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This chapter explores the history of the political and diplomatic relations between England and the Hanseatic League in the late 14th to the middle of the 15th centuries. The chapter argues that the history of Anglo-Hanseatic relations has been neglected in favour of the history of the Hundred Years’ War in the English-language historical literature, despite its demonstrated significance in other European literature. The chapter describes the diplomatic relations of the kingdom of England and the Hanseatic League and demonstrates that the English merchant class had considerable influence on English foreign policy in the Baltic (though the Royal administration always sought to find a peaceful solution to conflicts with the League). The chapter also argues that the English merchant class found a measure of cohesion over the implementation of a programme of parity in Anglo-Hanseatic relations which succinctly summarised the interests of domestic and overseas English merchants. The English merchants successfully exploited internal divisions in the League, but were eventually defeated themselves by the breakdown in national English cohesion caused by the Wars of the Roses.

The economic and political relations between the Hanseatic League and the kingdom of England in the 14th and early 15th centuries are still far from a standard part of English historiography. The situation has only marginally improved since Philippe Dollinger remarked in 1970:

There has been no general study of the Hansa in England since A. Weimer’s [sic] contribution to the Cambridge Medieval History (1932), despite the importance of Anglo-Hanseatic relations for nearly five hundred years.

There are still remarkably few studies written in English of the relations between the Hanseatic League and England. A search in the Library of Congress Catalogue under the keywords Hanseatic League, Hanse Towns, and Hanseatic League History produced 349 hits, but only eight entries were in English, reflecting a very low awareness of the impact of the League among English historians. A similar search in the International Medieval Bibliography for articles published in English on the Hanseatic League produced only 48 articles published since 1967. Only 18 of these deal with the Hanseatic League and its relations with the British Isles. This admittedly rough impression of the situation does ignore interesting work, such as John Munroe’s study of Anglo-Hanseat-
ic relations c. 1450-1510, but it is clear that Dollinger’s complaint is still as valid today as it was in 1970.

This is all the more surprising considering the fact that the historiography of the Hanseatic League and its influence in northern Europe in languages other than English is simply too large to cover in detail in this chapter. The League’s influence extended all over Northern Europe and the Baltic where it was a major player in economic and political developments from the middle of the 13th to the 17th centuries. Not only has the Hansischer Geschichtsverein published the Hansische Geschichtsblätter since 1871, but several series of publications have been ongoing since 1875. The minutes of the meetings of the German Hanse can be studied in good modern editions and studies by Karl Koopmann, Wilhelm Stieda, Dietrich Schäfer, Ernst Daenell, Walther Stein, Walther Vogel, Fritz Rörig, Erik Arup, Paul Johansen, Akesver von Brandt and Aksel E. Christensen from the late 19th and the 20th centuries provide more than an outline of the Hanseatic League’s international relations.

The starting point in any study of Anglo-Hanseatic relations must be Lappenberg’s 1851 study of the history of the Hanseatic Kontor, the Steelyard in London, combined with the primary sources collected in Kunze’s Hanseakten aus England [Hanseatic sources from England]. More synthetic works include Georg Schanz’s study of English trade and politics and Ernst Daenell’s study of the flowering of the Hanseatic League. Friedrich Schulz’s 1911 study of Anglo-Hanseatic relations is still essential, as is Louise von Winterfeld’s biography of Tidemann Limberg, one of the earliest [and the only successful] financiers of the Hundred Years’ War between England and France. These studies should be complemented by Michael Postan’s and Eileen Power’s work, particularly Postan’s articles on the Hanse, and also the work of Elizabeth Carus-Wilson. In later years important studies include monographs by Klaus Friedland, T.H. Lloyd and Stuart Jenks’ three-volume study of the period. Apart from these studies, for the purpose of illuminating the relations between the Hanse and England, the political history of the League and the Scandinavian kingdoms are of particular importance. A summary of Scandinavian research can be found in the minutes of the eleventh Nordiske Historikermøde [Nordic historians’ meeting] in Århus, 1956. This may be supplemented by relevant articles in Kulturhistorisk Leksikon for Nordisk Middelalder [Cultural history dictionary for the Nordic middle ages] which also provide excellent bibliographies. Aksel E. Christensen wrote a number of studies of Danish-Hanseatic relations in the period, excellently summarised in Kai Horby and Michael Wenge, Tiden 1340-1648 [The period 1340-1648], vol. 2 of Danmarks historie, exec. ed. Axel E. Christensen, et al. which also contains a bibliography which attempts to list the most important studies of the previous century and a half.

For most of the 20th century the political and economic relations between the Hanse and England have taken second or even third place in the attentions of British historians. Instead, they have preferred to focus on the spectacular events of the Hundred Years’ War and its social, political and economic impact on the kingdom of England and the impact of England’s participation in the growing European wool trade. The history
of the interaction of the Hanseatic League and England is therefore still in its infancy and the following offers a start in the field. The history of England and the Hanseatic League is particularly relevant to the theme of this volume because Anglo-Hanseatic conflict tended to focus around rights and privileges in the geographical area of the Baltic and the North Sea. Thus this subject will allow us to investigate the way in which ‘traditional’ nation states, with government institutions such as royal councils and parliamentary institutions that can easily be understood by modern observers, interacted with one of the fore-fathers of today’s European Union, the Hanseatic League.

