Public power in Europe: studies in historical transformations / edited by James S. Amelang, Siegfried Beer
(Thematic work group. States, legislation, institutions; 1)

320.94 (21.)
1. Società e Stato - Europa 2. Europa - Storiografia I. Amelang, James S. II Beer, Siegfried
CIP a cura del Sistema bibliotecario dell’Università di Pisa

This volume is published, thanks to the support of the Directorate General for Research of the European Commission, by the Sixth Framework Network of Excellence CLIOHRES.net under the contract CIT3-CT-2005-00164. The volume is solely the responsibility of the Network and the authors; the European Community cannot be held responsible for its contents or for any use which may be made of it.

Volumes published (2006)

I. Thematic Work Groups
   I. Public Power in Europe: Studies in Historical Transformations
   II. Power and Culture: Hegemony, Interaction and Dissent
   III. Religion, Ritual and Mythology. Aspects of Identity Formation in Europe
   IV. Professions and Social Identity. New European Historical Research on Work, Gender and Society
   V. Frontiers and Identities: Mapping the Research Field
   VI. Europe and the World in European Historiography

II. Transversal Theme
   I. Citizenship in Historical Perspective

III. Doctoral Dissertations
   I. F. Peyrou, La Comunidad de Ciudadanos. El Discurso Democrático-Republicano en España, 1840-1868

Intelligence Institutions and State Relations in the twentieth Century: a Central European Perspective

SIEGFRIED BEER
University of Graz

September 11, 2001 and the subsequent “war on terrorism” as proclaimed by U.S. president George W. Bush have utterly transformed the role and standing of intelligence in world politics. The threat of “superterrorism” by terrorist organizations like Al Quaeda has supplanted the traditional Cold War motto of “learning to live with the bomb” with today’s issue of “having to learn to live with intelligence”¹. Yet to this day intelligence, as “the hidden hand”², remains among the “least understood” and “most under-theorized”
areas and aspects of international relations. It is also widely misread, as understanding intelligence in the 21st century has become difficult indeed, not least because of its technology-driven character. Perhaps one way of explaining and demythologising it is to reduce it to its three distinct and basic elements, as explicated by Sherman Kent’s classic study of America’s intelligence needs after World War II: intelligence is knowledge; intelligence is organization and intelligence is activity.

At the beginning of the 20th century intelligence institutions, still mostly military, of major or middle-ranking powers were in a comparatively primitive state; they were understaffed, underfinanced and generally held in low esteem. Today intelligence has become an integral part of national, i.e. internal security and international behaviour, i.e. foreign policy, of even small nations. The globalisation of communication as well as the creation and importance of international organizations over the last century have stimulated the growth and importance of national as well as private intelligence agencies. Creating supranational intelligence institutions, as for example with NATO, the European Union or the United Nations, has so far proved too difficult to achieve.

This survey essay is an attempt to position intelligence as well as the study thereof in the world of international politics as a product and an activity, created and undertaken mostly by national agencies, organizations and institutions, usually kept and financed by states, big and small, to assure better security at home and to maximize national interests abroad. It wants to serve as an introduction to a complex yet increasingly relevant topic and field from a Central European viewpoint, intentionally addressing a non-specialist audience.

“Intelligence Revolutions”

Public knowledge about intelligence has greatly increased over the last quarter century as academic scholars, practitioners of the trade, and serious journalists have taken up the study of this “missing dimension” in diplomatic history, and no less in military and political history. Richard W. Rowan’s accusation, that spies have had a greater influence on the course of history than on the work of historians, which was included in the introduction to his best-selling survey of espionage in world history, held true in 1938 and was still valid when his book was reprinted in 1969. Since the 1970s, however, scholarly attention has been applied to the subject of intelligence and a distinct discipline has emerged which is generally known as ‘intelligence studies’. It can certainly be claimed that over the last three decades intelligence and intelligence studies have become a considerable growth industry with a proliferation of monographs, periodicals, anthologies and symposia, thereby seemingly marking the acceptance of intelligence as a serious and respectable academic discipline. Since the late 1970s historians have shown and documented that the 20th century has seen an intelligence revolution, which has impacted on world history in a massive way, and not just militarily speaking. It was mainly with the publication of J.C. Masterman’s The Double Cross System and the subsequent leakage of the “Ultra Secret”, that is, the revelation of the painstakingly
guarded successes of the western Allies against the German and Japanese ("Magic") war machines during the Second World War, that a wider and also an academic interest in intelligence issues was stirred.\(^1\)

Intelligence can be said to have two principal roots: one is diplomatic, seeking information about the policy-making of other states, actually or potentially inimical to that state or group of states; and the other is military-operational, securing knowledge of the capabilities, intentions and movements of other armed forces. Thus, a necessary pre-condition of intelligence is the systematic observation of foreign powers, their armies, and their ruling elites over longer periods of time.\(^2\) Though spying is as old as organized mankind (even if only “the second-oldest profession”), it was only slightly over a century ago that governments started to create separate and more or less permanent institutions to pursue a strategy of systematic gathering of information, at first mainly of military, but soon also of state secrets, about other countries.\(^3\) As imperial tensions of the late 19th century and fast-paced technological changes, particularly in the field of armaments, combined, a public fascination but also a fear about subversive activities and espionage began to be generated; this in turn led to a widely perceived need for protection (counter espionage) and offence (foreign intelligence) particularly in the period before the Great War. At about the same time the spy fiction genre was launched on its successful path into the 20th century.\(^4\) Naturally World War I greatly increased the scope for espionage by technological means, particularly in the area of interception of radio signals and application of aerial photography. The Bolshevik Revolution and, soon thereafter, the victory of the communists in Russia stressed the need for continued peace-time intelligence operations, now linked to ideological concerns.

