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# Global Warming: Shifting Perspectives on Terrorism on Both Sides of the Atlantic after 9/11 and 3/11

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## ABSTRACT

The main object of this chapter is to show how the events of 9/11 and 3/11 in New York and Madrid, respectively, have had great influence on the perceptions and understanding that people have of the terrorist phenomenon on both sides of the Atlantic. Although some experts have argued that these attacks marked the beginning of a “new type of warfare” and that “human history would not be the same thereafter,” I contend that there are in fact as many elements of continuity as of disruption between these events and earlier instances of terrorism. My contribution offers some reflections – using the tools of discourse and media analysis – on how the responses to the two terrorist attacks have caused significant changes in the ways Spaniards and US citizens think and speak about the phenomenon.

*El principal objetivo de este trabajo es demostrar que los eventos ocurridos en Nueva York el 11-S y Madrid el 11-M, respectivamente, han tenido una notable incidencia en la percepción que los ciudadanos tienen del fenómeno terrorista a ambos lados del Atlántico. Aunque algunos especialistas han mantenido que estos atentados supusieron un “nuevo tipo de conflicto” y que “la historia de la humanidad no sería la misma a partir de entonces”, en realidad se puede encontrar en ellos tantos elementos de continuidad como de ruptura con respecto a formas más tradicionales de terrorismo. Este artículo presenta una serie de reflexiones – utilizando las herramientas del análisis de medios y discursivo – sobre cómo el tratamiento dado a los atentados en la prensa escrita ha producido cambios significativos en la forma de pensar y hablar sobre el tema entre los estadounidenses y los españoles. Para explicar estos cambios de perspectiva es imprescindible indagar no sólo en las experiencias anteriores del fenómeno en ambos países, sino también en aspectos tales como los giros en las relaciones internacionales, decisiones clave en política interior, grado de implicación en procesos de globalización, sentimientos patrióticos y demás. Una de las conclusiones más importantes a las que se llega en el trabajo es que las atrocidades ocurridas en Manhattan y Atocha no eran tan “impredecibles” como algunos analistas nos quisieron hacer creer. La primera parte del artículo analiza en profundidad esos signos de continuidad entre los actos terroristas de épocas anteriores y estos dos brutales atentados. Otra conclusión del todo rele-*

*vante es que, a pesar de la existencia de patrones de causa-efecto recurrentes en la mayoría de las sociedades, siempre es recomendable hacer un riguroso ejercicio de contextualización histórica antes de determinar cuáles son las respuestas y medidas más adecuadas para hacer frente – tanto desde un punto de vista ético como pragmático – a los problemas que las nuevas realidades nos plantean. Por poner un ejemplo, soluciones al fenómeno terrorista que pudieron ser de gran efectividad en la España de diez años atrás pueden no tener ningún sentido en los EE.UU. del siglo XXI.*

## INTRODUCTION

In an article recently published in “Time” magazine, Harvard historian Niall Ferguson speculates on how the next generation – twenty-five years from now – will judge the war on terrorism that the U.S. engaged in after the traumatic events of 11 September 2001: “How well did America respond to that day, when viewed with the benefit of hindsight? How has history judged our leaders’ actions?”<sup>1</sup> According to Ferguson, not only is it likely that many Americans in the year 2031 will have little memory of the incidents that took place on that fatal date but, more importantly, they will think of the conflict started then as a War for Democracy rather than as a global War on Terror. But, of course, for this historian’s hypothesis to work, some important conditions would need to be fulfilled: No sequels to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 would occur in the country on Bush’s watch; he would also lose the Presidency in 2008 to a Democratic candidate who would bring the economy to the top of the political agenda; as a result of this change, the U.S. presence in the Middle East would wind down; and, finally, deep reforms of Medicare, Social Security and the Federal Tax System would cause the economy to surge again. No need to explain that this is just an exercise in ‘historical fiction’ writing constructed on very selective evidence and significantly animated by the author’s wishful thinking. Should we look more attentively into the information available today, the prospective picture would surely seem much bleaker since most specialists would agree that the U.S. reaction to 9/11 has failed clamorously to eliminate the terrorist threat and contributed, instead, to making the world a more dangerous place.

This general perception is true not only on this side of the Atlantic, where the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 and 2005 have raised the Europeans’ awareness that they may also turn into an easy target for that ugly force that has been orchestrating all kinds of global terrorists. A “Time”/Discovery Channel poll<sup>2</sup> conducted last August among over a thousand U.S. citizens revealed that 55% of them believed that the conflict in Iraq was hurting the ‘war on terrorism’ while only 40% thought that it was helping it. Moreover, almost 60% of the interviewees observed that they did not think that the Bush Administration had a clear and well-thought-out policy to deal with terrorism. If these opinions are indicative of anything it is that Ferguson’s prognosis of a gradual disappearance of terrorist actions is very unlikely to materialize in the near future, especially when, as Zulaika and Douglass have rightly pointed out, “terrorism is becoming a functional reality of American politics”<sup>3</sup>.

The main aim of my discussion is to show how the events of 9/11 and 3/11 in New York and Madrid, respectively, have had a great impact on the perceptions and understanding that most people have of the terrorist phenomenon on both sides of the Atlantic. Evidently, one of the fundamental reasons for these shifts in perspectives needs to be sought in the profound transformations undergone by the phenomenon itself. In Reinares' opinion, the organizational dimensions and the violence it employs have been exponentially increased due to the new "global character" of the phenomenon<sup>4</sup>. Yet, although it is unquestionable that this incipient "megaterrorism" reveals important differences with regard to the more local and tactical one that prevailed in the last four decades of the 20th century, it would be erroneous to assume that there are no signs of continuity and similarities between the two kinds of physical – and especially psychological – violence. In fact, it could be easily demonstrated that the massacres in Manhattan and Madrid have added great relevance and urgency to the analysis of the interfaces between the more traditional forms of resistance and aggression of peoples who feel that they have been disenfranchised for political, ethnic or religious reasons by the modern nation-states (Quebec, Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, Palestine or Chechnya, to mention just a few)<sup>5</sup>, and the new strategies and rhetoric of global terrorism, which have become lately a key topic of political debates all around the world.

While there are well-known experts in the field of Conflict Studies<sup>6</sup> who would insist that there are scarcely any aspects commensurable between the type of terrorism we are facing now and those of the past, which derived, in their eyes, from an attempt to reconcile specific identity politics and some universal political claims, there are others who argue that it is quite impossible to reach a full understanding of global terror without alluding to concepts – such as nationalism, internationalization processes, identity politics, racial relations, globalization, and so on – which already played a major role in the emergence of 20th-century terrorism. Gray rightly notes on this point that "patterns and processes reoccur in natural systems, including human culture. Understanding those should help us live longer"<sup>7</sup>. And he concludes that the postmodern terror that we are experiencing today is best characterized as a second Cold War in which information has become a more crucial factor. In this study I intend to explore some of the (dis)continuities observable in the treatment of terrorism before and after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the commuter trains in Atocha Station.