**The Purpose of This Chapter**

This chapter investigates the political and diplomatic efforts of certain interest groups and individuals to maintain and protect their economic and political interests in England and within the geographical area of the Hanseatic League. From the perspective of the English, efforts focussed on gaining access to trade in the Baltic. For the members of the League the question was how to preserve or enhance the privileged Hanseatic trading position in England. Throughout this contribution I shall be referring to the “Hanseatic League,” an institution that has caused much confusion by its nature. The Hanseatic League is often erroneously referred to as the ‘German Hanse’. This appellation may be technically correct in the sense that the language spoken by most of the League was German, but it gives a false impression of the League as a tool of German nationhood or Imperial policies. Indeed, the language employed for the most part by the Hanseatic League was Middle Low German, a language which grew into, or heavily influenced, the languages now spoken in the Northern areas of Germany, Belgium, Scandinavia and the Low Countries, not the Middle High German that has developed into modern German. The adjectives used to describe these two languages, hoch and plat, refer to the geographical features of the areas where they are spoken: the mountainous South and the plains and moors of the North. The appellation ‘German Hanse’ therefore refers to the linguistic, not the political, affiliation of the League.

**First Conflict: The Poundage of 1372**

During the reigns of the English kings Edward II (1307-1327) and Edward III (1327-1377) the Hanseatic League built up and secured an impressive array of privileges. It was the only group to retain the rights granted to all foreign merchants under the *Carta Mercatoria* (1307); the League’s merchants were granted an exemption from new wool subsidies and from increases in the wool customs levied for Edward III’s wars in France; they were granted the right to trade directly with the English producers of wool; and they were allowed the right to form their own guilds in England, provided that they elected a native Englishman as the head of all the Hanseatic guilds in England. This made it possible for the Hanseatic League to export profitable goods from England to Hanseatic areas more cheaply than native English merchants. As English trade in the
Baltic increased in the 1360s and 1370s, the fact that English merchants did not enjoy similar privileges in Hanseatic areas attracted increasing criticism in England.

The first recorded clash over these privileges dates from 1375. The conflict was occasioned by the arrival of a Hanseatic delegation that had come to London to negotiate the position of the members of the League in relation to a new wool subsidy or ‘poundage’ granted by parliament in 1372. Members of the League claimed an exemption from new impositions and therefore a group of English merchants resident in England who wished to limit Hanseatic liberties in England joined forces with a group of English overseas merchants (Merchant Adventurers) who wanted to open up the Hanseatic markets in the Baltic, particularly the Scania fairs. The League had gained control over these as a consequence of the Peace of Stralsund (1370) and had tried to limit non-Hanseatic involvement with these and as a consequence English merchant adventurers presented a petition to the aged King Edward III which enumerated ‘abuses’ which English merchants were subject to in areas under Hanseatic control in the Baltic. The king passed their petition on to the Hanseatic delegation who, in their turn, referred the plaintiffs to the next meeting of the member cities of the Hanse in Lübeck, but no serious negotiations were entered into about this problem.

Nor did the Hanseatic delegation enter into serious negotiations about the other substantial question, the poundage of 1372, because it was discontinued only six days after their arrival on 23 September 1375. Thus, the question of whether or not the Hanse should be exempt from tonnage and poundage was not resolved when the delegation left England, taking with them as an indication of Edward III’s continuing good will some relics of St. Thomas of Canterbury which were to be placed in a newly built chapel for the martyr in Lübeck. Another confrontation over Hanseatic privileges was therefore inevitable.

**NEW OPPORTUNITIES: THE ACESSION OF RICHARD II, 1377**

The English merchants’ petition of 1375 had identified issues around which subsequent Anglo-Hanseatic conflicts would revolve for at least the next sixty years. It also presented a political programme that was eminently understandable and succinctly formulated. ‘Full parity in Anglo-Hanseatic relations’ summarised the aims both of the merchant adventurers who were genuinely interested in obtaining trade privileges in the Hanseatic areas, particularly in the Baltic and those of the large native English guilds whose sole aim was to exclude the Hanseatic League from England so that English merchants could enjoy the profits of the wool trade and the trade in Baltic goods in England for themselves. The inevitable confrontation came with the accession of the ten-year-old Richard II in 1377. Revoking all charters contrary to the charter of London – among which were the charters of the Hanseatic League – King Richard II (or rather his royal council) at the request of the commons, ordered an investigation into the ‘abuses’ of the League. A petition had named the League as the architects behind the rising prices of Baltic goods, and Richard’s council saw that by complying with the suggestions of the petition he could secure the good will of the London merchants.
The wealthy London merchants seized the opportunity to establish a monopoly controlling the English trade in Baltic goods. Although the monopoly brought wealth to its members, it also contributed to an even higher rise in the prices of Baltic goods than those for which the League had been responsible, a fact which was crucial for the eventual restitution of the Hanseatic charters. When the Hanseatic Kontor in London did not receive an answer to his request for a copy of the petition which would enable the League to draw up a defence against the accusations, it was decided to hand the matter over to the next Hansatag in Lübeck in May 1378. At this meeting it was decided to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict, although the grand master of the Order of the Teutonic Knights, strongly supported by the Prussian cities, advocated radical measures against the English. For the sake of Hanseatic unity the grand master and the Prussian cities promised to abstain from any reprisals until Martinmas, and instead the Hanse sent letters to the English king and council and to the London guilds who had originally presented the petition to the king.

