Constantinople and Peć<sup>56</sup>. The end of Ottoman rule in Hungary (1699/1718) and the 'Great migration of Serbs' to the Kingdom of Hungary (1690) posed new challenges to the legal status of Serbs. They turned for a solution to the ecclesiastical and cultural autonomy ceded by the emperor Leopold I, and the establishment of a Serbian autonomous territory in Hungary. For their part, the Hungarians offered Serbs citizenship with the same rights and duties as the rest of population but refused to recognize their special privileges. Finally, the Viennese court looked to Serbian military service not only as a cheap way to maintain its army, but also as a means of keeping the Serbs and Hungarians politically disunited.

This situation led Serbian politicians and monasteries to demand formal territorial autonomy. During the 1848 revolution Serbs within the Habsburg monarchy proclaimed a new political entity, 'Serbian Vojvodina', which incorporated parts of southern Hungary, Croatia, and the Military Border. The Hungarian government's refusal to countenance what it saw as separatism led to a bloody civil war. In November 1849, fol-



Fig. 3  
The Territory of AP Vojvodina and its three historical-administrative sub-regions.

Following the suppression of the Hungarian revolt, emperor Franz Joseph 'granted' the Serbs a territory larger than they had demanded, which led to their being outnumbered by other ethnic communities. This duchy, considerably larger than Vojvodina today, lasted only for a decade. Following its abolition, it was split up and reincorporated in Hungary in December 1860. The concept of territorial autonomy remained but shortly thereafter it gave way to a different political strategy. Thereafter the term Vojvodina was rarely used except by Serbs. In fact, at the risk of over-simplifying, one might say that until 1918-1920 'Vojvodina' as a region survived only within the framework of Serbian national discourse.

To summarize, the idea of an autonomous region of 'Vojvodina' had its origins in Serbian political thought and the new political, demographic and cultural circumstances and opportunities which emerged beginning in the early 16th century. At the same time, Serbian demands for the establishment of political and territorial autonomy within the

Habsburg Empire and Hungary can be seen as one of the focal points (alongside Montenegro and the Pashalic of Belgrade) of the nationalist demand for the reestablishment of statehood and the union of Serbs in a single Serbian state. It would be wrong to identify Serbian political aspirations as the sole factor to have caused Vojvodina to develop into a particular region. However, Serbian ethnicity and culture strongly marked the southern parts of the territory of today's Vojvodina, even if under the Austro-Hungarian aegis, people did not see this territory as a region but as an integral part of the Empire, albeit one endowed with certain specific features.

Despite such Serbian political aspirations, it must once again be stressed that Vojvodina has traditionally been a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional area. Until very recently, linguistic, cultural or religious homogeneity could not have served as the basis for 'region-building'. Throughout history Vojvodina has been characterized instead by multiethnicity and multiculturalism (strongly interdependent qualities, yet far from the same thing). Over the long haul this part of Pannonia was unusually open to migrations. During the last five centuries (not to mention the ancient and medieval periods), the ethnic structure of the region changed dramatically. One especially important factor was Ottoman rule, which saw the complete transformation of the demographic and ethnic structures inherited from the Middle Ages. Moreover, by the end of this epoch (1699), the territory of Vojvodina had lost much of its population. Efforts at re-colonisation took place mostly during the 18th century<sup>57</sup>. Yet the most dramatic migrations occurred in the aftermath of the Second World War and during the recent dissolution of Yugoslavia. About one third/half of the inhabitants of Vojvodina now are first, second or third generation 'newcomers'. Over the course of time, some ethnic groups decreased in number and even disappeared. Such was the case of the Germans, for example, who were very numerous and contributed fundamentally to the regional multi-ethnic 'flavour'. As this example suggests, one crucial aspect of the area's multi-ethnicity over time has been its variability.

Cultural identity is one of the fundamental issues that Vojvodina now faces. First, if we consider culture in the broad sense, this territory includes people of different traditions, mentalities and habits. While certain differences remain obvious, one could nevertheless say that the region's common way of life does not much differ from that found in neighbouring parts of middle and eastern Europe. But if we focus on achievements in intellectual life, including education and the arts, then a more complex assessment is needed. For all ethnic groups except the Serbs, Vojvodina was regarded as peripheral to their cultural and political life. Hungarians simply treated this territory as any other province of their state. Germans, Slovaks, Ruthenians and Rumanians recognized themselves as enclaves, given that their distance from their native countries and urban centres. Another decisive development was the so-called Great Migration of 1690, when almost the whole national elite left historic Serbia to settle in southern Hungary. Today's Vojvodina became, for the next century and a half, the centre of Serbian cultural




Fig. 4  
Ethnic structure of territories of today's Vojvodina in 1910<sup>59</sup>.

and political life. Moreover, Serbian national institutions and society were 'westernized' during the 18th century. While after a Serbian revolution in 1804 the political centre shifted again, this time southward, the cultural and educational centre of Serbia remained for the next half century in Vojvodina. This is the main reason that the history of Vojvodina is treated by other ethnic groups as 'local'. The other side of this history is that Serbs fully regarded the region as a fundamental part of the national past. This is one of the main reasons that the history of Vojvodina is now quite 'Serbocentric'<sup>58</sup>.

Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia absorbed Vojvodina after 1918. However, it was not until after the Second World War that its current borders were fixed and the whole of its territory was, for first time, united in a single administrative unit, as an autonomous province and constituent part of Serbia within the broader Yugoslavian federation – an entity which had clear roots in the earlier Kingdom of Serbians, Croats and Slovenians. Vojvodina explicitly differed from the rest of the Serbian territories in many ways. In terms of geography, as noted above, Vojvodina consists of 'boring' flatlands and openness, compared to the rugged topography of Serbia proper<sup>60</sup>. Its longstanding legal, economic and fiscal systems were also different, as was its very distinct ethnic structure, which Germans, Hungarians, Rumanians and other non-Slavs outnumbered the Serbs and other Slavs taken together. And its cultural distinctiveness is based upon its middle-European (as opposed to Balkan) affinities<sup>61</sup>.

Another way of defining Vojvodina as a region is to distinguish it not only from the other territories of the Kingdom of Serbia, but also from the other annexed territories of Austro-Hungary, some of which had centuries-long traditions of statehood or territorial self-governance. In that sense, the Serbian monarchy faced a complex and hardly solvable problem of establishing an adequate political system for the emerging Yugoslav state. Mostly due to internal political considerations, the court decided to impose a centralist political framework. In the case of Vojvodina this meant that its new regional character was not matched by any substantial autonomy, which in the long run created political tensions. The establishment of political parties led to new efforts to achieve greater representation within the political system.

After a short period of euphoria Serbs from Vojvodina became aware of the differences in mentality and habits between themselves and Serbs from other parts of the country. Centuries of living in different polities had taken its toll. They considered themselves the victims of neglect and claimed that the best positions in the civil service were given to 'newcomers'. Some of them felt nostalgia for a golden age when 'Austrian Serbs' played a leading role in the Serbian nation. One can see a bit of snobbery, and even arrogance, in their stressing that they descended from a 'higher' middle-European culture. This was not calculated to please members of other ethnic groups: while the Hungarians mourned their lost national state, others idealized their earlier life in the enlightened and reliable Austro-Hungarian empire under Franz Joseph. That Vojvodina was one of the most economically developed and richest regions led its politicians to argue bitterly that the region was subject to heavy exploitation by the rest of the country. These accusations led to many bitter political disputes in the interwar period, which wound up being absorbed in local historiography.

In a self-proclaimed effort to break with the complex problems of the past and to take into account the particularities of local history, ethnic structure, and cultural distinctiveness, the communist government of Yugoslavia awarded territorial autonomy to Vojvodina in the aftermath of the Second World War. This act relaxed tensions and paved the way for further economic, cultural, industrial and urban development of Vojvodina within a multi-cultural atmosphere of ethnic tolerance firmly supported by the Socialist Party. The new constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 1974 made further changes crucial to the destiny of the 'Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina'. Its being granted autonomy almost equivalent to that of a federal republic led to a strong reaction on the part of Serbian centralists, who argued that such measures would lead to the disintegration of Serbia. Beginning in 1988 the nationalist wing of the Serbian Socialist Party has withdrawn most of Vojvodina's autonomous prerogatives. Meanwhile, other factors undermined its status as a region during the postwar period. These include immigration from lesser developed areas of Serbia and former Yugoslavia (more than half-million Serbian and Montenegrin immigrants arrived from 1945 to 1999), and the forced emigration of some 300,000 German inhabitants of Vojvodina at the end of the Second World War, followed by the more than 30,000

Hungarians and Croats who emigrated after 1990. These migrations altered the ethnic balance substantially in favour of the Serbs. Nationalist policies after the First World War and socialist revolution after 1945 had already weakened the social roots of a civil society that had prided itself on its middle-European culture and mentality<sup>62</sup>. Now new international relations combined with these migratory processes to the same effect.

The dilemma introduced at the beginning of this section still holds: do the different historical development, national structures, specific culture(s) and geographical-economical particularities of Vojvodina carry enough weight to justify its being regarded as a distinct region in Serbia? Do they together warrant awarding a broader scope of autonomy than that of a middling administrative unit? Naturally, the answers differ depending on one's social, national or party affiliations and preferences. Emotional and over-heated rhetoric often takes precedence over the sort of broad-ranging, multilayered and serious analysis that a more scientific answer requires. It may help to reformulate our question in a different direction. Does Vojvodina exist as a distinct region with sufficiently specific and defining features to merit an equally specific political structure? Or has it lost its special characteristics, and subsists only as a political construct without real roots in its earlier past? Or, better yet, does posing this problem in these terms simply add up to yet another attempt at mass manipulation within the endless infighting of political parties?

## SOUTH TYROL

South Tyrol represents another regional model. On one level, it is like Vojvodina in that it was created as a result of World War I as part of the redrawing of borders in Europe pursuant to the Treaty of Versailles and subsequent agreements. On another level, it represents a case nearly opposite to that of Vojvodina. Faithful to the principles of national self-determination, the Versailles settlement attached Vojvodina to Yugoslavia, since the majority of the region's inhabitants were Serbian. In the case of South Tyrol, however, the post-war settlement attached Southern Tyrol to Italy, even though the vast majority of its inhabitants were Austrian and preferred to remain part of Austria. The case of South Tyrol, then, represents an instance of a region (or a strategic enclave) which was annexed outright by a neighbouring country, converting practically all of its inhabitants overnight into an irredentist minority. Throughout its problematic history, it has been subject first to intense policies of ethnic cleansing by Mussolini, then to the geo-political machinations of Hitler, and finally to aggressive, post-war, Italian state-building. Yet even though its history is ridden with conflict, the region today is a place where tensions have been successfully quelled via negotiation. In fact, its exemplary levels of autonomy serve as a model for other regions in the world where violence remains unresolved. And from a methodological perspective, it provides clear proof that political and administrative divisions, demarcations, and solutions have served to change and shape regional identities.




Fig. 5  
Location of South Tyrol.

South Tyrol, a small region located between the Brenner Pass and the chasm of Salurn, is situated at the intersection of Italian and German-speaking cultural areas. It has an eventful history which has captivated politicians and diplomats, historians, sociologists, jurists and others for decades. The growth of nationalism in the 19th century led to violent conflicts between the Italian and German-speaking ethnic groups in the decades before the First World War and the subsequent cession of South Tyrol to Italy. The war also transformed the region into a bitterly contested front-line area. By separating South Tyrol from Austria the Paris peace treaties created new causes for conflict for future generations. Mussolini and Hitler tried to resolve the South Tyrol Question in their typically ruthless way. The Second World War permitted, after an Italian about-face, a short-term 'Tyrolean reunification'; and afterwards, South Tyrol became one of the first victims of the emerging Cold War. The difficult negotiations over regional autonomy were accompanied by bombs and terror attacks, the Austrian invocation of the UN General Assembly, and further decade-long negotiations. Austria and Italy finally reached a settlement in 1992, which has assured a level of autonomy which is regarded as a role model for resolving minority conflicts.

The Autonomous Province of Bozen-South Tyrol (*Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano-Alto Adige/Autonome Provinz Bozen-Südtirol*), as the region is officially called today, is about 7,400 km<sup>2</sup> large. In 1918, when Italian troops occupied the region, it was almost totally German-speaking, and overnight its inhabitants were converted into an oppressed minority within Italy. However, from the 1970s South Tyrol experienced an

impressive economic boom and dynamic modernization. Due to a secure Autonomy Statute the half-million South Tyroleans today could be said to be ‘masters of their own house’. The positive development of their region is a fact of which they are quite proud. Close relations with Austria, which has long supported South Tyrol on a European and international level, is one reason for the success. The other is the dynamic process of European unification, which has added a new dimension to the protection of minorities.

While the ‘south’ part of Tyrol is a recent creation, Tyrol itself is not. The name Tirol (Tyrol) has, since the 12th century, referred to a small area around today’s *Dorf Tirol* (Village Tyrol) including the neighbouring *Schloss Tirol* (Castle Tyrol) whose owners refer to themselves as the *Grafen von Tirol* (Counts of Tyrol). Thereafter, the name was converted into a synonym for the entire area. Over time its domain expanded, so much so that references to a specific Tyrolean identity can be dated to the 15th century. Up until the 19th century Tyrol existed as a compact entity incorporated as an Austrian Crown Land<sup>63</sup>. The Crown Lands (*Kronländer*) were different regions or sub-areas of the Habsburg Empire, each with their own historical, political and judicial peculiarities.

The Austrian Crown land Tyrol stretched from Kufstein in the north to Lake Garda in the south and comprised three different ethnic, or rather linguistic groups, based on three mother tongues: German, Italian and Ladin. This ethno-linguistic mix posed no serious problems until the 19th century, but in the ‘Age of National Awakening’ the trilingual Crown land of Tyrol had to cope with an increasing number of nationalist conflicts. Ever more violent clashes between German and Italian-speaking ethnic groups transformed what had long been a peaceful atmosphere into a hostile one. Within this conflict, the smallest but oldest ethnic group in Tyrol, the Ladins, usually sided with the German-speaking population<sup>64</sup>. The neighbouring Kingdom of Italy contributed to fomenting this tense situation, given that many Italians still considered their own national territory incomplete due to its failure to include Italian-speakers located beyond its existing borders. The Italian-inhabited territories of the Habsburg Empire, which were the coastal area around Trieste as well as the Italian part of Tyrol (Trentino), were the main foci of Italian irredentism<sup>65</sup>. Thus irredentism became a “thorn within a long time acceptable relation between the German- and Italian-speaking Tyroleans”<sup>66</sup>. Far-reaching autonomy for the Italian population of Tyrol – a promising opportunity to keep ethnic conflicts under control – had been rejected by the provincial government in Innsbruck and by the central government in Vienna, which feared that it would set a precedent with unpredictable consequences for the multi-ethnic Habsburg empire. As a tense situation worsened the First World War broke out, and led to the beginning of the end of a unified Tyrol.

At the outbreak of the war in 1914 Italy was allied with the Austro-Hungarian and German Empires as part of the Triple Alliance. However, it had also signed secret pacts with France and Russia. When hostilities began Rome thus declared its neutrality and



started secret negotiations with the Entente and the Central Powers about whether to enter into war or to remain neutral. In the end the Entente submitted the better offer for Italy, at the expense of Austria-Hungary, which was slated to lose not only the Italian part of Tyrol (Trentino), but also the German-speaking South Tyrol up to the watershed at the strategically important Brenner Pass. These concessions were formalized by the Treaty of London, signed on 26 April 1915 by Italy, Great Britain, France and Russia<sup>67</sup>. Four weeks later, on 23 May 1915, Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary. This decision converted Tyrol into one of the most hard-fought-over areas of the Great War. Despite their significant numerical superiority, the Italians failed to break through the enemy lines, which remained largely unchanged until the end of the war in November 1918 when the Austro-Hungarian Empire finally collapsed. An armistice was signed near Padua, at the Villa Giusti, on 3 November 1918. Italian troops occupied the entire Austrian Crownland of Tyrol, and the victorious powers started to work on stabilizing the post-war order.

On 10 September 1919 Austria signed the Treaty of St.-Germain-en-Laye, which sealed the final division of Tyrol. The Treaty of London had located the division at the Brenner Pass for strategic reasons. Closer adherence to the concept of self-determination promoted in the Fourteen Points of US President Woodrow Wilson would have placed the border at the ethnic or language divide at the Chasm of Salurn<sup>68</sup>. The consequence was that outside the basically Italian-speaking area of Trentino, only about 3% of the new province's population was Italian<sup>69</sup>. This created a situation of violent conflict within the new borders of the Italian Kingdom because Rome had to deal henceforward with a hostile minority of more than 200,000 German- and Ladin-speaking people. Thus began the so-called South Tyrol Question between Italy and Austria, which considered South Tyrol and its predominantly German-speaking population clearly and unambiguously as Austrian territory.

South Tyrol's postwar incorporation into Italy was not accompanied by any protective regulation of the native German and Ladin-speaking population. In this respect, it was a textbook case of the problems created by the treaties of Versailles. Initially, from 1919 until the Fascists took over the Italian government in 1922, the situation of South Tyrol was not as bad as might have been expected, since Italy was governed by the Liberal Party which had promised to respect the linguistic, ethnic and cultural diversity of South Tyrol<sup>70</sup>. Nevertheless, the Liberals proved reluctant to acknowledge South Tyrolean demands, and as Fascist influence grew the situation worsened. Violence first erupted in Bozen on 'Bloody Sunday', 24 April 1921, when hundreds of armed Fascists attacked a folkloric parade in traditional Tyrolean costumes. One person died and dozens were injured. On 1 October 1922 several hundred Fascists occupied the town hall of Bozen and declared to the frightened population from the balcony: "There is only one law, and this law is called Italy!"<sup>71</sup>. Three weeks later Mussolini's Fascist Party took power in Italy following the March on Rome.

This victory was a breakthrough for Ettore Tolomei, a key exponent of fascist denationalization policy whose life goal was the Italianization of South Tyrol<sup>72</sup>. On 15 July 1923, Senator Tolomei announced his *Provvedimenti per l'Alto Adige*, a program for the 'Italianization of South Tyrol' which consisted of 32 articles and called for the outright oppression of the mainly German-speaking population. In 1923 the name 'Tyrol' in all its derivations and connections was banned in order to avoid any kind of link to the remaining Austrian part of Tyrol. Instead of 'South Tyrol' the Italian term *Alto Adige* was officially used for the area between the Brenner Pass and Salurn<sup>73</sup>. Moreover Italian became the exclusive official language in an almost totally German-speaking region. From 1925, Fascists started to censor local papers and shut down the remaining German language press. One of the most severe actions was the Italianization of the schools, which effectively estranged children from their parents. Beginning in 1926, no German-speaking classes were allowed, and German private lessons were subject to punishment as well. However, with the aid of the Catholic Church, South Tyrol established a kind of secret school system – the so-called Catacomb Schools – which taught children the German language in garrets, cellars, farmhouses, cottages and mountain refuges. Additional measures, such as the thorough Italianization of place and family names, were accompanied by the destruction of Austrian and Tyrolean monuments, and their substitution by Fascist markers. At the same time the Italian military and police presence in South Tyrol grew, and in order to meet the goal of creating an Italian majority, the country was settled with thousands of families from southern Italy who found employment in newly-created industrial zones<sup>74</sup>.

Following Hitler's rise to power and the National Socialist takeover in Germany in 1933 many South Tyroleans were convinced that the Nazis would finally put an end to Italian oppression. After the Saarland was reintegrated in 1935 and Austria and Sudetenland were annexed to the German Reich in 1938, South Tyrol looked forward to becoming the next German-speaking region to benefit from the policy of *Heim ins Reich* (Home into the Empire)<sup>75</sup>. But Hitler and Mussolini, who regarded the South Tyrol Question as a problem for their alliance, had other plans. They wanted to resolve the South Tyrol problem once and for all in an extreme and ruthless manner. On 23 June 1939 high-ranking representatives of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany reached an accord – the so-called 'Hitler-Mussolini-Agreement' – on the ethnic cleansing of South Tyrol called the 'Option'. Native German and Ladin-speaking inhabitants had to choose before 31 December 1939 between emigrating to the German Reich or remaining in Italy and being forcefully assimilated into the Italian culture without any minority rights, thus losing their language and cultural heritage. While the Nazis promised substantial compensation and a specific settlement area for all re-settlers, in South Tyrol it was rumoured that those who chose to stay would be relocated by the Fascists to somewhere south of the Po River, or to Sicily or even the Italian colonies overseas. In the end 86% of the population opted for emigration

and relocation. From 1939 to 1940 to 75,000 South Tyroleans, or approximately 30% of the German-speaking population, left their homes. Of these only 20,000 returned after the end of the Second World War, while the remaining 50-55,000 found new homes, mainly in Austria and Germany<sup>76</sup>.

In 1943, when Italy signed an armistice and switched over to the Allied side, resettlement stopped. German troops moved quickly to disarm the Italian armed forces and occupied important positions throughout the peninsula, including Italian-controlled areas outside Italy. In South Tyrol – which became a part of the strategically important *Operationszone Alpenvorland* (Operation Zone of Alpine Foothills) and which led to a short-term ‘Tyrolean reunification’ under Nazi rule from 1943 to 1945 – many people were relieved to see the arrival of German troops<sup>77</sup>. But after the end of the war and the collapse of Nazi Germany, Italian troops reoccupied South Tyrol and the victorious Allied powers had to decide, once again, whether it should be returned to Austria or remain a part of Italy.

Despite intensive negotiations and proposals for minor border adjustments, South Tyrol was not returned to Austria<sup>78</sup>. Austria’s claim to the region and its repeated appeal to self-determination were finally subordinated by the Western powers to the political stabilization of the strategically more important Italian peninsula. South Tyrol thus became one of the first victims of the emerging Cold War<sup>79</sup>. Disappointment and rage due to the controversial decision of the Allied powers led to strikes, riots and civil disorder in Austria as well as the South Tyrol<sup>80</sup>. When all efforts at re-integration had failed, Austria tried to achieve at least the highest possible degree of autonomy for South Tyrol through direct negotiations with Italy. This resulted in the Gruber-De Gasperi-Agreement (also known as the Paris Agreement). Named after the Austrian minister for foreign affairs and the Italian prime minister, it was signed in Paris on 5 September 1946. Apart from containing important autonomy agreements it recognized Austria’s exercise of a protective function *vis-à-vis* Italy over the Austrian minority as well as the Ladins in South Tyrol. It furthermore specified that “the goal is to secure the continued ethnic, cultural, social and economic existence of the German and Ladin-speaking population of South Tyrol”<sup>81</sup>. However, in contrast to the spirit of the agreement, Italy granted autonomy rights not only to South Tyrol, but also to neighbouring Trentino. It thus created a common region with an Italian majority which could always overrule the German and Ladin-speaking population. The Autonomous Statute for South Tyrol, passed in 1948, was therefore a charade, which led to growing disappointment and impatience within the region. Moreover, Italian immigration to South Tyrol continued; in fact, Rome built more housing for Italian migrants after World War than during the Fascist period. At the same time the Italian government continued to maintain a highly visible military presence<sup>82</sup>.

The atmosphere in South Tyrol worsened further when Italy started ever more vehemently to demand the return of the internationally administered Territory of Trieste. In 1953 Italy ironically claimed for Trieste what it had opposed and rejected in the

context of South Tyrol in 1918-1919 and 1945-1946 respectively<sup>83</sup>. Protest demonstrations and manifestations in South Tyrol and in the Austrian parts of Tyrol (after South Tyrol's annexation by Italy the two remaining but separate parts of 'North Tyrol' and 'East Tyrol' together formed the Austrian federal state of Tyrol) led to increased tensions in the late 1950s. Bombing attacks accompanied unsuccessful efforts at the diplomatic level; bilateral discussions between Italy and Austria failed. In 1959, Austria raised the South Tyrol Question for the first time before the United Nations in New York, and in 1960 and in 1961 Austria submitted the problem of South Tyrol to the UN General Assembly, which adopted two unanimous resolutions calling upon Austria and Italy to engage in negotiations<sup>84</sup>. More bombings and bloody terror attacks shocked South Tyrol, Austria and Italy during the course of the 1960s<sup>85</sup>. Finally, in 1969 a breakthrough was reached:

It consisted of the so-called "South Tyrol Package", which contained all the [137] measures Italy was to take for the benefit of the German-speaking ethnic group in South Tyrol, and a "calendar of operations", which was a time-table for the implementation of the measures outlined in the package and subsequently for the settlement of the dispute with Austria<sup>86</sup>.

The so-called second Autonomy Statute, which was basically a further development of the highly controversial first Autonomy Statute of 1948, came into effect in 1972 and represented a milestone for the self-government of South Tyrol.

The second Autonomy Statute ensured the linguistic and cultural development of the German and Ladin groups within the framework of the Italian state. South Tyrol was granted special provisions regarding the use of the mother tongue, schools, culture, bilingualism, and employment. The conditions were thus created for a largely self-governing *Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano-Alto Adige/Autonome Provinz Bozen-Südtirol* (Autonomous Province of Bozen-South Tyrol) within the region Trentino-Alto Adige/Trentino-Südtirol. The most important new powers for South Tyrol were as follows: place naming; protection of objects of artistic and ethnic value, the countryside, fauna and flora, and local uses and customs; planning and construction; communal rights (for pasturage and timber): the regulation of small holdings, crafts and handicrafts, public housing, fairs and markets, disaster prevention, mining, hunting and fishing, alpine pastures, public works and welfare, transport, tourism and the hotel trade, agriculture and forestry, expropriations, employment exchanges, nursery schools, school buildings and school welfare, vocational training; trade and commerce, hygiene and health, and sport and leisure; and restricted powers applied to teaching in primary and secondary schools<sup>87</sup>.

However, the full implementation of the second Autonomy Statute and of all the measures provided for in the package, took much longer than envisaged. The autonomy process encountered tough resistance from the Italian population of South Tyrol, which had to give up many privileges. Further setbacks were caused by neo-Fascist electoral successes, forceful claims for self-determination, and new bombing and terror attacks<sup>88</sup>.

But finally, in 1992, the last measures of the package were implemented 20 years after the Autonomy Statute had been passed into law. As one official statement put it,

after the implementation of the package had been examined by the South Tyroleans and the Austrian federal government, both the SVP (the South Tyrolean Peoples' Party), as the party representing the majority of the German-speaking ethnic group in South Tyrol, and the Austrian parliament, agreed to the settlement of the dispute with Italy in 1992. The handing over of identical declarations by Austria and Italy to the UN Secretary-General in June 1992 marked the official settlement of the dispute on the implementation of the Paris Agreement. But Austria still remains the protective power of South Tyrol and in this capacity continues to keep an eye on the ongoing implementation of the autonomy agreement<sup>89</sup>.

Thereafter South Tyrol fell into the category of a 'dynamic autonomy'. This degree of autonomy was extended with new competencies such as salary contracts and the extension of programmatic competencies in the school sector; control over employment and motorized vehicle offices; state roads and real estate; state control functions such as the court of accounts; extension of administrative jurisdiction; new prospects in the energy sector; recognition of competencies in the EU-sector (Europe-Office); competence at the university level with the foundation of the Free University of Bozen; and a commitment to the rights of the Ladins in constitutional law. The year 2001 witnessed another series of important reforms at the constitutional level. These included a reorganisation of the relations among the central state, regions, provinces and municipalities. Altogether these reforms led to the third Autonomy Statute, by far the most important and most extensive amendment in the recent past.

The case of South Tyrol shows that autonomy is far from static. Instead, it is a dynamic process, and something capable of development<sup>90</sup>. Once again, in the words of an official declaration,

The German-speaking ethnic group in Italy has benefited greatly from the dynamism of the European integration process: upon Austria's accession to the European Union at the beginning of 1995 the political framework conditions improved decisively for South Tyrol. The Schengen Agreement subsequently pushed the separating aspects of the national border largely into the background and, finally, the introduction of a common currency contributed substantially to the dismantling of economic and financial barriers<sup>91</sup>.

In 1995 the historic parts of the ancient Austrian Crown land of Tyrol – nowadays the Austrian federal state of Tyrol (North and East Tyrol) – and the Italian Autonomous Provinces of Bozen (South Tyrol) and Trento (Trentino), which had been connected for hundreds of years by their common history, set up a common office of connection between the so-called European Region of Tyrol-South Tyrol-Trentino and the European Union in Brussels<sup>92</sup>. This was possible due to the Madrid Convention of 1980, the regulations of which came into force in 1985 as a European Framework Convention regarding trans-national cooperation among regional administrative boards, and Austria's entry into the EU in 1995<sup>93</sup>.



Fig. 6  
Map of the current administrative regional divisions within Italy and Austria of what is now called the 'European Region of Tyrol-South Tyrol-Trentino'.

At present, over 170 European liaison offices representing regional and local authorities from all member states (and even some candidate countries) are located in Brussels. But in 1995 Tyrol, South Tyrol and Trentino were the first to create a real common cross-border representation, where officials of regions from two different member states worked closely together on a permanent basis, thus reflecting the idea of European integration<sup>94</sup>. The office's common aim is to represent regional interests for the benefit of local authorities and citizens in areas such as regional policy, economy, environment, agriculture, social affairs, education and culture<sup>95</sup>. But one thing has to be clear; the influence of European regions, like Tyrol-South Tyrol-Trentino, within the current European integration process is limited. Cross-border cooperation between regional authorities can be fruitful, but the real players are still the nation states. In the case of South Tyrol, the opinions of Italy and Austria are decisive for its future development. To that effect the Austrian Federal

Ministry for European and International Affairs has declared that "Austria is convinced that there is a direct inter-relation between the beneficial development of the German-speaking ethnic group in South Tyrol and close, friendly ties between Austria and Italy, and therefore devotes particular attention to maintaining these relations"<sup>96</sup>.

The easing of tension in South Tyrol led to a process of normalisation in the relations between Austria and Italy. South Tyrol went from being a bone of contention to a bridge between these two neighbouring states. The German-speaking minority in Italy can now be considered to be politically, culturally, economically and socially well protected. The big winner here is in fact South Tyrol itself. Nowadays the South Tyroleans are among the best protected minorities in the world, and the Autonomous Province of Bozen-South Tyrol is one of the richest regions in Europe. High living standards, economic dynamism and a cleverly handled autonomy has transformed South Tyrol into a prosperous place, richer than most Austrian federal states and Italian provinces. This economic boom, together with an increasing German-speaking and decreasing Italian-speaking population (today some 70% German-speaking, 25% Italian-speaking and 5% Ladin-speaking people live in South Tyrol)<sup>97</sup> has resulted in a new self-confidence, which has shaped over the last decades a separate South Tyrolean identity. Most South Tyroleans nowadays do not consider themselves either Austrians or Italians. In fact, identities have followed regional administrative divisions. Inhabitants no longer cling to their identity as Tyroleans, but proudly present themselves as South Tyroleans.

However, one must still be cautious with respect to South Tyrol. Suspicion of Rome still lingers, even in the 21st century, and the relations with Austria are still very close. It was in this context that the governor of South Tyrol declared in 2003 that "We have to watch out ...We are a small Austrian minority with about 320,000 German-speaking and Ladin-speaking people living in a state with 57 million people. We have to watch out [...] otherwise, sooner or later, we won't be able to survive in this state"<sup>98</sup>. Still, with the well-protected autonomy for German and Ladin-speaking South Tyroleans there has emerged a new trouble spot over the last decades. Italians in South Tyrol feel more and more defensive as an endangered minority within a minority. Yet despite this relations between the different ethnic groups are positive and peaceful. High standards of living for all South Tyroleans, and the fact that there are hardly any distribution conflicts between the ethnic groups, are decisive factors for peace. The future challenge will come with further development and Europeanisation of an autonomy which is now regarded as a role model for resolving minority conflicts.

## THE REGIONALIZATION OF FRANCE

The process of 'regionalization' in contemporary France has taken a different path than in other countries. The most striking distinction is that the current regions, which emerged as part of the new political order after 1956, are quite different from the 'historic regions', or *anciennes provinces de France*. What caused this was the French Revo-

lution. In fact, one of its more far-ranging consequences was the abolition of the provinces of the old feudal state and their replacement by *départements*.

In order to understand the process of regionalization, then, it is essential to begin with the French Revolution. According to the *décret décidant la division de la France en 83 départements*, which the Constituent Assembly adopted on 9 December 1789, 36 ancient regions were disbanded and 83 *départements* replaced them. Each new *département* had between six and nine *districts* and was administrated by an elected *Conseil Général*. Abolishing the old provinces not only destroyed those structures that had helped the aristocracy to exert influence and exercise power. It also served to establish a more clearly-defined and efficient administration. The names chosen for the new *départements* were based on features of the landscape, geography or hydrography; for example, Côtes-du-Nord, Haute-Garonne or Indre-et-Loire.

Despite these reforms, a vague concept of region survived in the political discourse of 19th-century France for two reasons. Firstly, the *départements* were much smaller than the *anciennes provinces* that preceded them and no administrative entity existed between




Fig. 7  
The Regions in France today.



the level of the *département* and that of the state, which made administration often seem remote and clumsy. Secondly, regionalism emerged as a phenomenon at a sub-national level. This was expressed, for example, in a revival of Occitan language and culture, which fed back into the political circles of Paris through the foundation of the *Action Française* (1898). This organisation became the political outlet for the ideas of one of its founders, Charles Maurras. In his political theory, Maurras strongly opposed what he saw as the undermining of French society in the late 19th century by decadence and corruption. To him, Jews, Protestants, foreigners and freemasons represented 'anti-France', whereas he looked favorably on Catholicism (in terms of morality), monarchism (in terms of politics) and authoritarian rule (in order to push back 'anti-France').

This so-called *Maurrassisme* represented a sort of political ideology, which had at its core a dichotomy of *pays réel* (the real country) as opposed to *pays légal* (the legal country), which for Maurras was an artificial structure. The 'rebuilding' of the 'real country' as an ideal form of social organisation finally led to the concept of the historical region, which was linked to the idealization of the realities of rural life. Many more influences played a role in this development, and other movements existed alongside *Action Française*, although the latter was undoubtedly the strongest around 1900. What made it possible for these ideas to enter French politics was the fact that French society was extremely fragmented during the first decades of the Third Republic. Regionalism, in the style of *Action Française*, tended to the political right; indeed, in the case of *Action Française*, many scholars argue that it served as a precedent for Fascism.

Over time, it became clear that regional identity could not stand up to economic reality. By the 20th century, the system of *départements* required improvement in order to work properly, particularly in terms of economic integration and inter-*départemental* co-operation. There was no lack of ideas regarding the reforms needed; for example, the philosopher Auguste Comte suggested the creation of 17 *intendances*, each one administered by a major city. At the same time the sociologist Frédéric Le Play proposed dividing French territory into 13 provinces. In 1910, the influential geographer, Paul Vidal de la Blache, presented his concept of region as an "organized area around a town", and suggested the formation of 17 *régions*<sup>99</sup>. Some of these theories were taken into consideration when the *groupements économiques régionaux* were launched in 1917 (the so called *regions Clémentel*), and began functioning on 5 April 1919. Through its institutional framework it elaborated and promoted inter-departmental economic integration. In fact, the members of the different *départements'* chambers of commerce met for consultation, coordination and sharing advice. The original number of 17 *régions* quickly grew to 21, and a *Comité Régional* was founded with two representatives from each *région*. The emergence of the *groupements économiques régionaux* has to be seen in the context of the Great War, as the French government was forced to act under the constraints of a wartime economy. The first step toward regionalism was, therefore, economically rather than politically motivated.

Post-1945 regionalism in France had little in common with the ideas of the *Action Française*, a fact which has to be seen in the context of the radicalisation of regionalist (and nationalist) movements in France in the 1920s and 1930s. The fact that some of them even collaborated with Nazi Germany and the Vichy government crucially shaped the face of French regionalism in the second half of the 20th century. Exempt from all ideological references and cultural implications, the region, as an administrative entity, was originally created from above, and it was not until 1986 that direct elections to the *conseil régional* took place. The postwar period saw the creation of administrative entities above the *départemental* level. However, these first regional institutions were disbanded shortly thereafter, when Charles de Gaulle left office in 1946. The *Décret 55-873 du 30 juin* (1955) launched the so-called *programmes d'action régionale*, which were developed to counter the enormous regional disparities which had by then reached drastic levels<sup>100</sup>. As the gap between Paris and its neighbouring *départements* and even remoter areas continued to grow, Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France launched a program of financial incentives for businesses which invested in the industrial and economic development of disadvantaged regions. Mendès France even went so far as to ban the construction of new factories in a radius of 80 km around Paris in order to prevent even greater social and economic disparities, which he saw as threatening national unity<sup>101</sup>. Apart from these economic aspects, France was in a severe crisis in the mid-fifties. The process of decolonisation was gathering momentum, although no one wished to admit it. The Algerian Crisis, hitherto officially referred to as *opérations de maintien de l'ordre* (operations in order to maintain law), led to a constitutional crisis which eventually brought down the French Fourth Republic, and which led to the founding of a more presidential Fifth Republic. The economy had to face a long post-war crisis, while the emerging Cold War (and the shifts in the world balance of power that it would cause) posed another serious threat to the already precarious French self-confidence.

The outlines of the *régions* created in 1955-1956 were shaped by mainly technical considerations specified in the *programmes d'action régionale*. Many borders corresponded with those of the *anciennes provinces*, while some, such as Brittany, lost part of their earlier territory. Originally, 24 *régions* were created and bolstered by programs aimed at economic integration. Four years later, in 1960, measures were taken in order to further promote regional development. The *programmes d'action régionale* were converted into *circonscriptions d'action régionale*, which introduced the *circonscription* as a new administrative entity between the nation and the department. In 1964 each region was headed by a prefect (*préfet de région*) who officially resided in the *département* in which the regional capital was located, the prefect of the latter *département* becoming at the same time the prefect of the entire *région*. In 1969 a referendum was held regarding the further development of regional autonomy (and on some changes in the structure of the French Senate)<sup>102</sup>. Its failure not only led to Charles de Gaulle's retreat from office, but also stalled the process of regionalisation for some time. Although *conseils régionaux* were created

in 1972, they proved to be rather ineffectual and finally were superseded by the *loi du 2 mars 1982*<sup>103</sup>, a major step towards decentralisation. As a consequence, elected *conseils régionaux* took over the executive agenda of the state and the regional prefects handed over most of their decision-making powers to the *présidents des conseils régionaux*.

French *régions* do not have any autonomy in terms of legislation and regulation. Their jurisdiction is limited to the spheres of education, economic development and spatial and infrastructural planning. This means that economic development at the regional level is governed by the *conseil régional*. This body devises educational strategy, in that the region decides where new schools are to be built and is, in general, responsible for the upkeep of education infrastructure. Meanwhile, the curriculum is still largely determined by the Ministry of Education in Paris. With the exception of major routes (highways, high-speed railway) the provision and upkeep of communications infrastructure is incumbent upon the region. The funding for these activities comes mainly from the state, though in recent times, European Union funds have also been directed to the regions. The French region can thus be regarded as an administrative and economic institution rather than a cultural entity. Of course, there are *régions* which show features of regional identity stronger than others, but this is limited compared to Spanish regions and the degree of autonomy they enjoy. Comparison with some European federal republics such as Germany or Austria makes even clearer how far the institution of the *région* is subject to the structural constraints of the centralised state.

As has been mentioned above, the imbalance between Paris and the provinces in terms of the concentration of political and economic power and cultural importance, has been striking. From the very beginning, the project of *régionalisation* has aimed at compensating and levelling off inter-regional disparities. Few other European countries have featured such a strong contrast between capital and province as France during the post World War II years. In part this represents the resumption of a development that began at least 150 years earlier. Though Paris had for many centuries been the indisputable political centre of France, its position was further strengthened due to the events of the French Revolution. The abolition of the *anciennes provinces* in favour of the *départements* left the capital the sole site of political decision-making and administrative power in France. During the 19th century it therefore attracted hundreds of thousands of immigrants, from France as well as from all over Europe. What political leaders feared in the aftermath of the French Revolution was the Parisian mob; and the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, as well as the Paris Commune of 1871, showed that these misgivings were well-founded. It was this tension between rulers and ruled that made the splitting of the old *domaine royal* (which the *Île de France* constituted until 1789) into three *départements* such a welcome side effect of the French Revolution. Like many other European capitals, such as London or Vienna, 19th-century Paris had to deal with the conflicts that arose between local and national authorities. The balance of power between the state and its capital, therefore, was often tense. Conservative governments feared the power of the *classe ouvrière* (working

class) concentrated in these metropolitan areas around the capital<sup>104</sup>. During its period of strongest growth Paris was not administrated by local authorities but by the national government and its agents. The capital, and its millions of inhabitants, became an important and dangerous parameter which exerted direct influence on French politics.

In order to prevent Paris from turning more 'red' than absolutely necessary its administrative borders were adjusted only reluctantly. The urban space of Paris was very small compared to that of other cities of a similar scale. It was divided into the town centre, the *petite couronne* (close suburban settlement areas) and the *grande couronne* (including the so called *banlieue*, or suburbs). When the *programmes d'action régionale* were launched in 1955, Paris and its surroundings became the *Région Parisienne*, which in 1976 became in turn the Île-de-France. Île-de-France differed in many regards from all other French *régions*: while the most populated (almost 12 million inhabitants), and producing almost one third of the entire French GDP (28.6%), it was nevertheless the third-smallest region (a mere 12,072 square kilometres)<sup>105</sup>. Before 1968, Paris and its *petite couronne* shared one *département* (Seine). The de Gaulle government, however, decided to break up the *département* through the *loi n 64-707 du 10 juillet 1964 portant réorganisation de la région parisienne*, because its prefect was perceived to have almost as much power as the French prime minister<sup>106</sup>. Although the borders of the modern Île-de-France are almost identical to those of the former *domaine royal*, the strength of its regional identity, in terms of a common consciousness and a shared cultural/historical framework, is questionable. Unlike more peripheral French regions, Île-de-France's culture and dialect were subjected to constant change over almost 200 years of administrative division. Meanwhile, the influence of millions of immigrants, particularly from France, Europe and the former French colonies, have made the Parisian by birth a rare species. Île-de-France does not, therefore, fulfil the requirements of the classical region if we define it as a historically developed identity, manifested through institutions which symbolize it.

The regional identity of the French heartland thus seems to be much younger, and it is partly based on the provision of services like public transport by the *conseil régional*.

Two examples which represent regional identities in a more classical sense are the remote and coastal Brittany, with its own language and national history, and Burgundy, an agricultural centre in the northeast<sup>107</sup>. Though Brittany today considers itself as a nation with a long and eventful past, its history is largely a regional one<sup>108</sup>. It has been a part of France since 1532, and references to Breton independence date back to the medieval Duchy (and former kingdom) of Brittany, a political entity distinguished by language and a distinctive culture. After entering into a union with France, Brittany enjoyed for several centuries many privileges, including its own assembly, the *États de Bretagne*. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the French Revolution the Duchy was disbanded and split up into five *départements*, and the effects of centralization slowly reached even the remoter parts of the former province. As the French Republic refused to recognise any language but French, a latent linguistic conflict arose early on, in the opening decades of the 19th century.

Some enlightened Breton intellectuals of the 18th century had originally supported the French Revolution. They looked on it as a great opportunity for Brittany, one which would bring about the codification of its language and strengthen regional consciousness among its inhabitants. Despite the foundation of the *Académie celtique* in 1804, the opposite proved to be the case; and leading French and Breton intellectuals wound up viewing the potential role of Breton cultural distinctiveness in the French Republic in diametrically opposed terms<sup>109</sup>. While the French Republic integrated aspects of what it considered ancient Celtic culture into the wider definition of Frenchness, Breton leaders wanted more recognition of their distinctiveness. The conflict remained at a cultural level for several decades, as Breton-language literature and music underwent a strong revival. The romantic idea of Celtic Brittany grew in popularity, not only among the Breton middle classes and aristocrats, but also among artists and intellectuals in Paris. When, in 1898, the *Union Régionaliste Bretonne* was founded, cultural assertiveness was raised to a political level and the potential for conflict increased<sup>110</sup>.

1911 saw the creation of the first national party of the Bretons, the *Parti nationaliste Breton*. Around that time Brittany was a remote part of *France Métropolitaine*, and many of its inhabitants did not speak French properly. Furthermore, economic structures had remained unchanged for decades and if Paris was considered the centre of political life in France, Brittany could be regarded as its opposite, backward in both social and economic terms. During the Great War, Brittany lost twice as many young men as the national average of France, and during its aftermath it experienced much stronger contact with the rest of France than had previously been the case<sup>111</sup>. The terrible losses in the trenches fostered the boom of an aggressive Breton nationalism between 1918 and 1944. Regionalist movements which had appeared in many parts of France were explicitly rejected by most Breton nationalists in favour of a more aggressive attitude, one which contested not only the idea of the French Republic but also its concept of Nationhood. Catholicism was still strong in this rural and conservative region, and Breton nationalism was dominated by right-wing parties, which led to a massive turn to the extreme right in the early 1930s under the pressures of the Great Depression. Many Breton nationalists even became collaborators during the Nazi occupation<sup>112</sup>.

All of this led to the collapse of Breton nationalism following the Second World War. Cultural and linguistic aspects of the regional identity were undermined, while economic links between Brittany and the central parts of France were strengthened by new infrastructure such as the TGV (high speed trains) between Paris and Rennes. The *programme d'action régionale* brought Brittany not only economic integration and industrialisation but new forms of cultural and educational autonomy. Nevertheless, its respective autonomy cannot be compared with the Statutes of Autonomy granted in Spain to Catalonia or the Basque Country. Though Breton was taught in many schools through the immersion method, authorities could only be addressed in French and there were no national laws prescribing the use of bilingual traffic and road signs

in bilingually settled areas. Breton nationalism has to be seen in the context of similar peripheral regions in Europe, as for instance Wales, Cornwall or Scotland, all members of the so called Celtic Fringe.

Unlike Brittany, Burgundy represents an old constituent part of the French heartland. The modern region comprises the old duchy of Burgundy (although it should not be confused with the old county of Burgundy, now called *Franche-Comté*, which became part of France in 1678 and constitutes a region of its own), which was a feudal territory which existed roughly between the 9th and the 15th centuries, and which became part of France on the death of duke Charles the Bold in 1477. It had originally emerged from the far older kingdom founded by the Burgundians, who had settled the region in the 4th century. The duchy incorporated for some time parts of the Low Countries, as well as the duchies of Luxemburg, of Bar, and of Lorraine. The historical region of Burgundy has, therefore, been subject to constant change and it is particularly difficult to define its geographical dimension with a single frontier.

A rich agricultural centre, Burgundy has for centuries played a prominent role in French viticulture. Its division into four departments (*Côte-d'Or*, *Nièvre*, *Saône-et-Loire*, *Yonne*) following the French Revolution proceeded without difficulties, and Burgundy might well be considered a region whose identity was compatible with French nationalism. The primacy of the nation over the region was never questioned, and when industrialisation intensified beginning in the mid 19th century (especially the metal industry around Le Creusot), historians began to treat issues of regional history<sup>113</sup>. In tandem with regionalist movements spreading throughout France in the later 19th century, Burgundy began to develop a new sense of regional identity, which was represented particularly by its prosperous agriculture, as has been shown in recent studies of several fairs and expositions held in the 1930s, which served as showcases for a developing Burgundian regionalism<sup>114</sup>. Unlike Brittany, the construction of a regional identity in Burgundy focused on agricultural produce (particularly on wine), and also on folkloristic practices and traditional customs. Political elements were not particularly visible<sup>115</sup>. It is remarkable that at the *Exposition Coloniale* in 1937, regionalism and regional identity were promoted by the organisers. Yet it is striking that in the 1920s and 1930s Burgundy very often presented itself as consisting of seven *départements* (as opposed to today's four), which also indicates that regionalists first tended to reconstruct the region in its largest historical extension. All the same, the *circonscriptions d'action régionale* finally demarcated smaller regions with lesser regard to what might once have been considered an *Ancienne Province*. Burgundy succeeded in establishing the name of its region as a by-word for agricultural produce, and therefore closely linked its regional identity to what is considered a farming tradition of France as a whole.

Regionalisation in France thus has to be seen from different perspectives. First, the dichotomy between centre and periphery found an outlet in regionalisation. Second, ideology played a role, as can be seen in certain lines of discourse from the late 19th and early 20th centuries<sup>116</sup>. A third context might be that of historical identi-

ties and shared common pasts, which played a greater role in certain areas, though it is frequently remarked that the territorial division of France into functional entities – as effectuated by the *programme d'action régionale* – erased many of the traditions and features of the *anciennes provinces*, already eroded by the French Revolution and the creation of the *départements*<sup>117</sup>. A fourth aspect of regionalism in France would be economic.

It is interesting to see how French regionalism lost almost all of its ideological connotations after the Second World War, a process which accompanied a weakening of regionalism in favor of national identity. The construction of Frenchness launched by Charles de Gaulle shortly after 1945 helped undermine regionalist attitudes. The collaboration, for instance, of Breton nationalists (and many other regionalist movements) with the German occupiers discredited not only regional ideology, but also the intellectual traditions from which it drew inspiration<sup>118</sup>.

The sort of regionalisation which finally emerged in France in the 1950s was a sterile one, on the surface lacking in ideological and cultural entity thanks to its exclusive focus on economic integration. Indeed it was more than accidental that in many cases historic regions were re-established, though in disputable cases precautions were taken (Brittany was split up and one part of its historical core was given to the neighbouring region). The new administrative entity of the region was very weak in the beginning; directed by a bureaucrat instead of an elected representative, it functioned as an advisory board. Almost twenty years went by until some major changes, such as elected prefects or specific agendas for regions, were enacted.

Though cultural regionalism has seen something of a rebirth in the past decades through the staging of traditional folkloric fêtes and the emergence of immersion teaching in old regional languages, political regionalism is comparatively weak, and the programs of political parties in regions such as Provence and Brittany are not focused on aspects of a regional agenda. Finally, it is telling that regional elections are still used to test the mood in terms of national politics.

## CONCLUSION

These five case studies have been chosen to present a broad overview of types of regions in Europe today. They demonstrate that although the region is a necessarily subjective and ambiguous entity, this does not mean that regional history should remain under-theorized, much less neglected. We have proposed that the study of regions should take into account three major factors: (1) economy, environment, and geography; (2) the construction of identity; and (3) juridical and administrative structures. It would be an error to assert that all these factors are equally relevant to the making of all regions. Yet it would also be a mistake to assert that any region in Europe can be understood with reference to any single criterion.

In all of the above case studies, the subject of the economy has figured prominently. Catalonia, for example, became the most industrialized region in Spain during the 18th and 19th centuries, a development that brought important political consequences: the economic and social differences between what was widely perceived to be a 'modern' Catalonia and a 'backward' Castile fuelled the creation of a regionalist movement. With respect to the Baltic region, economic factors have not been as visible; nonetheless, they still played an important, if counter-intuitive role in the making of the region. For one could argue that one of the chief reasons that the Baltic territories historically possessed such a large degree of autonomy was because they never formed the economic or political heart of the various empires to which they belonged, and were hence regarded as peripheral. In the case of Vojvodina, a distinctive economy and geography has distinguished the region from other Serbo-Croatian speaking lands. Even though the Duchy became part of Yugoslavia after the First World War, its flat 'central-European' topography differs from that of the rest of the mountainous Balkans. Its economy developed with communication systems constructed during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which endowed it with enduring links to central and south-eastern Europe. Finally, South Tyrol has never been an 'economically defined' region in the past. However, the conspicuously high standard of living of its present-day inhabitants, juxtaposed with the region's enviable fiscal privileges, is a central factor helping to account for the rapid coalescence of its new identity. Finally, many of the French regions, in the absence of strong political structures, have distinguished themselves by their economic features.

We have also placed emphasis on the importance of identity. A distinct sense of Catalan identity emerged as early as the medieval period, and has remained politically important. In the case of the Baltic regions, a unified identity was very strong among Baltic Germans during the early modern period and through the 19th century – so much so that it was the key to maintaining the large degree of de-facto autonomy within the various territories under Swedish and Russian governance. Even after the exodus of the German elite in the 20th century, a loose sense of Baltic identity was reconstructed around the shared experience of Soviet repression. In the case of Vojvodina, the subject of identity is particularly interesting given that the region changed hands precisely when ethnicity had gained political currency. When Vojvodina was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it gave birth to a strong Serbian nationalist movement. Today, however, it boasts a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and 'central-European' identity which many inhabitants contrast with the more homogenous identity of Balkan Serbia. In the case of South Tyrol, the sudden loss of the inhabitants' Austrian citizenship was a burning issue for decades after annexation. However, a new South Tyrolean identity has emerged today. Finally, even in France, regional administrative divisions have served to awaken old identities that remained politically unimportant following the dismantling of the *anciennes provinces*.

Finally, these case studies have drawn attention to political and administrative structures and powers. In the case of Catalonia, the preservation of Catalan public and pri-



vate law, with its roots in the Middle Ages, was one of the chief reasons why Catalans and other Spaniards regarded (and continue to regard) Catalonia as a 'region' or even a 'nation' within the Spanish state. With respect to the Baltic, historians have traced the origins of the region to the Livonian confederation of the 13th century, and to other complex administrative and ecclesiastical structures that the various territories maintained within the Polish-Lithuanian, Swedish, and Russian empires. In contrast to these examples, Vojvodina and South Tyrol never possessed a hallowed tradition of medieval or early modern public or ecclesiastical law. Both places achieved their current borders, and administrative and juridical personalities, at the end of the First World War, when they were incorporated at the stroke of a pen into other countries. Since then, however, the relationship between these regions and the centre has become a major political issue. The respective rights of the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina and the Austrian majority in South Tyrol have remained at the heart of political debate. At the present time, South Tyrol and Catalonia have ample statutes of Autonomy, while that of Vojvodina remains subject to ongoing negotiations. Even in the centralized state of modern France, the creation of regional administrative divisions in 1956 has gradually led to a modest level of devolution.

Given the priorities of CLIORHES Thematic Work Group One, it is appropriate to end this chapter with a final thought on the importance of juridical and institutional factors. It is often assumed that the region is a purely geographic and economic entity that lies somewhere between the two institutional formations of municipality and state; or that the region is a constructed identity based on enduring memories and resurrected customs of ancient or medieval times. These two notions, however, are false. The region is not only a geographically defined zone of work and production. It is not only a popular repository for language, traditions, folklore, and religion. The region is also defined by the existence of juridical, political, ecclesiastical, and administrative structures that have affected the lives of people over centuries through a plethora of rules and practices which range from marriage to divorce, from crime to taxation, from legitimacy to inheritance, from education to health, from voting to minority rights. The current trend toward increasing administrative and political 'regionalization' and devolution in Europe makes it imperative that historians continue to research and explore the conflicts and controversies inherent in the creation, disappearance, perseverance, and resurrection of regions.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> On this see M. Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*, Cambridge 2005.
- <sup>2</sup> See M. Řezník, *Transformations of Regional History in The Polish 'Western Territories' since 1945: Legitimization, Nationalization, Regionalization*; M. Moll, "Our home country has turned into an alien land for us". *Regional History Without Region: The Peculiar Case of Post-1945 West German Historical Research into Former German Territories in the East*; I.-M. Bucur, I. Costea, *Transylvania between Two National Historiographies: Historical Consciousness and Political Identity*, all in S.G. Ellis, R. Eßer (eds.), *Frontiers and Regions in Comparative Perspective*, Pisa 2009, pp. 223-244, 245-270, 271-286 respectively.
- <sup>3</sup> See K. Hoare, *Region to Nation: The Development of Irish Nationalist Historiography, 1880-1920*, in Ellis, Eßer (eds.), *Frontiers and Regions* cit., pp. 205-221.
- <sup>4</sup> For this observation, see S.G. Ellis, R. Eßer, *Introduction: Frontiers and Regions in Comparative Perspective*, in Ellis, Eßer (eds.), *Frontiers and Regions* cit., p. XIV.
- <sup>5</sup> F. Requejo, *Multinational Federalism and Value Pluralism*, London 2005; U.M. Amoretti, N.G. Bermejo, *Federalism and Territorial Cleavages*, Baltimore 2004.
- <sup>6</sup> P. Vidal de la Blache, *La France de l'Est: Lorraine-Alsace*, Paris 1917.
- <sup>7</sup> As Cecil Applegate notes in *A Europe of the Regions: Reflections on the Historiography of Sub-National Places in Modern Times*, in "American Historical Review", October 1999, 104, pp. 1157-1182, at p. 1161, while specifying that Jonathan Beecher also made this point in his review of Fernand Braudel's *The Identity of France*, in "The Journal of Modern History", June 1997, 67, p. 426.
- <sup>8</sup> See M. Hroch, *Regional Memory: Reflections on the Role of History in (Re)constructing Regional Identity*, in Ellis, Eßer (eds.), *Frontiers and Regions* cit., pp. 1-14.
- <sup>9</sup> The subject of frontiers and borderlands is now such a thriving field that it has at last developed a sturdy theoretical framework. See, for example, P. Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees*, Berkeley 1989; L. Klusáková, S.G. Ellis (eds.), *Frontiers and Identities. Exploring the Research Area*, Pisa 2006; T. Baycroft, D. Lavan, *Border Identities*, in "European Review of History", 2008, 15, pp. 255-275; J-F. Berdah, *The Pyrenees without Frontiers. The French-Spanish Border in Modern Times, 17th to 20th Centuries*, in Ellis, Eßer (eds.), *Frontiers and Regions* cit., pp. 163-184.
- <sup>10</sup> The pathbreaking work in this regard is F. Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde Méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, Paris 1949. See also his *La Méditerranée: l'espace et l'histoire*, Paris 1977.
- <sup>11</sup> See M. Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966*, Berkeley 1975.
- <sup>12</sup> For this point, see A.M. Pult Quaglia, *Early Modern Tuscany: 'Regional' Borders and Internal Boundaries*, in Ellis, Eßer (eds.), *Frontiers and Regions* cit., pp. 129-142.
- <sup>13</sup> M. Bloch, *L'Île-de-France (le pays autour de Paris)*, Paris 1913.
- <sup>14</sup> For an example of this in France, see W. Brustein, *The Social Origins of Political Regionalism: France, 1849-1981*, Berkeley 1988.
- <sup>15</sup> B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London 1983; E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford 1983; E. Hobsbawm, T. Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge 1983; P. Nora (ed.), *Les lieux de mémoire*, Paris 1984-1992, 3 vols.; E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge 1990.
- <sup>16</sup> For how regional identities have strengthened national identity in Spain, see X.M. Nuñez Seixas, *The Region as the Essence of the Fatherland: Regionalist Variants of Spanish Nationalism (1840-1936)*, in "European History Quarterly", 2001, 31, pp. 483-518. For how Scottish enlightened scholars strengthened British national identity, see C. Kidd, *Subverting Scotland's Past: Scottish Whig Historians and the Creation of an Anglo-British Identity, 1689 - c.1830*, Cambridge 1993. For the region and German

- national identity, see C. Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat*, Berkeley 1990, and A. Confino, *The Nation as Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany and National Memory, 1871-1918*, Chapel Hill 1997. For France, see C. Ford, *Creating the Nation in Provincial France: Religion and Political Identity in Brittany*, Princeton 1993; T. Baycroft, *Culture, Identity and Nationalism: French Flanders in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, Suffolk 2004. For a sophisticated study of different identities emerging out of the same region, see J. King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948*, Princeton 2002. The above is only a sample of the vast literature, and is by no means an exhaustive list.
- <sup>17</sup> K. Duwe (ed.), *Regionalismus in Europa: Beiträge über kulturelle und socio-ökonomische Hintergründe des politischen Regionalismus*, Frankfurt 1987; G. Bosson et al., *Westeuropäische Regionen und ihre Identität*, Mannheim 1994; R. Babel, J.-M. Moeglin, *Identité Régionale et conscience nationale en France et en Allemagne du moyen âge à l'Époque moderne*, Sigmaringen 1997; H.G. Haupt, M.G. Müller, S. Woolf, *Regional and National Identities in Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, Hague 1998.
- <sup>18</sup> See, in particular, R. Eßer, "Flandria Illustrata": *Flemish Identities in the Late Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period*, and E. Mannová, *Southern Slovakia as Imagined Territory*, in Ellis, Eßer (eds.), *Frontiers and Regions* cit., pp. 143-162 and 185-204, respectively.
- <sup>19</sup> See G. Chittolini, "City States" and Regional States in North-Central Italy, in "Theory and Society", 1989, 18, pp. 689-706; G. Chittolini, *The "Private", the "Public", and the State*, E. Fasano Guarini, *Center and Periphery*, in "Journal of Modern History", 1995, 67, supplement, pp. 34-61 and pp. 74-96, respectively; and E. Muir, *The Sources of Civil Society in Italy*, in "Journal of Interdisciplinary History", 1999, 29, pp. 379-406.
- <sup>20</sup> C. Tilly, *Reflections on the History of European State-Making*, in Id. (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton 1975, p. 15. For an example of one such 'composite' state, see J.H. Elliott, *A Europe of Composite Monarchies*, in "Past and Present", 1992, 137, pp. 48-71.
- <sup>21</sup> Latest survey data reveals that 55.3 percent of the populace believes that Catalonia should remain "an autonomous community within Spain". Other relevant responses include "a region within Spain" (4.6 percent), a "state within a federal Spain" (18.1 percent). See *Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, Sondeig d'opinió 2008*, Barcelona 2008, p. 22.
- <sup>22</sup> See P. Vilar, *Cataluña en la España moderna*, Barcelona 1987 [3rd ed.], 3 vols.
- <sup>23</sup> J.K.J. Thomson, *A Distinctive Industrialization: Cotton in Barcelona, 1728-1832*, Cambridge 1992.
- <sup>24</sup> See, for example, J.M. Fradera, *Indústria i mercat: Les bases comercials de la indústria catalana moderna*, Barcelona 1987; P. Pascual, *Agricultura i industrialització a la Catalunya del segle XIX. Formació i desestructuració d'un sistema econòmic*, Barcelona 1990.
- <sup>25</sup> Vilar, *Cataluña* cit., vol. 1, p. 102.
- <sup>26</sup> Some of the early debates appear in A. Balcells, *L'Història de Catalunya a debat: Els textos d'una polèmica*, Barcelona 1994.
- <sup>27</sup> This is the message of the best-known history of Catalonia in English, Albert Balcells' *Catalan Nationalism: Past and Present*, trans. J. Hall, G.J. Walker, Basingstoke 1996. For another example of such an approach, see J. Albareda (ed.), *Del patriotisme al catalanisme. Societat i política, segles XVI-XIX*, Vic 2001.
- <sup>28</sup> J.-L. Marfany, *La cultura del catalanisme*, Barcelona 1995, and his *Minority Languages and Literary Revivals*, in "Past and Present", August 2004, 184, pp. 137-167; E. Ucelay-Da Cal, *Descriure el que hauria d'haver existit, o com historiografiar el fracàs particularista català al llarg del segle XX*, in J.M. Fradera, E. Ucelay-Da Cal (eds.), *Notícia nova de Catalunya. Consideracions crítiques sobre la historiografia catalana al cinquanta anys de Notícia de Catalunya de Jaume Vicens i Vives*, Barcelona 2005, pp. 197-256.
- <sup>29</sup> For the early modern period, see A. Simon i Tarrés, *Construccions polítiques i identitats nacionals. Catalunya i els orígens de l'estat modern espanyol*, Barcelona 2005; X. Torres Sans, *Naciones sin nacionalismo:*

- Cataluña en la monarquía hispánica, siglos XVI-XVII*, Valencia 2009. For the modern period, see B. de Riquer i Permanyer, *Identitats contemporànies: Catalunya i Espanya*, Vic 2000.
- <sup>30</sup> One exception to this is E. Ucelay-Da Cal, *El imperialismo catalán. Prat de la Riba, Cambó, D'Ors y la conquista moral de España*, Madrid 2003. This study covers the early 20th century. There are few similar studies for earlier periods.
- <sup>31</sup> A recent opinion poll found that 45.6 percent of respondents replied that they felt "as much Spanish as Catalan", while 20 percent felt "more Catalan than Spanish" and 14 percent felt "solely Catalan". In contrast only 5 percent felt "more Spanish than Catalan", while 5.7 percent felt "solely Spanish". See *Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials* cit., p. 34.
- <sup>32</sup> Cited in E. Duran, *Patriotisme i historiografia humanística*, in "Manuscripts", 2001, 19, pp. 43-58, at p. 35.
- <sup>33</sup> Cited in J. Capdeferro i Pla, *Joan Pere Fontanella (1575-1649?): El dret al servei de la pàtria*, in Albareda (ed.), *Del patriotisme* cit., pp. 51-70, at p. 58.
- <sup>34</sup> A. de Capmany, *Centinela contra Franceses*, Valencia 1808, p. 18.
- <sup>35</sup> For dual identities, see J.M. Fradera, *Cultura nacional en una societat dividida. Catalunya, patriotisme i cultura a Catalunya, 1838-1868*, Barcelona 1992.
- <sup>36</sup> Latest survey data reveals that 44 percent of residents speak Spanish at home, 38.8 percent speak Catalan, 9.8 percent speak both languages, and 7.4 percent speak another language. See *Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials* cit., p. 41.
- <sup>37</sup> Unfortunately, there is no survey data covering these descriptors.
- <sup>38</sup> The official title of the Diputació was the *Consistori dels Molts Il·lustres i Fidelíssims Diputats i Oïdors de Comptes del General del Principat de Catalunya i els Comtats de Rosselló i Cerdanya*. For this and the public law in Catalonia, see V. Ferro, *El Dret Públic Català: Les institucions a Catalunya fins al Decret de Nova Planta*, Vic 1987, p. 246.
- <sup>39</sup> For the Middle Ages, see T. Bisson, *The Rise of Catalonia: Identity, Power, and Ideology in a Twelfth-Century Society*, in his *Medieval France and her Pyrenean Neighbours: Studies in Early Institutional History*, London 1989, pp. 125-152; J.M. Salrach, *Catalunya i Catalans des de quan?*, in "Revista de Catalunya", January 1988, 15, pp. 35-50.
- <sup>40</sup> For these citizenship laws and others, see E. Roca i Trias, "Unde Cathalanus quasi in Cathalonia stans": *La condición de catalán en el derecho histórico*, in "Revista Jurídica de Cataluña", January - March 1978, 67 (1), pp. 7-44.
- <sup>41</sup> P.N. Vives y Cebriá, *Usages y demás derechos de Cataluña, que no están derogados ó no son notoriamente inútiles*, Madrid - Barcelona, 1861-1864 [2nd ed.], 5 vols.
- <sup>42</sup> S. Jacobson, *Law and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe: The Case of Catalonia in Comparative Perspective*, in "Law and History Review", summer 2002, 20, pp. 308-347, and the same author's *Catalonia's Advocates: Lawyers, Society, and Politics in Barcelona, 1759-1900*, Chapel Hill 2009, pp. 198-238, 248-256.
- <sup>43</sup> See, for example, E. Jansen, "Baltus", *baltisakslased, eestlased*, in "Tuna", 2005, 2, pp. 35-44, and 3, pp. 31-42; J. Hackmann, R. Schweitzer, *Introduction: North Eastern Europe as a Historical Region*, in "Journal of Baltic Studies", 2002, 33, pp. 361-368; J. Hackmann, *From "Object" to "Subject": The Contribution of Small Nations to Region-Building in North Eastern Europe*, in "Journal of Baltic Studies", 2002, 33, pp. 412-430. See also J. Hackmann, R. Schweitzer (eds.), *Nordosteuropa als Geschichtsregion – ein neuer Blick auf den Ostseeraum?*, in "Nordosteuropa als Geschichtsregion", Beiträge des III. Internationalen Symposiums zur deutschen Kultur und Geschichte im europäischen Nordosten vom 20.-22. September 2001 in Tallinn (Estland), „Veröffentlichungen der Aue-Stiftung“, 17, Helsinki - Lübeck 2006, pp. 13-25, and G. von Pistohlkors, *Regionalismus als Konzept der baltischen Geschichte: Überlegungen zum Stand der Geschichtsschreibung über die baltischen Provinzen Russlands im 19. Jahrhundert*, in "Journal of Baltic Studies", 1984, 15 (2/3), pp. 98-118.

- <sup>44</sup> Ösel formed a distinct political unit within the government of Livland. The territory of Pilten was incorporated into the province of Kurland under the Russian crown. For an overview of the political history of the Baltic region see G. von Pistohlkors, *Baltische Länder*, Berlin 1994; D. Kirby, *Northern Europe in the Early Modern Period. The Baltic World 1492-1772*, London - New York 1990; T.U. Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians*, Stanford 2001.
- <sup>45</sup> J. von Hehn, H. von Rimscha, H. Weiss, *Von den baltischen Provinzen zu den baltischen Staaten. 1. Beiträge zur Entstehung der Republiken Estland und Lettland 1917-1918; 2. Beiträge zur Entstehung der Republiken Estland und Lettland 1918-1920*, Marburg - Lahn 1971, 1977.
- <sup>46</sup> R.J. Misiunas, R. Taagepera, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1940-1990*, Berkeley - Los Angeles 1993.
- <sup>47</sup> T. Eng, *The Legal Position of Estland in the Swedish Kingdom during the First Decades of the Swedish Rule*, and A. Loit, *Die baltischen Länder im schwedischen Ostseereich*, in A. Loit, H. Piirimäe (eds.), *Die schwedischen Ostseeprovinzen Estland und Livland im 16.-18. Jahrhundert*, in "Studia Baltica Stockholmensis", 1993, 11, pp. 53-61 and pp. 63-85 respectively.
- <sup>48</sup> E.C. Thaden (ed.), *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914*, Princeton 1981. During the last quarter of the 18th century the central government tried to reform the administration of the Baltic provinces along inner Russia lines, but that experiment proved to be short-lived.
- <sup>49</sup> D. Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals*, New Haven - London 2001; L. Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great*, New Haven - London 1998.
- <sup>50</sup> In the early period of Russian supremacy there were only about 150,000 Estonians, and somewhat more Latvians.
- <sup>51</sup> A. Buchholtz, *Deutsch-protestantische Kämpfe in den baltischen Provinzen Rußlands*, Leipzig 1888; H. Rothfels, *Reich, Staat und Nation im deutschbaltischen Denken*, in "Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft. Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse", Halle 1930, no. 4, and his *Das baltische Deutschland in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, in *Das Auslandsdeutschum des Ostens*, "Auslandsstudien. vol. 7", Königsberg 1932, pp. 37-61.
- <sup>52</sup> Z. Jančić (ed.), *Попис становништва, домаћинства и станова 2002, Становништво, Национална или етничка припадност по насељима*, Републички завод за статистику Србије, Belgrade 2003, pp. 13-15.
- <sup>53</sup> Draft of the Statute of Vojvodina accepted by the regional Parliament in October 2008, whose final validity requires approval by the Parliament of Serbia: [http://www.vojvodina.gov.rs/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=178&Itemid=86](http://www.vojvodina.gov.rs/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=178&Itemid=86)
- <sup>54</sup> Z. Györe, *Gradovi i varoši Bačke početkom XIX veka*, Novi Sad 2007, pp. 31-32; B. Samu (urednik), *Bács-Bodrog vármegye*, Budapest 1909, 2 vols.
- <sup>55</sup> Z. Györe, *Mađarski i srpski nacionalni preporod*, Novi Sad 2009, pp. 43-45; S. József (ed.), *Szultán és császár birodalmában. Magyarország művelődéstörténete 1526-1790, Magyar kódex 3*, Budapest 2000, pp. 341-345.
- <sup>56</sup> P. Rokai, Z. Györe, P. Tibor, A. Kasaš, *Историја Мађара*, Belgrade 2002, pp. 192-193.
- <sup>57</sup> K. Čobanović, A. Hegediš, *Demografska i agrarna statistika Vojvodine 1767-1867*, Novi Sad 1991; O. Jászi, *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés*, Budapest 1986, pp. 148-149.
- <sup>58</sup> Despite the recent prominence of the status of Vojvodina as a political question all the relevant overviews of its history were written and published between 1929 and 1963. See A. Ivić, *Историја Срба у Војводини, од најстаријих времена до основања потиско-поморишке војне границе (1703)*, Novi Sad 1929 (reprint 1996); D. Popović (ed.), *Војводина*, Novi Sad 1939-1940, 2 vols. (reprint 2008); Id., *Срби у Војводини*, Novi Sad 1957-1963, 3 vols. (reprint 1990).
- <sup>59</sup> M. Árpád (ed.), *1990. évi népszámlálás. Magyarország nemzetiségi adatai megyénként (a mindenkori államigazgatási beosztás szerint, 1870-1990)*, Budapest 1992, pp. 18-21.

- <sup>60</sup> See S. Ćurčić, *Насеља Баната: географске карактеристике*, Novi Sad 2004; Id., *Насеља Бачке. географске карактеристике*, Novi Sad 2007.
- <sup>61</sup> Z. Györe, *Скица промена етничког састава становништва на тлу данашње Војводине 1526-1910*, in "Истраживања", 2004, 15, pp. 120-2; Magyar "Statistikai Közlemények", Új Sorozat, 42. kötet, *A Magyar Szent Korona Országainak 1910. évi népszámlálás*, Budapest 1912. For a recent perspective on national minorities in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia see Z. Janjetović, *Deca careva, pastorčad kraljeva: nacionalne manjine u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, Belgrade 2005.
- <sup>62</sup> M. Károly, *Demográfiai jellemzők, társadalmi mutatók*, in G. Molnár Irén, M. Zsuzsa (eds.), *Vájdasági Marasztaló*, Szabadka 2000, pp. 32-45.
- <sup>63</sup> See K. Brandstätter, „Tyrol, die herrliche, gefirstete Grafschaft ist von uralten zeiten gehaissen und auch so geschrieben...“ *Zur Geschichte des Begriffes „Tirol“*, in Arbeitsgruppe Regionalgeschichte, Bozen/Gruppo di ricerca per la storia regionale; Bolzano (ed.), *Tirol-Trentino: Eine Begriffsgeschichte/Semantica di un concetto*, Vienna - Bozen/Bolzano 2000, pp. 12-24.
- <sup>64</sup> See M. Pizzinini, *Das Kronland Tirol in den Jahrzehnten um 1900*, in Id. (ed.), *Zeitgeschichte Tirols*, Innsbruck - Vienna - Bozen 1990, p. 20.
- <sup>65</sup> Irredentism can be defined in general terms as a movement which strives to annex foreign administered territories to the mother country on the grounds of shared ethnicity or historical reasons. The words *Italia irredenta* (unredeemed Italy) or *terre irredente* (unredeemed territories) also convey a certain underlying religious tone marking this movement and its goals.
- <sup>66</sup> G. Solderer (ed.), *Das 20. Jahrhundert in Südtirol*, Bozen 1999, vol. I, p. 245.
- <sup>67</sup> The entire Treaty of London is published in R. Albrecht-Carré, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference*, The Paris Peace Conference. History and Documents, New York 1938, pp. 334-339.
- <sup>68</sup> Concerning the "Tyrolean Question" at the Paris Peace Conference see R. Schober, *Die Tiroler Frage auf der Friedenskonferenz von Saint Germain*, Innsbruck 1982; H. Haas, *Südtirol 1919*, in A. Pelinka, A. Maislinger (eds.), *Handbuch zur neueren Geschichte Tirols*, vol. 2, *Zeitgeschichte*, part 1, *Politische Geschichte*, Innsbruck 1993, pp. 95-130; K. Stuhlpfarrer, *Südtirol 1919*, in I. Ackerl, R. Neck (eds.), *Saint Germain 1919*, Vienna 1989, vol. 11, pp. 54-77, 375-385; K.H. Ritschel, *Diplomatie um Südtirol: Politische Hintergründe eines europäischen Versagens*, Stuttgart 1966, pp. 73-103; L. Steurer, *Südtirol zwischen Rom und Berlin 1919-1939*, Vienna - Munich - Zurich 1980, pp. 52-59; A.E. Alcock, *The History of the South Tyrol Question*, London 1970, pp. 19-26. For important documents see K. Koch, W. Rauscher, A. Suppan (eds.), *Außenpolitische Dokumente der Republik Österreich 1918-1938 (ADÖ)*, Munich - Vienna 1994, vol. 2; N. Almond, R.H. Lutz (eds.), *The Treaty of St. Germain. A Documentary History of its Territorial and Political Clauses. With a Survey of the Documents of the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference*, London 1935, pp. 335-359.
- <sup>69</sup> According to the 1910 census the territory of South Tyrol contained about 250,000 persons, among them approximately 89% primarily German-speaking, 4% Ladin-speaking, 3% Italian-speaking and 4% speakers of other languages. See Vgl. A. Leidlmair, *Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft 1919-1945*, in F. Huter (ed.), *Südtirol - Eine Frage des europäischen Gewissens*, Vienna - Munich 1965, pp. 362-364.
- <sup>70</sup> For the situation of South Tyrol within 'liberal' Italy (1919-1922) see R. Lill, *Südtirol in der Zeit des Nationalismus*, Constance 2002, pp. 49-68; R. Steininger, *Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert. Vom Leben und Überleben einer Minderheit*, Innsbruck - Vienna 1997, pp. 39-71; R. Steininger, *South Tyrol: A Minority Conflict of the Twentieth Century*, New Brunswick 2003; B. Schloh, *Italiens Politik in Südtirol 1919-1945*, in Huter, *Südtirol* cit., pp. 297-301; Steurer, *Südtirol* cit., pp. 59-63; U. Corsini, *Il Trentino e l'Alto Adige nel periodo 3.11.1918-31.12.1922*, in U. Corsini, G.B. Emert, H. Kramer, *Trentino e Alto Adige dall'Austria all'Italia*, Bozen 1969, pp. 103-229.
- <sup>71</sup> "Esiste una sola legge, e questa si chiama Italia!". Cited in Lill, *Nationalismus* cit., p. 63.

- <sup>72</sup> For Ettore Tolomei see M. Ferrandi, *Ettore Tolomei. L'uomo che inventò l'Alto Adige*, Trento 1986; G. Framke, *Im Kampf um Südtirol. Ettore Tolomei (1865-1952) und das "Archivio per l'Alto Adige"*, Tübingen 1987; M. von Malfè, *Ettore Tolomei und die Südtirolfrage*, Vienna 1988; S. Benvenuti, C.H. von Hartungen (eds.), *Ettore Tolomei (1865-1952): Un nazionalista di confine/Die Grenzen des Nationalismus*, Trento 1998.
- <sup>73</sup> See Steininger, *Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert* cit., p. 80.
- <sup>74</sup> For Fascist policy towards South Tyrol see Lill, *Nationalismus* cit.; Steininger, *Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert* cit.; Solderer, *Das 20. Jahrhundert in Südtirol* cit.; A. Gruber, *Südtirol unter dem Faschismus*, Bozen 1974 (Italian translation: *L'Alto Adige sotto il fascismo*, Bolzano 1979).
- <sup>75</sup> The National Socialist initiative *Heim ins Reich* (Home into the Empire; Back to the Empire) tried to convince German-speaking regions outside of the Reich to rejoin a greater Germany.
- <sup>76</sup> For the "Option" in South Tyrol see K. Eisterer, R. Steininger, *Die Option. Südtirol zwischen Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus*, Innsbruck 1989; R. Lill (ed.), *Die Option der Südtiroler 1939. Beiträge eines Neustifter Symposiums*, Bozen 1991; K. Stuhlpfarrer, *Umsiedlung Südtirol 1939-1940*, 2 vol., Vienna - Munich 1985; R. Messner (ed.), *Die Option. 1939 stimmten 86% der Südtiroler für das Aufgeben ihrer Heimat. Warum? Ein Lehrbuch in Zeitgeschichte*, Munich - Zurich 1989; See also Steininger, *Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert* cit., pp. 153-186; Lill, *Nationalismus* cit., pp. 179-209; D.I. Rusinow, *Italy's Austrian Heritage 1919-1946*, Oxford 1969, pp. 239-265; Alcock, *South Tyrol Question* cit., pp. 45-59; R. De Felice, *Il problema dell'Alto Adige nei rapporti italo-tedeschi dall'Anschluss alla fine della seconda guerra mondiale*, Bologna 1973, pp. 33-67; M. Toscano, *Storia diplomatica della questione dell'Alto Adige*, Bari 1967, pp. 133-199.
- <sup>77</sup> For South Tyrol and the Operation Zone of Alpine Foothills see above all M. Wedekind, *Nationalsozialistische Besatzungs- und Annexionspolitik in Norditalien 1943-1945: Die Operationszonen „Alpenvorland“ und „Adriatisches Küstenland“*, Munich 2003. See also K. Stuhlpfarrer, *Die Operationszonen „Alpenvorland“ und „Adriatisches Küstenland“ 1943-1945*, Vienna 1969; Tyrol M. Lun, *NS-Herrschaft in Südtirol: Die Operationszone Alpenvorland 1943-1945*, Innsbruck - Vienna - Munich - Bozen 2004; G. Steinacher (ed.), *Südtirol im Dritten Reich/L'Alto Adige nel Terzo Reich. NS-Herrschaft im Norden Italiens/L'occupazione nazista nell'Italia settentrionale, 1943-1945*, Innsbruck - Vienna - Munich - Bozen 2003; P. Agostini, C. Romeo, *Trentino e Alto Adige. Province del Reich*, Trent 2002; L.W. Regele, *Operationszone Alpenvorland, Repubblica di Salò und Provinz Bozen 1943-1945: Verfassungsrechtliche Lage in Italien nach dem Sturz Mussolinis*, in "Der Schlerm", August - September 1994, vol. 68, 8/9, pp. 458-467; J. Fontana, *Südtirol unter Gauleiter Franz Hofer (1943-1945)*, in "Der Schlerm", 1994, 68, pp. 476-497; L. Steuer, *Südtirol 1943-1946: Von der Operationszone Alpenvorland bis zum Pariser Vertrag*, in H. Heiss, G. Pfeifer (eds.), *Südtirol- Stunde Null? Kriegsende 1945-1946*, Innsbruck - Vienna - Munich 2000, pp. 48-54; De Felice, *Il problema dell'Alto Adige* cit., pp. 69-96.
- <sup>78</sup> See R. Steininger, *Los von Rom? Die Südtirolfrage 1945/46 und das Gruber-De Gasperi-Abkommen*, Innsbruck 1987.
- <sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>80</sup> Vgl. M. Gehler, *Selbstbestimmung-kulturelle Landeseinheit-Europaregion? Die Tiroler Südtirolpolitik 1945-1998*, in Id. (ed.), *Tirol. „Land im Gebirge“: Zwischen Tradition und Moderne*, Vienna - Cologne - Weimar 1999, p. 573; C. Gatterer, *Im Kampf gegen Rom. Bürger, Minderheiten und Autonomien in Italien*, Vienna - Frankfurt - Zurich 1968, p. 889; Steuer, *Südtirol 1943-1946* cit., p. 80.
- <sup>81</sup> Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, <http://bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/foreign-policy/europe/neighbourhood-policy/south-tyrol.html>, accessed on 21.10.2009.
- <sup>82</sup> See Gehler, *Tiroler Südtirolpolitik 1945-1998* cit.; R. Steininger, *Südtirol zwischen Diplomatie und Terror*, Bozen 1999, vol. 1, pp. 233-235.
- <sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 148-54.

- <sup>84</sup> See A. von Egen, *Die Südtirol-Frage vor den Vereinten Nationen. Rechtsgeschichte und Dokumente – mit einer Zusammenfassung in italienischer und englischer Sprache*, Bozen - Frankfurt 1997; Steininger, *Diplomatie und Terror* cit.; W. Strasser, *Österreich und die Vereinten Nationen. Eine Bestandsaufnahme von 10 Jahren Mitgliedschaft*, Vienna 1967, pp. 295-371.
- <sup>85</sup> See C. Franceschini, *Bomben um Südtirol. Eine Geschichte des Südtirol-Terrorismus (1955-1968)*, Diploma Thesis, Innsbruck 1991; E. Baumgartner, H. Mayr, G. Mumelter (eds.), *Feuernacht. Südtirols Bombenjahre. Ein zeitgeschichtliches Lesebuch*, Bozen 2001; Steininger, *Diplomatie und Terror* cit.
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- <sup>87</sup> Civic Network of South Tyrol, [http://www.provinz.bz.it/english/overview/autonomy\\_statute.htm](http://www.provinz.bz.it/english/overview/autonomy_statute.htm), accessed on 21.10.2009.
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- <sup>91</sup> Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, in <http://bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/foreign-policy/europe/neighbourhood-policy/south-tyrol.html>, accessed on 21.10.2009.
- <sup>92</sup> For the European Region of Tyrol-South Tyrol-Trentino see G. Pallaver, *Die Beziehungen zwischen Südtirol und Nordtirol und die Europaregion Tirol-Südtirol-Trentino*, in F. Karlhofer, A. Pelinka (eds.), *Politik in Tirol*, Innsbruck - Vienna - Munich - Bozen 2004, p. 131; F. Palermo, J. Woelk, *Die "Europa-Brücke" Tirol, Südtirol und Trentino*, in M. Warasin, *Unsere Sache ist gerecht. Südtirol als Thema der österreichischen Außenpolitik vor dem Hintergrund der europäischen Einigung*, Bozen 2002, pp. 257-280 and see the homepage <http://www.europaregion.info>, accessed on 21.10.2009.
- <sup>93</sup> See the download (German-English-French) of the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities ("Madrid Convention") of 21 May 1980 (BGBl. 24, 1983), <http://www.europaregion.info/en/22.asp>, accessed on 21.10.2009.
- <sup>94</sup> See <http://www.europaregion.info/en/161.asp>, accessed on 21.10.2009.
- <sup>95</sup> See <http://www.europaregion.info/en/29.asp>, accessed on 21.10.2009.
- <sup>96</sup> Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs <http://bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/foreign-policy/europe/neighbourhood-policy/south-tyrol.html>, accessed on 21.10.2009.
- <sup>97</sup> According to the last census of 2001 the territory of South Tyrol was inhabited by 296,461 (69.15%) primarily German-speaking, 113,494 (26.47%) Italian-speaking and 18,736 (4.37%) Ladin-speaking people. See *Südtirol: Kein Italiener-Exodus*, in "Die Presse", 20 June 2002, p. 4.
- <sup>98</sup> Statement of Luis Durnwalder in the TV-documentary *Südtirol – eine Erfolgsgeschichte*, ORF-Landesstudio Tirol, 2003. Cited in Muigg, *Zwischen Wien und Brüssel lag Südtirol* cit., p. 208.
- <sup>99</sup> D. Noin, *L'espace français*, Paris 1976, pp. 106-107.
- <sup>100</sup> See <http://legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/jopdf/1957/102/JO195710295.PDF>, accessed on 20 August 2009.
- <sup>101</sup> S. Bernstein, P. Milza, *Histoire de la France au XXe siècle 1945-1958*, Paris 1991, p. 144.



- <sup>102</sup> C. Prochasson, O. Wiewiorka, *La France du XXe siècle: Documents d'histoire*, Paris 1994, pp. 541-544.
- <sup>103</sup> <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006068736&dateTexte=20090916>, accessed on 20 August 2009.
- <sup>104</sup> See E. Hazan, *L'invention de Paris*, Paris 2002; K. Stierle, *Der Mythos von Paris: Zeichen und Bewußtsein der Stadt*, Munich 1998.
- <sup>105</sup> See [http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg\\_id=99&ref\\_id=CMRSOS02137](http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=99&ref_id=CMRSOS02137), accessed on 20 August 2009.
- <sup>106</sup> <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006068249&dateTexte=20090917>, accessed on 20 August 2009.
- <sup>107</sup> On local France see S. Gerson, *The Pride of Place: Local Memories and Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century France*, Ithaca 2003, pp. 538ff.
- <sup>108</sup> See O. Freeman, *Régionalisme et régionalisation*, in J. Slugocki (ed.), *Regionalism in Europe: Traditions and New Trends*, Geneva 1993, p. 142.
- <sup>109</sup> See P.A. Bempéchat, *Allons enfants de \*quelle\* patrie? Breton Nationalism and the French Impressionist Aesthetic*, Working Paper Series #106, Center for European Studies, Harvard University [s.d.], p. 4.
- <sup>110</sup> See J. Reece, *The Bretons against France*, Chapel Hill 1977.
- <sup>111</sup> This point is much emphasized in travel literature. See H. Ebeling, *Bretagne: Land der Mythen und Legenden. Land am Meer*, Karlsruhe 1993, pp. 149-151; H. Ebeling, *Bretagne: Die Kultur des "Landes am Meer" 1300-1990*, Vienna 1990, pp. 374-376.
- <sup>112</sup> Freeman, *Régionalisme et régionalisation* cit., p. 142.
- <sup>113</sup> See for instance the works of César Lavirotte.
- <sup>114</sup> See P. Whalen, *Burgundian Regionalism and French Republican Commercial Culture at the 1937 Paris International Exposition*, in "Cultural Analysis", 2007, 6, pp. 31-62.
- <sup>115</sup> Whalen, *Burgundian* cit., pp. 44ff.
- <sup>116</sup> For a discussion of space as a precondition of region see D. Ipsen, *Regionale Identität: Überlegungen zum politischen Charakter einer psychosozialen Raumkategorie*, in R. Lindner (ed.), *Die Wiederkehr des Regionalen: Über neue Formen kultureller Identität*, Frankfurt - New York 1994, p. 237; H. Lefebvre, *La production de l'espace*, Paris 1974.
- <sup>117</sup> Noin, *L'espace français* cit., pp. 112-123.
- <sup>118</sup> Reece, *Bretons against France* cit., pp. 177ff.

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# Transnational Dimensions

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## ABSTRACT

*This chapter moves beyond the traditions of writing specifically national histories by refusing to use the borders of the nation-state (both cultural and legal) as the necessary frame of reference. It proposes that the historian needs to be attentive to the precise dimensions of the topic, refusing to let predetermined geographic boundaries dictate the shape of their enquiry. The chapter offers a number of case studies to this effect, using Sven Beckert's fourfold categorisation of objects, peoples, ideas and texts to generate a sequence of interlocking inquiries. Aisling Macquarrie explores the intricate trans-Atlantic nature of the North West Company's activities, suggesting how objects as ephemeral as hats might generate a wide range of cultural and economic connections. Momir Samardžić and Darina Martykánová concentrate their study on transport itself, highlighting how the development of the 19th-century rail network produced transnational communities of specialists and labourers, just as the track connected different national spaces. Marianna Christopoulos offers up a close rendering of one figure – the Greek diplomat John Gennadius – exploring how transnational contexts might shape an individual mentalité and germinate an idea of international arbitration. Hanne Hagtvedt Vik concludes by studying the origins of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, showing how texts have multiple origins. In sum, the chapter explores the tension between universal ideals and particular experience and contests the resolution of that tension within the nation-state model which is at once particular to a community and simultaneously endlessly exportable. It proposes that there are other modes of experience to explore, and highlights the need for historians to attend to frames of reference that go beyond the nation-state. In doing so, it provides one mechanism for understanding the transnational dimensions embodied in the institutions of the European Union.*

In thinking about the different levels where individuals interact with institutions and in which citizenship is forged, there is a strong tendency among historians to focus upon the commanding presence of the nation-state. The prevalence of the presumption that

the state should reflect – in a binary fashion – the national identity of the community it governs has itself a historical origin, albeit a heavily contested one. In this we share our colleagues' presumption concerning the emergence of a world of communities which had a unifying tendency encapsulated in the nation-state which culminated in the age of nationhood, lasting from the French Revolution until the Russian Revolution, and which may be on the brink of significant revival<sup>1</sup>. Just as the recent re-emergence of national identity and state-building projects both in the wake of decolonisation and the collapse of communism has had as its counterpoint economic and political trends towards internationalism and globalisation, so too a new agenda in historical scholarship has emerged which emphasises institutions that facilitate interaction across state borders, be they of commerce, communication, or of government.

A conversation hosted by the “American Historical Review” in 2006 considered this transnational dimension in historiography<sup>2</sup>. Therein, Wendy Kozol helpfully identified the central question with which transnational history struggles, namely “what constitutes the object of historical inquiry once you challenge the stability of the border to define a nation?”<sup>3</sup>. Sven Beckert responded by suggesting that transnational history writing take its place alongside global history, world history and international history as “a project to reconstruct aspects of the human past that transcend any one nation-state, empire or other politically defined territory”. He also asserted that “this sets these approaches apart from most of the history that has been written in most of the world during the past hundred years”<sup>4</sup>. Distinctiveness was assured by a concern for movement of “objects, people, ideas and texts” across boundaries<sup>5</sup>. As Isabel Hofmeyr argued:

The key claim of any transnational approach is its central concern with movements, flows and circulation, not simply as a theme or motif but as an analytical set of methods which defines the endeavour itself. Put another way, a concern with transnationalism would direct one's attention to the “space of the flows”<sup>6</sup>.