While intelligence efforts and investments diminished somewhat in the 1920s, by the mid-thirties a significant build-up of intelligence institutions by aggressive as well as defence-oriented countries can be seen. World War II became a veritable intelligence war, most decisively in the field of signals intelligence, i.e. the breaking of enemy ciphers. The early Cold War quickly re-focused states and governments to an unprecedented scale on secret intelligence collection and analysis; by the 1960s the intelligence war between Moscow and Washington was driven by mutual satellite surveillance. Both sides now sought ‘total’ intelligence about the respective main enemy and its supporters and satellite states. In the meantime intelligence expenses sky-rocketed as the intelligence game became more and more technology-driven. High-tech created a hitherto unknown problem: information overload through practically limitless reliance on signals and imagery intelligence drawn from satellites, spy planes and drone systems. As a consequence, the cost of high-tech intelligence has created a huge technology gap and has since the 1990s secured the United States its sole position of intelligence ‘hyper’ power. Human intelligence (HUMINT) seemed on its way out. Until September 11, 2001, that is. Intelligence as evolved since 1945 has clearly become a multinational activity and with its growing international anti-terrorism networks, as Michael Herman has pointed out, is quickly becoming an international system in its own right.\(^5\)
Even though intelligence historians and other intelligence scientists have started to illuminate and explicate the role and history of espionage and of intelligence institutions, it must be admitted that, to this day, their academic discipline, the field of intelligence studies, still occupies only a small part of the international relations agenda. The growing intelligence studies community is by and large comprised of four groups: historians, political scientists, practitioner-scholars and freelance writers/journalists. Among these the historians have been pre-eminent, and scholars from the English-speaking world have been leading the way. Senior members of the club are, admittedly subjectively chosen, the British scholars D.C. Watt, Christopher Andrew and Richard J. Aldrich, the Canadians David Stafford and Wesley Wark, and the American historians Ernest May, Robin Winks, Bradley F. Smith, John Prados and David Kahn, most of whose work is mainly on the pre-1945 period. To this group must be added a number of prominent CIA and KGB specialists and an exciting group of somewhat younger, but already established academicians, both American and European.

The historians’ pre-eminence within the intelligence studies community is based on their conceptual as well as their empirical work, as they have been able to give direction in terms of typology, methodology and even theory of intelligence, as well as providing the context for intelligence studies within political, social, military and international history. The leading political scientists within intelligence studies are mostly American. My own list of the most important contributors to the field includes Robert Jervis, Richard K. Betts, Roy Godson, Michael I. Handel, Michael Herman, Arthur S. Hulnick, Loch K. Johnson and Jeffrey T. Richelson. Their work is mainly analytical-descriptive and deals primarily with the post-1945 development of intelligence. Notable practitioner-scholars are also mainly American-British and almost exclusively concerned with the Cold War era. So are the leading intelligence journalists and freelance writers. Some of the work of both of these groups is impressive and even essential, particularly for historical research.

One of the main indicators of the liveliness of intelligence studies has been the growth of intelligence literature in scholarly journals and the founding of periodicals exclusively or largely devoted to intelligence matters. The two leading international intelligence journals dealing with historical issues were both founded in the mid-1980s: *Intelligence and National Security (INS)*, published by Frank Cass in London, and the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (IJIC)*, now published by Taylor&Francis in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. An annotated guide of past and present intelligence periodicals, dealing at least in part with questions of intelligence of any kind, appeared in 1992 and listed altogether 155 entries. It has practically become impossible for one and the same scholar to cover and master the whole range of the science of intelligence. Its diversity, particularly in the technical field, is quite forbidding.

Furthermore, the teaching of intelligence has become wide-spread, at least in the English-speaking world. The National Intelligence Study Center (NISC) in Washington, DC has conducted three surveys of college and university courses on the subject of intelligence and published their results in 1980, 1985 and 1992. A further survey,
this time conducted world-wide, was published in 2000\textsuperscript{23}. An increasing number of American universities now offer undergraduate and graduate programs in military or competitive intelligence (i.e. industrial espionage) and recently British universities have followed their example\textsuperscript{28}. Finally, professional associations devoted to the study and discussion of intelligence have been established and have since blossomed, first in Great Britain, Canada and the United States, and finally also in Europe. Among the main and oldest associations three deserve to be singled out: the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies, the British Study Group on Intelligence, and the Intelligence Section of the International Studies Association in the United States. European associations exist in several Scandinavian countries, in Holland (The Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association) and in Germany (Arbeitskreis Geschichte der Nachrichtendienste)\textsuperscript{25}. They all profit from a dialogue with veterans of national intelligence, who have organized themselves in a variety of professional organizations consisting mainly of retired personnel. In Europe these retired professionals are usually integrated into their respective national associations of intelligence studies.

To sum up, a widely effective intelligence revolution has been manifesting itself throughout the course of the 20th century and into the 21st century. This particular revolution has finally found an echo in a scholarly revolution which has started to describe and interpret its impact on world politics. This scholarly revolution started slowly and only after about 1975, but it has accelerated since the 1980s and has produced impressive results particularly in the 1990s\textsuperscript{26}.