However, before the League received an answer to its letters, a new petition, this time favourable to Hanseatic merchants, was presented in Parliament. In this new petition, a group of merchants not belonging to the monopoly on Baltic trade drew attention to the fact that the new monopoly had failed to check the increase in the price of Baltic goods and requested the restitution of the Hanseatic charters. Following the recommendations of this new petition, the royal council promised to restore the Hanse to its former privileges. However, in accordance with the wishes of the London merchants, certain conditions were included which the Hanse had to meet before a full restitution of privileges could be made. The Hanse was requested to draw up a list of cities that were members of the League and to guarantee by sealed letters from each member of the Hanse that English merchants would be ‘amicably’ treated, i.e. allowed to trade freely, in all areas under Hanseatic control and be treated like native merchants in matters of Hanseatic customs and subsidies.

On 17 May, 1379, the Prussian members of the League met in the castle of the Teutonic Knights to discuss (among other things) their response to the English demands before the Hansatag in Lübeck, and there they decided to reject them and to work for a total embargo against the English until the London Kontor had received its charters back. However, the full Hansatag decided not to follow the Prussian suggestions until all other solutions to the problem had been exhausted. It was decided, however, that if negotiations had not been reopened before Shrovetide 1380 the Hanse would implement three sanctions against the English. Under the penalty of a fine of 10 gold marks, Hanseatic merchants were to be instructed not to trade with the English or to travel to England; the London Kontor would close and move to Bruges; and the Hanseatic officials in Scania and Norway would be instructed not to protect English merchants in the areas of their jurisdiction against robbery and murder. To avoid this happening, the Hansatag appointed a delegation under the leadership of Jakob Pleskow from Lübeck and Johan Kordelitz from Thorn to negotiate with the English. The two men arrived in London toward the end of November 1379, and, although they were un-
By the time Kordelitz and Thorn left London in January 1380, the English had demonstrated that they were willing to make concessions, and negotiations continued between the London Kontor and the English authorities. These eventually led to the re-confirmation of the Hanseatic privileges, which took place at an official ceremony at Westminster, where representatives of the Kontor received a copy of the charters in the presence of Simon Sudbury, the chancellor, Thomas, Bishop of Exeter, the king’s treasurer, John de Fordham, keeper of his privy seal, William de Dighton, John de Wendlingburgh, and others … on condition that English merchants when they come into their parts (i.e. Hanseatic areas) with merchandise should be as amicably and fairly treated there, and be allowed to traffic as freely as by the liberties contained in the above charter the Almains exercise their trade here.

In order to protect the English against reprisals in spite of the agreement, a clause was included in the memorandum quoted above to the effect that the Hanseatic privileges would be revoked if anything contrary to the charter was done to any Englishman in any way.

CONTINUED TENSIONS AND COMPLICATIONS

Although the League had its privileges back, the grand master of the order of the Teutonic Knights continued to harass English merchants, and, as late as 24 June, 1381, the Hansatag, seeking to avoid further antagonism of the English, commanded the grand master to remove the new Puntgeld (poundage) that was levied on English merchants in Prussia. The tense situation was not helped by the English Peasants’ Revolt in 1381, during which the rebels executed all the low-German speakers they could round up. However, the situation was saved by the quick reaction of the Hanseatic Kontor, who sent a letter two days after the revolt assuring the grand master that they had received protection from their English Vrenden during the revolt and that they were all safe.

The protection received from individual London merchants did not prevent Anglo-Hanseatic relations from deteriorating during the next four years, and 1385 saw the beginnings of the most serious conflict between the Hanseatic League and England in the 14th century. The League was becoming increasingly bullish about the issue of piracy. When English pirates captured a Hanseatic fleet off Zwijn and the English authorities refused to help Hanseatic merchants to gain restitution for their losses a series of mutual reprisals brought trade between England and the League to a virtual stand-still: indeed, reprisals in Prussia forced the English merchants’ colony in Danzig to move to the less hostile Stralsund. Nevertheless, even that measure proved ineffectual in preventing reprisals against English merchants in the Baltic: when the crisis reached its peak around 1388 and threatened to develop into open war, the English merchants had their goods confiscated by the Stralsund authorities. Neither the League nor the English government were interested in war, and the English government decided that
it had for too long ignored the potential dangers of the policy of the native merchants. A delegation was sent to Prussia to negotiate, and in three months a treaty was ready. The treaty contained a concession to the English: they were allowed to form a guild in Danzig, and although the guild was not to enjoy the same privileges as the Kontor in London, it was definitely a good starting point for further English expansion into the Prussian areas\textsuperscript{36}.