This is to place the focus on the means, the content and the consequences of “a whole range of connections that transcend politically bounded territories and connect various parts of the world to one another”, as Beckert framed it, while recognising that “rulers, empires, and states are important in structuring them”<sup>7</sup>. Transnational history is thus intrigued and perplexed by mobility. In this it differentiates itself from postcolonial approaches, which are shaped by a narrative of “domination and resistance”<sup>8</sup>. Its ambition is rather to undermine political claims to hegemonic and foundational status and highlight the permeability of states and nations, “making visible a wider range of political possibilities”<sup>9</sup>. Its approach is connective in that it attends not only to the impact of movement on both the sending and receiving societies, but also on the act of mobility itself, studying the migratory patterns, the middle passage, the transport links or the distribution networks, and the channels along which the chosen subject traverses the landscape or seascape.

In thinking about these trends the contributors to this chapter will explore the four-tiered model proposed by Beckert, examining ‘objects, people, ideas and texts’. It is our central proposition in doing so that the new agenda implicit in exploring transnational dimensions, as opposed to traditional national approaches to subjects such as industrialisation, imperialism, jurisprudence and political philosophy, enhances our understanding of the vexed and problematic nature of those developments. Too frequently history is written through the prism of the state. Here we contend that a more comprehensive, more fertile history of collaboration, contestation and combination is possible. This new agenda, in other words, provides an analysis of global politics and economy in the 21st century and exposes some of the central myths we have inherited from the ages of communities and nations.

While the source of national identity has been located in the banal nationalism of everyday institutional terminology – television stations (such as the British Broadcasting Corporation), newspapers (“The Irish Times”), and signifiers – stamps and flags – transnational endeavours complicate the static correlation between the symbolic objects of the state and communal action<sup>10</sup>. Although there is a presumption of a shared cultural practice that supplies nationhood with its affective content (for instance, in the paintings of Edward Munch or the musical adaptations of folksong by Béla Bartók), transnational studies of social formation highlight the composite nature of peoples and their constructed cohesion. Equally, just as the ideology of nationalism relies upon a series of intellectual predicates from which the national universe is deduced, so a transnational sensitivity can highlight anomalies and illuminate intersections across the globe that help universalise ideas of dignity, toleration and respect. Whereas the inclusion of national narratives in school books, academic studies and historical romances (such as Walter Scott’s highly popular Waverley novels) generates in a modernist model the active citizenship of plebiscites, transnational studies premise a less stable, less integrated narrative of democratic origins, in which ideas of citizenship are forged in combat across national domains. In other words, at each of the four levels of conceptual analysis, in examining objects, people, ideas and texts, comprehension of the transnational dimension opens new avenues of research and offers new modes of understanding.

## OBJECTS

How then are we to understand the emotional and affective quality of the networks that criss-cross national boundaries? Aisling MacQuarrie explores here the consequences of previous globalisations and imperial projects in terms of the emotional connections generated through commercial exchange. Certainly, early modernists have been concerned with viewing various seas and oceans as regions worth studying<sup>11</sup>. The Baltic, for instance, has been rethought as a market in which raw materials and manufactured goods were traded along its shores and across its waters. More

ambitiously, there has been a growing concern for navigating the Atlantic not only as part of the exploration of the emergence of capitalism, but also in charting the political squalls of the 17th and 18th centuries. Even the British Empire of the 19th century has been reconfigured as 'an empire of information', in which commercial activity was just as central as political control<sup>12</sup>.

In what follows MacQuarrie looks to the transnational dimension to provide a new agenda for the politics of identity that has informed much recent cultural history, arguing for the re-establishment of a macro-economic perspective. Her contribution focuses on how the North West Company traversed state boundaries and forged personal ties of interest and trust that did not map onto any traditional, nationalist road-map. But she presents her argument in such a way as to recognise the affective power of the object: in this case that the North West Company's economic tentacles were centred not just on London and its financial hub, but on the European fashion for hats. One is reminded of Allan Ramsay's exquisite portrait of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, that poet of personal freedom, dashingy attired as an Armenian peasant, in headgear possibly stitched from the pelts culled from Canada's interior<sup>13</sup>. The link between personal identity (freedom), social appearance (fashion) and economic interest (trade) is beautifully illustrated here.

The North West Company, a fur trading enterprise based in Montreal and dominated by Scots, developed a commercial operation that extended across the boundaries of Europe, North America and the Orient. The Company is generally famous for its exploration of unknown lands and river systems and its persistent search for an overland passage across British North America to the Pacific. The voyages of Alexander Mackenzie to the Arctic Ocean in 1789 and to the Pacific in 1793, Simon Fraser's ventures along the river systems of British Columbia in 1806-1808 and David Thompson's expedition to the mouth of the Columbia river in 1811, extended the physical boundaries and knowledge of the British Empire. The *raison d'être* for the Company's exploration and exploitation of these newly discovered river systems was not the glory of Empire, but the pursuit of trade. The streams, straits, lakes and rivers that flowed throughout the wilderness of British North America were the vital arteries and communication routes that connected the far-flung, fur-trapping lands with the avid markets of Europe and the Orient. With such a vast operation the Company depended upon a network of importers and exporters of goods, insurers, financiers, and shipping agents. The enterprise's activities criss-crossed boundaries and borders, both in the material export of its commodities and in the multiple associations and partnerships developed in the execution of business. The research of other CLIOHRES groups has unearthed the mobility of individuals and groups; thus, for example, Lud'a Klusáková has focused on the importance of 'routes' as a means of both dividing and connecting people<sup>14</sup>. Indeed, the Company's strength did not rest solely in its exploration of new river systems but also in its ability to navigate and exploit new socio-economic highways. This section



expands upon some of the themes touched on in previous CLIOHRES research and attempts to ascertain the character of these networks and what this tells us about the nature of the British imperial economy in the late 18th century.

Curiously, most fur-trade historiography has failed to examine fully the nexus between the micro and macro levels of the North West Company's fur trading enterprise. The majority of studies have focused on the organisation's activities within the confines of Canada, or in relation to its main competitor, the Hudson's Bay Company. The strength of this kind of scholarship lies in its detailed account of the Company in comparison with its business rival. Only two important works from this 'Laurentian school' examine the fur trade more broadly<sup>15</sup>. *The Fur Trade in Canada* attempts to connect patterns of Canadian economic development to others within the Western world<sup>16</sup>. Similarly, *The Commercial Empire of the St Lawrence, 1760-1850*, views Canada's development bilaterally with that of Britain. The key argument of the Laurentian school, typified by these works, is that geography determined, in large part, Canada's economic fortunes<sup>17</sup>. However, this is a rather narrow, deterministic perspective that neglects other variables that influenced the development of the fur trade and its overall contribution to the Canadian economy. Later 20th-century scholarship witnessed a growth in cultural and ethno-historical approaches, which have devoted particular attention to the role of women and, even more specifically, to that of Native American women within marriage, and how they were active economic agents within the development of the fur trade<sup>18</sup>. Such works are welcome for their ability to illustrate how the First Nations people were key actors in the local fur trade economy, which was strengthened by the social ties they formed with fur traders such as the Nor' Westerners.

However, these approaches are limited as they fail to recognise the scale of the Company's ambition and the wide reach of its trading activities. The macro-economic scale of the fur trade has recently been somewhat sidelined by the cultural and ethno-historical trends outlined above. The North West Company did operate at local, regional and national levels as traditional histories have demonstrated, but it also functioned on a transnational level. Essential to the Company's success, and to the evolution of the fur trade as a whole, was the cultivation and development of social-entrepreneurial networks across North America and Europe. It was crucial for the merchants to spin a wide web of connections allowing them to tap into different markets and respond to the ever changing demands of the trade as their commodities crossed and re-crossed boundaries. The North West Company was a transnational commercial institution in the same way in which the research of TWG6 has illuminated the increasing trans-national activity of the mercantile community across Europe at the same time<sup>19</sup>. One example can be seen in Victor Zakharov's study of 18th-century Russian merchants and how they became engaged in a 'system of world transcontinental contacts' and the 'decisive role' this played in the development of Russia<sup>20</sup>. Similarly, David Hancock asserts that it was through networks that "Europeans developed their own economies and that of their

colonies and empires” and how “European states and colonies grew to wealth and greatness”<sup>21</sup>. Recognising the transnational dimension of the Company’s activities places it in a wider socio-economic framework and allows for a more meaningful understanding of not only the fur trade but also of the nature of 18th-century private enterprise<sup>22</sup>.

The demand for furs existed largely because of a fashion in hats. In the 18th century the broad-brimmed hat signified a man’s status as honourable and respectable. Beaver fur, which was one of the principal pelts the Company exported, was ideal for the production of the broad-brimmed hat as the long, barbed, guard hairs from the under layer of the beaver’s coat were suitable for the felting process. The finest and thickest pelts were to be found in some of the coldest regions of north-west Canada, such as in Athabasca. This was a costly and arduous business due the challenges of transportation, climatic conditions, supplying goods, packaging furs and shipping them to markets, not to mention fending off the constant threat of competition. In total it took 42 months from the time the necessary trade goods ordered from England reached the interior in order to be exchanged for furs, which were then packed, shipped and auctioned, and turned into profit<sup>23</sup>. With such a lengthy trade cycle it was vital for fur-trade merchants to keep overheads low, and to ensure they had reliable and regular suppliers and, most importantly, readily available credit. Indeed, once the trade goods reached Montreal it was two years before they could be turned into cash, which in the words of Nor’ Westerner Alexander Mackenzie, made this “a very heavy business”<sup>24</sup>.

In 1787, the two principal shareholders of the North West Company, the Scotsman Simon McTavish of Stratherick, Invernesshire, and the Yorkshireman Joseph Frobisher, joined their “Fortunes and Names in a general Co-partnership, one half each” to supply the North West Company in a bid to “keep up our present Influence and Interest in that country”<sup>25</sup>. With McTavish and Frobisher as the principal shareholders in the Company, and through the establishment of their new subsidiary house, they were able to consolidate their growing control over the affairs of the Company by appointing their firm to be solely responsible for the supply of goods and the direction of its external activities<sup>26</sup>. It was through this mechanism and management that the North West Company was able to extend its reach and develop the means to send furs to the markets of Europe as well as the Orient. With the House McTavish & Frobisher acting as executives over the North West Company, it began aggressively to penetrate further into the north west, opening new posts at strategic points on the rivers to meet the Native Americans directly on their own ground and secure their business. With expansion, however, pressure on the organisation’s logistical and financial structures began to increase. Edwin E. Rich has calculated that from the total of the Company’s exports of beaver pelts to England, Russia took a quarter and France and Holland took about an eighth each<sup>27</sup>. It should be noted that many of the furs sent to Russia found their way to China. Frobisher, in a letter to his creditors, emphasised the value of the Russian market for Canadian furs:

When you consider the very bad prospect of the sale of Furs from the war between the Russian & Turks, which shuts the communication with China – some of the most considerable debts due to me being payable in Fur and our great dependence being on the demand from Petersburg for the sale of our best Beaver<sup>28</sup>.

Frobisher's words also illustrate the vulnerability of fur markets to external pressures such as war, which could close down lucrative trade routes, as took place for instance in the early 1800s when trade with China became more significant as a result of Napoleon's naval blockade of England. In such a capricious market it was essential that the North West Company be in a position to respond quickly to changes and recover any incidental debts. As London was a crucial market for the Company's pelts, the role of the London agency was central in developing commercial contacts when adverse conditions made it imperative for the enterprise to negotiate new market destinations. Indeed, a mismanaged London agency had the potential to destroy a fur-trading company<sup>29</sup>. Consequently, the connections the Company formed with its London correspondents mattered greatly as, due to the difficulties of distance, it needed to ensure it could rely on and trust in the good judgement of its agents<sup>30</sup>. As the North West Company's trading activities evolved, Simon McTavish, with his cousin John Fraser, established the London agency, McTavish & Fraser of London, in 1790, although it did not appear in the London Directories until 1796<sup>31</sup>. This firm, a subsidiary of McTavish, Frobisher & Co., became the London agent and financier to the Montreal House, responsible for selling furs and shipping arrangements as well as supplying goods on favourable terms. The position of the London agency became more entrenched partly due to the growth and volume of the Company's global trade. It was essential for the success of the North West Company to have an outpost that was able to adapt to the varying conditions of internal and external trade. The House of McTavish, Fraser & Co. became the vehicle through which the enterprise was able to do so. Additionally, the decision to use kin networks to establish the London agency ensured for McTavish that his London agent was someone he was intimately connected with, as well as someone he could trust and hold accountable. This cohesive internal structure gave the London House a solidity from which it was able to reach out and form business connections with outside interests as the enterprise expanded.

Typically the London House would have sold its furs at public auction, but the agency began to explore other outlets while attempting to form connections directly with traders. E.E. Rich cites an instance wherein John Brickwood complained bitterly to McTavish about his new business tactics and asked him to remain loyal to the 'system of public auctions', particularly as Brickwood was one of a small number of brokers and such tactics were likely to undermine his trade<sup>32</sup>. Furthermore, John Brickwood of Brickwood, Pattle & Co. had supplied one half of McTavish, Frobisher & Co. since its very inception and had had long-standing links with the proprietors of the North West Company from the early 1780s. Given that Brickwood's plea went unheard it would appear that

loyalty and family did not count for so much when the issue of economic pragmatism was at stake. The House formed a connection with an influential German buyer, a Mr Schneider, to whom McTavish directly consigned the North West Company's furs, which he then shipped over in the Company vessel the *Hamburg*<sup>33</sup>. However, the ship never reached its destination due to "too many casks" and two squabbling pilots, "who [...] never ceas'd wrangling till they had run her on shore on the Coast of Holland" [sic]. Despite John Fraser's concerns, particularly when his "old friends the Dutch" reminded him "it's a bad running aground at high water", the furs were salvaged and ended up being sold in London by the underwriters<sup>34</sup>. However, Rich observes that Schneider acted as an intermediary for this sale and was allowed his pickings of the cargo<sup>35</sup>. After such a debacle Fraser was eager to form new connections, this time with the German furriers themselves, thereby avoiding having to deal with buyers such as Schneider. Yet it was essential not to snub or aggrieve a current or former correspondent as it could do untold harm to an organisation's good standing in an environment where reputation was of paramount importance. Hence Fraser's fear of exciting jealousies with former connections is understandable:

Consulted our landlord about the German Furriers, he seems to think he can get the business managed for me; if so I shall like it better than to apply to Schneider or any at the Traders as it might excite Jealouseys & apprehensions<sup>36</sup>.

Whether Fraser was successful in making direct contact with the German furriers is unknown, but it is likely as Schneider had become aware of an under-the-table deal. Later correspondence reveals that the House's connection with him came to a discordant end. James Hallowell and his colleagues at the Montreal house, McTavish & Frobisher, were surprised at Schneider's new connection, and mused in writing to McTavish:

A Robertson is not the kind of man Schneider would have chosen for his agent, but [...] on the other hand the rage & vindictive transfer of Schneider may have urged him to act in a manner we think inconsistent with his own interests<sup>37</sup>.

Fortunately for the firm its reputation remained intact.

The Company's associations with external business partners can be characterised as loose and flexible. Given the variety of strong markets outside England, in Russia, France, Holland and Germany, it made good business sense to form loose commercial connections with trading partners. This highly globalised process of networking afforded the Company the necessary flexibility to respond to the varying demands of the trade. If it was in its best commercial interests to do so, the enterprise also showed itself ruthless enough to end established partnerships, such as that with John Brickwood (a fellow Scot who was also a supplier to the North West Company), in favour of Schneider. Indeed, the Company continually reconfigured its connections and tried to find new partners and spread the risk and cost of its endeavours. For example, Alexander Mackenzie proposed to the prominent shipper, John Murray (a Scot based in New York) a plan to ship furs to Hamburg on joint account: "I proposed to Murray to ship

some furs on joint acc't to Hambro. He did not like it until he heard of the fate of that which has been sent & I see there can be no difficulty in making up the twenty M Drs Expected from the Beaver with the assistance of Mr Murray's loan"<sup>38</sup>.

These instances (and there are many others) suggest that the Company's connections were fluid and subject to alteration, countering Richard Drayton's view of imperial trading networks as "systems of connected repetition and repeated connection"<sup>39</sup>. Drayton suggests that the key to understanding the development of networks lies in the oceanography of the maritime world. He contends that "the profits to be made from slaves, sugar, tobacco, furs, cottons ... came into collaboration with the oceanic winds and currents, and built cycles of repeated engagement"<sup>40</sup>. However, it is apparent that the web of connections the agency cast was formed in spite of natural geography and was essentially tactical, strategic and creative. To a certain extent a locality's geographic position aided a business in forming and integrating itself into wider webs of connections, but this hardly accounts for the actual organisation and management of these networks. For instance although the Company's approach to networking in the external sphere can be characterised as loose and flexible, this contrasts with the internal structure of the enterprise, where concentrated kin networks dominated its management and control. This is reflected in the London House and is also true of the Montreal firm. For example, in 1795 the partners of McTavish & Frobisher were Simon McTavish, his nephew William McGillivray and his kinsmen John Gregory and Joseph Frobisher. In 1802 the House expanded to encompass Simon McTavish, William McGillivray and his brother Duncan (McTavish's nephew), John Gregory (kinsman), Roderick Mackenzie (brother in law to McTavish's wife and the brother of Alexander Mackenzie, formerly an agent of the firm) and William Hallowell (son of James Hallowell accountant of the firm and said to be a distant relation of McTavish)<sup>41</sup>. At the micro level of the trade these tight kin networks ensured that the management of the Company was cohesive and robust when it needed to be and provided it with a base from which to develop an assortment of networks with autonomous business partners at the macro level.

Between these two Houses, McTavish & Fraser and McTavish, Frobisher & Co., the balance of power ebbed and flowed. The London agency was important in the formation and development of outside connections with European buyers, but this depended on the activities of its sister House in Montreal. Their relations were not without tension. James Hallowell (accountant of McTavish & Frobisher), Joseph Frobisher and John Gregory collectively wrote to McTavish & Fraser (with a duplicate addressed personally to John Fraser) to remind the latter of the sacrifices their firm had made and "shall cheerfully make others for the promotion of our common Interests and the preservation of our common Credit"<sup>42</sup>. This extract captures the relationship between these two staging posts in the North West Company's operation and the extent to which they were bound together for the advancement of their commercial interests.

The tension within this chain was also evident when Frobisher attempted to assert the position of the Montreal House over London, reminding Fraser that “for the ruin of your whole concern, you must be well aware, depends on our stability”<sup>43</sup>. B.R. Tomlinson argues that by the late 18th century the character of socio-entrepreneurial networks heralded the arrival of a new, more centralised structure under British control<sup>44</sup>. However, the transnational nature of the Company’s networks can best be described using Hancock’s term ‘multi-local’<sup>45</sup>. The organisation’s activities in both Montreal and London, and their relationship to one another, complicate Patrick K. O’Brien’s argument that it was conditions at home that allowed for private enterprise to venture overseas<sup>46</sup>. The development of the Company’s connections depended upon the co-operation and co-ordination of both of the organisation’s staging posts in Montreal and London. While the London House was forming connections with continental buyers such as Schneider, the Montreal House was looking to associations it had built up in North America for capital, as seen in the case of the shipper John Murray, who as we have seen jointly shipped furs to Hamburg with the North West Company. The connections the Company formed with outside business interests were located both outside and inside the metropolis. The activities of these private merchants serve to undermine the ‘hub and spoke’ model common in the historical literature, as the enterprise was constructed through the movement of goods and capital across multiple boundaries. Significantly, the commercial links it developed to facilitate this system were flexible and subject to reconfiguration.

The development and expansion of the North West Company was many sided. The Company’s practice of networking and the nature of its associations suggest that the late 18th-century imperial British economy was highly fluid and mobile. Within the management of the subsidiary Houses kin networks prevailed, while loose connections with outside interests allowed the Company to be both pragmatic and expedient in its endeavours. Through these networks interaction and exchange of commodities occurred between different European powers, with goods continually crossing boundaries, but the networks of these private merchants operating in the British Empire were not repetitious as Drayton suggests. The Company required a flexibility to ensure it could respond to gluts in the market, the problematic conditions of war, or a poor choice of correspondent. For this reason the connections that existed can be described as fragile, as fur-trading patterns continually altered due to the sensitive nature and pressures of the trade. The interaction and integration of the connections and business arrangements that crossed boundaries were moreover intermittent and subject to tensions that arose between the two Houses. The fluid nature of these connections, and the fact they were formed at both ends of the imperial spectrum (in the metropolis and the periphery), further complicate the argument that mercantile networks were becoming more centralised. Indeed, given that the fur trade was, as Alexander Mackenzie argued, “a very heavy business”, it was essential for mercantile adventurers such as the Nor’ West-erners to be fleet of foot in their ambitious pursuit of trade.

## PEOPLE

If MacQuarrie highlights how the pursuit of wealth among emerging merchant elites drove forward transnational activism, so the multi-national project of constructing a transcontinental railway line intersected with national politics and informed the identity of workers. In doing so it complicated and distorted the simple lines of power that were assumed by 19th-century nationalism. Therefore, we turn now to the commutative linkages that emerged from the industrial age, highlighting how even in the age of nation-state formation borders were porous, as the states themselves repeatedly undercut the homogeneity implicit in the national project. The analysis offered here by Momir Samardžić and Darina Martykánová – by examining the kinds of shared transnational identities that might develop in the context of transcontinental ambition – illustrates precisely how the process of state formation might have, in the international arena, augmented and enabled transnational industrial enterprise.

Means of transport are, of course, of the utmost importance for the economic development of a country. Thus, it is not surprising that in modern Europe transnational links and infrastructures have been political and economic priorities. Modern economies based on mass production could hardly have fully developed in 19th-century Europe without new types of transport. Railways contributed to the industrial revolution with their own revolution in transport, and thus became the leading technology of transnational communication<sup>47</sup>. This new type of transport also expanded the possibilities for administrative and military control over territory, acting as tentacles of the interventionist and transformative state which was under construction in that period. Finally, by facilitating the exchange and expansion of ideas to an unprecedented extent, it contributed to a radical transformation of Europe and the world.

Capital exports and railway construction represented important factors in the creation of a more unified European economic system. At the same time they helped fuel a growth in trade unimaginable in the pre-railways era. Inclusion of poorly-developed areas that were rich in food and raw materials, and which provided good markets for industrial products, was of the utmost importance for industrialized countries such as Great Britain, France, Belgium, Germany and, to certain extent, Austria-Hungary. Investment was oriented towards the construction of a trans-European transport network and, as a logical next step, towards the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states under its increasingly precarious control<sup>48</sup>. Beyond the strictly economic sphere, the Great Powers viewed Balkan railway construction through the prism of their own strategic interests within the broader context of the expected dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the resolution of the so-called Eastern question. As well as a focal point of international competition, the Balkan railways can moreover be understood as the product of a transnational group of experts and a diverse, multiethnic and multi-religious group of workers. Therefore, the Balkan railways cannot be studied within a narrow framework

of national history. Rather, it should be approached from the perspective of international relations, as well as from a truly transnational perspective, which allows issues to be addressed that cannot be reduced to the one-on-one clash of national interests<sup>49</sup>.

Improving transport proved to be especially important in a geopolitically crucial territory such as the Balkans, with its “mountain chaos” where “ranges run from north to south and west to east”<sup>50</sup>. Railways, especially the large cross-border lines, were, from the very beginning, perceived as highly significant not only from the economic but also from military and political points of view<sup>51</sup>. Apart from individual fortune-seekers, they attracted foreign powers which saw an opportunity to promote expansionist policies. Competing plans for trans-Balkan railways “mirrored the international rivalry in this cockpit of Europe” and “inspired trials of strength” between Europe’s Great Powers<sup>52</sup>. But they also reflected the interests of small, local states as Balkan versions of imperialism met with diverse struggles for national unification.

The British were the pioneers of railroad construction in the Balkans. Beginning in the 1830s, British entrepreneurs carried out railway reconnaissance in the Middle East. Their main goal was the construction of a line passing through the Balkans and Asia Minor towards the Persian Gulf, thus establishing a connection with India and opening up Western Asia for future exploitation. The first railway project in the Balkan Ottoman territories, the line from Cernavoda to Constanza (in present-day Rumania) was halted in 1839 due to Russian opposition and could only be built after the Crimean War (1853-1856). That conflict, followed by the opening of the Ottoman Empire to more direct Western influence and intervention, constituted an important turning point in the construction of railways in Ottoman territory. After the war Great Britain and France wanted to use their newly-established influence to build railways and thereby open the interior Ottoman market by providing access to food and raw materials. The first Balkan railways, Cernavoda to Constanza (64 km) and Rushchuk to Varna (224 km), opened in 1860 and 1866 respectively. By-passing the Danube delta, they opened Rumanian markets to British trade. The idea of opening the Ottoman market was also behind the proposal of British entrepreneurs during the 1850s to construct a trans-Balkan railway that would connect the Ottoman capital with the Austrian border near Belgrade<sup>53</sup>.

Despite the fact that the idea was British, the greatest credit for the final success of the trans-Balkan railway belongs to the Habsburg Monarchy (from 1867 Austria-Hungary). The Austrian *Drang zum Meer* was a direct consequence of the economic, political, and strategic interests of the Dual Monarchy in the Balkans. Its goal was to halt British and French commercial penetration, as well as Russian hopes of obtaining control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, while at the same time solving the Eastern question and securing unrestricted access to the Mediterranean and agrarian exports from Ukraine. Austria-Hungary did everything it could to fulfill the contract signed between Baron Maurice de Hirsch (Moritz von Hirsch), a banker from Brussels, and the Sublime Porte in 1869.



The period between the start of construction of the trans-Balkan railway in 1870 and its opening in 1888 witnessed almost two decades of construction, changes in planning, and negotiations between Austria-Hungary and the governments of the Balkan states (the Ottoman Empire, Serbia and, from 1878, Bulgaria), as well as between these governments and different construction companies. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878 the Great Powers officially recognized Austria-Hungary's decisive role in the successful completion of the railway line that by running through Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, finally connected central and western Europe with the Ottoman capital<sup>54</sup>.

The Trans-Balkan railway from Belgrade to Constantinople was the only one of the numerous large railway projects that was actually completed. The late 19th and early 20th century was marked by the struggle between the two great diplomatic blocs to complete another trans-Balkan railway project. In the 1890s the Serbs and Russians revived the idea of a Danube-Adriatic line that would end on the Albanian coast and thus connect Russia and Rumania with the Adriatic while giving the Russians an additional sea outlet in the Mediterranean independent of Ottoman control. Italy wished to connect the Albanian coast near Valona with the Macedonian lines (the so-called 'trans-Pindar project') so as gradually to create its own sphere of interest in southern Albania. The Austrian 'answer' to all such plans was the Novibazar Railway Project, a north-south line connecting Austrian routes in Bosnia with existing Ottoman track leading to the Aegean and Thessaloniki and thus avoiding Serbia.

Predictably, Balkan nation-states played an important role in these railway plans. Their elites hoped to use the railways to speed up economic development in order to lessen their peripheral role in the European economy. They showed interest in the railway as a means of pursuing expansionist policies. The Bulgarian government thus prepared a trans-Balkan railway plan which by providing access to Macedonia, would benefit Bulgarian interests and aspirations. Similarly, the government in Athens hoped to connect Greek lines with those in Macedonia. Yet it was the Serbian scheme for the Adriatic line which attracted the greatest international attention. For decades Serbia had looked to the construction of this railway as a means of escaping Austro-Hungarian political and economic control. At the same time, a transport line through those Ottoman territories partially inhabited by Serbs and thus the object of Serbian expansion was seen as a means that could facilitate their future acquisition<sup>55</sup>.

None of these plans was carried out despite their being for more than a decade the object of diplomatic negotiations among interested Great Powers, Balkan nation-states, and the Sublime Porte. Ottoman authorities were cautious and sometimes reluctant to license projects, torn as they were between a desire to modernize and fear of the penetration of foreign powers and of stimulating Balkan nationalist movements. During and after the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909), the Ottoman state tried to bring railway building under its control, not only to prevent wasting money through speculation, but also in order to secure its strategic interests<sup>56</sup>.

As has already been noted, the export of capital was an important factor in the creation of a single European economic system. The construction of a 2,500 kilometre rail line (the length agreed upon by the Ottoman government and Hirsch in 1869) was an enormous enterprise. While demanding huge amounts of investment and technical knowledge and experience, it promised enormous profits for the builder and organizer of the enterprise. Estimates of major profits attracted foreign capital and united banking firms from many different European countries. French, British, Belgian and Austrian investors were tempted by the opportunity to unite their resources and become a part of this great industrial endeavor.

The history of the first trans-Balkan railway provides an excellent example of the difficulties inherent in developing transnational economic cooperation in an area intersected by the interests of powerful states, and where laying a few kilometers of railtrack could lead to disputes between several ministries of foreign affairs. In such circumstances, foreign capital had to adapt by seeking state support and by serving political goals<sup>57</sup>. During the 1850s and the 1860s British entrepreneurs enjoyed the support of a government always attentive to national trade interests. Likewise, Austro-Hungarian diplomacy supported the owner of the first Constantinople-Belgrade concession in 1867, Count Langrand-Dumonceau, who headed a consortium which included the Belgian *Van der Elst & Compagnie*, the Parisian *Crédit foncier* and a group of London banks. Also receiving political backing were the Rothschilds' Viennese *Anglo-Österreichische Bank* and *Kredit Anstalt* during their unsuccessful negotiations, while the final concessionaire Baron Maurice de Hirsch, a banker from Brussels, was connected with one of the most powerful banker families, the Bischoffsheims<sup>58</sup>.

In 1869 Hirsch came to an agreement with the Sublime Porte to construct a trans-Balkan railway linking Constantinople, Adrianople (Edirne), Philippopolis (Plovdiv), Sofia, Nish, Prishtina, Mitrovica, Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Novi (on the border with Austria-Hungary), with branches to Alexandroupolis (Dedeğaç) on the Aegean Sea, Yambol, the Serbian border and Thessaloniki. Even though this line was longer and more expensive, thanks to its route through the mountainous regions of Bosnia, Hirsch adapted the project to the strategic interests of the Austrian (not the Austro-Hungarian) and Ottoman governments. The main concern of the Austrians was a connection bypassing Hungary, while the Sublime Porte wished to avoid Serbia, whose government was denying its authority over this activity. Simultaneously, French and Austrian bankers and entrepreneurs were trying to reach an agreement with the Serbian government to start construction and thus open the Serbian market to foreign trade<sup>59</sup>.

The situation became even more complex after the Congress of Berlin, as Serbia became independent and the vassal Principality of Bulgaria emerged on the line of the trans-Balkan railway. Other financiers and constructors replaced Hirsch, and only the construction of the Bulgarian portion was financed by native investors. The competition for the construction and exploitation of the Serbian railway was particularly intricate. In the

end the Serbian government, facing a choice between Austrian, Russian, French and British banks and companies, made the mistake of giving the concession to the French *Société de l'Union Générale*, which was itself connected with the *Österreichische Ländersbank*. The French bank went bankrupt in early 1882 while negotiating with Hirsch over the purchase of the concession for the exploitation of the Ottoman railways. With support from Austria-Hungary, the Serbian government was saved by the *Comptoir national d'escompte*. This banking firm played an important role in the final chapter of the construction of the trans-Balkan railway when, together with the *Banque impériale ottomane* (the Ottoman state bank, opened in 1863 and controlled by the French and British), it came to an agreement with the Sublime Porte and finished the job Hirsch had started. Finally, German capital stepped in. In 1890 a group of banks led by the *Deutsche Bank* and *Wiener Bankverein* signed a contract with Hirsch through which they bought from him a quarter of the shares of the company (eventually, this syndicate of banks acquired 88%). In the same year the *Bank für orientalische Eisenbahnen* was founded in Zurich; a consortium of banks drawn mainly from Germany, Austria and Switzerland, it also included the *Banque impériale ottomane*<sup>60</sup>.

Balkan railways not only represented an opportunity for the circulation of capital. They also constituted a space of knowledge. The people who worked building the railways constituted *ad hoc* transnational communities. This did not mean an idyllic environment in which differences did not matter. Instead, power was distributed and hierarchies were organized along national, socio-cultural and ethno-religious lines. Many workers were recruited locally, but there were also poorly-paid migrants such as the Crimean Tatars who worked on the Constanza railway<sup>61</sup>. Foreign companies often preferred to import engineers and qualified workers, and were inclined to hire people from their own country of origin. Sometimes, the companies were linked to industrial interests and favored the use of domestic components, which also privileged resort to foreign expertise. Ottoman laws did not impose any conditions as to the hiring of local engineers; quite the contrary, the graduates of Ottoman schools of engineering, mainly Muslims from the Balkans and Anatolia, were engaged in military and civil administration and were actively discouraged from working for private companies or as liberal professionals. First, foreign companies did not trust the expertise of Ottoman subjects and preferred to import qualified staff. However, the companies soon found it worth their while to employ men who knew how to deal with the local and central authorities, as well as with the workers. Rumanians, Bulgarians, Greeks and other Ottoman Christians (including Armenians, who were heirs of a centuries-long tradition of architecture and engineering) were an obvious choice in this regard. Some of them had studied in the schools founded in the Balkans during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Others had received their education abroad, and many had acquired their knowledge through practical training. Also involved were Polish and Hungarian émigrés who settled in the Ottoman lands, as well as adventurers and opportunity-seekers from various European countries and further afield.

Engineering work was not limited to the technical aspects of railway-building. Rather, it also involved taking on administration and management on behalf of the investing companies. Bringing engineers, clerks, and workers of different origins to work together on these projects led to an exchange of knowledge which took place on different levels, involving not only technical skills but also what nowadays would be called intercultural management. French was the *lingua franca* of the multilingual and multi-ethnic community of people who participated in this enterprise<sup>62</sup>. And during the different phases of the railway construction, profitable multilateral relations were established. Foreign experts obtained prestigious jobs they might never have secured in their countries of origin and obtained access to the kind of expertise that distinguished them from their less mobile colleagues. Local experts enjoyed well-paid jobs, established important international contacts, and cast themselves in the role of mediators between the westerners and the Ottoman administration. For talented local young men, the construction of the railways often meant an opportunity to learn from foreign and local experts and become engineers in their own right. In many cases, work on the railways built under Ottoman rule constituted a step towards the configuration of the scientific-technical elites of the new Balkan nation-states. Furthermore, the railways represent a space of configuration of the trade union movement within Ottoman territory, which serve as yet another example of a phenomenon of transnational dimensions.

The brief overview offered here suggests that the construction of the Balkan railways is a research topic that can be best approached from multiple perspectives. Over-emphasizing borders that were more or less easily crossed by 19th-century railroads would be an all too eloquent example of nationalist narrow-mindedness. A more reasonable alternative would point to the existence of different levels on which complex dynamics of political, economic and social factors operated and intervened. Foremost amongst these was the interaction between the construction of the railways and the creation of nation-states. Such a highly contested issue as the construction of railroads in a territory which was of general strategic interest, and where a radical questioning of the legitimacy of imperial rule was taking place, invites us to resort to political, economic, social and even cultural history. A careful combination of these approaches can shed light on all the different aspects of Balkan railway construction and administration. Moreover, future research should pay special attention to the Balkan railways as a *lieu* of exchange of knowledge, scientific and technical as well as administrative and linguistic; and one which fostered the participation of workers, engineers, administrators and businessmen from many different countries, who spoke different languages, professed different religions and supported different ideological opinions. In this respect, the truly transnational space of knowledge that developed around the Balkan railways may have paradoxically contributed to the dissemination, appropriation and hybridization of the physical and discursive tools that were to contribute in a decisive way to the transformation of the Balkans into a mosaic of nation-states. In our opinion, this case

suggests that both national history and the history of international relations should be accompanied and enriched by the analysis of transnational dimensions.

## IDEAS

The study of the transcontinental railway line and the complexity of achieving its completion remind us of some of the practical limits that nation-state formation imposed on economic development. Moreover, in the coming together of a transnational collection of experts, it sets in relief how the state systems of the 19th century acted to corral, confine, coordinate and control their subjects. The census, that great 19th-century innovation which located and labelled the transient population it oversaw, presumed static populations. It accorded people a geographic location, an economic place, a racial or political personhood and a unitary identity. Migrants had the awkward habit of evading the eye of the administrator, slipping through the categories into which bureaucrats systematically divided the world, thus upsetting their calculations. They were thus banished from the official imagination.

This crude refusal to accommodate for the actual experience of people and communities has, perhaps surprisingly, survived the horrors of the 20th century, when the desire to quantify and calculate was coupled with murderous intent, in what Michael Mann has called the “dark side of democracy”<sup>63</sup>. The conflicts of the last century did, however, inspire one positive institutional impulse: the determination to develop international norms and protocols that sought to lighten the darkness of democracy and preclude the kinds of conflict that displaced and disrupted populations and peoples. This impulse has a history of its own, and one that has a trans-national dimension. In Marianna Christopolos’ study of John Gennadius it becomes evident how an international array of influences informed and shaped transnational jurisprudence.

One of the principal as well as oldest means of settling international disputes is arbitration. Instead of resorting to conflict, states appeal to a neutral party (arbiter) in search of resolution, laying down the rules through which the arbiter is to form his judgment. During the 19th century the proliferation of compulsory arbitration treaties, mostly between Latin American countries, along with the appearance of an influential European movement of intellectuals and jurists favoring the concept, marked the beginning of a new epoch. What its advocates sought was the codification of international law in order to establish a solid legal framework for the resolution of differences between states, as well as the creation of permanent institutions, such as a court of arbitration.

The dynamic of this movement became evident during the proceedings of the first Hague Conference, held in 1899. The limits on implementing arbitration, along with the possible inclusion of arbitration in inter-state treaties, were two of the main subjects under discussion. The participants decided on a Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which provided for international commissions of

inquiry and the establishment of a Permanent Court of Arbitration. The term ‘court’ notwithstanding, it was in essence a panel of individual jurists, from whom the Court would be composed following a request by the states involved. Rules were also formulated regarding the procedures to be followed<sup>64</sup>. The conference’s major goal was to recognize arbitration as an official, international practice for resolving disputes. Nonetheless, due to the reservations and skepticism of some participants concerning possible unfavorable consequences for their standing in foreign affairs, arbitration remained optional and limited to cases that would ‘involve neither honor nor essential interests’. Reservations and restrictions aside, the proceedings influenced most of the 70 treaties of arbitration concluded between the first and the second Hague Conference (1904)<sup>65</sup>.

As expected, international arbitration attracted the interest of diplomats, politicians and jurists, who produced a massive corpus of pamphlets, treatises and journals on the subject<sup>66</sup>. Among them can be found a pamphlet by a former Greek diplomat, John Gennadius (1834-1932)<sup>67</sup>. It is actually the compilation of four articles published in 1904 in the journal “Broader Views” under the general title *A Record of International Arbitration*<sup>68</sup>. Believing that institutions are evolving entities, Gennadius stressed the need to study the long-run evolution of arbitration and presented a succession of cases from Antiquity to his own times. While he favored meticulous narration of these cases to in-depth political analysis, his text remains an interesting case-study, one which offers an insider’s view of the weaknesses and the strengths of arbitration as discerned by a diplomat of a fledgling Balkan state, Greece, which moreover claimed to be the heir to classical Antiquity.

The author divided his 78-page chronicle of international arbitration into five periods: Greek Antiquity, Rome, the Middle Ages, and the ‘Modern’ and Contemporary eras. Influenced by current philosophical trends, Gennadius introduced the idea of progress as a basic concept for understanding different civilizations and epochs<sup>69</sup>. He moreover closely associated progress with religion, which he saw as forging the context as well as the development of basic institutions. With this criterion in mind he excluded from his analysis all Eastern civilizations, noting that their religious beliefs engendered despotism, intolerance, war and fear of the supernatural, notions incompatible with the primary principles of arbitration, which he deemed to be freedom, equality and tolerance<sup>70</sup>. This prejudice against Eastern, non-Christian civilizations was instilled in him by the power and ‘superiority’ of the British Empire, in whose capital city he had resided for decades.

Concentrating on Europe and America, and ever proud of his own country’s history, Gennadius traced the earliest and most complete form of inter-state arbitration to Greek Antiquity, and particularly to the function of the *Amphictyons*. The most famous and long lasting Amphictyony was the Delphic, a religious council of 12 members representing the dozen tribes into which the Greek people were originally divided<sup>71</sup>.

Amphictyony was mainly concerned with money and other offerings at the Temple of Apollo, but due to the power of religion and to the strength of Pan-Hellenic respect for the Delphic oracle, disputes were arbitrated there, and on certain occasions the Amphictyony “became the representative body through which united Greece made her voice heard”<sup>72</sup>. It is worth noting that Gennadius devoted 24 pages, approximately a quarter of the pamphlet, to the philosophy and exercise of arbitration in ancient Greece, which reflected his aim of enhancing the stature of modern Greece by reminding Europe that his country was the first to pave the way for the advancement of civilization.

When treating the Roman Empire, Gennadius stressed that, in spite of the existence of *recuperatores*, judges for the conciliation of disputes between Roman citizens and strangers, and the *fetiales*, priests who, in their capacity as ambassadors, had the duty to declare war and confirm treaties, Rome did not in essence apply arbitration. In its international affairs and due to its feeling of supremacy towards other peoples, it turned arbitration into a mere formality<sup>73</sup>. For similar reasons, the Pope and the Holy Roman Empire did not fully appreciate the idea of arbitration, despite their claim to adhere to Christian values of love and peace. Thus the idea of arbitration stagnated during the late Antique and medieval periods. Reading between Gennadius's lines, one can see that he believed that the major obstacle to the development of arbitration was recourse to it by autocratic institutions such as the papacy or empires. The obvious implication is that international arbitration should be organized along different lines, especially in terms of equality.

The chapter on modern times, with the subtitle “growth of opinion in support of arbitration”, is a favorable account of the advance of the idea of arbitration and international law. Gennadius explored both theory and practice. The Great Design planned by the French statesman Sully was one of the most representative examples of the new spirit. In 1603, this minister of king Henri IV envisioned a political reorganization of Europe that would be result in a loose federation of 15 member-states, to be known as the ‘*République Très Chrétien*’. This Republic would be administered by a Council of 40 delegates, which, as Gennadius pointed out, resembled the ancient Council of Amphictyons. Differences between the member states would be submitted to the Council for compulsory arbitration. The project provided for a federal army which would be responsible for the République's defense against external enemies and for the execution of the Council's decisions within its borders. This ambitious project, however, was never carried out due, among many other reasons, to the king's assassination in 1610. Gennadius attributed its failure to at least two other factors. The first was the current state of international law, which was still ‘undefined’ and unable to offer an adequate basis for discussion of this scheme. The other was his suggestion that the ulterior motives of the great powers, such as France's efforts, by this scheme, to weaken the Habsburg Empire, would face opposition from rival states.

The Great Design is one of the foundation stones of Gennadius's inquiry into the development of political thought. He went on to list key intellectuals whose works had

formed the philosophical substructure upon which projects for international institutions were based. This list included such names as Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Sir James Dalrymple (1619-1695), Gottfried Leibnitz (1646-1716), the Abbé de Saint Pierre (1658-1743), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)<sup>74</sup>. According to Gennadius, their principles were introduced into practical politics through the establishment of alliances among the Great Powers. The Holy Alliance (created in 1815 after the Napoleonic wars) and the Concert of Europe (a 19th-century system of diplomatic collaboration among the European Powers) occasionally functioned as tribunals of arbitration, or indirectly promoted it<sup>75</sup>. Gennadius referred to them as the 'moral agencies' that made arbitration a recognized principle of international politics<sup>76</sup>. He believed that the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe had managed to preserve peace for almost 40 years, but he acknowledged that their decisions ranged from acts which promoted international cooperation, such as the establishment of International Courts in Egypt (1875-1885), to those which increased mistrust between states, as in the case of the oppression of weaker nations, as when at the Ljubljana Conference in 1821 the Holy Alliance had condemned the Greek revolution against Ottoman rule. Gennadius's reservation did not, however, stem merely from injured patriotism. It was also rooted in his own experience as a diplomat of a weaker state subject to the collaboration of the Great Powers.

While in Europe arbitration remained a 'byproduct' precisely of this limited sort of collaboration, in the American continent, countries had started to include arbitration clauses in bilateral state agreements, and to exercise it, albeit in an ad hoc fashion, through committees established for resolving disputes<sup>77</sup>. Similar trends developed gradually in Europe. In the British Parliament, for example, in 1849 Richard Cobden (1804-1865) suggested that arbitration clauses should be included in all the treaties signed by Great Britain<sup>78</sup>. This increasingly favorable climate gradually led to the transformation of arbitration into a judicial process, in which both jurists and representative bodies would become involved. However, arbitration was resorted to mostly by small states, or for questions of secondary importance, until the so-called Alabama Case.

In 1871 the Washington Treaty between the USA and Great Britain ended a long-standing dispute by submitting it to arbitration. Since the end of the American Civil War (1865) the US had been claiming compensation for damages done to Union ships by Confederate warships built in Great Britain. It was referred to as the 'Alabama Case' from the name of one of the Confederate ships that had attacked Union vessels. The claims were left pending until the Washington Treaty stipulated that the dispute be settled by an international court of arbitration. The mutual agreement of these two powers to submit to arbitration, along with Britain's acceptance of the final decision in 1872, was recognized by many, including Gennadius, as the prime example thus far of skilful arbitration by a body of private individuals which had arrived at a solution "leaving unscathed the prestige of both litigants"<sup>79</sup>. More and more European states would



follow suit. These political developments were backed by public opinion, as expressed in journals and newspapers, and in the activities of associations and leagues of a multinational makeup.

Gennadius's narrative concludes with a notable prediction; namely, that while the power inherent in arbitration would lead to its further development, not all cases were "amenable to the test of arbitration", and that war continue to take place<sup>80</sup>. The accelerating rearmament of the Great Powers and Greco-Bulgarian rivalry over Macedonia probably strengthened his conviction that war would remain a part of the political game. Therefore, he could not state with certainty the fortunes of arbitration in the future. Gennadius had previously, however, mentioned that the ideal of universality was a legacy from ancient Greek philosophy to the notion of arbitration. Democritus, he added, stated that "for the wise man every country is habitable, since to the virtuous all the world is a Fatherland"<sup>81</sup>. While Gennadius looked to arbitration as strengthening the cause of peace and the feeling of unity among nations, he clearly could not ignore the weight of countervailing forces moving in the opposite direction.

It was not just Gennadius who sensed that arbitration would bring about changes in the interaction between states. In 1896, a leading British jurist and firm advocate of arbitration, John Westlake (1828-1913), predicted that although the states of his era would support international arbitration, they would reject any form of international government that curtailed their power. He did add, however, that:

It is difficult to resist the conviction that the tendencies are already in operation which in a remote future may crystallize into some form of international government [...] the route by which this good will be reached will depend on the unpredictable circumstance which we call chance [...] We may believe that in a thousand of years from now there will be a United States of Europe and a United States of all America<sup>82</sup>.

Given the period in which Gennadius and Westlake were writing it is only natural that they did not go so far as to state that arbitration could be exercised within a federal Europe or an integrated European legal system. Gennadius's text was written at the dawn of the 20th century, when sovereignty in both its internal and external aspects was one of the fundamental attributes of statehood. National sovereignty had become the source of lawmaking within borders<sup>83</sup>, while the state strove to safeguard its external sovereignty by the establishment of institutions that would act as barriers against foreign interference<sup>84</sup>. A federal Europe, within which arbitration could be freely exercised, would therefore remain a distant and apparently utopian ideal. States were unwilling to relinquish part of their sovereignty by participating in schemes that required any such sacrifice, at least at that stage.

Proposals for compulsory arbitration treaties and a permanent court of arbitration developed slowly in Europe precisely out of fear of their threat to state sovereignty, and for decades the proper function of arbitration depended upon the ethical commitment of states to comply with such decisions. Yet despite these reservations international

arbitration became institutionalized toward the end of the 19th century mainly due to the steady increase in successful cases of arbitration. It also helped that the rules upon which the arbitrator would adjudicate were decided by the litigating states. This facilitated legal encounters between countries of different juridical and cultural backgrounds in which the parties could supercede, if necessary, the formalities of their own legal systems by applying either to an agreed national law or to international law. This meant that arbitration could be a very effective means of worldwide legal intercourse beyond the Eurocentric perceptions of Gennadius and the men of his time.

Arbitrators' decisions set precedents for the development of arbitration as part of international jurisprudence and, in the course of time, it evolved into one of the basic means of integrating domestic (or municipal) and international law. All the cases cited in Gennadius's treatise involved cases of inter-state arbitration, since the litigants were states promoting their interests or representing individual nationals. However, the establishment of the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in 1923 inaugurated a new epoch in resolution of commercial differences, and to some extent in the resolution of disputes between states and private or corporate bodies<sup>85</sup>. This bestowed upon arbitration a truly transnational character<sup>86</sup>.

Defenders of arbitration rallied around numerous associations which worked for perpetual peace through international institutions. The 'multinational' character of these associations, such as the *Institut de Droit International*, the International Arbitration and Peace Association, *La Société Française pour l'Arbitrage entre les Nations*, and the American Society of International Law, supported the cause of arbitration by appealing not only to governments but also to a worldwide public<sup>87</sup>. With the establishment of journals like the *Revue de Droit International* these bodies created channels through which the public could be informed of arbitration and international law, and aspired to influence political decision-making<sup>88</sup>. This was only the beginning of the contribution of such bodies to the promotion of international legal institutions related to global values. An even greater role was to be played subsequently in the definition of human rights and their inclusion in international organizations<sup>89</sup>.

In his modest treatise Gennadius was not able to predict the enormous changes that the European legal order would undergo a century later. Analyzing the evolution of arbitration from Antiquity to his own times, he traced those elements which had promoted or hindered it and concluded by simply communicating, combining hope with skepticism, his sense of the 'inherent potential' of arbitration. His insight was completely in tune with the needs of his era and, more indirectly, with those of a small European nation that was experiencing, in its own way, international politics and practices. Arbitration was a notion that, beginning in the 16th century, had developed alongside ideas of unity and cooperation. This theoretical and empirical tradition, along with many other factors, helped to pave the way towards greater integration. It seems imperative to follow up with further study these 'integrating' factors and the historical contexts within

which they have developed. Their broad spectrum extends from communications and trade, to human values, political institutions and economic policies. It is upon these elements that new communities (imaginary or real) are based. The European Union seems to be, so far, the best example.

## TEXTS

Far from being another narrative of state-building and nation-making, Gennadius had as his focus the liminal space between states and the intersections of nations. This can also be found beyond both, on the seas, where no state's sanction holds sway. Indeed, international law has one of its roots in the consideration of international waters and the norms that might be expected to be observed there. From as far back as Hugo Grotius's 1609 treatise, *Mare Liberum* [The Free Sea], the trade routes that have connected Europe to its imperial outposts have prompted reflection on the natural law that underlies any state structure<sup>90</sup>. This legal vantage-point on transnational history carries us beyond the growth and development of institutions of power and forces us to attend to the cultural, intellectual and philosophical underpinnings of their construction. The interaction and exchange of norms that are involved in any international treaty reveal something of the cultural predicates involved, and of the shared norms and ambitions that provide a context for mutual understanding and agreed action.

This is even the case when the result of international agreement is the development of new institutions of power-sharing and power management. Thus, the European Union has a cultural history that is embedded in a transnational context. The immediate context was, of course, the carnage of the Second World War, and the desire to re-establish trade networks in its wake. But the concept was also built upon a shared idea of Europe that had its roots in a medieval concept of Christendom, a shared experience of national communitarianism and a shared value system founded on variations of republicanism, democracy and liberalism<sup>91</sup>. Alongside such regionalism, there was also an emerging global politics, exemplified first in the League of Nations and then the United Nations. The ideals which underpin the latter are embodied in the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Here Hanne Hagtvedt Vik provides a pre-history of this document.

The concept of human rights is today often regarded in a global context and is recognized as a pillar of international politics. It was propelled into diplomatic language during the Second World War and in the immediate post-war years. With the Charter of the United Nations Organization and later human rights treaties it also became part of international law. Historians are increasingly drawn to the study of human rights, explaining why it entered the international political scene at the close of the war, and how the concept was given its particular institutional expression and specific meanings<sup>92</sup>. The term 'transnational history' challenges us to conduct empirical research beyond the diplomatic activities of state representatives and to include the growth and transformation of ideas, as well as the political activism that brought human rights into the

committee rooms in the first place. Lawyers of different national backgrounds came to play a key role in defining the concept of ‘human rights’ and disseminating the vision of international human rights protection to policymakers and the general public. This text explores the background to one of the more significant contributions to defining precisely which rights were to be considered fundamental human rights, namely the ‘Statement of Essential Human Rights’.

This document was drafted under the auspices of the American Law Institute from the fall of 1942 to the early winter of 1944. Although its direct impact on the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights should not be overstated, its drafting and final text influenced the work of the United States Department of State, the San Francisco Conference and, later, that of the United Nations Human Rights Commission<sup>93</sup>. Furthermore, the project also influenced the work of other non-governmental organizations<sup>94</sup>. Thus, the American Law Institute project offers an opportunity to move beyond the committee rooms of international diplomacy and towards a specific investigation of who formulated the new vision of human rights as well as revealing interconnections among the different protagonists. The aim of this text is to identify who contributed to drafting the Statement of Essential Human Rights and through this to shed light on the origins of the vision of human rights which appeared during the Second World War.

Prior to the San Francisco Conference of 1945 the term ‘human rights’ appeared only sporadically in speeches and official documents. It was used interchangeably with terms such as ‘individual rights’, ‘freedom’, ‘rights of man’ and the like. International lawyers were not unfamiliar with the idea that individuals should be protected by international law. The existence of certain individual (or human) rights that states were expected to respect and protect was well established within many countries. There were also scattered institutional and legal precedents at the inter-state level, including the League of Nations’ minority treaties, aspects of the mandates system, the concept of humanitarian intervention and the many conventions developed under the auspices of the International Labour Organisation<sup>95</sup>. The innovation of the mid-1940s lay in the political and legal recognition of the generalized concept of ‘human rights’ at an international level, and the gradual formulation of the concept’s specific meanings, as well as institutions for the practical protection of these rights.

During the interwar years European lawyers played a leading role in attempts to arrive at a generally accepted definition of individual rights. In 1929, the *Institut de Droit International* adopted the “Declaration of the International Rights of Man”. Sixty members of the Institute participated in the meeting held at Briarcliff, New York<sup>96</sup>. There are also some indications that Latin American lawyers were interested in international recognition of the concept of individual rights<sup>97</sup>. Nevertheless, it is very important to remember that the issue of individual rights was only a minor issue in the international legal community at the time. During the war, the initiative passed to lawyers based

in the United States, and the first thorough discussion of international protection of individual rights as part of a post-war international order was possibly the one organized under the auspices of the World Citizens Association at the Onwentsia Club in Lake Forest, Illinois in April 1941. This conference benefited from the participation of intellectuals from various professional and national backgrounds<sup>98</sup>. This multi-cultural, intellectual community of the United States was also an important foundation for the American Law Institute project on an international bill of rights.

The American Law Institute was a private organization for lawyers, judges and law professors in the United States, membership in which was exclusive and considered an honour. With the war raging in Europe, the Institute's Executive Committee decided in 1941 to contribute its "best efforts" to "win the peace"<sup>99</sup>. The formulation of a "model international bill of rights" was identified as the best means of doing this, and represented the Institute's first attempt at formulating international legal principles<sup>100</sup>. At the outset, the organizational set-up of the project was similar to that of a normal Institute project. The core would be a group of advisors charged with drawing up the model bill of rights, which would then be revised and adopted by the Institute's Council. The intention was to transmit the blueprint bill of rights which would then be revised, adopted and transmitted to interested governments as a suggestion for the peace negotiations. For this particular project the Institute's Director, William Draper Lewis, thought that the group of advisors should include individuals with "first-hand knowledge of the legal and constitutional concepts and practices of at least English-speaking, European and Latin-American countries." It was his desire to include experts from other professional backgrounds and he hoped to secure the "sympathy and advice, though not the formal cooperation, of persons in the government"<sup>101</sup>. Lewis later explained that the draft had to appeal to people of "liberal instincts in other countries", and that the group should, therefore, represent a broad diversity of cultural backgrounds and include representatives from Russia, China and India<sup>102</sup>. Due to practical and economic constraints, advisors had to reside in the United States<sup>103</sup>.

Lewis was well connected in the legal community in the United States. Through correspondence and meetings with renowned experts in international law and international organizations, as well as contacts with embassies and officers of international organizations, Lewis put together a list of potential advisors. In September 1942, 17 persons were invited to serve, all of whom accepted. The group that met at the first conference was dominated by American lawyers, all with expertise in relevant fields. Manley O. Hudson and Philip C. Jessup were highly respected international lawyers. Noel T. Dowling and John E. Mulder were experts in constitutional law, including the American Bill of Rights. Warren A. Seavey had long served as a reporter to the A.L.I., and Rowland S. Morris and David Riesman, Jr. were also lawyers. The historian James T. Shotwell was primarily selected because of his position in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an institution Lewis thought important to have close relations

with, especially regarding funding needs. Similar motives lay behind the selection of Jessup and Morris. There was one Canadian member of the group, Percy E. Corbett, who was an international lawyer with close ties to the American legal community.

The European contingent was the second largest; most of whom were also lawyers. Many had fled Europe because of their Jewish backgrounds. Ernst Rabel, an Austrian, was working for the A.L.I. at the time. Karl Loewenstein was German and an expert in comparative constitutional law. Julio Alvarez del Vayo, from Spain, was a jurist, although his appointment to the A.L.I. group of advisers was probably due to his diplomatic expertise as a representative of the Spanish Republic. The British participant, C. Wilfred Jenks, was Legal Advisor to the International Labour Office. Only Henri Laugier, from France, and Ludwik Rajchman, from Poland, had professional backgrounds outside the law. There were also more informal members of the group, the most important being Durward Sandifer of the State Department, whose appointment to the project came after initiatives by William Sanders and William Draper Lewis<sup>104</sup>. Sandifer had worked on international post-war planning from the summer of 1942, and as part of this task he had held a key position in Department of State's effort to draft a bill of rights during the fall of 1942<sup>105</sup>.

There were several obvious problems with the composition of the group in terms of Lewis's desire for a global representation. Only two advisers came from outside North America or Europe: Richard J. Alfaro, from Panama, and Hu Shih, from China. Alfaro was an expert in civil law, while Shih was trained in philosophy, although Lewis admitted that he had some doubt as to 'how far' Shih 'represents Chinese thought'<sup>106</sup>. There was no Russian in the group. Lewis had searched, but had found it hard to locate someone that was not a representative of the Russian government<sup>107</sup>. Another problem, although this did not seem to cause much concern at the time, was that so few had educational backgrounds in fields other than law. It is also important to emphasize that all were men and (except Shih) Caucasian.

The composition of the group changed over time. Some of its members spent much time and effort on the project. Others, like Shotwell and Jessup, neither participated in meetings, nor gave comments as the work progressed<sup>108</sup>. The second conference was held in March 1943, by which time Hudson, Jessup and Shotwell had withdrawn from further work on the project due to heavy commitments elsewhere, as was the case with Laugier<sup>109</sup>. Three European lawyers – Gerhart Husserl, Paul Weill and George M. Wunderlich – had been added to the group, along with the American lawyer Charles E. Kenworthy. In addition to expanding the number of advisers, Lewis hired John R. Ellingston and Lucie Krassa to strengthen the coordination of the project and to assist the sub-committee reporters. Later the same spring, Chicago Law Professor Quincy Wright was added to the group of advisers. Wright was a key figure in the post-war planning discussions of several internationalist organizations, where he had promoted the vision of international human rights protection. During the fall of 1943 the work

was carried out by a so-called special sub-committee, in which American dominance was even greater than before<sup>110</sup>.

For the third and final conference, held in January 1944, Lewis made a renewed effort to include individuals from other geographic and cultural backgrounds. Twenty-two people attended the conference. Hudson reappeared, as did Husserl, Morris, Rabel, Rajchman, Weill and Wunderlicht<sup>111</sup>. Lewis also secured the participation of George 'Leo' M. Barakat, an American of Syrian background, who accepted the invitation to take part in the final meeting to represent the "views and culture of Arabia"<sup>112</sup>. An Italian jurist, Angelo P. Sereni, also participated for the first time<sup>113</sup>. Lewis had long sought to include an Indian member, and he finally succeeded when K.C. Mahindra attended the final conference and made a few written comments. With regard to the southern part of the western hemisphere, Lewis found that although Alfaro had traveled "all over" South America to discuss the Bill of Rights project with lawyers in "all the principal countries", the project was "still short on a proper representative from continental South America"<sup>114</sup>.

In February 1944, William Draper Lewis presented a report to the A.L.I. Council which contained The Statement of Essential Human Rights<sup>115</sup>. After many complicated discussions the final version comprised 18 brief articles, each with a longer explanatory comment. Compared to previous documents on the concept of international individual rights, the A.L.I. version went considerably further by including political and social rights, in addition to the more well known civil and procedural rights. However, the project never really solved the issue of what would be the most efficient way of enforcing rights on an international level. In the end, 23 of those involved in drafting the A.L.I. statement decided to sign the report, two of these with reservations<sup>116</sup>.

The report indicated that the Statement had been drafted by a globally representative group of advisors who, with one exception, unanimously agreed on what rights were to be *the* essential human rights. The front page, for example, stated that the report was produced by a committee of advisors "representing the principal cultures of the world". Thirteen "cultures or countries" were listed as represented among the group of advisers: American, Arabic, British, Canadian, Chinese, French, pre-Nazi German, Italian, Indian, Latin-American, Polish, Soviet Russian, and Spanish. No indication of their level of involvement or relative importance was given. This has also been repeated in historical scholarship, thus suggesting the existence of a consensus around the vision of international human rights protection<sup>117</sup>. The reception of the report by foreign policy elites within and outside the United States, and also in recent scholarship, testifies to Lewis's success in creating a report whose wide-based appeal was based on the legitimacy provided by having it drafted by a representative group of advisors. The archival records, as described above, nevertheless reveal that the project, although being the most inclusive process so far, had been dominated by American lawyers and, to a somewhat lesser extent, by their European counterparts.

The A.L.I. project and the final document influenced the expanding discourse of human rights in several different ways. Although the A.L.I. Council had decided to keep the deliberations of the group confidential, members of the group had discussed the report in general terms on many occasions, including in transnational networks of international lawyers. Furthermore, the work had influenced the deliberations of governments. Sandifer had conveyed the essence of the group's work and several of the documents to his colleagues in the State Department. Alfaro later became Foreign Minister of Panama, and in this capacity he presented the draft to the San Francisco Conference. The Statement also gained wider circulation when in early 1945 it was printed as a pamphlet by the Americans United for World Organization.

When speaking to the San Francisco Conference in June 1945, the US President Harry S. Truman, stated that "with this document we have good reason to expect the framing of an international bill of rights, acceptable to all the nations involved. That bill of rights will be as much a part of international life as our own Bill of Rights is part of our Constitution"<sup>118</sup>. The founding nations had included as many as seven references to human rights in the Charter of the United Nations Organization, giving the concept a more visible place than had the preceding Four Power Draft. The draft the American Law Institute advisors produced, and the advocacy by some of its members prior to the San Francisco conference, was one of the more important contributions that led to the repeated references to human rights in the United Nations Charter. It also provided the United Nations Commission on Human Rights with a text from which they could start to work. It was not the only draft international bill of rights available in 1947, but it was a particularly well developed one, and one that moreover claimed to be drafted by a globally representative group of individuals. The myth of global representativity has been sustained by later works on the history of human rights. However, women and individuals with more diverse national and racial backgrounds only weighed in when the United Nations Commission on Human Rights started drafting its international bill of rights in early 1947.

## CONCLUSIONS

In this analysis of the multi-layered character of transnational history, moving from fur-lined hats, through the construction workers and engineers of the rail networks of Europe, to ideas of international arbitration and the UN Declaration of Human Rights, we have suggested a new agenda for historians. In displacing the nation-state, the study of transnational history accommodates the expression of multiple loyalties – to community, to region, to state, to pan-national institutions and to a humanism that recognises that all people embody similar complexities and confusions. Transnational history narrates the ways in which commercial activity interacts with state boundaries, it explores the interface of peoples and cultures, it explains how legal and political developments are



prompted by the experience of others, and it highlights the creative conversation of intellectuals and public actors across political boundaries. Finally, and as a consequence of all these elements, an awareness of the transnational dimension to our studies guards us against political and social reductionism by allowing us to understand international collaboration as a creative exchange, a sharing of values, and a dialogue about the future.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> See the chapter on Communities in this volume.
- <sup>2</sup> *AHR Conversation: On Transnational History*, in "American Historical Review", 2006, 111, pp. 1441-1464.
- <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1445.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1445-1446.
- <sup>5</sup> Isabel Hofmeyer in *Ibid.*, p. 1450.
- <sup>6</sup> *AHR Conversation* cit., p. 1444.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1446.
- <sup>8</sup> Hofmeyer in *Ibid.*, p. 1450.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1451.
- <sup>10</sup> M. Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, London 1995.
- <sup>11</sup> See, for example, Fernand Braudel's *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, originally published in 1949.
- <sup>12</sup> On this see C.A. Bayly, *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870*, Cambridge 1996.
- <sup>13</sup> National Galleries of Scotland, Accession Number NG 820.
- <sup>14</sup> L. Klusáková, 'A European on the Road': In pursuit of 'Connecting Themes' for Frontiers, Borders and Cultural Identities', in L. Klusáková, S.G. Ellis (eds.), *Imagining Frontiers: Contesting Identities*, Pisa 2007, p. 11. For further discussion of mobility and challenging identities see this volume and volume 1 of TWG5.
- <sup>15</sup> The 'Laurentian school' derives its name from the Laurentian Shield, a territory laced with waterways and river routes which stretches from the St Lawrence River in Quebec to the Great Lakes and then reaches out over the Arctic, covering approximately half of Canada. This school of historians argued that the natural corridor that the Laurentian Shield forms determined the economic development of the fur trade.
- <sup>16</sup> H. Innis, *The Fur Trade in Canada*, Toronto 1970 [rev. ed.], p. xxxi.
- <sup>17</sup> D. Creighton, *The Commercial Empire of the St Lawrence, 1760-1850*, Toronto 1937.
- <sup>18</sup> The two notable examples of this trend are S. Van Kirk, *Many Tender Ties: Women in the Fur Trade Society, 1670-1776*, Vancouver 1974, and J.S.H. Brown, *Strangers in Blood: Fur Trade Company Families in Indian Country*, Vancouver 1985.
- <sup>19</sup> For further discussion see the work of Thematic Work Group 6: "Europe and the World", and in particular C. Lévai (ed.), *Europe and the World in European Historiography*, Pisa 2006, and Id. (ed.), *Europe and its Empires*, Pisa 2008.
- <sup>20</sup> V.N. Zakharov, *On the History of West-European Merchants' Activity in Russia in the 18th Century*, in Lévai (ed.), *Europe and the World in European Historiography* cit., pp. 36-37.

- <sup>21</sup> D. Hancock, *Combining Successes & Failures: Scottish Networks in the Atlantic Wine Trade*, in D. Dickson, J. Parmentier, J. Ohlmeyer (eds.), *Irish and Scottish Mercantile Networks in Europe and Overseas in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century*, Ghent 2007, p. 27.
- <sup>22</sup> Philipp Rossner in his study of Scottish trade with German ports in the first half of the 18th century makes the case that the “commercial fluctuations of any European nation in the 18th century cannot be viewed separately from their global economic, cultural, social and institutional context”. Although in his work he does not adopt a trans-national perspective *per se*, the call for adopting a broader approach in the examination of trading patterns is something which this chapter will attempt to do in terms of its treatment of mercantile fur-trading networks. See P.R. Rossner, *Scottish Trade in the Wake of Union (1700-1760): The Rise of a Warehouse Economy*, Stuttgart 2008, p. 17.
- <sup>23</sup> W.K. Lamb (ed.), *The Journals and Letters of Sir Alexander Mackenzie*, Toronto 1970, p. 81.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 81.
- <sup>25</sup> McGill University Rare Books and Special Collections, Montreal, Canada [hereafter McGill], Joseph Frobisher Collection: MS433/1: Letterbook 1787-1788. See the letter from Simon McTavish to Joseph Frobisher, April 1787, p. 4.
- <sup>26</sup> National Archives, Kew, London [hereafter NA] BH1/3604: Articles of Agreement dated 1792-1798. The McTavish & Frobisher House held 20 out of 26 shares. In addition, Article 6 of the 1799-1805 agreement, drawn up in 1795 and designed to supersede the 1792 agreement, and commencing with the first outfit of 1799, stipulated: “It is hereby specially agreed and covenanted by and between the parties to these Present that the House of McTavish, Frobisher and Company ... shall exclusively conduct and manage the Concerns of said Company at Montreal”.
- <sup>27</sup> E.E. Rich, *The History of the Hudson's Bay Company 1670-1820*, vol. II, *Rivalry from Montreal, 1763-1820*, Toronto 1960, p. 190.
- <sup>28</sup> McGill, Joseph Frobisher Collection: MS433/1: Letterbook 1787-1788. See the letter from W.D. Powell to Thomas A. Coffin, Joseph Frobisher to James McGill, Quebec 1st Feb. 1788, p. 43.
- <sup>29</sup> Rich, *Hudson's Bay* cit., p. 190.
- <sup>30</sup> Hancock, *Combining* cit., p. 14.
- <sup>31</sup> McTavish, Fraser House and Co. Canada merchants, Suffolk lane, Cannon Lane is listed in *A London Directory or alphabetical arrangement Containing the residences of the merchants, manufacturers and principal traders in the metropolis and its environs... Embellished with a plan of the Royal Exchange*, [London 1796]. However the 1792 Articles of Agreement highlight that McTavish, Fraser House was in existence from 1790. The Articles of 1792 were drawn up in 1790 to commence two years later, and refer to a McTavish & Frobisher in England in the handling of furs in London. The Articles state: “the Company according to their respective share or proportion there in, as soon as the same may be placed to the Credit of the said House of McTavish, Frobisher House in England” – meaning McTavish, Fraser and Co. See H.A. Innis, *Notes and Documents, The North West Company [Copy of 1792-1798 Articles of Agreement]*, in “Canadian Historical Review”, 1927, 8, pp. 308-321.
- <sup>32</sup> Rich, *Hudson's Bay* cit., p. 191.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 192.
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 192.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 192.
- <sup>36</sup> NA BH1/1809: Letter from John Fraser to Simon McTavish, London, 16 May 1792.
- <sup>37</sup> NA BH1/1809: Letter from James Hallowell to Simon McTavish, Montreal, 18 January 1793.
- <sup>38</sup> NA BH1/1809: Letter from Alexander Mackenzie to McTavish, Frobisher House, 4 February 1798.
- <sup>39</sup> R. Drayton, *Maritime Networks and the Making of Knowledge*, in D. Cannadine (ed.), *Empire, the Sea and the Global History: Britain's Maritime World, c.1760-c.1840*, Basingstoke 2007, p. 73.

- <sup>40</sup> Drayton, *Maritime Networks* cit., p. 81.
- <sup>41</sup> W.S. Wallace (ed.), *A Biographical Dictionary*, in Id. (ed.), *Documents Relating to the North West Company*, New York 1934 [reprint 1968], pp. 454-486.
- <sup>42</sup> NA BH1/1809: Letter from Joseph Frobisher, John Gregory and James Hallowell to McTavish, Montreal, 31 May 1794.
- <sup>43</sup> NA BH1/1809: Letter from Joseph Frobisher, John Gregory and James Hallowell to McTavish, Montreal, 31 May 1794.
- <sup>44</sup> B.R. Tomlinson, *The Empire of Enterprises: British Business Networks, Trade and Remittance in Asia, 1793-1810*, in "Modern Asian Studies", 2002, 36, p. 1.
- <sup>45</sup> D. Hancock, *Self Organised Complexity and the Emergence of An Atlantic Market Economy 1651-1815. The Case of Madeira*, in P.A. Coclanis (ed.), *The Atlantic Economy during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Organisation, Operation, Practice and Personnel*, Columbia SC 2005, p. 35.
- <sup>46</sup> P.K. O'Brien, *Inseparable Connections: Trade, Economy, Fiscal State and the Expansion of Empire, 1688-1815*, in P.J. Marshall (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. II, *The Eighteenth Century*, Oxford 1998, pp. 53-77.
- <sup>47</sup> I.T. Berend, G. Ránki, *The European Periphery and Industrialization 1780-1914*, Budapest 1982, pp. 128-134; E. van der Vleuten, A. Kaijser, *Transnational Networks and the Shaping of Contemporary Europe*, in Id. (eds.), *Networking Europe, Transnational Infrastructures and Shaping of Europe, 1850-2000*, Sagamore Beach 2006, pp. 3-9; *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, Cambridge 1965, VI, pp. 212-273.
- <sup>48</sup> Berend, Ránki, *The European Periphery* cit., pp. 105-144.
- <sup>49</sup> On transnational perspectives and how they differ from international relations and comparative history, see M. Seigel, *Beyond Compare: Comparative Method after the Transnational Turn*, in "Radical History Review", 2005, 91, pp. 69-90; S. Purdy, *A História Comparada o Desafio da Transnacionalidade*, paper presented at the 7th Meeting of the ANPHLAC (Associação de Pesquisadores e Professores da História das Américas e o Caribe), PUC-Campinas, São Paulo, October 2006 (online at [www.anphlac.org](http://www.anphlac.org)).
- <sup>50</sup> N. Buxton, *Balkan Geography and Balkan Railways*, in "The Geographical Journal", 1908, 32, p. 218.
- <sup>51</sup> Commercial interests were the major force behind the smaller, local railway projects. Complex political and strategic motivations also informed large, cross-border projects.
- <sup>52</sup> A.J. May, *Trans-Balkan Railway Schemes*, in "Journal of Modern History", 1952, 24, p. 352.
- <sup>53</sup> Y. Bektaş, *The Imperial Ottoman Izmir-to-Aydin Railway: The British Experimental Line in Asia Minor*, in E. Ihsanoğlu, A. Djebbar, F. Günergun (eds.), *Science, Technology and Industry in the Ottoman World*, Turnhout 2000, pp. 139-152; Y.N. Karkar, *Railway Development in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1914*, New York 1972, pp. 64-65; S. Khairallah, *Railways in the Middle East 1856-1948: Political and Economic Background*, Beirut 1991, pp. 32-34, 48-49; W. Rechberger, *Zur Geschichte der Orientbahnen. Ein Beitrag zur österreichisch-ungarischen Eisenbahnpolitik auf dem Balkan in den Jahren von 1852-1888*, PhD Dissertation, Vienna 1958, pp. 28-30; G. Rosegger, J.H. Jensen, *British Railway Builders along the Lower Danube 1856-1869*, in "The Slavonic and East European Review", 1968, 46 (106), pp. 106-119; D. Milić, *Die Pläne zum Ausbau der Eisenbahn in Serbien in der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, in R.G. Plaschka, A.M. Drabek, B. Zaar (eds.), *Eisenbahnbau und Kapitalinteressen in der Beziehungen der Österreichischen mit den Südslawischen Ländern*, Vienna 1993, pp. 32-40.
- <sup>54</sup> Rechberger, *Zur* cit., pp. 1-216; G. Rosegger, J.H. Jensen, *Transylvanian Railways and Access to the Lower Danube 1856-1914*, in "East European Quarterly", 1996, 29, pp. 428-438; Dž. Juzbašić, *Izgradnja željeznica u Bosni i Hercegovini u svjetlu austrougarske politike od okupacije do kraja Kállayeve ere*, Sarajevo 1974, p. 7; M. Samardžić, *Железничко питање у спољној политици Србије 1878-1888*, PhD Dissertation, Novi Sad 2008, pp. 25-407; L. Berov, *"Источните железници" в България (1873-1908 г.)*, in "Исторически преглед", 1959, XV (1), pp. 80-102; H. Stanišev, *История на строежите и съобщенията в България от освобождението до края на 1939. г.*, Sofia 1948, pp. 4-101.

- <sup>55</sup> May, *Trans-Balkan* cit., pp. 352-367, and his *The Novibazar Railway Project*, in "Journal of Modern History", 1938, 10, pp. 496-527; W. Rechberger, *Zur Geschichte der Orientbahnen. Österreichische Eisenbahnpolitik auf dem Balkan*, in "Österreichische Osthefte", 1961, 2, pp. 105-111; D. Đorđević, *Аустро-српски сукоб око пројекта новопазарске железнице*, in "Историски часопис", 1957, 7, pp. 213-247, and *Изразак Србије на Јадранско море и конференција амбасадора у Лондону 1912*, Belgrade 1956, pp. 6-147.
- <sup>56</sup> The conflicts manifested themselves on a micro-level as well. At times the engineers had to rely on army protection as was the case of a group of experts in charge of reconnaissance and measurements for a project on the Danube-Adriatic railway in 1910. The railway builders were threatened by armed groups, which were labeled as brigands by the Ottoman authorities (*Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi*, DH.MUI, file 25-2, sheet 27). Brigandry, however, was an all-encompassing label which might have included anyone from impoverished peasants driven from their lands to national independence fighters. While some attacks on railway builders were motivated by the conscious will to sabotage the project, most derived from the simple wish to rob.
- <sup>57</sup> H. Feis, *Europe: The World's Banker 1870-1914*, New York 1930, pp. 293-295.
- <sup>58</sup> P. Hertner, *The Balkan Railways, International Capital and Banking from the end of the Nineteenth Century until the Outbreak of the First World War*, in G.D. Feldman, P. Hertner (eds.), *Finance and Modernization: A Transnational and Transcontinental Perspective for the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, Farnham 2008, pp. 115-135; Rechberger, *Zur* cit., pp. 33-101; K. Grunwald, *Türkenhirsch. A Study of Baron Maurice de Hirsch: Entrepreneur and Philanthropist*, Jerusalem 1966, pp. 29-36.
- <sup>59</sup> Rechberger, *Zur* cit., pp. 33-101; Samardžić, *Железничко* cit., pp. 22-43.
- <sup>60</sup> J. Bouvier, *Le krach de l'Union Générale 1878-1885*, Paris 1960, pp. 21-26, 82-93; B. Michel, *Zur Gründung der Länderbank. Planung und Einsatz französischen Kapitals im Donauraum (1880 bis 1882)*, in "Österreichische Osthefte", 1986, 28, pp. 440-551; Stanišev, *История* cit., pp. 93-100; V.J. Vučković, *Пад Генералне уније и проглас краљевине (1882)*, in "Глас ССХVIII, САН, Одељење друштвених наука, нова серија", vol. 4, Belgrade 1956, pp. 49-91; Hertner, *The Balkan* cit., pp. 137-141.
- <sup>61</sup> M.P. Guboğlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Karadeniz-Tuna Kanalı Projeleri (1836-1876) ve Boğazköy-Köstence Arasında İlk Demiryolu İnşası (1855-1860)*, in E. İhsanoğlu, M. Kaçar (eds.), *Çağını Yakalayan Osmanlı!*, Istanbul 1995, pp. 217-247. For an example of the Ottoman authorities discouraging Civil Engineering School graduates from working in the private sector, see M. Akbaş, *Elektrik Mühendisi Mehmed Refik Fenmen: Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e yenilikçi bir aydın*, in "Osmanlı Bilimi Araştırmaları", 2007-2008, 9, pp. 101-119.
- <sup>62</sup> For a good example of such multinational *ambiance* see the French copy of a letter written in Ottoman by Hafız, the Director General of the Railways in European Turkey to M. Demarteau, technical inspector working in Ottoman Bulgaria, accepting his recommendation to increase the salary of the supervisor Hazuranîç, in *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi*, T.NFM. 703.16, 13 June 1873.
- <sup>63</sup> M. Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*, Cambridge 1994.
- <sup>64</sup> J.G. Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, Cambridge 1991, p. 44; H.M. Cory, *Compulsory Arbitration of International Disputes*, New York 1932, pp. 48-49.
- <sup>65</sup> *Peace Conferences and the Century of Total War: the 1899 Hague Conference and What Came After*, in "International Affairs", 1999, 75, pp. 619-634.
- <sup>66</sup> See J. Westlake, *International Arbitration*, in "International Journal of Ethics", 1896, 7, pp. 1-20; London Committee of the International Peace Crusade to the Representatives of the Powers at the Hague Conference (ed.), *A Scheme for the Establishment of International Courts or Tribunals for Settling Disputes Between States by Arbitration and Mediation*, [s.l.] May 1899; F.W. Holls, *The Peace Conference at the Hague and its Bearing on International Law and Policy*, New York 1900; E. Descamps, *Mémoire sur le Fonctionnement du premier Tribunal d'Arbitrage Constitué au Sein de la Cour Permanent de Haye*,

Louvain 1903; W.L. Pennfield, *International Arbitration*, in "American Journal of International Law", April 1907, 1, pp. 330-341.

- <sup>67</sup> Gennadius was the son of George Gennadius, a prominent figure in Greek education. Despite his father's early death, Gennadius was brought up in a scholarly environment. His godfather, John Henry Hill, missionary of the American Episcopal Church, suggested that Gennadius be educated at the English Protestant College in Malta. After concluding successfully his courses, Gennadius returned to Athens where he continued his studies and attended the University, while never taking a degree. He was appointed to the Greek diplomatic service in 1870. His diplomatic career up to 1892, when he was recalled, was marked by many successes, which were attributed to his dominating personality, broad perception of politics and hard work. Self-taught in literature, history and diplomacy, he kept abreast of current affairs and gradually accumulated close knowledge of many issues related to political and diplomatic developments of his era. From 1894 to 1897 he worked as an international correspondent for the "American Evening Post". Gennadius wrote a considerable number of papers on various subjects. In 1910 he was reappointed as a minister plenipotentiary in London and served until his retirement in 1918. Many honors were bestowed on him. For example, St. Andrews University awarded him an honorary Degree of Doctor of Law (1906), and Cambridge the honorary Degree of Doctor of Letters (1915). For details see D. Nicol, *Joannes Gennadios, the Man: A Biographical Sketch*, Athens 1990.
- <sup>68</sup> J. Gennadius, *A Record of International Arbitration*, London 1904.
- <sup>69</sup> For the omni-presence of the idea of human progress within 18th-century enlightened and reformist thought see J.B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its Origin and Growth*, New York 1960; D. Spadofora, *The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century Britain*, New Haven 1990; and K.T. Hoppen, *The Mid-Victorian Generation 1846-1886*, New York 1998, pp. 474-480.
- <sup>70</sup> Gennadius, *Record* cit., pp. 2-3.
- <sup>71</sup> See F. Lefevre, *L'Amphictionie Pyleo-Delphique: Histoire et Institutions*, Paris 1998.
- <sup>72</sup> Gennadius, *Record* cit., pp. 8-9.
- <sup>73</sup> It was not only Gennadius who stressed Rome's failure to apply arbitration properly. Louise E. Matthaei expressed similar views in *The Place of Arbitration and Mediation in Ancient Systems of International Ethics*, in "Classical Quarterly", 1908, 2, pp. 241-264.
- <sup>74</sup> Gennadius mentions Grotius's *De Jure Belli et Pacis* (1652), Leibnitz's *Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus* (1693), the Abbé Saint Pierres's *Projet de Paix Perpetuelle* (1713), and Kant's *Perpetual Peace* (1796). It should be noted, however, that it was the Renaissance philosophers who first brought up the idea of natural law and, therefore, promoted the study of international law. See M.N. Shaw, *International Law*, Cambridge 2003 (5th ed.), p. 22.
- <sup>75</sup> See C. Holbraad, *The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and British International Theory (1815-1914)*, London 1970.
- <sup>76</sup> Gennadius, *Record* cit., p. 57.
- <sup>77</sup> It should be noted that the first compulsory arbitration treaties were signed in Latin America, and that generally the inclusion of (voluntary) arbitration clauses in treaties was very common there. See Cory, *Compulsory Arbitration* cit., pp. 3-19.
- <sup>78</sup> D. Nicholls, *Richard Cobden and the International Peace Congress Movement, 1848-1853*, in "Journal of British Studies", 1991, 30, pp. 351-376; J.A. Hobson, *Richard Cobden: The International Man*, London 1968.
- <sup>79</sup> Gennadius, *Record* cit., p. 70.
- <sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.
- <sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.
- <sup>82</sup> Westlake, *International Arbitration* cit., p. 4.

- <sup>83</sup> See for example the resistance to the implementation of a uniform civil code in Spain in S. Jacobson, *European Normativity, Catalan Exceptionalism? The Codification of the Civil Law in Spain*, in G. Lottes, E. Medijainen, J. Viðar Sigurðsson (eds.), *Making, Using and Resisting the Law in European History*, Pisa 2008, pp. 189-208.
- <sup>84</sup> See, for example, the institution of legations in M. Christopoulos, *Modernizing the Greek State: Reforms in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, in A. Gémes, F. Peyrou, I. Xydopoulos (eds.), *Institutional Change and Stability: Conflicts, Transitions, Social Values*, Pisa 2009, pp. 205-221.
- <sup>85</sup> Many weighty books have been produced on commercial international arbitration. See, for example, *Fouchard Gaillard and Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration*, eds. E. Gaillard, J. Savage, Hague 1999.
- <sup>86</sup> For the modern legal context of the terms see R.O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A.-M. Slaughter, *Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational*, in "International Organization", 2000, 54, pp. 457-488. See also Gaillard, Savage, *Fouchard Gaillard and Goldman* cit., pp. 32-53.
- <sup>87</sup> F. Kirgis, *The Formative Years of the American Society of International Law*, in "American Journal of International Law", 1996, 90, pp. 559-589; G. Finch, *The American Society of International Law*, in "American Journal of International Law", 1956, 50, pp. 293-312; E. Cooper, *Pacifism in France 1889-1914: International Peace as a Human Right*, in "French Historical Studies", 1991, 17, pp. 359-386.
- <sup>88</sup> See J. Coffey, D. Martykánová, J. Pan-Montojo, F. Peyrou, *Law Justice, and Public Opinion in Nineteenth-Century Liberal Europe*, in Lottes, Medijainen, Viðar Sigurðsson (eds.), *Making, Using and Resisting* cit., pp. 159-188.
- <sup>89</sup> For a contemporary example see Hanne Hagtvædt Vik's contribution below.
- <sup>90</sup> H. Grotius, *The Free Sea*, ed. D. Armitage, Indianapolis 2004.
- <sup>91</sup> A. Pagden (ed.), *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union*, Cambridge 2002.
- <sup>92</sup> The diplomatic activities at the San Francisco Conference and the early years of the United Nations have been explored in several archive-based studies. The most prominent are P.G. Lauren, *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen*, Philadelphia 2003 [2nd ed.]; A.W.B. Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention*, Oxford 2001; M.A. Glendon, *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, New York 2001; J. Morsink, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent*, Philadelphia 1999.
- <sup>93</sup> John P. Humphrey, the Canadian lawyer who was appointed as the United Nations' Human Rights Director in 1946, has explained that the A.L.I. Statement was "the best of the texts on which I worked", and that he "borrowed freely from it". See Humphrey, *Great Adventure* cit., pp. 31-32. Humphrey authored the Draft Outline of an International Bill of Rights which is UN document E/CN.4/AC.1/3/4, June 1947. Many scholars who have written on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have quoted this passage from Humphrey's autobiography. See, for example, J.H. Burgers, *The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of the Human Rights Idea in the Twentieth Century*, in "Human Rights Quarterly", 1992, 14, p. 473; Lauren, *Visions Seen* cit., p. 153. Johannes Morsink also recognizes the importance of the A.L.I. Statement in his authoritative account of the drafting of the Universal Declaration, although he also mentions other texts Humphrey used. See Morsink, *Universal Declaration* cit., pp. 6, 131-132. The impact of the Statement on the Universal Declaration should not be overstated as the work of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights was a collective effort which drew on many sources.
- <sup>94</sup> For a detailed account, see H. Hagtvædt Vik, *The United States, the American Legal Community and the Vision of International Human Rights Protection*, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Oslo 2009.
- <sup>95</sup> The existence of a legitimate right for a state to be concerned with the treatment of the subjects of another state had been formulated by the 16th-century jurist Alberico Gentili, followed by Hugo Grotius. This has been coined 'humanitarian intervention'. For a recent scholarly discussion of the status

of international protection of individual rights before 1939 see Simpson, *End of Empire* cit., pp. 91-156; Lauren, *Visions Seen* cit., pp. 90-119. For a discussion of the I.L.O. see A. Alcock, *History of the International Labor Organization*, New York 1971, pp. 1-151; C.W. Jenks, *Social Justice in the Law of Nations*, Oxford 1970; D. Maul, *The ILO and the Struggle against Forced Labor from 1919 to the Present*, in "Labor History", 2007, 48, pp. 477-500. For women's rights, see L.J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement*, Princeton 1997, pp. 211-222. For a recent scholarly discussion of the League and racial issues, including the many petitions received from individuals, see P.G. Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination*, Boulder 1996 (2nd ed.), pp. 118-126. For a discussion of international protection of rights of minorities, see C. Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878-1938*, Cambridge 2004; C.A. Macartney, *League of Nations' Protection of Minority Rights*, in E. Luard (ed.), *The International Protection of Human Rights*, London 1967, pp. 22-39. For a short summary of the League's minority system and its collapse, see M. Mazower, *The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950*, in "Historical Journal", 2004, 47, pp. 382-385.

<sup>96</sup> The 1929 proceedings are available in Institut de Droit International, *Annuaire*, 1929, pp. 110-138. See also L.B. Sohn, *How American Lawyers Prepared for the San Francisco Bill of Rights*, in "American Journal of International Law", 1995, 89, pp. 540-553; J.H. Burgers, *The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of the Human Rights Idea in the Twentieth Century*, in "Human Rights Quarterly", 1992, 14, pp. 447-477.

<sup>97</sup> A Chilean draft resolution on individual rights had been discussed at the International Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in Buenos Aires in 1936. See the letter from W. Sanders to W.D. Lewis, 27 August 1941, Item 1, Box 6052, American Law Institute Papers, Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (hereafter ALI).

<sup>98</sup> World Citizens Association, *The World's Destiny and the United States*. The participants were Ray Lyman Wilbur\* (chairman); Antonin Basch; Anita McCormick Blaine\*; Henri Bonnet; Edwin H. Cassels\*; Ben M. Cherrington; Percy E. Corbett; Edwin R. Embree\*; Herman Finer; Paul Hagen; Edvard I. Hambro; Alvin S. Johnson; Charles S. Johnson; Paul U. Kellogg\*; Hans Kelsen; Enrique De Lozada; Edgar A. Mowrer; Ludwik Rajchman; Arthur Ramos; Krishnalal Shridharani; Adlai E. Stevenson\*; Arthur Sweetser; Kathrine Taylor; Henry W. Toll\*; Sigrid Undset; Julio Alvarez del Vayo; Charleton Washburne; William W. Waymack; Ray Lyman Wilbur; and Quincy Wright\*. Those marked with an asterisk formed the Central Committee of the Association. Frank Aydelotte and Charles G. Burlingham and Joseph H. Davies did not participate in the conference. Wright had been one of the founders of the organization and was its secretary. See also, World Citizens Association, *A Statement of Its Purpose*, Chicago 1939.

<sup>99</sup> *Minutes of the Executive Committee of the ALI Council*, 1 November 1941, p. 14, Electronic Resource, PLL; The American Law Institute, *Memorandum in re Project Model International Bill of Rights*, 6 December 1941, Item 11, Box 6051, ALI.

<sup>100</sup> *Minutes of the Meeting of the ALI Council*, 24-27 February 1942, p. 28, American Law Institute Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Meeting Minutes of the Council and Executive Committee, available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ali/> (hereafter Electronic Resource, UPLS); *Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the ALI Council*, 19 December 1942, p. 42.

<sup>101</sup> The American Law Institute, *Memorandum in re Project Model International Bill of Rights*, 6 December 1941, Item 11, Box 6051, *ALI Council* cit., 24-27 February 1942, p. 29, Electronic Resource, UPLS.

<sup>102</sup> W.D. Lewis, *An International Bill of Rights*, in "Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society", 1942, 85, p. 447.

<sup>103</sup> *ALI Council* cit., 20 June 1942, p. 24, Electronic Resource, UPLS. Apparently, an exception was made for those residing in Canada.