**The Search for a Definition, Doctrine or Theory of Intelligence**

Is there a correct definition of intelligence?\textsuperscript{27} Thomas Troy offers one and opts for brevity, actually adapting Constantine Fitzgibbon’s succinct description: “intelligence is knowledge of the enemy”, and further qualifying the enemy as actual or potential\textsuperscript{28}. There is no lack of attempts to define intelligence. I can here refer to only a few pertinent ones\textsuperscript{29}. A former CIA chief, for example, offers a definition of intelligence as “information about the plans, the intentions, and the capabilities of other nations”\textsuperscript{30}, whereas a former CIA officer turned scholar proposes a more complete, yet still brief characterization of intelligence as product and process: “Intelligence is 1) information about an adversary useful in dealing with him; 2) an organization or activity concerned with such information”\textsuperscript{31}. What is missing in many definitions is a reference to hostility and warfare, and most of these ignore the element of espionage and spying, which the theorists of military intelligence have long since seen as one of their main concerns, namely “the discovery of military secrets”\textsuperscript{32}. Clearly, secrecy is necessary if the sources or the policy issues are sensitive. What is even more important, and therefore has to be addressed in a comprehensive definition, is the recipient of intelligence. My own definition of intelligence therefore claims that intelligence is information — often secret — collected, organized and/or analysed on behalf of decision-makers (be they military, political or economic/private)\textsuperscript{33}.
The search for the correct definition of intelligence can only serve as the starting point for a characterization of or toward a doctrine or even a theory of intelligence that can claim to encompass the whole gamut of what modern intelligence institutions are expected to do and represent. It was in the late 1950s that the belief gained ground that intelligence had to be put on a sounder theoretical basis. However, intelligence practitioners and pragmatists remained very sceptical of this and even argued that a theory of intelligence would create unnecessary complications. Like the majority of the leading intelligencers, most international relations scholars then (as they still tend to do now) looked upon intelligence as a mere craft rather than as a science. This may in part explain why there have been so few attempts to propose holistic concepts of intelligence, which could be tested as a theory or even as a doctrine of intelligence.

To date only one ambitious intelligence expert has offered a really comprehensive explanation about the historical evolution of intelligence and espionage from the times of the Hebrews and Romans, reaching into the present age of technology-centred intelligence. In “Toward a Theory of Intelligence”, published in 1995, David Kahn, otherwise best known for his work on signals intelligence, clearly emphasizes military intelligence and strives to seek three clarifications: to explain the rise of military intelligence to its present level of importance; to show how intelligence works, and to address its main unsolved problems of today and for tomorrow. Kahn explains that from ancient times there have only been sporadic episodes of espionage but no organized efforts to gain intelligence. Only as larger armies and industrialization resulted in new needs and conditions for warfare, was a need for information about such factors as coal and iron production, transportation of armies, or mobilization of troops created. The political and industrial revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries provided the tools to explore these newly established targets. It was through ‘physical intelligence’, that is reconnaissance and systematic observation, that vital information was drawn, at first from balloons and zeppelins and soon from airplanes, and with special cameras. Information was extracted not from words but from things. Another source of information also emerged through technical innovations and communication development: ‘verbal intelligence’, acquired from a verbal or written source. Parliamentary debates, the daily press, public reports, or even the tapping of telegraph wires yielded information, at first systematically gathered by military attachés. This verbal intelligence funnelled information significantly in advance of physical intelligence.

While physical intelligence can inform about enemy capabilities, verbal intelligence tells of enemy intentions as well. Before World War I, physical intelligence supplied almost all information sought, but this kind of evidence rarely provided commanders enough time to win battles. Then, during the Great War, two inventions, the radio telephone and the trench telephone offered commanders information in time to help win battles. This heightened the role of intelligence and in the inter-war years most great powers reacted to this break-through by establishing code-breaking agencies, which were to rise to great prominence in World War II. The intelligence feats of the Allies in developing “Ultra” and “Magic” elevated intelligence to a highly sensitive political
and military instrument capable of providing the potential difference between victory and defeat in battle and diplomacy. Thus, the theory of physical and verbal intelligence convincingly explains the evolution of intelligence from its episodic beginnings to the intelligence revolution of the 20th century.

But are there permanent elements or timeless principles of intelligence that reach into the present or even into the future? David Kahn has very recently extended his theoretical scope and offers several conceptual generalizations, almost principles, to which I have added essential elements introduced by other theorists. I then suggest ten major premises for a general theory of intelligence:

1. Intelligence optimises one's resources through magnifying strength and improving command.

2. Intelligence can serve only as an auxiliary element, even in war; it remains of secondary importance in view of the necessity for armaments, supply, quality of troops or even inspirational skills by commanders.

3. Intelligence is perhaps more essential to the defence than to the offence. This has been borne out by history again and again, on the one hand, by the relative frequency of defensive intelligence successes over offensive postures and on the other, by the phenomenon that aggressors frequently neglect or underestimate intelligence, while defensive nations tend to rely on it.

4. Intelligence enjoys a secure future, for intelligence is an instrument of conflict and crisis, and human history has never known extended periods without conflicts and crises between peoples or states.

5. Intelligence per se is subjective; it assumes importance only in relation to a conflict, real or imagined.

6. Intelligence is always about someone else; that someone else is almost always a rival or enemy, again potential or actual. One does not collect intelligence in comparable intensity on friends, unless one is already suspicious of them.

7. Intelligence faces two basic and ultimately unsolvable problems:
   - the need to predict accurately;
   - the difficulty of convincing decision-makers, be they statesmen, generals or managers, to accept information they may not like to be presented with.

8. Superior or even adequate intelligence lessens tensions and the risk of war. In war, good intelligence shortens the struggle and in peace it reduces uncertainty and stabilizes the international system.