As I hope to demonstrate, the visions and interpretations of the phenomenon in the U.S. and Spain were significantly affected by the historical antecedents, positions of the actors in international relations, current policies in national affairs and the degree of the damage inflicted in each case. However, what most strikes the observer in the study of these shifting perspectives is the fact that they need to be set in the context of highly specific historical junctures in which we cannot depend much on earlier assumptions or categorizations to give an ethically – and rationally – suitable response to the events. In this sense, the climate metaphor in the title may prove surprisingly *a propos* since it seems to be the case that the larger the problem of global terrorism becomes, the more difficult it is to persuade different nations around the globe – even when they are all

potential targets – to reach an agreement on how to work jointly for the prevention of further catastrophes. This fact again makes Ferguson's predictions highly improbable, for his premises concern only the changes that might take place in a single country.

The views and commentaries I use in my analysis come primarily from the coverage given to the attacks in several printed media both in the Basque Country and the U.S. – especially in the latter. This being so, it seems important to ring a cautionary note about the accuracy and the validity of the judgments reproduced in my discussion since many of them were made fairly soon after the events had taken place, when there were still some critical information gaps concerning the authorship, strategies, damages, etc. of the attacks. I have tried to overcome this difficulty by probing publications that represent different factions of the political spectrum in both contexts. Anyhow, what interests me most in these observations is not whether they provide an accurate and sensible representation of the events but, rather, how they contributed to reshaping public opinion on the topic of terrorism. As will soon become evident, most journalists were aware from the start that they were facing historical episodes that were without parallel in the past and that, therefore, demanded special doses of responsibility and ingenuity on their part. Not only were they compelled to invent a new vocabulary and syntax to speak about mass crimes that had been quite inconceivable before but they had to do so in ways that would not cause retaliatory actions against particular groups or individuals. Fortunately, in both cases only relatively few instances of racial/religious victimization did happen.

And yet, it is less certain whether some of the newspaper and magazine articles did not help to foster the notion that we were confronted with a very different and most formidable kind of enemy which would call for all sorts of exceptional measures of prevention and increased security – if not immediate retaliation. Bearing in mind that one of the main objectives of any terrorist action is precisely to increase the level of fear and apprehension among concrete populations, and to produce a destabilization of the socio-political system<sup>8</sup>, it is not clear that the media did their best to appease some of the irrational angst that is likely to surface in these situations. In order to elucidate where some commentaries and reactions may have gone astray, I occasionally resort to more academic and expert opinions that are meant to shed some light on the (in)adequacy of the treatment in each instance. Most of these opinions have been gathered in my fairly extensive reading on the subject but perhaps the most precious ones came from scholars from diverse fields and countries whom I met at two conferences that were held not long after the terrorist attacks<sup>9</sup>. To them I owe not only the 'pills of knowledge' that I will incorporate into my analysis but, more importantly, a growing interest in how particular discourses are likely to shape and dominate the way we perceive and interpret reality. As Foucault taught us more than three decades ago,

True discourse, liberated by the nature of its form from desire and power, is incapable of recognizing the will to truth which pervades it; and the will to truth, having imposed itself upon us for so long, is such that the truth it seeks to reveal cannot fail to mask it<sup>10</sup>.

Apart from that will to truth underlying all kinds of discourse – but especially conspicuous in journalistic and historical writing – which may sometimes keep us from gaining

access to the real significance of events, one additional problem I have met in dealing with these violent actions is the lack of so-called 'historical perspective' (or distance) to gauge more proficiently the kind of weight that these episodes should be given in the context of contemporary world history. I am aware that some historians would even deny the possibility of achieving any valid insights into the significance of the events in the absence of an in-depth knowledge of their causes and a fairly complete record of their consequences. My response to this challenge would take three different lines of argumentation.

The first and probably most consequential one is that, given the magnitude of the problem and the anxiety with which many countries are experiencing the terrorist threat, it would be a luxury to put off an analysis of how the phenomenon is changing and how we are being changed by it. Of course, passing rash judgments on the issue may be as dangerous as offering no analysis at all, but it would be irresponsible – and, I am afraid, fatal – to defer interpretations just because we do not possess all the pertinent data to generate 'effective' solutions. Furthermore, the fact that what I am putting forth in these pages is mostly a comparative study of how perspectives have been refashioned lately in Western Europe and the U.S. may compensate to some extent for the lack of a larger and more detailed presentation of the historical trajectories in both settings. Since the object of this contribution is not so much to investigate processes in our own homelands but, rather, to explore how others experience and interpret those processes and how we, in our turn, view similar processes in their countries, it seems clear that what we should seek is not the description of singular or self-enclosed systems but, instead, the kind of intersections and divergences that comparable phenomena produce in different sites. Finally, a third argument has already been advanced earlier on when I remarked that, although many scholars are fond of speaking of a radically new form of terrorism and a Copernican revolution in world history, there is enough evidence to say that the events of 9/11 and 3/11 were, at least, partly predictable. Chomsky has explained on this point that

Not only is the 'war on terror', as conceived, likely to go on for a long time, but it is also did not suddenly become a crucial issue on 9-11. The terrorist attacks on that day were not entirely unexpected, yet another reason to question the widely held belief that 9-11 signalled a sharp change in the course of history<sup>11</sup>.

Like the esteemed linguist, I hold the opinion that it makes much more sense to read the brutal attacks in New York and Madrid as a consequence of previous dynamics than as the beginning of a crusade against terror worldwide. Failing to insert these events in the continuum of globalization processes and the increasing tensions in several areas of the planet may give rise to the misleading idea that we are confronting a completely novel and ineffable phenomenon or, even worse, that democratic states should reconsider the kind of rights and freedoms that they have secured for their citizens in the last century. Lest we fall into these undesirable predicaments, it seems wise to approach the topic by detecting first the connections that may exist between these new forms of violence and similar ones that preceded them in time. I will then proceed to consider

those aspects of today's terrorism that may reveal significant differences from what we are familiar with in old Europe.