- <sup>104</sup> Sanders, who worked for the Department of State, had consulted informally with Joseph Jones and Shepard Jones, who had responded favourably. See the letters from W. Sanders to W.D. Lewis, 3 and 4 September 1942, Item 33, Box 6053, ALI; W.D. Lewis to W. Sanders, 10 September 1942, *Ibid.* Lewis then sent a formal request, see: Letters, W.D. Lewis to C. Hull, 23 September 1942, Item 36, Box 6053, ALI; W.D. Lewis to L. Pasvolksy, 23 September 1942, *Ibid.* See also: Minutes, Executive Committee of the ALI Council, 31 October 1942, p. 26, Electronic Resource, UPLS; Minutes, Executive Committee of the ALI Council, 19 December 1942, p. 39, *Ibid.*
- <sup>105</sup> Bill of Rights, Draft Approved 3 December 1942, S/HRW D-78/47, Box 110, Record Group 353, United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NA).
- <sup>106</sup> Memorandum, *Summary of Information in re Bill of Rights Advisers of the American Law Institute*, accompanied: Letter, W.D. Lewis to K. Durant, 20 January 1943, Item 34, Box 6052, ALI.
- <sup>107</sup> Minutes of First Conference of the Advisers, 5-7 November 1942, p. 36, Item 21, Box 6051, ALI.
- <sup>108</sup> Memorandum, *Summary of Information in re Bill of Rights Advisers of the American Law Institute*, attached to: Letter, W.D. Lewis to K. Durant, 20 January 1943, Item 34, Box 6052, ALI.
- <sup>109</sup> Minutes of Second Conference of the Advisers, 4-6 March 1943, p. 1, Item 22, Box 6051, ALI.
- <sup>110</sup> International Bill of Rights Project, Minutes (Summary) of Meeting Special Subcommittee, 3, 4-6 and 7 August 1943 (Hereafter: Minutes, Special Subcommittee, 3-7 August 1943), Northeast Harbor, Maine, Item 25, Box 6051, ALI. Loewenstein, Mulder, Alfaro and Riesman had been were invited, but were unable to participate, see: Letters, Loewenstein to W.D. Lewis, 28 August 1943, Item 42, Box 6052, ALI; W.D. Lewis to J.E. Mulder, 17 August 1943, Item 45, *Ibid.*; W.D. Lewis to D. Riesman, 17 August 1943, Item 48, *Ibid.*
- <sup>111</sup> International Bill of Rights Conference, Saturday Sessions, 8 January 1944, Item 24, Box 6051, ALI; Proceedings, Sunday, 9 January 1944, *Ibid.*
- <sup>112</sup> Letter, W.D. Lewis to G.M. Barakat, 23 December 1943, Item 30, Box 6052, ALI. Barakat had been suggested by Quincy Wright.
- <sup>113</sup> Letter, W.D. Lewis to A.P. Sereni, 28 December 1943, Item 1, Box 6053, ALI.
- <sup>114</sup> Letter from W.D. Lewis to P.C. Jessup, 22 December 1943, Item 30, Box 6053, ALI.
- <sup>115</sup> The American Law Institute, *Report to the Council of the Institute and Statement of Essential Human Rights by a Committee of Advisers, representing the principal cultures of the world*, 7 February 1944, Item 44, Box 6054, ALI. The document is today known as the "Statement of Essential Human Rights".
- <sup>116</sup> The American Law Institute, *Report to the Council of the Institute and Statement of Essential Human Rights by a Committee of Advisers, representing the principal cultures of the world*, 7 February 1944, p. 8, Item 44, Box 6054, ALI. Durant, Husserl, Jessup and Shotwell refrained from signing the report. Durant and Lewis were later included in the list. See *Statement of Essential Human Rights. By a Committee Appointed by the American Law Institute*, in "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science", 1946, 243, p. 18.
- <sup>117</sup> Simpson refers to it as a "panel of advisers from a variety of cultures". See Simpson, *End of Empire* cit., p. 196. On the next page Simpson makes a small modification by inserting "it was claimed" before he lists the 13 cultures from the Report. Lauren finds that the ALI report was "heavily influenced by Latin American jurists". See Lauren, *Visions Seen* cit., p. 153. Samnøy refers to it as a declaration prepared by "jurists from twenty-four countries". See Å. Samnøy, *Human Rights as International Consensus: The Making of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1945-1948*, Bergen 1993, p. 16. Mary Ann Glendon has described the ALI statement as the result of a "cross-national collaboration under the auspices of the American Law Institute". See M.A. Glendon, *The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the Human Rights Idea*, in "Harvard Human Rights Journal", 2003, 16, pp. 29, 31.
- <sup>118</sup> Address in San Francisco to the Closing Session of the United Nations Conference, 26 June 1945, in Woolley, Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12188>



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# Regional History and the Regional Agenda in Romania, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia

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## ABSTRACT

In east central Europe, regionality stood in a direct, but ambivalent, relationship to the nation and to ethnic-national identity. In a certain sense it was a product of the nationalization of society: only within nations, in respect of their national territories, could regions be imagined and constructed. But, on the other hand, national regionalities might perpetuate older regional traditions such as pre-modern or Enlightenment territorial patriotism, based on geographical, administrative or other units. There is, however, no general rule by which the relationship between nation and regionality might be defined. On the contrary, this relationship was variable and may change dramatically according to political, cultural, or geographical circumstances. These conditions have all influenced the beginnings and development of regional historiography as they have historical reflection on regions down to the present day – not just on the meaning of regions and regional history, but also on their perceived relevance and the way in which this changed during the 19th and 20th centuries.

## PRECONDITIONS FOR A REGIONAL AGENDA IN THE NATIONAL AND MODERN CONTEXT

In the four cases discussed here – Romania, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia – we may observe quite notable similarities in regard to the major developments. The beginnings of a regional historiographical agenda were to an important extent connected to

national history as a product of changing senses of identity in the 19th century, even if they retained some traditions of estates discourse and the patriotic history of the Enlightenment. But in addition, geographical, historical and political circumstances influenced the beginnings, development and aims of the regional historical agenda from the 19th century down to the present, not least in the context of both modern nation- and state-building, of dictatorships and of political as well as cultural and environmental changes. This may be demonstrated from the specific example of Slovakia. In historical perspective, territorial organization into counties proved most stable. Originally, royal counties<sup>1</sup>, transformed in the 13th century into aristocratic counties, were where elected representatives of the nobility participated in the administration and the judiciary. They influenced administrative structures notably in the second half of the 19th century and right until the end of the monarchy. After the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, the new Slovak-Hungarian state border divided the territory of several counties. In the Czechoslovak Republic, the counties were abolished in 1923: they did not correspond to the Czech tradition. New but artificial administrative units proved unstable and were frequently changed. In the period of real socialism, the whole of Slovakia was divided into three regions (*kraje*) containing smaller units or districts (*okresy*).

The present regional identification of inhabitants, following the frequent territorial reorganizations of the 20th century, is not very strong<sup>2</sup>. In so far as it exists, it may vary between a feeling of belonging to a historic county (for instance, Orava, Liptov, Turiec, or Spiš) or to one of the bigger regions without fixed borders: Western, Middle or Eastern Slovakia. The strongest sense of regional belonging may be observed among the inhabitants of Eastern Slovakia. Another virtual region was set up in Southern Slovakia after separation from the old Kingdom of Hungary. After 1918, the Slovak authorities employed the Czech concept of a “borderland” (*pobraníče*), based on the perception of border regions as areas inhabited by members of a foreign ethnic group, with the connotation that they were intruders harbouring separatist ideas.

Slovak historians did not rank the history of Slovakia in the category of regional history. Until 1918/1920 they could not describe it as a geographical and geo-political unit because there were no exact administrative borders of the territory called Upper Hungary and officially even the name “Slovakia” appeared only sporadically. During the era of nation-building, Slovak historians deliberately ignored Hungarian history<sup>3</sup> and constructed a separate specific territory from a nationalist perspective. The creation of a national territory did not permit of the use of the hierarchically lower concept of a region. These authors refused to join the history of Slovakia with the history of the Hungarian kingdom because “Slovaks did not possess equal rights”, but paradoxically the integration of Slovak history into Czech (“Czechoslovak”) history was accepted<sup>4</sup>.

In regard to Poland, its geophysical and ethnic differentiation have likewise fostered various different concepts of regionality. There were historical and physiographical lands, administrative units (provinces, districts), as well as territories and neighbourhoods

which often had no historical context<sup>5</sup>. The extent and boundaries of areas studied in the context of regional history were often uncertain and contested. These difficulties arose from the imprecise definitions of “region” and regional history. Apart from problems of a methodological nature, which are still of current interest, problems concerning the concept, definition and borders of a region are still common and of particular significance. The reason for these difficulties lay mainly in the administrative changes to the individual districts of a region. Some terminological difficulties also stem from the Polish language, which lacks suitably precise terms for a region as opposed to an entire country or a state<sup>6</sup>. The relevance of this struggle by historians and regionalists with concepts is also underlined by a comment by Józef Borzyszkowski, for whom the need to discuss the territorial shape of Polish regions remains<sup>7</sup>. From a historical perspective, the term “Polish historical lands” (*historyczne krainy*) (e.g. *Małopolska*, *Wielkopolska*, *Pomerania*, *Mazovia*, *Silesia*, and so on) seems to offer the most durable concept of regionality. The methodologist of history Jerzy Topolski has also referred to this notion in his definition of regional history, understood by him as

the derived meaning of the concept of a ‘historical region’ is a definite territory inhabited by a population group with a common historical connection, whether short- or long-term. This territory may be distinguished by particular stated criteria from another territory, its population, and history<sup>8</sup>.

At the beginning of 19th century the concept *Kresy* (“Borderlands”, “Outskirts”) appears in the *Dictionary of Polish Language* by S. Linde. In the 20th century the territorial range of the concept of *Kresy* (Eastern *Kresy*) evolved. Presently the term is defined as the eastern areas of the Second Polish Republic which were lost to the USSR as a result of the Teheran and Potsdam conferences. After the end of the Second World War the territory of Poland was partitioned anew, and the former German areas were attached. According to the propaganda of the Polish Peoples’ Republic they were defined as the “Regained Areas” but in recent historiography they are described more generally and neutrally as “the Western and Northern Areas”.

The Czech case was unlike all others, in spite of the fact that the kingdom of Bohemia still existed as a political unit within the Austrian Empire and that, unlike Slovakia, there were no divisions of existing administrative units after the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy – since the kingdom’s historic border was accepted as the border of the Czechoslovak state. But as early as in the 19th century it was necessary to internalize the territory – including the parts of Bohemia with a German-speaking majority – as a historically and “naturally” Czech land. Historiography as well as literature played an important role in this context. This development is epitomised the Czech writer of German origin, Karel Klostermann (1848-1923), whose novels and tales played a decisive role in internalizing the Mountains of the Bohemian Forest (*Šumava*, *Böhmerwald*, on the border between Bohemia, Bavaria and the Upper Austria) as a part of the Czech homeland, notwithstanding the German-speaking majority there.

As with Slovakia, there are no significant collective identities which correspond to administrative units (regions, districts) in the Czech Republic right up to the present. Both local identities, as well as identities connected with geographically specific regions like mountains or some borderland regions, may however be observed. Nevertheless, as regards the west and the north-west of Bohemia, the identification of the inhabitants with the former German-speaking regions constitutes a very difficult problem for long periods down to the present. Much stronger collective identities are connected to the historical lands in the East – Moravia and, in part, Czech Silesia, as well as to the regions which are specific from a folkloristic and dialectological point of view, especially in Moravia and Silesia again.

As far as the Romanian case is concerned, the national movement and state building of the 19th and 20th centuries were connected with the attempt to unify some geographically and historically disparate lands. The Carpathian mountains separated Transylvania from Moldavia and Wallachia, and in addition the river Milcov separated the last two countries one from another. These natural frontiers did not prevent Romanians from considering each other as having the same linguistic, cultural and religious identity. On the other hand, these lands had been divided between several great powers – the Habsburg monarchy, the Ottoman Empire, Russia in Bessarabia – which made any union between them almost impossible. The 19th century, though, brought new ideas and impulses for the national movements which not only cut across the interests of great powers in the Balkans but also tended to lay claim to all those territories inhabited by members of the same national group. Only in 1859 was a union between Moldavia and Wallachia under Ottoman suzerainty achieved<sup>9</sup>. In 1877, the Romanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (known to history as “Little Romania”, as opposed to the “Greater Romania” created in 1918) secured independence from the Ottoman empire and began to support the Romanian movement outside Romania through culture, religion and political manifestos. But the existing political borders collapsed only in 1916 when Romania entered the First World War against the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and Transylvanians were forced to fight against Romanians. 1918 thus brought the Romanians to the fulfillment of national state unity. But this in turn led to tensions and conflicts with almost all its neighbours, especially Hungary, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, as well as the Ukrainian national movement. In 1940, Northern Transylvania, Bessarabia and Cadrilater [South Dobrudja] were ceded to Hungary, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria respectively. Bessarabia and northern Bukovina remained Soviet after the Second World War in accordance with a Romanian-Soviet convention signed in Moscow in September 1944. Whereas northern Bukovina was ceded to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Bessarabia became the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova within the USSR and a sovereign state after the break-up of the Union in 1991. By contrast, the cession of northern Transylvania to Hungary was annulled, and this country with its considerable Hungarian minority was reunited with Romania. The Romanian

Revolution brought with it the hope of re-establishing relationships with the former Romanian territories. The “flower-bridge” in 1990 with Moldova (Bessarabia) and the economic and cultural programmes with Bukovina were just a few projects which offered at least spiritual unity for Romanians across the mental barriers.

## THE ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF REGIONAL HISTORY: FROM THE 19TH CENTURY TO WORLD WAR II

The pioneer of regional historiography in the future Slovakia, the Hungarian Enlightenment’s polyhistorian, Matthias Bel (1684-1749), personified the heterogeneity of the land: born into a Slovak family, priest of the German Lutheran community, Hungarian patriot. He initiated a monumental homeland research project on the counties of the Hungarian kingdom. The first four volumes of his *Notitia Hungariae novae historico-geographica*, which included also historical, geographical and ethnographical descriptions of regions inhabited mostly by Slovaks, were published in 1735-1742<sup>10</sup>. In the 18th and at the beginning of the 19th century, several mostly short-lived learned societies dealt with regional homeland and linguistic studies<sup>11</sup>. Patriotic homeland and scientific associations were displaced by the more numerous regional natural-historical, archaeological, historical, museum and literary voluntary associations. Although some of their members kept on good terms, in the 19th century two polarized groups grew up. German and, from 1880s, predominantly Hungarian German-speaking societies promoted a Hungarian state-national historical narrative, while the weaker, discriminated Slovak voluntary associations<sup>12</sup> tried to construct a Slovak national narrative. In both cases, the focus on creating a national territory prevailed, as is demonstrated by regional sources. When it proved impossible to rely on Slovak national universities and grammar schools, a great part of the organizational and methodological work was taken over by publishing societies and by journalists in periodicals. In such conditions, those authors who promoted the nation-state concept prepared and published works of regional history on related issues<sup>13</sup>. The institutional basis of Slovak historiography was developed only later, in the Czechoslovak Republic and pursued most intensively in the period following the inauguration of communist totalitarianism in 1948<sup>14</sup>.

The situation in Polish historiography was not entirely dissimilar, despite the enormous differences in circumstances of the Polish, Slovak and Czech nation-building processes. The beginnings of regional history and ‘regional studies’ in Poland date back to the 19th century. At that time, in a country partitioned between three occupying powers, ‘regionality’ was one of the ways of coming to grips with and experiencing history<sup>15</sup>. Only after World War I did this situation undergo a radical change. In the Czech case, the tradition of regional historiography dates far back into the 19th century. As with Slovakian developments, the voluminous topographical, geographical and statistical descriptions were the first to highlight the variety of regions in the Czech lands. The

most important authors in Bohemia were Jaroslaus Schaller (1738-1809) at the end of the 18th century<sup>16</sup>, and Johann Gottfried Sommer (1772-1848), in the second quarter of the 19th century<sup>17</sup>. Patriotic scientific interest as well as the beginning of the national movement inspired a growing interest in the specificity of regions, in regional ways of speech, customs, and so on in the parts of the multifarious homeland<sup>18</sup>. Patriotic societies and other institutions such as museums represented and supported those activities as early as the first half of the 19th century. From their very beginning regional and local history was subordinated to certain national tasks and was legitimized through the fulfilment, enhancement and specification of national history. By that means, the local was connected to the national and the regional: both were meant to supplement and, above all, to illustrate the other, thus enabling the establishment of an identity-building relationship between nation, country, region and place. It was above all a long succession of local grammar school professors and other active and interested persons who dealt with the history of their places and regions.

The history of cities and towns certainly dominated that of larger regions. The first steps to the institutionalization of local and regional history had been made in the second half of the 19th century by founding local museums, journals, so-called beautification societies (*okrašlovací spolky*, *Verschönerungsvereine*), and by organizing regional and local exhibitions. Around 1900 as well as in the interwar period, historical subjects took up a large part of the local and regional press, and a boom in regional literature could be observed. Against this background a regional historical perspective became established as an integral part of Czech historiography and subsequently entered the “main” institutions, achieving a particular importance furthermore in the late 19th and the first half of the 20th century. From the 19th century a parallel regional history in the “classical” sense – an interest in the history of one’s own place or region – based partly on non-professional interests and underpinned institutionally by local museums as well as historical and other societies emerged.

Starting in the late 19th century, Romanian historiography tried to promote a national history in despite of political borders. Initially, this historiographical tradition took the form of memoirs, but gradually studies developed which aimed to propagate a Romanian identity among Romanians extending beyond territorial borders. In Bukovina, historical research developed too, especially after 1900<sup>19</sup>. Some of this published work<sup>20</sup> is still not considered entirely superseded by later research<sup>21</sup>. In regard to national consciousness among Romanians in Bukovina and the legitimization of Romanian national claims, we may cite Teodor Balan<sup>22</sup>. Also, much of the work on the problems of the different nationalities in Bukovina was polemical in nature<sup>23</sup>. The history of Bessarabia evoked new interest<sup>24</sup>. These works sought to legitimize the claims of the Romanian people to its territories, borders and rights, besides fostering a Romanian spirit.

After World War I, the conditions for regional historical research as well as historical reflection in a regional context changed dramatically. New political circumstances,



marked above all by the birth of new national states, pointed towards the exploitation of new conditions and new tasks in regional studies as well as regional policy. The relationship to the national state or the nation as a whole was a decisive factor which constituted the *raison d'être* of regionalism. This was especially the case in Poland and Romania. The socio-political reasons for the development of Polish regionalism related to the rebirth of Poland which in 1918 faced the need to unite territories separated for over 120 years. During the period of the partition, Polish people had lived in different countries with different economic and legal systems, and were subject to diverse cultural influences. Within each of the annexed territories of the partitioned country, communities of specific ethnic composition were formed. After regaining independence and reuniting these territories, this resulted in regional separatisms<sup>25</sup>. Therefore, there was a need for social and cultural integration, as also for research on the specific character and the similarities of the individual regions and sub-regions, emphasizing their Polish heritage and cultural unity. The creators and propagators of regionalism at that time, under the leadership of Aleksander Patkowski, placed high hopes in education, and in regional scientific societies and museums<sup>26</sup>. In the 1920s and 1930s, the first methodological discussions concerning regional history also occurred. The most important problem was the issue of defining and determining the borders of historical regions and sub-regions. In spite of the fact that the first methodological discussions only took place in the 1930s, regional history grappled with these difficulties over many years.

## THE SITUATION IN THE COMMUNIST PERIOD

Under communist rule, any similarities between Poland and Czechoslovakia which may have arisen from the same political system were in fact rather superficial. The basic differences reflected the fact that Marxist Leninism lasted as the official methodological approach to history for less than one decade (till October 1956) in Poland. Even if lip service was still paid to Marxism by the bulk of historians, from the late 1950s until the end of Real Socialism Polish historians undoubtedly enjoyed much more liberal ideological and methodological conditions by comparison with their Czechoslovak, Romanian, East-German or Soviet colleagues. On the other hand, Polish regional policy and studies, including the political and cultural reflections of scientific history, faced the enormous problem of how to legitimize Poland's westward extension after 1945 and to internalize the new territories as Polish. The interest in regional history triggered in the interwar period was revived again after World War II – now motivated politically, in relation to the moving borders. The loss of territories east of the Bug (the so-called *Kresy*, meaning "Eastern borderland") to the Soviet Union, and the acquisition of the so-called Western and Northern Territories (called the Recovered Territories in socialist propaganda) required further, preferably scientific, legitimization. In this context, two series of publications should be mentioned: *Oblicze Ziemi Odzyskanych* ("The Nature of the Recovered Territories") and *Ziemia Staropolska* ("The Regions of Old Poland"), which

were a sort of an ‘inventory’ of land incorporated into Poland in 1945<sup>27</sup>. Later, during the period of so-called Real Socialism, viz. the years 1949-1956, interest in regional history was abandoned, and, in keeping with the new ideology, economic problems and issues of class consciousness among the inhabitants of cities and villages became the focus<sup>28</sup>. Research was renewed in 1956, when many regional societies and scientific institutions were revived<sup>29</sup>. In the 1960s and 1970s the territories incorporated into Poland constituted an important and frequently confrontational area of regional history research after 1945<sup>30</sup>. Although today a Polish-German “war for remembrance” is conducted, there is no denying that in the Western and Northern Territories a growing number of academic and research centres for dialogue and cooperation with German, Lithuanian, and Belarussian historians have been established in order to create syntheses and conduct regional research (on Szczecin, Poznań, Wrocław, and Olsztyn among others)<sup>31</sup>.

National identification and institutionalization had been strengthened in the Slovak state 1939-1945, especially with the Slovak National Uprising in 1944, but in post-war Czechoslovakia it was gradually suppressed. After 1949, communist rule also struck at some representatives of the Slovak intelligentsia (labelled “bourgeois nationalists”) and the Communist Party arrogated to itself the exclusive right to interpret the ‘historical heritage’ according to class and pro-Soviet criteria and also, in the 1950s, according to centralistic Czechoslovak principles. A moderating of state pressure and some revival of independent thought – even concerning the national agenda – ensued in the late 1950s and the 1960s. One of the signs of this was a boom in regional history, especially in eastern Slovakia. The re-established Slovak Historical Society developed regional branches and organized conferences on methodology and themes of regional history (1959, 1960, 1962)<sup>32</sup>. A new network of museums functioned as regional centres of research. They published proceedings, yearbooks<sup>33</sup>, and monographs on cities, towns and villages. A homeland periodical “*Vlastivedný časopis*” came into being 1961. The Encyclopaedic Institute of the Academy prepared three volumes of a homeland lexicon of villages and towns (1977-1978). But the professional community of historians was not allowed to develop regional historiography without interference. The Communist Party directed and controlled all central and regional institutions. And political pressure in the 1970s became even stronger: among the preferred topics were regional and local “progressive revolutionary traditions”, the history of workers and the communist movement and anti-fascist communist resistance. To evade the Marxist-Leninist line, many authors retreated into writing positivist descriptive texts. Ethnical and religious heterogeneity became fuzzy: Germans, Hungarians, Rutheniens, Jews, Catholics, and Protestants did not appear in regional historical narratives. Censorship and auto-censorship did not allow discussions about Slovakia’s positioning in a broader context, away from the “socialist camp”. Only in the liberalized atmosphere of late 1960s could Lubomír Lipták publish an article on the country’s marginal location on the frontiers of expansive empires, on the border of Christian civilization and in the space between East

and West<sup>34</sup>. “Normalization” after the Soviet occupation ended any kind of free debate about macro-regionalism.

The situation in the Czech case was very similar to the Slovak one, since the two nations shared the same political system and government. The Second Congress of Czechoslovak Historians (October 1947) took regional history into account as an important part of historiography and considered it not only in the methodological, but also in the philosophical context<sup>35</sup>. But new political developments also influenced the orientation and possibilities for regional history after 1948. Attitudes to national and regional history did not generally change and they were still based on national traditions. In regional historiography, a focus on folk traditions as well as traditions of labour and socialism in regard to the communist movement were held up as a central task, but the classic positivist tradition of regional and local history was continued concurrently. At university level, general methodological problems received only sporadic attention. Specific instances were the attempts to organize international conferences of regional history attended by historians from Eastern Europe in Olomouc and Pilsen (Plzeň). Some regional centres played a specific role as places of asylum for particular historians outside the official historiography of the 1970s and 1980s, but they were also places for meeting and collaboration with those from central historical institutions, where approaches and perspectives outside the approved narratives might be discussed or elaborated. In particular, the Hussite Museum of Tábor and its yearbook *Husitský Tábor* became famous for their role in this context in the two decades after 1968. A similar role was played by the yearly conferences in Pilsen, devoted to the problems of Czech society in the long 19th century and organized by historians, art historians and literature sciences. However, in both cases these regional institutions played an important role by discussing problems of national history, rather than general or regional history<sup>36</sup>.

In Romania, auto-censorship and the official censorship were almost unchallenged. A few years after they had taken power and consolidated their political position, the Romanian Communists took the first steps towards a complete subordination of culture to the party's policies. This ‘cultural revolution’ came in the shape of repression but also persuasion. One of the first steps taken in this direction was to replace the intellectual elite of the interwar period with supporters of the Communist regime even if these were usually people who were only marginally relevant in their profession. Their role was that of ideological tools in the process of implementation of the new cultural policies. The new historiography aimed to erode traditional values in Romanian consciousness and to replace them with new propagandistic themes which expressed the vision of the new power. We might mention here the celebration of Stalin and the USSR, the condemnation of ancient Rome and of the former ruling classes – the boyars and the bourgeoisie who were in thrall to the capitalist imperialists. This re-writing of Romanian history according to the new vision was obligatory. A single history manual was imposed in which Mihai Roller and those around him had created a new version of his-

tory in tune with Soviet demands. In these conditions there was obviously little place for developing regional historiography in the methodological sense.

## FROM THE POLITICAL TURN OF 1989 TO THE PRESENT

In all countries the political turn of 1989 had far-reaching consequences for reflections on regional history. The most important common tendencies in east central Europe were the following: a continuity of national narratives as well as a partial denationalization of historical representations, changes in the administrative structure of territories, partial changes in collective identities with the growing importance of regionalism (the watchword of “small homelands” in Poland), accompanied by European integration with its political ideology of a “Europe of the Regions” in the 1990s, liberalization, the administrative decentralization of nation states, a new importance of regional and local self-government as well as a kind of pluralization of historical narratives and groups or persons concerned with markers of regional history. The political changes of 1989 brought to historiography, besides an omission of some previous topics, new paradigms and a discussion of the place of the countries affected in a macro-region of central Europe<sup>37</sup>. This was undoubtedly the case in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In Slovakia, for example, this idea facilitates a perception of the Hungarian kingdom as a homeland of Slovaks and overcomes the negative image of a ‘plebeian’ past of a nation without its own statehood<sup>38</sup>. This new appreciation of the kingdom of Hungary as an integral part of Slovak history, the relevance of which even in context of a national past is not to be denied or ignored, is similar to some Czech and Polish tendencies. Among the new topics addressed by regional historiography was the history of the German population in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. Ethnic minorities also grew to be an important topic of Polish regional and historical studies.

A very significant development in the Polish case was the untrammelled growth of interest in the 1990s in the history of ethnic groups such as the Kashubians, *Kurpie*<sup>39</sup>, Lemkos, and the Mazurs. This was also a time of development in neighbourly cooperation concerning research on regional history. Despite the previously-mentioned Polish-German and Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian dialogues, from 1990 there was also a development of Polish-Czech and Polish-German-Czech cooperation (concerning Silesia). Significant cultural phenomena are the process of Europeanization and multi-culturalization of the regional historical legacies which have been observed since the 1990s. The best example is the Borussia Cultural Community Association (founded in Olsztyn in 1990) which promotes the idea of an “open regionalism”<sup>40</sup> through various international research projects on regional history in cooperation with Poland’s eastern neighbours. In the last two decades a growth of historical interest has also been seen in the fields of *Kresy* history<sup>41</sup> and the more familiar Galician history. Although interest in regional history has been increasing since the 1990s, the carrot offered to a wider group of readers interested

in syntheses of the history of individual regions is still not sufficiently tempting, and new syntheses of some of the regions have not yet even been written<sup>42</sup>.

The years after 1989 brought new conditions for Czech regional historiography. On the one hand, a relatively strong continuity can be observed in regard to institutional, thematic or methodological matters, and also in regard to personnel, but at the same time regional historiography had increasingly to cope with financial and organizational difficulties. On the other hand, regional history gained in importance in certain fields – not least with explicit reference to its identity-building role, as can be seen especially in its attempted legitimization through arguments along those lines. This in turn increases the prospects of regional history gaining acceptance in (regional) politics as well as among the general public. The position of regional history is also complicated by the traditional hierarchization in the categories of centre and periphery which may be observed in the Czech case, reflected in another – rather tacit – hierarchization between “mainstream” (i.e. global, general, or national) and regional history. This is underpinned by the constant orientation towards a national framework in research, its popularization and in historical education/teaching. After all, even micro-history, the history of everyday life, modern cultural history and historical anthropology have occasionally been depicted as genuine and principally regional-historical methods and approaches<sup>43</sup>. But this has altered the general isolation of individual regional histories in the various regions only to a limited extent<sup>44</sup>. Only at the last historians’ congress at Pardubice in 2006 was it possible to observe stronger tendencies towards the development of regional history as a sort of general, methodologically specific approach, a kind of subdiscipline, and to integrate the historiography into a transdisciplinary regional science. However, even here, attention is chiefly directed towards the methods of local history, rather than general regionalist perspectives and subjects, for example in the context of interregional historical comparisons or of historical forms of regionalities as a scientific problem in itself<sup>45</sup>.

With some few exceptions in Czech historiography, there is scarcely anything by way of a “general” regional history characterized as a sub-discipline defined by particular approaches, methods, questions or fields of interest. Regional history is commonly seen as the history of a particular region, being understood as a clarification or regional modification of national history. Regional history in this context refers to national history, being illustrative of and located within a national framework. Forms of publication range from popular articles in local newspapers and popular scientific journals, serious periodicals and anthologies to the production of popular books, scientific monographs and editions of sources. In the last decade biographies of important personalities, albums with old picture postcards of the respective place or region, publications about castles and palaces (so-called “castellology”), and memoirs have been the most popular genres. Certain regions display some kind of special bias towards the development of regional history, for instance southern Bohemia; but with few exceptions it is cross-border regions which attract most attention. Examples of this are the Czech-Polish region

of Upper Silesia, and since the 1990s the Polish region of Glatz/Kłodzko, and to some extent also the Bohemian-Saxon Ore Mountains (Krušnohoří, Erzgebirge). Only in part has the process of “Euro-regionalization” contributed to this: the most prominent example seems to be the vivid cooperation of historical institutions in the Czech-German-Polish triangle of the “Neiße”-Euroregion<sup>46</sup>. To a very limited but growing extent, research interests are directed towards the history of the former German-speaking areas of Bohemia<sup>47</sup>.

In Romania, the situation is quite similar. Despite a few attempts to tackle the regional agenda, especially for politics in the inter-war and post-war period, there are relatively few works dealing with regional identities (for instance, in Bukovina or Bessarabia), cultural aspects and religious symbiosis (for example, in Transylvania) and their impact on the Romanian cultural and historical identity. A special case for Romanian history is Moldova: on the one side, Bessarabia as a former part of inter-war Romania is shaping its own destiny<sup>48</sup>. Concurrently, regional history and historiography offer a discursive account of identities in the construction and historical representations of museums in Transnistria. Art exhibitions consisting of old pictures of the former towns and regions, regional poetry (such as that written by Ioan Aldea Teodorovici, martyr of Romanian identity in Bessarabia) and music are also reviving long forgotten memories and evoke new meanings of events past and present.

## REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REGIONAL AGENDA AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION SINCE 1989

Some significant differences and common tendencies can be drawn concerning the present situation in regional historiography as well as the regionalist agenda in Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. By way of example, two perspectives have been chosen here to illustrate the possibility of an east central-European and, then, a European comparison in regard to practitioners of a regional agenda, in history especially, and the institutionalization of regional history today. As regards the historiographical regional agenda, the situation is generally similar. In each country, mainly four groups are active in research and the corresponding transfer of knowledge, without any significant generational differences: these are, first, professional historians, usually at universities and main research institutions, doing regional analyses as part of a non-regional research interest – particularly social history, modern cultural history, and historical anthropology. Second, there are professional historians in regional or local institutions, whose main task is to research their ‘own’ regional history and to handle respective collections at museums and archives. A third group is creative artists, inspired by and active in local or regional history. Finally, there are further non-professionals, who are interested in history and partially active in local research. A personal continuity across the political turn of 1989 can be observed in all these countries. This means that there was no ex-

traordinary change in the persons involved linked to political change; but on the other hand, far more people including politicians and scientists have since become interested in regional matters. The second point, institutionalization, is characterized by variety and decentralization in all countries, by also in the last decades by a more or less significant boom of regional historical institutions, especially as regards societies and journals, and partly also museums. On the other hand, museums have had to face new problems both of financing their activities and justifying their *raison d'être* in a media society.

In the Czech Republic, regional history is partly embedded in institutions like the regional universities outside Prague. In particular, the Historical Institutes of the universities in Ústí nad Labem, Hradec Králové, Pardubice and Ostrava/Opava are renowned for their explicit and widely respected orientation towards regional history. That had already been the case with the University of Olomouc, as the local Cabinet for Regional History was probably the only instance of an institutionalization of a 'general' regional history in a methodical sense. A significant decentralization of the university landscape may be observed especially in the last decades. But there are also new museums established within the last twenty years, many of them devoted to specialized subjects. The archives, however, are mostly part of the basic network of regional and district archives administered by the Ministry of the Interior, increasingly burdened with administrative tasks, their resources only partly geared to research.

In Slovakia, a flood of amateur and professional homeland monographs on towns and villages has appeared, initiated by bodies of local self-government, regional historical societies<sup>49</sup>, and universities. Most of them offer plenty of unknown facts mainly about ethnic minorities and church history, but conceptually they are based on academic grand narratives, both nationalist and otherwise. Methodological centres of regional research operate at the universities in Prešov and Banská Bystrica. New approaches may be seen in a study on regional anchoring of elites<sup>50</sup> or in studies on symbolic regions as memory sites<sup>51</sup>. Regional differentiation of the country is researched more from a historical geography and sociological perspective. For instance, *Slovakia and its regions* offers a most important and inspiring view of continuity in regional patterns of political culture<sup>52</sup>. Existing statistical data determined a structuring by districts (*okras*), but the ethnographic part of the book illustrated a different cultural regionalization: "natural" regionalism corresponds to the historical county system<sup>53</sup>. A comparative historical study of counties and districts, besides Slovakia as a sub-region of central Europe as a historical region, with its cultural heterogeneity and hybridity, could be a topic for future research.

Among the main Polish centres of regional history are the predominant state institutions and non-governmental organizations developed mainly in the 1990s. The first group contains scientific and university centres usually located in the largest Polish cities. State institutions located in the Polish borderlands also play an important role in popularizing and disseminating regional research. One of such example is the Western Institute in Poznań, which does research on the Polish-German history of the re-

gion. The Historical Research Centre in Berlin also plays a vital role in Polish-German research on the borderlands, memory and identity. Along with museums and the regional branches of the State Archive, which are more geared to the popularization of regional history by galleries, exhibitions and conferences, local-government bodies play the major role in research. They often execute research, educational and cultural projects, in nearby regions (usually the province) quite often supported by micro-historical and oral history methods. In the field of regional research non-governmental organizations (associations, foundations) have been increasingly important since the late 1990s. The Borussia Cultural Community Association (and Foundation), founded by Robert Traba in Olsztyn, has played a leading role in research on Polish regions (Warmia, Mazuria, Eastern Prussia lands) and borderlands. The same may be said of the "Borderland" Foundation in Sejny. The web of Regional Cultural Associations also play a considerable role. Beginning in the 1990s, they have started to organize around the Movement of Regional Associations of the Republic of Poland which was founded in 2002 and includes around 190 regional organizations at present. The contribution of local branches of the Polish Historical Association (*Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne* – PTH) is also considerable, assembling representatives of the previously-mentioned scientific and cultural institutions (universities, centres, museums, archives). The Polish Historical Association undertakes a number of initiatives in order to propagate historical knowledge relating to Polish regions<sup>54</sup>.

In Romania 1989 brought with it the urge to re-discover national history in an objective sense, "as it really was." Many historians and passionate amateurs began to search the national and regional archives in order to bring to light hidden aspects of national history and historiography. In universities, there have been plenty of theses focusing on the peripheral territories still pertaining or no longer pertaining to Romania. Dobrudja, Bessarabia and Bukovina have filled the pages with their history, their people and the way they understood their relationship with the Romanian state. University professors, PhD students or graduates 'dug' into available national and international archives in order to present their theses or findings reached after months or years of study. Monographs on towns and cities or villages are also important in illustrating particular details concerning the ethos of these places, the customs and the way in which an identity or multiple identities had been formed and developed. There are not as yet many methodological centres of regional research. A very important aspect is the perpetuation of the folklore patrimony which preserves the collective memory in *doine* [improvised songs] and ballads.

In their attempt to rediscover national frontiers and identities, the mutual agreements between the states has led to the appearance of Bureaux of Trans-Frontier Cooperation between Romania and Ukraine (concerning Bukovina), Hungary and Serbia (concerning the Banat), Bulgaria (inter alia concerning the Cadrilater), programmes which aim to present the culture, the national and international identity and history of each country or region, with its similarities and differences.



## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> *Comitatus* in Latin, *stolica* or *župa* in Slovak, *vármegye* in Hungarian.
- <sup>2</sup> According to research by sociologists, there is no dominant collective identity in Slovakia. Even national identity does not present a central organizing loyalty, and regional identities are not widely accepted. V. Krivý, O. Danglová, *Svet mnohých "MY a ONI". Kolektívne identity na súčasnom Slovensku*. Bratislava 2006, p. 101.
- <sup>3</sup> P. Švorc, *Die slowakische Historiographie und die Regionalgeschichte: 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, in "Bohemia 44", 2003, 2, pp. 459-476, at p. 460.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 464.
- <sup>5</sup> A. Stępnik, *Historia regionalna i lokalna w Polsce 1918-1939. Badania i popularyzacja*, Warsaw 1990, p. 6.
- <sup>6</sup> The term "small homeland", coined in the 1960s and 70s, as a synonym of a region is not very precise and was a late usage. See F. Mincer, *Wpływ czynników pozanaukowych na wyniki badań regionalnych*, in A. J. Omelaniuk, *Historia w ruchu regionalnym*, Wrocław 2001, p. 39.
- <sup>7</sup> J. Borzyszkowski, *O nowy kształt badań historycznych – nie tyle regionalnych: ile dziejów regionów*, in K. A. Makowski (ed.), *O nowy model historycznych badań regionalnych*, Poznań 2007, p. 39.
- <sup>8</sup> See A. Stępnik, *Trzy modele historii regionalnej w nauczaniu szkolnym*, in "Kultura i Historia", 2002, 3, 2002.
- <sup>9</sup> See I. Agrigoroaiei, *O acțiune hotărâtoare pentru recunoașterea drepturilor naționale fundamentale, 1914-1916* [A decisive action for the recognition of fundamental national rights], in *Național și social în Istoria Românilor: Profesorului Gheorghe Platon la a 70-a aniversare*, Iași 1998, pp. 405-416; D. Berindei, *Temeiurile dreptului istoric și dreptul natural al Memorandului* [The reasons of historical law and natural law in the Memorandum], in "MSȘIA", 1992, 17, pp. 49-52; N. Bocșan, *Ideea de națiune la românii din Austro-Ungaria, 1880-1906* [The idea of nation among the Romanians of Austria-Hungary], in "Banatica", 1995, 13, 2, pp. 97-114; N. Bocșan, *The Romanians from Austria-Hungary and the Idea of Nation, 1880-1906*, in "Colloquia", 1995, 2, 1-2, pp. 98-112.
- <sup>10</sup> On regional historiography in the 19th century, see P. Horváth, *Slovenská regionálna historiografia v 19. storočí*, in "Historický časopis", 1981, 29, pp. 217-243.
- <sup>11</sup> The most important were the *Erudita societas Kishontiensis* (1808-1845) in the County of Small Hont with its Latin yearbooks *Solennia*, and the Learned Society of Mine District in Banská Štiavnica (1810-1832).
- <sup>12</sup> Mainly the *Tatrin* society in Liptovský Mikuláš (1844-1848) and, in Martin, the *Matica slovenská* [Slovak Foundation] (1863-1875) and the *Muzeálna Slovenska Spoločnosť* [Slovak Museum Society] (1893-1960).
- <sup>13</sup> S. Borovszky (ed.), *Magyar orsz  g v  rmegyei   s v  rosai*, Budapest, s.d.; *Az osztr  k-magyar monarchia ir  sban   s k  pben*, 21 vols., Budapest, 1887-1901; also Hungarian historical regional journals and county monographs predominantly on medieval themes.
- <sup>14</sup> An overview in E. Mannov  , *Historical Institutions*, in E. Mannov  , D.P. Daniel (eds.), *A Guide to Historiography in Slovakia* (Studia historica Slovaca 20), Bratislava 1995, pp. 133-152.
- <sup>15</sup> St  pnik, *Historia regionalna cit.*, p. 21.
- <sup>16</sup> J. Schaller, *Topographie des K  nigreichs B  hmen*, vols. 1-16, Prague 1782-1792.
- <sup>17</sup> J.G. Sommer, *K  nigreich B  hmen, statistisch-topographisch dargestellt*, vols. 1-16, Prague 1833-1849.
- <sup>18</sup> M. Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, Cambridge 1985.
- <sup>19</sup> There still is no satisfactory monograph on the national Romanian movement in Bukowina, but E. Prokopowitsch, *Die rumanische National-bewegung in der Bukowina und der Dako-Romanismus*, Graz 1965 is a useful guide to its main aspects. For Transylvania, see esp. a book by the French historian

- J. Nouzille, *Transilvania, zona de contacte și conflicte*, Bucharest 1995, as well as T. Pavel, *Mișcarea românilor pentru unitate națională și diplomația Puterilor Centrale*, 2 vols., Timișoara 1979-1982.
- <sup>20</sup> Esp. the works of I. Toroutiu, *Romanii și clasa intelectuală din Bucovina*, Cernauti 1911; *Romanii și clasa de mijloc din Bucovina*, Cernauti 1912; *Poporiatia și clasele sociale din Bucovina*, Bucharest 1916.
- <sup>21</sup> Such as N. Iorga, *Histoire des Roumains de Bucovine a partir de l'annexion autrichienne (1775-1914)*, Iași 1917.
- <sup>22</sup> T. Balan, *Procesul Arboreasei, 1875-1878*, Cernăuți 1937; Id., *Suprimarea mișcărilor naționale din Bucovina pe timpul războiului mondial, 1914-1918*, Cernăuți 1923.
- <sup>23</sup> The central arguments are suggested in *Rutenizarea Bucovinei și cauzele deznaționalizării poporului român by a Bucovinean*, Bucharest 1904, and by I. Nistor, *Romanii și Rutenii în Bucovina*, Bucharest 1915.
- <sup>24</sup> I. Nistor, *Istoria Basarabiei*, Cernauti 1923, or S. Ciobanu, *Cultura românească în Basarabia sub stăpânirea rusă*, Chișinău 1923, which suggests vast levels of Russification. Z.C. Arbore, *Basarabia în secolul XIX*, Bucharest 1899.
- <sup>25</sup> In various parts of Poland defensive reactions against mingling with a wider ethnic group, and dislike for and hostility towards representatives of other districts occurred due to their strangeness, primarily in terms of political views and traditions, or a conflict of interests. See T. Kulak, *U źródeł regionalizmu II Rzeczypospolitej (Wizje ruchu regionalnego Stefana Żeromskiego i Władysława Orkana)*, in *Historia w ruchu regionalnym*, ed. A.J. Omelaniuk, Wrocław 2001, p. 8.
- <sup>26</sup> A. Stępiński, *Kilka uwag na temat polskiej historiografii regionalnej XIX i XX wieku*, in *O nowy model historycznych badań regionalnych*, ed. K.A. Makowski, Poznań 2007, p. 47.
- <sup>27</sup> E. Maleczyńska (ed.), *Oblicze Ziemi Odzyskanych. Dolny Śląsk*, vol. I-II, Wrocław - Warsaw 1948; Z. Wojciechowski (ed.), *Ziemia Staropolska, Dolny Śląsk* [Lower Silesia], vol. I-II, Poznań 1948. Studies on other regions were prepared later: West Pomerania (1949); Ziemia Lubuska (1950); Warmia and Masuria (1953); Supple Silesia (1959); cited in T. Kulak, *O książkach z historii regionalnej (Uwagi o współczesnym piśmiennictwie regionalistycznym w aspekcie historycznym)*, in Omelaniuk (ed.), *Historia w ruchu regionalnym* cit., p. 79.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.
- <sup>29</sup> F. Kyrk, *Badania regionalne w Małopolsce*, in Omelaniuk (ed.), *Historia w ruchu regionalnym*, Wrocław 2001, p. 52.
- <sup>30</sup> At the same time, F. Kyrk emphasizes that Polish historians of the Polish People's Republic era, who criticized German science for its nationalism, very frequently could not see their own nationalism: "Today some studies by W. Sobieski or K. Piwowski concerning the history of Silesia and Pomerania are read with embarrassment. It is a paradox that the antagonists on both sides frequently had genuine local patriotism in common, and it was this patriotism which intensified the dispute", *Ibid.*, p. 43.
- <sup>31</sup> The Historical Research Centre in Berlin (HRC) [*Centrum Badań Historycznych*, PAN in Berlin], run by historian Robert Traba, plays a vital role in Polish-German research on regional history, borderland, memory and identity. The HRC gathered many historians and researchers from the main Polish academic and research centres (Warsaw, Poznań, Wrocław). Another research centre very important for regional history is the Western Institute in Poznań [*Instytut Zachodni w Poznaniu*]. The Borussia Cultural Community Association (and Foundation), founded by R. Traba, is the third and equally essential, interdisciplinary research centre of regional history situated in eastern Poland (Olsztyn). A considerable role is also played by the Polish Historical Association (and its regional branches).
- <sup>32</sup> J. Alberty, *Regionálna história nie je iba historiografia (so zreteľom na stredné Slovensko)*, in M. Pekár, P. Derfiňák (eds.), *Regionálne dejiny a dejiny regiónov* (Ročenka Katedry dejín FHPV Prešovskej univerzity 2004), Prešov 2004, pp. 93-109; M. Pekár, *Niekoľko poznámok k stavu a aktuálnym problémom výskumu regionálnych dejín*, in "Historický časopis", 2005, 55, 1, pp. 96-103.

- <sup>33</sup> Their overview in M. Havrila, M. Lipka, I. Michnovič, *Podiel slovenských muzeálnych zborníkov na rozvoji regionálnej historiografie v rokoch 1945-1989 (s približnutím na východoslovenské múzeá)*, in "Regionálne dejiny a dejiny regiónov" (as in note 12 above), pp. 109-123.
- <sup>34</sup> L. Lipták, *Poloha Slovenska na javisku európskych dejín*, in Id., *Storočie dlhšie ako sto rokov*, Bratislava 1999, pp. 29-42.
- <sup>35</sup> A. Kostlán (ed.), *Druhý sjezd československých historiků (5.-11. října 1947) a jeho místo ve vývoji českého dějepisectví*, Prague 1993, pp. 136-142, 240-48.
- <sup>36</sup> For Tábor, see esp. D. Olšáková, Z. Vybíral (eds.), *Husitský Tábor a jeho postavení v české historiografii v 70. a 80. letech 20. století* [The Husitský Tábor and its Position in Czech Historiography in the 1970s and 1980s] [= *Husitský Tábor*, Suppl. 2], Tábor 2004.
- <sup>37</sup> A. Avenarius, *The Basic Problems of Slovak History and Historiography*, in E. Mannová (ed.), *A Concise History of Slovakia* (Studia historica Slovaca 21), Bratislava 2000, pp. 307-314.
- <sup>38</sup> Švorc, *Die slowakische Historiographie* cit., p. 476.
- <sup>39</sup> An inhabitant of the "Kurpie" region which is a part of the Mazovia region of Poland.
- <sup>40</sup> About "Borussia" and its idea of "open regionalism", see for instance, <http://www.borussia.pl/>. The Borussia Cultural Community Association quarterly magazine is "Borussia: culture, literature, history", published since 1991.
- <sup>41</sup> The term *Kresy* (meaning "Outskirts" or "Borderlands") was used in the 1920s and 1930s to describe Polish lands to the east of Curzon Line. After World War II they were incorporated into the Soviet Union. In Poland, after 1945, the interest of researchers (historians) in these areas was suppressed by the communist censorship. It revived soon after the fall of communism in the 1990s.
- <sup>42</sup> M. Molik, *O nowy model syntezy dziejów regionalnych na przykładzie Wielkopolski*, in K. A. Makowski (ed.), *O nowy model historycznych badań regionalnych*, Poznań 2007, p. 25.
- <sup>43</sup> For a connection of this sort, see V. Bůžek: *Regionální dějiny v České republice. Stav a perspektivy bádání s důrazem na raný novověk* [Regional History in Czech History. Condition and Perspectives of Research with an Accent on the Early Modern Era], in J. Pešek (ed.), *VII. sjezd českých historiků*, Prague 2000, pp. 33-47.
- <sup>44</sup> See *VII. sjezd českých historiků. Praha 24.-26. září 1993*, Prague 1994, pp. 183-190; *VIII. sjezd českých historiků. Hradec Králové 10.-12. října 1999*, Prague 2000, pp. 33-82.
- <sup>45</sup> See J. Bartoš, J. Schulz, M. Trapl, *Regionální dějiny. Pojetí, poslání, metodika* [Regional history. Approach, Function, Methodology], Olomouc 2004; P. Vorel, *Základy historické regionalistiky. Metodika výzkumu a interpretace pramenných zdrojů místních a regionálních dějin v českých zemích* [The Essentials of Historical Regional Science. Methods of Research and Interpretation of Sources of Local and Regional History in the Czech Lands], Pardubice 2005; M. Svoboda, *Regionální dějiny: Co s nimi můžeme a máme dělat na vysoké škole? Případ „Regionalistika“* [Regional history: what can and shall we do with it at universities? The case of Regional Studies], in Z. Beneš, J. Pešek, P. Vorel, *IX. sjezd českých historiků. Pardubice 6.-8. září 2006*, vol. 1, Pardubice - Prague - Ústí nad Labem 2007, pp. 177-184.
- <sup>46</sup> *Fontes Nissae* 1, 2000ff.; see also the series *Vědecká pojednání – Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen – Prace Naukowe* 1ff., Liberec 1995ff.
- <sup>47</sup> The new series of the *Zprávy Společnosti pro dějiny Němců v Čechách/Mittelungen der Gesellschaft für die Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen*, edited by Kristýna Kaiserová, has been re-established in Ústí nad Labem and published since 2001. The re-established Society in Ústí nad Labem represents an indirect Czech (or Czech-German) continuation of the old German nationalist association with almost the same name (*Verein für die Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen*).

- <sup>48</sup> If, in the early 1990s, Bessarabia favoured a union with Romania, or at least a more favourable relationship between the two states, now Romanian patriots, called Moldavian by the Communists in order to deny any relationship with Romania, are trying to preserve their right to a national history and not a bogus one.
- <sup>49</sup> Their list is on the web-page [www.dejiny.sk/Spolky/spolky.htm](http://www.dejiny.sk/Spolky/spolky.htm). Special attention was devoted to the history of Spiš (Zips), see V. Jankovič, *Spišská regionálna historiografia za posledných sto rokov 1883-1983*, in "Nové obzory", 1986, 28, pp. 99-114; Z. Kollárová, *Spišská regionálna historiografia od roku 1989, jej stav a perspektívy*, in "Historický časopis", 2002, 50, pp. 120-126.
- <sup>50</sup> R. Holec, *Osobnosť a región (metodologické úvahy)*, in *Regionálne dejiny a dejiny regiónov* (as in note 12 above), pp. 38-47.
- <sup>51</sup> P. Macho, *Podbradlanský kraj ako topograficko-historický konštrukt v popularizačných dielach o Štefánikovi (1919-1929)*, in I. Kamenec, E. Mannová, E. Kowalská (eds.), *Historik v čase a priestore. Laudatio Ľubomírovi Liptákovi*, Bratislava 2000, pp. 111-120; P. Macho, *Premena a stálosť regionálnej identity*, in "História. Revue o dejinách spoločnosti", 2001, 1, p. 22.
- <sup>52</sup> V. Krivý, V. Feglová, D. Balko, *Slovensko a jeho regióny. Sociokultúrne súvislosti volebného správania*, Bratislava 1996.
- <sup>53</sup> O. Danglová, J. Hampel (eds.), *Diskusia o knihe*, in "Etnologické rozpravy", 2000, 1-2, pp. 156-159.
- <sup>54</sup> See, for instance, *Regionalism - traditions - challenges- perspectives. Materials from the first Regional Gathering of Malopolska Regional Associations*, Krakow 2008.

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# The Cult of Diomedes in the Adriatic: Complementary Contributions from Literary Sources and Archaeology

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## ABSTRACTS

This contribution aims to highlight how, by studying religious events in Antiquity, the information provided by literary sources can be fully supplemented by the contribution of archaeological finds. Our chapter will consider the case of Diomedes and his worship within the Adriatic area, and will conclude with a demonstration of how the recent archaeological research in Croatia has allowed a better understanding of the importance of Diomedes, and a more precise definition of his profile as protector of navigation in the Adriatic Sea.

A central hero of Homeric epic, Diomedes emigrated to Daunia (the region corresponding to the north of Apulia) where he settled many towns, was killed by the local king Daunus and was buried on an Adriatic island called *Diomedean Island*, where he was worshipped.

The ancient writers seem to localize the cult of the hero primarily on the west Adriatic coastline. For this reason, a statement by Pliny the Elder that mentions a *promontorium Diomedis* along the Dalmatian coast has never interested experts. The testimony of Pliny seemed to be too isolated to conclude that the Homeric hero could have been the subject of worship on the east side of the Adriatic as well.

This perspective was definitively overturned more than ten years ago, thanks to the research of a group of archaeologists working in an international project, called the *Adriatic Island Project*, at Cape Ploča between Šibenik and Trogir. The research was such an immediate success that Cape Ploča is the site that has, to date, produced the most copious and meaningful sources about the cult of Diomedes in the Adriatic. The site has, in fact, revealed not only the presence of a small sized temple, but also ceramic chips, some of which bear inscriptions of the name of Diomedes. Such evidence shows, without any doubt, that the sanctuary was dedicated to Diomedes and that the hero there took the role of the protector of navigation, at least from the 4th century BC.

Further improvements in the definition of the relationship between Diomedes and Adriatic navigation were made, all by the same research project and at the same time, due to finds made on a very small island in the centre of the Adriatic, Palagruža. Ceramic chips with engravings of Diomedes' name were also found there. This evidence can be dated to the 5th century BC and we can state, therefore, that worship of Diomedes extends to the end of the archaic period. The island of Palagruža occupies a strategic place in the Adriatic. It is part of the so called "insular bridge" that has allowed passage between Dalmatia and the Gargano (the region of Dauni) since the Neolithic period. The ceramic finds of Palagruža belong mostly to Athens and Aegina. However, this does not mean that Diomedes' cult was introduced there from Attica. The mythical presence of Diomedes was, at that time, already present in Daunian, where the hero arrived, without doubt, from north-western Greece, coming along with the first users of the insular bridge. Thanks to them, the mythical presence of Diomedes spread little by little in the Adriatic, rendering him an outright lord of this sea, as stated in a verse of Lycophron (Lycophron, *Alexandra*, 630-631).

*Pour l'historien de l'Antiquité, confronté à un passé lointain dont il ne subsiste que des traces documentaires et matérielles fragmentaires, le recours à plusieurs méthodes d'analyse se révèle fondamental. L'utilisation complémentaire de diverses disciplines lui permet ainsi de combler des lacunes que la lecture des documents littéraires ne peut parfaire à elle seule.*

*Le chapitre témoigne des résultats issus d'une approche méthodologique conjuguant étude des données textuelles et recherche sur le terrain, à travers l'exemple de la diffusion du culte du héros grec Diomède dans l'Adriatique.*

*Les auteurs anciens insistent surtout sur la fuite post-troyenne de Diomède en Daunie (la partie septentrionale des Pouilles), où le héros aurait fondé des villes, aurait été tué par le roi local, Daunus, pour connaître après sa mort une véritable héroïsation sur l'île (ou les îles) diomédique(s). Un culte en l'honneur de Diomède aurait été pratiqué également plus au nord le long du littoral adriatique occidental: chez les Ombriens, au delta du Po et en Vénétie. Une seule attestation littéraire, fournie par Pline l'Ancien, fait état de l'existence d'un promontorium Diomedis (promontoire de Diomède) en Dalmatie, du côté oriental de la mer Adriatique. La notice, jugée trop isolée, n'avait que rarement suscité l'intérêt des spécialistes, jusqu'aux découvertes effectuées à partir de 1996 par les archéologues de l'Adriatic Island Project. Les explorations menées sur la petite pointe du cap Ploča par cette équipe internationale ont permis en effet de mettre au jour les vestiges d'un sanctuaire diomédique d'époque hellénistique, et une importante quantité de tessons de céramique portant des dédicaces à Diomède. Ces découvertes, qui demeurent à ce jour les témoignages archéologiques les plus complets sur le culte de Diomède dans l'Adriatique, ont révélé un enracinement du culte de Diomède beaucoup plus vaste que le bilan littéraire ne le laissait entrevoir, et ont mis en évidence ses rapports étroits avec la navigation.*

*Le profil d'un Diomède protecteur des marins grecs aux prises avec la traversée trans-adriatique a été confirmé dans les mêmes années par les recherches conduites sur la minuscule île de Palagruža. Située au large de l'Adriatique, entre la Dalmatie et le Gargano, celle-ci faisait partie du «pont insulaire» unissant les deux côtes de la mer Adriatique, utilisé depuis l'époque préhistorique. Ici, dans un autre sanctuaire diomédique, le matériel archéologique plus ancien remonte à la fin de l'époque archaïque. Les graffiti citant Diomède sur des tessons de céramique permettent même de déterminer l'identité des dédicants, des marins provenant d'Athènes et d'Egine, ayant sans doute repris un culte diomédique déjà installé sur l'île.*

*Relégué autrefois aux espaces dauniens, le profil adriatique de Diomède peut être étudié aujourd'hui, à la faveur de ces contributions archéologiques, sous une lumière nouvelle, et contribuer à mieux saisir les trafics adriatiques et les échanges entre Grecs et indigènes à l'époque ancienne.*

L. Canfora, in the preface to an introductory essay on the study of Greek history, compares time to a vast sea that has swallowed up much of the precious cargo that once crossed it. All that remains of the ancient civilizations and their human, material and cultural treasures are some tiny islands on the surface of that great expanse of water<sup>1</sup>; the rest has disappeared forever, leaving no trace or memory. This rather melancholy metaphor illustrates some of the difficulties with which the historian of antiquity has to struggle. But, despite such obstacles, and motivated by a desire to piece together some of the fragments that have by chance survived, he appeals for the development of research tools that enable this goal to be pursued as thoroughly as possible.

Although the approach used in this work is not new (Thucydides was the first to supplement his knowledge of the remote Greek past with archaeology in the 5th century BC), it has only really been properly appreciated since the 17th and 18th centuries, with the development of auxiliary sciences such as archaeology, epigraphy, numismatics and papyrology. Historians of antiquity have thus become aware of the need to use material evidence to bridge the gaps in literary accounts. Indeed, today, nobody can deny the remarkable contributions that such approaches have made to our knowledge of antiquity, from the discoveries of H. Schliemann to the recent excavations in the Adriatic dock.

A particularly revealing example of the complementarity and synergies existing between literary data and archaeological research is provided by studies into the cult of Diomedes in the Adriatic. Diomedes was a prominent figure in the Homeric epic, a brave and valiant warrior who dared even to injure Aphrodite, and who, according to Homer (Homer, *Odyssey*, III, 180-184) had one of the easiest and happiest returns from the war at Troy<sup>2</sup>. However, an alternative mythography, dating from at least the 7th century BC, recounts quite a different tale, claiming that, on the contrary, his return to Argos

was short-lived and troubled<sup>3</sup>: induced by Aphrodite (eager to revenge herself for the wound inflicted by the hero on the battlefield), the hero's wife Aegialea plotted to kill her husband, with the complicity of her lover Kometes. Luckier than Agamemnon, victim of a very similar plot, Diomedes managed to escape and was forced to leave the Peloponnese definitively<sup>4</sup>.


This event launched the adventures of Diomedes in the west. The hero emigrated to Daunia (the region corresponding to the north of Apulia), where he lived in a number of different towns and introduced new cults, helping the local king, Daunus, conquer his local enemies. After marrying Daunus' daughter, he eventually inherited the realm and started a fertile lineage, becoming the object of a divine cult after his death<sup>5</sup>. Thus, the portrait painted by these literary sources is of a civilizing hero, who brings urban and religious progress to a non-Hellenic land.

Other versions give a more dramatic ending to the story. In these, Diomedes is presented as a victim of Daunus, who killed him after having used him for a military operation<sup>6</sup>. After this event, his companions were transformed into birds and spent the rest of their lives guarding their leader's grave on the "Diomedean Island in the Adriatic"<sup>7</sup>.

The Diomedes cult was not restricted to Southern Italy, however. He was also worshipped by the people of Veneto in the north (who made horse sacrifices at his shrine<sup>8</sup>); by the inhabitants of Umbria and Ancona (a colony founded by Dionysius of Syracuse in the central shore of the Adriatic), and at the Po delta, where he is represented as the founder of Adria and Spina<sup>9</sup>. This suggests that it might be possible to identify an Adriatic geography of the Diomedean cult.<sup>10</sup> The ancient literary sources indicate that the cult was located first and foremost along the western Adriatic coast. However, there is an isolated claim by Pliny the Elder that there existed a *promontorium Diomedis* on the Dalmatian coast to the south of Liburnia and the river Titius (modern Krka)<sup>11</sup>, a claim which has never been taken seriously by experts. In 1973, E. Lepore expressed his reservations about the reliability of Pliny's testimony, and declared it very unlikely that a site of the Diomedean cult had ever existed on the coast of Šibenik<sup>12</sup>. His caution seemed justified at that time. Since then, though, this perspective has been definitively overturned by archaeological research undertaken by a group of Croatian, English and Canadian archaeologists as part of an international initiative called the "Adriatic Island Project".

The site mentioned by Pliny was identified in the 17th century by the Croatian historian, Iohannes Lucius<sup>13</sup>, as Cape Ploča (or Punta Planka<sup>14</sup>) between Šibenik and Trogir<sup>15</sup>, a promontory that was used for centuries as a point of departure for the passage between the northern and southern sides of the Adriatic. It is very tricky to navigate along the east coast of this sea, for two opposing winds converge and ships are unprotected by the bar of islands along the Croatian coast. It would not be surprising, therefore, if this critical promontory had been considered to be under the protection of a divinity

or protective hero (and S. Bilić-Dujmušić also adds that Cape Ploča was located exactly at the border between the waters infested by Liburnian pirates, and the safer waters of Dalmatia, controlled by the Greek colony of Issa<sup>16</sup>). Thus, this area would have been an appropriate place in which to take vows in preparation for such a trip, or to thank the divinities when the sea crossing had been successfully made. Indeed, the fact that the promontory was considered a suitable place for worship is confirmed by the existence of a Christian cult, with a 14th-century church dedicated to St. John of Trogir (Sveti Ivan Trogirski), bishop and local saint, who, at the beginning of the 12th century, had saved a ship, its crew and cargo from a violent storm just off the Ploča promontory.



Map 1  
Diomedes in the Adriatic and Italy  
From: Kirigin-Čače (1998)

Archaeological confirmation of the presence of a Diomedean cult arrived in 1996 when S. Čače, from the history department of the Faculty of Philosophy in Zadar, and B. Kirigin, from the Archaeological Museum in Split, decided to undertake three short archaeological campaigns<sup>17</sup>. The results were so unexpected and encouraging that they now provide the most complete testimony to the presence of a Diomedean cult in the Adriatic. Unfortunately, excavations were constrained by the site's exposure to erosion from rain and wind over the centuries, which meant that most of the archaeological layers, particularly those nearest the seashore, had largely disappeared. For this reason, the archaeologists decided to concentrate their research in two small sectors on the southern edge of the plateau and directly below this, in a "pocket" within the first bed-rock syncline.

The first sector revealed the remains of a small sanctuary from the Hellenic age situated at the highest point of the Cape, some 10 m above sea level and 120-200 m from the present shore line. The remains of two walls are the only vestiges that remain of a small temple or sacred area bounded by a stone perimeter. Next to the ruins of the northern perimeter wall, the archaeologists also discovered a grave and the skeletal remains of a woman who had died at the age of 20-25 years and was approximately seven months pregnant. Unfortunately, the poor conditions at this side of the sector have not allowed the related chronology to be established. It is therefore impossible to know if the grave was destroyed by the wall's foundations or if, on the contrary, it postdates it. We will only know with more certainty from the results of the C-14 bone analysis; some fragments of a bird found in the same area also suggest that there may have been burial rituals related to the tomb.

The second sector, the "pocket", located directly south of the sanctuary or temple, has revealed an extraordinary quantity of pottery fragments: more than 110 kg or 250,000 shards in a trench approximately 16 m<sup>2</sup>. Such a high concentration of pottery can, of course, only result from human activity; it was very probably a depot where the broken vessels that once contained offerings were kept in order to make space for other more recent oblations in the temple area.

The excavations also brought to light other kinds of gifts: rings, finely-wrought gems, fibulas, necklaces or bracelets made of glass paste, bronze nails and bronze costume accessories. Among the most important discoveries were 24 Roman and Greek coins, dating from between the beginning of the 3rd century BC and the fourth decade of the 1st century BC. Their origins are varied: alongside coins of Adriatic and Ionic production (from Issa, Ancona, Apollonia, Kerkyra and Leukas), archaeologists also discovered Peloponnesian, Cypriot, Numidian and Carthaginian coins, precious testimony to the diverse backgrounds of people visiting the sanctuary<sup>18</sup>.

The most important clues are provided by the pottery fragments, of which there are, as I have said, an extraordinary quantity. Apart from some fragments from coarse vessels

and amphorae, most consist of pieces of *skyphoi*, *kantharoi*, cups, *kylikes*, *oinochoai* and *pelikai*, i.e. containers designed to contain wine, which would very probably have been part of the offerings. The most ancient specimens, *skyphoi* fragments from the Middle Gnathian period, have been dated to the 4th century BC (340-315/310 BC) and were imported from southern Italy<sup>19</sup>. Over 200 fragments are inscribed with writing in the Greek alphabet. They mention the personal names of the devotees, and, in several cases, the name of the hero Diomedes. The clear and repeated mention of the hero's name leaves no doubt as to the identity of the recipient of the cult practised in the sanctuary. The inscription ΔΙΟΜΕΔΙ ΔΟΠΟΝ [gift to Diomedes] engraved on a grey-clay bowl from the end of the 3rd or beginning of the 2nd century BC<sup>20</sup> clearly supports Pliny's account: Cape Ploča was called the *promontorium Diomedis* because it housed a sanctuary dedicated to that hero.

These archaeological discoveries suggest that the vows taken at the Sanctuary were generally of a personal nature. The only exception is a single fragment with the inscription ΚΑΙ ΟΙ..., which refers to a group, though there is insufficient information to identify which one. As regards the ethnic identity of the devotees, it appears that the Diomedes' cult appealed to non-Greeks. A piece of a *skyphos* from the Late Gnathian period, dated to the late 4th or early 3rd century BC, bears the following text: ΤΡΙΤΟΣ ΔΙΟΜ(ΕΔ) [Tritos'gift] to Diomedes]; the name Tritos has been classified as a south-eastern Illyrian name, and has been only been found in the Illyrian and Epirotic areas, except for a single Sicilian example<sup>21</sup>. The Tritos of the inscription was probably an Illyrian traveller who wished to give thanks to the Aetolian hero for a successful sea-crossing. Unfortunately, we are unable to draw more general conclusions from this single example, although it clearly represents a case (even if an isolated one) of native reception of a Greek cult. We cannot exclude the hypothesis that the Diomedes cult at Cape Ploča may represent a case of syncretism, in which Diomedes succeeded a local divinity that had previously occupied the site (as probably also happened in Veneto)<sup>22</sup>.

The inscription is of interest not only because it confirms Pliny's account, but also because it allows us to establish the chronological limits of the sanctuary's activity. This corresponds more or less to the information yielded by numismatic sources: the most ancient fragments are from the end of the 4th century BC, while the most recent ones date from the beginning of the 1st century AD. The Diomedes cult was therefore essentially a phenomenon of the Hellenistic age, the period when the Greeks, who established themselves on the central Dalmatian islands, effectively controlled the trade of the area, assuring safe shipping. Even though the Dalmatian coast was frequented by Greeks during the Archaic age, as testified by the presence of Greek objects (Attic and Corinthian ceramics, fragments of statues, *aryballoi*, etc.) from that period on the islands and on the Dalmatian coast<sup>23</sup>, and although the first Greek colony in this area, Korkyra Melaina (on the present island of Korčula) was founded at the beginning of the 6th century, Greek interest in the area only really increased after the beginning of

4th century, with the establishment of two new colonial centres. Diodorus of Sicily (whose source was probably Theopompus<sup>24</sup>) mentions the colony of Issa (modern Vis), probably founded upon the initiative of Dionysius of Syracuse, and, later, the colony of Pharos (modern Stari Grad on the isle of Hvar), the result of the cooperation between the inhabitants of Paros, sent by Delphic oracle, and the Sicilian tyrant in 385/4 BC (συμπράξαντος αὐτοῖς Διονυσίου τοῦ τυράννου)<sup>25</sup>. Diodorus of Sicily suggests that Dionysius' contribution to the foundation of Pharos would have been justified and facilitated by the prior colonization of Issa<sup>26</sup>.

Nevertheless, the tyrant of Syracuse allowed the governor he sent to Issa to intervene in Pharos in order to help the Pharian colonists, who were threatened, a year after their arrival, by the island's Illyrian natives, supported by barbarians from the opposite coast, who had crossed the sea in a multitude of little boats. The hostilities ended in favour of the Greeks: five thousand Illyrians were killed and two thousand taken prisoner, according to the Sicilian source, though Diodorus may have been a little biased<sup>27</sup>. In any case, Greek arrowheads and traces of fires, found in the archaeological stratum corresponding to the period immediately preceding Greek colonization, confirm that the Greek occupation did not happen with the natives' consent<sup>28</sup>. Indeed, the relationship between the colonisers and indigenous population continued to be belligerent for some time: an inscription found at Pharos celebrates a military victory by the colonists over the inhabitants of Iader (modern Zara) and their allies<sup>29</sup>, and although this is impossible to date precisely, it probably took place in the 4th century BC<sup>30</sup>. A metric epitaph from the beginning of the 3rd century, found at Issa, honours a certain Callias, slain while fighting against the continent's Illyrians<sup>31</sup>. This evidence reveals a strained relationship with some of the coastline's natives, such as the Liburnians in the area of Iader, who would have perceived the Greek presence as an obstacle to their piracy (particularly in the vicinity of Issa and Pharos, two ideal refuge points, which only Dionysius' forces could have secured and colonized).


The help that Dionysius gave to the Greeks of Pharos and his acts of colonization in the Adriatic are clearly an expression of the power and authority of the Syracusan tyrant, who was able effectively to supplant Athens, the main protagonist of Adriatic traffic in the 5th century, and conduct a good diplomatic and military policy in South Illyria and Epirus. It would not, therefore, be surprising if he used propaganda to support his projects in this part of the Adriatic, as he did in Ancona, Adria and Spina on the other side<sup>32</sup>. He may have made the figure of Diomedes into the mythic fulcrum of his Adriatic conquests, renaming the Hyllös promontory after the Greek hero. Pliny reveals that this promontory was also known by the name of *peninsula Hyllis*, a toponym that probably preceded the *promontorium Diomedis*<sup>33</sup>. The first name likely derived from a Corcyrean tradition concerning the myth of Herakles, whose son was called Hyllös, and may have been connected with the early, and still occasional, visits to the Dalmatian coast during the Archaic period (when the colony of Korkyra Melaina was founded).



The substitution of Hyllos (the eponym of the local Hylleis people) with Diomedes probably resulted from the activities of the Syracuse tyrant and was designed to emphasise Syracuse's control over the Adriatic Sea.

It is possible that the Syracusan centre of Issa controlled the sanctuary alone, through its secondary colony of Tragurion, founded around 300 BC or a little later<sup>34</sup>, and, more generally, through the dominion exercised along the Illyrian coast by Salona (*ager Salonitanus*)<sup>35</sup>. The unfortunate alliances contracted by Issa at the time of the civil wars led it to lose its favoured position, which may have resulted in the progressive abandonment of the Diomedes cult. This was probably a deliberate result of the religious policy of Augustus.

The relationship between the Diomedes cult and Adriatic shipping has been further clarified by finds made on a very small island in the centre of the Adriatic, Palagruža



Map 2  
Cape Ploča, the island of Palagruža and the "island bridge"  
From: Kirigin-Čaće (1998).

(44 km from the Croatian island of Sušac and 53 km from Gargano), again during the Adriatic Island Project<sup>36</sup>.

Literary sources, in fact, report the existence of one or more islands in the Adriatic where Diomedes was honoured as a god or, in other versions, where he was buried and protected by his companions, who had changed into birds. The most ancient source is Ibycus of Rhegium, followed by a host of more recent authors<sup>37</sup>. None of these authors position the island(s) correctly, although they almost unanimously place it/them in the Adriatic, not far from Gargano. The only exception is the geographer Pseudo-Scymnos, who locates Diomedes' island in a completely different geographic context, on Lake Lychnidus (modern Lake Ohrid on the border between Macedonia and Albania). The author is probably referring to one of the tiny islands on the Little Prespa Lake, close to Lake Ohrid, near the Albanian, Greek and Macedonian borders. Although archaeological finds show the presence of material from Greece on this island<sup>38</sup>, this evidence is not sufficient to prove that the legend and cult of Diomedes had spread to such an outlying area. Moreover, the literary passage in question is too obscure and isolated to be seriously considered.

According to the other authors, the island of Diomedes was traditionally located amongst the Tremiti islands, an archipelago 22 km north of Gargano, which includes the islands of San Domenico, San Nicola, Caprara and the rocks of Cretaccio and La Vecchia<sup>39</sup>. The hero's grave is generally considered to be on the largest of these islands, San Domenico. However, there are no archaeological traces to support this claim, while excavations recently carried out on Palagruža (which is nearby, though not belonging to the Tremiti) shows clear evidence of a Diomedean cult.

Situated at the very centre of the Adriatic, the small archipelago of Palagruža consists of two islands: Vela (Great) and Mala (Little) Palagruža, separated by a 250m wide channel surrounded by small reefs and rocks. Vela Palagruža is 1390m long, between 60 and 270m wide and has an area of some 290 hectares. The highest natural point is 87m above sea level (though, following the construction of a lighthouse in 1875 by the Austrian government, its maximum height is now 109m). The southern side is rocky and bleak, while the northern coast has arable land. However, it is mostly desert, due to lack of natural freshwater sources. There are only two landing-points on the island, Zolo in the south and Stora Vloka in the northwest. From the first of these ports, a path leads up to the central plateau of the island. In the 18th century, fishermen from Vis, who frequented the island while sardine-fishing, built a chapel to St Michael there (today falling into ruin), and a cistern to collect rainwater (at a site named Salamandrja)<sup>40</sup>. Mala Palagruža is even smaller: 450 m long, 200 m wide and 39 m high, and is totally desert, though rich in layers of flint, which were exploited in prehistoric times.

The archipelago has belonged to the state of Croatia since 1992, which has promoted methodical archaeological campaigns within the ambit of the Adriatic Island Project.



there was also a temple, or the remains of a grave, at the place where the offerings were made.

Can we then identify Palagruža as the Diomedean island to which the literary sources refer? Unfortunately, the evidence in our possession is still insufficient to give a final answer. However, unlike the island of Palagruža, the Tremiti islands have yielded no traces of cult activity, even though some Greek objects have been found on the two largest islands, San Domenico and San Nicola<sup>42</sup>.

G. Colonna remarks that the distance between Palagruža and the promontory of Gargano does not raise any obstacle as regards the identification of this island with the Diomedean island. Despite being in Croatian waters, the archipelago of Palagruža is closer to the Apulian Cape than to the Dalmatian coast. In fact, its position seems to correspond to the indications given by the literary sources, due to the fact that its position is more frontal in relation to Gargano than the Tremiti islands, which are situated to the north of the promontory<sup>43</sup>.

Furthermore, the sources describe the Diomedean island, explicitly or implicitly, as an uninhabited place, only occasionally reached by humans during the irregular calls of Greek and barbarian ships<sup>44</sup>. Lacking freshwater springs or wells, and with little arable land, Palagruža did not offer ideal conditions to support human life. The same cannot be said of the Tremiti islands, particularly San Domenico and San Nicola.

The ancient authors sometimes mention an archipelago rather than a single island<sup>45</sup>, and this is also true of Palagruža, notwithstanding its very small dimensions. Additionally, a passage from Ptolemy, which counts five Diomedean islands, does not undermine this identification, if we consider all the islands to the east of the Italian coast, particularly the largest among them (San Domenico, San Nicola, Capraia, Pianosa and Vela Palagruža)<sup>46</sup>.

In addition to these considerations based upon the literary sources, there is also a more compelling argument in favour of Palagruža, namely its geographic position, at the centre of trans-Adriatic navigation. Palagruža is the sole place from where it is possible to see both Adriatic coasts, and would therefore have been perceived as the *omphalos*, or navel, of the region – the sole land reference for any sailor facing the Adriatic crossing. With its favourable winds and currents, the route via Palagruža would have been the safest passage from prehistory until the Middle Ages, as is also testified by the systematic presence of the island on mediaeval nautical charts<sup>47</sup>.

There is no doubt that the easiest route across the Adriatic was the Otranto channel, at least in the Mycenaean Age<sup>48</sup>, but this was not very convenient if the destination included the northern ports of Daunia, Picenum, the Po delta or Veneto, mainly because it was particularly difficult to sail close to the coast on the Italian side. For navigators coming from Greece, the fastest route would have been to follow the Illyrian coast from

Korkyra as far as the Neretva estuary or up to the *promontorium Diomedis*: from there, the crossing would have been facilitated by favourable winds.

One of the oldest routes between the Dalmatian coast and Gargano (in use from the Neolithic age) was via an “island bridge” formed by Korčula, Sušac and Palagruža, which were a regular distance apart, therefore providing safe reference points for mariners<sup>49</sup>. The 50 km that separate Palagruža from the Gargano were easily covered with the help of a favourable surface current. According to the *Itinerarium Maritimum* of Antoninus (5th century AD), the journey from Salona to Siponto could be made in a day and two nights sailing<sup>50</sup>. It was, after all, thanks to this ‘via maestra’ that Daunian ceramics, taken in the opposite direction, were able to arrive in Dalmatia in such great quantities and be distributed as far north as Istria, Slovenia and Veneto<sup>51</sup>.

Palagruža also occupied a strategic position for sailors who wanted to travel from Greece to the Po delta and the *Caput Adriae*: setting off from Corfu or the Albanian coast, the vessels could easily reach Palagruža via the island bridge and, from there, take advantage of a powerful current that would propel them northwards to the Po valley’s ports of Adria and Spina, thereby avoiding the *importuosa Italiae litora* and without being obliged to follow the eastern coast<sup>52</sup>.

Palagruža was therefore the navel of the Adriatic, which supports its claims to being the Diomedean Island. Here the sailors would have stopped to pay homage to the hero that Strabo and Lycophron define as the lord of this sea<sup>53</sup>, invested with the role of protector of shipping<sup>54</sup>. Palagruža is also directly related to other places involved in the Diomedean cult; indeed, the more recent sanctuaries of Timavus, Ancona and the *promontorium Diomedis*, were probably modelled upon it, the latter two as a result of Dionysius’ propaganda.

Archaeological evidence therefore suggests that the sanctuaries of Diomedes may be assimilated to the numerous *euploia* (shrines to successful seafaring). As A. Fenet points out, these were located at sites frequented by crews, who left signs of their devotion there, indicating their hopes and fears with regards to the perils of the sea. These took the form of inscriptions addressed to the divinity to whom the sanctuary was consecrated, and contained vows to ensure a safe crossing, or expressions of thanks at the end of one<sup>55</sup>. These cults logically appeared at strategic navigation points, such as Cape Ploča or Palagruža.

The latter was, without a doubt, one of the first Diomedean sanctuaries, as is witnessed by the strong presence of Archaic and Classical material, which is absent from Cape Ploča. It is very likely that, between the end of the 6th century BC and the beginning of the 4th, it became an obligatory stopping point on the transversal passage that linked the southeast and northwest extremes of the Adriatic, then the privileged route of the Greeks to the Po Delta. The affinities between the black- and red-figure ceramics discovered in Palagruža, Spina and Adria can confirm this<sup>56</sup>.

Based on the archaeological evidence, we can furthermore assert that the cult of Diomedes only became properly established from this time, probably upon the initiative of the principal users of this route. The handwriting on the most ancient inscriptions at Palagruža offers an important insight into the origin of the first believers, as it belongs to the alphabets of Athens and Aegina<sup>57</sup>. There is, then, no doubt that the sanctuary of Palagruža was a key stopping place for Attic and Aeginetan merchants heading towards the Po valley centres, where they had held a trade monopoly from the 6th century BC<sup>58</sup>. They would certainly have been responsible for the establishment, or at least enhancement, of the Diomedean cult on Palagruža, and so it is likely that they brought this cult to the Venetian people, too.

The Diomedean myth existed before this in Daunia, not far from the Adriatic island of Palagruža. In Daunia, the hero was said to have arrived without difficulty from north-western Greece, becoming one of the first users of the island bridge. It is possible that the myth preceded the rite, and that the Athenians developed a site for the Diomedean cult because the island was already linked to the mythic figure of Diomedes in the context of a 'Diomedean route' that led from the Balkans (Diomedes was a hero from Aetolia) to Gargano.

Without the discovery of the sanctuaries of Cape Ploča and Palagruža, the seafaring dimension of the cult of Diomedes would have remained unknown, and our knowledge of the spread of the Diomedes myth would have been confined to the west coast of the Adriatic, from Daunia to Veneto. It is therefore only thanks to archaeological research that the Adriatic profile of Diomedes can be entirely understood. Diomedes was not only a civilizing hero, he was also, more importantly, a protector of trans-Adriatic shipping.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> L. Canfora, *Prima lezione di storia greca*, Bari 2000, pp. VII-VIII.
- <sup>2</sup> On Diomedes in Troy, Homer, *Iliad*, VI, 119-236 (Glaucus and Diomedes), X, 150-579 (the capture of Rhesus' horses); V, 1-114 (Diomedes and Aphrodite). For a general introduction to Diomedes, see *Enciclopedia Virgiliana*, s.v. *Diomede*, pp. 77-82, Pauli-Wissowa, s.v. *Diomedes* and Roscher, s.v. *Diomedes*.
- <sup>3</sup> On the origin of this tradition, see U. Fantasia, *Le leggende di fondazione di Brindisi e alcuni aspetti della presenza greca nell'Adriatico*, in "Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa", 1972, 3, 2 (1), p. 127; L. Pearson, *Greek Historians of the West: Timaeus and his Predecessors*, Atlanta 1987, p. 73; I. Malkin, *The Returns of Odysseus: Colonisation and Ethnicity*, Berkeley 1998, p. 234.
- <sup>4</sup> *Scholium* to Lycophron, *Alexandra*, 610, fr. 17 Gentili-Prati.
- <sup>5</sup> There are numerous literary sources. We refer mainly to Lycophron, *Alexandra*, 592-632 with his *scholia*; Antoninus Liberalis, *Metamorphosis*, XXXVII; Appian, *Civil Wars*, VII, 31; Stephanus Byzantinus, s.v. Ἀργυροπία; Horace, *Satires*, I, 5, 91-93; Justin, *Epitome*, XX, 1; Pindar, *Nemean Odes*, X, 12-13; Pliny, *Natural History*, III, 104; Strabo, VI, 3, 9.
- <sup>6</sup> Lycophron, *Alexandra*, 619-624; *scholium* to Lycophron, *Alexandra*, 601; Pseudo-Aristotle, *De mirabilibus auscultationibus*, 79.

- <sup>7</sup> *Scholium* to Pindar, *Nemean Odes*, X, 12; Lycos, *FGrHist* 570 F6; Pseudo-Aristotle, *De mirabilibus auscultationibus*, 79; Virgil, *Aeneid*, XI, 271-274; Ovid, *Metamorphosis*, XIV, 484; Strabo, II, 5, 20; V, 1, 8-9; VI, 3, 9; Pliny, *Natural History*, III, 151; X, 126-127 and XII, 6; Aelianus, *De natura animalium*, I, 1; Theophrastus, *History of Plants*, IV, 5, 6; Stephanus Byzantinus, *s.v. Diomhèdeia*; Solinus, II, 45; St. Augustine, *City of God*, XVIII, 16; Avien, *Orbis descriptio*, 646-649; Eustathius, *scholium* to Dionysius Periegetes, 481-486; Isidore of Seville, *Etymologies*, XII, 7, 28-29; Solinus, II, 45-51; Pomponius Mela, *Chorography*, II, 7, 114.
- <sup>8</sup> Strabo, V, 1, 8-9.
- <sup>9</sup> Pliny, *Natural History*, III, 120; Stephanus Byzantinus, *s.v. Ἀτρία*.
- <sup>10</sup> See Map 1.
- <sup>11</sup> Pliny, *Natural History*, III, 141.
- <sup>12</sup> E. Lepore, *Problemi storici dell'area adriatica nell'età della colonizzazione greca*, L'Adriatico tra mediterraneo e penisola balcanica nell'Antichità, Lecce - Matera, 21-27 ottobre 1973, Taranto 1983, p. 131.
- <sup>13</sup> I. Lucius, *Vita B. Ioannis confessoris episcopi Traguriensis et eius miracula*, Rome 1657, and Id., *De regno Dalmatiae et Croatiae*, Amsterdam 1666.
- <sup>14</sup> The Croatian and Italian toponyms refer to the orographic aspect of the promontory head, whose rocks have been so deeply eroded by wind and sea that they have become like "plates, slates, boards". This is in fact what the term "*ploča*" and the Venetian word "*planca*" both mean.
- <sup>15</sup> See Map 2.
- <sup>16</sup> S. Bilić Dujmušić, *The Archaeological Excavations on Cape Ploča (Promontorium Diomedis)*, in *Greek Influence along the East Adriatic coast*. Proceedings of the International Conference held in Split from September 24-26 1998, Split 2002, p. 486, and Id., *Excavations at Cape Ploča near Šibenik, Croatia*, in "Hesperia", 2004, 18, p. 128.
- <sup>17</sup> See B. Kirigin, S. Čače, *Archaeological Evidence for the Cult of Diomedes in the Adriatic*, in "Hesperia", 1998, 9, p. 72.
- <sup>18</sup> See the catalogue of coins found at Cape Ploča, edited by M. Bonačić-Mandinić, *The Coins Found at Ploča Promontory*, in "I Greci in Adriatico 2", Rome 2004 = "Hesperia", 2004, 18, pp. 151- 161.
- <sup>19</sup> B. Kirigin, *The Beginning of Promontorium Diomedis*, in "I Greci in Adriatico 2", Rome 2004 = "Hesperia", 2004, 18, p. 143.
- <sup>20</sup> See Kirigin, *The Beginning* cit., p. 148.
- <sup>21</sup> V. Toçi, *Données récentes sur l'onomastique illyrienne à Durrachium* (résumé), in «Iliria», 1986, 1, pp. 133-134; D. Rendić-Miočević, *Epidamnos-Dyrrhachion, Rider-Municipium Riditanum (Dalmatie) et leurs fonds épigraphiques comme sources de l'onomastique illyrienne (Un essai de rapprochement)*, in *Grecs et Illyriens dans les inscriptions en langue grecque d'Epidamne-Dyrrhachion et d'Apollonia d'Illyrie*, Actes de la Table ronde internationale (Clermont-Ferrand, 19-21 octobre 1989), Paris 1993, p. 123; C. De Simone, *L'elemento non greco nelle iscrizioni di Durazzo e Apollonia*, in *Grecs et Illyriens dans les inscriptions en langue grecque d'Epidamne-Dyrrhachion et Apollonia d'Illyrie*, Actes de la table ronde internationale (Clermont-Ferrand, 19-21 octobre 1989), Paris 1993, p. 66.
- <sup>22</sup> It should be pointed out that there are important differences between the Venetian and Illyrian cults in honour of Diomedes: the Venetian ritual of horse sacrifice was very probably exclusively practised by native populations with a ceremony from their own culture. Tritos, on the other hand, was an Illyrian who dedicated an offering to Diomedes in the manner of a Greek visitor to the sanctuary.
- <sup>23</sup> N. Cambi, *La civiltà dei Greci nell'Adriatico orientale*, in "Hesperia", 2003, 17, pp. 12ff.
- <sup>24</sup> T. Alfieri Tonini, *Diodoro e la colonizzazione adriatica di Siracusa*, in "Hesperia", 2002, 15, p. 215.

- <sup>25</sup> Diodorus of Sicily, XV, 13, 14. See also Pseudo-Scylax, 23 and Pseudo-Scymnos, 413-414, who refer to the existence of a Syracusan colony on the isle. About Pharos: Stephanus Byzantinus, *s.v. Παέρον*; Pseudo-Scymnos, 425-427; Pseudo-Scylax, 23; Stephanus Byzantinus, *s.v. Παέρον*; *scholium* to Apollonios of Rhodes, IV, 1215; Strabo, VII, 5, 5. Regarding Issa, see B. Kirigin, *The Greeks in Central Dalmatia: Some New Evidence*, in J.-P. Descoeudres (ed.), *Greek Colonists and Native Populations*. Proceedings of the First Australian Congress of Classical Archaeology held in honour of Emeritus Professor A.D. Trendall (Sidney 9-14 July 1985), Oxford 1990, pp. 303-311. Issa's site was also inhabited before Syracusan colonization, but there is no archaeological evidence of Greek occupation of the island before the age of the Parian colonization. On the pre-Greek occupation of Pharos, see M. Katić, *Agglomération illyrienne pré-grecque à Stari Grad sur l'île de Hvar*, in P. Cabanes (ed.), *L'Illyrie Méridionale et l'Épire dans l'Antiquité-III*, Actes du III<sup>e</sup> colloque internationale de Chantilly (16-19 octobre 1996), Paris, 1999, pp. 61-65. Pottery fragments, with the red and black figures of the early 5th century BC, have been found on the island, testifying to the existence of contact with the Greek world in the pre-colonial age. See also D. Rendić-Miočević, *I Greci in Adriatico*, in "Studi romagnoli", 1962, 13, pp. 50-51.
- <sup>26</sup> It should be pointed out that Diodorus' text uses the toponym Lissos. However, it seems more logical to assume that Diodorus was referring to the colony of Issa, much nearer to Pharos than to Lissos (modern Lesh, in Northern Albania) which was 300 km away. Unfortunately the subsequent lines of his text have been destroyed, leaving an embarrassing gap. Archaeological research directed by F. Prendi in the 1970s at Lissos, at the mouth of the Drin, shows that there are no trace of 4th century occupation; evidence appears only at the beginning of the 3rd century. Moreover, no objects of Sicilian origin have been found. The hypothesis that the site was a Syracusan colony is therefore very weak, although this does not exclude the possibility that, given its strategic position, it may have been used as a Syracusan naval base. Diodorus' text does, however, allude to a real established colony, so it would seem legitimate to correct the text. P. Anello is in favour of the Syracusan presence in Lissos (*La colonizzazione siracusana in Adriatico*, in L. Braccisi, S. Graciotti (ed.), *La Dalmazia e l'altra sponda. Problemi di archaiologia adriatica*, Florence 1999, p. 125). On the other hand, F. Prendi and K. Zheku (*La ville illyrienne de Lissos, son origine et son système de fortification*, in "Studia Albanica", 1971, pp. 35-51) disagree. On this controversy, see A. Coppola, *Demetrio di Faro. Un protagonista dimenticato*, Rome 1993, p. 16, with bibliography, note 10. On Dionysius' projected thalassocracy, see P. Anello, *Dionisio il Vecchio I: Politica adriatica e tirrenica*, Palermo 1980, pp. 25-36.
- <sup>27</sup> Diodorus of Sicily, XV, 14. Part of the manuscript once again uses the toponym Lissos. F. Vial, *Diodore de Sicile. Bibliothèque historique. Livre XV*, Paris 1977, p. 127, prefers the *lectio* Ἰσση. An intervention from Issa would have been easier: a squadron arriving from Lissos, 300 km away, would hardly have arrived in time to save the Parian colonists on Pharos.
- <sup>28</sup> See Katić, *Agglomération* cit., p. 64.
- <sup>29</sup> J. Brunšmid, *Die Inschriften und Münzen der griechischen Städte Dalmatiens*, Vienna 1898, p. 16, 3n.; V. Gaffney, B. Kirigin, M. Petrić, *The Adriatic Islands Project. Contact, Commerce and Colonialism (6000 BC- AD 600)*, vol. I, *The Archaeological Heritage of Hvar, Croatia*, Oxford 1997, p. 236; C. Cobiانchi, *Le iscrizioni greche dalle colonie adriatiche di Dionisio I*, in "Anemos", 2005, 3, n° 3, p. 10: Φάριοι ἀπὸ Ἰαδασινῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὅπλα... "The Pharians [offered] these weapons confiscated from the Iadasi-noi and their allies...".
- <sup>30</sup> See also Gaffney, Kirigin, Petrić, *The Adriatic* cit., pp. 236-237. The attack may also be placed after the downfall of the Syracuse tyranny in 357 BC.
- <sup>31</sup> L. Moretti, *Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche*, vol. 2, Florence 1976, 121n., and Cobiانchi, *Le iscrizioni* cit., pp. 45-47, 56n.
- <sup>32</sup> On the use of the figure of Diomedes by Dionysius in Ancona, Adria and Spina, see A. Coppola, *Adria e la tradizione siracusana*, in "Padusa", 1990-1991, 26-27, pp. 287-289, and L. Braccisi, *Diomedes cum Gallis*, in "Hesperia", 1991, 2, pp. 89ff.