9. Good intelligence can also save money by reducing the need to acquire ever more military and/or otherwise sophisticated equipment.

10. The heart of intelligence is the enabling of appropriate action over time.
Does all this amount to a theory of intelligence in international and national security politics? Hardly, though it does constitute considerable progress in view of the widespread neglect of theoretical thinking on intelligence during the first two decades of the scholarly intelligence revolution. What then are the chances of integrating intelligence studies more vigorously into security studies and international relations, looking for a common theoretical ground on which the theory of power, so prevalent in the study and field of international relations, may be augmented by a theory of knowledge so central to intelligence activity? Nothing points to the notion that the international relations community, essentially dominated by American political scientists, finds it desirable or necessary to develop a theory of intelligence within the realm of international relations. Such an impetus would have to come from the intelligence studies community and would have to be sustained over a substantial period of time to achieve a decisive impact on the international relations community.

**Austria as a Central European Case Study**

It is generally assumed that the ‘intelligence revolution’, which so greatly accelerated in World War II, continued to influence the evolution, possibly even the escalation, of the Cold War. New and exciting research has recently been applied to that very question: what difference did intelligence and more particularly, intelligence institutions, make on post-war diplomacy in Europe and on the seemingly inevitable emergence of the Cold War? It stands to reason that quadripartitely occupied Austria from 1945 to 1955 should prove a fertile ground to start applying concrete questions on the international and at least on some areas of national politics in that geopolitically sensitive country of Central Europe. Similar inquiries should be made into the national history experiences of all European countries.

There can be no doubt about the fact that post-war Austria quickly became one of the hot-spots of international intrigue and espionage, as corroborated by the sagacious observation of a top American diplomat who was stationed in Vienna and in Salzburg in the late 1940s and who, in a private comment to a colleague in the State Department on the “fantastic intelligence saturation of Austria”, speculated in 1950 that every fourth inhabitant of the city of Salzburg spied for some domestic or foreign intelligence service. This state of affairs at a crucial juncture of the First Cold War amply reflects the fact that Austria, certainly from the era of Metternich onwards, has also had a real and pervasive tradition of state surveillance and state-organized intelligence-gathering, as it has also had its share of spectacular cases of espionage. The latter have stretched from Alfred Redl in the waning years of the Dual Monarchy to Felix Bloch, the Austrian-born American diplomat-turned-traitor in the late 1980s, only to mention the publicly better-known Austrian espionage cases of the last century.

Having said all this by way of introduction to an application of intelligence enquiry to Austrian history as a case study for the Central European experience, we now must ask: how can the above-mentioned considerations and methods of the study of intelligence...
be applied to the study of Austrian history? Adapting Wesley Wark’s general research agenda for the future of intelligence studies I recognise six major ‘research issues’ for an intelligence-oriented exploration of 20th-century Austrian history.46

1. The ‘Research Issue’, defined as the effort to unearth and make available, through new search strategies, bold interpretation, and documentation, vital raw materials for intelligence-related topics and questions of Austrian history. This would clearly necessitate a concerted effort by historians and other social scientists, possibly also through organized public pressure, to achieve better access to documentary collections in state or regional Austrian archives as well as in normal administrative record depositories like ministries or the several types of security offices in this country. It is high time for Austria to lift its archival standards to liberal international norms.47 This can only be achieved through a collective effort by all those who value transparency and accountability of all government agencies to ensure that all information is available with reasonable exceptions on the basis of current national interests and after a reasonable lapse of time. To be sure, there will always be major gaps in the documentation of military, security or even regular government activities due, for example, to censorship or intentional, in some cases even legally compulsory destruction of evidence (e.g. through Verschlußsachverordnungen [closure decrees]).48 One can, however, draw solace from the fact that in the field of intelligence nobody ever gets the whole story. Nor, at least, does one have to suffer from archival overload. However, a small state like Austria, surrounded as it is by small, medium-sized and great powers, will always attract foreign (intelligence) attention through diplomatic, military, political or economic channels. The evidence of such activities may, and eventually most likely will, become available in foreign archives, sometimes much earlier than in the national depositories of Austria.

2. The ‘Historical Issue’ is focussed on intelligence in war and peace in an international but also, of course, in a national context over a longer period of time. Its case-study quality lends itself well to comparative assessment, that is, to the question of how states and governments differ in their reactions and policies to the same or at least similar challenges. This pertains to both the civilian and military intelligence organizations and to the often naturally secretive agenda of regular national bureaucracies or organizations. This type of assessment always deals with the perception and psychology of governmental decision makers. Intelligence historians forcefully need to defy the notion, widely held even by their colleagues in related fields, that it is always necessary to establish a clear link between intelligence provision and policy outcome, that is, between the intelligence producer/analyst and the intelligence user. It can be just as important to illuminate the archaeology of thinking or even only the mental atmosphere and specific climate under which decision makers operate and reach policy conclusions. Through the method of historical comparison one can examine the relative importance of size, power, and impact of organized intelligence in small, medium-sized, and major states, not least to determine the degree of the general applicability or lack there of the historical intelligence revolution in
the various countries examined or compared. It is quite evident that on the national level, or one could also call it the micro level, republican Austria has not figured among the more developed and/or active participants in the intelligence revolution; however, due to its strategic location, between the wars simply in the heart of Central Europe, and after World War II at a crucial borderline of the ideological divide in Europe, Austria has played a major role on the international or macro level of the intelligence struggle between the two global super powers.