\textbf{INCREASED FRICTION (I): THE CITIES OF THE EASTERN QUARTER OF THE LEAGUE AND ENGLAND}

English concentration on one geographical area of the Hanseatic League was the foundation of English political success in the confrontations between the two, and the main cornerstone of the eventual English success in breaking Hanseatic unity. Because of the confirmation of the Hanseatic charters in 1388 in England, the members of the eastern part of the League faced English competition alone. English merchants had settled in towns such as Elbing, Danzig and Stralsund, where they were initially well received because of the large number of English knights involved in the crusades against the pagan Lithuanians\textsuperscript{37}. However, soon their activities threatened eastern Hanseatic interests and the English were not only prohibited from trading outside the towns, but also from trading with other foreigners and from hiring Hanseatic ships. Other members from the western parts of the League had no interest in a conflict with the English while their trade with England went unimpeded. The English took advantage of the situation, and, acting within the agreement of 1388, increasingly made their present felt in the Baltic, by increasing their retail trade and entering into partnerships with local Hanseatic merchants. Their main centre of activity was Danzig where they established a Kontor or a guild with its own laws, aldermen and governor, as the League had already done in London. The first governor, John Bebys from London, was appointed by King Richard II in 1391\textsuperscript{38}. In contrast to Hanseatic merchants in London, English merchants in Danzig brought over their wives and families. This was seen as a wish by the English to settle permanently in the town and regarded as an open provocation by the Danzigers. Fearing the lawlessness of a permanent foreign settlement which could claim exemption from municipal jurisdiction, they insisted that the English should at least appear to be travelling merchants\textsuperscript{39}. Financially the English were successful. They soon controlled a substantial proportion of foreign trade, and this financial success encouraged Prussian merchants to work for the protection of their own interests in the face of mounting foreign, mainly English, competition.

The English concentration on one area of the Hanse was the foundation of their political success in their confrontations with the Hanse, and the main reason behind their later successful attempts to break Hanseatic unity. Prussia had to face English competition alone and the other areas of the Hanse saw no interest in a conflict with the English at that time, especially since their trade with England went unimpeded through the confirmation of the Hanseatic charters in 1388. In 1398, pressure on the grand master
by the cities of the Baltic coast to restrict the privileges of the English forced the grand master to terminate the treaty with the English\textsuperscript{10}. Although the proposed restrictions were not enforced immediately, they created friction between the Prussians and the English. When the diet decided to attempt a final confrontation over the English trade to the interior of the country in 1402, the possibility of war presented itself again. Prussia had urged the other members of the Hanseatic League to use this weapon time and time again but to no avail. English trade did not threaten the interests of the other Hanse members, and their trade in English cloth was a main source of income. In the end, however, the Hanse was united against the English by the actions of English privateers\textsuperscript{41}.

**Increased Friction (II): Internal Tension in the League**

English privateers had been active in the English Channel for years, but they had mainly concentrated their attention on French enemy ships and allowed neutral ships to pass. However, by the beginning of the 15th century the broadening of the term ‘enemy’ also to include ships going to or from – or carrying cargo for merchants from – enemy lands, meant that Hanseatic cargoes came within the grasp of the English privateers. They seized the opportunity of securing an extra income with eager hands\textsuperscript{42}. The League’s answer to the situation was prompt and classic. At a diet held at Lübeck in March 1405, the League decided in favour of a prohibition against exports to England of Baltic goods and a total prohibition against any form of commercial intercourse between the two areas, a move which, correctly, was interpreted as the overture to a war with England\textsuperscript{43}.

But war did not come. Although a war would have suited certain interests in Prussia by supplying them with an excuse for what they hoped would be the final confrontation with English merchants, the real interest of Prussia, the Hanseatic League and the English kingdom was against a war. Prussia might resent English competition but Prussia could not do without English cloth, and English cloth inevitably meant English merchants. The English could not do without Baltic goods, and although they were loath to admit it, the English had discovered in 1378 that the Hanseatic merchants supplied the goods cheaper and on a more regular basis than the English merchants\textsuperscript{44}. While the Hanseatic league would suffer severe economic losses through the loss of its incomes from the trade in English cloth and the import of Baltic goods into England, the English would not feel the effects of an embargo so much since they could still sell their cloth in the fairs of Flanders and buy Baltic goods from middlemen. Consequently the embargo was never complete and the inner contradictions in the Prussian cities between the majority who were threatened by the English expansion and the large minority who benefited from the export of their goods to England soon severely threatened Hanseatic unity\textsuperscript{45}. For this reason, only a few months after the implementation of the embargo, the Prussian towns suggested its discontinuation at the diet at Falsterbo in 1405, and although the Bruges Kontor exhorted the diet to hold out, the Prussian towns soon after broke ranks and re-established trade with the English on their own accord\textsuperscript{46}.
Premodern Diplomatic Practices

An English delegation arrived in Prussia in 1405 and a draft treaty between Prussia and England was ready in October of that year. Thus, for the first time in the history of Anglo-Hanseatic relations, the English were successful in breaking Hanseatic unity. Despite the advice of the Bruges Kontor, and in the face of the rest of the Hanseatic towns, Prussia concluded a separate truce with England, and to top it all, the treaty was the most far-reaching yet. The Prussians recognised the right of the English to trade in the Baltic and even admitted to the principle of full parity in the relations between the two areas. The English could come to Prussia to:

- trade in a free manner both with Prussians and others of whatever nation of faith they may be
- exchange goods and stay there and to return from thence to their bases and homes.