- <sup>33</sup> Pliny, *Natural History*, III, 141.
- <sup>34</sup> Strabo, VII, 5, 5 and Polybius, XXXII, 9, 2, and XXXII, 18. See J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, London 1969, pp. 13-28; L. Braccesi, *Grecità adriatica*, Bologna 1977, pp. 310-317 and D. Rendić-Miočević, *I Greci in Adriatico*, in "Studi romagnoli", 1962, 13, p. 48.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54, where the autor speaks of an Issean empire on the Illyrian coast.
- <sup>36</sup> See Map 2.
- <sup>37</sup> *Scholium* to Pindar, *Nemean Odes*, X, 12-13 and, for the later sources, see n. 7.
- <sup>38</sup> See P. Cabanes, *Les Illyriens de Bardylis à Genthios (IVe-IIe siècles avant J.-C.)*, Paris 1988, p. 203 and G. Daux, *Chronique des fouilles et découvertes archéologiques en Grèce en 1959*, in "Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique", 1960, 84, p. 765. See also V. Bitrakova Grozdanova, *L'agglomération antique et médiévale de Golem Grad sur le lac de Prespa*, in "Macedoniae Acta Archaeologica", 1985-86, 10, pp. 131-133.
- <sup>39</sup> See R. L. Beaumont, *Greek Influence in the Adriatic Sea before the Fourth Century B.C.*, in "Journal of Hellenic Studies", 1936, 56, pp. 159-204, 194-195; V. Bérard, *La colonisation grecque de l'Italie méridionale et de la Sicile dans l'Antiquité: l'Histoire et la légende*, Rome 1957, 368-376, p. 387; Braccesi, *Grecità cit.*, p. 15, 12n.; B. D'Agostino, *La Daunia arcaica e i suoi rapporti con la Campania*, in "Profili della Daunia antica", 1991, 7, pp. 35-48; J. Gagé, *Les traditions "diomédiques" dans l'Italie ancienne, de l'Apulie à l'Etrurie Méridionale et quelques-unes des origines de la légende de Ménéce*, in "Mélanges de l'Ecole française de Rome-Antiquité", 1972, 84 (2), pp. 735-788; A. Coppola, *Siracusa e il Diomede adriatico*, in "Prometheus", 1988, 14, 3, p. 222.
- <sup>40</sup> See Fig. 1.
- <sup>41</sup> Kirigin, Čače, *Archaeological Evidence cit.*, p. 64.
- <sup>42</sup> A. Fornaro, *Carta archeologica di S. Nicola, Tremiti*, Bari 1993, pp. 91-114.
- <sup>43</sup> G. Colonna, *Pelagosa, Diomede e le rotte dell'Adriatico*, in "Archeologia classica", 1998, 50, p. 370. See also S. Forenbaher, V. Gaffney, J.W. Hayes, T. Kaiser, B. Kirigin, P. Leach, N. Vujnović, *Hvar – Vis – Palagruža 1992-1993. A preliminary report of the Adriatic Island Project (Contact, commerce and colonisation 6000 B.C. – 600 A.D.)*, in "Vjesnik za arheologiju i historiju dalmatinsku", 1994, 86, p. 45.
- <sup>44</sup> *Scholium* to Lycophron, *Alexandra*, 601; Pseudo-Aristotle, *De mirabilibus auscultationibus*, 79; Antoninus Liberalis, *Metamorphosis*, 37, 5.
- <sup>45</sup> See Strabo, II, 5, 20 and VI, 3, 9; Pliny, *Natural History*, III, 151 and Eustathius, *scholium* to Dionysius the Perieget, 481-486.
- <sup>46</sup> Ptolemy, *Geography* III, 1, 80.
- <sup>47</sup> The hypothesis that the island was frequently visited during prehistory is supported by the discovery of Tyrrhenian obsidian and by some remains of Illyrian culture from Cetina. See D. Radić, *Le rôle de la vallée de la Neretva et du «pont insulaire» dans les liaisons entre les côtes opposées de l'Adriatique (résumé)*, in "Arheološka Istraživanja u Naroni i Dolini Neretve", Zagreb - Metković-Split 2003, p. 316 and Forenbaher *et al.*, *Hvar – Vis – Palagruža cit.*, pp. 38-41.
- <sup>48</sup> See Pliny, *Natural History*, III, 100. On the Otranto channel, see E. Deniaux, *Introduction. Le canal d'Otrante et la Méditerranée antique et médiévale*, in E. Deniaux (ed.), *Le Canal d'Otrante et la Méditerranée antique et médiévale*, Colloque organisé à l'Université de Paris X - Nanterre (20-21 novembre 2000), Bari 2005, pp. 7-14, with bibliography.
- <sup>49</sup> See Map 2 and Radić, *Le rôle cit.*, p. 316: The author emphasises the importance of evidence pointing to exchanges taking place between the two seas since the Neolithic, before the two landmasses were separated by the formation of the sea in the Mesolithic. Research has shown that, during the Middle Neolithic, there was intense exchange of painted ceramics, flint and obsidian objects thanks to the use of the "island bridge". The contacts became rarer in the Late Neolithic and Eneolithic, when the civilisa-

- tions on either side of the Adriatic fell under the influence of their respective hinterlands, but started again in the Bronze Age, with the powerful Cetina culture.
- <sup>50</sup> See P. Arnaud, *Les routes de la navigation antique, Itinéraire en Méditerranée*, Paris 2005, p. 205.
  - <sup>51</sup> E. de Iulii, *La ceramica geometrica della Daunia*, Florence 1977, pp. 83-87; N. Petrić, *Finds of Apulian Geometric Pottery in Central Dalmatia*, in "Taras", 1994, 13, 1-2, pp. 217-222.
  - <sup>52</sup> Colonna, *Pelagosa* cit., p. 376.
  - <sup>53</sup> Strabo, V, 1, 9 and Lycophron, *Alexandra*, 630.
  - <sup>54</sup> See *scholium* to Pindar, *Nemean Odes*, X, 12.
  - <sup>55</sup> A. Fenet, *Sanctuaires marins du Canal d'Otrante*, in E. Deniaux (ed.), *Le Canal d'Otrante et la Méditerranée antique et médiévale*, Colloque organisé à l'Université de Paris X - Nanterre (20-21 novembre 2000), Bari 2005, p. 47.
  - <sup>56</sup> Kirigin, Čače, *Archaeological Evidence* cit., p. 65, 78; Colonna, *Pelagosa* cit., pp. 372-373.
  - <sup>57</sup> Colonna, *Pelagosa* cit., p. 374. The Doricism of some graffiti could simply refer to Aegina.
  - <sup>58</sup> On the Athenian and Aeginetan presence in Adria, see F. Raviola, *Atene in Occidente e Atene in Adriatico*, in L. Braccisi, S. Graciotti (ed.), *La Dalmazia e l'altra sponda. Problemi di archaiologia adriatica*, Florence 1999, pp. 51ff, and C. Antonetti, *I Greci ad Adria tra il VI e il V secolo a.C.*, in M.G. Angeli, A. Donati (ed.), *Serta antiqua et mediaevalia, VII. Il cittadino, lo straniero, il barbaro, fra integrazione ed emarginazione nell'Antichità*. Atti del I Incontro Internazionale di Storia Antica (Genova, 22-24 maggio 2003), Rome 2005, pp. 115-141.

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## SOURCES

1) Pliny the Elder, *Natural History*, III, 141:

*Liburniae finis et initium Delmatiae Scardona in amne eo XII (millia) passum a mari. Dein Tariotarum antiqua regio et castellum Tariona, promontorium Diomedis uel, ut alii, paeninsula Hyllis circuitu C (millia), Tragurium ciuium Romanorum, marmore notum, Siculi, in quem locum Diuus Claudios ueteranos misit, Salona colonia ab Iader CXII (millia).*

The end of Liburnia and beginning of Dalmatia is Scardona, which is on the same river, 12 miles from the sea. Thenceforward are: the old region of Tariotes and fortress Tariona, the cape of Diomedes, or, according to the others, peninsula Hyllis, which is 100 miles in diameter, Tragurium of Roman citizens famous for its marble, Siculi, where divine Claudius sent his veterans, colonia Salona 112 miles distant from Jader.

2) Lycophron, *Alexandra*, 592-632

‘Ο δ’ Ἀργυρίππαν Δαυνίων παγκληρίαν  
παρ’ Αὔσονίτην Φυλαμὸν δωμήσεται,  
πικρὰν ἑταίρων ἐπτερωμένην ἰδὼν  
οἰωνόμικτον μοῖραν, οἱ θαλασσίαν  
δαίταν αἰνήσουσι πορκέων δίκην,  
κύκνοισιν ἰνδαλθέντες εὐγλήνοισι δομήν.  
Ῥάμφεσσι δ’ ἀγρώσσοντες ἑλλόπων θοροῦς  
φερώνυμον νησίδα νάσσονται πρόμου,  
θεατρομόρφῳ πρὸς κλίτει γεωλόφῳ  
ἀγνιοπλαστήσαντες ἐμπέδοις τομαῖς  
πυκνὰς καλιάς, Ζήθον ἐκμιμούμενοι.  
ὁμοῦ δ’ ἐς ἄγραν κάπτι κοιταῖαν νάπην  
νύκτωρ στελοῦνται, πάντα φεύγοντες βροτῶν  
κάρβανον ὄχλον, ἐν δὲ γραικίταις πέπλοις  
κόλπων ἱαυθμοὺς ἡθάδας διζήμενοι,  
καὶ κρίμνα χειρῶν ἀπιδόρπιον τρύφος  
μάχης σπᾶσσονται προσφίλεις κυνζούμενοι,  
τῆς πρὶν διαίτης τλήμονες μεμνημένοι.  
Τροϊζηνίας δὲ τραῦμα φοιτάδος πλάνης  
ἔσται κακῶν τε πημάτων παραίτιον,  
ὅταν θρασεία θουράς οἰστρήσῃ κύων  
πρὸς λέκτρα. τύμβος δ’ αὐτὸν ἐκσώσει μόρου  
Ὀπλοσμίας, σφαγαῖσιν ἡτρεπισμένον.  
Κολοσσοβάμων δ’ ἐν πτυχαῖσιν Αὔσονων  
σταθεῖς ἐρείσει κῶλα χερμαδῶν ἔπι

τοῦ τειχοποιοῦ γαπέδων Ἀμοιβέως,  
 τὸν ἐρματίτην νηὸς ἐκβαλὼν πέτρον.  
 Κρίσει δ' Ἀλαίνου τοῦ κασιγνήτου σφαλῆς  
 εὐχὰς ἀρούραις ἀμφ' ἐτητύμους βαλεῖ,  
 Δηοῦς ἀνείναι μήποτ' ὀμπνιον στάχυν  
 γύας τιθαιβώσσοντος ἀρδηθμῶ Διός,  
 ἣν μή τις αὐτοῦ ῥίζαν Αἰτωλῶν σπάσας  
 χέρσον λαχρήνη βουσὶν αὐλακας τεμών.  
 Στήλαις δ' ἀκινήτοισιν ὀχμάσει πέδον,  
 ἃς οὔτις ἀνδρῶν ἐκ βίας καυχήσεται  
 μετοχλίσας ὀλίζον. ἡ γὰρ ἀπτέρως  
 αὐταὶ παλιμπόρευτον ἴζονται βάσιν,  
 ἄνδρ' ἀπέζοις ἴχνεσιν δατούμεναι.  
 Θεὸς δὲ πολλοῖς αἰπὺς αὐδῆθήσεται,  
 ὅσοι παρ' Ἰοῦς γρῶνον οἰκοῦνται πέδον,  
 δράκοντα τὸν φθείραντα Φαίακας κτανών.

Another shall found Argyrippa, a Daunian estate beside Ausonian Phylamus, seeing the bitter fate of his comrades turned to winged birds, who shall accept a sea life, after the manner of fishermen, like in form to bright-eyed swans. Seizing in their bills the spawn of fishes they shall dwell in an island which bears their leader's name, on a theatre-shaped rising ground, building in rows their close-set nests with firm bits of wood, after the manner of Zethus. And together they shall betake them to the chase and by night to rest in the dell, avoiding all the alien crowd of men, but in folds of Grecian robes seeking their accustomed resting-place they shall eat crumbs from the hand and fragments of cake from the table, murmuring pleasantly, remembering, hapless ones, their former way of life. His wounding of the Lady of Troezen shall be part cause of his wild lustful bitch being frenzied for adulterous bed. But the altar-tomb of Hoplosmia shall save him from doom, when already prepared for slaughter. And in the glen of Ausonia he shall stand like a colossus resting his feet on boulders, the foundations of Amoebeus, the builder of the walls, when he has cast out of his ship the ballast stones. And, disappointed by the judgement of his brother Alaeus, he shall cast an effectual curse upon the fields, that they may never send up the opulent corn-ear of Deo, when Zeus with his rain nurtures the soil, save only if one who draws his blood from his own Aetolian stock shall till the land, cleaving the furrows with team of oxen. And with pillars which no man shall boast to have moved even a little by his might. For as on wings they shall come back again, traversing with trackless steps the terraces. And a high god shall he be called by many, even by those who dwell by the cavernous plain of Io, when he shall have slain the dragon that harried the Phaeacians.

### 3) Strabo, VI, 9

Τῆς δὲ τοῦ Διομήδους δυναστείας περὶ τὴν θάλατταν ταύτην αἱ τε Διομήδαιοι νῆσοι μαρτύρια καὶ τὰ περὶ Δαυνίους καὶ τὸ Ἄργος τὸ Ἰππιον ἱστορούμενα.

That Diomedes did hold sovereignty over the country around this sea is proved both by the Diomedean islands, and the traditions concerning the Daunii and Argos-Hippium.

# Sea migration in the Roman Empire

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*I Romani vedevano già nelle origini della propria città un elemento importante di novità e di differenza rispetto alle altre civiltà antiche, e in particolare rispetto alle poleis greche, nel fatto che Roma arcaica fin dalla sua fondazione sarebbe stata un città 'aperta' agli stranieri, anzi una città che considerava con orgoglio la discendenza da eroi d'oltremare sia che fossero greci, troiani o etruschi.*

*Come era ovvio l'apertura della Roma arcaica nei confronti degli stranieri fu un argomento importante nel posteriore dibattito sull'ampliamento della cittadinanza. Ma non solo; il ricordo della Roma arcaica quale città aperta agli stranieri e nella quale si era potuta realizzare un'armonica e fruttuosa fusione tra elementi di diversa origine tornò anche quando i Romani della tarda repubblica e degli inizi dell'impero si trovarono ad avere a che fare con gruppi non solo etnici, ma soprattutto sociali e politici, i cui rapporti erano molto più difficili. L'esempio dei maiores poteva fornire una guida per affrontare questi conflitti, difficilmente risolvibili.*

*L'idea che Roma avesse esteso a tutte le proprie conquiste, ovvero a tutte le terre che circondano il Mediterraneo, la propria politica di ospitalità ed integrazione nella cittadinanza dei popoli sottomessi fece sì che tutto l'impero potesse venir paragonato ad una grande città, ad una sola comunità, senza barriere e senza confini. Attraverso l'esame di un passo dell'Orazione a Roma di Elio Aristide si mostra l'immagine diffusa nel II sec. dell'impero come un'unica grande città, in cui la mobilità di uomini ed idee non doveva trovare ostacoli ma essere un fattore naturale di scambio tra centro e periferia.*

*Quindi si analizzano altre fonti che mostrano che cosa pensassero gli autori antichi della possibilità di recarsi per mare nelle regioni del mondo che non si affacciavano sul mare Mediterraneo, ma ad esempio sull'Oceano Atlantico o sul Mare del Nord. Queste, anche se in parte sottomesse al dominio romano, apparivano luoghi insospitati e pericolosi, e soprattutto scarsamente attraenti, come si può vedere dai passi di Augusto nelle Res Gestae o Tacito nella Germania.*

*Nella seconda parte del testo si esamina rapidamente attraverso alcuni esempi il contributo delle fonti documentarie alla comprensione del fenomeno complessivo della mobilità delle persone nell'età imperiale romana, il ruolo che ebbero l'origine geografica e sociale, le specifiche competenze, i diversi ambienti geografici e cronologici. In particolare sono stati scelti i seguenti tre ambiti esemplificativi:*

*1. Le fonti epigrafiche di età imperiale come strumento per lo studio delle migrazioni nelle province in età repubblicana e in generale l'apporto della prosopografia e dell'onomastica per lo studio delle migrazioni transmarine nel mondo romano.*

2. *Le fonti epigrafiche e archeologiche come fonte per l'organizzazione delle comunità di stranieri, soprattutto le comunità di mercanti che possono essere considerati protagonisti di un fenomeno di 'migrazione' temporanea.*

3. *Le fonti papiracee come fonte per gli aspetti personali della vita degli 'emigranti': le lettere private.*



The Romans could already see an important element of originality and difference in their city in comparison to other ancient civilisations, particularly in comparison to the Greek *poleis*. This was due to the fact that Ancient Rome, from the time of its foundation, was thought have been a city “open” to

foreigners, and moreover a city which took pride in its descent from other countries’ heroes, whether they were Greek, Trojan or Etruscan.

There are many stories of the founding of Rome, created and circulated to ennoble the city’s origins. Beside the famous legend of Romulus and Remus, there are other stories which credit the foundation of Rome to the mythical heroes of the Greek world. The most fruitful of these stories are the work of Greek authors and ascribe the foundation of the city to the famous protagonists of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, the Greek hero Ulysses and the Trojan hero Aeneas, amongst others. The harmonisation between the Greek and native elements of the story takes its most famous form in the Augustan Age (from the end of I B.C. to the start of I A.D.), in the *Aeneid* of Virgil and in the stories of Livy. These stories tell us that Aeneas landed in Latium and was received by King Latinus. According to the stories he then went on to marry the king’s daughter, Lavinia. After having founded the city *Lavinium* in honour of his wife, Aeneas later died and was succeeded by his son Ascanius, himself the founder of *Alba Longa*. We are told that, after Ascanius, twelve kings reigned in Alba and the last of these kings had a daughter named Rhea Silvia, who was the mother of the famous Romulus and Remus<sup>1</sup>.

Some stories which became less well known were told and handed down to us above all by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a Greek historian also from the Augustean Age. If we examine these, which shed light on the Greek, rather than on the “barbarian” origins of Rome, we see that stories circulated which said that Rome was at its very origins, and not after some generations, founded by ‘emigrants’<sup>2</sup>.

Let’s look at the debated evidence of Ellanicus of Lesbos, passed on to us by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and datable around the end of 5 B.C. (Hellenic., FGH 4, F 84 = Dion., I, 72, 2): According to Dionysius the author of the work on the Priestess of Argos, that is Ellanicus, said that: *Aeneas, from the land of Molossians, who came to Italy with Odysseus, was the founder of Rome*. He claims that the city took its name from one of the Trojan women

who, tired of wandering, set fire to the boats to make the men stay there and not move on. Dionysius adds that this version was upheld also by Damastes of Sigeum and other historians who are not explicitly named. So Ellanicus of Lesbos wrote of a collaboration between Aeneas and Ulysses, which may have had something to do with the foundation of Rome.

Aristotle probably also mentioned a Greek-Trojan mixed foundation of Rome (Arist., FGH 555, F 3 = Dion., I, 72, 3-4). He tells us of a group of Achaens who, returning from Ilion (the ancient name of Troy), were thrown by a storm into a place called *Latinium* on the Tyrrhenian Sea. Here the Trojan prisoners set fire to the fleet for fear that, if the Achaens returned to their country, they would become slaves. The short Aristotelian piece quoted by Dionysius ends here, but it is probable that Aristotle held that Greek warriors and Trojan prisoners united to form a new community on the site of *Latinium*, and that the origins of Rome had been in this community. However, we must point out that in Aristotle the Greek characteristics of the city probably prevailed over the Trojan ones.

What sense can we make of these stories of the origins of Rome, in which we see the relevance of foundations by different ethnic groups from the Eastern world? I think simply that on the one hand these authors tried to reconcile the numerous myths which told about the wandering to the west of heroes from the Trojan war, in the first place obviously Ulysses and Aeneas. Other authors preferred to attribute the origins of Rome to only one of the heroes until Aeneas became the most firmly established, over all the others. On the other hand, maybe they were attempting to account for the characteristics of Rome – a city which certainly wasn't a 'barbarian' city, but neither, for some writers, was it a Greek city to all effects. We must remember that in the story of the origins of the city, Greek-Trojan meetings and marriages meant that Rome participated in Greek culture from its very beginning, even if it wasn't completely integrated it.

To understand the characteristics of the city, for others it was enough to use the evidence of the Trojan origins of Rome. Troy wasn't a true Greek city, in fact it even fought against the Greeks. Nevertheless it was a city deeply embedded in Greek culture, and was undoubtedly a part of the cultural orbit of Hellas. If Pirrus could claim his descent from Achilles at the time he was attacking Aeneas' Roman descendants, the myth of the Trojan origins of Rome also could be used as a unifying factor, as a reason for closer fellowship.

We are however, as you can see, in a very early phase of historical re-elaboration. Nevertheless we must note that the writers we are examining are amongst the first who concerned themselves with the origins of Rome, at a time when the city had not yet established close and continued contact with Greece. We must also remember that we only have a small part of the original works available to us: we cannot rule out that in the missing parts the writers left room for more in-depth considerations on this subject.

The fact that Ancient Rome was open to foreigners was an important argument in the later debate about the increase in citizens. Also, the testimony of Ancient Rome as a city where harmony was achieved between people of different origins was important later, when the Romans of the late Republic and early Empire had to deal not only with ethnic groups, but also with social and political groups in which relationships proved much more difficult.

The example of the *maiores* (the ancestors) could have provided a guide for solving these

difficult conflicts.

This opinion, on the other hand, finds support in the renowned speech of Claudius in the Senate, when he wanted to grant some notable personages from Gaul the right to enter that body. We know about this speech thanks to a fortunate epigraphical discovery (cf. ILS 212) <sup>3</sup>, and through the narrative of Tacitus, (cf. Tac., Ann., XI, 24, 1-2) <sup>4</sup>; The Emperor, as we can see, in order to defend his proposal to admit some prominent persons from *Gallia Comata* into the Senate, appeals to the fact that many of the kings who had governed Rome had not been Roman. Moreover, one of the kings, Tarquinius Priscus, was not even Italian, and some families of the Republican Aristocracy, including the ancestors of the Emperor, were not of Roman origin.

The idea that the city of Rome had extended its policy of hospitality and integration to all its conquests, or rather to all the lands around the Mediterranean and their inhabitants, meant that the whole Empire could be likened to one big city, a community without barriers or borders.

The passage we now wish to examine was written by a Greek rhetorician in the second century A.D., and is part of an oration praising the city of Rome. Not everything that is said in this passage is true. In fact we know that until 212 A.D., when Roman citizenship was granted to all inhabitants of the Empire, there was a great legal and fiscal difference between the rights of Roman citizens and those who did not have citizenship. Later on, the difference between Italy's inhabitants and those of the provinces were still visible, meaning that there were still individuals and communities which did not fully enjoy the rights of Roman citizens <sup>5</sup>.

Nevertheless, the passage is interesting because it gives us the image of the Roman Empire it wanted to pass on, that is, as one big city, in which the mobility of men and ideas was free-flowing and without obstacle.

It is also interesting to analyse what the ancient writers thought about the possibility of going to other regions of the world which were far from the Mediterranean Sea, for example in the Atlantic Ocean or the North Sea. These places, even if under Roman rule in part, seemed hostile, dangerous and unattractive. In his writings about his deeds Emperor Augustus declares that he sailed east from the mouth of the Rhine to the territory of the Cimbri (modern Jutland) [...] *a country which no Roman had visited before either by land or by sea*. He claimed to have pacified the region and to have made close friendships with the population. But this was not the beginning of Roman penetration and migration of other Mediterraneans to these parts. In fact, almost one hundred years later, the Latin writer Tacitus affirmed that nobody would have left Asia, Africa or Italy light-heartedly to challenge the unknown ocean – a sea awful and unknown (*horridus et ignotus*) – to go to Germany, unless it was his home country <sup>6</sup>.

What sources can help us to understand and study the circulation of men and intellectual and technical resources in the Roman Empire? Historians of the ancient world have dealt with this theme only for limited areas – from a chronological or historical point of view, or from the point of view of the documentation they have examined. Thus the complex phenomenon of the mobility of people in the Age of the Roman Empire, the role of geo-



graphical and social origins, the specific skills and the different geographical areas and chronological periods, have not yet been comprehensively looked at.

Literary sources give us information on, for example, the multiethnic character of some cities, such as Alexandria or Rome. These sources also inform us of the circulation of goods and merchants, measures taken by the emperors to deal with the pressure of external populations wishing to enter the Empire, and information on the movements of illustrious people – writers, philosophers, scientists, administrators or politicians – who were part of the Roman Senate <sup>7</sup>.

But we also have access to kinds of sources on the Age of the Roman Empire that allow us to make a more precise and broader investigation on others categories of the population.

Today we have access to a large number of inscriptions, superior to those of the Republican age, originating from all provinces of the Empire.

Starting from 3rd-2nd century B.C., an intense Romanisation came about in these provinces with the extension of Roman rule and also thanks to the migration of native Romans and Italians. The materials available dating to the imperial age, that is, from one to three centuries later – simple funeral epitaphs, honorary inscriptions, copies of official letters and legal instructions – offer us many clues as to the origins and mobility of people.

Alongside inscriptions, a second category of very important documentation available to us are *papyri* – private and public documents of every type written in Greek and Latin during the Age of the Empire on papyrus. They were preserved thanks to the dry atmosphere particularly in Egypt, but also in Judaea, Syria and Mesopotamia. Egypt became a part of the Empire from 30 B.C., so the documentation which was preserved in that area can provide a very detailed and precise source of many of the administrative and social aspects of life in the Empire. To understand more about the phenomenon of migration it is enough to think of the multiple possibilities of finding traces of the presence of individuals or groups of foreigners in Egypt by looking at administrative documents, private transactions and accounting documents. Or, to cite two of the documents that we wish to examine here, the possibility of finding traces of Egyptian emigration outside of their own country through the letters sent home by Egyptians who were resident abroad, or in official census registration documents.

Since it is not possible to examine migration during the whole history of the Roman Empire, here I wish to look only at some cases which are illustrated by information which we can obtain from original sources, in order to show something of the methodological analysis of ancient sources.

## **EPIGRAPHICAL SOURCES FROM THE IMPERIAL AGE AS INSTRUMENTS FOR THE STUDY OF MIGRATION INTO PROVINCES IN THE REPUBLICAN AGE**

Let us to examine a field of investigation which is particularly important in the study of migration in the Roman world: prosopography and the study of onomastics. I'd like to examine the specific case of the Roman gentilitial name (the part of the Roman name which indicated the "gens") *Safidius*. This name is known only through the epigraphical

documentation of the Imperial Roman Age in the 2nd and 3rd centuries A.D. in Africa, but its origin can be reconstructed by comparison with sources written in pre-Roman Italian as pertaining to Central Italy. The record of the *Gens Safidia* only came down to us from the place to which they emigrated, but it allows us to reflect on the origin of this people, the period, and their reasons for leaving to go to Africa <sup>8</sup>.

The use of prosopography and onomastics to study migrational movements in the Mediterranean is still one of the most used methods. The scarcity of information in ancient documents often makes this type of research the only one applicable. The obvious problem with carrying out this type of research is to single out which people should be included in the prosopography and which evidence can safely indicate the origins of a person said to have been in an overseas area. It is evident that we must be able to base each subsequent historical or social consideration on migration on reliable data, or at least we must know to what extent the data are or are not reliable.

An important example comes from the research taking place at the University of Bologna in the Department of Ancient History – *Prosopography of the Egyptians and Alexandrians in the Roman Empire*. This consists of regional catalogues of inhabitants and natives of Alexandria and Egypt from 30 B.C. to 476 A.D. who are attested in documents and literary sources as living outside their motherland or native country. This prosopography should enable us to make subsequent studies on the emigration of Egyptians to other regions of the Roman Empire. It should also allow us to study and evaluate the mobility of the Egyptians and Alexandrians in comparison with other geographical and ethnic realities, and the role of geographical and social origins in migration. We can also study specific areas of expertise (intellectuals, athletes, doctors, magicians, soldiers, sailors), and the different geographical and social patterns.

Except for several well-documented famous cases, also found in literary sources, demographic research, except for that on Egypt, is essentially based upon epigraphical documentation which is difficult to place and which in most cases offers little information about the social status and occupations of single individuals. So we find ourselves, for the identification of a person's place of origin, as well, forced to rely on uncertain evidence, including the study of names.

Usually it is thought that we can see a strong indication of Egyptian origin in certain names – those using the names of Egyptian gods, for example *Ammonius*, *Anubion*, *Harpocras*, *Isidorus*, *Serapio*; geographical names, such as *Aegyptius* or *Nilus* or dynastical names such as *Cleopatra* and *Ptolemaeus*. In reality this type of identification is weak if not used in conjunction with other evidence. For example we can consider the case of the inscription of Malta in which *Sarapion* (son of *Sarapion*) and his brother *Dionysus* made a dedication to *Herakles Archegetes*. The name *Sarapion* has strong Egyptian connotations, being the name Alexandria's god for excellence, *Serapis*. So if we did not have any more information we might conclude (with some doubts) that they were two brothers of Egyptian origin. But the Greek text is accompanied by a text in Phoenician in which the brothers give their names in that language as *Abdosir* and *Osirshamar* and say that they come from Tyre in Phoenicia. So *Sarapion* is only the Greek version of a Phoenician name. This proves the cultural influence of Egypt on the nearby Syrian-Palestinian area and

helps us to understand the “theoforic” development of similar Greek-Egyptian names in Phoenicia. This example shows us how much care must be taken with data obtained exclusively from names <sup>9</sup>.

## **EPIGRAPHICAL AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL SOURCES AS SOURCES FOR THE ORGANISATION OF FOREIGN COMMUNITIES, ABOVE ALL THOSE OF MERCHANTS**

Inscriptions can sometimes be more informative. Among the ancient sources listed below you will find two which talk about the organisation of the merchants' community in two important ancient ports, Puteoli and Ostia. You will find images of the mosaics in Ostia with representations and inscriptions of the so-called ‘Piazzale delle Corporazioni’. It was a large piazza flanked on three sides by porticoes containing over sixty offices of shipping agencies and other organizations connected with the port's commerce. In front of each office was a mosaic pavement executed in a design appropriate to the business of the House <sup>10</sup>.

From these images and inscriptions we have an idea of the place of origin of the merchants that came from Rome: *Carthage, Syllectum, Narbo, Sabrata, Hippo Diarrhytus*.

Naturally these merchants cannot be considered emigrants in the real sense, as people who have moved indefinitely to a region other than their own. Rather, their movement is treated as a type of temporary ‘migration’, which may have taken place very often: on the plaque of the merchant Flavius Zeuxis' tomb it is recorded that he made 72 journeys from the East to Italy. Points of support, offices and support agencies were needed for these temporary ‘migrations’, and these were often supplied by the merchants themselves, or by people from other Mediterranean commercial cities who had moved to live in another port <sup>11</sup>.

A very interesting testimony of these agencies and the connections they had with the home country can be found in the inscription IGGR I, 421 of 174 A.D. *Here a community of Tyrians resident in Puteoli, writes to chief magistrates council and people of their sovereign native city (to the city of Tyre, the sacred, inviolable and autonomous metropolis of Phoenicia and of other cities and mistress of a fleet) [...]* <sup>12</sup>.

The agency complains about the financial status and the small number of the Tyrians resident in Puteoli, as compared to the former times; they ask for support for their metropolis. Interestingly enough, the council of Tyre voted that the agency at Rome should pay for the Puteoli agency's rent from its income.

## **PAPYRI AS SOURCES FOR ASPECTS OF THE PERSONAL LIFE OF ‘EMIGRANTS’** <sup>18 19</sup>

A third class of documents that I wish to cite in conclusion are *papyri* originating from Egypt. These are a very special kind of source and they give us absolutely unique information about the ancient world. These *papyri* were preserved purely by chance, due to the dry atmosphere in Egypt, and often contain ephemeral information which the writers had no intention of passing on to us.

This is the case, for example, of the small archive of correspondence written by Apion, *alias Antonius Maximus*, a sailor of the Roman fleet stationed at Misenum in Campania. These letters were kept by his parents as personal mementos, and thus are available to us only because they were preserved by chance. In these letters Apion tells of his journey to Italy. He thanks the God *Serapis*, protector of sailing, that all went well on his journey. He also talks about his integration into the Roman Navy – his name was changed from Apion to Antonius Maximus when he enrolled, and he says that he is sending his ‘*eikonidion*’ (a portrait of himself) to his family<sup>13</sup>.

When we read these very ordinary and daily thoughts and reflections of this new recruit on the Roman fleet, can we perhaps fancy him as a Roman soldier in his new uniform<sup>14</sup>?

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Liv. I, 1-7. *Livy in fourteen volumes*, I, Books I and II, with an English translation by Foster B.O., Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge Mass.-London 1919, repr. 1967.
- <sup>2</sup> Dion. Halic., I, 72-73. *The Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, with an English translation by Cary E. on the basis of the version of Spelman E. in seven volumes, vol. III, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge Mass.-London 1940 repr. 1968.
- <sup>3</sup> ILS 212: *Senatus consultum Claudianum de iure honorum Gallis dando*. [...] *Quondam reges hanc tenuere urbem, nec tamen domesticis successoribus eam tradere contigit. Supervenere alieni et quidam externi, ut Numa Romulo successerit ex Sabinis veniens, vicinus quidem, sed tunc externus; ut Ancus Marcio Priscus Tarquinius. [Is] propter temeratum sanguinem, quod patre Demaratho C[or]inthio natus erat et Tarquiniensi matre generosa sed inopi, ut quae tali marito necesse habuerint succumbere, cum domi repelleretur a gerendis honoribus, postquam Romam migravit [...]. Once upon a time king occupied this city; all the same it was not their destiny to hand it on to heirs from their own household. Men who had nothing to do with them took their place – foreigners in fact: Numa succeeded to Romulus, and he came from the Sabine country, not far away of course, but it made him a foreigner in those days; and Tarquinius Priscus succeeded Ancus Martius. He had mixed blood, being the son of Demaratus of Corinth and a mother from Tarquinii who was well born but not well off, as one could expect with a woman who had to lower herself to such a husband, and that was why he was kept from holding office at home; after he migrated to Rome he obtained the kingdom [...] (trans. Levick B.). Smallwood E.M., *Documents illustrating the principates of Gaius, Claudius and Nero*, Cambridge 1967, n. 369, pp. 97-99. Levick B., *The Government of the Roman Empire. A Sourcebook*, London-Sidney 1985, n. 159, pp. 165-169.*
- <sup>4</sup> Tac., *Ann.*, XI, 24, 1-2. *Tacitus the Annals*, I, with an English translation by J. Jackson, in four volumes, *Annals Books IV-VI, XI-XII*, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge Mass.- London 1937, repr. 1963.
- <sup>5</sup> Ael. Arist., *Ad Rom.*, 59-63. Oliver J.M., *The Ruling Power. A Study of the Roman Empire in the Second Century after Christ through the Roman Oration of Aelius Aristides*, The American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia 1953.
- <sup>6</sup> Aug., *Res gestae* 26, 1-5. Tac., *Germ.*, 1-2. *Tacitus in five volumes*, I, *Agricola* translated by M. Hutton, rev. by Ogilvie M.; *Germania* trans. by Hutton M., rev. by Warmington E.H.; *Dialogus* trans. by Peterson W., rev. by Winterbottom M., Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge Mass.- London 1970.
- <sup>7</sup> Iuv., *Sat.* III. Juvenal and Persius with an English translation by Ramsay G.G. (revised), Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge Mass.- London 1918, repr. 1969. Dio Chr., *Or.* XXXII, 36-40. Dio Chrisostom with an English translation by Cohoon J.W., Lamar Crosby H., in five volumes, III, *Orations XXXI-XXXVI*, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge Mass.- London 1940, repr. 1961.
- <sup>8</sup> Cfr. Cristofori A., *Appunti sulla colonizzazione italiana dell'Africa settentrionale: il caso dei Safidii*, in *L'Africa Romana*, Atti del XII convegno di studio, Olbia 12-15 settembre 1996, Sassari 1998, pp. 1389-1399.
- <sup>9</sup> IG XIV, 600 e Guzzo Amadasi M.G., *Le iscrizioni fenicie e puniche delle colonie in Occidente*, Roma 1967, pp. 15-17, nn. I and I bis.
- <sup>10</sup> Meiggs R., *Roman Ostia*, Oxford 1973, pl. XXII-XXIV, mosaic inscriptions of shipowners and traders from the ‘Piazzale delle Corporazioni’, Ostia.

- <sup>11</sup> IGRR IV, 841 = Syll3 1229. Dittenberger W. et al., *Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum*, third edition, 4 v., Leipzig-Hirzel 1915-1924.
- <sup>12</sup> IGRR I, 421 (174 D.C.). Cagnat R., *Inscriptiones Graecae ad Res Romanas Pertinentes*, I, Paris 1906, n 421. Eng. Trans. of IGRR I, 421: Lewis N., Reinhold M., *Roman Civilisation. Sourcebook II: The Empire*, Columbia University Press, 1966, pp. 196-197.
- <sup>13</sup> BGU II, 423. Pestman P.W. The New Papyrological Primer, Leiden 19942, n. 39, pp. 167-169. Select Papyri in five volumes, I, Non Literary Papyri, private affairs, with an English Translation by Hunt A.S., Edgar C.C., Cambridge Mass-London 1932, rep. 1959, nn. 111-113.
- <sup>14</sup> Adriani A. (ed.), Repertorio d'arte dell'Egitto greco-romano. Serie B (Pittura). Vol. II: Parlasca K., *Ritratti di mummie*. (Tavole 61-120. Numeri 247-496.), Roma 1977, p. 51, n. 333. Walker S., Bierbrier M., *Ancient Faces. Roman Portraits from Roman Egypt*, London 1997, p. 95-96, n. 87.

## SOURCE

Apion writes his father in Philadelphia telling him that he has arrived safe and sound in Italy. He is assigned to the ship Athenonike at Misenum and has received the name of Antonius Maximus. The letter was first sent to the secretary of a cohort stationed at Alexandria and then forwarded to Philadelphia.

- Ἀπίων Ἐπιμάχῳ τῷ πατρὶ καὶ  
 κυρίῳ πλεῖστα χαίρειν. Πρὸ μὲν πάν-  
 των εὐχομαί σε ὑγιαίνειν καὶ διὰ παντὸς  
 ἔρωμένον εὐτυχεῖν μετὰ τῆς ἀδελφῆς  
 5 μου καὶ τῆς θυγατρὸς αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ  
 μου. Εὐχαριστῶ τῷ κυρίῳ Σεράπιδι,  
 ὅτι μου κινδυνεύσαντος εἰς θάλασσαν  
 ἔσωσε εὐθέως. Ὅτε εἰσῆλθον εἰς Μη-  
 σήνους, ἔλαβα βιατικὸν παρὰ Καίσαρος  
 10 χρυσοῦς τρεῖς. Καὶ καλῶς μοί ἐστιν.  
 Ἐρωτῶ σε οὖν, κύριέ μου πατήρ,  
 γράψον μοι ἐπιστόλιον, πρῶτον  
 μὲν περὶ τῆς σωτηρίας σου, δεύ-  
 τερον περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀδελφῶν μου,  
 15 τρ[ι]τον, ἵνα σου προσκυνήσω τὴν  
 χέραν, ὅτι με ἐπαίδευσας καλῶς  
 καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἐλπίζω ταχὺ προκό-  
 σαι τῶν θε[ῶ]ν θελόντων. Ἀσπασαι  
 Καπίτων[α] πολλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀδελφούς  
 20 [μ]ου καὶ Σε[ρηνί]λλαν καὶ το[ὺς] φίλους μο[υ].  
 Ἐπεμψά σοι εἰκόνιν μ[ου] διὰ Εὐκτῆ-  
 μονος.
- Ἐρρῶσθαί σε εὐχομαι.

4. Read ἔρρωμένον.
6. Serapis (or Sarapis) is here god of the sea.
7. εἰς θάλασσαν, "at sea".
8. σῶζειν, "to save".
- Μισηνοί = Misenum, a naval base near Naples, which is also mentioned in no. 50, 3; Apollinaris (see opposite) writes Μισηνοί.
9. ἔλαβα = ἔλαβον; cf. no. 40, 2, note.
- βιάτικον = *viaticum*, "travelling allowance".
10. Arion is satisfied with his place as a member of the fleet (καλῶς μοί ἐστιν), as Apollinaris (see opposite) was satisfied too, when he wrote to his

### Apollinaris

Apollinaris was another recruit from Egypt who was going to join the fleet in Misenum. In Rome he wrote a similar letter to his mother in Karanis, *P. Mich.* 8 491 [2nd cent. A.D.]:

- 4 Γεινώσκειν σε
- 5 θέλω, μήτηρ, ὅτι ἔρρωμένος ἐγενόμην εἰς Ῥώμην
- 6 Παχῶν μηνὶ κε καὶ ἐκληρώθην εἰς Μισηνοὺς.
- 7 Οὐπω δὲ τὴν κε<ν>τυρίαν μοι ἔγνων, οὐ γὰρ ἀπε-
- 8 ληλύτειν εἰς Μισηνοὺς ὅτε σοι τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ταύτην
- 9 ἔγραφον.

"I wish you to know, mother, that I arrived in Rome in good health on the 25th of the month Pachon and was assigned to Misenum. But I have not yet learned my century, for I had not yet gone to Misenum when I wrote you this letter" (translation by the editors of this text).

- 1) Διονύσιος καὶ Σαραπίων οἱ
- 2) Σαραπίωνος Τύριοι
- 3) Ἡρακλεῖ ἀρχηγέτει

Translation of the Greek text:

Dionysos and Sarapion the (sons)  
of Sarapion, from Tyre (dedicated) to Herakles  
the Lord.

1 – 1 לאדנן למלקרת בעל צר אש נדר  
 2 עבדך עבדאסר ואחי אסרשמר  
 3 שן בן אסרשמר בן עבדאסר כ שמע  
 4 קלם יברכם

Translation of the Phoenician text:

To our Lord Melqart, lord of Tyre  
 (this) has dedicated  
 your servant Abdosir and his brother Osirshamar  
 the two sons of Osirshamar, son of Abdosir, because he listened  
 to thier voice; he may bless them.

Syll<sup>3</sup> 1229. Hierapolis, Phrigia, ca. 2nd cent. A.D.

Φλαούιος Ζευξίς ἐργαστήης. | πλεύσας ὑπὲρ Μαλέαν εἰς Ἰταλίαν πλόας ἐβδομήκοντα | δύο.  
 κατεσκεύασεν τὸ μνημεῖον αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις Φλαουίῳ Θεοδώρῳ καὶ Φλαουίῳ | Θευδᾷ  
 καὶ ᾧ ἂν ἐκεῖνοι | συνχωρήσωσιν.

Flavius Zeuxis, merchant, who sailed seventy-two trips around Cape Malea (the southern  
 promontory of the Peloponnese, famous for its treacherous weather and seas) to Italy, built this





# Local and Regional Identity in Medieval Tuscany

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*Etruria, Tuscany, Toscana: questo è il cammino che ha fatto la denominazione della nostra regione attraverso i secoli. Ma gli uomini del pieno Medio Evo erano consapevoli di vivere in una regione a sé, in una regione con una sua identità? Già all'epoca longobarda vi è una chiara coscienza della particolarità di questa parte del regno che si chiama Tuscany. Con il 774 il regno dei Longobardi viene conquistato dai Franchi e, in un primo tempo, la Tuscany viene suddivisa in una serie di distretti amministrativi che fanno capo alle singole città e a capo dei quali vi è l'ufficiale tipico dei franchi, il conte. Ma dalla metà del IX secolo, il conte di Lucca, ossia l'ufficiale pubblico carolingio di Lucca, comincia ad allargare la propria autorità alle altre città vicine della Tuscany, ponendosi a capo di un organismo più ampio che comprende quasi tutta la Toscana nord occidentale attuale. Per qualificare questo conte di Lucca, detentore di un'autorità distesa su più città, troviamo nelle fonti il termine marchio, che normalmente nell'impero carolingio designa il "capo di una marca". Il secolo X vede nel regno italico un continuo avvicinarsi di re, una continua lotta per il potere: uno dei personaggi chiave, il cui appoggio è indispensabile per diventare re, è proprio il marchese di Tuscany. La rilevanza della marca di Tuscany si mantiene anche dopo la ricostituzione di un impero, ossia l'incoronazione di Ottone I nell'anno 962, e Ugo, il marchese di Tuscany negli ultimi anni del X secolo, è un personaggio ben conosciuto in tutta l'Europa. Nel X secolo, e anche successivamente, nei testi non italiani che parlano delle vicende italiane, è ben chiara la nozione di Tuscany come marca, la cui capitale è Lucca. Se cerchiamo un testo dove compaia l'idea che la Tuscany è una regione a sé, e in cui la Tuscany stessa diventi protagonista delle vicende storiche, possiamo riferirci alla "Vita metrica" di Anselmo vescovo di Lucca. Si tratta di un lungo poema di 7300 versi scritto alla fine del secolo XI per celebrare la storia di questo grande sostenitore di Gregorio VII nello scontro con Enrico IV e il suo antipapa Guiberto. Anselmo, vescovo di Lucca fra 1073 e 1086, per essere fedele a Gregorio VII nel momento in cui Enrico IV scese in Italia nel 1081, venne cacciato dalla città e dovette andare in esilio. Nel raccontare la ribellione dei Lucchesi a Matilde di Canossa loro marchesa e ad Anselmo loro vescovo, Rangerio, l'autore di questo testo, fa dire ai cittadini, nel momento in cui si sono ribellati, che "adesso tutta la Tuscany può prendere le armi contro Roma" e che la Tuscany tutta intera si batterà per sconfiggere Roma. Essi dicono chiaramente "Tuscany nostra": la "loro" Tuscany combatterà contro Roma. Nei secoli XI e nel XII la Tuscany viene identificata come ambito locale: nella vita di Zanobi, per esempio, redatta da Lorenzo d'Amalfi alla metà del secolo XI, troviamo che Zanobi aveva fatto tanti miracoli che erano ben noti "in tutto l'ambito della Tuscany. Questa realtà è presente anche nel XII secolo, che è il momento dell'affermazione delle città, dell'autonomia cittadina dei comuni. A questo punto la Tuscany non è più una marca come nei secoli precedenti; diventa semplicemente un insieme di città comunali, di civitates, che lottano fra loro per la supremazia. Cominciano ad apparire anche le cronache cittadine: la più importante cronaca cittadina in Toscana del XII secolo è di Pisa, scritta da un grande personaggio pisano che si chiamava Bernardo*

*Maragone. Nel raccontare le vicende della città nel XII secolo, Maragone applica lo stesso schema che abbiamo già visto, solo precisandone i protagonisti: Pisa è una civitas tra le altre civitates della Tuscia, ma è la più importante tra le civitates della Tuscia. Quindi, anche adesso che la Tuscia non ha più un'unità politica, ma è diventata un insieme di città, si continua ad applicare questo schema: la propria città è quella più importante rispetto alle altre civitates della regione. Questo è ciò che caratterizza l'idea della Tuscia in questi secoli: tutti sanno di appartenere a questa regione, che è proprio la patria normale, comune – non vi sono mai riferimenti all'Italia o anche al regno italico –, e tuttavia si pensa alla Tuscia solo quando bisogna dire che “noi” siamo la città più importante al suo interno.*



Etruria, Tuscia, Tuscany, this is the path followed by the name of our region through the centuries. In the main part of this chapter I wish to consider for a bit what it is possible to know about the regional consciousness in the minds of the people that inhabited this region in the Middle Ages, particularly between the years 1000 and 1200, hence between the 11th and the 13th centuries. Can we determine whether men and women of the Middle Ages had the idea that something called Tuscia existed, and indeed, whether or not they had the idea that they were living in a particular region, a region with its own identity?

To start our discussion let us go back to the time in which, in Italy, we can consider that the Middle Ages actually began. Historians always discuss when the passage, the break, between the ancient world and the new Medieval world occurred. For Italy we can establish a fairly clear dividing line: that is, in the year 569, when the Lombards invaded Italy (the Lombards came from what today is Hungary, then of course not called Hungary but rather Pannonia, using the name the Romans gave it). In that year the Lombards arrived in Italy and occupied a good part of the Italian peninsula. The Lombard invasion did not cover all Italy. The invaders occupied only Northern and Central Italy with some outposts in Southern Italy: the true Lombard Kingdom, the *Regum Langobardorum*, whose capital was Pavia, appears to be divided. The places where the King's authority actually held sway were limited to certain great areas. In Northern Italy was the true “*Langobardia*” as it is called in the documents, the lands of the Lombards. The Lombards themselves had a special geographical division which has not survived in the Italian language; they distinguished between the part of the Kingdom which went from Pavia to the Eastern Alps which they called Austria – this does not have anything to do with the Austria of today – and a western part which they called Neustria. In any case for them the Kingdom proper was divided into three parts: the Lombard king when he legislated, that is, in his edicts, considered that it was divided into three parts: Austria, Neustria and Tuscia. Hence *Tuscia*, which corresponded more or less to the present day Region of Tuscany, was perceived as a specific, identifiable part of the Lombard Kingdom.



**Fig. 1**  
Rothari, king of the Lombards, surrounded by court dignitaries. *Codex legum Longobardorum*, Abbey of Cava de' Tirreni.

So we may say that in Lombard times there was already a clear awareness of the particular nature of this region, of the specificity of this part of the Kingdom, which was referred to using the name of Tuscia. In 774 the Lombard Kingdom was conquered by the Franks. At first, in the administration of the Kingdom, which continued to be called the Lombard Kingdom, but which now had a King who was no longer a Lombard but a Frank – in fact Charlemagne himself –, Tuscia was subdivided into a series of administrative districts which depended on various cities. Each of them was governed by the typical Frankish official, the *count*. But already by the middle of the 9th century, the count of Lucca, which is to say the Carolingian public official in the city of Lucca, began to extend his authority to the other nearby cities of Tuscia. He became the head of a vaster organism which included almost all of present day north western Tuscany, and, precisely from the middle of the 9th century on, in order to identify this count of Lucca who had authority over various cities, hence over a much more extended area than the neighbouring counts, we find that the term “*marchio*” (marquess) is used in the sources.

The term “*marchio*” normally in the Carolingian Empire normally designated the “head of a March”. The March was a territorial entity in a border area, which generally was supposed to present particular problems of defence due to the likely incursions of the bordering peoples. In this case the March that formed around Lucca was actually a new creation of the mid 9th century which united a large part of Tuscany under the authority of the Count – now the Marquess – of Lucca. From this we can see that from this point on for a few centuries the political centre of Tuscia was Lucca. In Lucca there is still a great plaza, which today is called Piazza Giuseppe Verdi. Its historical name however was “the Marquess’ Field”, because that was the location of the palace, the residence, where the marquesses of Tuscia lived and ruled.

In the 9th century Tuscia hence had a specific political identity and centre of gravity, that is, it constituted a March of the Carolingian Empire with its capital in Lucca. After 887, after the end of the Empire when the last Carolingian emperor, Charles the Fat, or Carlo il Grosso as he is known in Italy, was deposed, the Empire dissolved, but there remained within it a few independent Kingdoms, among which we find the ancient Lombard Kingdom, now called the *Regnum Italicum*, the Italic Kingdom. Within this Kingdom, Tuscia with its marquess still had a strong identity. The marquess of Tuscia was one of the most powerful and illustrious personalities of the Kingdom. In the 10th century in a time in which there were continuous upheavals in the Italic Kingdom, with continuous changes of the king and struggles for power, one of the most illustrious personages, the one whose support was necessary in order to become king of the *Regnum*, was the marquess of Tuscia. In the works of the chroniclers of the 10th century – there is one in particular for Italy, Liutprand of Cremona (author of the *Antapodosis sive Res per Europam gestæ*, a history of the period from 887 to 950), the only one who tells us something about what actually happened in that stormy 10th century –, we see that precisely the marquess of Tuscia and his court in Lucca constituted in practice the political centre of the Italic Kingdom. The marquesses of Tuscia were almost more powerful than the kings who resided in Pavia. Although the kings enjoyed royal authority in name, in fact they were no more powerful than the marquesses of Tuscia. Therefore we may say that the importance of the March of Tuscia continues even after the Empire was reconstituted under Otto I after 962. And the personage who was the marquess of Tuscia at the end of the 10th century, the marquess Ugo of Tuscia, was a great personality at a European level.




was forced to lay siege to the city; he had to occupy and conquer all of Tuscia. This is what we learn from a chronicler, Vipo (Wipo) or Vipone he is called in Italy, Conrad II's biographer. This is another example of how a non-Italian chronicler had a clear idea that Tuscia was a specific well-defined entity and that its political centre was Lucca.

The year 1027 is important because, after the episode we have mentioned, Conrad II destituted the marquess who had rebelled against him and replaced him with a great Northern Italian aristocrat, that is, Bonifacio of Canossa, who became the new marquess of Tuscia. Bonifacio deserves mention because he was the father of Matilde of Canossa who, at a certain point in the second half of the 11th century, herself became the Marquise of Tuscia. Out of all Bonifacio's children she was the only one to survive him and hence she became marquise and is famous because she was the great ally of Pope Gregory VII in his struggle with Henry IV, an episode which our history textbooks refer to as the "Investiture Struggle".

From this period, the 11th century, on, the documentary sources begin to be a little more abundant. I have attempted to see whether it is possible to find indications that there was an awareness of belonging to Tuscia; that is, whether the people who lived in Tuscia had an idea of that they lived in this region and whether they thought of this region as an entity. My research has brought me to the conclusion that Tuscia was indeed the usual mental horizon of anyone who lived there. We might say that it was the regional father or motherland, or to be more precise, it constituted the mental horizon of its inhabitants. All the sources show that people had the very clear idea that they lived in Tuscany or Tuscia and that Tuscia was the framework in which they lived. The texts produced in this region always refer to the world which belongs to them as Tuscia; however this Tuscia is rarely or never felt to be a unified entity; it is simply the frame of reference within which what interested people most was the particular place where they lived, that is, either the city, or, as we shall see, even smaller places, for example the monastery or the village where they lived: the two extremes of personal awareness were the particular place where one lived and the vaster 'mental horizon', which was Tuscia.

Let us see a few brief examples in this regard. If we look for a text in which we find the idea that Tuscia is a region apart, and in which we find that it is considered as a whole entity, and in which Tuscia itself is the protagonist of historical events, there is only one text that we can refer to. It comes from the end of the 11th century, in the time of the Investiture Struggle: it is a long poem of 7300 verses written to celebrate the history of a bishop of Lucca, Anselmo, a great supporter of Gregory VII in the conflict between Gregory VII and Henry IV. Anselmo was the bishop of Lucca from 1073 to 1086. Because he continued to support Gregory VII when Henry VII came to Italy in 1081, he was driven out of the city and had to go into exile. In fact the city of Lucca itself supported Henry IV. In telling the story of Lucca's rebellion against Matilde, their marquise, and Anselmo, their bishop, Rangerio, the author of the text, has the Luchese say when they rebel that now all of Tuscia can take up arms against Rome. Hence they prepare the battle that all Tuscia will undertake in order to defeat Rome, and they say clearly that "our Tuscia" (*Tuscia nostra*) will fight against Rome. Hence, at the time of the rebellion against the political authority and against Gregory VII, the idea appears that it is the whole region which moved united against Rome. But of course this was only the idea of those that supported Henry IV, rebelling against



**Fig. 3**  
A siege as depicted in the middle of the 9th century. From the *Psalterium Aureum* of St. Gall.

Matilde and against their bishop. On the other hand, what is the opinion of the author of the biography of Anselmo, his successor Rangerio, who would be bishop of Lucca at the end of the 11th century? Naturally, he is contrary to the idea of the rebels, he favours Gregory VII, and hence he shows that Tuscia's rebellion is an error, in fact that Tuscia in and of itself does not exist except as a framework for reference, because he, in other parts of his work, does mention Tuscia, but only in order to say that Lucca, with her great religious traditions, with her great saints of the past and her bishop in the present, with her religious ceremonies, with her liturgy – thanks to her overall religious pre-eminence – Lucca is superior to all the other cities of Tuscia. Hence we may say that the author of the *Life of Anselmo* is the first person we find for whom Tuscia is only a reference point in order to celebrate his own city, in order to say that Lucca is the most important city of Tuscia, but in his case, it is important and illustrious because of its religiousness, because of its church.

In the 11th and 12th century, when we look for references to Tuscia in the sources, we always find that Tuscia is depicted as the area in which reference can be made in order to praise a local personality or some other local happening or characteristic. Let us give a few examples: when we read the life of a Florentine bishop of late Antiquity, Saint Zanobi, a life written around the middle of the 11th century, we are told that Zanobi had made many miracles – miracles which are well known in the entire area of Tuscia. Continuing to refer

to these religious texts, we see that around 1032 in Arezzo the tomb of another great bishop of late Antiquity, Saint Donato, was opened, and the body of Saint Donato was taken to a new tomb and a new church was built in his honour. In this case the sources from Arezzo say that all Tuscia came in pilgrimage to Saint Donato's tomb. Hence Tuscia is the normal frame of reference, but always in reference to something local.

These texts always want to show that the personage which they describe, if they are talking about a saint, or the church, if they are talking about a church, is at the centre, that he or she or it is popular and well known in all Tuscia. I could cite many more examples of this sort, which are characteristic of these centuries. Tuscia was the region which everyone knew about, which everyone had in mind, but which was mentioned only in order to say, 'we are the best in Tuscia', that everyone in Tuscia comes here because it is the most important place in Tuscia and so forth.

The same thing happened in the 12th century also, at the time in which the cities were becoming more important. The freedom of the Communes was growing, and hence at this point Tuscia was no longer a March as in the preceding centuries; it becomes simple an aggregate, a whole, formed of communal cities, of *civitates*, which struggled against each other for supremacy. City chronicles begin to appear: the most important in Tuscany in the 13th century is a chronicle of Pisa written by a great Pisan personality named Bernardo Maragone. In recounting the events of the city in the 12th century, Maragone applies the scheme that we have already seen, except for the fact that at this point, when he describes the protagonists, Pisa is a *civitas* among the other *civitates* of Tuscia which are in her hinterland, but Pisa is seen as the most important of the *civitates* of Tuscia – she is the top, the one that is pre-eminent among all the cities of Tuscia. Here once again Tuscia does not have political unity, it has become an aggregate of cities; the idea is still that one's own city is the most important one of the region and that is what characterises the idea of Tuscia.

Everyone is aware of belonging to this region, which is really the normal common father or motherland for the people of the time. There is no reference to Italy or even to the Italic Kingdom, that is to this Kingdom which included Northern Italy; and nonetheless people think of Tuscia only when they need to be able to say, we are the most important city in Tuscia.

To conclude, let me mention a final example from the end of the 13th century. When Florence, in 1296, decided to tear down the old city cathedral named Saint Reparata and to build a new majestic cathedral which is the one we see today, called Santa Maria del Fiore (and, we must add, it was not by chance that they abandoned Saint Reparata and dedicated the new cathedral to Saint Mary because the cathedrals of Pisa and of Siena were already dedicated to Saint Mary, and they did not want to have a lesser saint) they said: we want to build a temple which is the most beautiful, the most spectacular of all the cities of Tuscia, still using the usual scheme. Whether they actually succeeded in doing what they wanted to do, in building the most beautiful cathedral in Tuscia, or whether there are other more beautiful cathedrals in Tuscia... well, I will let you decide about that.





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## SOURCES

The sense of belonging to "Tuscia" and the contrast between "Tuscia", friendly to the emperor Henry IV, and the Rome of pope Gregory VII in the words of a Lucchese partisan of the Emperor (1081):

*Luca potest Tuscos in litem sollicitare  
 Luca potest Romam perdere Marte suo (...)  
 Maiores nostri pro libertate tuenda  
 oppressere duces et sine rege suos.  
 Nunc mihi rex pugnat et totis militat armis  
 et fert Teutonicas in mea bella manus.  
 Iam veteres acuit gladios mea Tuscia, Roma  
 iam trepidat, iam se dividit et latitat*

Lucca can call to the fight the men of Tuscia, Lucca can defeat Rome with her Mars [...]. Our ancestors, to preserve their liberty, rebelled against their chiefs even without the King. Now the King is fighting by my side and is in the field with many arms and has brought the Teutonic forces to my war. Already my Tuscia has sharpened her old swords and Rome, is already afraid and divided and she runs to hide.

From: Rangerius, *Vita metrica Anselmi lucensis episcopi* (MGH, Scriptores, vol. XXX/2), verses 1875-1876 and 1905-1910.



# Trade and Politics in the Medieval Baltic: English merchants and England's Relations to the Hanseatic league 1370-1437

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*This chapter explores the history of the political and diplomatic relations between England and the Hanseatic League in the late 14th to the middle of the 15th centuries. The chapter argues that the history of Anglo-Hanseatic relations has been neglected in favour of the history of the Hundred Years' War in the English-language historical literature, despite its demonstrated significance in other European literature. The chapter describes the diplomatic relations of the kingdom of England and the Hanseatic League and demonstrates that the English merchant class had considerable influence on English foreign policy in the Baltic (though the Royal administration always sought to find a peaceful solution to conflicts with the League). The chapter also argues that the English merchant class found a measure of cohesion over the implementation of a programme of parity in Anglo-Hanseatic relations which succinctly summarised the interests of domestic and overseas English merchants. The English merchants successfully exploited internal divisions in the League, but were eventually defeated themselves by the breakdown in national English cohesion caused by the Wars of the Roses.*

The economic and political relations between the Hanseatic League and the kingdom of England in the 14th and early 15th centuries are still far from a standard part of English historiography. The situation has only marginally improved since Philippe Dollinger remarked in 1970:

There has been no general study of the Hansa in England since A. Weimer's [sic] contribution to the *Cambridge Medieval History* (1932), despite the importance of Anglo-Hanseatic relations for nearly five hundred years<sup>1</sup>.

There are still remarkably few studies written in English of the relations between the Hanseatic League and England. A search in the Library of Congress Catalogue under the keywords *Hanseatic League*, *Hanse Towns*, and *Hanseatic League History* produced 349 hits, but only eight entries were in English, reflecting a very low awareness of the impact of the League among English historians<sup>2</sup>. A similar search in the *International Medieval Bibliography* for articles published in English on the Hanseatic League produced only 48 articles published since 1967. Only 18 of these deal with the Hanseatic League and its relations with the British Isles. This admittedly rough impression of the situation does ignore interesting work, such as John Munroe's study of Anglo-Hanseat-

ic relations c. 1450-1510<sup>3</sup>, but it is clear that Dollinger's complaint is still as valid today as it was in 1970.

This is all the more surprising considering the fact that the historiography of the Hanseatic League and its influence in northern Europe in languages other than English is simply too large to cover in detail in this chapter. The League's influence extended all over Northern Europe and the Baltic where it was a major player in economic and political developments from the middle of the 13th to the 17th centuries. Not only has the *Hansischer Geschichtsverein* published the *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* since 1871, but several series of publications have been ongoing since 1875<sup>4</sup>. The minutes of the meetings of the German Hanse can be studied in good modern editions<sup>5</sup> and studies by Karl Koopmann, Wilhelm Stieda, Dietrich Schäfer, Ernst Daenell, Walther Stein, Walther Vogel, Fritz Rörig, Erik Arup, Paul Johansen, Ahesver von Brandt and Aksel E. Christensen from the late 19th and the 20th centuries provide more than an outline of the Hanseatic League's international relations.

The starting point in any study of Anglo-Hanseatic relations must be Lappenberg's 1851 study of the history of the Hanseatic *Kontor*, the Steelyard in London<sup>6</sup>, combined with the primary sources collected in Kunze's *Hanseakten aus England* [Hanseatic sources from England]<sup>7</sup>. More synthetic works include Georg Schanz's study of English trade and politics<sup>8</sup> and Ernst Daenell's study of the flowering of the Hanseatic League<sup>9</sup>. Friedrich Schulz's 1911 study of Anglo-Hanseatic relations is still essential, as is Louise von Winterfeld's biography of Tidemann Limberg, one of the earliest [and the only successful] financiers of the Hundred Years' War between England and France<sup>10</sup>. These studies should be complemented by Michael Postan and Eileen Power's work, particularly Postan's articles on the Hanse, and also the work of Elizabeth Carus-Wilson<sup>11</sup>. In later years important studies include monographs by Klaus Friedland, T.H. Lloyd and Stuart Jenks' three-volume study of the period<sup>12</sup>. Apart from these studies, for the purpose of illuminating the relations between the Hanse and England, the political history of the League and the Scandinavian kingdoms are of particular importance. A summary of Scandinavian research can be found in the minutes of the eleventh *Nordiske Historikermøde* [Nordic historians' meeting] in Århus 1956. This may be supplemented by relevant articles in *Kulturhistorisk Leksikon for Nordisk Middelalder* [Cultural history dictionary for the Nordic middle ages] which also provide excellent bibliographies<sup>13</sup>. Aksel E. Christensen wrote a number of studies of Danish-Hanseatic relations in the period, excellently summarised in Kai Hørby and Michael Wenge, *Tiden 1340-1648* [The period 1340-1648], vol. 2 of *Danmarks historie*, exec. ed. Axel E. Christensen, et al.<sup>14</sup> which also contains a bibliography which attempts to list the most important studies of the previous century and a half.

For most of the 20th century the political and economic relations between the Hanse and England have taken second or even third place in the attentions of British historians. Instead, they have preferred to focus on the spectacular events of the Hundred Years' War and its social, political and economic impact on the kingdom of England and the impact of England's participation in the growing European wool trade. The history

of the interaction of the Hanseatic League and England is therefore still in its infancy and the following offers a start in the field. The history of England and the Hanseatic League is particularly relevant to the theme of this volume because Anglo-Hanseatic conflict tended to focus around rights and privileges in the geographical area of the Baltic and the North Sea. Thus this subject will allow us to investigate the way in which 'traditional' nation states, with government institutions such as royal councils and parliamentary institutions that can easily be understood by modern observers, interacted with one of the fore-fathers of today's European Union, the Hanseatic League.

## THE PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER

This chapter investigates the political and diplomatic efforts of certain interest groups and individuals to maintain and protect their economic and political interests in England and within the geographical area of the Hanseatic League. From the perspective of the English, efforts focussed on gaining access to trade in the Baltic. For the members of the League the question was how to preserve or enhance the privileged Hanseatic trading position in England<sup>15</sup>. Throughout this contribution I shall be referring to the "Hanseatic League," an institution that has caused much confusion by its nature. The Hanseatic League is often erroneously referred to as the 'German Hanse'<sup>16</sup>. This appellation may be technically correct in the sense that the language spoken by most of the League was German, but it gives a false impression of the League as a tool of German nationhood or Imperial policies. Indeed, the language employed for the most part by the Hanseatic League was Middle *Low* German, a language which grew into, or heavily influenced, the languages now spoken in the Northern areas of Germany, Belgium, Scandinavia and the Low Countries, not the Middle *High* German that has developed into modern German. The adjectives used to describe these two languages, *hoch* and *plat*, refer to the geographical features of the areas where they are spoken: the mountainous South and the plains and moors of the North. The appellation 'German Hanse' therefore refers to the linguistic, not the political, affiliation of the League.

## FIRST CONFLICT: THE POUNDAGE OF 1372

During the reigns of the English kings Edward II (1307-1327) and Edward III (1327-1377) the Hanseatic League built up and secured an impressive array of privileges. It was the only group to retain the rights granted to all foreign merchants under the *Carta Mercatoria* (1307); the League's merchants were granted an exemption from new wool subsidies and from increases in the wool customs levied for Edward III's wars in France; they were granted the right to trade directly with the English producers of wool; and they were allowed the right to form their own guilds in England, provided that they elected a native Englishman as the head of all the Hanseatic guilds in England<sup>17</sup>. This made it possible for the Hanseatic League to export profitable goods from England to Hanseatic areas more cheaply than native English merchants<sup>18</sup>. As English trade in the

Baltic increased in the 1360s and 1370s, the fact that English merchants did not enjoy similar privileges in Hanseatic areas attracted increasing criticism in England.

The first recorded clash over these privileges dates from 1375. The conflict was occasioned by the arrival of a Hanseatic delegation that had come to London to negotiate the position of the members of the League in relation to a new wool subsidy or 'poundage' granted by parliament in 1372. Members of the League claimed an exemption from new impositions and therefore a group of English merchants resident in England who wished to limit Hanseatic liberties in England joined forces with a group of English overseas merchants (*Merchant Adventurers*) who wanted to open up the Hanseatic markets in the Baltic, particularly the Scania fairs. The League had gained control over these as a consequence of the Peace of Stralsund (1370) and had tried to limit non-Hanseatic involvement with these and as a consequence English merchant adventurers presented a petition to the aged King Edward III which enumerated 'abuses' which English merchants were subject to in areas under Hanseatic control in the Baltic. The king passed their petition on to the Hanseatic delegation who, in their turn, referred the plaintiffs to the next meeting of the member cities of the Hanse in Lübeck<sup>19</sup>, but no serious negotiations were entered into about this problem.

Nor did the Hanseatic delegation enter into serious negotiations about the other substantial question, the poundage of 1372, because it was discontinued only six days after their arrival on 23 September 1375. Thus, the question of whether or not the Hanse should be exempt from tonnage and poundage was not resolved when the delegation left England, taking with them as an indication of Edward III's continuing good will some relics of St. Thomas of Canterbury which were to be placed in a newly built chapel for the martyr in Lübeck<sup>20</sup>. Another confrontation over Hanseatic privileges was therefore inevitable.

## NEW OPPORTUNITIES: THE ACCESSION OF RICHARD II, 1377

The English merchants' petition of 1375 had identified issues around which subsequent Anglo-Hanseatic conflicts would revolve for at least the next sixty years. It also presented a political programme that was eminently understandable and succinctly formulated. 'Full parity in Anglo-Hanseatic relations' summarised the aims both of the merchant adventurers who were genuinely interested in obtaining trade privileges in the Hanseatic areas, particularly in the Baltic and those of the large native English guilds whose sole aim was to exclude the Hanseatic League from England so that English merchants could enjoy the profits of the wool trade and the trade in Baltic goods in England for themselves. The inevitable confrontation came with the accession of the ten-year-old Richard II in 1377. Revoking all charters contrary to the charter of London – among which were the charters of the Hanseatic League<sup>21</sup> – King Richard II (or rather his royal council) at the request of the commons, ordered an investigation into the 'abuses' of the League<sup>22</sup>. A petition had named the League as the architects behind the rising prices of Baltic goods, and Richard's council saw that by complying with the suggestions of the petition he could secure the good will of the London merchants.

The wealthy London merchants seized the opportunity to establish a monopoly controlling the English trade in Baltic goods. Although the monopoly brought wealth to its members, it also contributed to an even higher rise in the prices of Baltic goods than those for which the League had been responsible, a fact which was crucial for the eventual restitution of the Hanseatic charters. When the Hanseatic *Kontor* in London did not receive an answer to his request for a copy of the petition which would enable the League to draw up a defence against the accusations, it was decided to hand the matter over to the next *Hansatag* in Lübeck in May 1378<sup>23</sup>. At this meeting it was decided to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict, although the grand master of the Order of the Teutonic Knights, strongly supported by the Prussian cities, advocated radical measures against the English<sup>24</sup>. For the sake of Hanseatic unity the grand master and the Prussian cities promised to abstain from any reprisals until Martinmas, and instead the Hanse sent letters to the English king and council and to the London guilds who had originally presented the petition to the king<sup>25</sup>.

However, before the League received an answer to its letters, a new petition, this time favourable to Hanseatic merchants, was presented in Parliament<sup>26</sup>. In this new petition, a group of merchants not belonging to the monopoly on Baltic trade drew attention to the fact that the new monopoly had failed to check the increase in the price of Baltic goods and requested the restitution of the Hanseatic charters. Following the recommendations of this new petition, the royal council promised to restore the Hanse to its former privileges. However, in accordance with the wishes of the London merchants, certain conditions were included which the Hanse had to meet before a full restitution of privileges could be made. The Hanse was requested to draw up a list of cities that were members of the League and to guarantee by sealed letters from each member of the Hanse that English merchants would be 'amicably' treated, i.e. allowed to trade freely, in all areas under Hanseatic control and be treated like native merchants in matters of Hanseatic customs and subsidies<sup>27</sup>.

On 17 May, 1379, the Prussian members of the League met in the castle of the Teutonic Knights to discuss (among other things) their response to the English demands before the *Hansatag* in Lübeck, and there they decided to reject them and to work for a total embargo against the English until the London *Kontor* had received its charters back<sup>28</sup>. However, the full *Hansatag* decided not to follow the Prussian suggestions until all other solutions to the problem had been exhausted. It was decided, however, that if negotiations had not been reopened before Shrovetide 1380 the Hanse would implement three sanctions against the English. Under the penalty of a fine of 10 gold marks, Hanseatic merchants were to be instructed not to trade with the English or to travel to England; the London *Kontor* would close and move to Bruges; and the Hanseatic officials in Scania and Norway would be instructed not to protect English merchants in the areas of their jurisdiction against robbery and murder<sup>29</sup>. To avoid this happening, the *Hansatag* appointed a delegation under the leadership of Jakob Pleskow from Lübeck and Johan Kordelitz from Thorn to negotiate with the English. The two men arrived in London toward the end of November 1379, and, although they were un-

successful in their attempts to restore the Hanse to its former privileges, they laid the foundations for the later settlement of the dispute.

By the time Kordelitz and Thorn left London in January 1380, the English had demonstrated that they were willing to make concessions<sup>30</sup>, and negotiations continued between the London *Kontor* and the English authorities. These eventually led to the re-confirmation of the Hanseatic privileges, which took place at an official ceremony at Westminster, where representatives of the *Kontor* received a copy of the charters

in the presence of Simon Sudbury, the chancellor, Thomas, Bishop of Exeter, the king's treasurer, John de Fordham, keeper of his privy seal, William de Dighton, John de Wendlyngburgh, and others ... on condition that English merchants when they come into their parts (i.e. Hanseatic areas) with merchandise should be as amicably and fairly treated there, and be allowed to traffic as freely as by the liberties contained in the above charter the Almaines exercise their trade here<sup>31</sup>

In order to protect the English against reprisals in spite of the agreement, a clause was included in the memorandum quoted above to the effect that the Hanseatic privileges would be revoked if anything contrary to the charter was done to any Englishman in any way<sup>32</sup>.

## CONTINUED TENSIONS AND COMPLICATIONS

Although the League had its privileges back, the grand master of the order of the Teutonic Knights continued to harass English merchants, and, as late as 24 June, 1381, the *Hansatag*, seeking to avoid further antagonism of the English, commanded the grand master to remove the new *Puntgeld* (poundage) that was levied on English merchants in Prussia<sup>33</sup>. The tense situation was not helped by the English Peasants' Revolt in 1381, during which the rebels executed all the low-German speakers they could round up. However, the situation was saved by the quick reaction of the Hanseatic *Kontor*, who sent a letter two days after the revolt assuring the grand master that they had received protection from their English *Vrenden* during the revolt and that they were all safe<sup>34</sup>.

The protection received from individual London merchants did not prevent Anglo-Hanseatic relations from deteriorating during the next four years, and 1385 saw the beginnings of the most serious conflict between the Hanseatic League and England in the 14th century. The League was becoming increasingly bullish about the issue of piracy. When English pirates captured a Hanseatic fleet off Zwijn and the English authorities refused to help Hanseatic merchants to gain restitution for their losses a series of mutual reprisals brought trade between England and the League to a virtual stand-still: indeed, reprisals in Prussia forced the English merchants' colony in Danzig to move to the less hostile Stralsund. Nevertheless, even that measure proved ineffectual in preventing reprisals against English merchants in the Baltic: when the crisis reached its peak around 1388 and threatened to develop into open war, the English merchants had their goods confiscated by the Stralsund authorities<sup>35</sup>. Neither the League nor the English government were interested in war, and the English government decided that



it had for too long ignored the potential dangers of the policy of the native merchants. A delegation was sent to Prussia to negotiate, and in three months a treaty was ready. The treaty contained a concession to the English: they were allowed to form a guild in Danzig, and although the guild was not to enjoy the same privileges as the *Kontor* in London, it was definitely a good starting point for further English expansion into the Prussian areas<sup>36</sup>.

## INCREASED FRICTION (I): THE CITIES OF THE EASTERN QUARTER OF THE LEAGUE AND ENGLAND

English concentration on one geographical area of the Hanseatic League was the foundation of English political success in the confrontations between the two, and the main cornerstone of the eventual English success in breaking Hanseatic unity. Because of the confirmation of the Hanseatic charters in 1388 in England, the members of the eastern part of the League faced English competition alone. English merchants had settled in towns such as Elbing, Danzig and Stralsund, where they were initially well received because of the large number of English knights involved in the crusades against the pagan Lithuanians<sup>37</sup>. However, soon their activities threatened eastern Hanseatic interests and the English were not only prohibited from trading outside the towns, but also from trading with other foreigners and from hiring Hanseatic ships. Other members from the western parts of the League had no interest in a conflict with the English while their trade with England went unimpeded. The English took advantage of the situation, and, acting within the agreement of 1388, increasingly made their present felt in the Baltic, by increasing their retail trade and entering into partnerships with local Hanseatic merchants. Their main centre of activity was Danzig where they established a *Kontor* or a guild with its own laws, aldermen and governor, as the League had already done in London. The first governor, John Bebys from London, was appointed by King Richard II in 1391<sup>38</sup>. In contrast to Hanseatic merchants in London, English merchants in Danzig brought over their wives and families. This was seen as a wish by the English to settle permanently in the town and regarded as an open provocation by the Danzigers. Fearing the lawlessness of a permanent foreign settlement which could claim exemption from municipal jurisdiction, they insisted that the English should at least appear to be travelling merchants<sup>39</sup>. Financially the English were successful. They soon controlled a substantial proportion of foreign trade, and this financial success encouraged Prussian merchants to work for the protection of their own interests in the face of mounting foreign, mainly English, competition.

The English concentration on one area of the Hanse was the foundation of their political success in their confrontations with the Hanse, and the main reason behind their later successful attempts to break Hanseatic unity. Prussia had to face English competition alone and the other areas of the Hanse saw no interest in a conflict with the English at that time, especially since their trade with England went unimpeded through the confirmation of the Hanseatic charters in 1388. In 1398, pressure on the grand master

by the cities of the Baltic coast to restrict the privileges of the English forced the grand master to terminate the treaty with the English<sup>40</sup>. Although the proposed restrictions were not enforced immediately, they created friction between the Prussians and the English. When the diet decided to attempt a final confrontation over the English trade to the interior of the country in 1402, the possibility of war presented itself again. Prussia had urged the other members of the Hanseatic League to use this weapon time and time again but to no avail. English trade did not threaten the interests of the other Hanse members, and their trade in English cloth was a main source of income. In the end, however, the Hanse was united against the English by the actions of English privateers<sup>41</sup>.

## INCREASED FRICTION (II): INTERNAL TENSION IN THE LEAGUE

English privateers had been active in the English Channel for years, but they had mainly concentrated their attention on French enemy ships and allowed neutral ships to pass. However, by the beginning of the 15th century the broadening of the term 'enemy' also to include ships going to or from – or carrying cargo for merchants from – enemy lands, meant that Hanseatic cargoes came within the grasp of the English privateers. They seized the opportunity of securing an extra income with eager hands<sup>42</sup>. The League's answer to the situation was prompt and classic. At a diet held at Lübeck in March 1405, the League decided in favour of a prohibition against exports to England of Baltic goods and a total prohibition against any form of commercial intercourse between the two areas, a move which, correctly, was interpreted as the overture to a war with England<sup>43</sup>.

But war did not come. Although a war would have suited certain interests in Prussia by supplying them with an excuse for what they hoped would be the final confrontation with English merchants, the real interest of Prussia, the Hanseatic League and the English kingdom was against a war. Prussia might resent English competition but Prussia could not do without English cloth, and English cloth inevitably meant English merchants. The English could not do without Baltic goods, and although they were loath to admit it, the English had discovered in 1378 that the Hanseatic merchants supplied the goods cheaper and on a more regular basis than the English merchants<sup>44</sup>. While the Hanseatic league would suffer severe economic losses through the loss of its incomes from the trade in English cloth and the import of Baltic goods into England, the English would not feel the effects of an embargo so much since they could still sell their cloth in the fairs of Flanders and buy Baltic goods from middlemen. Consequently the embargo was never complete and the inner contradictions in the Prussian cities between the majority who were threatened by the English expansion and the large minority who benefited from the export of their goods to England soon severely threatened Hanseatic unity<sup>45</sup>. For this reason, only a few months after the implementation of the embargo, the Prussian towns suggested its discontinuation at the diet at Falsterbo in 1405, and although the Bruges *Kontor* exhorted the diet to hold out, the Prussian towns soon after broke ranks and re-established trade with the English on their own accord<sup>46</sup>.

An English delegation arrived in Prussia in 1405 and a draft treaty between Prussia and England was ready in October of that year. Thus, for the first time in the history of Anglo-Hanseatic relations, the English were successful in breaking Hanseatic unity. Despite the advice of the Bruges *Kontor*, and in the face of the rest of the Hanseatic towns, Prussia concluded a separate truce with England, and to top it all, the treaty was the most far-reaching yet. The Prussians recognised the right of the English to trade in the Baltic and even admitted to the principle of full parity in the relations between the two areas<sup>47</sup>. The English could come to Prussia to:

trade in a free manner both with Prussians and others of whatever nation of faith they may be exchange goods and stay there and to return from thence to their bases and homes<sup>48</sup>.

In spite of their success in breaking Hanseatic unity, the English were forced by other political developments to attempt to placate the Hanse. In 1405 and again in 1407 John, Duke of Burgundy, offered a place in an anti-English alliance to the Hanseatic League<sup>49</sup>. Had this alliance come into being, it would have closed the continent to English cloth. Faced with this danger, the English government had no other option than to yield and offered to negotiate about compensation for the losses of Hanseatic merchants in the hands of English pirates.

The treaty of 1405 was an important victory for the English merchants and marked the end of Hanseatic unity in the League's relations with England. It was not until the English merchant class was weakened by the lawlessness of the War of the Roses that the Hanseatic league regained their earlier strength, and from this time it was Prussia which gave in more easily to English pressure<sup>50</sup>. Prussia and England became the principal actors in the ensuing conflicts. This break in Hanseatic unity came about for a variety of reasons. In the previous period we have seen how the Prussians acted as spokesmen for the most radical measures against the English, but increased commercial intercourse between the two areas gradually made Prussia more dependent on her exports to England and the economic activity of English merchants inside the country itself<sup>51</sup>. There was no significant increase in the economic activity between the rest of the League and England, and consequently they were more hesitant to conclude treaties with the English since they could afford to wait until they were offered what they considered to be the right terms. Political developments, too, were favourable to this. A series of democratic revolutions paralysed the Westphalian towns in the years 1408-10, which seriously weakened the vigour of the central and western members of the Hanseatic League. Furthermore, the new grand master of the order of the Teutonic Knights, Heinrich von Plauen, wished to strengthen the power of the order relative to the secular interests in the country, a wish which led him to try to use the English merchants as a kind of leverage against the merchants of Prussia. It was his hope that, by encouraging English trade, he would strengthen the financial and political position of the order through the increased competition for Prussian merchants, which would both divert the powers of the towns and replete the coffers of the order<sup>52</sup>. Although the treaty of 1405 acknowledged the principle of reciprocity in the relations between England and the Hanse, the wording of it was too imprecise to satisfy the more radical

English merchants who clamoured for full parity, while for precisely the same reason it frightened the Danzigers who feared that the English would finally succeed in their attempts to re-form their guild in Danzig<sup>53</sup>.

## THE LEGAL POSITION OF THE ENGLISH MERCHANTS IN DANZIG

Richard II had appointed an alderman of the English merchants' guild in Danzig as early as 1391. But the Prussians had successfully resisted the guild's formal acknowledgement<sup>54</sup>. With the official termination of the 1388 treaty in February, 1398, the English merchants in Prussia were included under the provisions of the *Gastenrecht* which demanded that they report to a hostel and sell their goods within forty days of their arrival in Prussia<sup>55</sup>. As such, they also lost their privilege to be tried by their own tribunals and had to use the Danzig courts where their disputes would be settled under Hanseatic law. This would change if they were allowed the right to establish their own guild and would put the English merchants outside the control of the Hanse authorities: English merchants would be able to claim the right to be tried by more favourable English guildsmen, should they be brought before the law. Clearly this was not in the interests of the towns and they vigorously resisted the implementation of any law allowing greater freedom for the English<sup>56</sup>.

The Teutonic Knights were defeated by the Poles at the battle of Tannenberg in 1410, a defeat which ended the order's successful domination over the Prussian towns and fatally weakened their ability to dictate Hanseatic policy in the English question. A taste of what was to come occurred soon after: the mayor of Danzig passed a decree terminating the English merchants' rights to trade with other foreigners, i.e. merchants from outside Danzig<sup>57</sup>, but fortunately for the English the grand master was still able to exercise his authority and the decree was quickly revoked<sup>58</sup>. However, this was to be the last time the grand master interceded on behalf of the English, as the pro-English Heinrich von Plauen was deposed by an internal revolt in the order in 1413<sup>59</sup>. The new grand master, Michael Kuchmeister von Sternberg, did not actively engage in the confrontations between the English and the Prussians, being too occupied with maintaining his position inside the order. However, surprisingly, the next confrontation between the League and the English was the work of the London merchants.

## THE DISPUTE OVER "SCOT AND LOT" (1418-1426)

In 1418 the London city council decided that members of the League were to pay 'Scot and Lot' with the rest of the city, an obligation from which the Hanse of course claimed exemption under their charters. The dispute was initially heard before the Lord Mayor's court, which decided against the decision of the city council, but two years later London sheriffs pleaded against the Lord Mayor's court's decision at the king's council which over-ruled the Lord Mayor's court. To underline the city's support of the council's decision the London aldermen refused to appoint an English alderman for the Hanseatic

guild in direct defiance of the Hanse's ancient charters<sup>60</sup>. For the next two years the case rested: the Hanse was forced to pay the impositions from which it considered itself exempt while the English merchants in the Baltic were still denied the right to their own guild. According to a Hanseatic complaint of 1423 the troubled relations between the Hanse and the English merchants were due to the agitation of the English merchants who were resentful of the Hanseatic charters; in particular the petition pointed to the agitation of the London merchants. The Hanse apparently misjudged the extent of its unpopularity, for it is clear from surviving documents that many other English merchants vigorously opposed the Hanseatic privileges and that anti-Hanseatic agitation was wide-spread. We even possess the accounts of the expenses of such a campaign in the town of Lynn, and it is not at all unlikely that the unspecified lobbying for which the York Merchants Adventurers paid an unnamed royal official in 1419 is connected with this clash between the Hanse and England<sup>61</sup>.

The English government saw and used the political opportunities of the situation. Although it was bound by custom to renew the Hanseatic charters, it was decided to force the Hanseatic merchants to pay tonnage and poundage for their goods like all other aliens, and this ruling was considered a success for the principle of full parity in Anglo-Hanseatic relations, although it was more the expression of the crown's financial needs than of a genuine understanding of the merchants' political aims. In pursuance of this policy Henry V wrote a letter to the grand master of the Teutonic Knights in which he complained about the lack of parity in Anglo-Prussian relations. The grand master sent his usual friendly, but firm reply that the Prussians did not enjoy any particular privileges in England but that they shared the privileges of all Hanseatic merchants in England. Furthermore, he assured the king that English merchants were, as always, welcome to trade in Prussia<sup>62</sup>.

There were reactions to this letter and the developments in England in the Hanseatic cities. But these were neither as concerted nor as efficient as they had been before. The Prussians continued their attempts at excluding the English from markets and areas under their control and they attempted to enforce the ancient rules regulating the rights of foreign merchants to trade with the 'foreigners', i.e. the non-Hanseatic merchants in Prussia, the old rules regulating the English guild and to exclude the English from the retail trade in Prussia. But when the diet in Lübeck suggested the imprisonment of all English merchants and the confiscation of all their goods as reprisals for the English infringement of the Hanseatic charters in England the Prussian towns – with the approval of the grand master of the Order of the Teutonic Knights – ignored the suggestion and continued their trade with the English<sup>63</sup>. Because of the war between the Wendish members of the Hanse and the Danish Kingdom, which flared up again in 1420, the passage through the Øresund was becoming increasingly difficult. The cities of the Eastern Quarter therefore needed all the income they could get from foreign trade<sup>64</sup>. This forced them to encourage all trade regardless of its nationality and, faced with the threat of Flemish measures against the English export of cloth, which would close the only other continental outlet for English wool, even the English government

was interested in keeping the Prussian back door open, should these become effective. This situation encouraged a number of reconciliatory measures from the English in the period of 1426-30.

## RECONCILIATORY MOVES BY THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT AND INCREASED TENSION WITH THE DANES, 1426-1430

In February, 1426, the English government retracted its earlier endorsement of the London council's refusal to appoint an English alderman for the Steelyard, and commanded the council to appoint one at once<sup>65</sup>. After seven months' procrastination and another command from the King's Council, the Londoners finally conceded. To further underline the government's good will towards the League, it decided in favour of the Hanseatic merchants in the case of the imposition of the Scot and Lot, and specifically exempted the Hanseatic merchants from most local dues in England. As a result, the merchants of the Steelyard promised to intercede on behalf of the English merchants in their struggle with the grand master in Prussia over the corporate rights of the English in the Prussian towns<sup>66</sup>. The Steelyard's efforts were not in vain: although the grand master would not allow an English merchants' guild in Prussia, he granted the English the right to a governor to govern the affairs of the English merchants in Prussia<sup>67</sup>. Following this move, a Prussian delegation arrived in London in 1429 to negotiate further instalments of the compensations to Hanseatic victims of English piracies contained in the treaty of 1409. The delegation was unsuccessful in its primary objective, the payment of the long over-due compensations, but obtained an important grant of freedom from taxation in England not specifically mentioned in their charter<sup>68</sup>.

However, for a second time the English government's policy of reconciliation was crossed by the interests of the merchants abroad and at home. The English in Danzig, claiming full parity, were not satisfied by the appointment of the governors, and at home the merchants engaged in foreign trade prepared for another confrontation with the Hanse. As before, the confrontation was brought about through the conjunction of national and international events. In 1427, the war between the Wendish towns and the Danish Kingdom was resumed. Warnings were issued to all Hanseatic merchants not to go through Danish waters since the Wends planned to blockade the Øresund to prevent supplies reaching the Danes<sup>69</sup>. English merchants chose to ignore this warning and continued trade in the Baltic, and consequently many English ships were lost to the Wends who claimed that they were trespassing in a war zone. However, it was not the piracies in the Baltic alone which led to further confrontation between the English and the Hanse.