### CONTINUITIES IN TERRORIST ORIGINS, TACTICS, AND GOALS

Even at the risk of sounding a bit tautological, one first aspect pointing to some degree of continuity between earlier episodes of terrorist violence and the two events under consideration here is that no reporter hesitated to characterize the latter as such from the start. After the initial confusion that followed the collision of American Airlines Flight 11 against the North tower of the WTC, authorities soon learnt that a few other aircrafts had also been hijacked and that, consequently, that first crash could not have been an accident. By the time the second airplane, a United Airlines Boeing 767, hit the South tower half an hour later, there remained almost nobody who would doubt the cause of the catastrophe. Of course, this was not the first time that airplanes had been used by terrorists to execute their criminal agendas, neither was it the first time that the WTC had become the target of a terrorist attack<sup>12</sup>. Still, it is worthwhile noting that, to some extent, the minds of national and foreign reporters had been expecting an event of this nature to take place on American soil. Paul Auster, the best-selling novelist, said on that day to a journalist: "We all knew that something like this could happen. We had been talking about the possibility for years but now that the tragedy has happened, it is much worse than anybody could have ever imagined<sup>13</sup>." The fact that many editorialists and average citizens had anticipated a terrorist attack did not make the shock of the carnage any less overwhelming. Nevertheless, it does suggest that at least some people were conscious of the rage and frustration that their country's hegemonic policy was arousing in other regions of the planet.

Weinberg, a professor of political science and author of studies on terrorism, observed that, according to the *UN Yearbook on Terrorism*, the attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon by three jetliners could be described as "low-tech stuff. The U.S. has expected a major terrorist attack for several years now, though the emphasis has always been on preparing against nuclear, biological or chemical means<sup>14</sup>." Nobody would want to imagine what the Big Apple would have been like if any of these other means had been used on September 11, but what seems quite irrefutable is that experts and common folk alike were aware of the possibility of a huge disaster. It could be argued in fact that part of the demolishing impact of the event derived precisely from the public's recognition that the aggression had not been wholly unforeseeable and that much more could have been done to prevent it. In Europe, after the initial expressions of sympathy and offers of assistance from most countries, epitomized by the proclamation of "Le Monde": "We are all Americans!", what mostly followed was a consideration of the Bush administration's possible missteps in handling the global threat at home and abroad<sup>15</sup>. Even in the U.S. several months after the assault, analysts were beginning to recognize the vulnerability of the security system. Michael Elliott wrote in a special report:

It is quite true that nobody predicted Sept. 11 – that nobody guessed in advance how and when the attacks would come. But other things are true too. By mid-2001, many of those in the know – the spooks, the buttoned-down bureaucrats, the law-enforcement professionals in a dozen countries – were almost frantic with worry that a major terrorist attack against American interests was imminent. It wasn't averted because 2001 saw a systematic collapse in the ability of Washington's national-security apparatus to handle the terrorist threat<sup>16</sup>.

And yet, what many of these research pieces failed to consider was the larger picture of the increasing levels of hatred against the U.S., especially in Middle Eastern countries. As Laqueur, one of the top specialists in terrorism, has explained, it is more than likely that the right answer to Bush's naïve question, "Why do they hate us?" is that American interventionism in that part of the world has made resentment and frustration among the younger generations skyrocket in the last decade:

To what extent the kind of ideology that has developed as a result of this unfortunate state of affairs is Islamic fundamentalist or nationalist, or a combination of the two, is hard to determine, and generalizations are of no help because situations vary from one place to another and at different times<sup>17</sup>.

It is quite revealing, though, that well-versed analysts around the world found prominent parallels between the sentiments allegedly entertained by the Muslim suicide hijackers and those of more traditional terrorists pursuing ideological and nationalist causes. In both instances, they see themselves driven by the David-vs.-Goliath myth – or the idea of drawing their power from helplessness – and a fanaticism that is deeply-rooted in the fear that their culture and beliefs are going to be erased from the face of the planet if they do not stand up and fight the hegemonic 'Other'. Hence the initial uncertainty about the authorship of the 2004 bombings in Atocha Station, since there seemed to be as much evidence to support the ETA-hypothesis as to try to dig out the possible Al-Qaeda cells in the Madrid area<sup>18</sup>. Nevertheless, for different reasons, it was conceivable that both Basque and Muslim terrorists would have wanted the pre-election period shaken by an event that would bring to the foreground President Aznar's (mis)managements of crucial national or international affairs. In his recent book on the roots of terror, Mamdani rightly notes that it is oversimplistic – and incorrect – to read people's political behavior in terms of their religious denomination or deriving from their culture. In his opinion, neither their culture nor their politics should be considered archaic but, rather, both are very contemporary outcomes of equally contemporary circumstances, relations, and conflicts<sup>19</sup>.

If the awareness of the existence of a potential enemy – inside or outside – and of the inevitable vulnerability of a country's defence and security-system are common denominators in most societies which have suffered the scourge of terrorism, we may add a third factor of continuity which also emerges in most terror-stricken scenarios. As I have noted earlier on, the damage caused by terrorist attacks is not easily quantifiable because the material and physical destruction is only a very small proportion of the total losses. It is no coincidence that many of the reports on the attacks in New York City and Madrid bore headlines referring "the heart of the nation" or "an emblem of

culture.” In a long editorial under the title of “If you want to humble an empire...,” Gibbs wrote:

The Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, planted at the base of Manhattan island with the Statue of Liberty as their sentry, and the Pentagon, a squat, concrete fort on the banks of the Potomac, are the sanctuaries of money and power that our enemies may imagine define us. But that assumes our faith rests on what we can buy and build, and that has never been America’s true God<sup>20</sup>.

Whether we agree or disagree with the writer’s opinion on the content of the nation’s religious thought, it would make little sense to deny that the action did succeed in inflicting a serious wound in the country’s confidence and morale. It has always been one of the key aims of terrorism to maximize the opportunities by taking advantage of the country’s vulnerabilities and hitting its basic pillars while, at the same time, minimizing its superior military power. We were familiar with these tactics among the Palestinians of the *intifadab*, the Kurds in Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries or the Chechens in Russia. If anything, what the new *jihadists* have added to those age-old terrorist tactics is an increase in the degree of allegorical power and spectacularity of their actions. Gabilondo has demonstrated that curiously both Hollywood and Muslim fundamentalists have shared an interest in presenting scenes of organized and massive violence to rally “large numbers of people around the world, precisely because of their spectacular nature”<sup>21</sup>.

For the purposes of terrorist groups, two remarkable gains may be obtained by the use of these spectacular methods. First, the viewer tends to be incorporated into the visual apparatus – be it a movie or news footage – so that s/he is repositioned as one more participant/victim of the allegory of global violence. One could go into deep psychological explanations to unravel this process of collective incorporation but suffice it to say that it does not seem accidental that films such as *Independence Day* (1996) had uncannily foreshadowed the attack on the Twin Towers, thus showing that the same spectacular logic underlies and regulates these areas of culture and politics. It is no surprise in this sense that many Americans watching the collapse of the WTC felt very much as if they were reliving a nightmare they had had not long before. Belategui wrote in the same vein that “the Twin Towers had already fallen before 11 September. [Several movies] had shown on the screen something that when it became real made Hollywood feel guilty about its own excesses”<sup>22</sup>. Secondly, another advantage fundamentalist movements derive from the spectacular nature of their acts is the propagandistic effect it has among its potential followers. As Reinares has argued, this factor and the religious incentives often associated with it *a posteriori* make the indoctrination and training of new recruits as future human bombs much easier as they are sure to see their predecessors as heroes or martyrs<sup>23</sup>. Even a superficial revision of the annals of earlier terrorist attacks will reveal that their media impact had a substantial bearing on the radicalization and strength of the movements in different parts of the world. Although Gibbs’ response to the 9/11 attacks or Aznar’s comments after the train bombings, emphasizing that his Government would not let terrorist groups condition its policies, may seem the natural

way to boost a nation's damaged morale, it is not so clear whether they truly alleviated the traumatic effects that the events produced on a majority of the population.