In spite of their success in breaking Hanseatic unity, the English were forced by other political developments to attempt to placate the Hanse. In 1405 and again in 1407 John, Duke of Burgundy, offered a place in an anti-English alliance to the Hanseatic League. Had this alliance come into being, it would have closed the continent to English cloth. Faced with this danger, the English government had no other option than to yield and offered to negotiate about compensation for the losses of Hanseatic merchants in the hands of English pirates.

The treaty of 1405 was an important victory for the English merchants and marked the end of Hanseatic unity in the League’s relations with England. It was not until the English merchant class was weakened by the lawlessness of the War of the Roses that the Hanseatic league regained their earlier strength, and from this time it was Prussia which gave in more easily to English pressure. Prussia and England became the principal actors in the ensuing conflicts. This break in Hanseatic unity came about for a variety of reasons. In the previous period we have seen how the Prussians acted as spokesmen for the most radical measures against the English, but increased commercial intercourse between the two areas gradually made Prussia more dependent on her exports to England and the economic activity of English merchants inside the country itself. There was no significant increase in the economic activity between the rest of the League and England, and consequently they were more hesitant to conclude treaties with the English since they could afford to wait until they were offered what they considered to be the right terms. Political developments, too, were favourable to this. A series of democratic revolutions paralysed the Westphalian towns in the years 1408-10, which seriously weakened the vigour of the central and western members of the Hanseatic League. Furthermore, the new grand master of the order of the Teutonic Knights, Heinrich von Plauen, wished to strengthen the power of the order relative to the secular interests in the country, a wish which led him to try to use the English merchants as a kind of leverage against the merchants of Prussia. It was his hope that, by encouraging English trade, he would strengthen the financial and political position of the order through the increased competition for Prussian merchants, which would both divert the powers of the towns and replete the coffers of the order. Although the treaty of 1405 acknowledged the principle of reciprocity in the relations between England and the Hanse, the wording of it was too imprecise to satisfy the more radical
English merchants who clamoured for full parity, while for precisely the same reason it frightened the Danzigers who feared that the English would finally succeed in their attempts to re-form their guild in Danzig.

**THE LEGAL POSITION OF THE ENGLISH MERCHANTS IN DANZIG**

Richard II had appointed an alderman of the English merchants’ guild in Danzig as early as 1391. But the Prussians had successfully resisted the guild’s formal acknowledgement. With the official termination of the 1388 treaty in February, 1398, the English merchants in Prussia were included under the provisions of the *Gastenrecht* which demanded that they report to a hostel and sell their goods within forty days of their arrival in Prussia. As such, they also lost their privilege to be tried by their own tribunals and had to use the Danzig courts where their disputes would be settled under Hanseatic law. This would change if they were allowed the right to establish their own guild and would put the English merchants outside the control of the Hanseatic authorities: English merchants would be able to claim the right to be tried by more favourable English guildsmen, should they be brought before the law. Clearly this was not in the interests of the towns and they vigorously resisted the implementation of any law allowing greater freedom for the English.

The Teutonic Knights were defeated by the Poles at the battle of Tannenberg in 1410, a defeat which ended the order’s successful domination over the Prussian towns and fatally weakened their ability to dictate Hanseatic policy in the English question. A taste of what was to come occurred soon after: the mayor of Danzig passed a decree terminating the English merchants’ rights to trade with other foreigners, i.e. merchants from outside Danzig, but fortunately for the English the grand master was still able to exercise his authority and the decree was quickly revoked. However, this was to be the last time the grand master interceded on behalf of the English, as the pro-English Heinrich von Plauen was deposed by an internal revolt in the order in 1413. The new grand master, Michael Kuchmeister von Sternberg, did not actively engage in the confrontations between the English and the Prussians, being too occupied with maintaining his position inside the order. However, surprisingly, the next confrontation between the League and the English was the work of the London merchants.

**THE DISPUTE OVER “SCOT AND LOT” (1418-1426)**

In 1418 the London city council decided that members of the League were to pay ‘Scot and Lot’ with the rest of the city, an obligation from which the Hanse of course claimed exemption under their charters. The dispute was initially heard before the Lord Mayor’s court, which decided against the decision of the city council, but two years later London sheriffs pleaded against the Lord Mayor’s court’s decision at the king’s council which over-ruled the Lord Mayor’s court. To underline the city’s support of the council’s decision the London aldermen refused to appoint an English alderman for the Hansatic
guild in direct defiance of the Hanse’s ancient charters. For the next two years the case rested: the Hanse was forced to pay the impositions from which it considered itself exempt while the English merchants in the Baltic were still denied the right to their own guild. According to a Hanseatic complaint of 1423 the troubled relations between the Hanse and the English merchants were due to the agitation of the English merchants who were resentful of the Hanseatic charters; in particular the petition pointed to the agitation of the London merchants. The Hanse apparently misjudged the extent of its unpopularity, for it is clear from surviving documents that many other English merchants vigorously opposed the Hanseatic privileges and that anti-Hanseatic agitation was widespread. We even possess the accounts of the expenses of such a campaign in the town of Lynn, and it is not at all unlikely that the unspecified lobbying for which the York Merchants Adventurers paid an unnamed royal official in 1419 is connected with this clash between the Hanse and England.