## INTRANSIGENCE AND NEGOTIATION, 1431-1436

In 1431, the stage was set for another clash over the tonnage and poundage subsidies. The parliament of that year granted Henry VI the tonnage and poundage for two years<sup>70</sup>, and

although there was no specific mention of the Hanseatic merchants, the authorities forced the Steelyard to raise sureties for an increase in the subsidies – from which the League of course considered itself exempt – of 6 d. in the pound and of 3 s. for each tun of sweet wine, an impost that was levied on alien merchants<sup>71</sup>. Following Hanseatic protests, and seeking to avoid antagonising the Prussians, the government realised its mistake and withdrew the order to its officials concerning the surety, but the damage was already done<sup>72</sup>. The Prussians had had enough. They forced the English merchants in Prussia to produce sureties to the sum of £1,200, to be forfeited should the new impost come through, and the grand master of the order of the Teutonic Knights decided to satisfy the Order's financial claims against England over the last 25 years out of the goods of the English merchants<sup>73</sup>. He also threatened to settle the claims of his towns in the same manner. In June, 1434, the Hanseatic diet at Lübeck decided on a plan of action against the English. The first step was to oust the English merchants from the Hanseatic area, and a delegation from the diet successfully petitioned the grand master to expel them from Prussia<sup>74</sup>. As the overture to this step, a letter of complaint was sent from Prussia to the English king, threatening to expel the English from Prussia if the harassment of the Hanseatic merchants in England did not stop at once<sup>75</sup>. Of course there was no serious reply to this letter, and the League decided that it was time to submit the position of their merchants in England to new negotiations. A delegation consisting of four Hanseatic mayors – among whom was the Danzig mayor Jacob Vorrath – was appointed to conduct negotiations for the League in England and in Flanders where there was trouble, too<sup>76</sup>. The delegation arrived in October, 1434, and informed the royal council of their arrival and their authorisation to negotiate on behalf of the League, together with a list of complaints<sup>77</sup>. The delegation was told that it was impossible for the council to find time for the negotiations until Christmas – officially because the council had to leave London to protect themselves from a new outbreak of the plague, but in reality because they needed more time to inform themselves of the contents of a new petition from the native merchants against the Hansards<sup>78</sup>. Since the delegation could not wait for this, they appointed four members of the Steelyard to plead the Hanseatic cause at the coming parliament<sup>79</sup>. These delegates were given specific and very interesting instructions in case their plea should be successful: they were to request that not only the king, but also the towns of London, York, Lynn and Bristol, should vouchsafe for the Hanseatic privileges<sup>80</sup>. The address of the delegation from the Steelyard elicited “...vele soter wort na older Englichen gewohnheit...”<sup>81</sup> [many sweet words as is the English custom], but the Hanseatic merchants had to wait till May the following year before negotiations were opened.

In May, 1435, Henry VI sent a delegation to Bruges where the Hanseatic delegation – which by now was reduced to two members: the mayors of Danzig and Hamburg, Heinrich Vorrath and Heinrich Hoyer – had set up permanent quarters. But since the English delegation wanted to negotiate the position of the English in Hanseatic areas as well as the Hanseatic charters in England, and since the Hanseatic delegation had no authority to treat these matters, negotiations were broken off pending consultations between the delegation and the Hanseatic diet<sup>82</sup>.

The Hanseatic diet decided on a hard line in the confrontation with the English. Danzig refused to negotiate about the position of the English and the diet decided to implement the strongest weapon short of war against the English merchants<sup>83</sup>. The Steelyard was closed and its members moved to Bruges, and an official trade embargo was initiated. But a trade embargo was difficult to enforce and afforded an entrance for middlemen, a situation which was more likely to harm the Hanseatic position on the continental markets than the loss of their privileges in England. The embargo was also not very efficient among the Hanseatic towns themselves: Cologne ignored the decision of the diet and even contemplated a separate treaty with the English, the Zuider Zee towns who had always been the unruly corner of the Hanse also ignored the embargo, and even the grand master of the order of the Teutonic Knights authorised the entry into his area of six large English ships to trade there in April, 1436<sup>84</sup>. Accepting defeat, Danzig furnished the delegation in Bruges with a set of more moderate claims in July, 1436, but they still refused to authorise Vorrath and Hoyer to negotiate the position of the English in Prussia<sup>85</sup>. Vorrath, who knew that it was impossible to reach an agreement with the English unless the Prussian problem was solved and that the Hanseatic unity would soon break unless an agreement was reached, resolved to take the matter into his own hands. He admitted that the issue should be dealt with and assumed the responsibility for the consequences of a transgression of his mandate. He offered to negotiate the English position in Prussia<sup>86</sup>.

## THE TREATY OF 1437

This done, Vorrath was soon able to report progress, and a treaty was in sight in the winter of 1437. According to the draft treaty, the Hansards received their charters back, a confirmation of their exemption from new taxation, and – as a further favour from the English crown – they were promised the outstanding compensations from piracies contained in an agreement of 1409<sup>87</sup>. In return, the English were allowed to enter Prussia, to trade there and to settle there, should they so wish. In addition to this, they were given extensive fiscal liberties, including an exemption from all taxes imposed over the preceding century<sup>88</sup>. The agreement promoted by Beauford did not satisfy the English merchants who had set their minds on a recognition of their entire programme for Anglo-Hanseatic relations. It did not contain the right to form their own guild in Prussia and English merchants were not to receive compensation for the ‘unjustly’ levied taxes in the preceding century. But in spite of their protests, the treaty was accepted and signed through the advocacy of Cardinal Beauford who was tired of the wars and confrontations between England and the Continent, and who above all wanted peace<sup>89</sup>.

## CONCLUSIONS

The treaty of 1437 marks the end of the English advance in the Baltic. The English were largely excluded from the Baltic markets by the late 1460s because of conflicts



at home and the absence of a strong government which could consolidate the gains made during the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. However, the focus of this chapter has been on the period before 1437 in order to demonstrate how the relations between the Hanseatic League and the kingdom of England throw light on the way in which English merchants at home and abroad influenced English government policies and how the internal contradictions in the Hanseatic League allowed the English to exploit the diverse interests of the Hanseatic regions. The influence which the English merchant class had over the foreign policy of the realm and the extent to which it acted as a pressure group exerting a profound influence over the English foreign policy has largely been overshadowed by the events of the Hundred Years' War and, after our period, by the Wars of the Roses, but it is evident in the history of English relations with the Hanse as outlined above. The markets of the southern littoral of the Baltic took on a new economic significance in the late years of the fourteenth century and at the same time Hanseatic privileges in England introduced a level of competition which was a painful thorn in the side for English merchants. These factors resulted in an alliance between the native English merchants and the merchant adventurers in Prussia aimed at breaking the privileged position of the Hanse in England and obtaining a better position for the English in the Baltic. This alliance was successful during the period in question, although its policy was often directly opposite to the real interest of the English kingdom. At least twice the alliance steered England towards open war with the Hanse to such a degree that the English government had to intervene to stabilise the situation. In other words, the merchant class enjoyed a real and important influence over English policies abroad throughout the period.

The study of the relations between the Hanseatic League and the Kingdom of England thus adds a much-needed foil to the English-French wars and allows us to study the political aspirations of a section of society which, despite its substantial successes in Northern Europe and in England, has received relatively little attention by British historians. It may be argued that English merchants only influenced a small and insignificant part of the kingdom's foreign policy. This is true to a certain extent: the merchants were never allowed to fully implement their radical and confrontational policies. This would have been were too dangerous for English national security. We have seen how the English government was willing to concede to Hanse demands when they were threatening to take the attention away from the French question. But nevertheless, mercantile interests did rule the English foreign policy as long as it benefited the country and enabled the government to concentrate fully on the war in France.

The time from the mid-fourteenth and to the end of the fifteenth centuries are the high point of Hanseatic influence in northern Europe. The Hanseatic league successfully took on the Danish kingdom and were in control of the Danish castles and the Scania market for a quarter of a century after the peace of Stralsund of 1370. It is a signal of the league's strength that when their lease on the castles expired they handed them over to the Danes with ease. They also understood how to maintain their position in relation to the rising Scandinavian superpower. The league managed to interfere politically

and hold on to their gains during the disintegration of the Kalmar Union during the reign of her adopted son, King Eric of Pomerania (in whose deposition in 1438 they played more than a small role). But the League *was* a strange hybrid political formation. Though it was able to make a success of Baltic politics, in its dealings with England the internal divisions of the Hanseatic League become highly visible. Once the English had been able to drive a wedge between the eastern and western members of the Hanse, the English achieved many of their goals. What eventually gave the League the upper hand in its relations with the English kingdom, was not so much an increase in the league's power and strength as much as the breakdown of royal power in England. Thus, despite their profound differences in organisation, both the league and the English kingdom found that their strength lay in presenting a unified policy which brought together diverse and contradictory interest groups under a clear and unified programme of action. The clearer the goals were and the less they were distracted, the better the interests of their members were served, whether these be Hanse merchants or English royal subjects.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> P. Dollinger, *The German Hanse*, London 1970, v. Dollinger was referring to A. Weiner, *The Hansa*, in J.R. Tanner - C.W. Previté-Orton - Z.N. Brooke (eds.), *The Cambridge Medieval History*, Cambridge 1932, pp. 216-47. Originally written in French in 1964, *La Hanse, XIIe-XVIIe Siecles*, Paris 1964, the German edition, *Die Hanse*, trans. Marga Krabusch and Hans Krabusch, Stuttgart 1966, added much material which was subsequently included in the English edition.
- <sup>2</sup> Apart from the English translation of Dollinger's work mentioned in note 1, the list consists of I.D. Colvin, *The Germans in England, 1066-1598*, reprint, 1915, N.Y. 1971; A. de Haenens, *Europe of the North Sea and the Baltic the World of the Hanse*, Antwerp 1984; T.H. Lloyd, *England and the German Hanse 1157-1611: A Study of Their Trade and Commercial Diplomacy*, Cambridge 1991; J. Schildhauer, *The Hansa History and Culture*, Leipzig 1985; W. Worm, *The Hanseatic League*, [S.l.]: ECA-OSR Information Division, Editorial Research and Analysis Section, 1950; I. Øye, (ed.), *Bergen and the German Hansa*, Bergen 1994.
- <sup>3</sup> J.D. Fudge, *Cargoes, Embargoes and Emissaries: the Commercial and Political Interaction of England and the German Hanse, 1450-1510*, Toronto 1995.
- <sup>4</sup> The Website of the *Hansischer Geschichtsverein* can be found at <http://www.phil.uni-erlangen.de/~p1ges/hgv/hgv.html>.
- <sup>5</sup> K. Koppman (ed.), *Hanserecesse, Serie 1*, in *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse und andere Akten der Hansatage von 1256-1430*, Herausgegeben vom Verein für Hansische Geschichte, Halle, Leipzig, Munich 1876-92; G. von der Ropp (ed.), *Hanserecesse, serie 2: Die Recesse und andere Akten der Hansatage von 1256-1430*, Leipzig, 1876-92.
- <sup>6</sup> J.M. Lappenberg, *Urkundliche Geschichte des hansischen Stablhofes zu London*, Hamburg 1851.
- <sup>7</sup> K. Kunze, *Hanseakten aus England, 1275 bis 1412*, Hansische Geschichtsquellen, Halle 1891.
- <sup>8</sup> G. Schanz, *Englische Handelspolitik gegen Ende des Mittelalters mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Zeitalters der beiden ersten Tudors Heinrich VII. und Heinrich VIII*, Leipzig 1881.
- <sup>9</sup> E. Daenell, *Die Blütezeit der Deutschen Hanse [1356-1478]*, Berlin 1905-6, 2 vols.
- <sup>10</sup> F. Schulz, *Die Hanse und England von Eduards III. bis auf Heinrichs VIII. Zeit*, Berlin 1911; L. von Winterfeld, *Tidemann Lemberg, ein Dortmunder Kaufmannsleben aus dem 14. Jahrhundert*, Hansische Geschichtsverein, Hansische Volkshefte, vol. 10, Bremen 1927.

- <sup>11</sup> M.M. Postan, *The Economic and Political Relations of England and the Hanse from 1400 to 1475*, in E. Power - M.M. Postan, *Studies in English Trade in the 15th Century*, Cambridge 1933; M.M. Postan, *The Trade of the Medieval North*, in M.M. Postan - H.J. Habakkuk (eds.), *Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages*, vol. 2 of *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, Cambridge 1966; E.E. Power, *The Wool Trade in English Medieval History Being the Ford Lectures*, London 1941; E.M. Carus-Wilson - O. Coleman, *England's Export Trade, 1275-1547*, Clarendon Press, 1963; E.M. Carus-Wilson, *Medieval Merchant Venturers: Collected Studies*, London 1967.
- <sup>12</sup> K. Friedland, *Die Hanse*, Urban-Taschenbücher, Stuttgart 1991; Lloyd, *England and the German Hanse* cit.; S. Jenks, *Handel*, vol. 1 of *England, die Hanse und Preussen: Handel und Diplomatie, 1377-1474*, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Hansischen Geschichte, Neue Folge, Band 38, Cologne 1992; S. Jenks, *Diplomatie*, vol. 2 of *England, die Hanse und Preussen: Handel und Diplomatie, 1377-1474*, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Hansischen Geschichte, Neue Folge, Band 38, Cologne 1992; S. Jenks, *Anhänge*, vol. 3 of *England, die Hanse und Preussen: Handel und Diplomatie, 1377-1474*, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Hansischen Geschichte, Neue Folge, Band 38, Cologne 1992.
- <sup>13</sup> A. Bugge - F. Hønebo (eds.), *Kulturbistorisk Leksikon for Nordisk Middelalder fra Vikingtid til Reformasjonstid*, Oslo 1956.
- <sup>14</sup> K. Hørby - M. Wenge, *Tiden 1340-1648*, vol. 2 of *Danmarks historie*, exec. ed. A.E. Christensen et al., Copenhagen 1980.
- <sup>15</sup> The latest study of the Hanseatic privileges in England is S. Jenks, *Die Carta Mercatoria: Ein 'hansisches' Privileg*, in *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 108, 1990, pp. 45-86, which also contains a sample of litigation over the privileges.
- <sup>16</sup> Cf. the title of Lloyd's study *England and the German Hanse* cit.
- <sup>17</sup> Schulz, *Die Hanse und England* cit., p. 66.
- <sup>18</sup> Postan, *The Economic and Political Relations of England* cit., p. 98; Carus-Wilson - Coleman, *England's Export Trade, 1275-1547* cit.
- <sup>19</sup> Schulz, *Die Hanse und England* cit., p. 22; K. Höhlbaum (ed.), *1361 bis 1392*, vol. 4 of *Hansisches Urkundenbuch*, Herausgeben vom Verein für Hansische Geschichte, Halle 1876-90, nos. 520-21.
- <sup>20</sup> *Rotuli parliamentorum, ut et petitiones, et placita in parlamento in tempore Edwardi R. I*, vol. 1 of *Rotuli parliamentorum, ut et petitiones, et placita in parlamento (1275-1503)*, edited by J. Topham et al., London 1783, pp.16-17, p. 27.
- <sup>21</sup> K. Koppman (ed.), *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 3 of *Hansarecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse und andere Akten der Hansatage von 1256-1430*, Herausgegeben vom Verein für Hansische Geschichte, Halle - Leipzig - Munich 1876-92, no. 102; *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol. 1, III, pp. 16-17.
- <sup>22</sup> Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 3 of *Hansarecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., no. 103; Schulz, *Die Hanse und England* cit., p. 24.
- <sup>23</sup> Höhlbaum (ed.), *1361 bis 1392*, vol. 4 of *Hansisches Urkundenbuch* cit., nos. 626, 643, 646, 663, 667, 677.
- <sup>24</sup> I am using the name *Prussia* for the areas encompassed by the present-day region of Pomerania, the lands between the Elbe and the Oder Rivers, and the lands encompassed by the Warthe and Netze rivers.
- <sup>25</sup> *Rotuli Parliamentorum* cit., Vol. 1, III, p. 47.
- <sup>26</sup> Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 2 of *Hansarecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 212-13.
- <sup>27</sup> Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 2 of *Hansarecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 174 (6-7).
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, nos. 190 (7, 12).
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 210.
- <sup>30</sup> *Calendar of Patent Rolls. Richard II, 1377-1381*, London 1895, p. 57.
- <sup>31</sup> Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 2 of *Hansarecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., no. 225.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 236.

- <sup>33</sup> Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 3 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 198-205, pp. 404-5.
- <sup>34</sup> F. Pedersen, *The German Hanse and the Peasants' Revolt of 1381*, "Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 57", 135, 1984, pp. 92-98.
- <sup>35</sup> Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 3 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 403-6.
- <sup>36</sup> Höhlbaum (ed.), *1361 bis 1392*, vol. 4 of *Hansisches Urkundenbuch*, no. 1045; Schulz, *Die Hanse und England*, 50.
- <sup>37</sup> Dollinger, *The German Hanse* cit., p. 73.
- <sup>38</sup> Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 108.
- <sup>39</sup> K. Höhlbaum (ed.), *1392 bis 1414*, vol. 5 of *Hansisches Urkundenbuch*, Herausgeben vom Verein für Han-sische Geschichte, Halle 1876-90, nos. 386, 387, p. 391; Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 2 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 433, 345 (2 Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 2 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 101 (2-3).
- <sup>40</sup> Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., pp. 108-9.
- <sup>41</sup> G.F. Warner (ed.), *The Libelle of Englysche Polycye*, Oxford 1926, p. XXII.
- <sup>42</sup> Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 3 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., no. 103.
- <sup>43</sup> Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 109.
- <sup>44</sup> Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 4 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit. no. 274.
- <sup>45</sup> Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 111; Schulz, *Die Hanse und England* cit., p.60.
- <sup>46</sup> Höhlbaum, *Hansisches Urkundenbuch* cit., no. 830; Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 5 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., no. 525; Thomas Rymer, *Foedera, conventiones, littera et ejusconque generis acta publica, inter reges anglae et alios quosvis imperatores, reges, pontifices, principes, vel communitates; ab ingressu Gulielmi I in anglicam, A.D. 1066 ad nostra usque tempora habita aut tractata*, vol. 8, London 1827, no. 664.
- <sup>47</sup> Höhlbaum, *Hansisches Urkundenbuch* cit., no. 830; Schulz, *Die Hanse und England* cit., p. 61.
- <sup>48</sup> *Conversari, libere more mercatorio tam cum prutensis quam aliis, cuiuscumque naciones vel ritus fuerint, mercari, ibidemque morari et exiende ad lares et domicilia propria*; Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 2 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., no. 210.
- <sup>49</sup> Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 5 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., no. 356, 402, 328, 429.
- <sup>50</sup> Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 111.
- <sup>51</sup> Schulz, *Die Hanse und England* cit., pp. 71-72.
- <sup>52</sup> Schulz, *Die Hanse und England* cit., p. 50; Höhlbaum, ed., *1361 Bis 1392*, vol. 4 of *Hansisches Urkundenbuch* cit., no. 1042.
- <sup>53</sup> Schulz, *Die Hanse und England* cit., pp. 71-73; Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 112.
- <sup>54</sup> Schulz, *Die Hanse und England* cit., p. 73; Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 113.
- <sup>55</sup> For a general discussion, see S. Jenks, *Zum Hansischen Gästerecht*, *Hansische Geschichtsblätter*, 114, 1996, pp. 3-60.
- <sup>56</sup> Schulz, *Die Hanse und England* cit., p. 73; Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 113.
- <sup>57</sup> Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 7 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., no. 592, 452, 454, 1162; Schulz, *Die Hanse und England* cit., pp. 71-72.
- <sup>58</sup> Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 7 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 87, p. 88.
- <sup>59</sup> Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 113.
- <sup>60</sup> Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 113.
- <sup>61</sup> Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 114 York Merchant Adventurers' Archive, Box D 63-30.
- <sup>62</sup> Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 4 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 397 (19), 413 (7), 503 (11), 539 (6), 541 (23), 559 (11).

- <sup>63</sup> Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 7 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 609 (6), p. 671.
- <sup>64</sup> Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 7 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 461 (1, 19), 708, 746 (3), 773 (7).
- <sup>65</sup> Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 115.
- <sup>66</sup> Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 115.
- <sup>67</sup> Ropp (ed.), *Hansarecesse, Serie 2*, vol. 1 of *Hanserecesse, serie 2: Die Recesse* cit., no. 50; *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol. 1, p. 389.
- <sup>68</sup> Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 7 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 641-42, 646 (3), 586-90.
- <sup>69</sup> Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 6 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 451, 556-57, 581-82; Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 7 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., no. 592 (7).
- <sup>70</sup> *Rotuli Parliamentorum, Vol. 1* cit., p. 389, p. 426, p. 503.
- <sup>71</sup> Konstantin Höhlbaum (ed.), *1415 bis 1433*, vol. 6 of *Hansisches Urkundenbuch*, Herausgeben vom Verein für Hansische Geschichte, Halle 1876-90, no. 1011; Ropp (ed.), *Hansarecesse, Serie 2*, vol. 1 of *Hanserecesse, serie 2: Die Recesse* cit., no. 147.
- <sup>72</sup> Ropp (ed.), *Hansarecesse, Serie 2*, vol. 1 of *Hanserecesse, serie 2: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 1465-147; Höhlbaum, *Hansisches Urkundenbuch* cit., nos. 1011, 1046, 1061, 1099.
- <sup>73</sup> Ropp (ed.), *Hansarecesse, Serie 2*, vol. 1 of *Hanserecesse, serie 2: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 146-47; Höhlbaum, *Hansisches Urkundenbuch* cit., nos. 1011, 1046, 1061, 1099.
- <sup>74</sup> Ropp (ed.), *Hansarecesse, Serie 2*, vol. 1 of *Hanserecesse, serie 2: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 383-85, 406-7, 421.
- <sup>75</sup> Höhlbaum, *Hansisches Urkundenbuch* cit., no. 1099.
- <sup>76</sup> Ropp (ed.), *Hansarecesse, Serie 2*, vol. 1 of *Hanserecesse, serie 2: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 392 (5), 407, 421, 429.
- <sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 407.
- <sup>78</sup> Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 113.
- <sup>79</sup> Ropp (ed.), *Hansarecesse, Serie 2*, vol. 1 of *Hanserecesse, serie 2: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 501, 508, 511, 522, 535-37, 596 (6).
- <sup>80</sup> Ropp (ed.), *Hansarecesse, Serie 2*, vol. 1 of *Hanserecesse, serie 2: Die Recesse* cit., no. 436.
- <sup>81</sup> Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 118.
- <sup>82</sup> Ropp (ed.), *Hansarecesse, Serie 2*, vol. 2 of *Hanserecesse, serie 2: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 20, 24, 57.
- <sup>83</sup> Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 119.
- <sup>84</sup> Ropp (ed.), *Hansarecesse, Serie 2*, vol. 1 of *Hanserecesse, serie 2: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 16-18, 53.
- <sup>85</sup> Schulz, *Die Hanse und England* cit., p. 85; Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 119.
- <sup>86</sup> Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 105 p. 120.
- <sup>87</sup> Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 3 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., no. 406; Höhlbaum, *Hansisches Urkundenbuch* cit., no. 687.
- <sup>88</sup> *Rotuli Parliamentorum, Vol. 1* cit., IV, p. 389, p. 426, p. 503.
- <sup>89</sup> Postan, *England and the Hanse* cit., p. 119; Schulz, *Die Hanse und England* cit., p. 85.

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# Region and Frontier in the English State: the English Far North, 1296-1603

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## ABSTRACT

This chapter assesses the far north of England as a frontier region and its relationship with the realm of England in the period between the beginning of the Scottish wars of independence and the Union of the Crowns. The thrust of much recent research on the far north has been to suggest that the region was far being from an impoverished and militarized borderland but a relatively peaceful and prosperous region which was fairly well integrated into the kingdom of England. This argument is here reviewed by means of a survey of the region's social and administrative structures, agricultural practices, and patterns of landholding so as to determine how far these were influenced by the proximity of a frontier. The final section takes the form of a case study of the career of a Northumberland border baron, Lord Ogle. The chapter concludes that, while the region was recognizably English and while its military importance as a frontier declined in the later 16th century, for most of this period it lived up to its reputation as a violent and impoverished borderland.

*Déanann an chaibidil seo anailís ar chiantuaisceart Shasana mar imeall-chríoch, chomh maith lena chaidreamh le ríocht Shasana i rith na tréimhse idir tús chogaí saoirse na hAlban i 1296 agus Aontas na gCorónach i 1603. De réir roinnt mhaith taighde ar an chiantuaisceart a rinneadh le gairid, níorbh imeall-chríoch bhocht mhíleata é an ciantuaisceart ar chor ar bith ach limistéar a bhí réasúnta síochánta saibhir taobh istigh de ríocht Shasana. Ardaítear ceist, ag an am chéanna, faoi stádas an limistéir mar theorainn idirnáisiúnta. Déantar léirmheas anseo ar an argóint seo fríd scrúdú ar an limistéar maidir lena struchtúir shóisialta agus a struchtúir riaracháin, a chleachtais talmhaíochta agus na pátrúin a bhain le húinéireacht na talún, le go bhfeicfear caidé mar a chuaigh riaradh agus cosaint na teorann in aice láimhe i gcion ar shaintréithe an limistéir ar fad. Déanann an chuid deireannach den chaibidil mionstaidéar ar shaol an Tiarna Ogle, a bhí in a bharrán imeall-chríche i Northumberland. Is í breith na caibidle seo go raibh clú an bhochtanaís agus an fhoréigin tuillte ag an imeallchríoch seo sa chuid is mó den tréimhse atá i*


*gceist, cé gur léir gur limistéar Sasanach é agus go dtáinig meath ar a thábhacht mhíleata mar theorainn sa dara leath den 16ú haois.*

## INTRODUCTION

The frontier dividing the kingdom of England from the kingdom of the Scots was remarkable for its stability over five centuries – from the integration of Northumbria and Cumbria into the respective kingdoms around 1100 to the frontier's final demise following the Union of the Crowns of England and Scotland in 1603. Much has been written about it, but addressing only a limited range of questions. There are studies which look at social conditions along the frontier and its political development over a particular timeframe, and there are studies which, working within a national context, seek to compare the English or Scottish marches with developments elsewhere in the respective kingdoms. More recently, the question of frontier regions has been raised, but regions (as opposed to counties) are not an established unit of study in British historiography. Above all, there have been relatively few attempts to break out from the largely self-referential national contexts so as to study the Anglo-Scottish frontier in the context of frontiers elsewhere; and among those working along more traditional lines there has also been criticism of this type of comparative history. The purpose of this chapter is to address one line of argument which cuts across attempts to view the Anglo-Scottish frontier in wider perspective by marginalizing the frontier's very character as a frontier.

What was the relationship between the English far north and England as a whole in the late middle ages? Was the far north a violent and impoverished borderland, with a turbulent marcher society which successive kings vainly attempted to reduce to the peace, good rule, and civility of southern parts? On the whole, historians have in recent years tended to underplay the region's exceptional character as a militarized border zone, stressing instead its civility and its integration into national politics<sup>1</sup>. There is also the question of whether the far north may fairly be described as *one* region. After all, its southern boundary in particular was fluctuating and indistinct; within the far north, conditions varied considerably between east and west marches; and even the border itself was much less than a *Trennungsgrenze* [frontier of separation]<sup>2</sup>. Summarizing the conclusions of nearly 40 years of historical research on the topic, Professor Tony Pollard has suggested that "north-eastern England was not the lawless, ungovernable, backward, impoverished, dark corner of the land of received wisdom". He also queried whether the "borders as a whole" were "such a marked international frontier during the period of *the* Anglo-Scottish wars"; he wondered "how deep national antagonisms really were for those who rubbed shoulders"; and he suggested that in "the thirteenth century and the later sixteenth, when there was peace between the kingdoms, the Border was not a barrier"<sup>3</sup>. About the same time, Dr. Maureen Meikle reinforced Pollard's conclusions in regard to the later Tudor





Map 1  
The Anglo-Scottish border region in the 16th century.

period, querying the alleged differences between lowland England and the Anglo-Scottish borders, suggesting that the “frontier was only recognised by Eastern borderers when it suited them”, and contrasting “the much written about endemic cross-border violence that more properly belongs in the Western Anglo-Scottish borders” with the “relative peace and sophistication” of “landed families in the Eastern Borders”<sup>4</sup>.

Arguments about distinctiveness or normality bear a suspicious resemblance to questions about the length of the proverbial piece of string. These issues are relative, because all societies are unique. It should be remembered, too, that the nation-centred paradigm which has underpinned most historical writing since the 19th century also presupposes that each nation has intrinsic qualities distinguishing it from other nations: it organizes events around a grand narrative focusing on the rise of the nation. In the circumstances, it is a fairly safe bet that arguments conducted within the parameters of this relationship between region and nation will tend to expose commonalities rather than differences.

This chapter reviews the evidence for the argument that, on the whole, politics, society, and government in the far north were little more than a northern extension of the national pattern. In other circumstances, an effective means of breaking out of these rather circular arguments about distinctiveness would be to adopt a comparative approach. In regard to continental Europe, the various chapters of this volume supply some sort of comparative context. The so-called New British history also suggests a way forward, shifting the focus from nation-building to state formation, and comparing, for instance, the impact of English expansion or Tudor centralization in one part of the British Isles, as against another<sup>5</sup>. A more closely-drawn comparison can also be offered, in terms of border societies, between the English of Ireland and the English of the far north, particularly if the separate ‘national agendas’ of English and Irish historiography are discounted. For the Tudor period, for instance, the far north can be compared as a region with the four shires of the English Pale. Indeed, a more limited comparison along these lines has in fact been attempted<sup>6</sup>.

The assumption here is that comparisons between the two frontier regions of the English state in the same chronological period are a valid historical exercise and that it is fruitful to apply the insights developed in the one context to the elucidation of another. Not everyone has found these comparative arguments convincing. Comparisons between a magnate in the English west marches and in the English Pale, it has been suggested, offer too narrow a basis on which to draw conclusions. In any case, the endemic violence of Cumberland society supposedly contrasted with the relative peace and prosperity of the Northumberland gentry<sup>7</sup>. It would clearly be far too ambitious to try to develop here a more sustained comparison by way of response. Strictly, of course, the Anglo-Scottish frontier approximated more closely to the political geographer’s definition of a border than a frontier, whereas the marches of the English Pale in Ireland, the product of medieval English colonization, were a frontier located on the margins of a settled or developed territory. Yet both were variously described in English official documents of

the period as a “march”, a “frontier”, or a “border”<sup>8</sup>. In what follows, many of the insights developed concerning the rule and defence of the English far north are drawn from Irish historiography, and the comparison with the English Pale in Ireland is at least implied, if not explicitly stated. The scope of previous work on the west marches is here extended by examining more closely the case of the allegedly more prosperous shire of Northumberland. And in the final section a short case study of the Northumberland peer, Lord Ogle, permits conditions there to be viewed in microcosm.

## MILITARIZATION AND THE ANGLO-SCOTTISH WARS

The Anglo-Scottish wars from 1296 onwards transformed the identity of the English far north, reinforcing its marcher character and sense of distinctness from lowland England. The wars ended a period of generally good relations between the English and Scottish monarchies, forcing lords to declare their allegiance, and breaking up cross-border landholdings with estates held of both English and Scottish kings. There followed almost three centuries of intermittent war, interspersed with fragile truces and temporary abstinences from war, lasting until 1560. The far north now became a more militarized society, as the fortunes of war swung back and forth. Initial English successes against the Scots were soon reversed, and in the early 14th century successive Scottish invasions prompted the maintenance of a defensive line in north Yorkshire, in the form of a chain of castles stretching from Scarborough on the east coast to Castle Bolton in Wensleydale, which marked the southerly limits of Scottish penetration at that time. Conversely, in the mid-14th century the English occupation of southern Scotland briefly restored some of the landowning links across the national frontier, but from the 1370s the English hold on the Scottish borders began to crumble. By 1409, when Jedburgh fell to the Scots, the old border line as agreed by the treaty of York in 1237 again marked the northern boundary of the English far north. The border line now formed a relatively stable frontier with Scotland, but constant war and unfavourable economic conditions saw cultivation of marginal land give way to pastoralism and also saw farms abandoned. As settlement receded, the reality of the frontier was in many parts a wilderness. Despite later English attempts to expand into what was now southern Scotland, in the event the border line was only altered in respect of two small parcels of land, the port-town of Berwick-on-Tweed in the east and the parish of Kirkcubright in the west<sup>9</sup>.

Exceptionally, the region was divided into marches, ruled by wardens who administered a special code of march law, alongside English common law, within the limits of their marches<sup>10</sup>. The English west marches comprised the area between Solway and Stainmore to the west of the Pennines, viz. the county of Cumberland north of the River Derwent, plus the barony of Westmorland (northern Westmorland). The east march, later the east and middle marches, comprised the area between the Tweed and the Tyne which formed the county of Northumberland, plus the surrounding liber-

ties<sup>11</sup>. Within the marches, too, the population was liable to do military service as required by the warden: smallholders there generally held their land by a form of tenure known as tenant right which included the obligation to maintain weapon, horse and harness for military service<sup>12</sup>. The needs of defence also ensured that the typical gentry residence of the border region was the towerhouse: towerhouses were erected in great numbers from the late 14th century onwards as the region was transformed into a heavily defended march. For instance, already by 1415 57 towerhouses had been built in Northumberland alone to extend the protection afforded by the existing 37 castles there; and later lists show new towerhouses being erected there on some scale well into the 16th century. Most of these castles and towerhouses were also guarded and kept in good repair whereas, by contrast, towerhouses in the English lowlands were unknown and castles there were, by the 16th century, mostly falling into ruin<sup>13</sup>. Even in the late 16th century, when they were much reduced in line with the diminishing threat from the Scots, the principal English garrisons at Berwick-on-Tweed and Carlisle defending the borders still cost Elizabeth over £15,000 a year. Earlier, she had spent over £250,000 in seven years on strengthening Berwick. Elizabeth was hardly likely to spend that kind of money on defences for a non-existent frontier<sup>14</sup>. In this context, arguments that acculturation and improving cross-border relations were undermining the frontier are misplaced. It has been shown, with reference to other societies, that geographical and social isolation are not the critical factors in sustaining cultural diversity, and also that boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them<sup>15</sup>.

The advent of war in the far north thus reinforced pre-existing differences of geography, land use, and settlement patterns. This was a very different landscape from the English lowlands. The far north was a predominantly upland and pastoral region of dispersed settlement, compact lordships, few gentry, and few large towns, where the terrain itself was often bleak, wild and inhospitable. In some parts, too, large stretches of land were held in common, in Gilsland in north Cumberland for instance; transhumance was practised in parts of the Northumberland uplands; and elsewhere, in the liberty of Redesdale for example, partible inheritance among a tenant's sons (and non-forfeiture of the estate for treason or felony) contrasted with the normal English custom of primogeniture<sup>16</sup>. These features all marked the region out from the mixed farming, nucleated villages, numerous market towns, the rich gentry, and more dispersed patterns of landholding which characterized the English lowlands. Yet, whereas the Anglo-Scottish border line provided a clear-cut northern boundary to the region, more typically the southern boundary of the English far north was fluid and shifting, reflecting in part the fortunes of war, as well as the influence of geography. After 1388 Scottish armies did not penetrate beyond the River Tyne<sup>17</sup>, and socio-economic developments in north Yorkshire and the south Durham lowlands began to mirror more closely the pattern further south. Geographically, the Pennine uplands gradually gave place to the Tees lowlands and the plains of York, with their very different settlement

patterns<sup>18</sup>. Militarily, the ubiquitous towerhouses of the region gradually petered out in Durham, Westmorland, and north Yorkshire, while the jurisdiction of the wardens of the marches ended more abruptly at the northern boundary of the Durham palatinate in the east, and in the west at the River Derwent and the boundary between the baronies of Westmorland and Kendale<sup>19</sup>.

In the upland zone nearer the border line, the endemic insecurity of the marches also prompted the development of the border surnames. These were kinship groups organized under a headsman or captain who acted together in all things, collectively seeking vengeance when one of their number was harmed, and often accepting joint responsibility when an individual was in trouble. The first specific reference to surnames does not occur until 1498<sup>20</sup>, but the surnames had clearly developed over the previous two centuries in response to local conditions. They were a formidable force in the Northumberland uplands, extending west into Gilsland and Bewcastledale, and south into Weardale and Teesdale. The Tynedale surnames alone could muster over 400 horsemen, with almost 200 horsemen and 250 footmen mustered by the Redesdale surnames<sup>21</sup>. The government classified the surnames as English or Scots, depending on which side of the border line they resided, and it relied heavily on the services of the English surnames in wartime. Yet, the surnames were unreliable: they had to be reminded to be “at all times ready to resist and persecute the rebels and enemies of the king’s highness and this his realm of England as true subjects ought to do unto their natural sovereign lord”<sup>22</sup>. And particularly during long truces, their activities were much less acceptable, since poverty and lack of alternative employment soon drove the surnames to prey on the wealthier English lowlanders. In a bad year, such as 1525, bands of up to 400 thieves raided south into the Palatinate and to within eight miles of Newcastle, and the surnames had to be reduced by a military campaign<sup>23</sup>. In practice, cattle rustling and robbery by the border surnames, often in collaboration with Scottish surnames, reinforced the sense of insecurity among the marcher population at large: border raiding took on a momentum of its own, notwithstanding occasional efforts by the two governments to discipline their border subjects<sup>24</sup>.

In other respects, too, the region’s earlier history exercised a continuing influence on the far north, reinforcing its sense of distinctness. The English far north was typical of distinct regions elsewhere in Europe not only by reason of its peripheral location, but also in that it was a later addition to the English realm<sup>25</sup>. The area between Solway and Stainmore in the English west marches had been annexed to England in 1092; and Scottish claims over the area between the Tweed and the Tees had only finally been relinquished in 1157<sup>26</sup>. Earlier defensive arrangements meant that society in the region was dominated by marcher lords, with relatively compact lordships. The magnates held great accumulations of land in the form of feudal baronies which had been created in the aftermath of conquest<sup>27</sup>. The Percy earl of Northumberland, for instance, was by far the largest landowner in Northumberland, with almost 2,000 tenants and estates there worth around £900 a year under the early Tudors; while in the 1520s Lord Dacre was able to bring

4,000 tenants on a raid into Scotland and his estates in Cumberland, centred on the strategically important northern baronies of Burgh and Gilsland, plus Greystoke in the south, were worth about £650 a year<sup>28</sup>. Throughout the region, too, there were extensive private jurisdictions from which the normal officials of English local government were excluded. The most important of these lay nominally within Northumberland. Durham was held by its bishop as a county palatine, with three detached members to the north (collectively known as North Durham), and two more in Yorkshire. Northamptonshire in North Durham separated the disputed military outpost of Berwick-on-Tweed (which changed hands several times in this period) from Northumberland proper, while to the south-west, also on the border, lay the liberties of Tynedale and Redesdale. Tynedale had once belonged to the king of Scots, while the Tailboys lords of Redesdale held the liberty by the service of guarding the valley from wolves and robbers<sup>29</sup>. South of Tynedale lay the archbishop of York's regality of Hexham, and the prior of Tynemouth held a small liberty east of Newcastle. From each of these liberties, the king's sheriff and other officials were excluded and the lord enjoyed regal powers. West of the Pennines, the territorial lords enjoyed less extensive legal privileges, but the Clifford family were hereditary sheriffs of Westmorland, and the sheriff of Cumberland was excluded from the honour of Cockermouth<sup>30</sup>. Overall, however, the ubiquity of these feudal franchises – altogether, “the king's writ did not run” in almost half the region – introduced an element which set the far north apart from southern and central England.

## THE TUDOR PROBLEM OF THE NORTH

As the reach of royal government expanded under the Tudors, and as the gentry looked increasingly to the court for patronage and protection, so this fragmentation of power was increasingly seen as an obstacle to law and order. The arbitrary power of private jurisdictions came to be contrasted with the “indifferent justice” of royal officials, and these liberties were castigated as sanctuaries for criminals fleeing from the sheriffs of surrounding counties<sup>31</sup>. At the same time, the great territorial magnates of the region – the Percies, Nevilles, and Dacres – came under suspicion as “overmighty subjects”, and on a number of occasions Tudor monarchs took the opportunity to reduce their power and authority<sup>32</sup>. In marcher conditions, however, this devolution of power and authority was very necessary: defence and good rule rested mainly on the resident magnates who alone had what in Tudor times was often called the *manraed* (the number of his kin, friends, tenants, and the gentry following a lord could call on) to raise an army to repel raiders and maintain order. But given the vast accumulations of land in magnate hands, the region generally had fewer and poorer gentry than the English lowlands; and the premium on armed might in border conditions also meant that the marcher gentry were generally more subservient to the magnates. In Northumberland, for instance, there were about 40 crown tenants under baronial rank in the county, but only 22 of them held land equivalent to half a knight's fee; and in Cumberland there

were only two in this latter category. Accordingly, the pool of county gentry available to operate the system of English local government, or to which the crown could turn as an alternative to the rule of the great magnates, was much smaller in the far north. And in Northumberland almost half the leading crown tenants were also ‘mesne’ [intermediate] tenants of the Percy earls<sup>33</sup>. Lists drawn up in 1528 suggest that altogether only 118 gentry then lived in Northumberland and the adjoining liberties, of whom about 30 were worth £40 a year in land. This was a remarkably small number for so large a shire: few substantial gentry families of any sort lived in the highland zone, and none at all in Redesdale and Hexhamshire<sup>34</sup>. Yet the county gentry were the key figures in English local government: they were normally appointed to peace commissions and expected to maintain order and to deal with petty crime in the shire through the system of quarter sessions. So the shortage of gentry had a serious impact on law and order<sup>35</sup>. And at a higher level, the coordination of this work by the justices of assize was also less effective: the king’s justices of the northern circuit only visited the region once a year, holding sessions at Newcastle, Carlisle, and Appleby which lasted for no more than a week. The city of Carlisle, in particular, lay very close to the frontier, and in wartime the justices sometimes preferred to hold their sessions at Penrith on the Westmorland border: in 1449 and 1455-57 the visits to Carlisle and Appleby were abandoned altogether because the judges feared to visit the region<sup>36</sup>. In the marches, however, *manraed* was more important than “indifferent [= impartial] justice”, and in Northumberland, which was especially vulnerable to raiding and robbery, most of the gentry kept horsemen for defence. A list of 55 Northumberland gentry compiled in 1528, “with a declaration of what ability they are of to do the king service”, noted in particular how many horsemen they kept, how far their chief residence lay from Scotland, and any other qualities they might have which would enhance the value of their military service, as well as (more typically) their landed income. Of these 55 gentry, eleven of them, or 20%, had a landed income of far less than £10, the accepted threshold for a gentleman at that time. So, for instance, Rauff Collingwod of Lytlynton lived nine miles from Scotland, kept eight horsemen, and was a “sharp young man”, but had only £4 a year; and ten others had only £5 or £6 a year. Yet the total *manraed* at the disposal of these 55 gentry, on lands worth £1,524 altogether, was 976 horsemen. This represented a significant charge on the land<sup>37</sup>. No wonder that Northumberland was so poor.

Given the region’s militarized nature, its exceptional administrative structures, its different topography and settlement patterns, and its very remoteness, it is hardly surprising that the far north should attract adverse comment from royal officials about its disorderly character. As early as the 12th century English commentators were highlighting as the essence of civility what in reality were the normal features of economic activity in lowland England – a well-populated landscape with a settled society, wealthy towns and nucleated villages, a manorial economy, a cereal-based agriculture, and a well differentiated social structure with a numerous and vigorous gentry. By contrast, they denigrated the

peoples of the British upland zone as lazy, bestial and barbarous – a shifting population living in mean wooden huts and scattered settlements in remote regions of forest, mountain, and bog, eking out a miserable existence from cattle raising and rustling<sup>38</sup>. As will be apparent from the foregoing analysis, many aspects of life in the far north appeared to resemble more the customs of the mere Welsh, the wild Irish, and the Scots than the best practices of English civility. The nucleated villages of the Northumberland coastal plain and the Durham lowlands certainly looked civil enough, and were more easily organized for defensive purposes; but inland from this narrow coastal strip the thinly populated Northumbrian uplands had a very different appearance, and the defence of scattered pastoral communities was much more difficult<sup>39</sup>. These differences were less remarked on during the Hundred Years War with France (1337-1453), with its constant demands for military service in France as well as against Scotland; but following the Wars of the Roses (1455-87) and the revival of royal power under the Tudors, adverse comments about the disorderly character of the far north, in contrast with the more peaceful conditions further south, became more frequent. Broadly, Tudor opinion about the essential nature of the problem fell into two categories. Reports and complaints by local officials and gentry attributed the disorders to the malice of the Scots and the “misguided men” of the marches, the border surnames, and called for increased resources to police and defend the region. For instance, a complaint of the Northumberland gentry in 1525 against the rule of Thomas Lord Dacre, warden general of the marches, argued that “for lack of justice” the thieves of Gilsland, Bewcastledale, Tynedale and Redesdale had “so robbed, despoiled and impoverished the true inhabitants in the same country of Northumberland that diverse towns there are become almost desolate and barren of inhabitants”. Unless remedy were soon provided, they alleged, the “country is like shortly to be most inhabited with thieves English & Scottish and the king’s true subjects there ... expelled”<sup>40</sup>. A decade later, in 1536, after Lord Dacre had in turn been ousted from the rule of the west marches, a proclamation of four rebel captains of Penrith in Cumberland presented their uprising as “for the maintenance of ... this country” and urged the people “to help one another” because the “rulers of this country do not defend us against the Scots”<sup>41</sup>. The weakness of border defence against the Scots was a more general grievance in the north at this time: the rebels recalled that “a prince should be made king to defend the realm”, and Robert Aske was particularly concerned that whereas, hitherto, the king’s revenues in the north “went to the finding of Berwyke” [Berwick-on-Tweed], the principal English military outpost in the east marches, now they would be sent up to London, “so that of necessity the said country should either patyssh [=make terms] with the Scots, or for of very poverty enforced to make commotions or rebellions”<sup>42</sup>. The Pontefract articles demanded that Princess Mary be restored to avoid the danger that the king of Scots might claim the English throne; that a parliament be summoned to Nottingham or York; and that the king’s subjects “from Trent north appear but at York” to answer summonses, unless it were a grave matter touching the king<sup>43</sup>.



By contrast, officials drafted in from more 'civil' parts ('inlandmen') were more likely to blame the borderers themselves for the violence and disorders there. Commissioned in 1550 to inquire into the decay of the borders, Sir Robert Bowes reported of Northumberland that "the whole country is much given to wildness" and also "much given to riot, specially the young gentlemen or headsmen and diverse of them also to thefts and other greater offences"<sup>44</sup>. As the Tudors became more concerned about the continuing high levels of violence and the apparent 'decay' of the borders, the problem was increasingly conceived in terms of a struggle for the defence of English civility against the wild men of the marches. Concerned at the apparent resemblances between conditions in the north and Gaelic Ireland, Archbishop Parker warned in 1560 that if bishops were not soon appointed to the northern sees, the region would become "too much Irish and savage"<sup>45</sup>. Later on, William Camden depicted the borderers as nomads; and it was reported in 1586 of the preaching of Bernard Gilpin among the inhabitants of Tynedale and Redesdale that "their former savage behaviour is very much abated, and their barbarous wildness and fierceness so much qualified" that there was now hope "of their reduction unto civility"<sup>46</sup>.

## NORTHERN IDENTITY

Although the far north was unmistakably English, contemporaries wrote of the northerners in terms which clearly recognized their distinct identity. When, for instance, Henry VIII assembled an army royal for the invasion of France in 1513, he found it necessary to order that "no man give no reproach to none other by cause of the country that he is of; that is to say, be he French, English, Northern, Welsh or Irish"<sup>47</sup>. Inured to the more disturbed conditions of the region, northern levies enjoyed a high reputation as near-professional soldiers: when garrisons were laid in border holds to counter Scottish raids, the exact proportions of 'southern' and 'northern' troops were occasionally specified, as in 1524, so as to ensure an adequate defence<sup>48</sup>. Northern troops were also regularly deployed in the similar conditions of the Anglo-Gaelic marches of Ireland: in English Ireland, they were referred to quite simply as "the northern men", it being readily understood that "northern" referred here not to Ulster but to the English mainland<sup>49</sup>. The northerners themselves celebrated their martial qualities and prowess in ballads, both those such as "the battle of Otterburn", which recalled the exploits of the nobility, and the 'riding ballads' which commemorated the feuds and frays of the border surnames<sup>50</sup>. At an earlier date, civil strife in the form of the Wars of the Roses was cast by some in terms of North versus South. The campaigns of 1460-61, in particular, were seen by Abbot Whethamstede of St Albans as a northern revolt against the south, while a London chronicler berated "the malice of the northernmen"<sup>51</sup>. Not surprisingly, the south's defence against Queen Margaret's northern army attracted eager support, the local lords having much ado "to keep down all this country more than four or five shires, for they would be up on the men in north, for it is for the weal of all the south"<sup>52</sup>.

Whether or not the English far north was in reality a militarized border zone, it is very revealing that it was the exceptional features of the frontier district which supplied the popular image of the north and its inhabitants. During the Wars of the Roses, southerners regularly drew on cultural stereotypes of the warlike, penurious and plundering northerners as the 'other' to stiffen local resistance. The northern men, wrote the prior of Crowland of Queen Margaret's northern army, "swept onwards like a whirlwind from the north, and in the impulse of their fury attempted to overrun the whole of England". A "plague of locusts" was another comment, while "the city of London dread for to be robbed and despoiled if they should come". Another commentator elaborated on how "the people in the north rob and steal and been appointed to pill all this country, and give away men's goods and lifelodes in all the south country"<sup>53</sup>. Shortly after his accession, Henry VII set out for York "in order to keep in obedience the folk of the north, savage and more eager for upheavals"; and when in 1489 there was another rebellion in Yorkshire, the king responded with a proclamation that the rebels intended to "rob, despoil, and destroy all the south parts of this his realm and to bring to captivity all the people of the same"<sup>54</sup>. Yet, by no stretch of the imagination were these Yorkshire rebels hard-bitten marchers bent on plunder: it is very revealing that the north as a whole could credibly be described in these terms. During another rebellion in 1536-7, Henry VIII memorably described Lincolnshire as "one of the most brute and beastly of the whole realm", while Archbishop Cranmer castigated the northerners more generally as "a certain sort of barbarous and savage people, who ... could not bear to hear anything of culture"<sup>55</sup>.

It would, of course, be very unwise to take these comments at face value. The north was indeed very much part of England, was recognized as such by Englishmen elsewhere, and the northerners themselves were also very conscious of their English identity. Moreover, if the focus of this sketch were shifted to the Tees lowlands in Durham or the barony of Kendale in Westmorland, the resultant picture would be of a much more evidently "civil society", with fewer particularisms, a society which was more closely integrated into the national community. But then, as Professor Miroslav Hroch has argued in the introductory chapter of this volume, it was the essence of a region that it was also a part of the wider whole, and that the boundaries of the region were often less than clear cut<sup>56</sup>. In the final part of this chapter, I have chosen to offer a brief sketch of a northern baronial family and its estates in early Tudor times. In many ways, the fortunes of this Northumberland family epitomize the features which, as is here argued, marked out the far north as a distinct region of the English state.

### LORD OGLE OF BOTHAL

The Ogles of Bothal were an obscure northern peerage family whose heads, for most of Henry VIII's reign, were Robert, 4th Lord Ogle (1513-1530/32), and Robert, 5th Lord Ogle (1530/2-45). Successive barons, father and son, spent their whole careers in


the rule and defence of the English marches towards Scotland. The 4th lord succeeded his father in the months before the battle of Flodden, with Scottish invasion looming, and he was knighted by the English commander, the earl of Surrey, after the battle<sup>57</sup>. The 5th lord fared less well, being killed by the Scots in skirmishing which surrounded the battle of Ancrum Moor (27 February 1545)<sup>58</sup>. Though known locally as “a true young man and a good housekeeper”, Ogle’s one claim to fame was that he was the only English peer throughout the reign of Henry VIII to die in battle<sup>59</sup>. Neither lord, however, showed any great interest in affairs of state. They never attended parliament: very often, the chancery clerks failed even to send the Lords Ogle a writ of summons to parliament. They never went to court, not even for major state occasions. The 5th lord was, however, an unwilling visitor to London on one occasion, being committed to the Fleet prison in May 1534 for disobeying the king’s process<sup>60</sup>. He was also briefly deputy-warden of the middle marches in 1536-37, but even in frontier defence, neither lord ever exercised a major command. In practice, the influence of the Lords Ogle was purely local. Not surprisingly, the standard surveys of the reign largely ignore Ogle of Bothal, although there are occasional references to aspects of the careers of the two lords in regional histories<sup>61</sup>.

In the mid-15th century, the great grandfather of the 4th Lord Ogle, Sir Robert Ogle of Bothal, tenant of the bishop of Durham and later a Neville retainer, was for over thirty years captain of Norham, an important military outpost in the bishop of Durham’s liberty of North Durham<sup>62</sup>. In 1461, after the disturbances of the period had finally erupted in civil war, the political situation in the north-east was transformed, following the Yorkist victory at Towton, by the attainder of leading Northumberland landowners, Sir William Tailboys, John Heron of Ford, and most importantly, the earl of Northumberland himself. This left a dangerous power vacuum in the region at a time when the Scots, having captured and razed Roxburgh and recovered Berwick-on-Tweed, were looking to make further advances. Among the countermeasures taken by Edward IV was to advance two local knights, Sir Robert Ogle and Sir Thomas Lumley, to the peerage in 1461. In Ogle’s case, his new status was backed by a grant of lands worth around £140 a year, including the extensive Tailboys lordship of Redesdale and manor of Harbottle, together with certain Percy estates in Northumberland<sup>63</sup>. The Percy lands were soon regranted to John Neville, earl of Northumberland, however, and then back to the Percy earl, when the latter was restored; and Ogle also lost Redesdale and Harbottle following the reversal of the Tailboys attainder in 1472<sup>64</sup>. By then, Lord Robert himself was long dead; but the landed estates held by his son, Owen, 2nd Lord, as revealed by inquisitions taken after the death in 1486, were simply the family’s ancestral possessions as inherited by the 1st lord<sup>65</sup>. In the longer term, therefore, all the Ogle family had to show for its loyalty and service to the Yorkist kings was the baronial title.

This in turn meant that Lord Ogle’s landed income was remarkably small. It was reported of the 5th lord in 1537 that he was worth 300 marks [=£200] a year “in pos-

session and reversion”<sup>66</sup>. For a peer of the realm, this was poverty indeed, barely sufficient to support the family’s new dignity, and far smaller than that of established baronial families like Lord Scrope of Masham<sup>67</sup>. He was of course among the crown’s most prominent knight-service tenants in Northumberland, with extensive possessions there: inquisitions taken after the death of the 5th lord in 1545 suggest that Ogle’s Northumberland estates were actually worth around £225 per annum, but they were no more extensive than those of leading Northumberland gentry such as Grey of Chillingham, Radcliffe of Cartington, or Widdrington of Widdrington<sup>68</sup>. They included some significant mesne tenancies held of the earls of Northumberland and Westmorland and Lord Dacre. Elsewhere, however, Ogle held only the manor of Netherton and some other lands in the bishopric of Durham. In Cumberland, his manor of Thoresby and lands in Crofton, worth £5 a year, had in 1517 been sold back to Lord Dacre, the chief lord<sup>69</sup>. In a frontier society like Tudor Northumberland, the one major advantage which Ogle’s comparatively modest holdings afforded him was their relative compactness. This meant that Ogle normally resided in the county – he was at times the only resident peer – and could personally supervise the rule and defence of his own estates. Indeed, the absence of estates elsewhere meant that he really had no choice. Concentrated landholdings were of course a natural response among marcher lords to the more turbulent conditions in which they operated, although great magnates like Northumberland or Kildare with their more extensive possessions were necessarily more reliant on an extended kin, a gentry following, and numerous estate officials to organize the good rule and defence of their country and to administer their estates<sup>70</sup>.

Ogle was normally resident for a second reason, too: the particular location of his estates in the middle marches. Almost the first major challenge which the 4th lord faced, after he had succeeded his father in January 1513, was a Scottish invasion. King James IV crossed the Tweed in August and captured the border castles of Norham, Wark, Etal, and Ford<sup>71</sup>. Any deeper penetration and Lord Ogle would have faced enormous losses. In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the king’s intrusion as warden at this time of Lord Dacre, a relative stranger from the west marches, led to tensions with the Northumberland gentry. Dacre’s barony of Morpeth in Northumberland was worth c.£180 per annum, and he had some following there, particularly among the poorer upland gentry; but he lacked the *manraed* of the Percy earl and the leading gentry distrusted him. Dacre in turn thought they offered little support, the county being so poor and wasted, but he accused Lord Ogle, in particular, of backwardness in the king’s service<sup>72</sup>. Later on, though, Ogle served willingly enough, supporting Lord Dacre “with all his name and friends” on a “rode” into Scotland in 1523<sup>73</sup>. In fact, Ogle’s possessions in the Northumbrian lowlands, notably his chief manors and castles of Ogle and Bothal around Morpeth were relatively secure, but other estates lay in a much more exposed position. In upper Coquetdale, he held the manors of Great and Little Tossen, Happle, Bickerton, and Wharton in Rothbury parish near Harbottle, plus Lourbottle and



Map 2

Tudor Northumberland, with the border ring, towers, castles, and Ogle properties.

Ingram to the north, and to the south Fallowlees and the manor of North Middleton near Kirkwhelpington<sup>74</sup>. Although supplying at least a quarter of Ogle's landed income, the value of these estates was more strategic than financial. They all lay on the fringes of the highland zone, along what Christopher Dacre was later to describe as the "plenished ring of the border", offering tempting targets for the border surnames and mostly also within striking distance of Scottish raiders. This border ring followed the highland line, cutting through Northumberland in a great arc, in a south-easterly direction from Wark-on-Tweed and then south to Harbottle, east to Tossen, south to Fallowlees, and south-west to Kirkwhelpington and Chollerton on the North Tyne.

What counted most in marcher society, however, was not so much the extent of a landowner's estates as his *manraed*. Like most of the Northumberland landowners, Lord Ogle was obliged to keep horsemen for defence. Lists of Northumberland landowners made by the authorities in 1537 (their military capacity, their "ability" to "do the king service", distance of their chief residence from Scotland, and any "other qualities" enhancing the value of their military service) included the leading members of the Ogle family: they noted that Lord Ogle himself "may serve the king with 100 horsemen", that he resided fourteen miles from Scotland and four miles from Redesdale, and that his lands were worth annually £100 in possession and £100 reversion; his uncle, Sir William Ogle of Cockle Park, with five or six household servants, resided thirteen miles from Scotland and four miles from Redesdale and was "a true man" with lands worth 40 marks [£26 13s. 4d.] a year for life; John Ogle of Ogle castle with ten horsemen, lived twelve miles from Scotland and four miles from Redesdale, and was "a sharp forward man" worth £20 a year; George Ogle, "a true sharp forward man", had married Lord Ogle's mother and was "in house with the said Lord Ogle"; and John Ogle of Kirklaw with eight men, lived twelve miles from Scotland, four miles from Redesdale, and was "a sharp forward man" worth £10 per annum: "which men be well minded to justice"<sup>75</sup>.

Lords and gentry in lowland England did not keep horsemen for defence, nor did they need to fortify their properties, as Ogle did, by building towerhouses, the characteristic form of military architecture in the marches. The tower protecting Ogle's northern outpost at Ingram was erected sometime in the late 15th century and could accommodate a garrison of 40 horsemen, but in 1509 both Ingram and Hepple, which could take 20 horsemen, were unmanned<sup>76</sup>. In 1542, the border commissioners noted that Ogle's tower at Great Tossen was "not in good reparations" and his tower at Hepple "scarcely in good reparations"<sup>77</sup>. To the west of this "plenished ring" and stretching south-west for fourteen miles from Hepple and Tossen lay an uninhabited wasteland. At its northern end Lord Ogle held "a parcel of ground called Falloly burnes which is measurable good for pastures": though let to John Hall of Otterburn, it was otherwise uninhabited, both because of its location near Redesdale and "because there is no stone house builded thereupon"<sup>78</sup>. Likewise, the defence of the key tower of Fallowlees proved so troublesome that in 1530 the 4th Lord Ogle sold the property to Hall of Otterburn<sup>79</sup>. In the marches, tenants

could not be found for undefended estates, which were rapidly reduced to a worthless wasteland, but equally the costs of defending marchland might exceed its value.

### THE DECAY OF THE BORDERS

As a military frontier, the Anglo-Scottish border finally disappeared in 1603, when the Union of the Crowns saw the Scottish king, James VI, accede to the English throne as James I. It now became a predominantly administrative boundary between two peoples who were both subjects of the one king. Long before this, however, the military importance of the frontier had declined: during the 16th century relations between England and Scotland improved, particularly during “the long peace” which followed the treaty of Edinburgh in 1560. The impact of the Reformation also disrupted traditional ties between Scotland and France at the same time as it forged a newfound sense of religious solidarity between two Protestant regimes in London and Edinburgh. In these circumstances, the military preparedness of the borderers declined. In 1538 a muster of the east and middle marches had produced a total of 6,375 able men, of whom 2,913 were equipped with horse and harness; but musters in 1580 produced only 1,468 equipped with horse and harness, and by 1584 there was a further decline to just 1,086 horsemen<sup>80</sup>. The government now grew alarmed at the “great decay of horses” on the marches. Commissions were authorized by statute “to enquire what tenancies and houses of habitation [since 1536] be decayed and not occupied by men able to serve as horsemen or footmen, according to the ancient duty of these tenancies”, and a detailed report appeared in 1584 listing 1,354 decayed tenancies<sup>81</sup>. With the threat of Scottish invasion removed, the government expected that the defence of the marches would take care of itself. But by then, the great marcher lords who had traditionally had the rule of the region as wardens had either been eliminated altogether (Lord Dacre and the Neville earl of Westmorland), or banished from the region (the Percy earl of Northumberland), leaving the wardenries in the hands of local gentry such as Sir John Forster who lacked the *manraed* to organize its defence<sup>82</sup>. The result was that townships in the more exposed parts increasingly fell prey to raiding and robbery by Scottish reivers and whole districts near the border line were converted into an uninhabited wasteland<sup>83</sup>. Only the Union of the Crowns in 1603 saved the situation: with the accession of King James VI of Scotland as King James I of England the military frontier between the two kingdoms finally disappeared, being replaced by an administrative boundary between the English and Scottish parts of what King James now relabelled the Middle Shires.

It will not do to exaggerate the poverty and levels of violence in the far north. This was, after all, a recognizably English society, a region of the English realm: it was not Gaelic Ireland. All the same, Northumberland was poor and violent by English standards: in so far as distinctions may be drawn between the English marches in this regard, they were not between East and West but between the central uplands and the narrow but

superficially more 'civil' coastal plains further removed from the border line. Poverty and violence are relative, but there is plenty of evidence to support the traditional view that throughout this period the far north, and especially Northumberland, remained poor and backward, hard to rule, and very much a frontier region. This is also how it was seen by contemporaries.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> See, esp., A.J. Pollard, *North-eastern England during the Wars of the Roses: lay society, war, and politics 1450-1500*, Oxford 1990, pp. 18-23; Id., *Use and Ornament: late-twentieth-century historians on the late medieval north-east*, in "Northern History" [henceforth NH], 2005, 42, pp. 61-74.
- <sup>2</sup> M.M. Meikle, *A British frontier? Lairds and gentlemen in the eastern borders, 1540-1603*, East Linton 2004, pp. 2-5; A. Goodman, *The Anglo-Scottish marches in the fifteenth century: a frontier society?*, in R.A. Mason (ed.), *Scotland and England 1286-1815*, Edinburgh 1987, pp. 18-33.
- <sup>3</sup> Pollard, *Use and Ornament* cit., pp. 61-74 (quotations, pp. 67, 68).
- <sup>4</sup> Meikle, *A British frontier?* cit., pp. 1-5, 278, 280 (quotations, pp. 1, 3).
- <sup>5</sup> There is now a fairly extensive literature from the New British perspective. More general surveys include R. Frame, *The political development of the British Isles 1100-1400*, Oxford 1990; R.R. Davies, *The first English empire: power and identities in the British Isles 1093-1343*, Oxford 2000; S.G. Ellis with C. Maginn, *The making of the British Isles: the state of Britain and Ireland 1450-1660*, London 2007.
- <sup>6</sup> S.G. Ellis, *Tudor frontiers and noble power: the making of the British state*, Oxford 1995.
- <sup>7</sup> Meikle, *A British frontier?* cit., pp. 2-3. Can an argument based on a comparison between two regions be confuted on the basis of an analysis of the evidence relating to only one of these two regions?
- <sup>8</sup> S.G. Ellis, *The English state and its frontiers in the British Isles, 1300-1600*, in D. Power, N. Standen (eds.), *Frontiers in question: Eurasian borderlands, 700-1700*, Basingstoke 1999, pp. 157-161.
- <sup>9</sup> This paragraph is based on J.A. Tuck, *Northumbrian society in the fourteenth century*, in NH, 1971, 6, pp. 22-39; Id., *Richard II and the border magnates*, in NH, 1968, 3, pp. 32-39; Id., *War and society in the medieval north*, in NH, 1985, 21, pp. 39-43; A.J. MacDonald, *Border bloodshed: Scotland and England at war 1369-1403*, East Linton 2000; J.M.W. Bean, *The Percies and their estates in Scotland*, in "Archaeologia Aeliana", 1957, 4th ser., 35, pp. 91-99; Goodman, *The Anglo-Scottish marches* cit., pp. 20-24; Ellis, *Tudor frontiers* cit., pp. 20-22, 25-27; Pollard, *North-eastern England* cit., pp. 18-19; R.L. Storey, *The north of England*, in S.B. Chrimes, C.D. Ross, R.A. Griffiths (eds.), *Fifteenth-century England 1399-1509: studies in politics and society*, Manchester 1972, p. 130.
- <sup>10</sup> Documents illustrating this legal code are collected in W. Nicolson (ed.), *Leges marchiarum*, London 1747. And see also, J. Nicolson, R. Burn, *The history and antiquities of the counties of Westmorland and Cumberland*, 2 vols., London 1777.
- <sup>11</sup> R.L. Storey, *The end of the house of Lancaster*, 2nd ed., Gloucester 1986, pp. 107-109; Ellis, *Tudor frontiers* cit., pp. 24-25. From c.1470 the north-eastern corner of Northumberland (Berwick-on-Tweed, Northamptonshire, and the area immediately to the south) were administered separately as the east march, with most of Northumberland and the other liberties forming the much larger middle march.
- <sup>12</sup> Ellis, *Tudor frontiers* cit., pp. 39-40, 98-100, 240.
- <sup>13</sup> P. Dixon, *Towerhouses, pelehouses and border society*, in "Archaeological Journal", 1979, 136, pp. 240-252; J. Hodgson, *A history of Northumberland*, 3 parts in 7 vols., Newcastle 1820-1825, III, i, pp. 26-30; C.J. Bates, *The border holds of Northumberland*, in "Archaeologia Aeliana", 1891, new ser., 14, at pp. 14, 23-24, 32 (a list of 1509, and maps of castles and towers in 1415 and 1541); S.J. Watts, *From border to*



- middle shire: Northumberland 1586-1625*, Leicester 1975, pp. 22-23. And see more generally, M.W. Thompson, *The decline of the castle*, Cambridge 1987, esp. the map illustrating the distribution of towerhouses on p. 23.
- <sup>14</sup> Watts, *From border* cit., p. 18; P.E.J. Hammer, *Elizabeth's wars*, Basingstoke 2003, pp. 67, 103.
- <sup>15</sup> See in particular, F. Barth (ed.), *Ethnic groups and boundaries: the social organization of cultural difference*, Bergen 1969, esp. pp. 9-10, 18-19, 32-33.
- <sup>16</sup> Ellis, *Tudor frontiers* cit., pp. 67-68; J. McDonnell, *The role of transhumance in northern England*, in NH, 1988, 24, pp. 11-17.
- <sup>17</sup> Pollard, *North-eastern England* cit., p. 14; Storey, *North of England* cit., p. 130; M. Holford, A. King, C.D. Liddy, *North-east England in the late middle ages: rivers, boundaries and identities, 1296-1461*, in A. Green, A.J. Pollard (eds.), *Regional identities in north-east England, 1300-2000*, Woodbridge 2007, p. 40.
- <sup>18</sup> Cf. M. James, *Family, lineage and civil society: a study of society, politics, and mentality in the Durham region 1500-1640*, Oxford 1974, pp. 4-7; A. Green, A.J. Pollard, *Introduction: identifying regions*, in Green, Pollard (eds.), *Regional identities* cit., pp. 4-5.
- <sup>19</sup> Storey, *End of the house of Lancaster* cit., pp. 107-109; Pollard, *North-eastern England* cit., pp. 14, 19.
- <sup>20</sup> J. Bain (ed.), *Calendar of documents relating to Scotland*, 4 vols., Edinburgh 1881-1888, iv, no. 1649.
- <sup>21</sup> The National Archives [henceforth TNA], SP 1/48, ff 117-34v (J.S. Brewer, J. Gairdner, R.H. Brodie (eds.), *Letters and papers, foreign and domestic, of the reign of Henry VIII* [henceforth *L. & P. Hen. VIII*], 36 vols., London 1862-1932, iv (ii), 4336 (2)); S.G. Ellis, *Civilizing Northumberland: representations of Englishness in the Tudor state*, in "Journal of Historical Sociology", 1999, 12, p. 114.
- <sup>22</sup> TNA, SP 1/46, f. 130 (*L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, no. 3816 (2)).
- <sup>23</sup> Ellis, *Tudor frontiers* cit., pp. 61-71, 165-167.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 61-68.
- <sup>25</sup> Cf. M. Hroch, *Regional Memory: Reflections on the Role of History in (Re)constructing Regional Identity*, in this volume, pp. 4-6.
- <sup>26</sup> Ellis, *Tudor frontiers* cit., pp. 20-21.
- <sup>27</sup> See esp. R. Lomas, *North-east England in the middle ages*, Edinburgh 1992, ch. 2; A.J.L. Winchester, *Landscape and society in medieval Cumbria*, Edinburgh 1987, pp. 14-22.
- <sup>28</sup> J.M.W. Bean, *The estates of the Percy family, 1416-1537*, Oxford 1958, esp. pp. 128-132, 139; Ellis, *Tudor frontiers* cit., pp. 90, 101.
- <sup>29</sup> Hodgson, *Northumberland* cit., II, i, p. 62 (reproducing an exchequer court case of 1438).
- <sup>30</sup> Storey, *End of the house* cit., p. 106; Ellis, *Tudor frontiers* cit., pp. 34-35.
- <sup>31</sup> See, for instance, the complaints of the Northumberland gentry against franchises operated by Lord Dacre, 1525, in Hodgson, *Northumberland* cit., III, i, pp. 31-40; Ellis, *Tudor frontiers* cit., pp. 34-35.
- <sup>32</sup> See, for instance, M. James, *Society, politics and culture: studies in early modern England*, Cambridge 1986, chs. 2-4.
- <sup>33</sup> *Inquisitions and Assessments relating to Feudal Aids ... 1284-1431*, 4 vols., i, 244-5, London 1899-1906, iv, pp. 76-90; James, *Society, politics and culture* cit., pp. 68-70.
- <sup>34</sup> TNA, SP 1/45, ff 104-107 (*L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, no. 3629(4)); *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, no. 5085, Add. i, no. 618; E. Barrington de Fonblanque (ed.), *Annals of the House of Percy*, 2 vols., London 1887, I, app. XLVII. See also Hodgson, *Northumberland* cit., I, i, pp. 346-348, II, i, pp. 67-68; *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, ix, no. 1078, xii (ii), nos. 249-250 for slightly later lists. By contrast, around 45 of the gentry in the North Riding of Yorkshire alone had a landed income of £40 a year: Pollard, *North-eastern England* cit., pp. 86-90.

- <sup>35</sup> See the remarks on the difficulties in operating the traditional English system of local government in Ellis, *Tudor frontiers* cit., pp. 52-56; Id., *Civilizing Northumberland* cit., pp. 109-112. By the late 16th century, however, both the operation of local government and law enforcement in the north-east would seem to have improved considerably: D. Newton, *Borders and bishopric: regional identities in the pre-modern north east, 1559-1620*, in Green, Pollard (eds.), *Regional identities* cit., pp. 60-61.
- <sup>36</sup> C.J. Neville, *Gaol delivery in the border counties, 1439-1459: some preliminary observations*, in NH, 1983, 19, pp. 45-60; Storey, *End of the house* cit., pp. 116, 118; Ellis, *Civilizing Northumberland* cit., pp. 109-112.
- <sup>37</sup> TNA, SP 1/45, ff 104-7 (*L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, no. 3629(4), Cf. Hodgson, *Northumberland*, I, pp. 346-348, II, i, pp. 67-68, which prints slightly later lists of gentry, with a similar emphasis on their *manraed*; see also below, p. 92. Equivalents in modern money are of course problematic, but c.1500 a labourer commonly earned 4d. a day, or one-sixtieth of a pound (£1), and might get by on £2 or £3 a year. A priest was comfortably off if he had an income of £13 a year.
- <sup>38</sup> S.G. Ellis, *Civilizing the natives: state formation and the Tudor monarchy, c.1400-1603*, in Id., L. Klusáková (eds.), *Imagining frontiers, contesting identities*, Pisa 2007, pp. 77-92, at p. 83.
- <sup>39</sup> The different arrangements for the defence of arable lowland and pastoral upland communities are discussed in S.G. Ellis, *Integration, identities and frontiers in the British Isles: a European perspective*, in H. Gustafsson, H. Sanders (eds.), *Vid Gränsen: integration och identitet i det förnationella Norden*, Gothenburg 2006, pp. 19-45, esp. pp. 28-37.
- <sup>40</sup> Hodgson, *Northumberland* cit., III, i, pp. 35-36.
- <sup>41</sup> Quoted, M.L. Bush, *Captain Poverty and the Pilgrimage of Grace*, in "Historical Research", 1992, 65, pp. 21-22.
- <sup>42</sup> TNA, SP 1/112, f. 138 v (*L. & P. Hen VIII*, xi, no. 1244); A. Fletcher, D. MacCulloch (eds.), *Tudor rebellions*, 5th ed., London 2004, (quotation, p. 144).
- <sup>43</sup> Fletcher, MacCulloch (eds.), *Tudor rebellions* cit., pp. 147-149 (quotation, p. 149).
- <sup>44</sup> *A book of the state of the frontiers and marches betwixt England and Scotland, written by Sir Robert Bowes*, in Hodgson, *Northumberland* cit., III, ii, pp. 171-248, at p. 244.
- <sup>45</sup> J. Bruce, T.T. Perowne (eds.), *Correspondence of Matthew Parker, D.D. Archbishop of Canterbury*, Cambridge 1853, p. 123.
- <sup>46</sup> W. Camden, *Britannia, a chorographical description*, trans. P. Holland, 1610, p. 806; Hodgson, *A History of Northumberland* cit., II, i, 75.
- <sup>47</sup> P.L. Hughes, J.F. Larkin (eds.), *Tudor Royal Proclamations*, 3 vols., New Haven 1964-1969, i, p. 114.
- <sup>48</sup> *Sir John Bulmer. Bill of the lieng of soldeours*, in British Library, Additional MS 24965, f. 98 (*L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, no. 131).
- <sup>49</sup> Dublin annals, *sub anno* 1520, 1531, Trinity College Dublin, MS 543/2; *State Papers, Henry VIII*, 11 vols., London 1830-1852, ii, 223, 225, 234; Ellis, *Tudor frontiers* cit., pp. 138, 186, 212-213, 223.
- <sup>50</sup> J. Reed, *The ballad and the source: some literary reflections on the battle of Otterburne*, in A. Tuck, A. Goodman (eds.), *War and border societies in the middle ages*, London 1992, pp. 94-123. See more generally, D. Newton, *North-east England 1569-1625: governance, culture and identity*, ch. 7, Woodbridge 2006.
- <sup>51</sup> J. Whethamstede, *Register*, in H.T. Riley (ed.), *Registra quorundam Abbatum Monasterii S. Albani*, I, London 1872, pp. 171ff, 386ff; J.S. Davies (ed.), *An English chronicle of the reigns of Richard II, Henry IV, Henry V, and Henry VI*, London 1856, p. 106; N. Pronay, J. Cox (eds.), *The Crowland chronicle continuations 1459-1486*, London 1986, pp. 109, 113.
- <sup>52</sup> J. Gairdner (ed.), *The Paston letters*, I, London 1872, no. 367.

- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, i, no. 541; Whethamstede, *Register* cit., in Riley (ed.), *Registra quorundam* cit., pp. 171ff, 386ff; H.M. Jewell, *North and South: the antiquity of the great divide*, in NH, 1991, 27, pp. 13-16.
- <sup>54</sup> *Tudor Royal Proclamations*, 3 vols., New Haven 1964-1969, i, 20-21; D. Hay (ed.), *The Anglica Historia of Polydore Vergil AD 1485-1537*, Camden Soc., 1950, 3rd ser., 74, p. 11.
- <sup>55</sup> Quotations, James, *Society, politics and culture* cit., p. 189; D. MacCulloch, *Thomas Cranmer: a life*, New Haven 1996, p. 178 (quotation).
- <sup>56</sup> Hroch, *Regional Memory* cit., pp. 3, 5-6, 10-11. And see also the perceptive comments in Newton, *Borders and bishopric* cit., pp. 68-70; Pollard, *North-eastern England* cit., pp. 13-14.
- <sup>57</sup> *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, i, 2nd ed., no. 2246ii.
- <sup>58</sup> R. Robson, *The rise and fall of the English highland clans: Tudor responses to a mediaeval problem*, Edinburgh 1989, p. 192; *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, xx (i), nos. 280, 285, 301, 306, 339, 1046 (1, 2).
- <sup>59</sup> The king's retainers in Northumberland, 1537, printed in Hodgson, *Northumberland* cit., I, i, p. 346; H. Miller, *Henry VIII and the English nobility*, Oxford 1986, p. 159; Ogle was not, of course, the first Tudor peer in Henry VIII's reign to die in battle. In 1513, Gerald Fitzgerald, 8th earl of Kildare, was shot while watering his horse in the River Barrow; and Edward Plunket, Lord Dunsany, 'a valiant man' was killed in a skirmish in 1521 when his horse broke a leg: *State Papers* cit., ii, 80; Ellis, Maginn, *The making of the British Isles* cit., p. 78.
- <sup>60</sup> British Library, Lansdowne MS I, f. 43; Miller, *Henry VIII and* cit., pp. 10, 44, 92, 99, 126, 143, 148, 261. The Lords Ogle were indeed so obscure that it is not even clear when the father died or his son succeeded to the title (some time between 1530 and 1532).
- <sup>61</sup> On the 5th lord, see especially Robson, *English highland clans* cit., pp. 85, 87, 115, 117, 124, 158, 175, 182, 183, 192; Sir H.A. Ogle, *Ogle and Bothal or a History of the Baronies of Ogle, Bothal, and Hephple* [privately printed], Newcastle-upon-Tyne 1902 is an antiquarian, annalistic account of the family which collects and calendars much of the surviving source material.
- <sup>62</sup> Pollard, *North-eastern England* cit., pp. 150, 152, 227, 264, 270, 288, 298; *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* [Oxford DNB], xli, p. 604.
- <sup>63</sup> *Calendar of the Patent Rolls, 1461-1467*, pp. 29, 113-14, 466; *Oxford DNB*, xli, 604; Pollard, *North-eastern England* cit., pp. 270, 288-289.
- <sup>64</sup> *Calendar of the Patent Rolls* cit., pp. 340-341; Robson, *English highland clans* cit., pp. 60-64.
- <sup>65</sup> TNA, C 142/19, no. 4 (*Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem, Henry VII*, 3 vols., London 1898-1955, iii, no. 14); *Calendar of Inquisitions* cit., iii, no. 28.
- <sup>66</sup> The king's retainers in Northumberland, 1537, printed in Hodgson, *Northumberland* cit., I, i, 346.
- <sup>67</sup> Cf. Pollard, *North-eastern England* cit., p. 94.
- <sup>68</sup> TNA, C 142/27, no. 126, C 142/75, no. 16; *Inquisitions and Assessments* cit., iv, 76-90. Cf. *Calendar of Inquisitions* cit., ii, no. 547, iii, nos. 10, 16-18, 359, 470; Meikle, *A British frontier?* cit., pp. 142-143.
- <sup>69</sup> *Calendar of Inquisitions* cit., i, no. 157, iii, nos. 14, 28; *Inquisitions and Assessments* cit., iv, 76-90; Ogle, *Ogle and Bothal* cit., p. xxiii (citing an inquisition post mortem taken in Durham, 1513); H. Warne (ed.), *The duke of Norfolk's deeds at Arundel castle. Catalogue I: Dacre estates in northern counties*, Chichester 2006, p. 75.
- <sup>70</sup> Cf. Bean, *Estates of the Percy* cit., passim; Ellis, *Tudor frontiers* cit., chs. 3-4.
- <sup>71</sup> R.G. Eaves, *Henry VIII's Scottish diplomacy 1513-1524: England's relations with the regency government of James V*, New York 1971, p. 29.
- <sup>72</sup> *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, i (2nd ed.), nos. 2383, 2423, 2443, 2913; Ellis, *Tudor frontiers* cit., pp. 88, 104-105.
- <sup>73</sup> BL, Caligula, B VI (II), f. 326 (*L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iii, no. 2955ii); *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iii, no. 2875 v.

- <sup>74</sup> TNA, C 142/27, no. 126, C 142/75, no. 16. See also the list of 1509 and the maps of castles and towers in 1415 and 1541 in C.J. Bates, *The border holds of Northumberland*, in "Archaeologia Aeliana", 1891, new ser., 14, pp. 14, 23-24, 32.
- <sup>75</sup> The king's retainers in Northumberland, 1537, two lists printed in Hodgson, *Northumberland cit.*, I, i, pp. 346-8; II, i, pp. 67-68.
- <sup>76</sup> See Bates, *The Border holds cit.*, esp. pp. 22-25 (prints a list of holds and their owners, 1509).
- <sup>77</sup> Survey of the east and middle marches by Sir Robert Bowes and Sir Ralph Ellerker, 1542, in Hodgson, *Northumberland cit.*, III, ii, pp. 212, 214.
- <sup>78</sup> Survey of the east and middle marches, 1542, in Hodgson, *Northumberland cit.*, III, ii, pp. 226-7; The king's retainers in Northumberland, 1537; *ibid.*, I, i, pp. 346-8; Watts, *Border to middle shire cit.*, p. 22 (quotation).
- <sup>79</sup> Hodgson, *Northumberland cit.*, II, i, p. 289n.
- <sup>80</sup> J. Bain (ed.), *Calendar of letters and papers relating to the affairs of the Borders of England and Scotland*, i, Edinburgh 1894, nos. 47, 50, 253, 255, 259. The 1538 musters for Northumberland were transcribed from the originals in the National Archives by John Hodgson and printed in "Archaeologia Aeliana", 1855, 1st ser., 4, pp. 124-135.
- <sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, I, nos. 41, 74-75; R. Newton, *The decay of the borders: Tudor Northumberland in transition*, in C.W. Chalklin, M.A. Havinden (eds.), *Rural change and urban growth 1500-1800: essays in English regional history in honour of W.G. Hoskins*, London 1974, pp. 12-18.
- <sup>82</sup> M.M. Meikle, *A godly rogue: the career of Sir John Forster, an Elizabethan border warden*, in NH, 1992, 28, pp. 126-163.
- <sup>83</sup> Newton, *Decay of the borders cit.*, pp. 12-18.

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# *Flandria Illustrata*: Flemish Identities in the Late Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period

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## ABSTRACT

This chapter discusses identity formation in early modern Flanders. It argues that policy makers and their intellectual agents transformed the perception of a province that had been divided by urban rivalries, civil war and conflicts with the Burgundian and Habsburg overlords, into a bastion of the Catholic Counter Reformation with strong ties to the Spanish King and his representatives. It then assesses the role of the province as a 'border region' and suggests a future research agenda to understand further the role of Flanders and its political elite in the Habsburg Empire.

*Der folgende Artikel untersucht die Identitätsbildung der niederländischen Provinz Flandern auf dem Hintergrund des Achtzigjährigen Krieges. Es wird aufgezeigt, wie durch die Frontstellung gegen die Nördlichen Niederlande von Politikern in Brüssel und Madrid und von Historiographen aus dem Kader der Katholischen Kirche aus einem heterogenen territorialen Gebilde mit starken Partikularinteressen eine einheitliche flandrische Identität konstruiert wurde, deren Träger sich als loyal zu Spanien und dem Katholizismus sahen. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch die Frage diskutiert, ob Flandern deshalb als "Grenzregion" verstanden werden kann und welche Rolle die Provinz innerhalb des Länderkonglomerates des Spanischen Königreichs spielte.*

## INTRODUCTION

On the eve of Belgium's national holiday, 21 July 2008, a dinner party conversation in Antwerp steered, almost inevitably, towards the future of the Belgian state, which, despite the various political manoeuvres of Flemish and Walloon politicians, seemed then to be very much in the balance in its current form. The Flemish hosts, both academics with international careers and anything but a parochial outlook on national and regional identity, suggested to their foreign guests to go to Brussels for the day and

to watch what they deemed would be the last national parade as they knew it. The rift between the Flemish and the Walloon parts of the country seemed a painful reality which was based, so at least the argument around the dinner table, on different perceptions of the roles and responsibilities of the central and the regional governments. Two seemingly solid blocks of Flemish and Walloon identities were confronting each other with competing visions of financial policies and political rights. The identification of the Flemish core provinces, Flanders and Brabant, and their opposition to their French-speaking southern neighbours is undoubtedly based on developments in Belgium's earlier history, notably during the 19th and 20th centuries, when French was the dominant language of the political and social elites and decisions were made in the then more prosperous Walloon South.

However, Flemish identification with a region that encompassed the area south of today's Belgian-Dutch border and north of Brussels was not an 'inevitable' outcome of the linguistic similarities between the Netherlandish dialects spoken in Flanders and in Brabant<sup>1</sup>. Since the Middle Ages, and, indeed, even earlier, identities in the Netherlands have been far from stable and have changed with the various political overlords who dominated the area over its long and chequered history<sup>2</sup>. The 'seventeen' provinces, which formed the Spanish Netherlands until the outbreak of the Eighty Years' War in 1572 had only been united for a relatively short time under their Habsburg overlords and had fought aggressive wars against each other through most of the Middle Ages and during the Burgundian and early Habsburg period<sup>3</sup>. And even during the war dividing lines between the members of the Union of Utrecht and the southern provinces were often blurred and changed in the course of the armed struggle. These divisions were only settled in the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, when the negotiators drafted a more permanent border line between the United Provinces and the Spanish, later Austrian, Netherlands.

The following chapter assesses the role of war and partition for the development of a distinct identity in one of the core provinces of the Spanish Netherlands: Flanders. It outlines the various layers of identity that Flemish men and women constructed and applied to themselves and the modifications to these concepts during the turbulent political times of civil war in the heartlands of the – somewhat misleadingly named – “Dutch Revolt” in its early stages<sup>4</sup>. The chapter will also analyse how the historians and politicians of the time transformed initially rather diverse identities into a more solid concept of what it meant to be in Flanders and what was within and what outside its boundaries. This process was the consequence of a prolonged conflict of the different powers and interest groups in the political and economic centres of Flanders. It was fuelled by the need of the Habsburg authorities in Brussels and in Madrid to construct an essentially “Spanish Netherlandish” identity. The chapter thus also addresses the questions concerning the relationship between border regions and the composite state which lie at the heart of this volume. Agents of this process of identity formation which





Map 1

The County of Flanders by Matthias Qaed (cartographer) and Johannes Bussemacher (engraver), Cologne 1609.

are scrutinized here were both the indigenous provincial elites and the administrators of the central government and their supporters, notably the members of the Catholic Counter-Reformation Church<sup>5</sup>. The identity they created which utilized and found its expression in histories, commemorative practices and artefacts, civic rituals, poems, dramas and songs, often reacting to contemporary circumstances and amending the political memory of the region's or province's past according to a present-centred agenda<sup>6</sup>. This Flemish identity emphasized both the uniqueness of Flanders as a bastion of the Habsburg Empire and its role as part of the wider Habsburg world.

## THE TERRITORY: FLANDERS IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

In the Middle Ages the term "Flanders" encompassed a larger and more diverse territory than the province which would eventually form a part of the Southern Netherlands after 1648. Territorial divisions, not just in Flanders but also in neighbouring Brabant and elsewhere in the Netherlands, were the norm rather than the exception in

what was one of the most urbanized regions in Europe during the Late Middle Ages and the Early Modern period. The geographically and politically most prominent part of Flanders was the area under the sovereignty of the counts of Flanders (which became part of the Burgundian and later Habsburg territories in 1384, with the death of the last count of Flanders, Louis de Mâle). A small eastern area bordering Hainaut and Brabant, which was known as *Reichs-* or Imperial Flanders was initially given to the expansionistic Count Baldwin V of Flanders by the Holy Roman Emperor in 1050 as a feudal loan. This area was later renamed according to its largest city and administrative headquarters the “Land van Aalst”. In 1166 it became fully incorporated into the possessions of the counts of Flanders, but the regional memory of a different and distinct past survived well into Habsburg times. Flemish-speaking Flanders was bordered in the south by Artois and a small strip of land surrounding the cities of Lille and Douai, which was known as Walloon Flanders. These areas were annexed to France in 1640 and 1667/68 respectively thus turning Flanders into a border state with external boundaries both in the north and in the south. Moreover, the Flanders that emerged from the Treaties of Westphalia also suffered the loss of a small strip of northern territory with the strategic cities of Aardenburg and Terneuzen which were, as a consequence of the siege warfare in the early 17th century, incorporated into the Dutch province of Zeeland as *Zeeuws-Vlaanderen*. This area lost much of its initial economic and strategic power and became something of a backwater. It also remained something of a Catholic anomaly in an otherwise staunchly Protestant region<sup>7</sup>. Geographical particularism was thus a distinct feature of Flanders’ history and identity, and as will be demonstrated below, this is reflected in the historiographical traditions of the area.

More important, perhaps, than these geographical distinctions was Flanders’ eminently strong urban tradition. Ghent, Bruges and Ypres were powerful economic centres with highly international connections, notably through the Hanse, and with prosperous indigenous industries, which were largely based on cloth and other textiles. Until the very end of the 15th century the leading Flemish cities dwarfed all their competitors in their northern neighbourhood in terms of population and trade<sup>8</sup>. The “Four Members of Flanders”, the medieval representative council of the county, comprised of delegates of the three main cities and of the so-called Franc of Bruges, the area around Bruges. Significantly, the Flemish nobility was not included in this assembly<sup>9</sup>. It has been pointed out that this emphasis on towns and cities rather than on the land was a decisive marker of Flanders’ medieval and also early modern identity<sup>10</sup>. Relations between these cities and their overlords were often turbulent and frequently exploded in violent clashes, notably under the expansionist reign of the Burgundian rulers<sup>11</sup>. It was during this period, as Jan Dumolyn has recently pointed out, that a new Flemish nobility which included not only the aristocratic elite, but also, by intermarriage, members of the urban patriciate, was rising to prominence in the emerging Burgundian state<sup>12</sup>. This group became

particularly important in the establishment of the Habsburg regime in Flanders after the tumultuous first phase of the Eighty Years' War at the end of the 16th century.