While it is true that the immediate reaction to most terrorist attacks usually takes the form of comforting words trying to relieve the grief produced by the catastrophe and to recover the balance and confidence lost in the socio-political system, after a few days or weeks it is not uncommon to begin to hear talks of retribution and retaliation. Unlike historians who, as I observed above, prefer to ponder a bit longer over the motives and effects of events, politicians often feel compelled to react in the heat of the moment. Of course, one cannot easily measure the kind of pressures that decision-makers face when something as disruptive as a terrorist attack happens to their own people. It would seem reasonable, though, to think that one of the essential responsibilities of those in power is certainly to learn to deal with these pressures without letting them affect their judgment too decisively. This is by no means an easy task and, as will become soon clear, leaders unlucky enough to be confronted with terrorist actions are especially prone to (mis)using them to advance their own agendas. In order to do so, however, they often count on the support of other social actors who do their best to clear the ground to simplify their further movements. Take the opening lines from an article published soon after the 9/11 mass crimes:

For once, let's have no 'grief counsellors' standing by with banal consolations, as if the purpose, in the midst of all this, were merely to make everyone feel better as quickly as possible. We shouldn't feel better.

For once, let's have no fatuous rhetoric about 'healing'. Healing is inappropriate now, and dangerous. There will be time later for the tears of sorrow.

A day cannot live in infamy without the nourishment of rage. Let's have rage<sup>24</sup>.

Apart from the total disrespect shown toward the work done by the many psychiatrists and other medical staff who had to attend to the needs of victims, relatives, etc. in those trying moments, perhaps what most calls the attention of the reader in these comments is that anybody willing to share some of the loathing and hatred exhibited here could use them to justify the most indiscriminate forms of retaliation. No wonder then that the mass media are often regarded in modern nation-states as the 'Fourth Power' since they can easily act as a catalyst to bring together the most diverse and lukewarm sensibilities.

Although many Spanish correspondents found the public display of patriotic sentiment after 9/11 quite exaggerated, the truth is that this is a fairly common reaction when a country has been lacerated by atrocities of this kind: "Hit for a first time in their own homeland," wrote Gallego, "Americans rushed to find refuge under their national flag"<sup>25</sup>. In hindsight, what does not seem so logical and easily explicable is the fact that most U.S. citizens should have accepted their President's statement two weeks later that "The deliberate and deadly attacks that were carried out against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of War". Again, it is difficult to estimate the role played by the media in preparing the public opinion for the acceptance of this major turn in policy without much challenge or protest. Zinn is of the opinion that a majority

of the population has historically been kept blind to the real motivations behind their Presidents' and cohorts' decisions: "It seems to me there are two reasons, which go deep into our national culture, and which help explain the vulnerability of the press and citizenry to outrageous lies whose consequences bring death to tens of thousands of people"<sup>26</sup>. The two reasons Zinn pinpoints as causing this vulnerability are the absence of historical perspective – little knowledge of the true history of the nation – and the inability to think outside the boundaries of nationalism – too many Americans think of their country as the center of the universe. According to Nancy Chang, one of the most undesirable and ugly consequences of this blind patriotic fervor has been that freedom of speech, which "has sustained America's most prized traditions – independence of thought, diversity of opinion, and the right to the uninhibited expression of one's views –", has been curtailed by the US Patriot Act and several other legislative responses to the terrorist attacks<sup>27</sup>.

This phenomenon of the misinformation and gagging of the masses after terrorist acts is not restricted, of course, to the US, and the days that followed the Madrid bombings offer ample evidence of the strenuous efforts of some Spanish leaders to present the authors of the 3/11 attack as blind instruments of a mysterious *deus ex machina*. Even today, several years after the fact, there are still Popular Party representatives who try to conceal their own mistakes behind the screen of various conspiracy theories. It should be said, though, that the consequences of these deceptions increase in direct proportion with the power held by the nation in the international political scene. Pradera found several connections between the reactions to the attacks on 9/11 and to the Madrid train bombings but, naturally, he was also very clear about the transcendental differences between the impact they had on home and foreign affairs:

The *war on terror* is not happy with just getting rid of the boundaries protecting the sovereignty of states: after occupying Afghanistan in search of Bin Laden, Iraq was invaded under the false pretence that Saddam had taken part in the attack of 9/11 and that there were weapons of mass destruction in the country. This new *global* warfare suspends or radically reduces the domains of individual and human rights, arguing that this is fully justified by the threat of fundamentalist terrorists. The concentration camp of Guantánamo, the torture in the Iraqi prison of Abu Ghraib, the secret detention camps that the CIA has kept in different countries all mark a scary backward step toward practices that we thought the modern liberal democracies had abandoned<sup>28</sup>.

Obviously then, the kind of retaliatory actions taken in each instance is closely related to the power – especially military – held by those executing them and the potential for resistance that their alleged aggressors may show. In Reinares' view, "this differential treatment creates very serious difficulties to legitimize any military retaliation that the U.S. embarks on unilaterally with the object of fighting international terrorism"<sup>29</sup>. Indeed, if anything has been learnt from previous experiences in the management of terrorist problems this is that disproportionate reactions only help to make the insurgent groups stronger by indirectly encouraging more moderate sectors in their societies to join in the war against a superior 'Other'<sup>30</sup>. Such seems to have been the case too in many Arab countries which, after having shown their immediate sympathy and support soon after the attacks, are now showing more reticent attitudes.