The English government saw and used the political opportunities of the situation. Although it was bound by custom to renew the Hanseatic charters, it was decided to force the Hanseatic merchants to pay tonnage and poundage for their goods like all other aliens, and this ruling was considered a success for the principle of full parity in Anglo-Hanseatic relations, although it was more the expression of the crown’s financial needs than of a genuine understanding of the merchants’ political aims. In pursuance of this policy Henry V wrote a letter to the grand master of the Teutonic Knights in which he complained about the lack of parity in Anglo-Prussian relations. The grand master sent his usual friendly, but firm reply that the Prussians did not enjoy any particular privileges in England but that they shared the privileges of all Hanseatic merchants in England. Furthermore, he assured the king that English merchants were, as always, welcome to trade in Prussia.

There were reactions to this letter and the developments in England in the Hanseatic cities. But these were neither as concerted nor as efficient as they had been before. The Prussians continued their attempts at excluding the English from markets and areas under their control and they attempted to enforce the ancient rules regulating the rights of foreign merchants to trade with the ‘foreigns’, i.e. the non-Hanseatic merchants in Prussia, the old rules regulating the English guild and to exclude the English from the retail trade in Prussia. But when the diet in Lübeck suggested the imprisonment of all English merchants and the confiscation of all their goods as reprisals for the English infringement of the Hanseatic charters in England the Prussian towns – with the approval of the grand master of the Order of the Teutonic Knights – ignored the suggestion and continued their trade with the English. Because of the war between the Wendish members of the Hanse and the Danish Kingdom, which flared up again in 1420, the passage through the Øresund was becoming increasingly difficult. The cities of the Eastern Quarter therefore needed all the income they could get from foreign trade. This forced them to encourage all trade regardless of its nationality and, faced with the threat of Flemish measures against the English export of cloth, which would close the only other continental outlet for English wool, even the English government...
was interested in keeping the Prussian back door open, should these become effective. This situation encouraged a number of reconciliatory measures from the English in the period of 1426-30.

**Reconciliatory Moves by the English Government and Increased Tension with the Danes, 1426-1430**

In February, 1426, the English government retracted its earlier endorsement of the London council’s refusal to appoint an English alderman for the Steelyard, and commanded the council to appoint one at once. After seven months’ procrastination and another command from the King’s Council, the Londoners finally conceded. To further underline the government’s good will towards the League, it decided in favour of the Hanseatic merchants in the case of the imposition of the Scot and Lot, and specifically exempted the Hanseatic merchants from most local dues in England. As a result, the merchants of the Steelyard promised to intercede on behalf of the English merchants in their struggle with the grand master in Prussia over the corporate rights of the English in the Prussian towns. The Steelyard’s efforts were not in vain: although the grand master would not allow an English merchants’ guild in Prussia, he granted the English the right to a governor to govern the affairs of the English merchants in Prussia. Following this move, a Prussian delegation arrived in London in 1429 to negotiate further instalments of the compensations to Hanseatic victims of English piracies contained in the treaty of 1409. The delegation was unsuccessful in its primary objective, the payment of the long over-due compensations, but obtained an important grant of freedom from taxation in England not specifically mentioned in their charter.

However, for a second time the English government’s policy of reconciliation was crossed by the interests of the merchants abroad and at home. The English in Danzig, claiming full parity, were not satisfied by the appointment of the governors, and at home the merchants engaged in foreign trade prepared for another confrontation with the Hanse. As before, the confrontation was brought about through the conjunction of national and international events. In 1427, the war between the Wendish towns and the Danish Kingdom was resumed. Warnings were issued to all Hanseatic merchants not to go through Danish waters since the Wends planned to blockade the Øresund to prevent supplies reaching the Danes. English merchants chose to ignore this warning and continued trade in the Baltic, and consequently many English ships were lost to the Wends who claimed that they were trespassing in a war zone. However, it was not the piracies in the Baltic alone which led to further confrontation between the English and the Hanse.