3. The ‘Public Policy Issue.’ This project has had special importance for the larger debate on the intelligence establishment in the United States in regard to the role and functions of the American intelligence community, and particularly of the CIA in American foreign policy since the 1970s. This debate has pitted the critics of American intelligence abuses against the defenders of the status quo of intelligence or of its continual structural reform. Importantly, however, it prompted a significant number of intelligence practitioners of the past and the present to engage in fairly open debate on the past and future value of U.S. intelligence and this, naturally, led to a much broader awareness of the complicated issues involved on the part at least a good portion of the American electorate. The main problems addressed in this context have been the high cost of intelligence, the necessity for greater accountability to Congress and for better efficiency, the question of ethics in the use of covert operations (e.g. assassination) and the issue of executive leadership in the whole area of intelligence. One of the direct stimuli of this public discourse on intelligence in the United States has been the writing of memoirs or even defensive treatises by veterans of intelligence services which in turn have become significant sources of information for historical analysis too.

All of this, quite clearly, has but little reference to the state of intelligence debate in Austria which historically has not gone much beyond political infighting between the governments of the day and the respective political opposition. At present a national community of intelligence scientists simply does not exist in Austria where intelligence issues, if they are addressed at all, are researched and analysed only by individual representatives of academic fields such as International Law, Penal Law, Political Science and History, general and military. Even if a community of intelligence scholars from these various fields did exist, they would have great difficulty in finding an organized community of practitioners with whom to enter into a dialogue. Presumably only the Austrian military (Bundesheer) possesses such a group of specialists, but this author has not encountered any evidence that this group of active or even retired military experts has ever sought to engage in a broader national debate on general intelligence issues in Austria. Nor do the parliamentary security spokesmen of the political parties seem to seek the company or advice of scholarly experts on intelligence. This field has simply not yet been integrated into the Austrian political landscape.

4. The ‘Civil Liberties Issue’ in Austria is closely tied to the topic just discussed. It is the predominant theme in the limited public security debate in Austria. It naturally focuses on the abuse of the law primarily in the domestic behaviour of both the special
security forces, on the one hand, the Staatspolizeilicher Dienst [state police] (Stapo), since 2002 the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung [Federal Agency for State Protection and Counter-Terrorism], BTA for short and on the other, of the military counter intelligence service, the Heeresabwehramt (AbwA). Protection of privacy has been the overriding issue of the national intelligence debate in Austria. This debate, though obviously of great importance in any developed democracy, has obscured the relevance of the legitimate functions of the defensive and foreign intelligence agencies necessary for the protection against interior subversion and terrorism or aggressive espionage from the outside, political or military. It has also clouded the issue of the division of labour between the separate organizations for domestic and foreign intelligence. It will be up to the Austrian scholars in the various fields concerned to break down these artificial barriers and to study and debate the system of Austrian intelligence gathering and operating as a whole, both historically and as it pertains to the current needs and situation of present-day Austria. Intelligence needs for the future should also feature within the horizons of policy function and policy change.

5. The ‘Investigative Journalism Issue’. Journalists of every persuasion in Austria have taken up intelligence topics much earlier, and so far even more comprehensively, than most intelligence scholars. These journalists appear to have been motivated in their pursuit of intelligence stories more often by the wide interest of average readers in secretive politics, subversion and terrorism than in a thorough research into complicated patterns of clandestine behaviour in Austria, past and present. Most of the published monographic work by journalists or amateur-historians on Austrian intelligence involvement, both historical and current, has actually proved very successful from a commercial point of view, as such books have generally sold well and have allegedly reached best-seller status, even if only for short periods of time. All of these journalistic investigations or presentations share an open or occasionally hidden tendency towards conspiracy theories; they often either stress that what intelligence services or practitioners do/did was false or they tend to exaggerate the danger of intelligence services or agents in a particular historical or current situation. Intelligence agencies are thus usually portrayed as ineffectual and ridiculous or they are seen as too powerful and even conspiratorial. Some of these journalistic products can actually prove to be a good read; however, on closer inspection, they often appear more akin to fictional writing. Nevertheless, as serious analysts of intelligence have recognized, some of their quickly-arrived-at conspiracy theories have occasionally later been proved partially or even largely accurate.

6. And finally, the ‘Popular Culture Issue’. The inclusion of popular culture in the treatment of intelligence generally and of intelligence involvement of a specific country or people may prove to be a suitable vehicle for reaching a larger audience when national or international issues of intelligence need to be addressed for reasons of popular political support. Spy novels and spy films have been perennial and almost assured successes in most societies; here again one can see that Austria is no excep-
tion. Popular notions of espionage and clandestinity, if studied and understood by scholars and trade practitioners, may well serve as a widely available background against which a deeper understanding of the need for a responsible national intelligence effort can be explained, that is, verified or falsified in view of existing popular beliefs. It will take knowledgeable, responsible and skilful specialists to convey this type of message if ever the issue of the need or the renunciation of significant intelligence failures of the Austrian government will arise as a general political question or principle.

All these issues confirm that the agenda for intelligence scholars from all disciplines in Austria, and I would argue, by analogy in most (Central) European countries, is stacked with challenges of many and certainly fundamental kinds. I am convinced that historians of Austrian intelligence or of the forces of intelligence active in Austrian history have a mammoth and specialized task to tackle. Judging by international experience and example, it will most likely be up to the historians to unite the scholars from the various academic fields and the retired or active practitioners in intelligence institutions to join in a national or, better still, a supra-national, i.e. (Central) European community of intelligence scholars and studies.