To conclude this section on the continuities in terrorist attacks and the responses to them, let me raise two points which, although very common-sensical, are sometimes neglected in the literature on the subject. On the one hand, no country seems to react to this phenomenon in the same way when it takes place in its own territory and when it happens abroad. It is true that statesmen and politicians often claim that terrorists are not the enemy of one regime or another, but of the whole civilized world. Rupérez argued along this line a few months after 9/11:

‘Our’ terrorists share with their Islamic extremist colleagues neither the suicidal impulse nor the terrible technological sophistication. But in everything else – in their empty words, in their desire to destroy, in their historical and ideological simplification, in their irrationality – they are exactly the same. There is nothing more like a terrorist than another terrorist, no matter what the cause they claim to pursue...<sup>31</sup>

Statements of this kind are likely to appear in most Western countries after any of them has suffered a terrorist attack. However, if terrorists do definitely oversimplify historical and ideological issues, it would be unfair not to observe that this happens among other groups in the socio-political arena too. One only needs to look into the perception that some U.S. citizens and politicians had of the IRA or ETA before the events of 9/11 or the views held by many Europeans in the 1990s about the PLO and the role it played in the peace negotiations. My point here is that despite claims to the contrary, how terrorism and terrorist groups are perceived is always a function of what their cause is, who their victims are, whose interests are affected and other related questions. In this light, it is not so surprising that,

Alongside horror at the crime against humanity and the sympathy for the victims, the commentators outside the ranks of Western privilege often responded to the 9/11 atrocities with a ‘welcome to the club’, particularly in Latin America, where it is not easy to forget the plague of violence and repression that swept through the region from the early 1960s, or its roots<sup>32</sup>.

Likewise, not a few reporters in Basque newspapers related the Madrid bombings to President Aznar’s ‘unwise involvement’ in the war on terror sponsored by the U.S. Administration.

To move on to the second point, one of the most undesirable effects of terrorist attacks is that they cause the most fundamentalist sectors of the target societies to gather new momentum and visibility. Be they of a nationalist or a religious orientation, these groups tend to interpret the attacks as aggressions against their particular way of life and belief-system, and inscribe these actions into a larger war for the survival of their own community. Kevin Phillips observes in a recent article in “The Nation”:

Those voting Republican for President since 1988 have become increasingly religious in motivation. After 9/11 pro-Bush preachers described Bush as God’s chosen man while hinting that Saddam Hussein, whose Iraq was the biblical ‘New Babylon’ of fundamentalist preacher Tim LaHaye’s eerie Left Behind series, was the Antichrist or at least the forerunner of the Evil One. In 2004 a further wave of evangelical, fundamentalist and Pentecostal turnout helped to cement the Republican transformation...<sup>33</sup>

What is worrying about the neo-conservatives, thriving on various theocratic excesses is that, like their enemies, they will gain new strength every time their land is shocked by another ‘unexpected’ assault. Of course, we may hope that horrors like those being analyzed here will not occur again since fundamentalisms do not usually last forever. But we cannot be sure either that new forms of radicalism will not replace the existing ones – particularly if experts in fear-mongering keep doing their job. “For this reason,” concludes Laqueur, “we must admit that the world is moving today into a historical phase fraught with new dangers that were unknown in earlier periods”<sup>34</sup>.

## WHAT IS NEW ABOUT THE NEW GLOBAL TERRORISM?

So far I have argued that significant continuities can be traced between the terrorism practiced – mostly in Europe and the Middle East – before 9/11 and the attacks carried out by Islamic fundamentalists after that date. Only those who for various reasons were interested in characterizing those events as highly ‘exceptional’ could judge the facts as something utterly puzzling or unexpected. As Gray explains, however, “For most of us who study contemporary war, September 11 was no surprise, and it wasn’t even the worst thing we have predicted. Because, horrible as it was, it could have been so much worse”<sup>35</sup>. Truly, when we learnt just recently that worldwide expenses in the development and production of weapons of mass destruction have surpassed the levels that they reached in the worst years of the Cold War, it is difficult not to expect that more brutal terrorist acts will happen in the near future. Most likely the attacks will come from independent networks of the kind that Osama bin Laden started to organize only a few years prior to their assault on the WTC and the Pentagon, but we should not exclude the possibility that governments themselves or their proxies could use similar tactics. In fact, in the eyes of some commentators, we have already seen instances of both: “It is terribly disquieting to observe that the frontier separating the fundamentalists with the modern technology from the democrats with the barbaric resources is being blurred”<sup>36</sup>.

One of the major problems we sometimes face today is precisely to be able to draw the line between which should be considered terrorist acts and which others respond to the right of modern democracies to defend themselves against outside or inside aggressors. In Chomsky’s words,

Whether attacking “soft targets” is right or wrong, terrorism or a noble cause, depends on who is the agent. This practice is routine, and unproblematic, once moral truisms have been deemed irrelevant and unwanted facts effectively “disappeared”<sup>37</sup>.

As was conveyed above, the mass media have played a crucial role in highlighting both the ‘exceptionality’ of the fundamentalist attacks on some Western countries and the radically different interpretation that the retaliation to those attacks should be given. It is not so clear, though, whether they have really succeeded in convincing us of the legitimacy of the special treatment that these cases of global terrorism deserve. Many experts still believe that, like other global phenomena, terrorism is also undergoing constant metamorphoses but never losing its most basic traits.

Although I have underlined the need to refrain from talking of the atrocities in New York City and Madrid as isolated or completely disconnected from other events in the history of terrorism, it is undeniable that they displayed a number of features which set them apart from violent actions of the kind. If only for the complicated planning they involved and the incredible magnitude of their effects, it is evident that the world was confronting a much more sophisticated and lethal form of radicalism:

No other incident in the history of contemporary terrorism bears comparison with the attacks perpetrated on September 11. No organization or terrorist network had been able to achieve anything like it. Neither the dramatic consequences in terms of casualties and people injured nor the huge material damage it occasioned had any historical precedents<sup>38</sup>.

Even if one needs to be very cautious about the hyperbolic rhetoric that usually erupts after events of this type, it is not hard to understand that such rhetoric is part of the cascade of emotions that need to be released in order to deal successfully with the trauma. Apart from the ‘unprecedentedness’ of the horrors, these early reactions tend to underline the immense human drama and the helplessness of survivors when they face the overwhelming consequences:

This was the bloodiest day on American soil since our Civil War, a modern Antietam played out in real time, on fast-forward, and not with soldiers but with secretaries, security guards, lawyers, bankers, janitors. It was strange that a day of war was a day we stood still. We couldn’t move – that must have been the whole idea – so we had no choice but to watch<sup>39</sup>.

Probably unwittingly, the author places great emphasis here on two of the aspects that certainly mark a decisive difference with regard to most terrorist actions in the past.

Furthermore, she also refers to the capacity of the events to paralyze a whole nation just by the power of the images they were watching. As Castells has pointed out, people in Western societies build their lives and organize their institutions around the power held by “the codes of information and the images of representation”<sup>40</sup>. And indeed, it would be quite impossible to get the projects people are engaged in today done properly without these essential cultural mobilizers. However, this is only half of the story. Just as the leaders and networks who organize and distribute the information may be highly inspirational and constructive, there may be people who prefer to use these instruments for subversive or even fanatical purposes. In short, what makes our society more efficient and liberal is also making it more vulnerable. J. M. Calvo explained in “El País” that “neither the military retaliation nor the implantation of new security measures can guarantee the prevention of other attacks in the future<sup>41</sup>.” And this is so because, due to the lines of interconnection and interdependence that we call globalization, the number of places around the world that have become accessible to terrorist schemes has increased dramatically.