**Intransigence and Negotiation, 1431-1436**

In 1431, the stage was set for another clash over the tonnage and poundage subsidies. The parliament of that year granted Henry VI the tonnage and poundage for two years, and
although there was no specific mention of the Hanseatic merchants, the authorities forced the Steelyard to raise sureties for an increase in the subsidies – from which the League of course considered itself exempt – of 6 d. in the pound and of 3 s. for each tun of sweet wine, an impost that was levied on alien merchants. Following Hanseatic protests, and seeking to avoid antagonising the Prussians, the government realised its mistake and withdrew the order to its officials concerning the surety, but the damage was already done. The Prussians had had enough. They forced the English merchants in Prussia to produce sureties to the sum of £1,200, to be forfeited should the new impost come through, and the grand master of the order of the Teutonic Knights decided to satisfy the Order’s financial claims against England over the last 25 years out of the goods of the English merchants. He also threatened to settle the claims of his towns in the same manner. In June, 1434, the Hanseatic diet at Lübeck decided on a plan of action against the English. The first step was to oust the English merchants from the Hanseatic area, and a delegation from the diet successfully petitioned the grand master to expel them from Prussia. As the overtour to this step, a letter of complaint was sent from Prussia to the English king, threatening to expel the English from Prussia if the harassment of the Hanseatic merchants in England did not stop at once. Of course there was no serious reply to this letter, and the League decided that it was time to submit the position of their merchants in England to new negotiations. A delegation consisting of four Hanseatic mayors – among whom was the Danzig mayor Jacob Vorraath – was appointed to conduct negotiations for the League in England and in Flanders where there was trouble, too. The delegation arrived in October, 1434, and informed the royal council of their arrival and their authorisation to negotiate on behalf of the League, together with a list of complaints. The delegation was told that it was impossible for the council to find time for the negotiations until Christmas – officially because the council had to leave London to protect themselves from a new outbreak of the plague, but in reality because they needed more time to inform themselves of the contents of a new petition from the native merchants against the Hansards. Since the delegation could not wait for this, they appointed four members of the Steelyard to plead the Hanseatic cause at the coming parliament. These delegates were given specific and very interesting instructions in case their plea should be successful: they were to request that not only the king, but also the towns of London, York, Lynn and Bristol, should vouchsafe for the Hanseatic privileges. The address of the delegation from the Steelyard elicited “…vele soter wort na older Englischen gewohnheit…” [many sweet words as is the English custom], but the Hanseatic merchants had to wait till May the following year before negotiations were opened.

In May, 1435, Henry VI sent a delegation to Bruges where the Hanseatic delegation – which by now was reduced to two members: the mayors of Danzig and Hamburg, Heinrich Vorraath and Heinrich Hoyer – had set up permanent quarters. But since the English delegation wanted to negotiate the position of the English in Hanseatic areas as well as the Hanseatic charters in England, and since the Hanseatic delegation had no authority to treat these matters, negotiations were broken off pending consultations between the delegation and the Hanseatic diet.
The Hanseatic diet decided on a hard line in the confrontation with the English. Danzig refused to negotiate about the position of the English and the diet decided to implement the strongest weapon short of war against the English merchants. The Steelyard was closed and its members moved to Bruges, and an official trade embargo was initiated. But a trade embargo was difficult to enforce and afforded an entrance for middlemen, a situation which was more likely to harm the Hanseatic position on the continental markets than the loss of their privileges in England. The embargo was also not very efficient among the Hanseatic towns themselves: Cologne ignored the decision of the diet and even contemplated a separate treaty with the English, the Zuider Zee towns who had always been the unruly corner of the Hanse also ignored the embargo, and even the grand master of the order of the Teutonic Knights authorised the entry into his area of six large English ships to trade there in April, 1436. Accepting defeat, Danzig furnished the delegation in Bruges with a set of more moderate claims in July, 1436, but they still refused to authorise Vorrath and Hoyer to negotiate the position of the English in Prussia. Vorrath, who knew that it was impossible to reach an agreement with the English unless the Prussian problem was solved and that the Hanseatic unity would soon break unless an agreement was reached, resolved to take the matter into his own hands. He admitted that the issue should be dealt with and assumed the responsibility for the consequences of a transgression of his mandate. He offered to negotiate the English position in Prussia.

The treaty of 1437

This done, Vorrath was soon able to report progress, and a treaty was in sight in the winter of 1437. According to the draft treaty, the Hansards received their charters back, a confirmation of their exemption from new taxation, and – as a further favour from the English crown – they were promised the outstanding compensations from piracies contained in an agreement of 1409. In return, the English were allowed to enter Prussia, to trade there and to settle there, should they so wish. In addition to this, they were given extensive fiscal liberties, including an exemption from all taxes imposed over the preceding century. The agreement promoted by Beauford did not satisfy the English merchants who had set their minds on a recognition of their entire programme for Anglo-Hanseatic relations. It did not contain the right to form their own guild in Prussia and English merchants were not to receive compensation for the ‘unjustly’ levied taxes in the preceding century. But in spite of their protests, the treaty was accepted and signed through the advocacy of Cardinal Beauford who was tired of the wars and confrontations between England and the Continent, and who above all wanted peace.