The State of Intelligence Studies in Central Europe

It can perhaps be claimed that there has been a modest start towards the gradual integration of intelligence issues into the larger context of Austrian history and politics in the 20th century.

There are now almost a dozen trained Austrian historians who have taken up the challenge of tackling issues in which intelligence factors play a central role and there are also several academics in non-historical fields who have ventured into questions of historical or current importance in the areas of state surveillance, foreign intelligence-gathering, military counter-espionage or general Austrian involvement in the larger, international intelligence community. These scholars can be quickly enumerated. Among historians they are, by alphabetical listing: Thomas Albrich, Siegfried Beer, Walter Blasi, Edda Engelke, Michael Gehler, Gerhard Jagschitz, Stefan Karner, Arnold Kopeckez, Albert Pethö, Oliver Rathkolb, Hans Schafranek, Felix Schneider and Gerald Steinacher. Their work is characterized largely by efforts to ground these studies on archival sources wherever and whenever available. Fortunately, there are also several non-Austrian historians who have made significant contributions to the field of Austrian intelligence history, among them, again in alphabetical order: Ralph W. Brown III, James T. Carafano, Hans Rudolf Fuhrer, Barry McLoughlin, Timothy J. Naftali, Kevin C. Ruffner and D.C. Watt.

Relevant contributions by former practitioners of the trade on Austrian soil, both foreign and domestic, have been made by Tennant H. Bagley, Blake Baker, Peer de Silva, Wilhelm Hötzl, William Hood, Erwin Kemper, James V. Milano and Michael Sika. There are a few Austrian specialists in related social and military sciences who have
furthered our understanding of secretive and defensive security issues in Austrian society, past and present, foremost among them political scientists and juridical experts. Among these the following have made significant contributions: Wolfgang Braumandl, Benjamin and Ulrike Davy, Bernd-Christian Funk, Robert Fuchs, Gustav E. Gusteinau, Walter Hauptmann, Friedrich Korkisch, Markus Purkart, Erich Reiter, Angelika Schätz and Helmut Widder. The relative dearth of non-historical specialists is the more surprising and regrettable as the question of the role and legitimacy of the current intelligence organizations in Austria has surfaced again and again over the last few years as successive governments have tried to find a political consensus on modernizing the three services: the Staatspolizeilicher Dienst (Stapo), recently reformed into the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung (BVT) and the two military intelligence institutions, the Herrennachrichtenamt (HNaA) for foreign military intelligence and the Abwehramt as a military security service.

Even though there are several significant differences in attitude and approach between the civilian security force Stapo (which includes units for special police operations and the fight against terrorism and organized crime) and the two military intelligence organizations, all three have elected to remain largely inconspicuous or even hidden from the view of the average citizen. There has never been an effective public attempt at self-portrayal except for an annual state security report by the Ministry of the Interior primarily on the work of the Stapo. The traditional self-imposed silence and secrecy has resulted in a chronically sceptical and often very critical press coverage whenever intelligence-related stories or issues surface. This could only be counter-acted by the active participation of these services in a public debate on the nature of the national intelligence and security needs for the present and the future of Austria.

What then is the status of intelligence studies in the larger context of Central Europe in the year 2006? It is indeed very difficult from an Austrian location and vantage point to assess this accurately in the former territories of the Eastern Bloc countries. This difficulty may partly be caused by the traditional difficulties with Slavic languages but there is also evidence that genuine intelligence studies have not yet emerged in some of the new democracies like Hungary, Slovakia or the Czech Republic. Slovenia, Croatia, Poland and Romania appear to have started to tackle at least some of the major historical issues directly related to their former national intelligence institutions. In Germany, Switzerland and Italy intelligence studies are undertaken by individual scholars who can sometimes be loosely grouped in schools (e.g. the Tübingen/Köln school of intelligence studies) or, as in the case of Germany as a whole, seen in the larger context of an active national intelligence association.

In Germany the field of general intelligence history has more or less been carried by the following specialists: Gerhard Schulz, Jürgen Heideking, Christof Mauch, Heike Bungert, Petra Marquardt-Bigman, Reinhard Doerries, Wolfgang Krieger, Michael Wala, Ian Foitzik and Jürgen Rohwer. The last dozen years since the demise of the German Democratic Republic have seen a veritable flood of documentation and secondary literature on the activities of the Stasi within the East German Ministry of
State Security. Serious journalistic contributions about the role and activities of the Bundesnachrichtendienst are consistently made by Erich Schmidt-Eenboom and Udo Ulfkotte.

For Switzerland solid intelligence research, mostly on Switzerland during World War II, can be connected to the following scholars: Hans Rudolf Kurz, Hans Rudolf Fuhrer, Heinz K. Meier and Pierre Braunschweig. Polish intelligence history was early on taken up by Jozef Garlinski and Richard Woytak. Perhaps the best-known Polish intelligence historian is Andrezj Peplonsk who has written widely on Polish intelligence history 1918-1945. Since 1990 “The Enigma Bulletin”, edited by Zdzislaw Jan Kapera, has offered an important forum mainly, but not exclusively, for enigma specialists. In Slovenia intelligence issues of World War II have been addressed in the main by scholars such as Dusan Biber (Ljubljana), Jerca Vodušek-Staric (Maribor) and Gorazd Baje (Koper). National intelligence issues in Romania have been raised by scholars like Marius Oprea and Cristian Troncota in Bucarest. Several British intelligence experts, such as Dennis Deletant, Kieran Williams, and Maurice Pearton have contributed significantly from abroad.