But even more disturbing than this expansion of the problem to countries that had been terror-free before, there is the fact that in the information society terrorist networks do not need to be as hierarchically organized and localized as they were in the past. Kushner points out that “Knowing the structure of the terrorist group made fighting

terrorism easier"<sup>42</sup>. Their new mobility and horizontality allow these groups to work transnationally, thus reducing the chances of being detected. As several of the recorded interviews with Bin Laden attest, this is very likely the greatest advantage new terrorists have derived from globalization processes. When asked about his plans and future targets, he invariably replies: "Don't worry, you'll see them and you'll hear talk about them in the media, God willing [*Inshallah*]".

The second reference in Gibbs' description which implies the existence of new components in fundamentalist terrorism is that attacks are no longer directed towards military or political targets. On the contrary, the victims are civilians and they belong to all social strata. One does not need to go too deep into the psychology of the mass killers to find possible motivations for this strategic change in their actions. First, most experts claim that global terrorists would hit where they believe they are going to cause the most damage, while running only limited risks. In this sense, it is always easier to attack civil buildings or means of transportation than to prepare assaults to federal offices or military bases. Second, although attempts against public officials and political figures usually have a significant immediate impact on the media, it cannot be compared to the kind of aftershocks left by a victimization *en masse* of the common people. Here are a few lines from a report by Kluger a week after 9/11:

As rescue workers began weighing the destruction from last week's terrorist attacks, psychologists were similarly beginning to estimate just what the emotional cost might be. Around the country, normally well-adjusted people have found themselves jumping at shadows, avoiding crowds, giving in to little rituals (take the subway to work but the bus home in the evening) that provide not a jot of real protection but somehow offer them an irrational reassurance that if another plane comes screaming out of the sky, maybe it won't be coming for them or their loved ones<sup>43</sup>.

Similarly, reporters of the Madrid bombings claimed that the fact that victims were mostly low-middle class workers and students would make the images of the carnage stick much longer in the minds of Spaniards. The sharpness of those images will not last forever but it will certainly take a fairly long period of grieving to recover. Interestingly, there are also specialists who believe that a prompt return to normality is also possible: "the very brutality of the attacks [9/11 and 3/11] may have helped a majority of citizens realize that they needed to go on living freely, assuming that a degree of risk existed and hoping that they or their close ones would not be the next victims"<sup>44</sup>.

A third motivation for this change is that since the 1960s some terrorist groups have convinced themselves that there are in fact no 'innocent' victims and that indiscriminate mass murders are acceptable if they are conducive to their goals. This has sometimes been read by the media as a sign of the group's waning power, but it has not always been so. In the case of the Muslim fundamentalists, an additional reason to take this path may be the belief that they are acting under a religious imperative, and more specifically under the norms of an integrist conception of the Islamic creed. As many Europeans and North Americans are beginning to understand now, for these extremists, who are ultimately fighting for the constitution of a single nation of Islam – governed

according to sacred and immutable religious principles – our Western civilization has historically abused and humiliated their people and, therefore, deserves the scourge of their obsessive violence. Little wonder then that this terrorism is perceived as the most treacherous one on both sides of the Atlantic. Beatrice Ivaldi, a 30-year-old woman from Madrid, now living in Rome, told a “Time Magazine” reporter after the Atocha bombings: “We hope it’s ETA. In the end, ETA is just our problem. The real fear is that it’s Islamic terrorists, which would be like the drop of oil destined to spread and spread. If they hit Madrid, it will only move on from there”<sup>45</sup>. And it did.

Last but not least, a final component of the new global terrorism that was not generally present in earlier forms of the phenomenon is that its agents seem more than willing to die at the moment of executing their malevolent deeds. This fact turns them into particularly lethal weapons since they will very rarely miss their target and they do not need to be concerned with the problem of running away from the scene of the crime. From the viewpoint of a Western mentality there acts also extremely disquieting. After the attacks of 9/11, countless commentators claimed that the suicide bombers had left for their mission directly from their mosques, where they had been chanting with their spiritual leaders well-chosen selections of the Koran. Whether this is true or not, what seems unquestionable is the fact that outstanding leaders of the Islamic *jihad* have been encouraging their youngest followers since the early 1990s to sacrifice their lives for their cause:

We do not have the weapons that our enemies possess. We do not have their airplanes and missiles, not even a cannon with which to fight against injustice. The most effective method of inflicting damage and destruction with very little loss is through actions of this nature. This is a legitimate method, based on martyrdom. The martyr receives the privilege of entering paradise and is relieved of all pain and misery<sup>46</sup>.

This promise and the fact that they knew that their actions were going to be widely publicized by their surviving brethren has made the recruitment of new blood for the diverse Islamic groups much easier. Not only that but, as Elorza explains in an article entitled “This terror needs no excuses,” it also reinforces the mechanism of adhesion to the religious truth as the subject of the action becomes immediately a member of the *umma*, or community of believers, and shows his will to destroy the cultural ‘Other’<sup>47</sup>.

One aspect of the new global terror that has powerfully attracted the attention of outside observers is the fact that it is as vicious and mindless against dissenters as it is against the so-called infidels. Thus, suicide bombers have been as habitual in Baghdad or Tunis as they have been in Western countries. Someone could argue that this is not really a novel trend since terrorist groups have always been specially tough on members who have decided to disalign or to abandon the fight. But, again, what distinguishes the new terrorism is that they are often indiscriminate about the choice of their victims. It is not specific individuals or even concrete social groups but, rather, all those who are felt to have done something against their faith or its community of believers – especially capitalist and Zionist conspirators. Both of these aspects, the lethal effects of the suicide bombers and the indiscriminate nature of their crimes, are of course among the changes

that have had a greater impact on our perceptions of the terrorist phenomenon. As some of the quotations included above suggest, the most widespread opinion is that the world has become a much more dangerous place to live in, although as I argue below terrorists can only be partly blamed for this state of affairs.