## REPRESENTATIONS OF FLANDERS: HISTORIOGRAPHY AND CHOROGRAPHY IN THE 16TH AND 17TH CENTURIES

Given the prominent role of cities in Flanders it seems, at first glance, surprising that none of these places developed a medieval chronicle tradition such as those in Italian and also German towns and cities of the time. It has been argued, however, that urban identity in Flanders and elsewhere in the Southern Netherlands found its expression in other, often non-textual media such as civic processions, tapestry and architecture rather than in histories or descriptions sponsored by the urban authorities or other civic interest groups<sup>13</sup>. The manifold manifestations of urban pride and self-confidence of a prosperous, but often heterogeneous elite, which encompassed both members of the various powerful craft guilds and merchants, were, however, not situated in a wider geographical context. Urban identity in Flanders, so it seems, was based on sharp comparisons and competition among the eminent cities of the region<sup>14</sup>. An identification with the wider geographical surroundings, be they the county of Flanders, the Burgundian Circle (as part of the Holy Roman Empire) or the whole of the Burgundian (later Habsburg) territories of the Netherlands, only emerged at the end of the 15th century, when Flemish towns and cities steered clear of internal strife and conflict. Texts, which also incorporated the dynasty and showed the Burgundians and later the Habsburgs in a positive light, were often the products of *rederijkers kamers*, chambers of rhetoric, whose members staged plays, and produced poems and songs in praise of their city. As Anne-Laure van Bruaene has pointed out, in the larger Flemish cities, these chambers were not only sponsored by the civic authorities, but also by the representatives of the Burgundian-Habsburg court, who thus influenced the content and the underlying messages of these works, which were often distinctly urban and emphatically dynastic in tone<sup>15</sup>. A Flemish master narrative outside the dynasty emphasizing the land rather than its rulers did not develop in the late medieval and early modern period<sup>16</sup>.

This fragmentation of a Flemish identity was undoubtedly further fuelled by the events surrounding the Iconoclastic Fury (1566) and the early phase of the Eighty Years' War, which in many instances was fought as a civil war between opposing factions within individual towns and cities. Here, dividing lines separated moderates (Catholics in search of a compromise with their Habsburg overlords) and radicals (Calvinists, who favoured a separate solution), which often correlated with the urban/rural divide. Most of the leading aristocracy and gentry in Flanders remained staunchly loyal to the Catholic Church and their Habsburg rulers, not least because many of the noble families had risen through the service of their Burgundian rulers and had lucrative and powerful positions at the court in Brussels and within the Habsburg administration<sup>17</sup>. Protes-

tant uprisings and support for the Dutch Revolt were more widespread in the Flemish cities. In this context, the city of Ghent rose to notoriety. In 1577 a Calvinist regime, recruited largely from artisan circles, took over urban government. Other cities such as Kortrijk, Arras and Ypres followed suit in 1578. These divisions, which further separated an already diverse area, also increased the difficulties of shaping an acceptable master narrative for Flanders which could accommodate both town dwellers and the regional elites. It is, therefore, perhaps not surprising that historiographical texts written in this period were often accounts of the events surrounding the Flemish uprising in one city or another rather than surveys of Flanders as a whole<sup>18</sup>. Moreover, the political and confessional vision that radical Calvinists in Ghent, Bruges and elsewhere developed was not based on territorial unity, but rather reflected an idealized medieval past based on a “city-state” system, so reversing the state-building initiatives of the Burgundians and Habsburgs and presenting Flanders as an area divided into cities and their respective hinterlands<sup>19</sup>. Politically, the Flemish cities sought to revive their medieval dominance over the surrounding countryside. These ideals and certainly also the composition of the Calvinist government with its strong influence drawn from craft guilds rather than the traditional urban elite further antagonized the Flemish nobility and strengthened their allegiance to the Habsburgs.

The events during the early phase of the Eighty Years’ War thus intensified the rifts between the various political groups within Flanders. More than neighbouring Brabant, for instance, Flanders was politically and ideologically divided, which made a unanimous response to the war impossible. The war itself did not provide a ‘usable’ master narrative of heroic defence or victory against antagonistic, ‘foreign’ forces, as was the case in the historiography of the northern Netherlandish provinces, notably Holland and Zeeland. More than neighbouring Holland, with its iconic sieges and heroic defeats of cities such as Haarlem and Leiden, Flanders became the battleground of a war, whose ‘narrative’ could only be told by multiple and conflicting voices<sup>20</sup>.

In 1584 the Spanish forces under the Duke of Parma crushed the urban strongholds of Protestantism, inaugurating an exodus of thousands of Calvinists to the North. Ghent and other cities were garrisoned with Castilian troops and Flanders was fortified as a Habsburg stronghold. The brief period of the Calvinist regime, notably in Ghent, however, remained a vivid point of reference in later narratives of Flanders from a Southern perspective: these often portrayed the inhabitants of Ghent as fanatical heretics drawn from the lower strata of society who had driven from home and hearth those who did not follow their vision of a godly government<sup>21</sup>. The story of Ghent’s Calvinist regime was frequently invoked as a warning against an all-too-lax approach towards tolerance of non-Catholic minorities in the country. Joannes van Waesberghe, for instance, in his study of Geraardsbergen, a city in Imperial Flanders and his adopted home – after his family had been expelled from Ghent – never missed an opportunity to discredit Ghent’s Calvinist period. Joannes van Waesberghe was canon of the collegiate church of St.

Omaars te Lilaar with a doctorate in Law and a keen interest in promoting the history of his home town. His *Gerardimontium* was published in Latin in Brussels in 1627. In the present context, his book is remarkable not just for its snide comments against Ghent, but also for the underlying theme of the text, which was a eulogy of Geraardsbergen, but at the same time an acknowledgement of the characteristic disunity of Flanders which could only be kept at bay by a strong centralized power such as the Habsburgs. Not surprisingly, most references to Ghent described the place as a hotbed of iconoclasm and dissent.

A *patria* rhetoric is well developed in van Waesberghe's text. In his dedication he cited his patriotic feelings as the motor for his enterprise and he also did not forget to point out that the history of his own family gave him both incentive enough and also the expertise to undertake this enterprise. He used terms such as *natale solume*, which here served as a descriptor of his home town rather than his province or the whole of the Netherlands<sup>22</sup>. At the same time he firmly embedded Geraardsbergen into the county of Flanders. Here, however, he was more specific, as can be seen from the sub-title of his book, *Gerardimontium, sive Altera Imperialis Flandriae Metropolis eiusque Castellania*, and focused on Imperial Flanders, rather than on all of Flanders. This reference to the area's past as part of the Holy Roman Empire fitted well into the eulogy that van Waesberghe constructed. Here, he emphasized in particular the medieval prominence of the city with its ecclesiastical "jewel", the Benedictine Abbey of St. Adrian, which kept the relics of the early warrior saint of the 4th century<sup>23</sup>. He also highlighted the city's rights, which he claimed, were the earliest granted to a city in Flanders by Baldwin van Bergen (ca. 1039-1070, also known as Baldwin VI Count of Flanders and Baldwin I of Hainaut) in 1067. The common bond between the neighbouring provinces – and here van Waesberghe concentrated mainly on Hainaut and Brabant – was Habsburg rule. Geraardsbergen was a border town in the political triangle between Hainaut, Flanders and Brabant, and as such it had suffered, so the reader was told, many assaults from its neighbours. Quarrels, even wars between the various parts of what were then the Burgundian and later Habsburg lands, were not played down or blended out of the story. On the contrary, these struggles, based on the expansionist ambitions of the powerful nobility, thus in van Waesberghe's interpretation, were the norm rather than the exception: it needed a strong overlord to keep them at bay<sup>24</sup>. The common bond between the neighbouring provinces was Habsburg rule. In his interpretation, the city of Geraardsbergen and the land were inhabited by the noble and clerical protagonists of the Habsburg regime. Given the noble patron, whom he had chosen for his work, Claude de Croÿ-Roeulx, he could not have presented a different picture. His dedicatee was the representative of Archduchess Isabella in Geraardsbergen. The House of Croÿ in its several branches was certainly one of the most eminent noble families in the Spanish Netherlands, with close links to the Habsburg government. The Croÿs had substantial landholdings scattered across the Southern Netherlands and had embarked on a mas-

sive project to chart their possessions, appointing their own artist, Adrien de Montigny to create a series of 2,500 pictures of their properties, which were produced with accompanying descriptions in 23 volumes between 1598 and 1614 and are known as the “Albums de Croÿ”. This splendid collection offers the most comprehensive survey of land in Hainaut, Brabant, Flanders and elsewhere in the Low Countries then in the possession of the various branches of the Croÿ family. It provides an eminently rural scenario of the country, which invoked memories of an idyllic medieval peasant society<sup>25</sup>.

Van Waesberghe wrote a local account of a specific part of Flanders close to his heart. More comprehensive works on Flanders, which focused on the entirety of the province rather than on specific areas, were written by members of the clerical elite who set out to chart the country for the Counter Reformation initiatives of the Spanish Habsburgs. The great chorographical works on Flanders of the 17th century, notably Jean Baptiste Gramaye’s *Antiquitates comitatus Flandriae*, published in Brussels in 1611 and Antonius Sanderus’ *Flandria Illustrata* published in two volumes in 1641 and 1644 in Amsterdam, but with a false Cologne imprint, set their mark on a description of the country which was portrayed as decidedly Catholic with strong regional autonomy through powerful estates dominated by a regional elite unquestionably loyal to the House of Habsburg. The authors of these monumental surveys, which set the agenda for a whole range of chorographical writings on the Southern provinces, were part of the wider network of Counter Reformation agents, who kept close contacts with academics and intellectuals in the Netherlands and elsewhere in the Catholic world<sup>26</sup>. Their European agenda was expressed in the fact that their works were written in Latin, not in the vernacular or in French, which was the language of the ruling elite in Brussels. Both men had links to the court in Brussels: Gramaye had been appointed as court historian by the Archdukes in 1606. He also served as their agent in the Holy Roman Empire and was particularly involved in the purchase and translation of relics from Germany to Brabant<sup>27</sup>. Sanderus’ family had close links to the Habsburgs: his grandfather had been the personal doctor of Charles V. Sanderus himself had been secretary of Cardinal Alfonso de la Cueva, minister of Philip IV since 1625.

Both surveys followed a distinct form of chorographical writing and highlighted the continuing traditions of the Catholic Church and its clerical and noble protagonists in the province. A closer look at the latter of the two works will outline the strategies used by the author to create the Catholic bastion of Flanders. Antonius Sanderus had read History in Douai before embarking on a clerical career, which brought him to the position of Canon of St. Maarten in Ypres in 1625<sup>28</sup>. His heart, however, remained with the study of history. When the then royal historian Erycius Puteanus died in 1646 Sanderus applied for the post, but was rejected. Inspired by Jean-Baptiste Gramaye, he was interested in chorographical studies and started collecting information on his native Flanders from 1627 onwards. With a letter of recommendation from Philip IV, he then began his research, travelling across Flanders, which all too frequently brought him into

conflict with his colleagues and superiors in Ypres who were frowned upon his long absences. Sanderus' letters to potential sponsors among the aristocratic and urban elite in Flanders met with mixed responses and the money that he had expected to raise for his enterprise came rather sparsely<sup>29</sup>. Sanderus, however, was so dedicated to his project that he invested substantial sums of his own money in it, largely to finance the numerous engravings he had commissioned from Jodocus Hondius in Amsterdam. The first volume of the *Flandria Illustrata* was eventually published in 1641. The second volume with the subtitle *Flandria Illustrata* which was published in 1644 was to be followed by a third and fourth volume, *Flandria Gallicana* and *Paralipomena Flandriae*, but these two were not published during Sanderus's lifetime.

The first volume was dedicated to Philip IV, the second to Francisco de Mello, a Portuguese nobleman and protégé of Olivares and General Governor of the Spanish Netherlands between 1641 and 1643. In both books, the Spanish overlords and the nobility of Flanders were generously praised as the custodians of the country. After a long dedication to the regional nobility supplied in volume 1, it does not come as a surprise that much space was dedicated to noble houses, castles and other residences of the noble families of Flanders, which were covered in great detail and with numerous engravings. The larger and smaller religious houses were also presented in great detail. Although Flanders' eminent cities, and first and foremost Sanderus' home town, Ghent, were presented with lavish illustrations of the most eminent religious and secular places, the reader leaves the books with the impression that the nobility and landed elite with their castles, ornate gardens and manor houses scattered throughout the country were equally, if not more, important than the old urban centres of the province. Sanderus started his discussion of the lie of the land with the Romans and highlighted the administrative units of the country, which were mostly the results of Roman structures. This presentation of the administrative organization of the country from Roman times led Sanderus to a discussion of the establishment of bishoprics, which were a more important frame of reference for the clerical administrator than potential ancestors and (legendary) founding fathers. A *gentium origines*, that had become so important in Northern studies, was not necessary in a land that was marked by well-established administrative units<sup>30</sup>. Clear and strong traditions were thus drawn from the Roman Empire to be applied the Roman Church and its administrators. This emphasis on administrative units also allowed Sanderus the opportunity to confirm the role of the nobility as the bearers of administrative responsibility in the country. Continuity from Roman times was the strength of his argument and thus the strength of Flanders. This strategy was pursued throughout the chorographical description, which has an air of timelessness. Events of the Dutch Revolt, when Flemish cities and towns had been on the frontline, were not mentioned. In Sanderus' description of Nieuwpoort, for instance, the epic battle fought in 1600 between Prince Maurice and Archduke Albert was ignored<sup>31</sup>. This might still have been explicable, given that the battle ended in defeat for the Span-

ish forces. The significance of the battle of Ostend (1604), however, which brought victory to the Archduke and his forces, was also understated. However, some rather laconic comments about the Eighty Years' War were scattered through the text. In the vignettes of the counts of Flanders, for instance, where Sanderus discussed Philip II, he briefly mentioned the Revolt: "The Netherland have turned against themselves and staged the saddest tragedy ever played on the world theatre"<sup>32</sup>. Indeed, at those points where the Dutch Revolt sneaked into the description, the United Provinces were labelled the "Hollanders", a descriptor, which, in a way, reflected the leading role that the province of Holland had ascribed to itself in its own historiography<sup>33</sup>. The Dutch opponents were also simply labelled "the enemy"<sup>34</sup>. The internal strife that had arisen in Flanders itself was thus externalised. Enemies came from outside, not from within Flanders. Not surprisingly, the Habsburgs were presented in a positive light. Although references were made to the devastating war, the reign of Philip II was noted not only for his politics towards the Netherlands. Highlighted instead were the international commitments of the king in defence of Christianity throughout the world. These included his fight against the Turks, and, notably, the battle of Lepanto (1571) which was especially mentioned<sup>35</sup>. The history of the Counts of Flanders was presented as world history, which had already been a feature of earlier generations. Robert II (1065-1111), for instance, was mentioned with the title "Hierosolymitanus", of Jerusalem, for his participation in the First Crusade. Another count, Baldwin IX was remembered with the title "Caesar Augustus Constantinopolitanus", for his role in the Fourth Crusade against Constantinople, where he was crowned Emperor Baldwin I in 1204<sup>36</sup>. This history made it easy for Sanderus to present Flanders as belonging to traditionally highly international dynasties and as just one theatre of war in the struggle of the current rulers, the Habsburgs, for the true religion. Cathedrals, abbeys and monastic houses featured prominently in the chorographical surveys, where long lists of abbots and bishops supported the underlying message of Sanderus' work as an appreciation of the longevity of Catholic organizations in the country. Although there were three life-size images of Archdukes Albert and Isabella, Philip III and Philip IV, Sanderus' historical survey terminated with the death of Philip II in 1598. Contemporary history was certainly not on Sanderus' agenda. For a more recent account of the lives of the Archdukes he referred the reader to the works of his contemporary and fellow-historian, Aubert le Mire, alias Miraeus<sup>37</sup>. Although the picture of a timeless, eminently Catholic region under Habsburg leadership is the grand scheme of Sanderus' work, he, like his predecessors, was aware of the subdivisions of Flanders. It is not surprising that his coverage of Geraardsbergen, which was firmly based on van Waesberghe's account, was included in volume 2, *Flandria Subalterna*. The eastern parts of Flanders, notably Imperial Flanders, were distinguished from what Sanderus, as an inhabitant of Ghent, saw as the heart of Flanders, the prosperous western part of the county. The title of his third volume is unsurprising: it was never published, but was intended to cover Wal-



loon or French Flanders (as it then was). Despite all financial difficulties, *Flandria Illustrata* enjoyed a very successful further life. A second Latin edition appeared in 1732 and 1753 in The Hague published by Christiaan van Lom. An amended Dutch version under the title *Verheerlijckt Vlaandre* appeared in Leiden, Rotterdam and The Hague published by Jan vander Deyster, Jan-Daniël Beman and Cornelius and Frederik Boucquet in 1735. This, however, was not the original translation of Sanderus' work<sup>38</sup>.

#### THE POLITICS OF UNITY: RITUALS, NETWORKS AND POWER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FLEMISH ELITES AND THE HABSBURG COURT

While the Catholic Church thus provided an eminently strong framework of identity in Flanders, particularly since the recapture of the county for the Habsburgs in the 1580s, the loyalty of the Flemish power elites provided the second important pillar which held the county together in these turbulent times and which fostered a sense of both regional identity and an identification with the wider Habsburg world that had been missing in earlier centuries<sup>39</sup>. This loyalty was, as has been pointed out, a result of the career opportunities for a new elite which rose to power and prominence during the Burgundian attempts at state formation. Their successors, the Habsburgs, were well aware of the fact that this loyalty had to be rewarded, if they wanted the nobility to continue their contributions to the increasingly protracted war effort which, from the outbreak of hostilities between Spain and France in 1635, was fought on two fronts. As René Vermeir has recently pointed out, the Habsburgs responded to this challenge with a series of highly symbolic measures that assured the Flemish elite that their position and their county were central to the wider Spanish strategy and to the success of the Counter Reformation<sup>40</sup>. From the death of Archduke Albert in 1621, when the Spanish Netherlands returned to direct rule of Madrid, the Spanish kings ensured that the Governor General of the Netherlands would always be of royal blood. During her lifetime, until 1633, Archduchess Isabella, who was eminently popular in the Habsburg provinces, remained ruler of the Netherlands. After the brief interim of the Marquis of Aytona, a protégé of the powerful duke of Olivares, the governorship was then given to the Cardinal-Infante Don Fernando de Austria, King Philip IV's younger brother, in 1634. When the young and charismatic Spanish heir apparent, whose appointment had aroused high expectations both for his promise as a military leader and as a diplomat, died of smallpox at the age of 39 in 1641 he was replaced by two internationally well-connected first-class bureaucrats: first by Don Francisco de Melo, then by the marquis of Castel Rodrigo who succeeded him in 1643. The latter was replaced in 1647 by a high-ranking member of the Austrian Habsburg line, Emperor Ferdinand III's brother, Leopold-William. The three governors who were not princes of the blood royal were regarded as interim governors, who had each held posts at the court of Vienna before their secondment to Brussels.

The presentation of these candidates and especially the arrival of the Archdukes and of Cardinal-Infante Don Fernando as the guardians of Flemish security within the Habsburg empire was carefully orchestrated, particularly through the traditional ceremonies of the *Blijde Inkomst*, or Joyous Entry, which formed an essential part of the political and constitutional ritual of government in the Netherlands. These progresses by the new governors into the most prominent cities of the Southern Netherlands were eminently political events which constituted, rather than merely confirmed, the relationship between ruler and ruled. More than any other encounter, the Joyous Entries gave dramatic and symbolic expression to the complicated interplay of rights and privileges characteristic of Burgundian and later Habsburg rule in the Netherlands. The details of each individual entry, which every new ruler had to undergo, gave both sides, but, perhaps, even more specifically the town oligarchies, considerable room for manoeuvre which they exploited with eminently political statements concerning their expectations of the new sovereign. While career opportunities at court appealed to the Flemish nobility's loyalties, the Joyous Entries targeted the hearts and minds of the urban elite in Flanders.

Much has been written in recent years on the well-documented entries of Archdukes Albert and Isabella and also of their predecessor Philip II into Brussels and Antwerp. An assessment of the use of these highly symbolic events in Flanders is still missing. Moreover, research into the later period and notably on Cardinal-Infante Don Fernando and his successors is insufficiently developed so far<sup>41</sup>. René Vermeir, however, has pointed out that the entry of Don Fernando into Ghent had been carefully orchestrated to remind the participants, spectators as well as actors in the royal procession, of the long Habsburg tradition in the city, which, after all, was the birth place of Don Fernando's great ancestor, Charles V<sup>42</sup>. The Habsburg dynasty thus became the unifying bond of Flemish identity and loyalty. It remained such a powerful tool that the Flemish power elites did not hesitate to contribute to an increasingly difficult war effort without considering changing sides and responding to the overtures of either the Dutch Republic or the French monarchy. Constitutionally, their loyalty was rewarded by the strict adherence of the Spanish Governor Generals to the Estates' rights<sup>43</sup>.

## FLANDERS – A “BORDER REGION”?

Flanders was constructed as a bastion in the Habsburgs' battle against their enemies in the North and in the South. While the conflict with the Dutch Republic was clearly seen as a fight for Catholicism as the only true religion, French fellow-Catholics in the South had to be repainted as significantly 'other' by reference to French absolutism, which was incompatible with and a threat to the traditional rights and liberties of the Flemish power elites.

Flanders thus had foreign borders north and south of its territory, but does this justify labelling the county a “border region” – a term which has been much discussed in recent historiography?<sup>44</sup> Research into the nature of border regions and their role in

(national) identity formation has, so far, mainly addressed the relationship of border regions in the geographical periphery to the centre of a nation-state<sup>45</sup>. With its eminently important role as one of core provinces of the Spanish Habsburg possessions in the Southern Netherlands (together with Brabant), Flanders cannot be described as peripheral to the centre in Brussels, even if much of the Habsburgs ceremonial display of their power, expressed for instance in the highly publicized pilgrimages of Albert and Isabella to the shrines of Our Lady of Scherpenheuvel or Halle, took place in Brabant<sup>46</sup>. Flanders was also not peripheral in its relation to Madrid, although conflicts between the Governor Generals in the Netherlands and the Escorial over the war effort and Spanish strategy in the Netherlands frequently erupted. However, not only Charles V, born in Ghent, but also his son Philip II and his grandson Philip III still regarded the Low Countries as the jewel in the imperial crown: *Belgium coronae Regiae gemma prestantior* was the motto that Philip III had inscribed on a triumphal arch erected in Lisbon in 1619<sup>47</sup>. In terms of the nomenclature used in Spanish texts to describe their Southern Netherlandish subjects, they were referred to as *Flamencos*, while the Eighty Years War was known in Spanish as *la guerra de Flandes* or *las guerras de Flandes*. At the same time the term could also be used to describe the province of Flanders rather than the whole of the Netherlands. As with Sanderus' "Hollanders", "Flamencos" became a *pars pro toto*, highlighting the importance of the province in Spanish eyes<sup>48</sup>. Together with its eastern and southern neighbours under Habsburg rule, Flanders was elevated to the status of a bastion of the Counter Reformation and of Habsburg power. If the term "border region" can be applied here, then it should encompass the whole of the Spanish Netherlands within the wider, Habsburg, or even Counter-Reformation world. Through the intermediaries of local political, administrative and religious elites this vision was transported to, but also accommodated into the specifically Flemish scenario. Recent research into border regions has challenged the perception of a "weak, conservative" border area which was confronted by a "dynamic, modern" nation-state<sup>49</sup>. It is attractive to test this hypothesis for 17th-century Flanders and Spain. Whether and how events and political, social and cultural practices in Flanders and in the Spanish Netherlands in general influenced Spanish court and political culture, educational systems or social norms has, however, not to date been adequately assessed by historians. Yolanda Rodríguez Péres has suggested that perceptions of the enemy other, the *Holandeses*, were much further developed, albeit in negative terms, than the ideas that Spaniards had of Netherlandish subjects who were loyal to the Spanish monarchy<sup>50</sup>. The *relaciones*, newsletters on the war distributed in Spain, which she has studied report events in the Netherlands, but largely refrain from detailed value judgements on the Southern Netherlanders, who are stereotypically described as Catholic and loyal<sup>51</sup>. How far Flemish nobles or merchants could and did make a career in Spain or elsewhere in the wider Habsburg world also need further research<sup>52</sup>. On the regional level of Flanders and its border, again, a number of questions remain unanswered. It is difficult to assess, for instance, how porous the borders were between Flanders and its lost

territories in *Zeeuws-Vlaanderen* and also with French Flanders. So far, no in-depth study has addressed the question of intermarriage on a local level or the role of a black, cross-border economy.

## SUMMARY AND AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The Eighty Years' War played an important role in the development of a Flemish identity, which was firmly embedded within the Habsburg world. It was Catholic, pro-Spanish and international. This transformation was far from clear in the first phase of the hostilities, when Flemish identity was even more fragmented through the different interest groups in the country which supported different camps in the war. Only from the last decades of the 16th century onwards did the Spanish overlords succeed in their military and ideological efforts to unify the region that was left of its Netherlandish possessions. In Flanders they were supported by a power elite which expected greater gains from its loyalty to Spain than from joining the rebellion. On the fringes of this general picture of identity formation of a province which bonded with its eastern neighbours to the extent that we can use the term regional identity here, there remain, however, a number of unanswered questions which need further investigation: relations to the lost border regions in the north and in the south are still unclear. Likewise, relations between Flanders and the wider Habsburg world in terms of career networks, intermarriage, and cultural exchange have not yet been adequately researched and would certainly provide closer insights into the relationship between border regions and composite states, which are at the heart of this collection.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> I use the term Netherlandish here to denote issues and phenomena applicable to both parts of the Netherlands. This reflects the usage in the Netherlandish language. On the difficulties of nomenclature see, for instance, A. Duke, *The Elusive Netherlands. The Question of National Identity in the Early Modern Low Countries on the Eve of the Revolt*, in "Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden", 2004, 119, pp. 10-35.
- <sup>2</sup> See, for instance, R. Stein, *Seventeen. The Multiplicity of a Unity in the Low Countries*, in D'A. J.D. Boulton, Jan R. Veenstra (eds.), *The Ideology of Burgundy*, Leiden 2007, chapter 17.
- <sup>3</sup> On identity in the pre-Revolt Low Countries: Duke, *The Elusive Netherlands* cit.
- <sup>4</sup> On the history of the term "Dutch Revolt", see, for instance, H. van Nierop, *Making Sense of the Revolt of the Netherlands*, in G. Darby (ed.), *The Origins and Development of the Dutch Revolt*, London - New York 2001, pp. 29-47.
- <sup>5</sup> It needs to be pointed out, however, that identity formation is not understood as a merely top-down process, but that it is also fed by bottom-up initiatives of individuals and groups in society on the margins of political (and social) power. This is certainly also the case with regional identities and their relationship to a centre.
- <sup>6</sup> The argument of tradition was certainly one of the most powerful tools in early modern discourse.

- <sup>7</sup> On the impact of the cessation of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, see R. Vermeir, *De grens verlegd. Het zuiden zonder Sluis tijdens de Tachtigjarige Oorlog, 1604-1648*, in "Archief. Mededelingen van de Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen", 2004, pp. 49-60.
- <sup>8</sup> For further details and figures, see J. Israel, *The Dutch Republic. Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806*, Oxford 1995, p. 5.
- <sup>9</sup> H. De Schepper, J.-M. Cauchies, *Legal tools of the public power in the Netherlands, 1200-1600*, in A. Padoa-Schioppa (ed.), *Legislation and Justice (The Origins of the Modern State in Europe C)*, Oxford 1997, pp. 229-268.
- <sup>10</sup> See, for instance, K. Tilmans, *De ontwikkeling van een vaderland-begrip in de laat-middeleeuwse en vroeg-moderne geschiedsschrijving van de Nederlanden*, in N.C.F. Van Sas (ed.), *Vaderland. Een geschiedenis van de vijftiende eeuw tot 1940*, Amsterdam, 1999, pp. 41-45. For a recent discussion of the lack of urban chronicle traditions in Flanders and Brabant, see A.-L. van Bruaene, *L'Ecriture de la Mémoire Urbaine en Flandre et en Brabant (XIVe-XVIe Siècle)*, in E. Crouzet-Pavan, E. Lecuppre-Desjardin (eds.), *Villes des Flandres et d'Italie (XIIIe-XVIe Siècle)*, Turnhout 2008, pp. 149-164.
- <sup>11</sup> On the Burgundian State see W. Blockmans, W. Prevenier, *The Burgundian Netherlands*, Cambridge 1986. See also W. ter Brake, *A Plague of Insurrection. Popular Politics and the Peasant Revolt in Flanders, 1323-1328*, Philadelphia 1993.
- <sup>12</sup> J. Dumolyn, *Nobles, Patricians and Officers. The making of a regional political elite in late medieval Flanders*, in "Journal of Social History", 2006, 40, 2, pp. 431-453.
- <sup>13</sup> See, for instance, E. Lecuppre-Desjardin, *La ville des cérémonies. Essais sur la communication politique dans les anciens Pays-Bas bourguignons*, Turnhout 2004. See also W. Rösener, *Einleitung*, in Id. (ed.), *Adelige und bürgerliche Erinnerungskulturen des Spätmittelalters und der Frühen Neuzeit*, Göttingen 2000.
- <sup>14</sup> van Bruaene, *L'Ecriture de la Mémoire Urbaine* cit.
- <sup>15</sup> A.-L. van Bruaene, *Om beters wille. Rederijkerskamers en de stedelijke cultuur in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden (1400-1650)*, Amsterdam 2008.
- <sup>16</sup> This contrasts with developments in neighbouring Brabant, where histories of the Duchy emphasize the role not only of the dynasty, but the land itself. See V. Souche-Hazebrouck, *Le Brabant, terre de sainteté à travers l'oeuvre de Jean Gielemans († 1487)* in S. Boesch Gajano, R. Michetti (eds.), *Europa Sacra, Raccolte agiografiche e identità politiche in Europa fra Medioevo ed Età moderna*, Rome 2002, pp. 34-44. See also her *Patriotic saints or patriotic hagiography in Brabant at the end of the Middle Ages?*, in D. Bauer, K. Herbers, G. Signori (eds.), *Patriotische Heilige. Beiträge zur Konstruktion religiöser und politischer Identitäten in der Vormoderne*, Stuttgart 2007, pp. 113-122.
- <sup>17</sup> Dries Raeymaekers is currently preparing a PhD dissertation (University of Antwerp) on the Habsburg Court in Brussels, 1598-1647. I am grateful for his information on the administrative structures at court.
- <sup>18</sup> See, for instance, J.P. van Male (ed.), *Philip de Kempenare, Vlaemsche Kroniek of Dagregister van al het gene gedenkwaardig voorgevallen is binnen de Stadt Gent sedert den 15 Julij 1566 tot 15 Julij 1585*, Ghent 1839; *Memorieboek der Stadt Ghent van't Jaar 1301 tot 1737*, Ghent 1852-54 (Maatschappij der Vlaemsche Bibliophilen, 2. series No.15), F. Vanderhaeghen (ed.), *Marcus van Vaernewyck, Van die beroerliche tijden in die Nederlanden en voornamelijk in Ghendt, 1566-1568*, Ghent 1872.
- <sup>19</sup> W. Blockmans, *Alternatives to monarchical Centralisation: The Great Tradition of Revolt in Flanders and Brabant*, in H.G. Koenigsberger (ed.), *Republiken und Republikanismus im Europa der frühen Neuzeit*, Munich 1988, pp. 145-154.
- <sup>20</sup> It needs to be remembered, however, that the narratives constructed around the iconic sieges in Holland also weeded out the existing divisions in places like Haarlem, where it was by no means clear that

the city would become a symbol of Dutch resistance against Spanish forces. On the internal strife in Haarlem, see Joke Spaans' still seminal: *Haarlem na de Reformatie: Stedelijke Cultuur and kerkelijk leven, 1577-1620*, The Hague 1989.

- <sup>21</sup> This view on events in the short-lived Calvinist city states was, however, also often used in Northern debates as a warning against intolerance. Radical Calvinism was, in fact, associated with Southern refugees rather than seen as an "indigenous" Northern confessional pattern. Civic authorities in cities such as Haarlem emphasized tolerance rather than exclusivity as a means for peaceful and prosperous co-existence. On debates on religious tolerance in the Dutch Republic see, for instance, R. Po-Chia Hsia, H. van Nierop (eds.), *Calvinism and Religious Toleration in the Dutch Golden Age*, Cambridge 2002.
- <sup>22</sup> I. van Waesberghe, *Gerardimontium sive Altera Imperialis Flandriae Metropolis eiusque Castellania*, Brussels 1627, p. 99.
- <sup>23</sup> He was martyred in Nicomedia on 4 March 306.
- <sup>24</sup> van Waesberghe, *Gerardimontium* cit., p. 103.
- <sup>25</sup> J.-M. Duvosquel, R. Berger, F.-Ph. Jacquet-Ladrier, B. Minnen (eds.), *Albums de Croÿ, Dl. 3, Bezittingen der Croÿ's in Brabant, Vlaanderen, Artesië en het Naamse*, Brussels 1985; B. Minnen (ed.), *Het hertogdom Aarschot onder Karel van Croÿ (1595-1612); Kadasters en gezichten*, Brussels 1993. Members of the Croÿ family were frequently used as dedicatees for works in praise of the Southern Netherlands. Justus Lipsius' chorography of Leuven, for instance, had been dedicated to Charles de Croÿ, who resided in the seigniority of Heverlee, in close vicinity to the city of Leuven. See J. Papy (ed.), *Justus Lipsius. Leuven. Beschrijving van de Stad en haar Universiteit*, Leuven 2000.
- <sup>26</sup> For the Catholic Counter Reformation networks in the Holy Roman Empire and its neighbourhood, including the Netherlands, see S. Benz, *Zwischen Tradition und Kritik. Katholische Geschichtsschreibung im barocken Heiligen Römischen Reich*, Husum 2003.
- <sup>27</sup> A biography of this important Counter Reformation intellectual is still missing. For further details in his career, see Benz, *Zwischen Tradition und Kritik* cit.
- <sup>28</sup> Details of Sanderus' life are collected in: C. de Vleeschauer, *De Flandria Illustrata van Antonius Sanderus*, in "Archives et Bibliothèques de Belgique/Archief- en Bibliotheekswezen in België", 1978, XLIX 1-2, pp. 1-115. See also J. de Saint-Genois, *Antoine Sanderus et ses écrits. Une page de notre histoire littéraire*, Ghent 1861, reprint Utrecht 1980.
- <sup>29</sup> For details on his correspondence with the local nobility and with the administrators of the Spanish Netherlands, see J. de Saint-Genois, *Antoine Sanderus et ses écrits* cit.
- <sup>30</sup> Much has been written on the role of the Batavian myth in Dutch historiography. See, for instance: E.O.G. Haitsma Mulier, *De Bataafse mythe opnieuw bekeken*, in "Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden", 1996, 111, pp. 344-367; S. Langereis, *Van botte boeren tot beschaafde burgers. Oudheidskundige beelden van de Bataven, 1500-1800*, Exhibition Catalogue: *De Bataven. Verhalen van een verdwenen volk, De Bataafsche Leeuw*, Amsterdam, Museum Het Valkhof, Nijmegen 2004, pp. 72-108.
- <sup>31</sup> A. Sanderus, *Flandria Illustrata*, Amsterdam 1641-1644, vol. 2, p. 636.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 72.
- <sup>33</sup> Id., *Verheerlijkt Vlaandre*, Leiden 1735, vol. 1, 105.
- <sup>34</sup> Sanderus, *Flandria Illustrata* cit., vol. 1, p. 72.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 37, 44.
- <sup>37</sup> See, for instance, A. Le Mire, *Rerum Belgicarum Chronicon ab Iulii Caesaris in Galliam adventu etc.*, Antwerp 1636.

- <sup>38</sup> The Dutch edition also incorporated unpublished material of the projected volumes 3 and 4 of Sandercus' original work.
- <sup>39</sup> I use the term "regional identity" deliberately here to indicate that developments in Flanders were similar to the other prominent Counter Reformation bullwark in the Spanish Netherlands: Brabant. Brabant, however, had a less heterogeneous and divisive medieval past than Flanders. For identity in late medieval Brabant, see, in particular, R. Stein, *Politiek en Historiografie. Het onstaansmilieu van Brabantse kronieken in de eerste helft van de vijftiende eeuw*, Leuven 1994; Id., *Brabant en de Karolingische dynastie. Over het ontstaan van een historiografische traditie*, in "Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden", 1995, 110, 3, pp. 329-351.
- <sup>40</sup> R. Vermeir, *Power Elites and Royal Government in the Spanish Netherlands during the Last Phase of the Eighty Years' War (1621-1648)*, in A. Cimdina (ed.), *Religion and Political Change in Europe: Past and Present*, Clivio's Workshop II, 8, Pisa 2003, pp. 87-102.
- <sup>41</sup> On the public ceremonies of the Joyous Entries in the Netherlands, see H. Soly, *Plechtige Intochten in de steden van de Zuidelijke Nederlanden tijdens de overgang van Middeleeuwen naar Nieuwe Tijd; communicatie, propaganda, spektakel*, in "Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis", 1984, XCVII, pp. 341-361. On the entry of Philip II, see M.A. Meadow, *Ritual and Civic Identity in Philipp II 1549 Antwerp "Blijde Incompt"*, in R. Falkenburg et al. (eds.), *Hof- Staats- en Stadceremonies*, "Netherlands Yearbook for History of Art", 1998, 49, pp. 37-68. On public ceremony in the Southern Netherlands in the second part of the 16th century, see M. Thöfner, *A Common Art: Urban Ceremonials in Antwerp and Brussels during and after the Dutch Revolt*, Zwolle 2007.
- <sup>42</sup> Vermeir, *Power Elites and Royal Government* cit., p. 92.
- <sup>43</sup> On the interplay between the Southern Netherlands estates and the Spanish monarchy, see L. Duerloo, *Verbeelde gewesten. Zelfbeeld en zelfrepresentatie in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden*, in "De Zeventiende Eeuw", 2000, 16, pp. 3-13 and Id., *Discourse of conquest, discourse of contact: competing visions on the nature of Habsburg rule in the Netherlands*, in G. Ammerer (ed.), *Bündnispartner und Konkurrenten der Landesfürsten? Die Stände in der Habsburgermonarchie*, Vienna 2007, pp. 463-478. More critical about the loyalty of the Flemish nobles to the Spanish monarchy is K. van Honacker, *The Archdukes and Their Subjects: The Political Culture of the Citizens in the Netherlands*, in W. Thomas, L. Duerloo (eds.), *Albert & Isabella 1598-1621*, Turnhout, 1998, pp. 241-248.
- <sup>44</sup> See, for instance, the Special Issue of the "European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'Histoire" 2008, 15, 3, "Municipalism, Regionalism, Nationalism: Hybrid Identity Formations and the Making of Modern Europe", and here especially the article by D. Lavan, T. Bancroft, *Border regions and identities*, which discusses several models of spatial identities and their application to border regions such as French Flanders and Trieste (pp. 255-275).
- <sup>45</sup> See M. Umbach, *Introduction*, in *Municipalism, Regionalism, Nationalism: Hybrid Identity Formations and the Making of Modern Europe*, "European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'Histoire", 2008, 15, 3, pp. 235-242.
- <sup>46</sup> On the role of pilgrimages in the Habsburg propaganda effort in the Netherlands, see L. Duerloo, M. Wingens, *Scherpenheuvel. Het Jeruzalem van de Lage Landen*, Leuven 2002; Thöfner, *A Common Art* cit.
- <sup>47</sup> Reference taken from Y. Rodríguez Pérez, *De Tachtigjarige Oorlog in Spaanse ogen*, Nijmegen 2003, p. 17.
- <sup>48</sup> Information on the Spanish nomenclature is taken from Rodríguez Péres, *De Tachtigjarige Oorlog* cit.
- <sup>49</sup> See Umbach, *Introduction* cit.
- <sup>50</sup> Rodríguez Péres, *De Tachtigjarige Oorlog* cit.

- <sup>51</sup> On the *relaciones*, see H. Ettinghausen, *The illustrated Spanish news. Text and image in the seventeenth-century press*, in C. Davis, P. J. Smith (eds.), *Art and Literature in Spain: 1600-1800. Studies in Honour of Nigel Glendinnen*, London 1993, pp. 117-133.
- <sup>52</sup> Studies which have addressed this subject so far include W. Thomas, E. Stols, *La integración de Flandes en la Monarchiá Hispánica*, in W. Thomas, R.A. Verdonck (eds.), *Encuentros en Flandes*, Leuven 2000, pp. 1-73.

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# The Napoleonic Empire, 1799-1814

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*Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) is one of most romantic and dominant figures in European and world history. His career has often been likened to a comet passing across the skies of human experience, and the rapid rise and fall of his empire, built on a military career by turns dazzling and catastrophic, can blind observers to other aspects of Napoleon's achievement which were less dramatic, but more lasting in their influence. When the Napoleonic period, from 1799 to 1814, is placed within the wider context of the role of empire in European history – rather than just on the career of Napoleon himself – a very different and more complex picture emerges. The Napoleonic empire was about more than one man or, indeed, one nation. It embraced not just France, but much of western Europe, becoming an enterprise that involved Germans, Belgians, Dutch, Italians, and many others, in laying many of the foundations of modern Europe. Napoleon has sometimes been painted as the precursor of modern nationalism in Europe, whereas, in fact, the character of his rule had more to do with forging common institutions across the boundaries of the states he controlled. These, in turn, would survive his fall and the rise of later regimes, whether rooted in nationalism or not.*



## THE CREATION OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE: THE GREAT REFORMS, 1799-1804

When Napoleon Bonaparte became the head of the French Republic, in November, 1799, not only had France been at war with most of the other major European powers for seven years, she had also begun to acquire territories and client states beyond her traditional borders. By any reasonable definition of the term, the First French Republic, founded with the overthrow of Louis XVI in August 1792, had already become an empire by 1799. In 1795, the French definitively annexed the provinces of the Austrian Netherlands, present day Belgium, turning them into French departments, governed from Paris under French laws and institutions. Two years later, they did the same with those areas of the Holy Roman Empire – now Germany – on the left (western) bank of the Rhine. Between 1796 and 1797, Napoleon himself created a 'satellite republic' in northern and central Italy with himself as its president – the Cisalpine Republic – with its capital at Milan. This example was modelled on what the

French had done in the United Provinces, the modern day Netherlands, in 1795, which was renamed the Batavian Republic, under a puppet government. It was repeated in 1798, when occupying French armies set up the Roman and Parthenopian Republics over the Papal states and the mainland parts of the Kingdom of Naples, respectively, in southern Italy, and the Helvetic Republic in present day Switzerland; the first two lasted only a few months before they were overthrown by an internal revolt; the third is still the official name of the Swiss Confederation. Thus, until a series of military reverses in 1799, France had established a hegemony over most of what is now western Europe, the historic core of the modern European Union. Napoleon's first task, as First Consul of the Republic, was to recapture these territories from the Austro-Russian coalition, and re-establish French hegemony over them, in one form or another. This he did, in a series of well co-ordinated military campaigns, 1799-1800. By 1801, a general peace had been concluded with all the major powers, culminating in the Peace of Amiens with Great Britain, in March 1802. Although Britain and France were soon at war again, France did not return to war with the continental powers until 1805, allowing Napoleon to consolidate his rule not just in France, but in those other parts of Europe now annexed directly to France, and in the satellite states.

Even before Napoleon standardized and stabilized the character and institutions of French rule, incorporation into the French Republic meant the complete introduction of French law and administrative practices into non-French territories. In the satellite states, this meant constitutions modelled directly on those of France; everywhere, it meant the replacement of local laws, weights and measures, currency and administrative structures, by those developed by the French Revolutionaries since 1789. This also meant the abolition of the vestiges of feudalism, of provincial and noble privileges, and the confiscation of the properties of the Church. That is, from the very outset, to be part of the French empire meant joining a uniform, standardized political system; the old orders were swept away in every area the French took under their definitive control.

This process intensified under Napoleon, because he refined French institutions still further, in a series of seminal domestic reforms carried out between 1800 and the resumption of war in 1805. By 1804, the work begun by the legal reformers of the Revolution was brought together in the Civil Code – known generally as the Code Napoleon – which established many fundamental precepts such as the equal division of property among all heirs, the right to equal public trials for all citizens, the abolition of all privileges in matters of taxation, divorce – even if this was much more restrictive than existing laws in France – freedom of religion, and compulsory civil marriage. Napoleon also consolidated the French administrative system of local government, giving the departments new executive officials, the prefects, who were appointed directly by the central government. He consolidated and strengthened the Gendarmerie, a paramilitary police force under the Ministry of War, whose specific task was to police the countryside, a step which gave the state a more powerful presence in the daily life of its citizens than ever before. In a wide ranging agreement with Pope Pius VII in 1801, Napoleon recognized the Catholic Church as 'the religion of the majority of Frenchmen', while also reaffirming the right to religious liberty and, perhaps more importantly, confirming the loss of Church property to the state and the dissolution of most regular clergy carried out by the revolutionary government in 1790.



**Fig. 1**  
Napoleon Bonaparte.

It is of crucial importance for the future development of Europe, to remember that all these things applied not just to France, but to all those parts of western Europe under Napoleon's control – direct or indirect – between 1800 and 1805. All the Low Countries and Switzerland, much of western Germany, and most of north-western and central Italy received these reforms at exactly the same time as France itself. Indeed, these years also saw many of the essential elements of the Napoleonic reforms adopted – and adapted – by the states of southern Germany, notably Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria, and Nassau. In the years after the Peace of Amiens, Napoleon drew the rulers of these states away from their traditional allegiance to the Habsburgs and the Holy Roman Empire, towards himself and the French empire. They turned to Napoleon not just for military and diplomatic reasons, but because his system of government reflected their own ideas for internal reform. Napoleon supported them in their desire to curb the privilege and power enjoyed by the nobles, clergy and urban centres within their states, and to challenge these traditional restrictions on state power, whereas these same institutions were the bases of Habsburg influence in the Holy Roman Empire. Thus, the process of administrative centralization and the growth of state power were truly European, and laid the legal and institutional foundations of many future west European states. Many of these changes proved more abrupt and traumatic outside France than within it, particularly for the masses: there were revolts in Piedmont – the mainland possessions of the House of Savoy and the old Republic of Genoa, both in northern Italy – and in rural parts of the Rhineland when these areas were plunged from very traditional forms of local justice and government, based on arbitration, for example. Independently, the German princes met similar opposition within their own borders. Some aspects of Napoleonic rule, such as the religious settlement or the ruthless imposition of conscription, were never really accepted outside France.

Nevertheless, by the end of Napoleonic rule in 1814, the elites of most of western Europe had come to accept the essential elements of Napoleonic law and administrative institutions, as the best form of political organization for a state. The propertied classes, which

also included much of the peasantry, benefited from the higher levels of law and order brought to the countryside by the Gendarmerie, particularly the extirpation of brigandage. Justice for civil cases under Napoleon became quicker and cheaper to obtain than in the past, and was administered by an honest, professional magistracy. The fair and equitable reparation and administration of property taxes was largely achieved by the compilation of accurate land registers, the *cadaastre*, although indirect taxes became very high under Napoleon. The prefects, particularly, proved able and honest local administrators, all of which left a deep, favourable impression on the elites of western Europe, even among those politically opposed to Napoleon.

However, democratic politics formed no part of this system. The western European experience of the new Napoleonic state – which proved so formative for the future, in so many ways – was not linked to representative, parliamentary forms of government in any meaningful way. As these reforms took root in the territories under Napoleonic control prior to 1805, the core of the Napoleonic empire also took shape, a core that was not wholly French. When the empire expanded through war from 1805 onwards, these areas came to form an ‘inner empire’ around the new territories to the east and south.

### THE ‘GRAND EMPIRE’: EUROPE UNDER NAPOLEON, 1805-1814

In December, 1804, Napoleon crowned himself ‘Emperor of the French’, and according to the new constitutional formula, ‘the French Republic was entrusted to a hereditary dynasty’. In line with this, the Italian and Batavian Republics became kingdoms, the former under Napoleon but effectively ruled by his stepson, Eugène de Beauharnais, the latter under his brother, Louis. However, the real changes in the European order came in the years immediately following the creation of the Empire. Fearing that the change of title heralded an attempt by Napoleon to become Holy Roman Emperor, the Habsburg Emperor, Francis I, dissolved this ancient institution, and henceforth styled himself Emperor of Austria. In the same spirit of suspicion about Napoleon’s ambitions, Austria soon joined with Britain and Russia in a new coalition against Napoleon. They were crushed by the French in a lightening campaign in 1805, and when Prussia and Russia attempted to fight on, they were defeated in a series of campaigns (1806-1807), that took French armies into Russia, itself.


This round of victories altered the shape of the empire and of Europe as a whole, in dramatic, unexpected ways. In 1805, Napoleon seized the southern Italian Kingdom of Naples, placing his brother Joseph on the throne, in place of the Bourbons; Germany was thoroughly reordered between 1804 and 1807: the states of western and southern Germany were linked together in the Confederation of the Rhine, with Napoleon as its ‘Protector’, thus providing a new kind of political ‘umbrella’ to replace that of the Holy Roman Empire; territory seized from Prussia and Hesse-Kassel in north-central Germany became a new Kingdom of Westphalia, under Napoleon’s youngest brother, Jerome. Further east, following the Treaty of Tilsit, with Tsar Alexander I, a new state, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, was created from the Prussian parts of Poland. After 1805, the Napoleonic Empire was no longer a purely west European state system, but a pan-European empire. However, the territories acquired in this second phase of expansion proved less ready to accept the set of

laws and administrative institutions which defined the Napoleonic imperium than those regions under its control up to 1804. Feudalism was much more powerful in northern Germany, southern Italy and, especially, in Poland, than elsewhere in Europe, nor was the principle of religious toleration readily accepted in many of these regions. Thus, the Code Napoleon was never fully implemented in many of these areas. Although they became important sources of conscripts for the armies and for supplies, these regions came to represent an outer empire, which never properly absorbed the essence of Napoleonic rule, although the Grand Duchy of Warsaw remained politically very loyal to Napoleon, personally, for having restored its independence.

Unable to defeat Britain militarily, in 1807 Napoleon issued the first of a long series of decrees which aimed to do so by means of economic warfare. This had two distinct aspects: the first was the attempt to create a continent-wide blockade of British goods, and to prevent goods from states under Napoleon's control reaching Britain. The second aspect of this policy of economic warfare is generally called the Continental System, and was much more ambitious and sophisticated than the blockade. Napoleon intended to create an integrated market system across Europe, in order to make it economically independent of Britain.

The need to impose the blockade proved impossible to enforce, and led Napoleon into a final, ultimately disastrous expansion of the empire along the coasts of northern, western, and southern Europe that proved his undoing. In 1808, he invaded Spain and then Portugal to stem the flow of British goods to and from their ports. He placed his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne, replacing him in Naples with his brother-in-law and cavalry commander, Murat, but a small British army drove him out of Portugal and successfully defended the country from further French attacks. Spain, too, proved impossible to control; a widespread – if often ineffective – guerrilla war broke out against Joseph, spasmodically aided by the British, and an opposition government held out in the southern port of Cadiz. Spanish resistance provided a beacon to the rest of Europe, not only because it was the first relatively effective check to Napoleon's advance, but also because the Spanish government in Cadiz, a parliament called the Cortez, produced a democratic constitution, as well as a plan for reform along Napoleonic lines. For the first time since the French Revolution, it now seemed possible to combine the benefits of rational Napoleonic legal and administrative reform, with representative government. Militarily, Spain proved a long, constant drain on the empire's resources from 1808 onwards.

Between 1808 and 1811, Napoleon annexed most of central Italy, expelling the rulers of Tuscany and the Pope from Rome, also to tighten the blockade. After a brief war with Austria in 1809, Napoleon took the Dalmatian provinces along the Adriatic coast from Francis – the modern Croatia and Slovenia – better to control their ports. In 1810-1811, he seized the whole of the North Sea coast, from modern Belgium to the Danish border, deposing Louis from the throne of Holland for his failure to enforce the blockade, together with the small city states of northern Germany. The blockade destroyed the commercial life of all the ports of western Europe, those within France such as Nantes and Bordeaux, included, although in most cases their trade revived after the end of the wars in 1814. None of these areas really became part of the empire, in the way the earlier acquisitions had. Indeed, the general failure of Napoleonic institutions to take root in them only serves to underline how well suited they were to the territories of the inner empire, further west.



**Fig. 2**  
Europe in the 1810.

The Continental System failed for very different reasons than the blockade. An important example is Napoleon's own failure to recognize that, by making his empire into a truly European state at an early, formative stage of its development, he had to think in terms other than pure French nationalism. In the crucial sphere of economic relations, Napoleon followed the selfish directives of French industrial and commercial interests, creating a 'one-way Common Market' throughout the inner empire, when there were clear signs that the non-French states within his orbit wanted to co-operate to foster a European economy free of British competition. Although Napoleonic economic policies often favoured agricultural development outwith France, there was a deliberate policy of undermining the manufacturing industries of other parts of the inner empire, as happened in the Rhineland, northern Italy, and Switzerland. The most blatant manifestation of this came in the decrees of St. Cloud and the Trianon, in 1810, which fixed the tariff and customs' borders of Napoleonic Europe. These decrees ignored the political boundaries created by Napoleon, himself, and made a mockery of the inner empire and the state system in economic matters, for they drew the 'tax free zone' around the borders of France in 1795. Although Belgium fell within the preferential zone, areas technically part of France such as the Rhineland, all the Italian departments and the newly annexed Dutch departments, did not. All these areas had hoped to benefit from closer links to the empire, but were bitterly disappointed. Napoleon's utter disregard for European co-operation in this sphere contrasts sharply with the progress made in legal and administrative integration, at least in western Europe. The damage done by the Continental System, like that wrought by the blockade, proved largely temporary, however. Indeed, the reintroduction of British competition after 1814 often did more lasting harm to continental industry than had Napoleon. However, the economic havoc engendered by these policies, coupled with the massive



demands of Napoleonic conscription, made the regime deeply unpopular with vast numbers of Europeans, well before Napoleon experienced his first crushing military disaster in Russia, in 1812.

Napoleon invaded Russia because his partnership forged with Alexander I in 1807 had broken down by 1810, over Alexander's withdrawal from the blockade. Napoleon's large army was decimated in the winter campaign, but the powerfully efficient administrative system created in the inner empire raised enough troops to allow him to fight on against a large allied coalition into the spring of 1814. Even the late defection of his German allies of the Confederation of the Rhine did not hinder this. Napoleon was finally forced to abdicate by the combined forces of Austria, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Britain, after having been driven back into France from the east, and out of Spain, from the south-west. By April, 1814, the Napoleonic adventure was virtually over. Although he returned to France briefly, in the desperate gamble of the Hundred Days which ended with his defeat at Waterloo, this concerned only France.

Thus, Napoleon's hegemony over Europe was relatively short; in some regions, Napoleonic rule lasted as little as three years. Nevertheless, the impact of his reforms was virtually permanent in the influence it exerted on how the states of western Europe were governed from that point in their histories onwards. Although the Congress of Vienna, which reorganized Europe after Napoleon's fall, reordered the borders of states to a considerable degree, Napoleonic administrative institutions and, above all, the Code Napoleon, re-emerged sooner, rather than later, as a basis for civil government in the lands of his inner empire. The legacy of the Napoleonic empire in European history is not to be found in Napoleon's transient military exploits, but in the durability of his civil reforms.

## THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE IN EUROPEAN HISTORY

Napoleon's style of leadership was two-fold, throughout his reign, both as First Consul and then as Emperor: He was an impersonal figure, a head of state who incarnated the laws and institutions of the Empire, depicted as a remote classical emperor – more Byzantine than Roman – in his coronation robes [Plates 5, 6]. Parallel to this, he was 'the first among equals', the great captain of other great captains, distributing the eagles to his army, bestowing honours on his brothers – both his natural brothers and his brothers-in-arms, the marshals. His rule was authoritarian, but never paternalistic, for the Napoleonic state was always too youthful, too restless, too thrusting, and – above all – too close to its revolutionary roots, to allow the image of its leader to resemble that of a paternal ruler in any way.

Napoleon did not seek out the deep roots or traditions of Europe. There are five central aspects of the concept of 'Europe' that the career and actions of Napoleon simply do not fit: the Europe of Napoleon was not about peace. He furthered the work of the French revolutionaries, in bringing 'war on the chateau', even if his war machine and the mass conscription he imposed on Italy, Germany and the Low Countries conspicuously failed to bring 'peace to the cottage', to say nothing of the depravations wrought from Lisbon to Moscow by his own wars. Second, his was a revolutionary regime, especially beyond the borders of France. He tore down traditional barriers, overthrew ancient dynasties and,

above all, had no regard for what both Tocqueville and Burke discerned as 'the ancient constitution of Europe', those remarkably similar institutions and legal traditions common to France, Germany and Britain, in the medieval and early modern periods. Indeed, it was under pressure from Napoleon, that one of the few genuinely European institutions, the Holy Roman Empire, was finally destroyed, in 1806. Nor did Napoleon respect or sustain the only other truly pan-national institution Europe possessed, the Roman Catholic Church. Much is often made of the Concordat Napoleon agreed with Pius VII in 1801, and too many have been too quick to see in him a restorer of religion and a supporter of conservative Catholicism. The most fundamental aspect of Napoleon's relations with the Catholic faith, in particular, and the Holy See, in general, was his hostility to traditional Catholicism, his unflinching, unremitting assault on the traditional Church calendar, with its *fêtes patronales* and penchant for local miracles, and on the regular clergy. The agreement of the 1801 Concordat is of far less importance for the concept of Napoleon as a European, than for the fact that both he and the Pope tore it up in each other's faces in 1809. The former imprisoned the latter, while the latter excommunicated the former.

Clearly, Napoleon had no time for the concept of a Europe built on the ancient notion of 'Christendom'. He would not have made a post-1945 Christian Democrat, not only because of his contempt for democracy, but also for his ingrained anticlericalism. This is to say nothing of the harsh, utterly Franco-centric economic policies behind the Continental System. In this context, as in his exploitation of the human resources of his non-French possessions through conscription, Napoleon's words to his Italian Viceroy, Eugène de Beauharnais – 'Think first of France' – acquire a concrete meaning that would make him an ill-fitted adherent to the Treaty of Rome. Finally, perhaps the greatest barrier to Napoleon's claims to being a great European – and even to being a 'Europhile' at all – was the sense of cultural superiority shown by the French in their dealings with other Europeans. Their attitudes to Italian, German and Spanish popular and high culture reflect attitudes more than tainted with the 'cultural imperialism' often associated with the extra-European colonial empires of the later 19th and 20th centuries.

In is obvious that there are many elements within the experience of the Napoleonic empire which render its example not only irrelevant, but often directly at odds with the concept of Europe as a united entity, that dominates our own times. Nevertheless, despite all his political attacks on European traditions, and his very real physical attacks on living Europeans throughout his reign, Napoleon left the clearest, most practical foundations of the modern European Union of any single ruler before or since his tenure of power. It is one of the greatest paradoxes surrounding this most paradoxical of regimes, and is, perhaps, most clearly resolved by conceiving of the Napoleonic as a truly revolutionary regime. While for many French people, Brumaire marks a turning back of the clock when set beside the events of the 1790s in their country, this was not the case beyond the borders of France. South of the Alps and Pyrenees, and east of the Rhine, Napoleon represented a truly revolutionary force, one that broke the traditional bonds between Europeans and drove relentlessly forward to the concept of a new Europe, built on practical foundations.

The experience of Napoleonic rule was terrifying for most ordinary Europeans. It meant war, conscription, heavy taxes, and rape and pillage if they got in the way of the almost ceaseless fighting. Yet, the need to rule a vast empire also forges a truly European elite of

administrators and future statesmen. Perhaps even more profound, were the institutional structures within which this elite worked: there were two hallmarks of French cultural imperialism. The first was an axiomatic belief in the superiority of their political culture: the Code Civil; the administrative system based on prefects and departments; a central government turning on the Council of State. The second was an unshakeable confidence that this system could be exported anywhere beyond France. The new elite of administrators, soldiers and magistrates went everywhere; the institutions followed them, taking roots in some places, being rejected in others. Napoleon found and moulded the first European administrative elite, and their experience charted where the core of a new Europe was to be found.

Napoleon had a very clear vision of what the educated, propertied classes of Europe should be: their roots should be in landed property, they should belong to their localities. They were the *notables*, 'the blocs of granite': immobile, eternal, the closest thing this restless regime ever got to a wish for stability and permanence. Yet, from them were to be hewn a new generation of highly mobile, highly educated and truly European administrators. Young men trained in the imperial *lycées*, in the *Université* and in the new *Grandes Écoles*, drawn from this stable milieu of the *notables*, went forth to rule the new empire, through the new institutions. They became the driving force of the Napoleonic regime, they created an 'empire of the young professionals', of young men – and their wives – who travelled without complaint and with boundless energy and enthusiasm – all over Europe, to establish the new institutions and make them work. The novelist Stendhal is the best known among them, their most articulate spokesman, and he spoke for a generation of imperial servants, whose task – in their own eyes – was to forge a new Europe, rather than to discover the intrinsic 'Europeanness' of their new *administrés*. Nevertheless, Napoleon sought to add other Europeans to their ranks, and achieved some success. Cesare Balbo, the first constitutional premier of Piedmont-Savoy, and the mentor of Cavour, served in their ranks and declared that the Napoleonic system was the only correct way to administer a state. Many statesmen and administrators of the small states of western and southern Germany found common ground quite easily with the French, having been educated in the long tradition of Cameralism and, more recently, in the Enlightened Absolutism practised by Joseph II. All these men shared the same vision, of an authoritarian but enlightened state, working through rational, centralised institutions, and their belief in the efficacy of this system far outlasted Napoleonic rule.

If the roots of modern Europe are to be found in the Napoleonic empire, it is because Napoleon fathered all the fundamental institutions of modern Europe. The Code Civil survived in the Rhineland after 1814, and was extended to the whole of Prussia in 1849, thus creating one of the greatest ironies in European history: while France and Prussia/Germany fought two bitter conflicts, in 1870-71 and 1914-18, they were governed by almost identical legal systems. Piedmontese domination of a united Italy, after 1859, saw an even closer model of the Napoleonic system envelop a large, new state. William IV, the newly restored king of the Netherlands in 1815, saw Napoleon as a hero, specifically because he had shattered forever the myriad of provincial and local institutions that hindered the emergence of a strong Dutch state. The roots of new European institutions were firmly planted under Napoleon, and survived the political and military conflicts of the following

century. It is probably logical – and fortunate – that when a period of sustained peace finally prevailed in Europe, after the cataclysm of 1945, that these roots would become the foundation of a new Europe: the similarity of institutions, especially, made – and continues to make – the work of the original member states of the Union relatively easy, perhaps more than is realised at a practical, day-to-day level.

Yet, just as the genuine appeal of the Napoleonic system was limited horizontally, in terms of class, it was also limited in terms of space. Those parts of Europe where the system took root formed a central core, around the Rhine-Saône axis: northern Italy, western Germany, the Low Countries, Switzerland, and France. It was here that the new state found willing servants, here that its institutions took root. Beyond, be it in the Italian Mezzogiorno, the Prussia of the *junkers*, the Europe of Napoleon remained alien and hostile. This to say nothing of Britain or the vast tracts of eastern Europe and the Balkans, which never felt the impact of the Napoleonic revolution in government. In the core of the future European Union, however, Napoleon discovered and helped to mould the first generation of administrators with a truly European experience and vision. They came to know their continent intimately and implanted institutions and methods of government which have remained common to much of western Europe ever since.



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### 1. Bonaparte to the Council of State, 4 May 1802 (extract).

When Napoleon first took power in France, late in 1799, it was as part of a three man executive, the Consulate. Soon afterwards, he was declared 'First Consul', and began to marginalize the other leading politicians who had taken power with him. As First Consul he was entitled to election for ten-year terms in office. By 1802, he demanded he be made First Consul for life, but initially, he was opposed by the Senate and the Tribunate, two elected assemblies. This document is his speech to the Council of State, a body of experts and ministers Napoleon always had great faith in, and on which he continued to rely until he fell from power in 1814. Here, he sets out his reasons and plans for demanding the Consulship for life, which he took for himself at this time, but rightly insists that it is not a dictatorship of the army. Two years later, in 1804, he proclaimed himself Emperor of the French, a title he held for the rest of his rule.

*J'ai prédit à des militaires qui avaient quelques scrupules que jamais le gouvernement militaire ne prendrait en France, à moins que la nation ne fût abruti par cinquante ans d'ignorance. Toutes les tentatives échoueront, et leurs auteurs en seront victimes. Ce n'est pas comme général que je gouverne, mais parce que la nation croit que j'ai les qualités civiles propres au gouvernement; si elle n'avait pas cette opinion, le gouvernement ne se soutiendrait pas.*

*Il ne faut pas raisonner des siècles de barbarie aux temps actuels. Nous sommes trente millions d'hommes réunis par les lumières, la propriété et le commerce; trois ou quatre cent mille militaires ne sont rien auprès de cette masse. (...) Les soldats eux-mêmes ne sont que les enfants des citoyens. L'armée, c'est la nation.*

I have forewarned several dependable soldiers, that there will never be a military government in France, unless the Nation were to lose its reason for fifty years. Any such attempt would fail, and their authors would become the victims of them. I do not govern as a general, but because the nation believes I have the qualities a civilian needs for government; if it did not believe this, the government could not survive.

One must not apply the thinking of centuries of barbarism to our own times. We are thirty million men, united by intelligence, property and business. Three or four hundred thousand troops are nothing beside this mass of people ... The troops themselves are but the sons of citizens. The army is the nation.

### 2. Napoleon's Coronation Oath, as Emperor of the French, 2 December 1804.

Napoleon proclaimed himself emperor in 1804, following a mass plebiscite of doubtful integrity, such as those which preceded his elections as Consul and Consul for life. He had argued that a monarchical title was necessary for a French head of state, in order to deal with the other European powers on equal terms. On 2 December, 1804, having brought Pope Pius VII to Paris to preside over the ceremony, in the cathedral of Notre Dame, Napoleon crowned first himself, and then his wife, Josephine, 'Emperor' and 'Empress' of the French, thereby 'entrusting the Republic to an hereditary dynasty'. The ceremony was about tradition, but the coronation oath stressed the new regime's roots in the French Revolution:

*L'Empereur, assis, la couronne sur la tête et la main levée sur l'Évangile, a prononcé le serment en ces termes:*

*Je jure de maintenir l'intégrité du territoire de la République; de respecter et de faire respecter les lois du concordat et la liberté des cultes; de respecter et de faire respecter l'égalité des droits, la liberté politique et civile, l'irrévocabilité des ventes des biens nationaux; de ne lever aucun impôt, de n'établir aucune taxe qu'en vertu de la loi; de maintenir l'institution de la Légion d'honneur; de gouverner dans la seule vue de l'intérêt, du bonheur et de la gloire du Peuple français.*

The Emperor, seated, the crown on his head and his hand on the Bible, swore in the following terms:

I swear to maintain the integrity of the territory of the Republic, to respect and to make respected, the terms of the Concordat, freedom of religion, equality before the law, civil and political liberty, the irrevocability of the sold national lands; neither to levy nor to introduce any taxes save according to the law; to sustain the institution of the Legion of Honour; to govern only in the interests, well being and glory of the French people.

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**SEE PLATES 5, 6**

# Belgium and the Flemish Movement. From Centralised Francophone State to Multilingual Federation (1830-2000)

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Toen België in 1830 ontstond, sprak iets meer dan de helft van de Belgische burgers uitsluitend een Vlaams dialect. Hoewel de taalvrijheid constitutioneel verankerd was, werd het Frans de facto de enige staatstaal. Het economische zwaartepunt van het nieuwe land lag immers bij de zware industrie van het Franstalige zuiden en al sinds de Middeleeuwen sprak de Vlaamse elite Frans. Vanaf 1830 kwam er een trage, maar gestage verfransing van het openbare leven in Vlaanderen op gang. In Brussel was er een radicale breuk. De rechtspleging werd er onmiddellijk na 1830 volledig verfranst en dit gold waarschijnlijk ook voor het bestuur. Zelfs het lager onderwijs verfransde er, iets wat in Vlaanderen nooit zou gebeuren.

Tegen deze achtergrond ontstond de Vlaamse beweging. Het was oorspronkelijk een Belgisch-nationalistische reactie van de kleine burgerij tegen de verfransing. Aanwankelijk hielden de flaminganten zich enkel bezig met Vlaamse folklore, geschiedenis en literatuur. In de periode 1840-1860 raakte de Vlaamse beweging meer en meer geïnteresseerd in politiek en probeerde ze wettelijke taalhervormingen af te dwingen. Na enkele mislukte pogingen om een onafhankelijke Vlaamse partij of drukingsgroep op te richten, trachtten de Vlaamsgezinden vanaf de jaren 1870 hun doelstellingen te verwezenlijken binnen de bestaande partijen. Tussen 1872 en 1894 was het Vlaamse vraagstuk nauwelijks een politieke factor van belang, maar dit veranderde geleidelijk tijdens de twee laatste decennia vóór de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Cruciaal was de vervanging van het cijsnstemrecht door het algemeen meervoudig mannelijk stemrecht in 1893. De machthebbers moesten nu ook rekening houden met het Fransonkundige electoraat in Vlaanderen. Daarenboven begon Vlaanderen langzaam aan een economische inhaalbeweging: Kempense steenkool werd ontdekt, de haven van Antwerpen groeide en er ontstond een klasse van bewust Vlaamse ondernemers. Daarnaast kende de tertiaire sector een grote uitbreiding dankzij de modernisering en bureaucratisering van de staat.

Het grote strijdpunt van de Vlaamse beweging voor 1914 was de vernederlandsing van de Gentse universiteit. Die flamingantische eis werd werkelijkheid tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Duitsland wilde België van binnenuit vernietigen via de Vlamingen, maar slechts een klein deel van de bevolking stortte zich in de collaboratie (de zgn. activisten). De Vlaamse beweging kwam danig verzwakt uit de oorlog. Ze had niet alleen af te rekenen met een golf van chauvinisme, maar kreeg ook het odium op zich geladen van het activisme. Daarenboven raakte ze blijvend verdeeld tussen anti-Belgische Vlaams-nationalisten en de zgn. minimalisten die streefden naar de officiële eentaligheid van Vlaanderen binnen België. Niettemin werd het minimumprogramma gerealiseerd tijdens de jaren 30, maar dit kon de radicale Vlaams-nationalisten niet verminderen. Zij evolueerden naar extreem-rechts en collaboreerden

*met Duitsland tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Opnieuw was de Vlaamse beweging in diskrediet gebracht en het zou jaren duren voor ze deze klap te boven kwam. De koningskwestie, de staking tegen de Eenheidswet en de ongelijke demografische en economische ontwikkeling van Vlaanderen en Wallonië scherpten de communautaire tegenstellingen aan. Om die af te zwakken werd het unitaire België vanaf 1970 omgevormd tot een federale staat.*



Present-day Belgium is a multilingual country with 10 million inhabitants, who speak one of three languages: Dutch, French or German. Nowadays these language communities occupy relatively monolingual territories: Dutch is spoken in Flanders (by around 6 million people) <sup>1</sup>, French in Wallonia (by 4 million),

and German in the eastern-most part of Belgium (by 50.000) (Fig. 1). The only exception to the homogeneous language territories is the Belgian capital, Brussels. The city is situated in Flanders, but speakers of Dutch and French live side by side: 10-20% of Belgian citizens in Brussels speak Dutch, 80-90% French <sup>2</sup>. This has, however, not always been the linguistic division of the country.

When Belgium was founded in 1830, French became the exclusive language of state, although a majority of people spoke one of the many Flemish dialects used in the country. Subsequently, a language conflict arose. This linguistic struggle has been very prominent in Belgian politics ever since World War I. Periodically relations between the Flemish and francophone communities have been very tense, but the language struggle has never turned violent: civil war or nationalist terrorism is unknown to Belgium.

In 1794, France annexed the Southern Netherlands (now known as 'Belgium') <sup>3</sup>. A language border, part of the old linguistic frontier between the Germanic and the Romance languages, ran right through the territory. In the northern part of the region, people spoke a wide variety of Flemish dialects of Dutch; to the south Walloon variants of French were the vernacular. Besides this territorial division there was also a social language border. In the Dutch-speaking north, the upper classes (totalling 3% of the population outside Brussels in 1846) were francophone. Ever since the Middle Ages, the aristocracy and the episcopate had spoken French, which over time had become the language of all 'civilised' conversation. Yet, this had little impact on state institutions until modern times. In the *ancien régime*, the people were generally governed in their own language.

A special case was Brussels. Situated at the heart of the Flemish-speaking north, it had been the capital of the Southern Netherlands since the end of the 14th century, when the dukes of Burgundy had introduced French at their court in Brussels. This had attracted a French speaking élite to the capital. But francophones remained a minority in Brussels during recent times: 5-10% of the total population in 1760, 15% in 1780, and 25% in 1821.

The French were the first to enact an official language policy in the Southern Netherlands, as during the period when the region was under their control (1795-1814), French became the exclusive language of state. All local dialects had to disappear for the greater good of





**Fig. 1**

Present day Belgium, its regions and language areas (or communities).

From: Deprez K. and Vos L., "Introduction", in Deprez K. and Vos L. (eds.), *Nationalism in Belgium. Shifting Identities, 1780-1995*, London 1998, p. 14.

'Progress', the Republic or the Empire. This effort to change the common people's language failed due to a lack of funds (there was, for instance, no primary school system), but in the administration and the judiciary, French replaced Dutch.

Between 1815, after Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo, and 1830, 'Belgium' and Holland formed the United Kingdom of the Netherlands. King William I chose Dutch as language of state and it was progressively introduced in the schools, the administration and the judiciary of the Dutch-speaking provinces of 'Belgium'. On the whole, the francophone aristocratic elite and the bourgeois governing classes were hardly bothered by William's language policy. More irritating to them were his religious and economic plans. They became so dissatisfied with the Dutch rule that in 1830 the Belgian revolution broke out.

The new unitary state was founded on the principle of liberty. At the time, Belgium boasted one of the most liberal constitutions in the world, guaranteeing the citizens freedom of language, press, religion and association. Suffrage was, however, limited to 1.1% of the population in 1831 (depending on the taxes one paid) and the linguistic freedom was, in fact, only theoretical. Although the inhabitants of Flanders numbered 56% of the Belgian population, of whom 95% used a Flemish dialect exclusively, French became the sole language of state (see the decree of 16 November 1830 by the Provisional Government of Belgium).

This was not surprising, considering that the new men in power, whatever side of the language border they came from, all belonged to the French-speaking *haute bourgeoisie*. Moreover, there was no 'Flemish' standard language and the young state was unwilling to adopt Dutch since it was associated with the despised William I. French was the language of culture, social mobility and national unity.

For this reason, from 1830 onwards, state institutions and public life in Flanders slowly, though consistently, turned francophone, but the great majority of people kept speaking their maternal language. Only in the larger cities the use of French spread. In Antwerp and Ghent respectively, 1.9% and 5% of the inhabitants were francophone in 1846, while these numbers had risen to 8% in both cities in 1910. In Brussels, however, there was a radical rupture in 1830. The judiciary and the administration instantly switched to French, and the population followed this trend because of social pressures. While in 1846 38.4% of the inhabitants of the capital spoke French, this figure had jumped to 50.5% in 1910.

This linguistic evolution coincided with the economic decline of Flanders. Tens of thousands of Flemings migrated to Wallonia, which was industrialising at the time, and they were put to work in the most menial trades. For this reason, the Flemish dialects became progressively associated with poverty and backwardness. The uneven economic development in the 19th century (with Wallonia industrialising and Flanders remaining predominantly rural) had major political repercussions. In Flanders, the church and the catholic party had a firm grip on society. On the other side of the language border the Liberal Party and (from the end of the 19th century on) socialism held sway.

Against this background the Flemish movement arose. From 1835 onwards Flemish associations were founded in all major towns in Flanders, they were called 'flamingants'. Their members were literate men and men of science who wanted to cultivate their mother tongue, Flemish literature, custom and history. The new movement was originally Belgian-nationalist: it supported Belgian independence and believed in the principles of the Belgian Revolution – this would change at the end of the 19th century. It also had a religious background: Belgium needed a healthy Dutch-speaking population to protect its independence against France and its loose, atheist morals. The flamingants were urban petty-bourgeois (teachers, lower civil servants, professionals) who, lacking the necessary funds, did not have the right to vote, and were thwarted in their upward mobility by the more powerful and richer French-speaking political élite.

In its first and philological phase, the Flemish movement was barely concerned with politics and concentrated on linguistic and literary issues. First of all, the flamingants needed a unified standard language to convince their francophone compatriots that their mother tongue was respectable. In 1844, their campaign resulted in a royal decree standardising Dutch spelling in Belgium. Gradually, the movement became more political in its orientation. In 1855, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Belgian revolution, some newspapers criticised the discrimination against the Dutch language. The government had a commission look into the grievances. When it published its report in 1859, demanding a certain degree of bilingualism in Flanders, the government immediately issued a counter report. It called the Flemish demands "ridiculous exaggerations". The government, or so it appeared, was sympathetic to the Flemish movement as long as it concentrated on Flemish folklore and did not question the monopoly of French. Finally, it dawned upon the flamin-

gants that, if they wanted to get something done, they would have to gain political influence and power.

The most obvious way to achieve some reforms was to found a flamingant political party. But all attempts in this direction were unsuccessful (only after World War I a flamingant, by then a nationalist party, was founded). Flamingants had to work within the two existing parties: the Catholic or Liberal Parties. They were successful at this. In some urban constituencies of Flanders the electoral backing for both parties was of comparable size. Because of the majority system, a small group of voters, such as the flamingants, could decide national elections. Consequently, in Ghent and Antwerp they got their own representatives on the ballot.

Thanks to this electoral influence, the first language law, dealing with criminal justice, was voted in 1873. From now on, Flemings could no longer be sentenced in French, although the law was never applied in Brussels. In the wake of this first success, a second language law was passed in 1878, stipulating that the public services in Flanders had to use Dutch in a limited number of cases. Although some flamingants thought that the law did not go far enough, it stimulated administrations of small municipalities to switch to Dutch, but the central state services kept using French exclusively.

Not everyone welcomed these language acts, and therefore the Walloon movement was founded in the 1880s<sup>4</sup>. Francophone civil servants and officials organised themselves in 'societies' to fight every measure to introduce Dutch in state administration. Before World War I the Walloon movement had little popular support except for among well-off liberals.

In the late 19th century, the Flemish movement got more political leverage. After 1893, the government was forced to accept Dutch as a public language in certain situations. In that year, universal plural male suffrage was introduced (each man could have several votes depending on income and family status). The number of voters multiplied tenfold, or to 1,370,687, and a year later 27 socialists and some catholic workers' representatives were elected to Parliament for the first time. Some of these new members of parliament did not understand French, so to ensure that all could participate in parliamentary activity, Dutch was accepted as a legal language in 1898. Moreover, the parties now had to court the ordinary public. Consequently, Dutch was increasingly used in the public sphere.

This did not give the Flemish movement a mass support, because it still lacked a social, emancipatory programme. In spite of the fact that the extension of the vote had stimulated linguistic legislation after 1893, the Flemish movement had never campaigned for universal suffrage. Since 1883, it had concentrated on Dutch secondary education for the petty bourgeoisie. If highly qualified speakers of Dutch entered public life, flamingants reasoned, language acts would not be sabotaged. At the turn of the century, they turned their attention to universities and to the development of a Flemish business class. This development owed much to the economic evolution of Flanders. In the two decades leading to the World War I, coal deposits were discovered in Flanders and the harbour of Antwerp expanded. At the same time, the tertiary sector grew thanks to the modernisation and bureaucratisation of the state. A growing number of Flemish civil servants and clerks were confronted with language discrimination and supported the flamingant cause.

Within the Flemish movement there was no consensus about the practical form of a vernacular university. Some wanted to found a new exclusively Dutch university, others wanted to 'Dutchify' the already existing state university of Ghent. Whether this meant introducing Dutch alongside French or excluding the use of French in the university, was a hotly debated question. This discussion was reflected in the vague ideas about Flanders' linguistic outlook. It was still unclear whether the Flemish movement would stop at an officially bilingual Flanders or would proceed towards linguistic homogeneity.

On the eve of World War I, dissatisfaction, sometimes bordering on anti-Belgian sentiments, had appeared within the Flemish movement for a number of reasons. First of all, there was a growing frustration and irritation over the slow progress of linguistic legislation. For instance, although a campaign started immediately after 1883, it was only in 1910 that a language law on secondary catholic education was passed. Second, the government, the francophone political élite, and the Walloon movement stalled the symbolically very important issue of a vernacular university. Third, the limited application of the language laws in Brussels and within the central state services had become an eternal complaint of flamingants. World War I would radicalise some of them.

From 1914 to 1918 Belgium was an occupied territory <sup>5</sup>. Through their 'Flamenpolitik', the Germans gave Flemings a preferential treatment to Walloons, creating, for instance, the long awaited Flemish university in Ghent. The German aim was to use the 'activists', i.e. the small group of Flemish collaborators, to destroy Belgium from within. The large majority of Flemings was, however, convinced that the solution of all pending problems, including the language question, had to wait until the end of the war and the restoration of the lawful Belgian government.

After the war, Belgium was a transformed country. The principle 'one man, one vote' (women did not get the vote until 1948) was introduced, but the language question was not solved in such radical manner. On the contrary, the 'activist' collaboration had set back the Flemish cause several years. The 'activists' were punished and all flamingants, even those who had remained loyal to Belgium, were under suspicion. This anti-Flemish atmosphere gave birth to the idea that the whole population of Flanders was being victimised. Ultimately, while immediately after the war activism had been unanimously rejected, many excused it. Amnesty for those who had been sentenced for collaborating during the war, became a central demand of the entire Flemish movement during the interwar period.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the Flemish movement became permanently divided between nationalists and flamingants. On the one hand, there was the anti-Belgian Front Party, the first Flemish nationalist party to emerge. It originated in the Front Movement, founded during the war by soldiers in the trenches in response to the discrimination of Flemish soldiers by francophone officers in the Belgian army. The Front Party campaigned for autonomy in Flanders. On the other hand, there were the 'minimalists', supporters of the so-called 'minimum programme'. They still believed in a unified Belgian state structure, but wanted a linguistically homogeneous Dutch Flanders: no French in the administration, the judiciary or the education system. It is generally agreed that Christian Democracy became the driving force behind this programme and that owing to its efforts the Flemish movement became a mass movement.

During the 1920s the Flemish movement could not, however, deliver on its minimum programme. The language acts of this period took the presence of a francophone minority for granted and sanctioned bilingualism in Flanders. For instance, in 1923 Dutch was partly introduced at the state university of Ghent: students could choose between the so-called French system (two-thirds of all courses in French, one-third in Dutch) and the Flemish system (two-thirds of all courses in Dutch, one-third in French). This greatly disappointed people on both sides of the debates: francophones and the Walloon Movement considered the introduction of Dutch, a language that they deemed to be without any scientific merit, an act of sacrilege, while the Flemish movement lamented that it still did not have a vernacular university using only Dutch.

The general elections in 1929 were a turning point. The Front Party, which until then had only had a marginal status in Belgian politics, shocked the Belgian establishment by rallying 11.6% of the vote in Flanders. This was merely a symptom of a broader dissatisfaction in Flemish society and of a newly found confidence. For the great majority of people in Flanders it had become clear that Dutch had to be the sole official language in Flanders. On top of that, after the Great War the economic and industrial development of Flanders had really taken off thanks to the harbour of Antwerp, the exploitation of coal mines and the increased importance of a service economy. A Flemish industrial bourgeoisie was formed, which wanted to loosen the firm grip of the Brussels high finance on the Belgian economy.

During the 1930s Dutch became the official language of Ghent University, the Flemish administration, the judiciary and the education system. This breakthrough was possible because the Walloon movement and the majority of Walloon politicians had given up their defence of the francophone minority in Flanders. They feared that bilingualism, which they abhorred, would be introduced in Wallonia if they insisted on a bilingual Flanders. Several problems remained, however. In Brussels, the language laws were systematically sabotaged and as a result of social pressures, Dutch became a minority language in the capital. The precise course of the language border between Flanders and Wallonia was also a cause of disagreement.

The Flemish nationalists rejected the linguistic legislation of the 1930s, because their central aim was the destruction of Belgium, blaming it for every conceivable problem. This anti-Belgian tendency became infused with anti-democratic and fascist ideologies. At the end of the 1930s the Flemish National League, which had replaced the Front Party as the most important Flemish nationalist party, had secret contacts with the Nazi government in preparing for a new war. It came, therefore, as no surprise that they collaborated with the Nazis in World War II and accepted national-socialist doctrine. This collaboration set back the Flemish movement after the war. History had repeated itself <sup>6</sup>.

The punishment of collaborators after World War II was more thorough than that of the 'activists' after the First World War. Flemings were not punished more severely or in greater numbers than francophones. However, relatively more supporters of the Flemish movement were punished because – undoubtedly – Flemish nationalists had collaborated, but also because the entire Flemish movement was tainted by the collaboration <sup>7</sup>.

Thanks to the support of the catholic pillar, the Flemish movement re-emerged in public life. Two events, marking the growing friction between the language groups, were central to this

evolution. First, there was the royal question. King Leopold III had vacillated between collaboration and resistance during the war and was unwilling to denounce his wartime course. For that reason, widespread protests against his return to the throne were heard. Support for the king mainly came from Flanders, where the Catholic Party held the majority, but opposition from Wallonia, where socialists ruled. In 1950, a referendum showed that 72% of all Flemings supported Leopold, while 58% of all Walloons rejected his return. Belgium was on the verge of a civil war. Eventually Leopold abdicated, which caused a trauma to the Flemish Catholics. They felt that the Walloons had ignored the Flemish people's voice.

The Flemish movement gained strength from this feeling, but also from the economic development. After the war, Walloon heavy industry suffered a major crisis, while new industries began to flourish in Flanders. In the winter of 1960-61, for the second time in one decade, a major difference of opinion between Wallonia and Flanders surfaced. The unease about the recession culminated in a great strike directed against the economic measures of the government. The strike was general in Wallonia, but limited in Flanders. The Walloon movement, fearing that the demographic increase in Flanders would inevitably lead to a Flemish stranglehold on the state, began to press for the transformation of Belgium into a federal state. In the future, Wallonia would try to reinvigorate its economy without interference of Flanders.

Meanwhile, the Flemish nationalists had also resurfaced. In 1955, the People's Union was founded. Its program focused on federalism and amnesty for collaborators. The People's Union, though democratic, never unequivocally condemned collaboration with the Nazis in the war. To a large extent it supported the myth that the Flemish collaborators in World War II had only been punished for their love of Flanders by a vengeful Belgian state, and not because of their wholehearted support of a criminal fascist system. As a result, the amnesty debate is still very much alive in Flanders and is exploited by parties of the extreme right <sup>8</sup>.

The reinvigoration of the Flemish movement by the economic growth, the rise of a Flemish nationalist party and the radicalisation of the Walloon movement, contributed to the solution of two pre-war problems. In 1962-63, speakers of Dutch were given legal protection in Brussels and the language borders were legally fixed. In spite of some opposition, primarily from the world of the high finance in Brussels and the royal court, the Belgian centralised, unitary state was gradually transformed into a federal state from 1970 onwards. Brussels is the key to the complex federal structure of Belgium. With its francophone majority, the capital lies in the heart of Flanders and claims its own distinct identity. Hence, a dual federalism with Flanders and Wallonia as opposing partners, is out of the question. Federalism with three sub-states is, however, equally controversial, because both Flemish and Walloon politicians consider Brussels to be an integral part of their respective communities. As a compromise, there are now three constitutional *communities* in Belgium (the Flemish, the French and the German communities) and three *regions* (Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia) with distinct authorities <sup>9</sup>.

Currently, Flemish politicians are generally in favour of a more thorough devolution, with even more competences, like social security and taxes, moving from the central state to the regions and communities. Walloon politicians resist further devolution, for fear of having

to shoulder the consequences of Wallonia's economic crisis on their own. The outcome of this devolution process will depend on the interplay between economic development and (national) identity politics. As the past shows us, these have been and will continue to be the force behind the national movements in Belgium.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> People are often confused as to what language is spoken in Flanders. Flemish relates to Dutch as American English to British English. Flemish does not exist as a standard language; there are only Flemish variants of Dutch, the common language of the Netherlands and Flanders. For more information see: Deprez K., *The language of the Flemings*, in: Deprez K., Vos L. (eds.), *Nationalism in Belgium. Shifting identities, 1780-1995*, London 1998, pp. 96-109.
- <sup>2</sup> Since 1947 there has not been any official language census in Belgium, so all figures are rough estimates. Moreover, one third of the Brussels population is not of Belgian nationality (280,000 on a total of 950,000 inhabitants in 1994). Roughly a third of these foreigners speak French. The others speak one of a variety of languages: Turkish, Arab, Greek, etc.
- <sup>3</sup> For Belgium's language history prior to 1794 see: Deprez K., Vos L. *Introduction*, in: Deprez K. and Vos L. (eds.), *Nationalism*, pp. 3-6; Roegiers J., *Belgian liberties and loyalty to the House of Austria*, *ibid.*, pp. 23-32.
- <sup>4</sup> For more information on the Walloon movement see Kesteloot C., *The growth of the Walloon movement*, in: Deprez K., Vos L. (eds.), *Nationalism*, pp. 139-152.
- <sup>5</sup> For Germany's policy towards Belgium during World War I see: Dolderer W., *Deutscher Imperialismus und belgischer Nationalitätenkonflikt. Die Rezeption der Flamenfrage in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit und deutsch-flämische Kontakte 1890-1920*, (Kasseler Forschungen zur Zeitgeschichte, nr. 7), Melsungen 1989.
- <sup>6</sup> For a more thorough analysis of World War II and the post-war period see: Wils L., *Introduction: a brief history of the Flemish movement*, in: Hermans T., Vos L., Wils L. (eds.), *The Flemish movement: a documentary history, 1780-1990*, London 1992, pp. 24-39.
- <sup>7</sup> Investigations were conducted into the acts of more than 400,000 people. 57,000 were brought to court, of which nearly 56,000 were sentenced. 3,000 were sentenced to death, but only 242 were actually executed. The rest was sentenced to prison, more than half of them for less than 5 years. In 1950 only 2,500 were still in prison, the rest had been pardoned. Besides this, some 40,000 Belgians lost their civil rights, while others suffered popular repression at the end of the war.
- <sup>8</sup> As in the interwar period the successes of linguistic legislation and devolution could not appease the most radical Flemish nationalists. In 1978 the Flemish Block broke away from the People's Union. This party is the immediate heir of the interwar nationalists. It is anti-Belgian and xenophobic. At the last general elections in 1999 it got 13% of the vote in Flanders.
- <sup>9</sup> See for more information: Falter R., *Belgium's peculiar way to federalism*, in: Deprez K., Vos L. (eds.), *Nationalism*, pp. 177-197.



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## SOURCES

Decree of 16 November 1830 by the Provisional Government of Belgium

Original text in French

*Le Gouvernement provisoire,*

*Considérant que le principe déjà proclamé de la liberté du langage, emporte pour chaque citoyen la faculté de se servir de l'idiome qui convient le mieux à ses intérêts ou à ses habitudes;*

*Et voulant régulariser l'exercice de cette faculté, pour la mettre en harmonie avec le service des administrations générales et des tribunaux;*

*Considérant d'autre part que les langues flamande et allemande, en usage parmi les habitants de certaines localités, varient de province à province, et quelquefois de district, de sorte qu'il serait impossible de publier un texte officiel de lois et arrêtés en langue flamande et allemande.*

*Arrête:*

*Art. 1. Le bulletin officiel des lois et actes du gouvernement sera publié en français.*

*2. Dans les provinces, où la langue flamande ou allemande est en usage parmi les habitants, les gouverneurs publieront dans leur mémorial administratif une traduction flamande ou allemande des lois et actes du gouvernement qui seraient applicables à toute la Belgique, et des actes particuliers qui ne concerneraient que leur province.*

*3. Cette traduction sera publiée dans le plus prochain numéro du mémorial administratif, et, s'il y a urgence, elle le sera dans un numéro spécialement destiné à cet effet.*

*4. Les publications par affiches seront également accompagnées d'une traduction en langue flamande ou allemande, suivant les localités.*

*5. Les citoyens dans leurs rapports avec l'administration, sont autorisés à se servir indifféremment de la langue française, flamande ou allemande.*

*6. Il en sera de même dans leurs rapports avec les tribunaux ou les officiers du parquet, pourvu que la langue dont ils veulent faire usage, soit comprise des juges et des avocats plaidants en matière civile; et en matière pénale, des juges, du ministère public et de leur défenseur.*

*7. Le comité de l'intérieur est chargé de l'exécution du présent arrêté.*

*Bruxelles, le 16 Novembre 1830.*



*Les Membres du Comité central*

(Signé) Comte Félix de Mérode.

Ch. Rogier.

A. Gendebien

Par ordonnance,

Le Secrétaire,

(signé) J. VanderLinden.

From: Coopman T., Broeckaert J., *Bibliographie van den Vlaamschen Taalstrijd. Eerste deel 1787-1844*, Gent 1904, p. 96.