Italian intelligence studies, general as well as on Central European issues, are best represented by scholars like Raimondo Craveri, Giuseppe de Lutiis, Vittorfranco S. Pisano, Peter Sebastian, Ambrogio Viviani, Mimmi Franzinelli and the OSS-veteran Max Corvo. Monographic journalistic treatments of terrorism and political agitation in northern Italy have been submitted by Christoph Franceschini and Hans Karl Peterlini.

Clearly Austria and most of the Central European states could never strive for a comparable status in regard to intelligence power or intelligence studies with countries like the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany or Canada, but they should be in a class, for example, with Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands or even Italy. At the least, these ‘intelligently advanced’ countries could serve as models on how to proceed and where to prioritise, both in the research and practise of intelligence.

Conclusions

Even though the study of intelligence as a whole and of intelligence institutions in particular has progressed quite impressively over the last three decades, particularly in North America and in Western and Northern Europe, there still abounds a wide-spread ignorance of the significant impact of the role, functions and tasks to which intelligence institutions in practically every country of the world have been put for decades and are now being put on a daily basis. While the shock of September 11 has greatly increased the need for awareness of intelligence issues, even on the part of the average citizen, there is a particular need to understand better the structures and activities of those secret intelligence institutions that practically each and every country has created. The international system unfolding in the 21st century is likely to be volatile and to include both nation-states and transnational actors. A high premium will therefore have to be placed on intelligence activities. And public scrutiny of them will undoubtedly increase.
Intelligence institutions certainly need to be viewed and understood as products of the society in which they operate. They also need to be seen in potential partnership with the citizen as “intelligence minute-man”; the citizen can be a kind of intelligence volunteer, alert to suspicious behaviour as self-defence and protection against threats to individual and public security.\textsuperscript{83} As intelligence institutions are organized and run by national governments, intelligence history must perhaps foremost be the realm of intelligence historians of each country.\textsuperscript{84} The problem is, in many countries such intelligence scientists do not exist, at least not in sufficient numbers.\textsuperscript{85} Though it may be argued that it is more important to understand the work of present intelligence agencies and their perceived tendencies towards an almost totalitarian monitoring of citizens (e.g. through operations like the US-controlled world-wide surveillance system Echelon), their changing roles and responsibilities cannot be understood without a proper concern for intelligence traditions, mentality and culture. This can only be studied and interpreted in historical reference. Learning lessons from history pre-supposes the existence of meaningful case studies and a sense of the past. It is the responsibility of national intelligence historians to provide this link from the past to the present and even to the future.

\textbf{Notes}

1 In analogy to Stanley Kubrick’s film classic “Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb” (Columbia Pictures 1963) and in reference to W.K. Wark, \textit{Learning to Live with Intelligence, Intelligence and National Security}, 18, 4, 2003, pp. 1-14.


10 1974/75 has been called “the year of intelligence”, as it witnessed the publication of Frederick Winterbotham’s memoirs \textit{The Ultra Secret} (1974) shortly after J.C. Masterman’s \textit{The Double Cross System} (1972) in Great Britain. In the United States two literary indictments of the CIA followed one after the other: J.D. Marks - V. Marchetti, \textit{The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence}, New York 1974 and P. Agee, \textit{Inside the Company: CIA Diary}, New York 1975.


the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in 1882 and the American Military Intelligence Division (MID) in 1885; in 1887 England followed with the establishment of the Naval Intelligence Department (NID) and the Royal Army’s Intelligence Department (ID).

15 Anti-espionage legislation was passed first in France in 1886, then in England and Italy in 1889, in Russia in 1892, in Germany in 1893, in Great Britain again in 1911 and in the United States in 1917. The first major non-military intelligence agencies came into being in Great Britain in 1909 as forerunner of the still existing SIS/MI6 and MI5. Germany followed in 1913, Russia in 1917, France in 1935 and the United States only in 1941. Cf. C. Andrew, Governments and Secret Services: A Historical Perspective, "International Journal", 34, 1979, pp. 167-186.


17 Among them e.g. W.R. Corson - R. Jeffreys-Jones - E.J. Epstein - A.W. Knight.

18 Foremost among them, in my opinion, T.J. Naftali - Z. Karabell - C. Mauch - C. Wiebes.


24 Such curricula have been developed e.g. by Brunel University or by the University of Wales at Aberystwyth, where a master’s program is offered in “intelligence and strategic security studies”.

25 The German Association, founded in 1993, has stressed its international focus by giving itself the designation “International Intelligence History Association” (IIHA) and has initiated its own journal in 2001, The

The historian Walter Laqueur has pointed to the fact that like the term 'history' the word 'intelligence' has more than one meaning. "On the one hand, it refers to an organization collecting information, and on the other to the information that has been gathered". W. Laqueur, *A World of Secrets. The Uses and Limits of Intelligence*, New York 1985, p. 12.


This definition enlarges somewhat on J.M. Nomikos, *Peacemaking Intelligence and the E.U.*, "Defensor Pacis", 6, 2000, p. 100. I also find the following, somewhat larger definition of intelligence as a working concept quite appealing: "Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analysed, and provided to policy makers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities". M.M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence. From Secrets to Policy*, Washington, DC 2000, p. 8.

Cf. Laqueur, *World of Secrets* cit., p. 293f. One rare exception among prominent former practitioners seems to have been William Colby, an OSS operational veteran of World War II and the Director of Intelligence (DCI) from 1973 to 1976. In an article published in an obscure publication in 1980 Colby speaks of intelligence as a "universal social science, able to bring all social science methodologies to bear, in order to produce solid scientific results". Quoted in Shulsky, *What is Intelligence?* cit., p. 21.