## CLOSING REMARKS

Let me sum up succinctly what, I believe, are some of the highlights in my contribution. To start with, and given the likeliness that nations in the Western hemisphere are going to suffer even fiercer terrorist attacks in the future, it is crucial that both authorities and the average citizen combat the temptation of thinking of them as utterly “exceptional”. This is highly significant for two reasons. On the one hand, putting too much emphasis on what is new about events of this nature may make us lose a much larger perspective on the problem that would take into consideration what we have learnt about it in the past. It is understandable for anybody to be shaken by a newly discovered vulnerability but that should not deflect our attention from seeking the deepest origins of the problem. Some journalists related the different treatment that the 9/11 attacks received, after the initial shock, in Europe and the U.S. to the degree of familiarity that citizens had with the phenomenon in each context. “Much of the difference,” writes Richburgh, “is rooted in their different experience with terrorism. For Europeans, terrorism has long been considered an unfortunate fact of life. [...] the lessons of terrorism are that it must be fought, but that the root causes must also be addressed”<sup>48</sup>. Another very weighty reason to avoid overly impulsive reactions to this violence is that it is precisely those responses that the terrorists most cherish, since they help them ‘justify’ their particular agendas. As I have suggested at several points throughout my discussion, one of the principal hazards the Western world is facing nowadays – apart from terrorism itself – is that, in trying to do away with the problem, we may come to resemble or behave like those who are intent on disrupting our democracies. Zizek appears to hold a similar opinion when he warns us that “If we fight them the way some countries are already doing, whether we win the military conflict will be of little import, for in a way the enemy would have won the war because we would have lost what we were allegedly defending”<sup>49</sup>.

A second crucial point I have raised is that the role played by the media in how countries and their leaders respond to terrorist actions should never be underestimated. It is hard to overstate the responsibility and the influence that the mass media have on how others view and interpret the events. Norman Fairclough has rightly explained that “The hidden power of media discourse and the capacity of the capitalist class and other power-holders to exercise this power depend on systematic tendencies in news reporting and media activities”<sup>50</sup>. As some of my examples should have made evident, it is clear that a significant number of collective responses to both attacks relied quite heavily on the existing norms, practices, and tendencies of the body politic and media reporters in both countries to incorporate these atrocities into discourses of national identity and patriotism. This is usually achieved by bringing readers to specific positions regarding events through

the repetition of well-calculated modes of representing agency and causality. Of course, there may always be individuals who manage to negotiate their relationship with the ideal subjects/readers that editorials propose but, in general, the power of the mass media is hidden from the average citizen because their practices of ideological reproduction are presented as *professional* skills with their own standards of excellence and rationalizations. This is most likely the “will to truth” that Foucault described as imposing itself for so long upon us that we have become utterly blind to its workings. As Zinn and others have claimed, the only chance we hold “not to become ready meat for carnivorous politicians and journalists” – who are constantly supplying the carving knives – is to get to know in some depth the history of our nations and of phenomena such as terrorism<sup>51</sup>.

One last issue that the second half of my study has also addressed implicitly is that, due to some of the new characteristics of terrorism, it would make little sense to try to come up with a list of measures and procedures to fight it that would be equally valid everywhere around the planet. Although most specialists believe that in order to achieve some results in this fight, “it is important to strengthen the collaboration of the different judicial, police, and State agencies, above all, but not exclusively, among the liberal democracies”<sup>52</sup>, it is also apparent that the scourge of terrorism will take very idiosyncratic forms in different settings since the background conditions in each case are going to determine the kind of violence that will eventually erupt. This variability is also closely related to the fact that, as I have noted, the membership in today’s terrorist organizations is much more horizontal and transnational. One only needs to look into some of the most recent attacks to discover that the diminishing ranks of local, ‘state-sponsored’ terrorists are being replaced by what have been called ‘freelance’ extremist cells supported outside particular national boundaries. Confronted with this new type of terror – sometimes misleadingly referred to as ‘universal/global’, it is important to shun falling into Manichaeic debates that would associate the origins of the problem either with situations of exclusion and humiliation in extensive areas of the world or to the existence of an ‘axis of evil’ that wants to destroy Western civilization. As Aulestia has noted, neither of these arguments carries the explanatory power necessary to reveal the motivations behind the new developments of the phenomenon: “What seems both possible and desirable, instead, is to identify areas of conflict of a distinct nature that could either perpetuate any of the variants of global terrorism or produce new forms of extreme violence”<sup>53</sup>. There are, therefore, two tasks that seem very urgent if we wish to generate competent analyses and effective solutions to the problem of terrorism: on the one hand, the political, economic, religious, etc. factors need to be rigorously studied in concrete locations before any judgments are passed on its origins and objectives; on the other, it is always advisable to elucidate the historical forces that may be contributing to the transformation of the phenomenon in different parts of the world. Generalizations of the kind that ‘this is a *clash of civilizations*’ or ‘the Muslim world has decided to wage a war on the West’ are not just simplistic but, again, they usually lead to reactions that will exacerbate the problem rather than help to solve it.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> N. Ferguson, *The Nation that Fell to Earth*, "Time" (European edition), 11 September 2006, p. 22.
- <sup>2</sup> This poll was carried out by telephone among adult Americans. The results have been weighted to reflect the demographic composition of this segment of the population. The margin of error is +/- 3 percentual points.
- <sup>3</sup> J. Zulaika, W. Douglass, *Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables, and Faces of Terrorism*, New York 1997, p. 238.
- <sup>4</sup> F. Reinares, *Terrorismo global*, Madrid 2003, p.31. Reinares is a member of the expert committee of Terrorism Prevention Branch of the U.N. and a contributing editor of the international journal "Studies in Conflict and Terrorism".
- <sup>5</sup> Allen Feldman's work in political anthropology focusing on the human body and the senses in the cases of Northern Ireland and South Africa sheds light on the role played by media and new technologies in what he refers to as the "mediatization of war." See especially his ground-breaking book *Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland*, Chicago 1991, and his article *Ground Zero Point One: On the Cinematics of History*, in "Social Analysis", 2002, 46, 1, pp. 110-17.
- <sup>6</sup> See, for instance, S. Huntington, *El choque de civilizaciones y la reconfiguración del orden mundial*, Barcelona 1997. Some of Huntington's views seem truly embarrassing to any analyst with a basic knowledge of the Hindu, Islamic or Confucian cultures. His descriptions of these are far too simplistic and his portrayal of the West as holding the monopoly of virtue and a majority of democratic values is simply incorrect.
- <sup>7</sup> C. Gray, *The Second Cold War and Postmodern Terror*, in B. Aretxaga et al. (eds.), *Empire and Terror: Nationalism/ Postnationalism in the New Millenium*, Reno (NE) 2004, p. 217.
- <sup>8</sup> See Reinares, *Terrorismo* cit., pp. 16-17.
- <sup>9</sup> The two conferences referred to here were the "American Studies Workshop 29": "The Continuing Challenge of America's Ethnic Pluralism" held at the Salzburg Seminar in Salzburg, Austria (February 2002) and the "Colloquium on European Minorities" held at Department of European Studies of the University of Pittsburgh, PA (July 2004). Both conferences devoted several sessions to terrorism and related issues.
- <sup>10</sup> M. Foucault, *The Discourse on Language*, in *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, New York 1972, p. 219.
- <sup>11</sup> N. Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominanc*, New York 2003, pp. 207-8.
- <sup>12</sup> On Friday, 26 February 1993, at 12:18 p.m., a massive explosion occurred in the garage area beneath the Vista Hotel, located at the World Trade Center complex in Manhattan. Until this terrorist action that took the lives of six innocent people and injured almost a thousand others, scholars had downplayed the possibility of international terrorism hitting the U.S.
- <sup>13</sup> Quoted in "El Correo", special supplement, 11 September 2002, p. 3.
- <sup>14</sup> Quoted by M. Supersano, *Nevada Experts Comment on Terrorist Acts*, in "Nevada News", 14 September 2001.
- <sup>15</sup> See K.B. Richburg, *Europe, U.S. Diverging on Key Policy Approches*, in "The Washington Post", 4 March 2002, p. A13. Richburg notes that "While the Bush administration has made the war on terrorism the central focus of its foreign policy, Europeans are pursuing a more broadly focused policy that looks at what they see as the root causes of terrorism, such as poverty, disease, and environmental degradation".
- <sup>16</sup> M. Elliot, *The Secret History: They Had a Plan*, in "Time Special Report", 12 August 2002, p. 25.
- <sup>17</sup> W. Laqueur, *Introducción tras el 11-S*, in Id., *Una historia del terrorismo*, Barcelona 2003, p. 17.
- <sup>18</sup> As is well-known, the Popular Party (PP) in power then tried to maintain until the very night before the general elections that the bombings had been perpetrated by ETA activists. Most of the interna-