The Provisional Government,

Considering that the principle of freedom of language, already announced, means that every citizen has the right to avail himself of the language which best suits his interests and his habits;

And wishing to regulate the exercise of this right, so as to bring it into harmony with the services of the general administration and the tribunals;

Considering, on the other hand, that the Flemish and the German languages, in use among the inhabitants of certain places, differ from one province to another, and sometimes from one district to another, rendering it impossible to publish an official text of laws and decrees in Flemish and German;

Decrees:

Art. 1. The official bulletin of laws and acts of government is to be published in French.

2. In those provinces where the Flemish or the German language is in use among the inhabitants the provincial governors will publish in their administrative memorials a Flemish or German translation of the laws and acts of government which apply to the whole of Belgium, and of the special acts which concern only their province.

3. This translation will be published in the immediately following issue of the administrative memorial or, if urgency requires it, in a separate issue published specially for this purpose.

4. Publications in the form of billboards will likewise be accompanied by a Flemish or German translation, depending on the area.

5. In their dealings with the administrative services the citizens are entitled to use French, Flemish or German, without distinction.

6. This will also be the case in their dealings with tribunals or with officers of the court, provided that the language they wish to use be understood by the judges and counsel, in civil cases, and, in penal cases, by the judges, the Public Prosecutor and counsel for the defence.

7. The Committee of the Interior is charged with the execution of this decree.

Brussels, the 16th of November 1830.

The Members of the Central Committee:

Count Felix de Mérode

Ch. Rogier

A. Gendebienx

From: Hermans T., Vos L., Wils L. (eds.), *The Flemish movement: a documentary history, 1780-1990*, London 1992, pp. 71-72.



# The Nordic Area: from Competition to Cooperation

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Ýmsir málsmetandi stjórnmálamenn á Norðurlöndum lögðu til á 19. öld að öll Norðurlöndin mynduðu eina heild, undir stjórn eins konungs. Þessar hugmyndir sóttu innblástur í vinsælar kenningar um miðja öldina um samstarf skyldra þjóða, s.s. “pan-slavisma” og “pan-germanisma”. Helsta ástæðan var þó sú að Danir og Svíar, hinum fornu stórveldum, Norðurlandanna þótti að sér þrengt frá stórveldum í suðri – Þjóðverjum – og í austri – Rússum – og betra væri fyrir því fyrir þá að vinna saman til að standast þá ógn en hver í sínu lagi. Á endanum sundruðust konungsríkin þó upp í fimm þjóðríki frekar en að þau rynnu saman í eina sæng. Ástæðurnar voru margar, en mestu máli skeipti að þjóðernisstefna þjóðanna fimm gerði þeim ókleift að mynda saman eitt ríki. Segja má þó að hugsjónir skandinavismans hafi lifað áfram í náinni samvinnu Norðurlandþjóðanna á sviði menningar og samfélagsmála, bæði með formlegu samstarfi í Norðurlandaráði og óformlegri samvinnu ýmissa félagsamtaka og fræðimanna. Mikil eining hefur ríkt um mikilvægi þessa samstarfs fyrir Norðurlöndin, en það sem hefur einkennt það alla tíð er sterk áhersla á pólitískt sjálfstæði ríkjanna og sú skoðun Norðurlöndin séu of þröngur vettvangur fyrir að efnahagslega og hernaðarlega samvinnu þeirra.




On January 11, 1863, the Danish minister of education and religious affairs, D. G. Monrad, visited the Swedish envoy in Copenhagen, Henning Hamilton. During their meeting, the Danish minister presented his future vision of Scandinavia, at a very uncertain juncture in Danish history. Under pressure from

Germany, Denmark had only three alternatives, he argued: first, to reestablish the absolute monarchy in Denmark, keeping the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein under the Danish crown; second, to go to war with Prussia over the duchies with very uncertain outcome; or, third, to construct a federate Scandinavian state, uniting the crowns of Sweden, Norway and Denmark under the Swedish king Carl XV. Monrad preferred the third option, because a united Scandinavian state, with integrated armed forces, unified diplomatic service, and one parliamentary system, would stand a much better chance in its transactions with unified Germany than Denmark could on its own <sup>1</sup>.

The Swedish response to this idea was guarded, if not entirely negative, because the Swedish authorities were not eager to get embroiled in a Danish-Prussian conflict. “There is something rotten in the state of Denmark”, commented, for example, K.R.L. Manderström, the Swedish minister of foreign affairs, when he learned about Monrad’s suggestion. He advised his king to reject the offer, although Carl XV had long advocated union of the Scandinavian crowns under his own leadership, and the king duly complied with his minister’s recommendation.

Daring as it might sound, Monrad’s initiative was not without support in Scandinavia during the 19th century. Under the banner of the so-called “Scandinavism”, intellectuals had called for cultural unity and political cooperation among the Scandinavian peoples, building on both their common heritage and their need for security in an insecure world. Seeking their inspiration in European pan-nationalist ideas, such as pan-Slavism in Russia and the Balkans, and pan-Germanism in the German Confederation, Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian students and academics had organized to promote the Scandinavist ideals, often mixed with demands for liberal and constitutional reforms <sup>2</sup>.

Scandinavism reached its pinnacle in the 1840s, or in the years leading to the first war over Schleswig-Holstein in 1848, but more or less vanished after Denmark lost the duchies in its war with Prussia and Austria in 1864. Since then, forces of fragmentation have been much stronger than ideas of political integration in the Nordic region; thus, rather than forming one Nordic empire, the two Scandinavian monarchies of the 18th century dissolved into five nation-states in the early 20th centuries. This development was driven by ethnic nationalism, which emphasized the cultural differences of the Nordic peoples rather than their similarities, but it never eradicated the Scandinavist desire for close relations of the independent Nordic states. Here I would like to examine these tendencies of consolidation and fragmentation in ‘Norden’ <sup>3</sup>, because they reflect similar trends in state forma-



**Fig.1**

Ditlev Gothard Monrad (1811–1887), Monrad served various ministerial posts 1849–1854 and 1859–1864. Monrad emigrated to New Zealand after the Danish defeat in the war over the duchies (1865), returning to Denmark in 1869.




tion in Europe during the 19th and early 20th centuries, at the same time as they were shaped by very particular conditions in this corner of the European continent.

## FROM IMPERIAL AMBITIONS TO ETHNIC NATIONALISM

In recent decades, the Nordic states have presented themselves – and have been perceived by others – as paradigms of peaceful regional cooperation and nonaggressive foreign policy. This has not always been case, however, as throughout most of the early modern period (1500-1800) the two traditional Scandinavian monarchies were locked into fierce competition for dominance on the Scandinavian peninsula and around the Baltic Sea. This bitter rivalry started for real in the early 16th century, when Sweden, under King Gustav Vasa, broke out of the union of the three Scandinavian crowns, originally formed in the late 14th century. In the beginning, the double monarchy of Denmark-Norway was much stronger of the two kingdoms, as it ruled an immense area in Scandinavia and spread around the North-Atlantic – including Norway, Iceland, the Faeroe Islands, the southern part of Sweden, and large parts of Schleswig-Holstein, in addition to the Danish isles and Jutland. Sweden grew, however, steadily in strength during the 16th and 17th centuries, constructing formidable army and fleet. During the late 16th and early 17th centuries, the Swedish monarchy expanded for the most part to the east, taking advantage of the relative weakness of Russia and Poland in this period. Thus, Finland, or at least its southern part, became an integral part of the Swedish monarchy in this period, and by the early 17th century, Sweden had conquered the area round the Gulf of Finland down to the south of the city Riga, capital of Latvia.

The new balance of power in Scandinavia became obvious in the 1640s and 50s, when Sweden had become one of the most aggressive military powers in Europe. Still fresh from its campaigns in the Thirty Years War, the Swedish army even set out to annihilate the Danish-Norwegian monarchy in 1658, and was only denied its price by an outside intervention. In fact, the Western European powers, with England and the Netherlands in the lead, opposed the Swedish expansion over the Sound, which would have given Sweden a total dominance over the traffic into the Baltic Sea. Denmark-Norway lost, however, extensive tracts of land in these years to Sweden, as the Swedish king annexed the old Danish provinces which form the southern tip of modern Sweden and three provinces on the borders with Norway.

The last episode in the armed rivalry between the Danish and Swedish kings took place during the Great Northern War of 1700-1721. The real adversaries in this long conflict were Peter the Great, tsar of Russia, and Carl XII, king of Sweden, but Danish involvement could not be avoided. One reason was the Swedish obsession to capture Norway, and Carl was, in fact, killed by one of his own soldiers in 1718 during the second of his two unsuccessful invasion of the country to the west. This was the swansong of Swedish militarism, because the rise of the Russian Empire ended all dreams of an expansion to the east. Moreover, military defeat in 1658 forced the Danish king to reorganize his administration, leading to the foundation of Danish absolutism in the 1660s. Sweden continued to be the stronger of the two monarchies, but thanks to more effective mobilization of its resources, Denmark was not as easy prey in the 18th century as it had been in the preceding century <sup>4</sup>.



**Fig. 2**  
These woodcuts, from Olaus Magnus's *Historia* (1555), describe the characteristic economic activity of each of the five Nordic Countries: Danish agriculture and Finland's forest industry (top), the Swedish mining industry and Icelandic fisheries (center) and Norway's fishing industry (bottom).

The Napoleonic Wars and their aftermath brought the fact home to the rulers of the two Scandinavian states that neither Sweden nor Denmark was any longer a major player on the European scene. To the east, Russia was the dominating power, occupying Finland in 1808-1809, and to the south, Prussia was an increasing threat to Denmark. At the same time, the English ruled the sea, appropriating most of the Danish-Norwegian fleet in an attack on Copenhagen in 1807. As the score was settled after the war, Sweden lost Finland to Russia, but was compensated by finally securing the Norwegian crown from Denmark. For both, this was a traumatic experience. The loss of Norway reduced Denmark to the status of a small peripheral state in Europe, cutting the strong ties that had linked Denmark and Norway through a union that lasted over four centuries. Moreover, for Sweden, gaining Norway did not fill the void that the loss of Finland had left in the monarchy, because the Swedish-Norwegian union never became very intimate. As the Norwegians opposed the union with Sweden, they guarded their autonomy and constitution with jealousy, resisting all attempts at integrating the Norwegian and Swedish administration into a uniform structure.

The Scandinavist ideals were, in part, a response to the political realities of the 19th century. By this time, the bitter rivalry between Denmark and Sweden had come to an end, because both monarchies were now under threat from aggressive neighbours with imperial ambitions. Thus, there were both political and military reasons for a close union between the two monarchies, because a united Scandinavia would have been better equipped to withstand outside pressure than either Denmark or Sweden-Norway would be on its own. There was also a strong cultural incentive for closer relations between the Scandinavian states, as differences between the Scandinavian languages (Swedish, Danish, and the various Norwegian dialects) were no greater than those between the dialects of many European national languages. For this reason, Scandinavian intellectuals often spoke of the 'Nordic spirit', although it was never entirely clear what they meant with this concept.

As it turned out, nationalism in the Nordic area did not lead to development similar to the unification of Germany or Italy, because it never overcame the separate identities of the different parts of the region. Many Swedes were suspicious of the Scandinavist ideals, calling them "Danish egoism, a foreign import in ancient Sweden, unrealizable, etc." <sup>5</sup>, and intellectuals in the dependent parts of the old monarchies claimed that the inhabitants of these regions formed separate nations rather than parts of a common Nordic national community. Norwegian nationalists looked to their history in arguing their case, as Norway had formed a separate monarchy in the Middle Ages. The nation had also expressed its will in 1814, when its representatives had convened in an assembly to adopt a separate constitution for Norway. The transfer to Sweden strengthened these sentiments, as the Swedish king had to accept the constitution of 1814, underlining the particular status of Norway in the union. Icelandic nationalism developed from a different premise, however, because Icelandic nationalists had much weaker historical arguments for their demands for a separate nation-state. To them, it was a distinctive culture that defined the nation: the people of Iceland spoke their own language, which many saw as the 'original' Scandinavian tongue, and had a unique literary heritage in the medieval sagas and eddic poetry, and therefore, the Icelandic nationalists argued, Icelanders formed a nation of their own, with all the political rights that come with a separate nationhood <sup>6</sup>. The development in 19th-century Finland was very similar, as Finnish intellectuals, most of whom were Swedish

speaking, sought their 'national spirit' in Finnish cultural traditions rather than in their Swedish past. Hence, for them the goal was not to reunify Finland with Sweden, but to form a Finnish state, independent from Russia as well as from Sweden.

The ethnic nationalists were always wary of the Scandinavianist ideals, as their goal was not to unify 'Norden' into one state but to form nation-states according to their own nationalist definitions. This is not to say that they opposed the general idea of Nordic fraternity, but the loyalty to the ethnic nation always had to come first. The Icelandic poet Steingrímur Thorsteinsson expressed this attitude towards Scandinavism in 1861, when he described it as an entirely harmless idea, "unless one renounces one's nationality and national rights and wants to turn Iceland into a pauper" <sup>7</sup> – that is, to become a member in the Nordic community, an Icelander had first to establish his national identity.

### FROM SCANDINAVISM TO COOPERATION OF INDEPENDENT STATES

At the end of the First World War, state formation in the Nordic region took on its final form. Norway had already left the union with Sweden in 1905 in a peaceful secession from Sweden, establishing a separate monarchy with a Danish prince as a king. In 1917, Finland declared its independence from Russia, founding a republic in 1919. Finally, Iceland became a sovereign state in 1918 in union with Denmark, sharing king and foreign service with its former mother country <sup>8</sup>.

Hence, the Scandinavianist dream of a united 'Norden' had been turned on its head – instead of seeking strength in a unified Scandinavia, the various population groups opted to retract into their own '*folkhem*' ('national/people's home'), to use a phrase coined in 1928 by the Swedish Social-Democrat Per Albin Hansson. The ideal of unity was not totally forgotten, however, as plans for cooperation between the Nordic peoples remained popular, at least among academics and intellectuals. The intellectual community of Nordic scholars and students was, perhaps, never stronger than around the beginning of the 20th century, because the educated understood each other with ease and had gone through similar social formation. At this time, Icelanders had, for example, to seek their university education in Denmark, and all Finnish academics spoke fluent Swedish. The 20th century was, therefore, not only a period of fragmentation in the Nordic region, but also one of greater cooperation among the Nordic states. As always, the need of closer collaboration grew out of insecurity, because in times of instability small states tend to look for allies to insure their existence. Thus, the first steps toward a closer unity of the Nordic states were taken in 1919, in the wake of the First World War, with the foundation of the so-called Nordic Societies. Their goal was to further cooperation and contacts between the various Nordic countries, in the hope that a new nightmare of war could be avoided. There were also numerous formal and informal channels of collaboration between Nordic officials, politicians, and intellectuals, intensifying in the difficult years leading up to the Second World War. One of the most tangible forms of Scandinavian economic cooperation came, however, to an end in the aftermath of the First World War, as the Scandinavian currency union, founded in 1875, faltered in 1924, at a difficult time in European monetary history.





**Fig.3**

The participants in a Danish-Swedish student meeting in 1895, photographed in Kronborg Castle in Helsingør.

The Nordic cooperation was, however, not fully formalized until after the catastrophic period of the World War II. Under Danish leadership, the Nordic Council was founded in 1952, with the participation of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Finland could only join the club in 1955 after the last Soviet soldiers had left the Finnish soil. The Nordic Council is a coordinating body of the five national parliaments, where Nordic parliamentarians meet and discuss issues of common interest for the citizens of their respective countries. This effort was intensified further in the early 1970s, with the foundation of the Nordic Council of Ministers in 1971, organizing regular meetings of Nordic ministers in different fields, and with the foundation of a permanent office of the Nordic Council in 1972.

We can see these efforts as part of the growing international cooperation in Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War, but Nordic collaboration took, however, a particular twist when compared with the history of European integration. Thus, attempts in the 1960s to construct a common economic market in 'Norden', under the name of NORDEK, were entirely unsuccessful. As a matter of fact, it became clear that it was more natural for the Nordic states to look towards Europe as a trading partner rather than isolating themselves behind protective tariff barriers. For this reason, all the Nordic countries entered European trade organizations, such as EEC and EFTA, in the 1960s and 1970s. In the same way, plans for a Nordic defense union came to nothing in 1949, when Denmark, Iceland, and Norway entered NATO, putting their trust in the American eagle rather than creating a pan-Nordic military force.

Nordic cooperation was, however, highly successful from the beginning in the fields of social and cultural affairs. In the interwar years, the ministers of social affairs had already begun to meet informally on a regular basis, making various non-binding agreements between the Nordic states. After the Second World War, this cooperation was formalized in more comprehensive treaties, and in 1955, the year that Finland entered the Nordic Council, these agreements were united into the Nordic Social Convention. Through this process, social legislations in various Nordic countries have become more similar, and the social rights of Nordic citizens are secured when they take up residence in another Nordic country. Closely related to the social convention was the creation of a common labor market and the Nordic passport union in 1954-1955, thus facilitating the free movement of people between the various Nordic states.

In recent decades, the Nordic countries have also developed intense cooperation in the fields of culture and education. The Nordic Council has, for example, created a number of awards for Nordic artists, in literature and music, in addition to the Nordic Environmental Award. The same can be said about educational cooperation, where the Nordic Council of Ministers has stimulated student and teacher mobility, in order to create a single educational area in the Nordic countries. The aim of these measures is, on the one hand, to strengthen the Nordic educational systems through cooperation, and, on the other, to encourage students to take part of their education in another Nordic country, thus providing young people with new opportunities to spend considerable time in a neighboring Nordic country.

All things considered, Nordic cooperation has been fairly limited, at least when compared with much more radical ideas of political integration on the European continent. It is clear that all the Nordic partners value their independence highly, and they have never seriously discussed merging their national sovereignty in their cooperative ventures. These attitudes have influenced the Nordic reaction to the European integration. Most Nordic countries have tended to drag their feet, if not to reject direct participation in the process. Denmark, the first of the Nordic countries to join the European Union (or, more exactly, the European Economic Community as it was called at the time), has, for example, been very reluctant to adopt measures which might seem to threaten the sovereignty of the state, or national symbols, such as their currency. Norway has, in the same manner, rejected membership twice in popular referenda, while Iceland has never seriously discussed even applying for membership. Since the end of the Cold War, Finland has been the most open to a close partnership with its European neighbors, perhaps because its proximity to the former Soviet Union has encouraged it to look for close partners on the continent.

## EUROPE OR 'NORDEN'

To conclude, the Nordic cooperative model has been based on a strong empathy and a sense of common identity, but has also been characterized by great reluctance to surrender any of the national sovereignty of the individual nation-states. Collaboration has been built on consensus, but also on aversion to homogenization. This has worked well so far, because the Nordic societies are remarkably similar, in spite of obvious linguistic diversity, differences in size and natural environments. Still, all five Nordic states trace their history back to only two administrative and legal traditions, that of Danish-Norwegian monarchy on the one hand, and that of Swedish monarchy on the other, and they all have been dominated for almost

half a millennium by Lutheran Protestant state churches. Moreover, political modernity in all five countries is founded on strong democratic traditions, which have their roots in the peasant societies of the 19th century. Finally, all of the Nordic countries have developed complex and comprehensive welfare systems, which, in spite of their differences in scope, are all based on the idea that citizens have rights to extensive assistance from the state, and that the state has the duty to level the social playing field, at least to a certain extent.

It is difficult to predict how the Nordic cooperation will fare in the future. It is clear that numerous obstacles lie ahead; now, for example, three of the five states (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) are members of the European Union, while the other two have opted to stay outside. This will lead to inevitable frictions, because when the members of the European Union have to select between a commitment to 'Europe' or to 'Norden' – that is, between European and Nordic interests – it is almost certain that they will be forced to choose the former. Increasing globalization also threatens the sense of common identity of the Nordic people, because as their horizon enlarges, they begin to look beyond their close neighbors for examples, paradigms, and partners.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> See A. Friis, *Skandinavismens Kulmination. Ministeriet Halls Planer om en nordisk Union forud for Udstedelsen af Marts-kungørelsen 1863*, Copenhagen 1936, pp. 13-16.
- <sup>2</sup> Å. Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige vid 1800-talets mitt (1843-1863)*, Gothenburg, 1946.
- <sup>3</sup> The Scandinavian term 'Norden' is used for the entire Nordic region – including Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden – in addition to the Faeroe Islands; Scandinavia refers primarily to Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.
- <sup>4</sup> See Ø. Rian, *Krigenes Norden 1523-1814*, in H.S. Nissen (ed.), *Nordens historie 1397-1997*, Copenhagen 1997, pp. 39-63.
- <sup>5</sup> Holmberg, *Skandinavismen* cit., p. 73.
- <sup>6</sup> See G. Hálfðanarson, *Icelandic Nationalism: A Non-Violent Paradigm?* in A.K. Isaacs and G. Hálfðanarson (eds.), *Nations and Nationalities in Historical Perspective*, Pisa 2001, pp. 1-13.
- <sup>7</sup> A letter to the leader of the Icelandic nationalist movement, Jón Sigurðsson, 30 March 1861. Quoted in A. Kristjánsson, *Nýfélagsrit og skáld fleirra*, "Skírnir" 2002, 176, p. 330.
- <sup>8</sup> T. Janson, *To riger bliver til fem nationstater – og flere nationer*, in Nissen (ed.), *Nordens historie* cit., pp. 65-97.



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## SOURCES

1. Th. Madsen-Mygdal, Prime-Minister of Denmark (1926-29), on Nordic cooperation.  
From: "Nationaltidende", 2 January 1929.

*Og denne [kulturelle] Samhørighed er saa udpræget, at den bliver opfattet af andre end os af os selv. Hvert enkelt af de nordiske Lande kan være nok saa godt kendt ude i den store Verden, vi oplever dog ofte, at det falder en Udlænding lettere at bruge den sammenfattende Betegnelse "Skandinavien" om alle de nordiske Lande, end at foretage den Søndering mellem de enkelte Lande, som vi naturligvis hver for sig har Krav paa, men som det ikke desto mindre har voldt Besvær for fremmede at foretage en korrekt Gennemførelse af.*

*Saa vel for en nordisk, som for en fremmed Opfattelse er Betegnelsen "Brødrefolk" om Nordens Folk baade sand og rigtig. Historien viser, at som Forholdet indenfor en Søkendeflok i Regelen er sterkt følelsesbetonet, saa har det altid været saaledes i det indbyrdes Forhold mellem Nordens Folk, at deres Venskab og Samarbejde har været lige saa varmt og naturligt, som Modsætningen og Striden til Tider har kunnet være bitter og hensynsløs. Men i de store og alvorlige Tider i den nordiske Folks Liv har altid Samfølelsen været sterk og levende. Det enkelte Folks Skæbne har baade i Modgang og Medgang været omfattet med en oprigtig Forstaaelse og Deltagelse fra Brødrefolkenes side.*

And this [cultural] solidarity is so evident that it is recognized by others besides ourselves. Each Nordic country may be quite well known throughout the wider world, but our experience shows that it is easier for foreigners to employ the generic term "Scandinavia" about all the Nordic countries than to distinguish between individual countries. Each of us may, of course, request to be looked at as a separate nation, but it remains, nonetheless, difficult for foreigners correctly to execute such distinction.

The use of the term "brother nations" for the Nordic peoples is both true and correct for a Nordic as well as a foreign understanding. History shows that relations between brothers and sisters are, as a rule, very emotional, and so have relations been between the Nordic nations. Their friendship and cooperation has been just as warm and natural as has their opposition and contention been, at times, bitter and disrespectful. The destiny of individual nations has, both in adversity and prosperity, been considered with real understanding and engagement by the brother nations.

2. Gro Harlem Brundtland, then prime minister of Norway.  
From: "Arbeiderbladet", 26 Januar 1995.

*Hvor går så veien videre for det nordiske samarbeidet? La oss ta utgangspunkt i det som forener oss, for det er mye.*

*Samarbeidet har oppslutning i alle nordiske land, ja, den er trolig større enn oppslutningen om europeisk integrasjon. Dette er et paradoks når vi vet at det nordiske samarbeidets største resultater stammer fra 1950-tallet. Men den nordiske tilhørigheten er følbar, den uttrykker seg hver gang vi krysser nordiske grenser uten pass. Det har med menneskelige kontakter, utstrakt handel og stor grad av felles identitet og kulturell tilhørighet å gjøre.*

*Dette skal vi fortsette med. Selv om det nå går en EU-grense gjennom Norden, er det ingen som ønsker at den frie ferdsel i verdens mest åpne region skal begrenses. Det vil være en belastning for det europeiske samarbeidets idé om deltakelse i EU skal lukke dører i Norden. Alle nordiske land har interesse av å forankre deltakelsen i europeisk samarbeid, enten det gjelder EU eller EØS, i en nordisk ramme. Det bringer nærmere hva mange opplever som fjernt. Likevel står vi overfor krevende oppgaver av såvel politisk som praktisk karakter. Hvordan kan vi finne tid og rom for samarbeid når tre land er med i det omfattende EU-samarbeidet? Hvordan kan vi kombinere samarbeid om nære nordiske saker med spørsmål på den europeiske dagsorden? Med utgangspunkt i samarbeidet mellom regjeringene vil jeg legge vekt på tre sentrale områder: Kultur og samfunnsutvikling, europeiske spørsmål og samarbeid med Nordens nærområder.*

Whither leads the road to Nordic cooperation? Let us begin with the things that unite us, because they are so many.

Nordic cooperation is supported in all the Nordic countries. Indeed, it probably enjoys wider support than European integration. This is a paradox when we consider that its greatest results came in the 1950s. But we sense this Nordic identity; it expresses itself whenever we cross Nordic borders without a passport. It relates to human contacts, extensive trade and a common identity and cultural solidarity.

We shall maintain all this. Even if the EU border divides the Nordic countries at present, no one wants to limit free movement inside the most open region in the world. It will be a hindrance to the idea of European cooperation if participation in the EU closes doors within the Nordic countries. It is important for all the Nordic countries to place participation in European cooperation, both in the European Union and the European Economic Area, inside a Nordic context. It will bring closer to us those things which many conceive as distant.

All the same, we are faced with demanding tasks both of a political and a practical nature. How shall we find time and space for cooperation when three countries have joined the extensive EU cooperation? How can we combine cooperation on Nordic issues with questions on the European agenda? Taking cooperation between governments as a point of departure, I should like to emphasize three central areas: culture, social development, and cooperation

with Nordic neighbours.



# The Baltic Question in the Twentieth Century: Historiographic Aspects

EERO MEDIJAINEN

University of Tartu

*Teaduslikud uurimused, dissertatsioonid, monograafiad, ajakirjad, artiklid ja samuti populaarteaduslikumad tutvustused, ülevaated, reisikirjeldused, mälestused, turistidele mõeldud kirjutised jne, mille pealkirjas või sisus esineb sõna Baltikum (Balti) saab eesmärkidelt ja tähenduselt klassifitseerida üsna erinevalt. Lihtsaim põhjus selle sõna kasutamiseks tuleneb geograafilisest alast (ruumist) või piirkonnast. Märksõnaga Balti tähistada ka ajalugu kõige üldisemas tähenduses ehk kõike, mis on mainitud ruumis aja jooksul juhtunud. Varjatult taandub niisugune lähenemisviis siiski poliitilisele ajaloole. Balti võib tähistada erinevaid tegevusalasid, inimesi, institutsioone, protesse, üksikisikuid jms, mis on kuidagi seotud tänapäeval eksisteerivate Balti riikidega ja seal juhtunuga.*

*Eraldi tuleks peatuda Baltikumi kui omaette regiooni mõiste arengul ning peamiselt viimast puudutaval historiograafial. Mõnikord võiks kahelda, kas näiteks uurimused, mis seostuvad nii või teisiti Balti merega ja tema ümber toimunuga ajas, on ikka ühtlasi Baltikumi ajalugu. Või on see pigem ja eelkõige kaubanduse, laevanduse, kalanduse jms merega seotud tegevuse ning sellise tegevuse mõnede eripärade ajalugu ühes konkreetsetes piirkonnas. Sel juhul pole reeglina kahtlust, mida mõeldakse Baltikumi all. See mõiste tähistab suuremaid sadamaid ja nende tagamaid (ka riike kui vähem olulisi tegureid), mis Balti- (Lääne- või mõnes piirkonna keeles ka Ida-) mere ja saartega.*

*Diskussioon teemal – mis ja miks moodustab Balti regiooni, algas juba I maailmasõja eel ja ajal. Samasse aega kuuluvad ka esimesed katsed nn uut Euroopat vähemalt mõttelise tervikuna kujundada ja neisse otsingutesse mahtusid plaanid tulevases Läti-Leedu, Suur-Sooime, Soome-Eesti ja Eesti-Läti-Sooime ning veelgi enam riike (rahvaid) ühendavate liitude otsingud, mõttelised konstruksioonid ja isegi konkreetsed tegevusplaanid niisuguste plaanide realiseerimiseks. Veel varasemad kavad XIX sajandist, näiteks Eesti-Sooime tulevasesst ühisriigist, jäid üksikute haritlaste unistuste ja kindlasti mitteametlikule tasandile.*

*Esimesed olulisemad uurimused Balti küsimuse teemadel rõhutasid, et probleemi näol on tegemist millegi enama kui vaid merega seotuga. Balti küsimuse ajaloo algust on otsitud ajast, mil need alad hakkasid mängima teatud rolli maailma asjades. 1970. aastate teisel poolel (taas)elavnes väljaspool annekteeritud Baltikumi teoreetiline arutelu teemal, mis ja miks moodustab selle regiooni. Arusaadavalt olid siin aktiivsemad Soome ja Saksamaa ajaloolased, kuigi ilmselt erinevatel põhjustel. Enamik ajaloolasi ja politolooge ei lepi tänapäeval ainult formaalsele ühisosale toetumisega ja seepärast võiks ühe suurema grupina eraldada uurimused, mis pühendatud just nimelt sisulise ühisosa, ühise ajaloo, isegi ühise*

*identiteedi otsimisele või koguni selle identiteedi kujundamise katsetele. Mõnigi kord viidatakse taoliste katsete puhul ajaloole ja varasemale (kuigi mõnikord ka ebamäärasele, ebaolulisele või välisele) kokkukuuluvusele. Balti küsimusega seotud historiograafias oli siinsete ajaloolaste endi töödes kuni viimase ajani suurem rõhk riiklusega seotud olulistel mõistetel – iseseisvus, suveräänsus, riiklik julgeolek, sõjaline (hard) jms julgeolek. Taoline üldtendents seletub väikeriigi eripära, aga ka teatud ajalooliste traditsioonidega ning poliitilis-ideoloogiliste vajadustega ja eriti vajadusega 1939-1940. aastal toimunud mõtestada. Ühte Balti küsimust kui niisugust pole siiski olemas, aga me leiame terve rea ulatuslikumaid – üldisemaid ja konkreetseid küsimusi erinevatest perioodidest XX sajandist, millele ilmselt pole võimalik üheselt vastata. Seega ei moodusta Balti küsimus mingit omaette nähtust, sama võib kinnitada erinevate riikide ja piirkondade ja regioonide kohta.*

*Käesolev artikkel valmis ETF granti nr. 5484 raames.*

The Baltic question as an object of historical study can be hypothetically treated on the basis of the following dichotomy. On the one hand, we can examine what has been written about the history of the Baltic, how it was written, and how inquiry, points of emphasis, subtopics, and interpretations of the Baltic question have changed over time. This would give an overview of the historiography of the Baltic question. On the other hand, we can view history itself as a process that took place in the past: as problems, periods, topics, and individual issues in history connected in one way or another with the Baltic. Like the definition and nature of history itself, the classification would be hypothetical. History as a phenomenon and what is studied, and how history is written – these are generally inseparably connected; Baltic history is certainly no exception. Scholarly studies, dissertations, monographs, journals and articles – as well as popular science literature, overviews, travel literature, and memoirs – whose title or content contains the word ‘Baltic’ or ‘Baltic States’ (*Baltikum*) can be classified in quite a variety of ways.

## THE BALTIC AS A SYMBOLIC BACKGROUND

‘Baltic’ can denote various fields of activity, people, institutions, processes, individual historical facts, events that are in some way connected to the Baltic States that became independent in the 1991. This gives the basis and justification to speak also of Baltic climate, geography, flora, fauna, art and art history, journalism, science and the history of science, economy and economic history, certain social processes, the background on which the processes developed, and much more. The word Baltic seems to sell better in the headlines of endless publications devoted to the promotion of tourism, economy, market-relations, enterprising, etc., in the Baltic area. A positive common denominator can be found in anthologies and other publications that are devoted to seafaring, trade, culture (generally the visual arts) or the growth of science in the region and usually treat periods earlier than the 20th century. Such a classification is in itself based a priori on statehood and power and assumes that this is a relatively permanent state



rather than a temporal prism through which some other phenomenon is viewed. Yet it does not look more closely at the development and change of statehood, institutions, legislation, power-relations, or the development of international relations in the Baltics.

### ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA (KALININGRAD?) OR BALTIC STATES

A separate category might be created for the numerous treatments of the Baltic States and/or even the political and social history of these countries that are published in the same volume, but contain individual histories and have no other connections besides an adjoining sphere and the fact that they examine phenomena and processes – whatever they may be – that took place in what are now the territories of the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). Such publications, representing history, culture, political science and social science and disciplines that are directly or indirectly tied to these branches, may contain such words as Baltic, Baltics, Baltic States, Baltic countries, Baltic studies, Baltic question in their titles. In some cases the common denominator in such studies is relatively limited. Some of these works may consist of three independent parts – the individual sections pertaining to the Baltic States are clearly distinct from one another. In some extreme cases, such publications may be published in the form of one volume, but the page numbering may be separate. For example, an overview of the developments in the Baltic States in the last ten years published in 2002 consisted of three separate books (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) of which each had separate page numbering, no doubt intentionally so<sup>1</sup>. The authors of this publication followed attempts, which increased in the late 1990s, to emphasize the different identities of the three Baltic States.

In some cases, historical overviews of the history of the Baltic States may be compilations of each country's historiography and the authors may be the same people who write overviews of each individual Baltic state's national history<sup>2</sup>. As a rule, such publications consist of individual articles that have relatively little in common, and deal with a particular overlord or ruler, conquest, war, conflict, occupation and related circumstances – generally tending to have a negative overtone or aspect. To a certain extent, the motif of heroic martyrdom (suffering) is characteristic of the history of the Baltic States.

### BALTIC GERMANS AS PROMOTERS OF COMMON HISTORY

The works of numerous historians and jurists of Baltic German origin are devoted to the history of the Baltic States and especially to the role of the Baltics in a broader context (international relations, major European events, development of the rule of law, etc.) and to the profiling of many individual accounts and to emphasising the importance of individuals. Of the best-known 20th-century writers, I would place Georg von Rauch and Boriss Meisner and their students and colleagues in this category<sup>3</sup>.

It must be said that it is primarily due to historians of Baltic German extraction that interest in the Baltics has persisted in Germany and that this has provided a role model and source of encouragement to others and had a substantial influence on historiography in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and even in Finland. The serial publications *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, *Baltisches Jahrbuch*, *Acta Baltica* etc, have been important for many decades. *Zeitschrift für Ostforschungen* changed its name for historical and ideological reasons in 1995 and expanded its range to cover *Ostmitteleuropa* studies. The new title does a better job of describing the main trends in the articles it publishes. Most historians and political scientists are not satisfied with only a formal common denominator approach and thus we could identify as a separate larger group works that are devoted to the search for a content-related common denominator, a common history, even a common identity or that even attempt to form such an identity. Sometimes, in the case of such attempts, reference is made to history and historical commonality, albeit a vague and extraneous one.

## THE BALTIC SEA – A UNIFYING FACTOR IN HISTORY

One possibility is to proceed from a particular sphere, field or geographical region. In such a case, the keyword *Baltic* can be used to denote history in the most general sense. Such an approach still comes down implicitly to political history.

The concept of Baltic Sea expanded after World War I to denote the nascent small states that developed in the former Estonian, Livonian and Courland districts. In discussing Baltic history, it would be appropriate to stress that, before 1918, the historical common denominator could indeed only be found in the former provinces of Estonia, Livonia and Courland<sup>4</sup>. Previously a common denominator was almost completely lacking, whether linguistic or cultural, religious, or economic or related to sovereignty or law. Nevertheless, we can discern certain attempts at cooperation – in other words, a common denominator – in examining the history of the Russian Duma, as well as in studying the activity of émigrés from Russia's western provinces in Europe and North America etc.<sup>5</sup>. This naturally does not hinder the creation of a certain common identity today through conferences and publications that treat earlier history but bear a title referring to a common denominator<sup>6</sup>.

The notion of the Baltics as an important factor in Europe or even in the world is a fairly widespread one.

The first major studies on topics of the Baltic question still stressed that the Baltic question was something more than just a sea-related issue. When Walter Kirchner attempted in 1954 to find the origins of the Baltic question, he stressed that the history of the “Baltic Question” is not merely the history of the Baltic Sea. He affirmed that neither is it the history of Denmark, Sweden, Finland or even the former Russian Baltic provinces. For Kirchner, the history of the Baltic question began when these areas began playing a certain role in world affairs. He likewise did not rule out the potential comparison of the Baltic region to such areas as Mesopotamia, Egypt, or the Rhine Val-

ley in terms of influence. He warned that the “Baltic Question” should not be confused with the topic in history of *dominium maris Baltici*<sup>7</sup>. Kirchner analyzed the rise of the Baltic question and its history up to the 16th century.

Pertti Luntinen (re)opened a second trend in approaching the Baltic question with his study from 1974-75. Luntinen focused on the independence of Norway and uncovering the international background of the treaty signed by Denmark, Sweden, Germany and Russia in 1908 under which the powers undertook to preserve the status quo in the Baltic Sea and likewise the North Sea. A similar obligation was taken separately under treaty by Denmark, France, Britain, Germany and the Netherlands<sup>8</sup>.

Since the late 1970s, dispute as to the extent and definition of the Baltic region was seen as escalating everywhere. It continues on the level of general research centers as well as in particular think tanks, projects, conferences, monographs and articles to the present day. The discussions became especially lively in the 1990s in connection with the restoration of the independence of the Baltics and the concurrent opening of archives, and the increase in the interest of researchers and historians in the region everywhere in Europe and in more distant countries.

In addition to Germany, strong centers of Baltic historical research have traditionally been located in Turku, Finland – we can even speak of a “Turku school” of thought – and elsewhere in Finland. On the other hand, numerous centers and researchers should be highlighted in Great Britain, Canada, Sweden and the US, not to mention the attempts by the Baltic States to found stable investigation centers, departments and even new universities which would focus on Baltic themes on the background of studying and teaching European and world politics.

## BALTIC AREA – THE CHALLENGE FOR A NEW EUROPE

The discussion on the topic of what forms the Baltic region and why, began to a certain extent before and during World War I. The same era marked the first attempts to shape the so-called new Europe as a whole, at least conceptually, and also accommodated plans for a future Latvia-Lithuania, and more so, a Great Finland, Finland-Estonia and Estonia-Latvia-Finland and other hypotheses and conceptualized constructions. Earlier plans, such as the idea of a future Estonian-Finnish commonwealth, were the stuff of salon discussions between individual scholars and certainly remained on an unofficial level. Better known were the meetings between Estonian and Finnish academics around the time of the first Estonian song festival in Tartu (1869) and the lively subsequent interchange up until the gaining of independence. If any serious importance was ascribed to these encounters and what was discussed there, it was rather based on the notions of some provincial officials or landholders of Baltic German origin, vague fears or even specific malicious accusations and reports to Russian authorities. At the same time, it is not certain how much such accusations laid at the doorstep of Estonians or Latvians – that they were tending toward separatism – contributed to the spread of such a way of thinking in the Baltic provinces. It is

not clear to what extent the position was adopted before 1917-1918 that the Baltic States could have an independent role in practical politics as intermediaries between East and West<sup>9</sup>.

Starting in autumn 1917, such discussions already took the form of specific decisions, propositions and documents. This meant the need to specify what areas (countries) would be included under the term Baltics. Along with independence of the three Baltic States, discussions started with politicians, cultural figures, historians, jurists and economists and businessmen, and they have not abated to the present day<sup>10</sup>.

Up until World War II and to a lesser extent, even during the war, such discussions proceeded from the assumption that the future region would be made up of (small) nation-states which would give up a certain amount of sovereignty for the common weal. Naturally, the meaning of "small state" in the regional, European or world scale, is quite variable<sup>11</sup>.

Such discussions are interesting and necessary, but discourse about what basis the *discussions* and *plans* for the Baltic as a new kind of construction contributed to the development of Estonians' national identity and sovereignty or independence, seems a bit of an exaggeration<sup>12</sup>. The national awakening of Estonians and Latvians and the changes in their political awareness were not in principle different compared to that of the Finns, for instance.

## REGION-BUILDING AND THE BALTIC

Separate treatment should be devoted to the development of the term Baltic as a region in its own right and to historiography that pertains primarily to the latter. *Region-building* draws on significant theories of international relations and specific common institutions – take for instance the Baltic Assembly created in the early 1990s and the Baltic Council or the existence of many other institutions outside the Baltic States, first and foremost in Germany<sup>13</sup>.

In going down this path, it must be pointed out that changes and deconstruction of the Baltic image took place in the late 1990s. Actions toward this aim stemmed on one hand from Lithuania, where there was more talk of Central Europe; on the other hand, opinions were expressed in Estonia on a high level that Estonia was one of the Nordic countries<sup>14</sup>. Such talk abated somewhat during accession to the European Union and NATO, mainly due to the fact that the topic lost its salience amid foreign policy considerations. It is more difficult to identify and substantiate any particular feeling of Baltic commonness in the mentality or attitudes of the populace of the Baltic States<sup>15</sup>.

In some instances there should be skepticism as to whether studies that are connected in some way or another to the Baltic Sea and surrounding events are still the history of the Baltics. Some works may be primarily tied to the history of commerce, shipping, fishing on some other maritime activity and to certain special aspects of the activity in one specific region. In such cases, there is generally no doubt as to what is meant by Baltics.

This term denotes major harbors and their hinterlands (including the countries) that border the sea and islands situated in the Baltic Sea. The sea goes by different names in the languages of the nations inhabiting its shores (hence Estonians with their “Western Sea” [*Läänemeri*], the Finns with their “Eastern Sea” [*Itämeri*], yet it is still the same body of water separated from the North Sea by the Danish straits. The history of shipping and commerce on the Baltic Sea has been thoroughly studied, primarily its history in the Middle Ages and more recently (Hanseatic League cities, on the background of relations between the Baltic and the Low Countries and other relationships). A separate topic is the development of naval military power and the relationships between – and interests of – the navies of the major powers on the Baltic throughout history up to the 20th century<sup>16</sup>. As mentioned above, in the late 1970s, the theoretical discussion outside the annexed Baltic region (again) developed on the topic of what forms the region and why. Understandably it was the Finnish and German historians who were more active in this, each most likely for different reasons. In the case of Finland, it can be assumed that that it would be difficult to include Finland in the Baltics in the narrower treatment of the latter. A nation-centered approach, which was the prevalent tendency in Finland as well, required one’s own history to be connected to the subject of study, in this case to Baltic themes. The University of Turku’s professor Kalervo Hovi has presented a comprehensive article on researchers in Finland and elsewhere in Scandinavia who have dealt with the history of the Baltic States over several generations<sup>17</sup>.

In the opinion of quite a number of German historians, it was not ideologically correct to use the term *Ostseeraum* to translate the Baltic area. That is why the name of the periodical was changed as mentioned and the term *Ostforschung* was abandoned. Alternatives known from the interwar period emerged – the Baltic and Scandinavian states or the Baltics and the Nordics; even Baltoscandia. The last term was touted by geographers Edgar Kant in Estonia and Kazys Pakštas in Lithuania. Thus similar discussions in the interwar period were livelier on the eastern shores of the Baltic and then, in the 1970s, a kind of reawakening took place.

As another possibility, a geographical term that was somewhat removed from the conceptualization of nation-state and sovereignty was proposed in accordance with the investigative methods characteristic of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The new term *Nordosteuropa* proceeded foremost from the internal considerations of German historians and a new approach. There was an attempt immediately to invest this approach with a region-creating content. Subsequently, there was an attempt to give the region a so-called historical justification through the writing of a new Baltic history. In addition to some Finnish and German historians, the search for a *North Eastern Europe* was joined by David Kirby and other British scholars. For Kirby, the *Baltic world* was tantamount to Europe’s northern periphery. In a study completed in the early 1990s, he tried to explain the distinctness of the region from the rest of the Russian empire and espoused a view of Baltic sovereignty as a questionable but nevertheless possible renaissance of history<sup>18</sup>. Nor would Estonian historians appear to oppose such an approach of connecting the Baltics and the Nordics, at least not in the title of a publication<sup>19</sup>.

Now the level of theorizing has reached the point that it is possible to contrast the terms *North Eastern*, *Northern*, *Nordic*, *Baltic Sea area*, *East Central*, and *Eastern Europe* and look for a common denominator from history or the present day as well as from different walks of life<sup>20</sup>. It is especially significant and tempting (and no doubt indirectly favored by financial interests) to abandon the so-called nation-centered approach and create a broader identity. It would also be in harmony with more general political and economic endeavors to engage Russia positively, at least its northwestern regions. A separate challenge is of course posed by the problems related to Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad is associated with historical, legal, economic and above all, security-related issues. It represents a serious challenge for the whole region, regardless of how narrowly or broadly the region is seen<sup>21</sup>.

### SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY: KEYWORDS OF THE BALTIC QUESTION

The greatest difference between the eastern and western shore of the Baltics undoubtedly lies in the greater emphasis ascribed to sovereignty (nation-statehood) in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and also by some Finnish historians. Accordingly, there is also a greater emphasis on terms connected to sovereignty – independence, sovereignty, national security, military and other types of security. Such a general tendency can be explained by the special character of small states, the methodological and theoretical gap, and by certain historical traditions and political-ideological necessities.

In what follows, I will touch on some of the more important topics and problems or the so-called open or key questions dealt with by Baltic historians and which find resonance more frequently in the eyes of the greater public, the local media, and so on. This is not a chronological approach. Rather, I will attempt to chart the extent of the interest and significance of the issue. This approach will inevitably remain subjective.

A one-of-a-kind event in the history of international relations and European and world history in the 20th century – the loss of independence of the Baltic States, and to an even greater extent, the restoration of independence – has given rise to a whole series of varied explanations interconnected with the general history of international relations as well as with the domestic problems of individual great nations.

First of all, the so-called big question will initially not be answered – whether the restoration of Baltic independence became a reality thanks to international law, thanks to non-recognition policy and the right to self-determination (violation of that right and later redressing of it). Or was restoration of Baltic independence tied to internal processes in the Soviet Union, a loss or significant weakening of sustainable power successfully taken advantage of in the Baltics and throughout Eastern Europe? This leads to more significant questions regarding the end of the Cold War and even of the role of the Baltic States in the end of that war. Naturally one question rears its head right away: did history teach anything as to which path the Baltic States would choose in the future?<sup>22</sup>

Similarly, the question remains open – how did the whole Baltic question stay so salient and powerful for so long? I am referring to the 50 years after the Baltic States were annexed. Should we be grateful to the Cold War, the power struggle in international relations and the skilful activity of many diplomats and ex-politicians from the Baltic States, above all in the US, Canada etc?<sup>23</sup> Or did the Baltic question remain salient first and foremost due to law and justice – thanks to international law, which did not recognize the violent changes on the territory?<sup>24</sup> If both were important aspects, we cannot avoid an analysis on which was the primary one; whether both aspects were necessary to the same extent throughout the entire period of annexation; how decisions were made in particular and who personally took the decisions and shaped the opinions. Baltic scholars were likewise initially in exile and now have returned in increasing numbers to the scene to study, describe and analyze how the annexed Baltics were actually subjugated to foreign power, the various forms of the resistance movement, repressions as well as the social, cultural and political adaptation that occurred. Special state foundations have been established for this purpose, with funding allocated. Numerous conferences and publication of corresponding papers help ensure an international level of research<sup>25</sup>.

## A FATAL YEAR: 1939/1940

Going back in time, it can be said that the most salient and still most central Baltic problem in the 20th century was (and at least for historians, will continue to be, far into the future) what happened in 1939-1940 and why. This question has been treated though various approaches and on various levels. Here I deliberately turn to the opinions or research-based views of Estonian politicians and historians, or else the subject would become too vast. When asking what was going on in those years and why, we could probably systematise potential answers in a variety of ways.

One way is to divide the responses according to their geographical (geopolitical) range. Thus we could distinguish explanations which primarily proceed from internal-political processes in the Baltic States. Then we could place an emphasis on the Baltic States - Soviet (Russian) relations and further, on a context of more extensive international relations. It is certainly possible to link together all three dimensions; however, as a rule, one of them is still slightly more predominating and decisive. According to the second way, the responses could be grouped into schemes borrowed from politologists or theoreticians of international relations. The reasons for the 1939-1940 events would then be either: a) associated with the activities or non-activities of people, individuals (politicians, military etc.); b) associated with states (a state) and their interests and needs (e.g., demands for security) – then, among other things, they depend on the regime, ideology, parties et al; c) associated with the system, understood as international relations, world politics, also movements or “-isms”, connected with world outlook (or even the features characteristic of an empire as a system).

Certainly, there may be exceptions in which case an opinion depends on attitudes, values and convictions, related primarily to definite organisations (institutions) that a

particular individual represents. Estonian academician Peeter Tulviste, a supporter of integration into EU and NATO, noted during the debates in this connection, "Thus we achieve that other countries contribute to our defence more more than we ourselves ever could. There is another emotional argument for paying for the umbrella. We all know (my emphasis – E.M.) what happened in 1939-1940. Now, imagine yourselves in Siberia, knowing that if more money had been spent on national defence (one of the main arguments why Laidoner said that it was hopeless) then (...)”<sup>26</sup>.

This citation clearly expresses a belief that we all know what happened in 1939-1940, but hopefully does not designate some kind of general, unique historical consciousness that is characteristic to the citizens of the Baltic States. If the latter existed, it is certainly richer, more varied and controversial.

Thus the arguments related to the years 1939-1940 can today be successfully used for fictitious proof of opinions even if they are drastically different or controversial. There is nothing special about this, of course. History has always been used to justify politics, even if under the motto *historia est magistra vitae*. A few more opinions are worth discussing to illustrate the background and causes of what happened in 1939-1940. They became particularly numerous in the press and public talks during the debates on integration into EU and NATO as well as when Baltic States became involved in the Iraqi events.

## STEREOTYPES IN ESTONIA

Two stereotypical models could be mentioned first: we were too alone and too weak. Conditionally, based on the reasons for being isolated, we could divide the model into two more categories. We were isolated because the neutrality idea was twisted (exhausted, degenerated) and it was an inevitable condition of Estonia, proceeding from the prior history and there was only bitter fruit to pick<sup>27</sup>. Estonia was too isolated from her neighbors and from the rest of the world, she had given up attempting alliances with other countries, first of all with Latvia, Lithuania and Finland or she had even rejected attempts to form alliances. We could have remained solitary also thanks to the then Estonian administration, particularly to the former president Konstantin Päts or to the *weak* commander-in-chief Juhan Laidoner who ordered not to choose sides<sup>28</sup>.

On the other hand, we could point to those who believe the events had a slightly wider context and find that in the 1920s-1930s not only the ideas and actions of Estonian politicians but also of those in Europe revealed a great naivety and the conviction that no war would ever break out<sup>29</sup>. Such an underestimating attitude towards the politicians of those years apparently feeds the self-confidence of today's politicians as well as their belief that one can and must learn from history.

Hereby one would not wish to oppose historians and politicians. Again, it seems extremely naïve, incompetent or deliberately demagogical when the politicians take advantage of history and opine that



Hitler did not turn into the most ruthless dictator of the last century overnight. He strengthened his dictatorship and prepared for war for long years under everyone's eyes. There were a few political clairvoyants who warned against the dangers of the Nazi regime but they preached to deaf ears. Fearful indecisiveness, short-sightedness and at places intra-state considerations kept the then states of the League of Nations from interference and counteracting Hitler when it was still possible. Can history repeat itself? Or perhaps it would more correct to ask – have the 60 years since the last war been a sufficiently long period to let history repeat itself?<sup>30</sup>.

In case of such demagogical statements an answer is not even expected to the questions – if, how, by whom and when Hitler should have been counteracted. Was there really any kind of international force that should have and could have interfered with Germany's internal affairs in the 1930s according to practice in the world today? Which democratic state or institution should have taken on itself the honour of launching World War II?

## SOVIET RUSSIA AND 1939/1940

In trying to systematise somewhat historians' views on the events of the 1939-1940 it has to be admitted that historians are and in their professional role must be more thorough in their studies and therefore they do not confine themselves to pointing to one all-explanatory reason. They approve a complex approach that takes into consideration all possible explanations as natural. On the other hand, a few most important causes can be brought forth to explain why in the years 1939-1940 our destiny took such a shape that our independence was lost.

There is no need to review what in recent years has been thought about presidents or high commanders of the Baltic States in 1939/1940. This is a path well trodden by historians both from Baltic and other countries. It is a level which regards an individual, concrete politician or military-man as the primary factor and proceeds from the conviction that, eventually, this is the man that makes history. Another path proceeds from the level of state, be it only in the Baltic or in the Soviet Union, or else in the interrelations of the two states. In that case a number of versions of explanations are possible:

- 1) The first version proceeded from the official Soviet-period viewpoint that Soviet foreign policy did everything possible to save the *status quo* and peace in Europe. It incriminated other countries (England and France) for the failure of these attempts and only then Moscow was forced to conclude an unpleasant but inevitable agreement with Hitler. The version works mainly in Russia but there are a few western authors who also subscribe to it. By this version Moscow kept in mind global or at least all-European interests – as possibilities to keep the peace in the region.
- 2) The second version points out that the primary foreign-policy interests of the Soviet Union involved creating conflicts among western powers just because of the forthcoming world revolution. Such a peculiar *idealistic* theory was focused on by Soviet Russia immediately after the Bolsheviks seized power. In the 1920s the proposed world revolution had no success, minor revolts with this aim in mind were organ-

ised in a number of countries but they failed. Later the idea was left in the background but in “1939 a number of basic conceptions of a somewhat supplemented idea of world revolution were ready for use”<sup>31</sup>.

- 3) The third version includes steps taken to guarantee the state (national?) security interests of the Soviet Union. This conception is based on the principle of a well known theory of international relations, claiming that in the 1930s Moscow proceeded from *realpolitik* considerations. Thus the Soviet Union did not so much consider keeping the peace as observing the interests of the state.
- 4) It is quite possible to link together the last two interpretations. Thus these versions are supposed to complement each other. According to that *realpolitik* vision there was no particular difference between the redistribution schemes of the Bolshevik country and those of the western powers. The establishment of the League of Nations and the Bolsheviks’ world occupation idea there were substantially very similar from this point of view. Behind the first idea were the United States of America, France and the UK, behind the second – the Soviet Union<sup>32</sup>. A similar scheme does not distinguish between the western powers, including them all in a hostile encampment respect to Moscow, or it proceeds from the vision of international relations which was apparently prevailing in the Soviet Union in the 1920s-1930s.
- 5) According to the fifth version there was no difference between Stalin and other dictators in the 1930s. In this version national interests or the idea of world occupation remain on the background but the dictator’s desire for occupation and domination power rise to the forefront. All the rest (national security or the idea of world revolution) can be considered as means to satisfy those indefinite, not fully perceived wishes.

For empirical historians it is sometimes rather complicated to specify their attitudes and the basic structure of their own world vision, particularly when those who write on similar topics seem deliberately to avoid references to each other’s works. A topic can be approached from an entirely Estonian-centred point of view and so the strength of an internal opposition and value judgements but not international relations can be observed. Sometimes not referring to another’s ideas can be very eloquent and can specify what one or another historian values most, allowing us to suppose what kind of historical vision or consciousness is represented or disseminated. The first way would be to approach the question by the individuals involved – by elucidating the role and significance of presidents, governments, individual cabinet ministers, military personnel and politicians in the events of 1939-1940. There is a high level of interest in such an approach in both the Baltic States themselves and abroad<sup>33</sup>.

The other level is the state level, where Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and others appear as independent states, but also to a certain extent as personified regional actors. Aspects better known such as those from the realist school of international relations would be a basis in this case. Important terms are national, the colliding interests of small and large states, balance of power, military and economic cooperation, military and economic

alliances, geopolitics. Thanks to Soviet traditions, importance is ascribed to various foreign policy orientations said to have been prevalent in the Baltics in the 1920s and 1930s, the relatively rapid changes in these orientations are emphasized as are, especially, the deleteriousness of various orientations to mutual cooperation. In raising such a historiography to the forefront, it must not be forgotten that as a rule, Baltic cooperation could only be written about in the Estonian and Latvian Soviet Socialist Republics in terms of an activity inimical to the Soviet Union<sup>34</sup>.

The topic of the so-called Baltic Union can be reduced to a subtopic in its own right. The birth of a plan, developments, various meanings and, understandings were tied to cooperation between the Baltic States and of course to the Baltic Entente signed in 1934, the nature and the further development of the entente and opening of its role. Ascribing particular importance to opportunities for Baltic cooperation can be highlighted as decisive in international relations<sup>35</sup>. On the other hand, there are authors who see the cooperation attempts of the Baltic States as coming to naught<sup>36</sup>.

A third level would cover the place and role of the Baltic question above all against the background of the development of international relations in Europe and the world. As a rule, the Baltic topic becomes somewhat extraneous in this case, a part of other processes. At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that the Baltics as a region did nonetheless have a significant place and meaning in the international negotiations that took place in summer 1939 and ultimately in the outbreak of World War II<sup>37</sup>. Historians' debates intertwine with political, legal and other problems in Baltic-Russian relations that are still salient today and it would be possible to further classify literature on the subject into subgroups according to various criteria and points of emphasis.

## A SPECIAL CHAPTER ON THE BALTIC QUESTION - EMERGING INDEPENDENCY

The birth and solution of the Baltic Question at the close of and after World War I – in other words in 1917-1920 – could be posited as a separate field. It is possible that this period is the one most abundantly covered by literature and that the greatest number of different subtopics and narrower issues can be found here.

In attempting to put the most general issues into words, we reach a set of problems related to the philosophy of history – for example, the problem of determinism, or to what extent the restoration of Baltic independence was tied to the preceding history and what were the most important developments.

Confirmation can be found on the level of school textbooks that without the experience of the 1905 revolution in Russia, the Baltics would not have been able to become independent, that this was an essential precondition. The significance of the national awakening is often stressed, as are much earlier events in history that lay the groundwork for independence as one culmination of the development of the history of these nations.

On the other hand, we find treatments of international relations that allow us to conclude that the independence of the Baltic States was possible only in a very brief span of

time that followed the outbreak of civil war in Russia and Germany's defeat in World War I. Europe was not ready for Baltic independence and the destiny of the Baltics depended more on individual influences, ad hoc needs and interests in the region. Corresponding literature can, similarly to works on the events of 1939-1940, be divided among at least three different levels. Debate about the role and significance of one or another level is not likely to abate any time soon. The end of World War I has remained to an increasing extent the province of historians, but certain problems – borders, nationality, returnable assets – are still salient issues today.

In summary, it can be said that there is no single Baltic Question as such, but we find a whole series of more extensive, general and concrete questions from the various periods of the 20th century, to which it is not possible to provide one unequivocal answer. Thus the Baltic question does not make up a separate phenomenon; the same can be said about the various countries as well as the regions.

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# Regional History without a Region: the Peculiar Case of Post-1945 West German Historical Research into Former German Territories in the East

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## ABSTRACT

This chapter focuses on the deep post-1945 break in German regional history devoted to the Reich's Eastern provinces and to those areas of Eastern Europe settled by ethnic Germans. Almost all institutions for regional history in that region vanished between autumn 1944 and spring 1945. The chapter reviews the attempts made to continue historical research into the lost German territories as a peculiar case of scholarship. The first organizations of *Ostforschung* [Eastern Research] were a deliberate continuation of like-minded institutions of the interwar period. From the late 1940s they were producing publications designed to tell the young about German cultural and economic achievements in the East. The Herder Institute functioned as an umbrella institution for a body of re-founded Historical Commissions which devoted themselves to the former German Eastern territories. The *Ostforscher* were more concerned with establishing a new institutional base than with clarifying their role during the Nazi years. A critical West German literature on *Ostforschung* developed only in the late 1960s. The policy of détente of the late 1960s and 1970s posed a threat to the institutional structure of *Ostforschung*. After Germany's reunification in 1990, there was a new interest in the history of the former German East. However, the process of abandoning the traditional Germanocentric perspective was irresistible. The abolition of the century-old German-Polish juxtaposition seems to allow a historiographical perspective free from political subtexts. The research agenda in the new millennium is the history of encounters, contacts and relations between peoples and cultures in the vast areas of Eastern and East-Central Europe.

*Das Jahr der endgültigen Niederlage Hitler-Deutschlands 1945 bedeutete für die deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas einen zweifachen und deshalb umso radikaleren Bruch.*


*Zum einen wurden etwa 12 bis 14 Millionen Deutsche aus Osteuropa vertrieben; sie fanden nach einigen Anlaufschwierigkeiten in Westdeutschland, der DDR und in Österreich eine neue Heimat. Zum anderen bedeutete diese auf der Konferenz der alliierten Sieger in Potsdam im Sommer 1945 sanktionierte Vertreibung das definitive Aus für die reiche regionalgeschichtliche Forschung, die bis 1945 in den Ostprovinzen des Deutschen Reiches sowie in den von Deutschen besiedelten Regionen Ost- und Südosteuropas von Universitäten, Archiven und privaten Geschichtsvereinen betrieben worden war.*

*Diese diversifizierte Landschaft regionalgeschichtlicher Forschung für Ost- und Westpreußen, Pommern, Schlesien, das Baltikum, Böhmen und Mähren sowie Südosteuropa war im Sommer 1945 definitiv, wie es schien, untergegangen. Nur ganz wenige Quellen und Bibliotheken konnten aus jenen nun sowjetisch beherrschten Regionen nach Westen transferiert werden, so dass ein Wiederaufleben der Ostforschung auf beträchtliche, bis heute virulente Schwierigkeiten stieß. Dennoch gelang es der Ostforschung, sich binnen weniger Jahre in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland institutionell und personell neu zu konstituieren und für heutige Begriffe gewaltige Förderungssummen aus dem westdeutschen Steuertopf zu erhalten. Nur ganz wenige bis 1945 mit dem Thema Ostforschung befasste Wissenschaftler fielen wegen ihrer zu offenkundigen Affinität zum NS-Regime und dessen mörderischer Ostpolitik durch den Rost, den meisten schadete ihre Beitragstäterschaft kaum. Um 1950 war wiederum ein rudimentäres Netz der Ostforschung in der BRD etabliert; personell und thematisch-methodisch knüpfte es an die stark von der Volksgegeschichte beeinflussten Konzepte der Zwischenkriegszeit an. Nach wie vor stand der deutsche kulturbringende Einfluss auf Osteuropa im Vordergrund. Diese Argumentation sollte unter den veränderten Rahmenbedingungen dazu dienen, mit historischen Argumenten den (west-)deutschen Anspruch auf die de jure noch nicht endgültig verlorenen Ostgebiete zu untermauern. Einen ganz ähnlichen Anspruch verfolgten die Landsmannschaften der Heimatvertriebenen, die mit den einschlägigen Forschungseinrichtungen eng kooperierten, wie überhaupt die erste Generation der Ostforscher nach 1945 selbst aus dem ehemals deutschen Osten stammte.*

*War so die teils nostalgischen Zielen dienende Revitalisierung der Ostforschung in den 1950er Jahren in der BRD weitgehend gelungen, so geriet diese Forschungsrichtung in den 1960er und noch mehr in den 70er Jahren im Zuge der sozialliberalen ‚Neuen Ostpolitik‘ in eine tiefe Krise. Revisionspolitische Argumente zur Untermauerung der deutschen Ansprüche auf die verlorenen, nun de facto abgeschriebenen Ostgebiete waren nicht länger gefragt. Hoch im Kurs standen vielmehr politik- und sozialwissenschaftliche, politisch unmittelbar verwertbare Analysen des sowjetischen Machtbereichs, welche die traditionelle Ostforschung kaum zu liefern vermochte.*

*In den 1970er Jahren brach sich zudem eine kritische Sicht auf die braunen Traditionen der Ostforschung Bahn, welche das Fach zeitweilig insgesamt in Zweifel zog. Die der Neuen Ostpolitik verpflichteten Bundesregierungen ließen das Fach evaluieren und damit zur Disposition stellen, es kam jedoch zu keinen Institutsschließungen. Erst in den 1990er*





Map 1  
The Oder-Neisse Line and Germany's postwar territorial losses.

*Jahren machte sich eine von den Landsmannschaften unabhängige Disziplin bemerkbar, die Osteuropa nicht länger als einstige Projektionsfläche deutschen Einflusses, sondern als eigenständigen Forschungsgegenstand wahrnahm und die Rolle der slawischen Bevölkerung angemessen würdigte. Zugleich kam es zu einem teils touristisch, teils nostalgisch inspirierten Wiederaufleben der Suche nach den verbliebenen deutschen Spuren im Osten des Kontinents, die gegenwärtig freilich im Sinne eines gesamteuropäischen Erbes und als (konfliktreiche) Beziehungsgeschichte verstanden werden.*

## INTRODUCTION


In 2008 a commercial (not a scientific!) publishing house located in the Polish capital of Warsaw published an updated street map of Poland together with an amazing appendix. The addition, printed in German, displays, in a literal translation, the 'historical borders of the Greater German Empire [sic!] and of the Free City of Danzig' as they existed in 1939; a further addition is an index of German and Polish topographic names in Poland. Apparently the map's aim is to facilitate the trip planning of German tourists making their way into Poland. Some 60 years ago, ethnic Germans who at that time lived in what is today Poland moved in the opposite direction, desperately fleeing westward from their home towns<sup>1</sup>.

1945, the year of Germany's final defeat in World War II, marked a deep break in German regional history devoted to the Reich's Eastern provinces (mainly East and West Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia) and to those areas of Eastern and East-Central Europe like Bohemia, Moravia and the Baltic states settled (partly or exclusively) by ethnic Germans. Prior to 1945, this part of Europe had enjoyed a rich and diversified landscape of historical research conducted by German academic historians as well as by non-academic amateurs. Many of the institutions promoting this research – often private associations – looked back to their own history of 100 or more years.

Since 1945, specific ethnic German communities attached to certain regions of Eastern Europe have ceased to exist. These populations have now found themselves scattered over the whole of Germany, both over West Germany and East Germany (and partly also over Austria), and have there been integrated into local society. Recent accounts reckon that 12 to 14 million people, were expelled: 1,5 to 2 million of them died during their flight. In this arduous and painful process they felt doubly afflicted: by total defeat as did all Germans at that time and, in addition, by the loss of their homes. The contribution of these expellees to the reconstruction of Germany counts, undoubtedly, among their greatest achievements and is, consequently, highly appreciated. However, many had understandable difficulties in accepting their fate. This makes it all the more necessary, therefore, to recognize that in the long run they did not become an institutionalized source of instability and thirst for revenge in – for example – a Palestinian manner. The majority of the expellees sooner or later came to accept their new homes, familiarized themselves with their new environment and settled down<sup>2</sup>.

Remembrance of their common past in the East was vivid for decades. Attempts made by the expellees to perpetuate memories of their lost home met with tremendous difficulties. National affirmation of the victorious nations included not only the physical removal of the Germans and their artefacts but also the removal of their historical presence through the establishment of a new – non-German – collective memory. As Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Yugoslavs and others struggled to create a new national present and future for their countries, they also sought to rewrite the past they had shared with the Germans of their respective areas. These accompanied the appropriation of shared and sometimes wholly German public cultural and historical spaces as well as a reinterpretation of the German role in the history of those regions. In the end, perhaps fittingly, physical evidence of a shared past could be found primarily in the language of headstone inscriptions and monuments which fell increasingly into disrepair<sup>3</sup>.

It is the aim of this chapter to review attempts made after 1945 to continue historical research into the lost German regions – a peculiar case of scholarship which deserves attention. The chapter will focus on Eastern Europe proper, i.e. Poland and the western parts of the USSR, mainly the Baltic area. Although regional history dealing with the Sudetenland and South-Eastern Europe followed a parallel path, these regions which had been a part of the Habsburg, not the German, Empire prior to 1918 are not dealt with here<sup>4</sup>.



Map 2  
Germany's territorial changes from 1914 to 1990.

Initially, the victorious Allies had in 1946 prohibited any attempts by the expellees to organize themselves, but this ban was lifted in 1948 in the Western zones of occupation. The years 1947-49 are filled in Western Germany with the founding of *Landsmannschaften* [territorial associations] and other organisations associating German refugees and expellees<sup>5</sup>. Around 1950, the various local branches of the East Germans in the new Federal Republic of Germany fused into the *Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten* [Association of the Expellees and Disenfranchised]. In the same year they published a Charter which – surprisingly – claimed to be against revenge and retribution for what they had experienced by way of unjust treatment. Although, initially, there was a broad consensus in Western Germany that the forceful expulsion of Eastern Germans from their home provinces had been unjust and that, sooner or later, Germany should be restored to its 1937 borders, the Bonn government of Konrad Adenauer

(chancellor 1949-1963) pursued two somewhat contradictory targets concurrently: to integrate the refugees and also to support their political/revisionist claims. For this latter goal, history seemed of the utmost importance.

Surprisingly, unlike the heated debates of the interwar years, interactions after 1945 with Polish historiography had little importance for West German historians. Thus, the gap between the expanding Polish regional historiography and its West German counterpart widened as historians in the Federal Republic still held fast to the analysis of Eastern history exclusively as a part of a wider German history. By proceeding in that manner, they deliberately ignored or at least downplayed the fact that, while German settlement in that area dated from the Middle Ages, German state rule there was a more recent phenomenon. Prussia, the core of the German Empire founded in 1871, had for centuries been a tiny and weak duchy, more or less under the tutelage of the much more powerful Polish-Lithuanian state. It was not until the partitions of Poland between 1772 and 1795 that Prussia, alongside Austria and Russia, gained control of large territories in East Central Europe.

No significant contribution came from historians of the other German state, the German Democratic Republic (GDR): they could not deny that East Prussia, not to speak of Pomerania which was after 1945 divided between Poland and the GDR, had been German before the War and part of a wider German state. Any mention of this fact, even within a strictly scientific frame, would have posed an obvious threat to socialist solidarity with Poland and the USSR, and this precluded GDR historians from exploring this interpretation. They simply – with very few exceptions – did not choose to research issues connected to the former German provinces in the East. A large number of German expellees also settled in the GDR but for evident political reasons they were not allowed to form any associations similar to their West German counterparts. For the GDR, at least as far as its official position was concerned, the new border with Poland, the Oder-Neiße line, was a just ‘border of peace’<sup>6</sup>.

A few sentences must suffice to outline the position of the third German-speaking state, Austria. This country, incorporated into the Third Reich in March 1938, hosted a large number of refugees after 1945, mainly from the Sudetenland and South-east Europe. Primarily concerned with presenting itself as Hitler’s ‘first victim’ and with ending the Allied occupation (which happened only in 1955), Austria’s government and public had little reason to tackle the issue of expellees. The question of whether the Sudetenland should join the Austrian Republic had been intensively discussed – and settled once and for all – after World War I. A renewed dispute over this delicate matter was, in the Austrian view, the more undesirable as it seemed likely to compromise the country’s official position, which was to maintain the pre-war borders. Defending the southern frontier against Yugoslavian demands for a border revision, Vienna could not spark off or even participate in a general questioning of the 1919 territorial settlement. For these reasons, the climate for organizing associations of the expelled was much less favourable

in Austria than it was in West Germany. In the latter, there was no Soviet occupation force, as was there in Austria. As to the historians, Austrian scholars had traditionally done research on the history of the Habsburg Empire. For them, the German Reich's lost provinces were no matter of concern nor interest; this was and still is a region totally alien to them. However, one concession was made to the powerful West German neighbour: until the late 1970s, as this author remembers from his own experience as a pupil, official maps used in Austrian public schools displayed Germany's 1937 borders and described the Eastern part of the former Reich as being temporarily "under Polish administration".

### THE VIEW FROM POLAND

Statements made even during World War II leave no doubt that in the framework of Polish historical thinking it was of the utmost importance to find historical justifications for Poland's new Western border. As soon as the Red Army had advanced into what were then still the Third Reich's Eastern provinces, Polish historical institutions were founded or their interwar predecessors were revived. At the end of 1944, for example, the *Instytut Zachodni* [Western Institute] was established at Poznań/Posen. It was given the task of coordinating all research dealing with Poland's new territories and was thereby expected to smooth their political integration into the Polish state<sup>7</sup>. Within a surprisingly short period, the Institute started to publish a series of books entitled "The Provinces of Old Poland" emphasizing the alleged Polish traditions of the newly-acquired regions. As far as former East and West Prussia are concerned, this overall endeavour was supported by the University of Toruń/Thorn, founded in January 1946. As is obvious, at this early date after the war Polish historiography – now focusing on what had hitherto been Germany's East – possessed a much broader institutional basis than its German counterpart. No wonder that a meeting under the programmatic title "First All-Polish Assembly of Historians of Pomerania and Prussia" took place as early as February 1947<sup>8</sup>. Surprisingly, the old German names for the regions concerned were still officially used. At that time, Polish historiography had not yet been streamlined according to Marxist doctrines. In asserting the Polish character of the new provinces, ideology was of little, if any, significance.

From the middle of the 1950s onward, however, the *Instytut Zachodni*, apart from continuing research into Poland's Western parts, focused on both German states, primarily targeting what Polish historians perceived as revisionist tendencies in the Federal Republic<sup>9</sup>. Political motives also played a role in the establishment in 1953 of the so-called "Working Department for the History of Pomerania" as a branch of the Polish Academy of Science: it was located in Poznań/Posen. From the 1950s these institutes also had to fulfil the task of fostering some idea of the history and culture of the new provinces among those Poles who had been resettled in those areas from former Eastern Poland, now part of the Soviet Union<sup>10</sup>.

Taking into account these political circumstances, it is no wonder that a more nuanced debate about issues of regional history failed to develop in Poland prior to the 1960s. Institutes of regional history were enlarged or new ones were founded, as was the case with the specific institutes in Toruń/Thorn and Olsztyn/Allenstein<sup>11</sup>. As a rule, they all published scientific journals devoted to the regional history of the former German territories. From 1972 onwards, they also engaged in a surprisingly liberal dialogue with West German historians, the basis of which was a bilateral commission for the revision of school history books<sup>12</sup>.

### A NEW START FOR *OSTFORSCHUNG*?

With millions of ethnic German refugees and expellees from Eastern Europe looking for a new home mainly in the Federal Republic of Germany (and, to a lesser extent, in Austria), their integration into these states was of the utmost importance. Apart from practical tasks like finding housing and jobs for the migrants, there was some awareness of the need to preserve their cultural heritage which now, as it seemed, had lost its geographical basis. On the one hand, such measures of preservation aimed at allowing the expelled to maintain their specific 'tribal' identities as Eastern Prussians, Silesians, Pomeranians and so on so as to smooth their integration into their new home countries. In that respect there existed a powerful coalition comprising the expellees' associations, the *Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten*, and the Federal Ministry for the Expelled for which the displaced Eastern Germans provided a disproportionate number of high-ranking officials. Representing millions of voters, the expelled had a strong say in formulating West Germany's cultural policy.

On the other hand, a strong scientific desire to rescue as much as possible from a quickly shrinking cultural heritage can be observed. This led, for example, to the creation of a specific sub-discipline within *Volkskunde* [ethnology], which found clear expression in the title of its journal (launched in 1955), "Jahrbuch für Volkskunde der Heimatvertriebenen" [Yearbook for Ethnology of the Expelled]. In 1949, the re-founded West German umbrella association for *Volkskunde* stressed the need to conduct intensive research on the issue of the expelled as quickly as possible and in 1951 established a *Zentralstelle* [central agency] for the Ethnology of the Expelled. Its main task was to advise on the collection of all kinds of material as well as spiritual heritage of the Eastern Germans: artefacts, literature, dialects, folk music, clothing and so on<sup>13</sup>.

Between 1944 and 1949, however, almost no historical publications of German historians dealing with the former German East can be traced. It was not until 1949 that the book *Ostwärts der Oder-Neiße-Linie* [Eastwards of the Oder-Neiße line], edited by Peter-Heinz Seraphim, Reinhart Maurach and Gerhart Wittram, appeared<sup>14</sup>. Even more important was the well-known fact that all institutions for regional history in that region, based mainly on universities, archives and historical associations, had perished between autumn 1944 and spring 1945. In many cases, the historical sources and specialist

libraries were lost, too, as they could not be evacuated to the West. This break was only a small and, as it seems, less significant part of a much broader process, i.e. the flight and the expulsion of Eastern Germans to the West. Even less well-known is the fact that the lacuna in the German-dominated regional history of some areas of Eastern Europe had commenced earlier, namely following the ominous Hitler-Stalin Pact of August 1939, according to which ethnic Germans from the USSR and from those territories now within the Soviet sphere of influence were swiftly resettled to the Reich proper or to German-occupied parts of the now-defeated Poland. As far as the Baltic states (annexed by the USSR in spring 1940) were concerned, this resettlement of Germans, as it was euphemistically called, spelled the end of the *Herder-Institut* in Riga and the *Institut für Heimatforschung* [Institute for research into local history] at Tartu/Dorpat in Estonia, to name but a few. It further resulted in the loss or the dissolution of large libraries (like those in Riga, Tartu and Tallinn/Reval) and archival repositories<sup>15</sup>.

It took some time until the gap could, at least partly, be filled again. At the end of 1949, the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde* [German Society for East European Scholarship] was re-founded and commenced publishing the journal "Osteuropa" in 1951<sup>16</sup>. The Historical Commission for East and West Prussian Regional Research (originally founded in 1923) resumed its activities in 1950, without being able to regain its former importance<sup>17</sup>. In 1951 it was followed by the Historical Commission for Silesia (founded in 1921) and the *Osteuropa-Institut* at the Free University of (West-)Berlin. The latter published the annual publication "Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte" [Research on East European History] from 1954. The Munich-based *Osteuropa-Institut*, the successor to a similar institution in the Silesian capital of Breslau, came into existence in 1952; its yearbook was the "Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas (Neue Folge)" [Yearbooks for the History of Eastern Europe (New Series)], started in the same year. In 1956, the Historical Association for the Ermland (a part of East Prussia) was also re-founded and started to publish its traditional journal anew.

Professional historians, however, often chose another path for themselves. Among the historians of the erstwhile East Prussian Albertus-University of Königsberg – a city renamed Kaliningrad and since 1945 part of the USSR – only Erich Maschke continued to write about East and West Prussian history. He did so, of course, from his new residence in West Germany. Almost all of his former colleagues, however, selected new topics for their continuing careers in the Federal Republic of Germany (and, seldom, in the GDR). It was mainly the archivists who guaranteed continuity, supported by those few academics who prior to 1945 had been closely connected with the regional archives of Königsberg and Danzig/Gdansk (e.g. Erich Keyser and Walther Hubatsch)<sup>18</sup>.

1945, it should be clear, was therefore a break, but not a total one. As time passed, serious attempts were made to revive what had been *Ostforschung* [Eastern Research] before the end of the war<sup>19</sup>. The first significant step towards reorganizing *Ostforschung* was the 1946 foundation of the *Göttinger Arbeitskreis* [Göttingen Work Group], ini-

tially headed by Joachim Freiherr von Braun. The original *Arbeitskreis* comprised a group of historians, geographers and anthropologists including Max Hildebert Boehm, Gunther Ipsen, Walther Hubatsch, Werner Markert, Theodor Oberländer and Theodor Schieder who had fled from the University of Königsberg<sup>20</sup>. As the rescued Königsberg city archive was later transferred to Göttingen, prevailed comparatively favourable conditions for re-establishing the Königsberg-style *Ostforschung*<sup>21</sup>. Since 1951, the *Arbeitskreis* was partially identical with the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Osteuropaforschung* [Study Group for East European Research], with Markert as its leading figure. When in 1953 Markert became a full professor at Tübingen University, the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft* moved with him. Loosely attached to Tübingen University, its funding came from the Federal Ministry of the Interior starting at 120,000 DM annually<sup>22</sup>.

By publishing popular as well as scientific accounts of Germany's lost provinces and by stressing revisionist aims, the *Arbeitskreis* was a deliberate continuation of like-minded institutions of the interwar period. It is not by chance that the establishment of the *Arbeitskreis* was prompted by the need to produce an expert report, entitled "The Significance and Indispensability of East Prussia for Germany". Ironically, the Western Allies had asked the nascent West German authorities for such a report in order to make use of it at the Moscow conference of foreign ministers in April 1947. It must be noted that at that time neither West nor East Germany (the Western and the Soviet zones of occupation, to be more precise) had a common border with what had been East Prussia up to 1945. For the historians assembled in the *Arbeitskreis*, however, the Allied demand provided a welcome opportunity to stress Germany's judicial claims to its Eastern territories which were now under Polish and Soviet administration. No wonder that the task of justifying such claims ranked prominently among the duties of the *Arbeitskreis*<sup>23</sup>. In that regard, there were striking similarities to revisionist endeavours of the interwar years aimed at setting aside the 1919 Versailles Treaty<sup>24</sup>. The Federal Ministry for Overall German Affairs supported the *Arbeitskreis* to the princely tune of 90,000 DM per year. The Foreign Ministry at Bonn frequently commissioned and funded publications which justified Germany's claims to its lost territories. This ministerial sponsorship, however, was cautiously concealed from the public<sup>25</sup>.

From the late 1940s the *Arbeitskreis* produced publications designed to inform the young about German cultural and economic achievements in the East, which was described as an integral part of Europe. In addition, various information sheets targeted at the Press and interested individuals in both Americas were circulated. Interest in South America was particularly strong, since a separate Buenos Aires edition of this *Pressedienst der Heimatvertriebenen* [Press Service of the Expelled] was produced for sympathisers residing in Chile and Argentina. Hans Mortensen, Theodor Oberländer and Ernst Vollert were on the steering committee.

It was from this background that a marked proliferation of research institutes surfaced in the Federal Republic from the early 1950s onwards: the Johann Gottfried Herder



Institute in Marburg an der Lahn (founded 1950); the *Norddeutsche Akademie* in Lüneburg (1951); the *Osteuropa-Institut*; the *Südost-Institut* (both founded in Munich in 1952); and umbrella organisations like the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde* in Stuttgart (1948); the *Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft* in Munich (1953) and the *Ostkolleg der Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst* in Cologne (1957).

The activities of the *Ostforscher* had clearly established a new institutional base in the Federal Republic of Germany. Although the Western occupying authorities were not initially well-disposed to the activities of the work groups and even banned Götz von Selle's manuscript "Deutsches Geistesleben in Ostpreussen" [German spiritual life in East Prussia], this does not seem to have obstructed the work of this self-proclaimed community of the like-minded. There were also six chairs of East European history, two chairs in Kiel for *Ostkunde* and six specialist institutes attached to the universities of Giessen, Mainz, Münster, Munich, Tübingen and Wilhelmshaven as well as the *Osteuropa-Institut* at the Free University of Berlin (founded in 1951).

By the early 1950s the *Ostforscher* were congratulating themselves upon having survived the difficult times of the recent past. In 1953, the *Bundestag*, the West German Parliament, resolved to promote the study of East and South-east European affairs at all levels – not only history – in the West German educational system. The following year, a committee consisting of representatives from the cultural department of the Ministry of the Interior, the ministers of culture of the *Länder* and the rectors of the universities was formed to suggest ways of allocating funds<sup>26</sup>.

The driving force behind the revival of *Ostforschung* in general and the creation of the Herder Institute and the Herder *Forschungsrat* [Research Council] in spring 1950 in particular was the historian Hermann Aubin (1885-1969)<sup>27</sup>. The 1948 currency reform, and the imminent creation of federal authorities, provided a window of opportunity for the institutional revival of *Ostforschung*. The structures adopted were explicitly modelled upon those of the past: conferences of interested scholars, a central institutional apparatus and a journal, the "Zeitschrift für Ostforschung" (launched in 1952). Aubin, Erich Keyser and Johannes Papritz were prominent in the *Forschungsrat* which met half-yearly to coordinate research.

The name of the institute, as compared with its nominal tasks, was striking: many of the institute's leading figures stood in sharp contrast to Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) because of the latter's Slavophil attitudes and his criticism of medieval German *Ostkolonisation*<sup>28</sup>. The Herder Institute functioned as an umbrella institution for a body of re-founded Historical Commissions which devoted themselves to the former German Eastern territories as well as to those ethnic Germans who had, prior to 1945, lived outside Germany's borders and were expelled from their homes in the wake of the Red Army's advance. In the middle of the 1950s, such Historical Commissions existed for Silesia, East and West Prussia, Pomerania, the Baltic region, the Sudetenland, and

others<sup>29</sup>. From that time on, those interested in the topic within the Federal Republic might observe that, to name just one example, annual conferences of 'Baltic Historians' were held at Göttingen! Baltic history researched in the Federal Republic remained a domain of Baltic Germans. No wonder that key books published on the issue dealt with the German minority in the Baltic region; the main reference book was a biographical encyclopaedia of Baltic Germans<sup>30</sup>.

### COMMUNIST CRITICS

During the first decades of the postwar period, a critical perspective on the relationship between *Ostforschung* and Hitler's regime had been rather slow to develop. Following Germany's military defeat, the *Ostforscher* were more concerned with establishing a new institutional base in totally altered political circumstances than with clarifying their own role during the Nazi years. Ironically enough, when in the mid-1950s criticism did ensue, the source of this criticism enabled the *Ostforscher* to postpone self-reflection. Their critics from across the inner-German divide were, as it appeared to them, enemies of Western freedom and tools of GDR or Polish political interests. No wonder then that the substance of the criticism from the East went unanswered. True, both sides shared the view that a serious scientific dialogue with their counterparts was impossible, whether because, from the Western side, of their opponents' attachment to Marxism or because, from the other, of addiction to Nationalism or to Imperialism and Militarism<sup>31</sup>.

From the middle of the 1950s the *Ostforscher* were refracted through two mutually antagonistic literatures. Their own was compounded of nostalgia, and old animosities refashioned for a global Cold War setting. GDR critics on the other side of the Iron Curtain sought to represent the *Ostforscher* as ideological bedfellows of a demonic succession running from Wilhelmine Imperialism, via the Nazis, to the so-called military-clerical dictators in Bonn<sup>32</sup>. In GDR opinion, the *Ostforscher* simply researched whatever target of Imperialism and expansion came next.

It was inevitable that the *Ostforscher* should have become the specific target of assaults from GDR scholars. Case studies of particular prominent individuals like Aubin and Theodor Oberländer accompanied attempts to discredit specific research institutes as alleged centres of subversion and espionage<sup>33</sup>. By studying this subject, Communist scholars and propagandists hoped to clarify what were for them the historical roots of contemporary West German *Ostpolitik* and to discover valuable analogies between past and present. Around 1960 they produced a study of institutions concerned with *Ostforschung* in the Federal Republic and posed the question as to why there was no longer a global *Westforschung* devoted to, let us say, Britain and France, or *Südforschung* covering Italy, Spain and Portugal. GDR historians noted correctly that the former pre-1945 *Westforschung* which had focused on the 'Germanic' heritage of Germany's West-

ern neighbours (Belgium, the Netherlands and France) had faded away in the foreign policy climate of the 1950s with the Federal Republic now involved in a process of full integration into the Western bloc. Unlike its Western counterpart, *Ostforschung* was still (or again) very active after 1945. The overt political objectives of GDR critics – and GDR historians made no secret of them – should not obscure the striking continuities in institutions and personnel between pre- and postwar *Ostforschung*.

## THE COLD WAR CONTEXT

In 1952 Hermann Aubin and ‘the band of the unbroken’ issued a new journal entitled “*Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*”<sup>34</sup>. The language and images were curiously familiar, simply worked into a Cold War context. With considerable monotony, Aubin repeated the same metaphors and notions of German cultural superiority, and had the same recourse to ‘blood’ as a causal agent, in numerous publications on the history of Silesia, a former part of Germany which Aubin used to describe as the exit gate for the teutonic being to the East<sup>35</sup>. Aubin stressed the continuity of German settlement in Eastern Europe despite the Germanic migrations; the inability of the Slavs to form coherent states; the existence of a West/East cultural watershed and the historic mission of the Germans to civilise the sub-Germanic zone. He then built a bridge to the present: he urged the members of the Herder Institute to defend “what is under attack from abroad: the claim of Germandom on its Eastern territories”<sup>36</sup>. Having assumed the role of a Cold War warrior, Aubin sallied forth in defence of freedom.

In 1952 Aubin’s colleague Keyser outlined the objectives of what he called the new German *Ostforschung*. Necessity and a sense of duty had impelled him and his like-minded colleagues to begin anew after the 1945 catastrophe. The German people were, according to Keyser, duty-bound to study some 700 years of German history in the East. The decisions made at the Allied summits of Yalta and Potsdam in 1945, Keyser argued, reflected an ignorance of German history. Narrow chauvinism was to be replaced by a sense of a European community to which the peoples of the East also belonged. This meant in practical terms that the Germans had brought Christianity, cultural improvement, political order and economic progress to the East, somehow, as he admitted, in collaboration with other nations. Keyser’s timid internationalising of traditional German chauvinism barely concealed the striking legacy from the past<sup>37</sup>. A moderate change in terms – from Eastern Germany to East-Central Europe – meant little; Europe as a geographical and historical space was more or less explicitly confined to Germany and the peoples of the so-called ‘West’<sup>38</sup>.

A Western community of interest, juxtaposed against an undefined (but surely now Communist) East, was apparent in much of the historical work produced by the *Ostforscher* during the 1950s<sup>39</sup>. To anyone familiar with what the same men had written only a couple of years before, these efforts to revise the past in terms of a trans-national

community of interest are – to say the least – unconvincing. But these lines of interpretation were in full harmony with the views of the Federal authorities. The state of affairs at the time, i.e. the division of Europe and the loss of Germany's provinces in the East, according to the Federal German Minister for Overall German affairs, was not a German, not a Polish, not even a Russian, but rather a Bolshevik solution. Keyser, Aubin and the historians collaborating with them laboured to demonstrate that the historical German expansion eastwards was carried out on behalf of the nascent 'West'. All this was presented in a highly aggressive tone, which again proves that the almost hysterical reactions in the GDR and Poland to this type of statement had some basis in fact<sup>40</sup>. No doubt, a curious intermingling of *völkisch* historiography and an ideology of Western culture is apparent in the writings of Aubin, Keyser and others.

## RESEARCH INTERESTS OF THE 1950S

Aubin and his like-minded colleagues relied partly upon the pre-1945 understanding of *Volksgeschichte*, a discipline that can now be described as ethnology. Research into the German or Prussian state's institutions in the East, from the time of the Teutonic Knights to modernity, also had top priority<sup>41</sup>. From this perspective the main topics of interest for historiography of the East automatically followed: the history of the Duchy of Prussia and the Hohenzollern administration. During the 1950s and 1960s, some new surveys of, for example, East and West Prussian history were published, accompanied by the 1955 handbook "Die Ostgebiete des Deutschen Reiches" [The Eastern Regions of the German Empire]<sup>42</sup>. They followed old patterns of argument and more or less openly expressed revisionist claims. For decades, those publications of the early postwar period remained in wide circulation. Bruno Schumacher's "History of East and West Prussia", first published in 1937 (!), had seen no less than six, albeit revised, editions by 1987 and was reprinted for the last time in 2002<sup>43</sup>.

Apart from those few surveys, the production of handbooks and maps stood in the foreground, e.g. the *Historisch-Geographischer Atlas* of the Prussian Lands which started to appear in 1968. There was, it is true, a long tradition of publishing valuable manuals like Eastern European maps, indexes of place names and so on which continues up to this day. Many of these endeavours were funded and supervised by the still existing *Kulturstiftung der Deutschen Vertriebenen* [Cultural Foundation of German Expellees]<sup>44</sup>.

## THE 1960S: A CRITICAL APPROACH SURFACES

Further examples of this type of writing would not promote a deeper understanding. Suffice to state that a critical West German literature on *Ostforschung* developed only in the late 1960s. Older criticism from Poland and the GDR, which could easily be brushed off through reference to its political purposes, was gradually accompanied by

a growing Western interest in the culpable involvement of intellectuals with the Nazi regime<sup>45</sup>. Younger scholars discovered that beneath the fine mask of academic respectability lay a more sophisticated collusion in Nazi atrocities. In a lesser key, the advent of détente in the late 1960s seems to have triggered an internal crisis of confidence within the discipline, as the assumptions that had guaranteed *Ostforschung* generous funding in the decade after the war were called in question.