Conclusions

The treaty of 1437 marks the end of the English advance in the Baltic. The English were largely excluded from the Baltic markets by the late 1460s because of conflicts
at home and the absence of a strong government which could consolidate the gains made during the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. However, the focus of this chapter has been on the period before 1437 in order to demonstrate how the relations between the Hanseatic League and the kingdom of England throw light on the way in which English merchants at home and abroad influenced English government policies and how the internal contradictions in the Hanseatic League allowed the English to exploit the diverse interests of the Hanseatic regions. The influence which the English merchant class had over the foreign policy of the realm and the extent to which it acted as a pressure group exerting a profound influence over the English foreign policy has largely been overshadowed by the events of the Hundred Years' War and, after our period, by the Wars of the Roses, but it is evident in the history of English relations with the Hanse as outlined above. The markets of the southern littoral of the Baltic took on a new economic significance in the late years of the fourteenth century and at the same time Hanseatic privileges in England introduced a level of competition which was a painful thorn in the side for English merchants. These factors resulted in an alliance between the native English merchants and the merchant adventurers in Prussia aimed at breaking the privileged position of the Hanse in England and obtaining a better position for the English in the Baltic. This alliance was successful during the period in question, although its policy was often directly opposite to the real interest of the English kingdom. At least twice the alliance steered England towards open war with the Hanse to such a degree that the English government had to intervene to stabilise the situation. In other words, the merchant class enjoyed a real and important influence over English policies abroad throughout the period.

The study of the relations between the Hanseatic League and the Kingdom of England thus adds a much-needed foil to the English-French wars and allows us to study the political aspirations of a section of society which, despite its substantial successes in Northern Europe and in England, has received relatively little attention by British historians. It may be argued that English merchants only influenced a small and insignificant part of the kingdom’s foreign policy. This is true to a certain extent: the merchants were never allowed to fully implement their radical and confrontational policies. This would have been too dangerous for English national security. We have seen how the English government was willing to concede to Hanse demands when they were threatening to take the attention away from the French question. But nevertheless, mercantile interests did rule the English foreign policy as long as it benefited the country and enabled the government to concentrate fully on the war in France.

The time from the mid-fourteenth and to the end of the fifteenth centuries are the high point of Hanseatic influence in northern Europe. The Hanseatic league successfully took on the Danish kingdom and were in control of the Danish castles and the Scania market for a quarter of a century after the peace of Stralsund of 1370. It is a signal of the league’s strength that when their lease on the castles expired they handed them over to the Danes with ease. They also understood how to maintain their position in relation to the rising Scandinavian superpower. The league managed to interfere politically
and hold on to their gains during the disintegration of the Kalmar Union during the reign of her adopted son, King Eric of Pomerania (in whose deposition in 1438 they played more than a small role). But the League was a strange hybrid political formation. Though it was able to make a success of Baltic politics, in its dealings with England the internal divisions of the Hanseatic League become highly visible. Once the English had been able to drive a wedge between the eastern and western members of the Hanse, the English achieved many of their goals. What eventually gave the League the upper hand in its relations with the English kingdom, was not so much an increase in the league's power and strength as much as the breakdown of royal power in England. Thus, despite their profound differences in organisation, both the league and the English kingdom found that their strength lay in presenting a unified policy which brought together diverse and contradictory interest groups under a clear and unified programme of action. The clearer the goals were and the less they were distracted, the better the interests of their members were served, whether these be Hanse merchants or English royal subjects.

NOTES


4. The Website of the *Hansischer Geschichtverein* can be found at http://www.phil.uni-erlangen.de/~p1ges/hgv/hgv.html.


16 Cf. the title of Lloyd’s study *England and the German Hanse* cit.


23 Höhlbaum (ed.), *1361 bis 1392*, vol. 4 of *Hansisches Urkundenbuch* cit., nos. 626, 643, 646, 663, 667, 677.

24 I am using the name *Prussia* for the areas encompassed by the present-day region of Pomerania, the lands between the Elbe and the Oder Rivers, and the lands encompassed by the Warthe and Netze rivers.


Premodern Diplomatic Practices
40 Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 5 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse* cit., nos. 87, p. 88.
43 Schulz, *Die Hanse und England* cit., p. 50; Höhlbaum, ed., *1361 Bis 1392*, vol. 4 of *Hansisches Urkundenbuch* cit., no. 1042.
48 For a general discussion, see S. Jenks, *Zum Hansischen Gästerecht*, *Hansische Geschichtsblätter*, 114, 1996, pp. 3-60.

Koppman, *Hansarecesse, Serie 1*, vol. 7 of *Hanserecesse, Serie 1: Die Recesse cit.*, nos 461 (1, 19), 708, 746 (3), 773 (7).


Konstantin Höhlbaum (ed.), *1415 bis 1433*, vol. 6 of *Hansisches Urkundenbuch*, Herausgeben vom Verein für Hansische Geschichte, Halle 1876-90, no. 1011; Ropp (ed.), *Hansarecesse, Serie 2*, vol. 1 of *Hanserecesse, serie 2: Die Recesse cit.*, no. 147.


Ropp (ed.), *Hansarecesse, Serie 2*, vol. 1 of *Hanserecesse, serie 2: Die Recesse cit.*, no. 436.


Ropp (ed.), *Hansarecesse, Serie 2*, vol. 2 of *Hanserecesse, serie 2: Die Recesse cit.*, nos. 20, 24, 57.


Ropp (ed.), *Hansarecesse, Serie 2*, vol. 1 of *Hanserecesse, serie 2: Die Recesse cit.*, nos. 16-18, 53.


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