tional media, however, began to favour the theory that Muslim terrorists had committed the massacre after the first twenty-four-hour period.

- <sup>19</sup> See M. Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror*, New York 2004. In an "Asia Source Interview" conducted by Nermeen Shaikh on 5 May 2004, Mamdani explained that "To understand terrorism, we need to go beyond self-defense, beyond the violence of liberation movements, beyond the violence of anti-colonial struggles and liberation movements. To understand non-state terror today, we need to understand the historical relationship between state terrorism and non-state terrorism. There is a clear and discernible historical dynamic..."
- <sup>20</sup> N. Gibbs, "Time Magazine" special issue, European edition, 11 September, 2001, p. 1.
- <sup>21</sup> J. Gabilondo, *Performing Populism: A Queer Theory of Globalization, Terror, and Spectacle (on Lord of the Rings and 9/11/2001)*, in B. Aretxaga et al. (eds), *Empire and Terror*, Reno (NE) 2004, p. 256.
- <sup>22</sup> O.L. Belategui, *El 'show' debe continuar*, in "El Correo", special supplement, 11 September 2002, p. 23.
- <sup>23</sup> Reinares, *Terrorismo* cit., pp. 110-11.
- <sup>24</sup> L. Morrow, *The Case for Rage and Retribution*, in "Time Magazine" (Special issue, European edition), 11 September, 2001. Morrow's incendiary article, which maintains that "what's needed is a unified, unifying, Pearl Harbor sort of purple American fury – a ruthless indignation that doesn't leak away in a week or two," was by no means an exception in the days following the catastrophe. For a number of other contributions advancing similar views, see S. Talbott, N. Chanda (eds.), *The Age of Terror*, New York 2001.
- <sup>25</sup> M. Gallego, *El ascenso al paraíso de Mohamed Atta*, in "El Correo", special supplement, 11 September 2002, p. 2.
- <sup>26</sup> H. Zinn, *American Blinders*, in "The Progressive", April 2006, p. 2.
- <sup>27</sup> N. Chang, *Silencing Political Dissent: How Post-September 11 Anti-terrorist Measures Threaten our Civil Liberties*, New York 2002, especially pp. 92-103.
- <sup>28</sup> J. Pradera, *Del 11-S al 11-M, in Cinco años del 11-S*, in "El País" supplement, 10 September 2006, p. 20.
- <sup>29</sup> Reinares, *Terrorismo* cit., p. 165.
- <sup>30</sup> See P.B. Heymann, *Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society*. Cambridge and London 2000. Heymann's main message "is that we can and must deal intelligently and dispassionately with a resurgent phenomenon, terrorism, that is designed to replace reason with fear," p. xvii.
- <sup>31</sup> J. Rupérez, *The Scourge of the 21st Century: Reflections on Terrorism from the Basque Country to Manhattan*, in "Security and Defense Studies Review", 2001, 1, pp. 219.
- <sup>32</sup> Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival* cit., p. 191.
- <sup>33</sup> K. Phillips, *Theocons and Theocrats*, in "The Nation", 1 May 2006.
- <sup>34</sup> Laqueur, *Historia* cit., p. 21.
- <sup>35</sup> Gray, *Second Cold War* cit., p. 224.
- <sup>36</sup> L.G. Montero, *La catástrofe democrática*, in "El País" supplement, 10 September 2006, p. 22.
- <sup>37</sup> Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival* cit., p. 193.
- <sup>38</sup> Reinares, *Terrorismo* cit., p. 67.
- <sup>39</sup> Gibbs, "Time Magazine" special issue, European edition, 11 September, 2001, p. 1.
- <sup>40</sup> M. Castells, *The Power of Identity*, in *The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture*, vol. 2 Oxford 1997, p. 359.
- <sup>41</sup> J.M. Calvo, *La herida sigue abierta*, in "El País", supplement, 10 September 2006, p. 2.
- <sup>42</sup> H. Kushner (ed.), *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium*, Thousand Oaks (CA) 1998, p. 15.

- <sup>43</sup> J. Kluger, *Attack on the Spirit*, in "Time" special issue, 24 September 2001, p. 90.
- <sup>44</sup> K. Aulestia, *Historia general del terrorismo*, Madrid 2005. See *Focos y escenarios futuros del terrorismo*.
- <sup>45</sup> Quoted in J. Tyrangiel, *We Are All Spaniards*, in "Time", 15 March 2004.
- <sup>46</sup> A. Shami, representative of the *jihad* in Palestine, quoted. in Reinares, *Terrorismo* cit., p. 109.
- <sup>47</sup> A. Elorza, *This Terror Needs no Excuses*, in "El País" supplement, 10 September 2006, p. 12.
- <sup>48</sup> Richburgh, *Europe* cit., p.A13. See also *Europe wages quiet, unrelenting fight against terror* in "The Boston Globe", 26 September 2004.
- <sup>49</sup> S. Zizek, *Irak. La letera prestada*, Madrid 2006.
- <sup>50</sup> N. Fairclough, *Language and Power*, London - New York 1989, p. 54.
- <sup>51</sup> Zinn, *American* cit., p. 2.
- <sup>52</sup> Reinares, *Terrorismo* cit., p. 171.
- <sup>53</sup> Aulestia, *Focos* cit., p. 347.

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