## 1970 ONWARD: DÉTENTE AND ‘NEW EASTERN POLICY’

In 1969 a new coalition government of Social Democrats (SPD) and Liberals (FPD) headed by Chancellor Willy Brandt (1913-1992, SPD) entered office in Bonn. Brandt’s main foreign policy aim was to ease tensions with the Communist countries and to achieve a détente – however fragile – with the entire Eastern bloc in general and better relations with the GDR and Poland in particular. To reach these goals, Brandt was prepared at least indirectly to abandon Germany’s claims to a future restitution of its former Eastern provinces. A quarter of a century after the end of World War II and with millions of East German refugees now fully integrated into the Federal Republic, such revisionist demands had become more and more anachronistic. Almost no one – including those who explicitly stated the contrary – expected a restoration of Germany’s 1937 borders within the foreseeable future, if ever. Furthermore, during the Cold War, Poland had come to be seen in Western eyes as another Soviet victim and as a potential ally of the West. This new perspective automatically triggered a modified view of Germany’s past in the East. Within the framework of this *Neue Ostpolitik* [New Eastern Policy], the revisionist fixation on regional history written about the East was perceived as an imminent threat. In addition, the policy of détente of the late 1960s and 1970s also posed a threat to the entire institutional structure of *Ostforschung* as it had developed during the 1950s<sup>46</sup>.

## MODIFICATIONS OF *OSTFORSCHUNG*: THE YEARS OF PERMANENT CRISIS

Historiographically, *Ostforschung* exhibited, somewhat reluctantly, a willingness to adapt itself to the radically altered political situation. For example, from the middle of the 1970s the Historical Commission for East and West Prussian Regional Research engaged in a dialogue with its Polish colleagues, being the first to do so among the various commissions for Eastern Historical Research in the Federal Republic<sup>47</sup>. This led inevitably to what was later described as a historiographical ‘Polonisation’ of former Eastern German territories. Klaus Zernack stated that without doubt this history had since 1945 been transformed into a domain of Poland’s historiography. He further objected that his colleagues in the Federal Republic had not even been capable of registering, not to mention studying, Polish publications on this common subject<sup>48</sup>.

A conference held in 1974 debated the nature and future of the discipline, and the question of whether the term *Ostforschung* should be dropped in favour of *Osteuropaforschung*, Sovietology, *Osteuropakunde* or *Ostwissenschaft*<sup>49</sup>. Behind this rather self-conscious semantic exercise lay concern about diminishing recruitment and budgetary stagnation. The founder generation – men like Aubin, Keyser and Papritz – had by then retired. Their 45- to 60-year-old successors, who had benefited from expansion from the late 1950s, were securely in place. Those whose training, and expectations, had been formed in the years of expansion had fewer opportunities when contraction ensued. Around 1980, 20 West German universities were concerned with historical research on Eastern Europe. This discipline was the primary concern of c.100 scholars, a third of whom had received their *Habilitation* during the 1970s. Another 100 scholars were reckoned as the reservoir of the next academic generation<sup>50</sup>. Problems were further compounded by the fact that whereas many of the middle generation had been born outside the Federal Republic of Germany, their younger pupils had no immediate personal link with the countries and regions to be studied. It was not just a matter of what sort of torch was to be handed on but whether there would be anyone with an interest in receiving it!

The aforementioned 1974 conference also discussed the relationship between academic expertise, politics and the mass media. While scholars wished to be in close proximity to but not in the tow of politics, the politicians wanted accurate information on developments within the Communist states of Eastern Europe. That was why the subject received generous funding. Contacts between researchers and the bureaucracy had been formalised when in 1953 the Bonn-based Federal Ministry of the Interior established a committee for research on Eastern Europe consisting eventually of the heads of the eleven major research institutes, and representatives from the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign, and Inner-German Relations. In 1974 an Inter-Ministerial Study Group for *Osteuropaforschung*, with a permanent secretariat, was formed to coordinate the interests of government departments and the work of the research institutes.

As the generation directly involved in giving the subject its originally extreme Germano-centric impetus passed away, its successors had the difficult task of adapting to the new international and domestic political realities, while not jettisoning the entire legacy of the past. Personal loyalties and ties of academic patronage have not assisted the process of confronting the recent history of the discipline. Cosmetic changes – like altering the title of a journal – resolved nothing. When, from the late 1960s onward, modern approaches like ‘Social History’ developed in the Federal Republic, younger scholars attached to these methods focused on regions outside Germany’s traditional East. Asking new questions mainly connected to the Age of Industrialisation, they gave short shrift to the predominantly agrarian regions east of the Oder-Neiße line. Tellingly, as late as 1987, a collection of essays devoted to *Landesgeschichte heute* [regional history today] did not even mention research on the lost East<sup>51</sup>. It was only as late as 1992 that an article by Klaus

Zernack raised as a subject for discussion the historical term 'Eastern Germany' with its different meaning before and after 1945 and the relevance of this shift for regional history<sup>52</sup>. Around 1990, for younger and middle-aged people in the reunited Germany the term 'Eastern Germany' meant nothing but the vanishing GDR, not Pomerania, Silesia or Prussia.

By roughly 1970, all *Länder* or provinces of West Germany had been accorded a modern synthesis of their regional histories while at the same time – and up to 1992 – not a single modern account comparable to its Western counterparts had been published for Germany's East. Continuing problems with access to the sources and the failure of agencies like the Herder Institute to compensate for the loss of pre-1945 research institutions in the East can only partly explain this stagnation. Another reason was the still prevailing political function attached to Eastern regional history. As the continued task primarily was the maintenance of recollections and memories of Germany's former role in Eastern Europe, a shift towards a somehow outdated *Heimatgeschichte* was inevitable<sup>53</sup>.

However, from the 1990s onward change has accelerated and will probably continue to accelerate – unless the subject becomes irrelevant – as the wider scholarly landscape becomes more internationalised. Even from the 1980s, in some areas of medieval history, for example, there have been genuine attempts to treat once sensitive issues in a broad, thematic and comparative way, by teams of scholars from East and West. Some of the most interesting work on towns, nobilities, estates or colonisation is the product of international conferences, organised by the *Konstanzer Arbeitskreis* [Konstanz Work Group], while Polish, West German, and Scandinavian medievalists meet regularly in Toruń/Thorn for the comparative study of military religious orders like the Teutonic Knights.

## OSTFORSCHUNG SINCE GERMAN RE-UNIFICATION IN 1990

Following Germany's reunification in 1990, a new interest in the history of the German East has developed. For the first time, this revived interest has not been limited to the circles of former refugees and expellees or their *Landsmannschaften*. There was and still is a tourism focused on discovering the few remaining German traces in the East. New editions of tourist guides for those areas try to exploit this revived interest into the former German East<sup>54</sup>. The museums of the *Landsmannschaften* have also been enlarged as, generally speaking, there is an increased media interest into Germany's erstwhile East.

A few years prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the prominent social historian, Werner Conze (1910-1986), started to schedule a series of books to be published under the umbrella title 'German History in Eastern Europe'. The title indicated that this endeavour was not to be limited to those areas which up to 1945 (or 1919 respectively) had formed a part of the Reich. On the contrary, the role of Germans in entire East and South-east of Europe was to be treated. The first volume to be published was that of Hartmut Boockmann (born 1934), 'East and West Prussia', the first synthesis of this

region since Bruno Schumacher's book from the 1950s<sup>55</sup>. Following the guidelines for the entire series, Boockmann wrote on German history in these regions, not a history of the regions proper. No wonder that his book concluded with the year 1945 as the author perceived the end of World War II to be the end of East and West Prussia. From 1945 onward, according to Boockmann, the history of Eastern Germany is the concern of those who now live to the west of the Oder-Neiße line and their successors.

Later parts of this series comprising ten huge and richly illustrated volumes more or less followed Boockmann's path<sup>56</sup>. None of them openly supported revisionist claims. On the other hand, it can hardly be ignored that the overall purpose of Conze's idea was to preserve a collective memory of the German character of the lost territories. In that respect, the *Ostdeutsche Landsmannschaften*, which still harboured political resentment against a more scientific outlook on regional history as connected to their former home countries and resisted this ongoing process, could at least partly be satisfied<sup>57</sup>.

Whatever the level of resistance, the process of abandoning the old Germano-centric perspective is irresistible. This is also mirrored in a quite new "Handbook of the History of East and West Prussia", edited during the 1990s by the Historical Commission for East and West Prussian Regional Research<sup>58</sup>. Unlike the initial planning which was undertaken by the Commission, the project has prompted a modest cooperation between German and Polish historians. The ongoing abolition of the former German-Polish juxtaposition seems to allow a historiographical perspective more or less free from political implications<sup>59</sup>.

Collectively, these developments reflect an increased specialisation within the various disciplines and regions hitherto subsumed under the term *Ostforschung*. Although there are still those who continue to plough the old Germano-centric furrow, this group now represents one school among many. Since the intellectually interesting developments occur elsewhere, stagnation ensues. Towards the end of the 1990s, one prominent scholar announced the end of *Ostforschung* as it had existed since roughly 1950 in its highly politicised fashion. With the expiry of the Cold War, the previous political function served by that research had lost any meaning. The author had observed some feelings of nostalgia which during the 1980s had found expression in the foundation of cultural centres devoted to the role of Germans in Eastern Europe. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, after 1990 mass emigration of the remaining Germans from Russia became possible and this nostalgia became increasingly obsolete<sup>60</sup>.

## RECENT EVENTS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

In the new millennium new institutions dealing with *Ostforschung* have been founded. The primary focus of the work of the *Nordost-Institut* [North-east Institute], for example, is research on the culture and history of North-eastern and Eastern Europe as well as the various ways in which this area connects with German history, especially modern



and contemporary history. The *Nordost-Institut* began its work on 1 January 2002 with its main office in Lüneburg and a department in Göttingen. A specific foundation, which supports the *Nordost-Institut*, came into being in June 2001. Since March 2004 it has been associated with the University of Hamburg. The *Nordost-Institut* emerged from two previously independent institutions: the North German Cultural Institute (*Institut Norddeutsches Kulturwerk*) in Lüneburg and the Institute for the Study of Germany and Eastern Europe (*Institut für Deutschland- und Osteuropaforschung des Göttinger Arbeitskreises*) in Göttingen. The Institute cooperates on research and teaching with the University of Hamburg and other universities. It conducts research projects and hosts conferences, publishes scientific research in its annual journal, "Nordost-Archiv, Zeitschrift für Regionalgeschichte", and in its series "Veröffentlichungen des Nordost-Instituts", and hosts the library *Nordost-Bibliothek*, a special collection of literature on North-eastern European history. The *Nordost-Institut* is financed by Federal funds (the Office of the Federal Representative for Culture and Media) as well as by third parties. Topics covered include regional, national and state developments as well as their interpretation in the context of wider political, economic and cultural European issues. The regional focus of research on the history of the Germans and their Eastern neighbours and the societies of North-eastern and Eastern Europe is mainly in the historically Prussian provinces (East and West Prussia, Pomerania, Posen) and Poland as well as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, also in the Soviet Union and its successor states.

What has become obvious in recent years is the continuous and intensified process of coming to terms with the past. This was partly an intellectual endeavour resulting from the loss of Germany's Eastern provinces. David Blackbourn has noticed a striking parallel between this process and the dissolution of the British and French colonial empires after 1945 which also released a decade-long, painful questioning of national identities<sup>61</sup>. Since the late 1950s, the political importance of issues like the Oder-Neiße line or the expulsion of ethnic Germans has decreased dramatically and has more and more been replaced by research into Eastern and East-Central Europe as a historical subject in its own right, no longer analyzed as a mere derivative of Germandom.

Gradually, the self-instrumentalisation of *Ostforschung* for political purposes has come to an end. This older view had focused on the German factor as the single decisive force in East European history. Furthermore, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the integration of the peoples living in Eastern Europe into the European Union, 'Eastern Europe' as the subject of the traditional version of *Ostforschung* has ceased to exist. What is now on the research agenda in the new millennium is so-called *Beziehungsgeschichte*, the history of encounters, contacts and relations between peoples and cultures in the vast areas of Eastern Europe. As the (fund-securing) slogan of today is cross-border cooperation within the European Union, reflecting Europe's fading borders, institutions like the German Historical Institutes have sprung up in Warsaw and Moscow since the 1990s. Recently the Polish Academy of Science has also opened a Centre for Historical Research

in Berlin which in 2008 began to issue a yearbook. Not surprisingly, the content of the first volume deals mainly with German and Polish demographic losses during and after World War II. Another prominent aim of the new journal is to inform German scholars about historical research in Poland, access to which is still, even increasingly, hampered by a language barrier.

At the time of writing this chapter (autumn 2008), the *Deutsch-Polnisches Jugendwerk* [German-Polish Youth Association] is inviting a limited number of German and Polish youngsters to participate in a joint visit to “places of common culture and history in the Ermland and Masuria” in North-eastern Poland. One aim of this sponsored journey, as announced in the schedule for the trip, is to allow the participants to get to know the “German contribution” to the history of the aforementioned regions. Amazingly, one excursion is to be made to the remnants of Hitler’s 1941-1944 East Prussian headquarters, the *Wolfsschanze* [Wolf’s Lair]<sup>62</sup>.

It appears to this author that in today’s Poland nearly all the taboos relating to the country’s German past have faded away. During the first years of the new millennium an increasing number of trans-national editions of sources, handbooks, learning material and surveys have been published. Polish historians today are no longer reluctant to acknowledge the German heritage in large parts of their country: they have also begun to use the Polish equivalent for ‘expulsion’ (*wypędzenia*) instead of the earlier euphemism ‘resettlement’ (*wysiedlenia*) when writing about the ethnic cleansing of the second half of the 1940s. One typical example of this fresh approach to history is a four-volume edition of documents describing the living conditions of Germans who stayed on to the east of the Oder-Neiße line between 1945 and 1950. As the title of this publication strikingly informs the reader, for the Germans their ‘home country has turned into an alien land for us’. Furthermore, a new atlas illustrating all flights, expulsions and resettlements which occurred in regard to Polish territory between 1939 and 1959 reinforces this recent historiographical trend<sup>63</sup>.

The former history of East Germans in that part of Europe is now beginning to find an appropriate place within these new cross-border research programmes. And hopefully such perspectives may also act as a stimulus to overcoming the current crisis in ‘area studies’. Undoubtedly, hermetically sealed-off cultures of national memories do not accord with the standards of the 21st century.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> *Autokarte Polen 1:750,000 – zuzüglich: Historische Grenzen des Großdeutschen Reiches und der Freien Stadt Danzig* (1939), *deutsche Ortsnamen, Verzeichnis der deutschen und polnischen Ortsnamen, aktuelles Straßennetz*, Warsaw 2008; Recent accounts of this topic are *Flucht und Vertreibung. Europa zwischen 1939 und 1948*, with Introduction by A. Surminski, Hamburg 2004; P. Ahonen, *After the Expulsion. West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945-1990*, Oxford 2003; M. Kittel, H. Möller, J. Pešek, O. Tuma (eds.), *Deutschsprachige Minderheiten 1945. Ein europäischer Vergleich*, Munich 2006.

- <sup>2</sup> Cf. J. Křen, *Changes in identity: Germans in Bohemia and Moravia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries*, in M. Teich (ed.), *Bohemia in History*, Cambridge 1998, pp. 324-343.
- <sup>3</sup> For the Czech case see N.M. Wingfield, *The Politics of Memory: Constructing National Identity in the Czech Lands, 1945 to 1948*, in "East European Politics and Societies", 2000, 14, pp. 246-267. For German reactions see E. Mühle, *The European East on the Mental Map of German Ostforschung*, in E. Mühle (ed.), *Germany and the European East in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford - New York 2003, pp. 107-130.
- <sup>4</sup> For these areas see M. Beer, G. Seewann (eds.), *Südostforschung im Schatten des Dritten Reiches. Institutionen-Inhalte-Personen*, Munich 2004; H.H. Hahn (ed.), *Hundert Jahre sudetendeutsche Geschichte. Eine völkische Bewegung in drei Staaten*, Frankfurt am Main - Berlin - Bern - Bruxelles - New York - Oxford - Vienna 2007; S. Albrecht, J. Malír, R. Melville (eds.), *Die "sudetendeutsche Geschichtsschreibung" 1918-1960. Zur Vorgeschichte und Gründung der Historischen Kommission der Sudetenländer*, Munich 2008; C. Brenner, K.E. Franzen, P. Haslinger, R. Luft (eds.), *Geschichtsschreibung zu den böhmischen Ländern im 20. Jahrhundert. Wissenschaftstraditionen-Institutionen-Diskurse*, Munich 2006; S. Salzborn, *Geteilte Erinnerung. Die deutsch-tschechischen Beziehungen und die sudetendeutsche Vergangenheit*, Frankfurt am Main 2008.
- <sup>5</sup> P. Ahonen, *Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik. The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era*, in "Central European History", 1998, 31, pp. 31-63; M. Stickler, "Ostdeutsch heißt Gesamtdeutsch". *Organisation, Selbstverständnis und heimatpolitische Zielsetzungen der deutschen Vertriebenenverbände 1949-1972*, Düsseldorf 2004. For the Sudeten German example see A. Šnejdár, *The Beginnings of Sudeten German Organizations in Western Germany after 1945*, in "Historica", 1964, 8, pp. 235-252; E. Glassheim, *National Mythologies and Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of Czechoslovak Germans in 1945*, in "Central European History", 2000, 33, pp. 463-486.
- <sup>6</sup> J. Hackmann, *Ostpreußen und Westpreußen in deutscher und polnischer Sicht. Landeshistorie als beziehungs-geschichtliches Problem*, Wiesbaden 1996, pp. 320-322, footnote 281 for further references; A. Fischer, *Forschung und Lehre zur Geschichte Osteuropas in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone bzw. der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (1945-1990)*, in E. Oberländer (ed.), *Geschichte Osteuropas. Zur Entwicklung einer historischen Disziplin in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz 1945-1990*, Stuttgart 1992, pp. 304-341, p. 312.
- <sup>7</sup> Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., pp. 258-259; J.M. Piskorski, "Deutsche Ostforschung" und "polnische Westforschung", in "Berliner Jahrbuch für osteuropäische Geschichte", 1996, 1, pp. 379-390; J. Hackmann, *Strukturen und Institutionen der polnischen Westforschung (1918-1960)*, in "Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung", 2001, 50/2, pp. 230-255.
- <sup>8</sup> Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., p. 267.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 276.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 279.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 285.
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 343; J.-D. Gauger, *Deutsche und Polen im Unterricht. Eine Untersuchung aktueller Lehrpläne, Richtlinien und Schulbücher für Geschichte*, Schwalbach 2008; K. Hartmann, M. Ruchniewicz, *Geschichte verstehen – Zukunft gestalten. Die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen in den Jahren 1933-1949. Ergänzende Unterrichtsmaterialien für das Fach Geschichte*, Dresden 2007.
- <sup>13</sup> For details see the introductory remarks in the first issue of the "Jahrbuch für Volkskunde der Heimatvertriebenen", 1955, 1.
- <sup>14</sup> C.R. Unger, *Ostforschung in Westdeutschland. Die Erforschung des europäischen Ostens und die deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 1945-1975*, Stuttgart 2007, p. 158; Cf. D. J. Allen, *The Oder-Neisse-Line. The*

- United States, Poland, and Germany in the Cold War*, Westport - London 2003; J.-D. Kühne, *Zu Veränderungsmöglichkeiten der Oder-Neiße-Linie nach 1945*, Baden-Baden 2008.
- <sup>15</sup> M. Hellmann, *Zur Lage der historischen Erforschung des östlichen Europa in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, in "Jahrbuch der historischen Forschung 1979", pp. 13-38, at p. 20. See also H. Lemberg, P. Nitsche, E. Oberländer (eds.), *Osteuropa in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Festschrift für Günther Stökl zum 60. Geburtstag*, Cologne 1977.
  - <sup>16</sup> C.R. Unger, "Objektiv, aber nicht neutral". *Zur Entwicklung der Ostforschung nach 1945*, in "Osteuropa", 2005, 55/12, pp. 113-131, 114-115.
  - <sup>17</sup> E. Keyser, *Die Historische Kommission für ost- und westpreußische Landesforschung*, in "Zeitschrift für Ostforschung", 1952, 1, pp. 525-529; <http://www1.uni-hamburg.de/Landesforschung/hiko.htm>. The journal published by the Commission is entitled "Preußenland".
  - <sup>18</sup> Cf. H. Lehmann, J. van Horn Melton (eds.), *Paths of Continuity. Central European Historiography from the 1930s to the 1950s*, Cambridge 1994; M. Salewski, J. Schröder (eds.), *Dienst für die Geschichte. Gedenkschrift für Walther Hubatsch*, Göttingen 1985; M. Burleigh, *Albert Brackmann (1871-1952), Ostforscher. The Years of Retirement*, in "Journal of Contemporary History", 1988, 23, pp. 573-587; J. Hackmann, *Königsberg in der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945*, in "Nordost-Archiv", 1994, Neue Folge 3, pp. 469-493.
  - <sup>19</sup> Basic for this issue is E. Mühle, *Institutionelle Grundlegung und wissenschaftliche Programmatik der westdeutschen Beschäftigung mit "deutscher Geschichte" im östlichen Mitteleuropa (1945-1959)*, in J. Kłoczowski (ed.), *Erfahrungen der Vergangenheit. Deutsche in Ostmitteleuropa in der Historiographie nach 1945*, Lublin - Marburg an der Lahn 2000, pp. 25-64; B. Schallhorn, *Anfänge der deutschlandpolitischen Forschungs- und Bildungsarbeit in den fünfziger Jahren: Die Ost-Akademie Lüneburg*, in "Deutsche Studien", 1987, 25, pp. 318-328; S. Conrad, *Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Nation. Geschichtsschreibung in Westdeutschland und Japan, 1945-1960*, Göttingen 1999.
  - <sup>20</sup> On Oberländer's fascinating career see P.-C. Wachs, *Der Fall Theodor Oberländer (1905-1998). Ein Lehrstück deutscher Geschichte*, Frankfurt am Main - New York 2000. Theodor Oberländer is not to be mixed up with the younger historian Erwin Oberländer. A general account of the *Arbeitskreis* is H.G. Marzian, *Der Göttinger Arbeitskreis*, in H. Neubach, H.-L. Abmeier (eds.), *Für unser Schlesien. Festschrift für Herbert Hupka*, Munich - Vienna 1985, pp. 142-152; J. von Braun, *Fünf Jahre Arbeit für den deutschen Osten. Der Göttinger Arbeitskreis. Tätigkeitsbericht zu seinem fünfjährigen Bestehen*, in "Jahrbuch der Albertus-Universität zu Königsberg", 1952, 2, pp. 208-251; M. Hagen, *Göttingen als "Fenster zum Osten" nach 1945*, in H. Boockmann, H. Wellenreuther (eds.), *Geschichtswissenschaft in Göttingen. Eine Vorlesungsreihe*, Göttingen 1987, pp. 321-343.
  - <sup>21</sup> Unger, *Ostforschung* cit., pp. 130-131.
  - <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 147. For the overall issue of federal funds for *Ostforschung* see A. Buchholz, *Koordination und Ressortbezug in der bundesgeforderten Osteuropaforschung*, in "Osteuropa", 1980, 30, pp. 688-704. At the time of the introduction of the Euro in 2002, 2 DM equalled 1 Euro. At the beginning of the 1950s, 120,000 DM was a tremendous amount of money.
  - <sup>23</sup> Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., pp. 306-307.
  - <sup>24</sup> Cf. W. Oberkrome, "Grenzkampf" und "Heimatsdienst". *Geschichtswissenschaft und Revisionsbegehren*, in "Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte", 1996, 25, pp. 187-204.
  - <sup>25</sup> Unger, *Ostforschung* cit., p. 131.
  - <sup>26</sup> M. Burleigh, *Germany turns eastwards. A study of Ostforschung in the Third Reich*, Cambridge - New York - Port Chester - Melbourne - Sydney 1988, pp. 313-314. For a list of all West German chairs dedicated to Eastern Europe including a brief survey of their research activities see Oberländer, *Geschichte* cit.

- <sup>27</sup> See E. Mühle, *Für Volk und deutschen Osten. Der Historiker Hermann Aubin und die deutsche Ostforschung*, Düsseldorf 2005.
- <sup>28</sup> Unger, *Ostforschung* cit., p. 155.
- <sup>29</sup> Hellmann, *Lage* cit., pp. 22-23; Unger, *Ostforschung* cit., pp. 132-133.
- <sup>30</sup> A. Martiny, *Osteuropäische Geschichte und Zeitgeschichte*, in "Osteuropa", 1980, 30, pp. 705-724, 712-713; W. Lenz (ed.), *Deutschbaltisches biographisches Lexikon 1710-1960*, Cologne - Vienna 1970.
- <sup>31</sup> Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., p. 341; Cf. W. Borodziej, "Ostforschung" aus der Sicht der polnischen Geschichtsschreibung, in "Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung", 1997, 46, pp. 405-426; H. Olszewski, *Die deutsche Historiographie über Polen aus polnischer Sicht*, in D. Dahlmann (ed.), *Hundert Jahre Osteuropäische Geschichte. Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft*, Stuttgart 2005, pp. 281-292.
- <sup>32</sup> Burleigh, *Germany* cit., pp. 300-301; S. Creuzberger, J. Unser, *Osteuropaforschung als politisches Instrument im Kalten Krieg. Die Abteilung für Geschichte der imperialistischen Ostforschung in der DDR (1960 bis 1968)*, in "Osteuropa", 1998, 48, pp. 849-867; C. Kleßmann, *DDR-Historiker und "imperialistische Ostforschung". Ein Kapitel deutsch-deutscher Wissenschaftsgeschichte im Kalten Krieg*, in "Deutschland-Archiv", 2002, 35, pp. 13-31.
- <sup>33</sup> Burleigh, *Germany* cit., p. 309.
- <sup>34</sup> The phrase "band of the unbroken" comes from the foreword to this new "Zeitschrift für Ostforschung", 1952, 1, p. 1.
- <sup>35</sup> Burleigh, *Germany* cit., p. 305; Mühle, *Volk* cit., passim.
- <sup>36</sup> Quoted after E. Mühle, *Ostforschung. Beobachtungen zu Aufstieg und Niedergang eines geschichtswissenschaftlichen Paradigmas*, in "Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung", 1997, 46, pp. 317-350, at p. 339. For the publications of the Herder Institute see *Fünfunddreißig Jahre Forschung über Ostmitteleuropa. Veröffentlichungen der Mitglieder des J.G.-Herder-Forschungsrates 1950-1984*, Marburg 1985.
- <sup>37</sup> E. Keyser, *Der Johann Gottfried Herder-Forschungsrat und das Johann Gottfried Herder-Institut*, in "Zeitschrift für Ostforschung", 1952, 2, pp. 101-106, at p. 102; H. Weczerka, *Johann Gottfried Herder-Forschungsrat*, in Oberländer, *Geschichte* cit., pp. 256-275.
- <sup>38</sup> Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., p. 310.
- <sup>39</sup> Burleigh, *Germany* cit., pp. 314-315.
- <sup>40</sup> K. Pagel (ed.), *The German East*, Berlin 1954, pp. 7-8.
- <sup>41</sup> Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., p. 313.
- <sup>42</sup> G. Rhode, *Die Ostgebiete des Deutschen Reiches. Ein Taschenbuch*, Würzburg 1955; Unger, *Ostforschung* cit., p. 136.
- <sup>43</sup> B. Schumacher, *Geschichte Ost- und Westpreussens*, Würzburg 1957; Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., p. 318.
- <sup>44</sup> Cf. for example R. Täubrich (ed.), *Archive in Ostpreußen vor und nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg unter Einschluß des Memellandes und des Soldaubegebietes*, Bonn 1990. For the foundation see <http://www.kulturstiftung-der-deutschen-vertriebenen.de>
- <sup>45</sup> A recent survey is E. Mühle, *Ostforschung und Nationalsozialismus. Kritische Bemerkungen zur aktuellen Forschungsdiskussion*, in "Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung", 2001, 50, pp. 256-275. Still valid on this topic is Burleigh, *Germany* cit.
- <sup>46</sup> T. Kleindienst, *Zerreißprobe. Entspannungspolitik und Osteuropaforschung*, in "Osteuropa", 2005, 55/12, pp. 149-162.
- <sup>47</sup> Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., p. 346.
- <sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 330-331.

- <sup>49</sup> H. König, *Ostforschung – Bilanz und Ausblick. Bericht und Gedanken zu einer erweiterten Redaktionskonferenz*, in "Osteuropa", 1975, 25, p. 787.
- <sup>50</sup> Martiny, *Geschichte* cit., passim.
- <sup>51</sup> C.-H. Hauptmeyer (ed.), *Landesgeschichte heute*, Göttingen 1987.
- <sup>52</sup> K. Zernack, *Der historische Begriff "Ostdeutschland" und die deutsche Landesgeschichte*, in "Nordost-Archiv", 1992, Neue Folge 1, pp. 157-173.
- <sup>53</sup> Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., p. 329.
- <sup>54</sup> A fascinating account of early post-war travels to the border regions is Y. Komska, *Border Looking: The Cold War Visuality of the Sudeten German Expellees and its Afterlife*, in "German Life and Letters", 2004, 57, pp. 401-426. A more recent example is M. Antoni, *Dehio-Handbuch der Kunstdenkmäler West- und Ostpreußen. Die ehemaligen Provinzen West- und Ostpreußen (Deutschordensland Preußen) mit Bütower und Lauenburger Land*, Munich - Berlin 1993.
- <sup>55</sup> H. Boockmann, *Ostpreussen und Westpreussen*, Berlin 1992.
- <sup>56</sup> G. von Pistohlkors, *Baltische Länder*, Berlin 1994; N. Conrads, *Schlesien*, Berlin 1994; F. Prinz, *Böhmen und Mähren*, Berlin 1995; G. Schödl, *Land an der Donau*, Berlin 1995; J. Rogall, *Land der großen Ströme. Von Polen nach Litauen*, Berlin 1996; G. Stricker, *Russland*, Berlin 1997; A. Suppan, *Zwischen Adria und Karawanken*, Berlin 1998; I. Röskau-Rydel, *Galizien*, Berlin 1999; W. Buchholz, *Pommern*, Berlin 1999.
- <sup>57</sup> Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., pp. 338-339.
- <sup>58</sup> E. Opgenoorth (ed.), *Handbuch der Geschichte Ost- und Westpreußens. Teil 2: Von der Teilung bis zum Schwedisch-Polnischen Krieg 1466-1655. Vom schwedisch-polnischen Krieg bis zur Reformzeit*, 2 vols., Lüneburg 1994 and 1996; *Teil 3: Von der Reformzeit bis zum Vertrag von Versailles, 1807-1918*, Lüneburg 1998; *Teil 4: Vom Vertrag von Versailles bis zum Ende des zweiten Weltkrieges, 1918-1945*, Lüneburg 1997.
- <sup>59</sup> Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., pp. 339-340.
- <sup>60</sup> J. Baberowski, *Das Ende der Osteuropäischen Geschichte. Bemerkungen zur Lage einer geschichtswissenschaftlichen Disziplin*, in "Osteuropa", 1998, 48, pp. 784-799. See also Mühle, *Ostforschung* cit., passim.
- <sup>61</sup> D. Blackburn, *Das Kaiserreich transnational. Eine Skizze*, in S. Conrad, J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt 1871-1914*, Göttingen 2004, pp. 302-324, at p. 324. Cf. S. Creuzberger, J. Mannteufel, A. Steininger, J. Unser (eds.), *Wohin steuert die Osteuropaforschung?*, Cologne 2000.
- <sup>62</sup> <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/termine/id=10007>
- <sup>63</sup> W. Borodziej, H. Lemberg (eds.), *"Nasza ojczyzna stała się dla nas obcym państwem ..." Niemcy w Polsce 1945-1950. Wybór dokumentów*, 4 vols., Warsaw 2000-2001; there is also a German version: *"Unsere Heimat ist uns ein fremdes Land geworden..." Die Deutschen östlich von Oder und Neiße 1945-1950. Dokumente aus polnischen Archiven*, 4 vols., Marburg an der Lahn 2000-2003; G. Hryciuk, W. Sienkiewicz (eds.), *Wysiedlenia, wypędzenia i ucieczki 1939-1959. Polacy, Żydzi, Niemcy, Ukraińcy. Atlas ziem Polski*, Warsaw 2008.

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# Transformations of Regional History in the Polish “Western Territories” since 1945: Legitimization, Nationalization, Regionalization

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## ABSTRACT


The present chapter analyses developments in Polish historiography in the regions which were incorporated into the Polish state after the Second World War (Outer Pomerania, Silesia, parts of East Prussia, and others). The “historical character” of these territories had, since the 19th century, been disputed by Germans and Poles. After 1945 the central task of Polish historical work there was to legitimate the new territorial changes, to prove that the lands concerned had always been Polish. In the 1950s and 1960s, large syntheses of their past began to be conceptually prepared, discussed and later also published, accompanied by a rapid development of monographic research. Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, the previous orientation towards Polonity and Polishness in the past receded into the background, and the formation of a new Polish regional history or *Landesgeschichte* took place. Since the 1990s, such features as the ‘European’ or ‘multicultural’ character of the territories have been emphasised.

*Príspevek sa zaoberá formovaním a vývojom poľskej historiografie na tzv. “znovuzískaných zemiach” od roku 1945, tj. na tých dříve nemeckých územiach, ktorá sa v dôsledku druhej svetovej vojny stala súčasťou poľského štátu (Slezsko, Kladsko, časť Lužice, Lubušsko, Zadní Pomořany, Pomořít, Varmie, Mazursko). Predmetom zájmu sú ako ciele a úkoly historiografie v súvislosti s politickými a teritoriálnymi zmenami, tak i základné rysy vývoje metodológie, konceptualizácií, tematických preferencií a inštitucionálnych podmienok. Pozornosť je pritom venovaná nielen samotnej historiografii, ale čiastočne aj politickej legitimizácii prostredníctvom dejín, historické popularizácii, verejnému a kultúrnemu traktovaniu histórie, historickej pamäte a politickej pamäte. Základný rys dlhodobého vývoje v perspektíve pädesiatich rokov po druhej svetovej vojne je spáťovaný v ceste od politickej a historickej legitimizácie pripojení jmenovaných zemí k Poľsku pres postupné etablovanie národne orientovaných regionálnych a zemských dejín Pomořan, Slezska atď. až po multikulturalizáciu a europeizáciu historického dedičstva v 90. rokoch 20. storočia.*

letí. Přitom jsou rozlišeny čtyři základní fáze. V první, bezprostředně na konci druhé světové války a v nejbližších poválečných měsících, byly položeny institucionální základy polské historické práce a cíleně připraveny první stručné publikace o polském charakteru minulosti těchto zemí, regionů a měst. Od konce 40. let lze sledovat orientaci na plánovanou historiografickou práci formou monografií, přičemž vůdčí ideou a hlavně centrální tematickou orientaci stále představovalo zapojení sledovaných oblastí do kontextu (celo)polských národních a státních dějin. Polský charakter minulosti a polonita jako předmět studia a východisko zůstávaly nadále markantními, i když ne vždy a za všech okolností zcela dominujícími rysy. Zároveň byly zahájeny přípravné práce a konceptualizace budoucích rozsáhlých syntéz dějin zemí a měst, doprovázené institucionálním rozvojem. Od konce 60. do 80. let pak lze pozorovat částečný ústup primárně národní a zejména legitimizační perspektivy, a to jak v souvislosti s monografickými studiemi, tak i v kontextu dlouhodobé realizace obsáhlých syntézních záměrů (dějiny Pomoran, Gdaňsku aj.). Do popředí tak silněji vstoupila dříve přehlížená témata německé kultury apod., zároveň však se posilovala orientace na dějiny daného regionu bez prioritního použití národně dějinné perspektivy. Dějiny těchto regionů se tak do určité míry začaly osvobozovat od národního narativu, takže lze nejpozději pro 80. léta mluvit o formování pomořanských, pomořských či slzeských zemských dějin jako oboru. Od 90. let pak v souvislosti s novými politickými, společenskými a kulturními jevy nastal zejména v oblasti politické a intelektuální reflexe dějin, ale i v samotné historiografii obrat k hodnotám multi-kulturality a evropanství, jež pak byly nacházeny také v minulosti regionů a měst jako jejich určující motivy. Zvláště markantním způsobem se tento trend projevil v Gdaňsku, ve Varmii a Mazursku, částečně ale i ve Štětíně, Slzsku, Vratislavi a jinde.

One of the most important territorial changes after the Second World War was the 'Westward Shift' of Poland. For the loss of its pre-war eastern territories, partly or predominantly Ukrainian, Belorussian or Lithuanian, to the Soviet Union, in the post-war settlement Poland was compensated with western territory. Predominantly German-speaking regions in south-eastern Prussia (Masuria, Warmia), Danzig/Gdańsk, eastern Pomerania, the Lebus Country (Lebuser Land, *ziemia lubuska*), Silesia, parts of Lusatia and the Glatz Country (Glatzer Land, *ziemia kłodzka*) in the south became Polish. These regions were formally transferred to Poland by the 1945 Treaty of Potsdam<sup>1</sup>, and have gained acceptance both internally and by the international community as integral parts of the Polish state. As recently as 1990, in the context of German reunification, the Federal Republic of Germany formally acknowledged the post-war Polish-German frontiers, along the rivers Neisse (Nysa Łużycka) and Oder (Odra), from Zittau to Wisłoujście. Thus international recognition of the "Western Territories" as Polish has been asserted definitively.

The incorporation of the new western territories was accompanied by large-scale population change, amid a drive by the state to impose a Polish identity on the areas. Many of



Map 9

Poland's 'Shift to the West' after 1945.

The continuous black line marks the post-World War II boundaries; the eastern and western boundaries between World War I and II are marked with dotted lines.

From: R. Fuhrmann, *Polen: Handbuch. Geschichte, Politik, Wirtschaft*, Hannover 1990, p. 183.

the indigenous, predominantly German-speaking inhabitants, had fled or been killed in the last months of the war: most, however, were transferred to Germany in the months and years after the war. At the same time, "repatriations" of Soviet and Polish citizens took place, with Poles from the east of the country – now ceded to the Soviet Union – re-settled in former German-speaking western regions, along with a sizeable contingent of Poles from central Poland. In the western areas, new local societies were gradually formed. A long-term process of re-socialising peoples of various languages and dialects, origins, cultures and traditions, confessions and outlooks took place – often tense and complicated by shifts in the state's ideological, social and religious agendas<sup>2</sup>.

Germans and Poles were not the only national groups affected by post-war political and demographic changes. A large group of Ukrainians was violently transferred and

settled in northern Poland as a result of the so-called Action Vistula in 1946, an attempt to forestall nationalist resistance in south-eastern Ukraine. However, acquiring western territory proved easier than imposing a uniform sense of Polish identity. There remained a heterogeneous contingent of native inhabitants that to this day remain difficult to define in ethnic or even national terms. The autochthonous population included some Germans who had not (yet) been ejected, Poles, and other Slavs with a less developed sense of Polish identity – referring to themselves as Warmians, Masurians, Kashubians, Slovincs, Silesians, or even *Wasserpolaks* (in Upper Silesia, an initially negative designation). These groups were either forced to move to Germany, or were subjected to so-called “repolonization”<sup>3</sup>. This latter policy was based on the idea that large parts of the population in these regions were Germanized Slavs who had lost their Polish consciousness, adopted German or Polish dialects as a result of centuries of ‘foreign’ rule – but still had the potential to reawaken their Polish identity. It was not always successful; and as a result migration from Poland continued in the 1950s to the 1970s. Thus, for several decades, an exodus of ethnically-specific and ambiguous groups took place, which resulted in the extinction of groups like the Warmians, Masurians and Slovincs from northern Poland. Only the Kashubians succeeded in defending their ethnic identity and redeveloping it to embrace both ethnic and territorial aspects, particularly after 1956. The survival and new identification trends among the two groups of German-speaking and Polish-speaking Silesians, especially in the Opole region, remained evident as late as the 1980s and 1990s<sup>4</sup>.

## PRE-HISTORY: NATIONALIZATION OF HISTORY SINCE THE 19TH CENTURY

The Polish-German struggle over the ‘historical’ character of Poland’s post-war western acquisitions was almost as old as the process of nationalization which took place in these regions from the 19th century. It was more pronounced in those regions with significant contingents of both Germans and Poles, and where there was a vigorous Polish elite: above all in Greater Poland (*Wielkopolska*), with its centre in Poznań, and in Western Prussia with Gdańsk, Toruń and other cities, and gradually also in Silesia or later Masuria, but rather less in Outer Pomerania, Lebus or Glatz Country. Disputes on the structure of the population and the cultural character of the lands were accompanied by attempts to prove the corresponding “historical character” of regions and cities. This tendency deepened significantly in the inter-war period. During the Versailles Conference, which was to settle the Polish-German frontier, both sides advanced historical arguments in support of their competing demands. Professional Polish and German historians, geographers and sociologists issued brief statements in English or French in order to achieve this. Scholarly disputes continued in the 1920s and 1930s<sup>5</sup>. Institutions were founded with the task of proving Polish territorial claims. The most important of these were the Silesian Institute at Katowice (*Instytut Śląski*, founded 1934) and the Baltic Institute at

Toruń (Instytut Bałtycki, founded 1925, opened 1927; from 1931 also in Gdynia), the task of which was to document the Polishness of the relevant regions.

Popular societies – similar to the groups which sought to mobilise support in the West for Poland in 1944-45 – were also active in the inter-war period. As early as 1921 and 1922, as the Polish and German states competed for Upper Silesia, the Union for the Defence of the Western Borderlands (*Związek Obrony Kresów Zachodnich*) was founded. It called for the legitimization of the Polish western borders as well as the "repolonization" of the borderlands' population. Renamed the Polish Western Union in 1934, branches of the society sprang up across the country. On the eve of the Second World War, the Union boasted 45,000 members.

In academia, so-called "Western Studies" became an important part of inter-war Polish national scholarship – its preoccupation with asserting the Polish character of disputed territory made it an official school of thought in science and politics after the foundation of the Polish Republic. It was not a regional perspective: Western Studies was supposed to reinforce the interests and claims of the greater Polish state and nation. Toruń historians were severely criticised at the Polish Historians' Congress in Warsaw in 1930 because of their regional and local interests<sup>6</sup>. Polish Western Studies, formulated in the 1920s and 1930s, was to be influential in the period after 1945.

## HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATIONS AFTER 1945

After the Second World War the Polish state needed to legitimize her western annexations. Generally, both natural and positivist modes of argumentation have been used to cast the annexations as a just and logical historical development. The annexations have commonly been presented not as the incorporation of German territory, but as a re-incorporation of "old Polish lands". Given this line of argument it was necessary to confront the un-Polish ethnic character of many of the inhabitants of these historic "old Polish lands". It was argued that Pomerania or Lower Silesia had been Slavic or explicitly Polish in the past, but that this Slavic character had been considerably weakened due to medieval German colonization. According to this interpretation, the presence of a German-speaking majority in these regions was attributable also to the Germanizing policy of the Prussian monarchy, along with colonization and oppression of the native Poles. Thus, a partial or dominant German ethnic character could be explained as an illegitimate, unnatural state which did nothing to alter natural Polish territorial claims. The Germans were to be regarded as colonists, foreigners, immigrants or as Germanized Slavs, denuded of their Polish identity. Even if they spoke a Slavic dialect, they were not aware of their Polishness and regarded their speech not as Polish (as it was regarded from the point of view of the Polish national elites). The policy of re-polonization of Kashubians, Silesians, Masurians and others was therefore legitimized.

The idea that the new Western regions were rightfully subject to Polish nationalizing efforts was signified by their official designation in Polish politics – the “Recovered Lands” (ziemie odzyskane). A ministry was even established for the integration of the new regions, with Władysław Gomułka as its administrator. Several societies and institutions addressed the Polonism of the Recovered Lands. The above-mentioned Western Union experienced a renaissance after 1944, becoming a mass organisation with over 100,000 members. Its post-war scope was broader: the society concerned itself with the national verification of the “autochthonous” population. Besides this, propagandist activities even concerned some problems beyond the Polish frontiers: the Union supported the idea of the incorporation of the Upper-Silesian Region Zaolzie<sup>7</sup> from Czechoslovakia into Poland; it also encouraged the secessionist movement among the Sorbs in German Lusatia. In 1951, the Polish Western Union was integrated into the Sea League (*Liga Morska*).

Between 1957 and 1971, the activities of the Polish Western Union were continued by the newly established *Towarzystwo Rozwoju Ziem Zachodnich* (TRZZ) [Society for the Development of the Western Countries]. The TRZZ was concerned not only with sustaining Polish claims to the western lands, but also with the further integration of the regions into the Polish state and society. This meant – besides administrative and economic activities – that it also attempted to shape identity by informing both the new inhabitants and Poles from the “central” parts of the state about the Polish heritage of the western territories. It was hoped that this would help to consolidate the territory, and to encourage those new arrivals from the former eastern part of Poland to take an active role in the repolonization of this ancient Polish territory. Their removal to the west was not to be seen as the loss of their country. This “internal” facet of Polish propaganda concerning the Western Territories has been little studied by historians, and would bear further research in the future.

To recapitulate, historical arguments played a crucial role in the legitimization of post-war Polish territorial expansion: the Polish population was a minority in large parts of the regions concerned, and in many cases it was indifferent to the nationalist perspective of the Polish state. History could be used to explain away these obstacles. In particular, a so-called “Piast” notion of Polish statehood could be mobilised, whereby historians concentrated on the rule of the Polish Piast dynasty. For particular periods during the middle ages, the western territories had been under Piast rule. In the case of Silesia, even after the region had been lost by Poland, it had remained under the rule of Piast branches<sup>8</sup>. In some cases – Pomerania, for instance – there had been other ruling dynasties of Slavic origin. Therefore, it was possible to depict the era from the later middle ages to 1945 as an interlude of foreign rule in an otherwise continuous narrative of Polish identity in the western regions<sup>9</sup>. In the context of the late 1940s, the Piast idea offered two other political advantages for the Polish communist authorities. First, it diverted public attention from territorial losses in the east towards gains in the west,

and thus was most convenient in the context of Polish-Soviet relations. Second, it constituted an alternative to the so-called Jagiellonian idea of Polish statehood, based on the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and represented by the inter-war ("bourgeois") political state establishment.

Use of the Piast idea can be seen as early as the arrival of Polish troops and administrators in the new territories. In March 1945, reporting on the capture of Kolberg (Kołobrzeg) in Outer Pomerania by the Polish army, the "Polish Film Journal" (*Polska Kronika Filmowa*) stated:

The Germans lost the war. They lost the country they had considered their own for centuries. Strengthened by the friendship of the U.S.S.R. and the alliance with the Red Army, the Democratic Poland returns to the territories of the Bolesławs [Polish Dukes and Kings of the Piast Dynasty]. This land, paid for with the blood of the best sons of the nation [...], no force can take from us.

And in a report about Breslau/Wrocław in the same year:

After six centuries of German rule, Wrocław, the old capital of the Silesian Piast Dynasty has returned to the Fatherland. [...] We shall destroy the signs of German rule in Silesia. We shall rebuild the Polish Wrocław. [...] Wrocław is a Polish city again! The German penetration of Silesia is definitively over!<sup>10</sup>

Thus, the Polish occupation of Pomerania and Silesia was painted as a form of historical redress, a re-establishment of normality and justice by claiming a continuity between the middle ages and the present day. (Interestingly, even Bohemian sovereignty over Silesia was regarded as part of "German penetration").

Polish historiography responded to the challenges presented by westward expansion. First, historians began to place the "regained" territory on the national historiographical agenda. As early as 1946, historical accounts of, for instance, Gdańsk, Wrocław, Masuria and Western Prussia emerged in the form of booklets and short monographs<sup>11</sup>. Some authors were connected to the towns and regions concerned, others came from other parts of Poland. In certain areas – such as Gdańsk and parts of Western and Eastern Prussia – there was a strong tradition of Polish historiography since the inter-war period or even the 19th century. Other parts, like Outer Pomerania (in German, *Hinterpommern*), the Lebus-Country or the Glatz/Kłodzko-Country, had a far less developed place in Polish historiography. These early works dealt not only with the Polish history of specific places, but explored their historical connections with Poland, the Polish language and literature. The purpose was to impress upon locals – and Poles in general – their Polish character, and to incorporate the new territories into the Polish national consciousness. The later 1940s can thus be regarded as the first stage of Polish historiography in the new territories. These initial efforts presented the lands as genuinely Polish.

## THE ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL HISTORICAL RESEARCH IN THE RECOVERED LANDS (1950s)

From the later 1940s, but especially after 1950, the second historiographical stage began, characterized by wider and more programmatic approaches both to the academic and popular treatment of the history of the regions. New museums, institutions and journals were founded. New research took place and numerous monographs were published. Efforts were made by historians to formulate a cohesive approach to writing the history of the new territory, and scholars planned large-scale works of synthesis on the history of certain regions<sup>12</sup>.

The establishment and re-establishment of local and regional museums was a characteristic development of this period. In larger cities like Wrocław, Gdańsk and Szczecin/Stettin, as well as in towns like Brzeg and Kłodzko, existing museums could be taken over or rebuilt after 1945: in other areas new museums had to be founded. In addition, special institutions were set up for various reasons dealing with research, teaching and the popularization of history. These bodies were relatively well financed by the state, which viewed them as representing national interests in the territories. Perhaps a typical example is the Research Centre in Olsztyn/Allenstein, competent for the part of the former East Prussia which became Polish in 1945. Its predecessor, the Masurian Institute, was founded by the Polish underground in 1943 and moved to Olsztyn just after the war. There it was transformed into an Olsztyn branch of the Poznań Western Institute, but soon subordinated to the Polish Historical Society. The new institute was organized in 1961. It was eventually named after Wojciech Kętrzyński (1838-1918), born Adalbert von Winkler, a historian from eastern Prussia, who identified himself as a Pole and polonized his name. He became an enthusiastic representative of Polish historical perspectives. The institute at Olsztyn undertook wide-ranging activities in research and in public interaction<sup>13</sup>. Fellows of the institute took part in public and educational activities in the context of a cultural “repolonization” of the regions. The first head of the institute, Emilia Sukertowa-Biedrawina (1887-1970), described the beginnings and the development of the institute’s work very impressively in her memoirs, emphasizing the national relevance of the institute’s tasks<sup>14</sup>.

In political terms the most important institute was probably the fore-mentioned Western Institute of Poznań (*Instytut Zachodni*). This institute was founded in Warsaw in 1944 and moved to Poznań a year later as a central scientific authority dealing with Polish-German relations and the new western territories. Although it was an interdisciplinary institution, historiography played a prominent role in it<sup>15</sup>. However, during the period of the Stalinization of Polish science in the first half of the 1950s, even the Western Institute faced severe criticism for the nationalist orientation of its publications. A rapid reduction of its resources followed, as Polish historiography in general became more centralized<sup>16</sup>.



After the foundation of the Polish Academy of Sciences (*Polska Akademia Nauk*, PAN) – which was an important, but not fully successful step towards the centralization of science in the Stalinist period, according to the Soviet model – Gerard Labuda established a Pomeranian History Research Institute (*Zakład Historii Pomorza*) as the Poznań branch of the Historical Institute of the Academy in 1953. This organization played a most important role in evaluating Pomeranian and Southern Baltic historiography, subject, since the 1950s, to opposing national and regional approaches<sup>17</sup>. In 1955, a branch of the Poznań establishment was founded in Gdańsk by Edmund Cieślak (1922-2007) with the task of preparing a large-scale synthesis of the history of Gdańsk<sup>18</sup>.

This period is also notable for the proliferation of scientific journals dedicated to the study of the Recovered Lands. The "Przegląd Zachodni" [Western Overview] in Polish (since 1945, initially published monthly), the "Polish Western Affairs" in English (since 1960), as well as the "La Pologne et les Affaires Occidentales" in French (1965-1981) represented the official Polish line with regard to "Western ideas" as well as Polish-German relations. The "Zapiski Historyczne" [Historical Notices] originally "Zapiski Towarzystwa Historycznego w Toruniu" [Notices of the Historical Society of Toruń], was renewed in 1945 in Toruń. It was devoted to the Baltic region history, including the Polish territories. New reviews dealt with the history of cities and regions, for example the Silesian historical review "Sobótka" since 1946, and the "Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie" [Masurian-Warmian Communications] published in Olsztyn since 1961.

The relevance of the Recovered Lands in the greater historiographical context is also highlighted by the series of important conferences and events devoted to the subject. Already from July to October 1948, the large propagandistic exhibition of the Recovered Lands, "Wystawa Ziem Odzyskanych", took place at Wrocław in order to document the successful repolonization in the western and northern "ancient Polish lands"; but the exhibition was dominated by a rather present-centred perspective on the new development<sup>19</sup>. In the same year the first post-war Congress of Polish Historians took place in Wrocław – the choice of venue was a powerful demonstration of the importance of the city within the new Poland and its normalized status as centre of science in Poland. The first session of the Congress dealt with the history of the Recovered Lands. In 1947 the Scientific Society of Toruń organized the "First Polish Meeting of the Historians of Pomerania and Prussia", where a future research agenda was discussed (ideas included the Baltic Slavs as a factor of regional unity in the history of the "new Polish North")<sup>20</sup>. A "Pomeranian Conference" took place in Gdańsk in late October 1954. On the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the "recovering of Pomerania by Poland"<sup>21</sup>, the conference had to implement Marxist historical materialism in the historiographical research of the North. The present Polish *raison d'état* remained one of the major problems of such meetings then as well as in the years following (for example at the International Conference of Pomeranian Studies at Szczecin in September 1960, organized by the Polish Ethnographical Society (*Polskie Towarzystwo Ludoznawcze*) and well attended

also by historians). The 550th anniversary of the battle at Tannenberg/Grunwald that year – interpreted as a famous victory of the Poles over the Germans – provided an ideal opportunity for the state to encourage Polish identity in the northern regions<sup>22</sup>.

The activities of museums and local and regional societies were directly connected to the popularization and propagation by the state of Polish identity. There was a drive to research and communicate a historic Polish national movement in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Even in regions where the national movement enjoyed little success, its local representatives became symbols of the eternal struggle for the Polish interest. This was certainly the case in Masuria, where the large majority of the Slavic-speaking people had opted to be in Germany in the referendum after the First World War, identifying themselves as Prussians or – later and regardless of their speech – Germans in the 1920s and 1930s<sup>23</sup>. State policy at a regional level, however, ignored this. In the official version, the Polish national movement was a central aspect of Masurian history. This was reflected by the polonization of place names. Several Masurian towns were named after the representatives of the Polish national movement there, despite the relative obscurity of the men commemorated. Rastenburg (Rastembork in Polish) was renamed Kętrzyn, after Wojciech Kętrzyński; Mehlsack became Pieniężno, after Seweryn Pieniężny Jr. (1890-1940), the publisher of the Polish newspaper “Gazeta Olsztyńska”, who died in a concentration camp; Wartenburg in Warmia became Barczewo, after the priest and historian Walenty Barczewski (1856-1928)<sup>24</sup>. The roots of Polishness were sought for in the folk culture of the regions<sup>25</sup>. Folk music was of primary importance here. Folk groups came to represent the old Polish culture in the territories and in the wider national context. This concentration corresponded neatly with the communist myth of people and folk culture. Perhaps the most popular example of this trend was the state ensemble of music and dance, *Śląsk*, founded in 1953 in Katowice with the task of cultivating Silesian folk culture<sup>26</sup>.

During this period the first substantial monographs, methodological conceptualizations and syntheses emerged. In the late 1940s a series of official scientific and statistical monographs on the new western territories was published by the Western Institute of Poznań, entitled *Ziemie Staropolskie* [The Lands of Ancient Poland]<sup>27</sup>. Unsurprisingly, the Polish dimension of the regions, cities and towns was central, and there was an attempt made to relate the local to the broader “national” narrative by stressing past connections with Poland. The centralist (in the national and state sense) perspective dominated the vision of the regional past, resulting in concepts which included “Poland at the Baltic”, and “a city [Gdańsk] true to the [Polish-Lithuanian] Commonwealth”<sup>28</sup>. An abundance of monographs and surveys on the history of Silesia, Pomerania, Masuria and Warmia, of Wrocław, Gdańsk, Szczecin, Elbląg and many more<sup>29</sup> appeared, especially in the 1960s, which sought to establish their place in the Polish grand narrative.

Historians made no bones about the one-sided nature of their endeavours. Zygmunt Wojciechowski (1900-1955)<sup>30</sup>, the first director of the Western Institute of Poznań, wrote in the first volume of *The Lands of Ancient Poland*:

We do not attempt to write a so-called objective history on this place. Our task is to present the Polish history of those lands and to project the present-day Polish reality of them onto the historic background. Such a consideration of the problem is imposed not only by present-day demands, but also by our conviction that the Polish past of those lands is the most important one<sup>31</sup>.

In terms of new historiographical concepts and methodologies, the case of Pomerania and the Baltic area is of particular importance. In the immediate post-war period Karol Górski (1903-1988), Gerard Labuda (born 1916) and Marian Biskup (perhaps the most prominent representative of northern Polish historiography), developed a general historiographical concept of the so-called "Greater Pomerania", a well-defined and coherent historical region in the southern Baltic, including Pomerania and East Prussia. In the 1950s and 1960s, this concept was subject to further elaboration and application, particularly by Gerard Labuda<sup>32</sup>. Thus was constructed a historically-united northern territory which was not only incorporated into the Polish state but also extended (according to the designation "Pomerania") into the German Democratic Republic (Western Pomerania) and the Soviet Union (the Kaliningrad region, and parts of Lithuania). The most important aspect of this concept was the fact that while Polonity remained an important perspective, it was not central: historians tended instead to conceptualize Pomeranian history in terms of its regional specificity, and not primarily as a part of the Polish state or its national history. At the same time, Polish historians regarded rather critically the older Polish and German tradition of specific local history (*Heimatgeschichte*) and postulated – not only under Marxist influence – a more holistic regional historical approach which would focus attention more on general historical problems. One could say that the concepts of Labuda marked a decisive turn toward a Polish *Landesgeschichte* and regional history.

As in the inter-war period, tendencies towards an autonomous, specific conception of these regions as having discrete histories were regarded with hostility by a part of the academic establishment, which condemned such practitioners as particularist or even separatist. A prominent example of this was the Kashubian movement in Northern Poland, suffering under the pressure of the central authorities especially before 1956, but also between the 1960s and 1980s<sup>33</sup>. Any attempt at conceptualizing Kashubian history was confronted by these problems, as Kashubian activists aroused the interest of the Polish state police<sup>34</sup>. Only in the late 1950s and the 1960s did relatively open and critical public discussions on regionalism become possible in the Polish press. Leading spokesmen of the Kashubian movement (such as Lech Bądkowski, Tadeusz Bolduan) spearheaded new regional approaches, looking beyond the mainstream preoccupation with folk culture<sup>35</sup>. But even if regionalism attained more respectability from the late

1950s, it still needed to remain within and contribute to the national culture. Nevertheless, for some scholars, historical argumentation continued to emphasize specific regional characteristics.

### TOWARDS A POLISH “LANDESGESCHICHTE”?

The late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s represent the third period of regional history in the Western territories. In this period the historical legitimization of the post-war acquisitions lost its dominant role, though it remained important. Détente both in the general international scene and in Polish-German relations, in the context of the new West-German *Ostpolitik*, as well as the long-term integration of the Western territories into the Polish state, made it possible to consider them as integrated and ‘normal’ parts of Poland. Nevertheless, the Federal Republic of Germany refrained from acknowledging unambiguously Polish claims to the Western Territories, referring to the regions as “territories under Polish administration” in official discourse. Moreover, it was still considered necessary to enter into polemical debate with revisionists as well as German expatriates. An increasingly important consideration, however, was the “interior” propaganda of the Communist authorities: the modernization and improvements in the Western Territories since 1945 were to be presented not only as a Polish achievement, but as an achievement of the socialist political and economic system.

Unlike other communist countries of Eastern Europe such as Czechoslovakia or the GDR, in Poland science – including history – gained a fair measure of methodological autonomy from the late 1950s<sup>36</sup>. The national perspective continued to dominate the historical narrative, more so than in some neighbouring countries. On the other hand, the official Marxist perspective ceased to be an obligatory methodology even at the official level after October 1956, and the state and Party authorities did not dare to impose it again. The 1960s to the 1980s saw the establishment of new academic and educational institutions in the Western Territories. Since the inter-war period only two Polish academic institutions had paid attention to the problems of the Western Territories – the Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań and the Pedagogical Academy in Katowice. Immediately after the war, the University of Wrocław had been taken over by the Polish state, while the University of Lwów had been ceded to the Soviet Union. Around the same time the Nicholas Copernicus University of Toruń and the Pedagogical Academy of Gdańsk were founded, followed by the Pedagogical Academy at Wrocław in 1950, which was moved to Opole four years later. Further institutes of higher education were not established until the late 1960s, among them pedagogical academies at Olsztyn, Bydgoszcz, Szczecin, Słupsk (all 1969) and Zielona Góra (1971); but universities remained at the forefront of historical research. As late as 1968 the University of Silesia at Katowice was founded, followed by the University of Gdańsk (1970) and the University of Szczecin only in 1984.

Political circumstances and institutional development went hand-in-hand with new tendencies in historiographical research and production. Regional history's time had come, and there was an outpouring of works on the histories of regions and cities – works which had been discussed and planned for decades. Small towns and modern-day administrative units were addressed; but the most important and extensive works of synthesis were devoted to larger territories, including Silesia, Pomerania, Western Prussia, Masuria and Warmia<sup>37</sup>. The first major works were published on Silesia and Gdańsk, and in the 1990s were themselves subject to revisions with new conceptual ideas<sup>38</sup>.

There is strong continuity of the persons involved in the historiography of northern Poland, with many of the historians who had set the agenda in the post-war period were still active in the 1980s and even in some cases in the 1990s, such as Marian Biskup (born 1922) and Gerard Labuda. The older generation of historians was not swept away: indeed they took part in conceptual and methodological innovation. The most important of these innovations – at least in the context of the history of the Western Territories – was regionalization and partial denationalization. Those tendencies were expressed in two ways. First, the regional perspective came to rival the primacy of the national. Although the role and place of those regions within Polish national history still remained prominent, it had ceased by the 1970s and 1980s to be the central point of historical reflection. While issues such as contacts between Wrocław and Poland from the 14th to the 20th centuries, attitudes of the East Prussian elite towards Poland in the 17th century, and "Polish Gdańsk" were still studied, they were no longer essential. Already at the Congress of Polish Historians at Wrocław in 1948, Stanisław Zajączkowski (1890-1977), who specialised in the Teutonic Order in medieval Prussia, had argued against projecting present-day territorial realities onto the history of "Recovered Lands"<sup>39</sup>. But it was not until decades later that this idea was widely adopted. In the 1970s and 1980s monographs on Silesia, Prussia or Pomerania (but much less Warmia and Masuria) focused on the "internal" phenomena and processes in those lands, without a primary contextualization within Polish history or as a regional part of the national past.

Perhaps the best example of the boom in regional history is the multi-volume *Historia Pomorza* [History of Pomerania], edited by Gerard Labuda, and still in progress<sup>40</sup>. Based on the concept of Greater Pomerania (discussed above), an extended synthesis of the history of that region was first discussed in the 1960s, and today seems to be the most rigorously prepared and self-critical work of synthesis devoted to a region in Polish post-war historiography<sup>41</sup>. However, the concept of regionalization of Pomeranian history could only partly be realized in the volumes published since the late 1960s. Whereas some chapters regarded Pomerania and related territories (such as Outer Pomerania, Eastern Prussia, and so on) as autonomous historical subjects, other sections reflected the former Polono-centrism. Nevertheless, the *History of Pomerania* and the

concept itself have continued to influence Polish regional historiography, particularly – but not only – in the North, up to the present day<sup>42</sup>.

The second, interrelated, expression of the autonomization of regional history was the increased attention to the German aspects of the history of the Recovered Lands, and on past relations between Germany and the territories. While these problems had never been entirely overlooked, they were emphasised much less than Polish national themes. The first signs of this development came as early as immediately after the war, from Jan Rutkowski (1886-1949), a leading historian in Poznań and one of the most important organizers of Polish historiography in the Western Territories since 1945. Rutkowski urged that his fellow Polish historians should not neglect or deny the presence and importance of German culture in those lands, and so avoid repeating the faults of their German counterparts<sup>43</sup>. Confronting issues such as the German-speaking urban elites, and relations between German cultural centres became, by the 1980s, well established as topics of inquiry in Polish historiography. Moreover, such topics and problems have increasingly become regarded not in terms of those regions and “Germany”, but as an integral part of their past. In this sense, we may describe the recent trend as the formation of a Silesian, Pomeranian, Masurian *Landesgeschichte* in Polish historiography<sup>44</sup>.

In terms of changing concepts of ethnic and minority groups in the western regions, the Kashubians represent a special case. Since the beginning of the Kashubian movement, the history of the group has been important to Kashubian intellectuals interested in reflecting on senses of identity, especially during the 20th century; but it was not until the 1980s that the Polish medievalist Gerard Labuda adopted a more sophisticated approach, considering the history of the ethnic group from a national, state and regional perspective<sup>45</sup>. The newly-founded Kashubian institute at Gdańsk (1996) continues this work, although it veers towards topics such as the Kashubian movement and Kashubian literature.

## AFTER THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION

All these trends continued in the 1990s under the new political, cultural and ideological circumstances<sup>46</sup>. While the national perspective remains predominant in the public domain, there has nonetheless been an acceleration of the shift away from the national lens over the past twenty years. Alongside these trends, the historiography of the Recovered Lands has also been subject to the programmatic application of ‘European’ and ‘multicultural’ perspectives. The most prominent example of this is undoubtedly Gdańsk. The city – whose ‘national character’ in the past and present has been the subject of Polish-German dispute since the 19th century – was gradually recast as a theatre of Polish-German co-existence, and even as a city with great multicultural and European traditions. Thus, a new image of the city could be forged, important, amongst other things, for tourism. Polish-German contact and European integration in the general Baltic region could be legitimated through references to the past. Historians and

intellectuals as well as local and state representatives took part in this new appraisal of historical culture in Gdańsk, which culminated in the city's millennium in 1997<sup>47</sup>. The cultural 'melting pot' became a very popular metaphor in the 1990s. Even the leading Polish medievalist and former Polish education minister Henryk Samsonowicz<sup>48</sup> used the character of the bishop of Prague and martyr St Adalbert (died 997) – whose *Vita* (by Johannes Canaparius) mentioned the city for the first time 1000 years ago – to point out the European dimension of the city's history. By emphasizing the pilgrimage of Adalbert from Bohemia via Rome, France, Germany and Poland to old Prussia, Samsonowicz accentuated the international dimension of the patron saint. A German author, Reinhold Lehmann, wrote expressively: "Adalbert was completely European. How else could a Bohemian have become a Polish patron saint? Should a lobbyist for Polish access to the EU be sought for, this profile would suit him perfectly"<sup>49</sup>. Focus on the international and multicultural history of Gdańsk was not confined to the millennial celebrations: historians continue to explore these aspects and today they are prominent topics in both academic and popular historical production<sup>50</sup>.

A similar tendency can also be observed in former Outer Pomerania, with Szczecin as its centre<sup>51</sup>, or in Silesia and Wrocław<sup>52</sup>, where German-Polish cooperation or even trilateral German-Polish-Czech cooperation has become very fashionable among historians. In Warmia and Masuria, younger scholars have since the 1990s begun to emphasise the "multicultural roots" of the regional tradition. Such a form of consciousness was certainly conditioned by the fact that its propagators were the second or third generation of Polish post-war settlers in the region. Therefore they had a sense of Masurian and Warmian identity, but were also keenly aware of pre-war society and culture in the regions. Such notions as border, multiculturalism, and cultural transfer have become fashionable watchwords in the new perception of Warmian-Masurian traditions. It was little wonder that one of the most prominent speakers of this cultural and intellectual movement, the historian Robert Traba, depicted Masuria as a "landscape of a thousand borders"<sup>53</sup>. Moreover, the "repolonization" policy of the early post-war period as well as the myth of the "Recovered Lands" has been considered rather critically.

We are aware of the cultural and multi-ethnic past [of the region]. Representing Polish identity, we discover the local Prussian, German, native heritage at the same time, in order to show – remembering the tragedies of the 20th century – that we strive for a democratic Fatherland and appreciate the good of other nations.

So stated, in 1991, the first volume of the review "Borussia" which was connected with this cultural movement in Masuria<sup>54</sup>. Warmia and Masuria's diversity in ethnicity, religion, language and culture has been embraced by recent intellectual movements as a positive aspect regional identity, even if the new tendency has yet to percolate completely among the general public<sup>55</sup>.

The re-orientation of historical reflection towards regions and cities has been directly connected with general political demands for state decentralization. An ideological

support has been provided by the identity policy of the so-called *mała Ojczyzna* [small Fatherlands], something akin to the German *Heimat*, but which is completely absent from the vocabulary of other neighbouring political languages, such as Czech and Slovak. Since the 1990s the *mała Ojczyzna* has become a significant political concept, legitimizing regional and political identities within – though seldom against – the national state.

## CONCLUSIONS

As we have seen, Polish historiography and historical reflection on the “Recovered Lands” underwent a continuous and significant alteration. From the inter-war focus on the Polish character of the regions, historiography after 1945 was concerned with legitimizing the recent territorial changes: history had a national “social mission”. From the 1950s, while the national perspective remained important, historians’ concepts and publications became more sophisticated and coordinated. This trend was amplified in the following two decades, as historians increasingly concerned themselves with ‘internal’ and specific aspects of regional and local history. In these decades the *Landesgeschichte* in the Western and Northern territories incorporated in 1945 came into existence. As a continuation of that development, but at the same time as the result of the political and cultural change of 1989, the 1990s saw a concentration on multiculturalism, internationalism and Europeanism, without a complete abandonment of the national perspective.

Although in some respects the recent trends in the historiography of the “Recovered Lands” bears comparison with other European examples, it may be argued that the shift towards *Landesgeschichte* and the post-1989 developments are almost unique in a Polish context – at least in terms of intensity. However, similar trends are observable in regions like the former Galicia. Clearly, today the historiography of the “Recovered Lands” no longer has to fulfil a prescribed task on behalf of the state; but recent developments are no less a product of contemporary concerns as well as the specific heritage of these regions.



## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> On the territorial incorporations, see for example E. Kaszuba, *Dzieje Śląska po 1945 roku* [History of Silesia after 1945], in M. Czapliński, E. Kaszuba, G. Wąs, R. Żerelik (eds.), *Historia Śląska*, Wrocław 2002, pp. 423-462; P. Madajczyk, *Przylączenie Śląska Opolskiego do Polski, 1945-1948* [Annexation of the Opole Silesia into Poland, 1945-1948], Warsaw 1996; J. Hackmann (ed.), *Stettin/Szczecin, 1945-1946: Dokumente – Erinnerungen/Dokumenty – wspomnienia*, Rostock 1994; K. Kozłowski, *Pierwsze dziesięć lat władzy politycznej na Pomorzu Zachodnim, 1945-1955* [The First Ten Years of Political Rule in the Outer Pomerania, 1945-1955], Warsaw 1994.
- <sup>2</sup> See a paradigmatical monography by M. Wagner, *"Wir waren alle Fremde": Die Neuformierung dörflicher Gesellschaft in Masuren seit 1945*, Münster 2001; C. Osękowski, *Spółeczeństwo Polski zachodniej i północnej w latach, 1945-1956: Procesy integracji i dezintegracji* [The Society of Western and Northern Poland: Integrative and Desintegrative Processes], Zielona Góra 1994; E. Kaszuba, *Miedzy propagandą a rzeczywistością: Polska ludność Wrocławia w latach, 1945-1947* [Between Propaganda and Reality: the Polish population of Wrocław from 1945 to 1947], Wrocław 1997.
- <sup>3</sup> See J. Misztal, *Weryfikacja narodowościowa na Ziemiach Odzyskanych* [National Verification in the Recovered Lands], Warsaw 1990; J. Misztal, *Weryfikacja narodowościowa na Śląsku Opolskim* [National Verification in the Opole Silesia], Opole 1984; L. Belzyt, *Zum Verfahren der nationalen Verifikation in den Gebieten des ehemaligen Ostpreußen, 1945-1950*, in "Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands", 1990, 39, pp. 247-269; L. Belzyt, *Miedzy Polską a Niemcami: Weryfikacja narodowościowa i jej następstwa na Warmii, Mazurach i Powiślu w latach, 1945-1960* [Between Poland and Germany: National Verification and its Results in Warmia, Masuria and the Vistule region], Toruń 1998, pp. 63-73, 142-154.
- <sup>4</sup> D. Berlińska, *Mniejszość niemiecka na Śląsku Opolskim w poszukiwaniu tożsamości* [The German Minority in Opole Silesia in Search of Identity], Opole 1999.
- <sup>5</sup> As examples for Pomerania, Gdańsk and Western Prussia: S. Askenazy, *Gdańsk a Polska*, Warsaw 1918 (2nd ed. 1923, revised ed. 1997; German version: *Danzig und Polen*, Warschau 1919, 2nd ed., 1930); J. Fürst, *Der Widersinn des polnischen Korridors: Ethnographisch, geschichtlich und wirtschaftlich dargestellt*, Berlin 1926; J. Kaufmann, *Das Verhältnis der Deutschen, Polen und Kaschuben in Westpreußen und Danzig*, Danzig 1919; E. Keyser, *Die Bedeutung der Deutschen und Slawen für Westpreußen*, Danzig 1919; W. Recke, *Die polnische Frage als Problem der europäischen Politik*, Berlin 1927; W. Sobieski, *Walka o Pomorze* [The Struggle for Pomerania], Poznań 1928; W. Recke, *Der Kampf um Pommerellen: Krit. Bericht über das Buch von W. Sobieski*, Danzig 1936; F. Znaniecki, *Socjologia walki o Pomorze* [The Sociology of the Struggle for Pomerania], Toruń 1935; E. Keyser (ed.), *Der Kampf um die Weichsel: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des polnischen Korridors*, Stuttgart - Berlin - Leipzig 1926; A. Zelle, *100 Korridorthesen. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Polen*, Berlin 1933.
- <sup>6</sup> M. Niedzielska, *Toruń jako ośrodek nauki historycznej* [Toruń as a Centre of the Historical Science], in A. Tomczak (ed.), *Dzieje historiografii Pomorza Gdańskiego i Prus Wschodnich, 1920-1939 (1944)* [History of the Historiography of Eastern Pomerania and Eastern Prussia, 1920-1939 (1944)], Toruń 1922, p. 9.
- <sup>7</sup> Zaolzie was a former part of Austrian Silesia in the Region of Cieszyn (Czech Těšín, German Teschen) on the right bank of the river Olza (Olše), which became Czechoslovakian after 1919. According to the census of 1910, a large part of the population was Polish-speaking. A short conflict between Poland and Czechoslovakia took place in the region of Cieszyn in January 1919. At the end, the Allies negotiated the Czech-Polish frontier on the Olza, which favoured rather Czech interests and gave rise to a relatively large Polish minority in Czechoslovakia as well as to long-term political tensions between the two states in the inter-war period. In October 1938, shortly after the Treaty of Munich and encouraged by Germany, Poland annexed the region and attempted to maintain it even after the war. At the same time (1945-1946), the Czechoslovak authorities claimed rights to parts of Lower Silesia and the Kłodzko-Country. As late

- as 1958 both sides signed a new treaty in Warsaw, which regulated definitively these salient problems and acknowledged the frontier from the inter-war period. See, for example, M.K. Kamiński, *Konflikt polsko-czeski, 1918-1921* [The Polish-Czech conflict, 1918-1921], Warsaw 2001; S. Zahradnik, M. Ryczkowski, *Korzenie Zaolzia* [The Roots of Zaolze], Warsaw 1992; D. Gawrecki, *Politické a národnostní poměry na Těšínském Slezsku, 1918-1938* [Political and Ethnic Relations in Teschen-Silesia, 1918-1938], Český Těšín 1999.
- <sup>8</sup> However, that was absolutely not true for the region of Glatz/Kłodzko. This part of medieval Bohemia and pre-modern Silesia always remained – except for two or three years under Bolesław I around 1000 – outside the territory of Poland or the Piast Duchies in Silesia.
- <sup>9</sup> See, for example, M. Řezník, *Das Königliche Preußen in den deutsch-polnischen Auseinandersetzungen um den "Historischen Charakter" Pommerellens in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts*, in D. Willoewit, H. Lemberg (eds.), *Reiche und Territorien in Ostmitteleuropa: Historische Beziehungen und politische Herrschaftslegitimation*, Munich 2006, pp. 311-328.
- <sup>10</sup> Quoted after the DVD edition *Ziemie odzyskane* [Recovered Lands] in the series "Propaganda PRL-u" [Propaganda in the Peoples' Republic of Poland], published by Wytwarznia Filmów Dokumentalnych i Fabularnych (WFDiF), G. Ryby. Quoted after original subtitles in this edition.
- <sup>11</sup> E. Sukertowa-Biedrawina, *Polskość Mazurów i Warmiaków* [The Polishness of Masurians and Warmians], Olsztyn 1946; J. Mitkowski, *Pomorze Zachodnie w stosunku do Polski* [Farther Pomerania in Its Relation to Poland], Poznań 1946; K. Górski, *Polityczna rola Warmii w Rzeczypospolitej* [The Political Role of Warmia in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth], in "Przegląd Zachodni", 1949, 7/8, pp. 1-23; M. Pelczar, *Polski Gdańsk* [Polish Gdańsk], Gdańsk 1947; A. Wielopolski, *Elbag, dzieje i przyszłość* [Elbląg, Past and Future], Gdańsk - Bydgoszcz - Szczecin 1946; K. Piwarski, *Dzieje Prus Wschodnich w czasach nowożytnych* [History of Eastern Prussia in the Early Modern Period], Gdańsk 1946; W. Konopczyński, *Kwestia bałtycka do XX wieku* [The Baltic Question to the 20th Century], Gdańsk 1946.
- <sup>12</sup> For the historiography after the World War II, especially in the Recovered Lands, see J. Hackmann, *Ostpreußen und Westpreußen in deutscher und polnischer Sicht: Landeshistorie als beziehungsgeschichtliches Problem*, Wiesbaden 1996; M. Górny, *Przede wszystkim ma być naród: Marksistowskie historiografie w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej* [The Nation Shall Be Above All: Marxist Historiographies in East-Central Europe], Warsaw 2007; R. Stobiecki, *Historiografia PRL: ani dobra, ani mądra, ani piękna... ale skomplikowana: Studia i szkice* [Historiography in the People's Republic of Poland: Not good, not wise, not nice... but complicated: Studies and Sketches], Warsaw 2007.
- <sup>13</sup> See J. Sikorski, *Ośrodek Badań Naukowych im: Wojciecha Kętrzyńskiego i jego rola w olsztyńskim środowisku humanistycznym* [Wojciech-Kętrzyński-Institute of Research and Its Role in the Humanities' Centre at Olsztyn], Olsztyn 1986. See also W. Wrzesiński, *Olsztyńskie regionalne badania historyczne, 1945-1997* [Regional Historical Research at Olsztyn, 1945-1997], in "Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie", 1998, 1 (219), pp. 73-86.
- <sup>14</sup> E. Sukeertowa-Biedrawina, *Dawno i niedawno: Wspomnienia* [Long Ago And Not Long Ago: Memoirs], Olsztyn 1965.
- <sup>15</sup> Among the directors of the institute, leading Polish historians dealing with the Recovered Lands or the Polish-German relations have dominated: Zygmunt Wojciechowski 1945-1955 (the present-day Western Institute at Poznań is named after him), Kazimierz Piwarski 1956-1958, Gerard Labuda 1959-1961, Lech Trzeciakowski 1974-1978 and Antoni Czubiński 1978-1990.
- <sup>16</sup> Górny, *Przede wszystkim ma być naród* cit., p. 67.
- <sup>17</sup> See G. Labuda, *Zakład Historii Pomorza Instytutu Historii PAN* [The Centre of Pomeranian History of the Historical Institute of the Polish Science Academy], in "Kwartalnik Historyczny", 1953, 1, pp. 326-329.

- <sup>18</sup> P.O. Loew, *Danzig und seine Vergangenheit, 1793-1997: Die Geschichtskultur einer Stadt zwischen Deutschland und Polen*, Osnabrück 1997, p. 369.
- <sup>19</sup> J. Tyszkiewicz, *Sto wielkich dni Wrocławia: Wystawa Ziem Odzyskanych we Wrocławiu a propaganda polityczna ziem zachodnich i północnych w latach, 1945-1948* [Hundred Great Days of Wrocław: The Exhibition of the Recovered Lands at Wrocław and the Political Propaganda of the Western and Northern Lands, 1945-1948], Wrocław 1997.
- <sup>20</sup> Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., p. 267.
- <sup>21</sup> In 1454 a conflict between the Prussian estates and the Teutonic Order began. The nobility and towns withdrew their allegiance to the Order and asked the King of Poland to assume authority in Prussia. After some hesitation, Casimir IV supported the Prussian estates. At the end of the following Polish-Teutonic war and according to the Treaty of Toruń (1466), western parts of the Teutonic state including Gdańsk, Toruń, Elbląg and Warmia became Polish, and the Polish King obtained sovereignty over Teutonic East Prussia as a seignorial lord.
- <sup>22</sup> See for example the representative publication *Grunwald: 550 lat chwały* [Grunwald: 550 years of honour], ed. by J. St. Kopczewski, M. Suchniński, Warsaw 1960. In the same year, the famous novel of H. Sienkiewicz, *"The Crusaders"* was made into a film by Aleksander Ford. See L. Jockheck, *Ein Nationalmythos in "Eastman Color": Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg 1410 im polnischen Monumentalfilm Die Kreuzritter von Aleksander Ford*, in D. Albrecht, M. Thoemmes (eds.), *Mare Balticum: Begegnungen zu Heimat, Geschichte, Kultur an der Ostsee*, Munich 2005, pp. 133-168.
- <sup>23</sup> R. Blanke, *Polish-speaking Germans? Language and National Identity among the Masurians since 1871*, Cologne - Weimar - Vienna 2001.
- <sup>24</sup> In Silesia, the town Reichenbach (Rychbach in the polonized version) was renamed Dzierżoniów after the Polish priest Jan Dzierżoń (1811-1905), who was one of the most important persons worldwide in the development of beekeeping.
- <sup>25</sup> W. Gębik, *Pieśni ludowe Mazur i Warmii* [Folk Songs in Masuria and Warmia], Olsztyn 1956; E. Su-kertowa-Biedrawina, *Świadomość narodowa na Mazurach i Warmii w pieśni ludowej* [National Consciousness in Masuria and Warmia in Folk Songs], in "Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie", 1962, 1 (75), p. 11.
- <sup>26</sup> The only larger monograph of the ensemble is J. Myrcik, *Pół wieku „Śląska”: Zarys monograficzny Zespołu Pieśni i Tańca „Śląsk”* [A Half Century of "Śląsk": A Monographical Outline of the Song and Dance Ensemble "Śląsk"], Koszęcin 2004.
- <sup>27</sup> "Ziemie Staropolskie", vols. 1-6, Poznań 1948-1959.
- <sup>28</sup> E. Cieślak, *Miasto wierne Rzeczypospolitej (Szkice gdańskie, XVII – XVIII w.)* [A City True to the Commonwealth (Gdańsk Sketches, 17th - 18th cent.)], Warsaw 1959.
- <sup>29</sup> G. Labuda (ed.), *Dzieje Szczecina* [History of Szczecin], Warsaw 1963 - Szczecin 1998; S. Gierszewski (ed.), *Dzieje ziemi bytowskiej* [History of the Bytów/Bütow Land], Poznań 1972; G. Labuda, S. Hoszowski, *Szkice z dziejów Pomorza* [Sketches on the History of Pomerania], vol. 2, *Pomorze nowożytnie* [Early Modern Pomerania], Warsaw 1956; S. Matysik, *Dzieje Gdańska* [History of Gdańsk], in *Gdańsk, jego dzieje i kultura* [Gdańsk, its History and Culture], Warsaw 1969, pp. 29-128; W. Łęga, *Grudziądz, dzieje i kultura* [Grudziądz, History and Culture], Grudziądz 1950; M. Biskup (ed.), *Dzieje Chełmna i jego regionu: Zarys monograficzny* [History of Chełmno and Its Region: A Monographical Outline], Toruń 1968; W. Długoborski, J. Gierowski, K. Malecziński, *Dzieje Wrocławia do roku 1807* [History of Wrocław to the year 1807], Warsaw 1958; A. Wakar, *Olsztyn, 1353-1945*, Olsztyn 1971; M. Biskup (ed.), *Toruń dawny i dzisiejszy: Zarys dziejów* [The Old and The Present Toruń: An Outline History], Toruń 1983; J. Lindmajer, T. Machura (eds.), *Dzieje Łęborka* [History of Łębork], Poznań 1982; K. Górski, *Dzieje Malborka* [History of Malbork], Gdynia 1960.

- <sup>30</sup> Wojciechowski, a law historian and medievalist, propagated the idea of the Polish border on the Oder already in his monographs about Silesia and Prussia at the beginning of the 1930s: Z. Wojciechowski, *Ustrój polityczny Śląska do końca XIV wieku* [The political constitution of Silesia to the end of the 14th century], 1932; *Rozwój terytorialny Prus w stosunku do Polski* [The territorial development of Prussia in relation to Poland], Toruń 1933. His nationalist orientation and his connexions with the national democrats in the inter-war period provoked communist attacks on him and on the Western Institute in the Stalinist period. See M. Krzoska, *Für ein Polen an der Oder und Ostsee. Zygmunt Wojciechowski (1900–1955) als Historiker und Publizist*, Osnabrück 2003.
- <sup>31</sup> Z. Wojciechowski, *Słowo wstępne* [Introduction], in “Ziemie Staropolski” [The Lands of Ancient Poland], vol. 1, *Dolny Śląsk* [Lower Silesia], part 1, 2nd ed., Poznań 1950, pp. 10–11.
- <sup>32</sup> J. Hackmann, *Gerarda Labudy koncepcja historii Pomorza*, in “Przegląd Zachodnio-Pomorski”, 1994, 2, pp. 7–36.
- <sup>33</sup> C. Obracht-Prondzyński, *Kaszubi: Między dyskryminacją a regionalną podmiotowością* [The Kashubians: Between Discrimination and Regional Subjectivity], Gdańsk 2002, pp. 153–180.
- <sup>34</sup> A. Paczoska, *Oskarżeni o separatyzm: Działania tajnych służb PRL wobec działaczy kaszubskich w latach, 1945–1970* [Accused of Separatism: Activities of the Security Police Towards the Kashubian Activists, 1945–1970], in “Pamięć i sprawiedliwość”, Pismo IPN, 2004, 2 (6), pp. 205–233.
- <sup>35</sup> See “Życie i Myśl”, 1961, 3/4, pp. 75–119.
- <sup>36</sup> Stobiecki, *Historiografia* cit., pp. 163–183; J. Topolski, *Polish Historians and Marxism after World War II*, in “Studies in East European Thought”, 1992, 2, pp. 169–183.
- <sup>37</sup> S. Achremczyk, *Warmia i Mazury: Zarys dziejów* [Warmia and Masuria: Outline of History], Olsztyn 1985; W. Odyniec, *Dzieje Prus Królewskich, 1454–1772: zarys monograficzny* [History of the Royal Prussia, 1454–1772: A Monographical Outline], Warsaw 1972; W. Odyniec (ed.), *Dzieje Pomorza Nadwiślańskiego: Od VII wieku do 1945 roku* [History of the Vistule Pomerania: From the 7th Century to 1945], Gdańsk 1978.
- <sup>38</sup> “*Historia Śląska*” [History of Silesia], 3 vols., Wrocław 1960–1985. For Gdańsk: E. Cieślak, C. Biernat, *History of Gdańsk: Gdańsk 1988*, in E. Cieślak (ed.), *Historia Gdańska* [History of Gdańsk], vols. 1–2, Gdańsk 1978–1982 (other parts of this voluminous work followed in the 1990s).
- <sup>39</sup> S. Zajączkowski, *O periodyzacji dziejów Ziem Odzyskanych* [On the Periodization of History of the Recovered Lands], in “Pamiętnik VII powszechnego zjazdu historyków polskich we Wrocławiu 19–20 września 1948” [Proceedings of the 7th Polish Historians’ Congress at Wrocław, 19th–20th September 1948], vol. 1, Warsaw 1948, p. 21.
- <sup>40</sup> Since 2000/2001, the editorial and scientific coordination have been taken over by Stanisław Salmonowicz.
- <sup>41</sup> J. Hackmann, *Gerarda Labudy koncepcja historii Pomorza* [Gerard Labuda’s Concept of the History of Pomerania], in “Przegląd Zachodnio-Pomorski”, 1994, 2, pp. 7–36.
- <sup>42</sup> Id., *Ostpreußen* cit., pp. 285–290.
- <sup>43</sup> J. Rutkowski, *Zadania nauk historycznych w procesie zespalania duchowego ziem odzyskanych z Polską* [The Tasks of Historical Sciences in the Process of Spiritual Integration of the Recovered Lands with Poland], in “IV sesja Rady Naukowej dla zagadnień ziem odzyskanych”, 18–21 XII 1946 [4th Session of the Scientific Council for the Problems of the Recovered Lands, 18th–21st Dec. 1946], Vol. 2, Kraków 1947, p. 68. See also Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., pp. 263f.
- <sup>44</sup> Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., pp. 290–304.
- <sup>45</sup> G. Labuda, *Historia Kaszubów na tle historii Pomorza* [History of the Kashubians on the Background of the History of Pomerania], Gdańsk 1992 (a simultaneous edition in Polish, Kashubian, English and German).

- <sup>46</sup> There were also significant developments at the institutional level. For example, since the 1990s several universities have been established, partly from the former high schools and pedagogical academies: the University of Opole in 1994, the University of Warmia and Masuria at Olsztyn in 1999, the University of Zielona Góra in 2001 and, most recently, the Casimir the Great University at Bydgoszcz in 2005.
- <sup>47</sup> R. Rexheuser, *Deutsche Geschichte als polnisches Problem: Beobachtungen zum tausendjährigen Jubiläum in Danzig* 1997, in M. Weber (ed.), *Deutschlands Osten – Polens Westen: Vergleichende Studien zur geschichtlichen Landeskunde*, Frankfurt 2001, pp. 253-276; Loew, *Danzig* cit., pp. 516-522.
- <sup>48</sup> In the 1989-90 cabinet of Tadeusz Mazowiecki.
- <sup>49</sup> Quoted by A. Krzemiński, Św. Wojciech, *Otto III i książę Bolesław/Der hl. Adalbert, Otto III. und Herzog Boleslaw*, in "Dialog", 1997, 11, pp. 20f.
- <sup>50</sup> E.g. M. Dymnicka, Z. Opacki (eds.), *Tożsamość miejsca i ludzi: Gdańszczanie i ich miasto w perspektywie historyczno-socjologicznej* [The Identity of Place and People: The Inhabitants of Gdańsk in the Historical-Sociological Perspective], Warsaw 2003, a volume published as a result of the First World Gdańsk Reunion, a great festivity which took place in May 2002.
- <sup>51</sup> See especially J. M. Piskorski (ed.), *Pomorze Zachodnie poprzez wieki* [Pomerania Through the Centuries], Szczecin 1999 (the German version of this common work of Polish and German historians: *Pommern im Wandel der Zeiten*, Szczecin 1999); J.M. Piskorski, B. Wachowiak, E. Włodarczyk, *Szczecin: Zarys historii* [Szczecin: An Outline History], Poznań 1993.
- <sup>52</sup> Z. Kłodnicki (ed.), *Dziedzictwo kultury Dolnego Śląska* [Cultural Heritage of Lower Silesia], Wrocław 1996; Wrocław. *Dziedzictwo wieków* [Wrocław. Heritage of Centuries], Wrocław 1997.
- <sup>53</sup> R. Traba, *Kraina tysiąca granic: Szkice o historii i pamięci* [Landscape of a Thousand Borders: Sketches on History and Memory], Olsztyn 2003.
- <sup>54</sup> "Borussia", 1991, 1.
- <sup>55</sup> E.g. S. Achremczyk, *Historia Warmii i Mazur* [History of Warmia and Masuria], 2nd ed., Olsztyn 1997; E. Kruk, *Warmia i Mazury* [Warmia and Masuria], Wrocław 2004.

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