In an interesting chat between former rival intelligence agents of the CIA and KGB, who were both stationed in Vienna during the mid-1950s, there was total agreement between these two veteran intelligence officers, "dass wir im Kalten Krieg durch unsere Arbeit größere Feindseligkeiten verhindert haben. [...] Unser


45 There are several other cases which for different reasons have not become widely known, among them: Theodor Maly, Arnold Deutsch, Hede Massing, Peter Smolka/ Smollett and Gustav Hochenbichler.


47 Though modest attempts have been made in this direction through the introduction of a national Archives Law (*Bundesarchivgesetz*), effective since January 1, 2000, this initiative falls far short securing sensitive information for future historical research.

48 It has become evident that even though substantial Cold War secret archives have already been released, much remains closed and will probably fall victim to organized destruction. Cf. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand* cit., pp. 7-8.

49 For the first time ever officially released by the current Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, as amounting to almost 30 billion dollars for the fiscal year 1998. Cf. *The International Herald Tribune, December 5-6, 1998*.

50 One of the more systematic and serious attacks on the American intelligence establishment was launched by an influential U.S. senator and former university professor: D.P. Moynihan, *Secrecy. The American Experience*, New Haven, CT 1998.


53 Significantly, it seems to be the monopoly of pacifist or anti-militarist organizations and publications in this country to try to stimulate public debate on such issues. One example would be the little-known Viennese journal *ZOOM* which regularly addresses itself to intelligence and security questions relevant for Austrian history or current Austrian politics. Cf. *ZOOM* 4-5/ 1996 on Gladio, 4/1998 on the parliamentary control of intelligence organizations in Austria or 5/1998 on OSS/SSU in Austria.

54 A promising step in the right direction was recently taken by the head of the Austrian foreign military intelligence (Heeres-Nachrichtenamt) who for the first time went public with an analysis of the security and intel-

55 Cf. Die Presse, 27. 12. 1999 ("Wien als ein Tummelplatz der Agenten – Mythos und Wirklichkeit")

56 Such a debate would have been fruitful in the context of the recent establishment of an Austrian National Security Council which could have been a very suitable occasion for finally installing some kind of national intelligence coordinator at an executive level. A similar situation for a useful dialogue with intelligence scientists should have been the period of reforming and transforming the former Stapo into a new service, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung (BVT).


60 Quite the contrary. The internationally popular notion of Austria as a shady place for secret and even illegal transactions can effectively be transported even by movies. The Anglo-American co-production of “The Third Man” (1949) is a rather convincing case in point. Cf. S. Beer, “The Third Man” and British Intelligence, “History Today”, 51, 2001, pp. 45-51.

61 In reference to regional concerns I am using the term ‘Central Europe’ in a politically neutral and mostly geographic sense and thereby mean to talk of the Danubian, Alpine and Adriatic States in the centre of Europe as they have consistently interacted, not least through their common and mutually influential past within the Habsburg Empire, particularly - though not exclusively - in the 19th century. Therefore I include in my survey the following states as constituted at the beginning of the 21st century: Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Romania.


Cf. S. Beer, "Bound" to Cooperate. Austria's Little-known Intelligence Community since 1945, “The Journal of Intelligence History”, 3, 2003, pp. 19-31. During the 1990s the powers of surveillance and control for the three Austrian services have been enlarged significantly by amendments to relevant legislation, the Militärbefugnissgesetz and to the Polizeisicherheitsgesetz.

The first of these Staatsschutzberichte was published in 1997.

Great Britain would be a good model for this as in 1993 the British government decided to go public about its intelligence institutions and to explain their tasks and functions to the electorate in a 27-page pamphlet entitled Central Intelligence Machinery.

In Croatia, for example, a new intelligence journal was started in 2000, edited by J. Matus and M. Tudjman, entitled National Security and the Future, while in Bulgaria, not really to be counted among the Central European states, the Trud Publishing House has started a new intelligence book series on intelligence issues, general and Bulgarian.


The quantity and quality of Stasi research is truly impressive. It would go far beyond the scope of this article to even name the most important secondary literature.


Other contributory Polish historians are e.g. Pyotr Kolakowski, Andrej Nieuwazny and Jacek Tebinka.


While the 20th century can also be understood as the age of secret intelligence, the 21st century may become the age of public intelligence as states and governments recognise the need to go public with their intelligence insights in order to promote public support for their concrete policies in war and peace. This was done by both the Blair and Bush governments in the case of making war with Iraq in 2003.

Needless to stress, comparative studies can be particularly enlightening and are increasingly undertaken. Cf. K.G. Robertson (ed.), *British and American Approaches to Intelligence*, London 1987.


**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


Andrew Ch., *For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush*, London 1998.


**Sources**

Three CIG/CIA Reports on Austria, 1947-1949 (excerpts)

1. “The Situation in Austria, February 1947”, 20 February 1947, in: National Archives (NA), Record Group (RG) 263: Records of the CIA, ORE Report 13/1, Box (B) 1.

SECRET

Summary

The four occupying powers have recognised a coalition government in Austria which was formed after the national elections of November 1945. The authority of the government is still limited by the conditions of four-power occupation and particularly by the hostile attitude of the USSR. The three-party coalition, however, is genuinely representative of a population which, except for an extremely small Communist minority, is almost evenly divided into an agrarian Catholic party and a trade union socialist party. Both of these parties are united in their opposition to the demands of the USSR and are anxious to begin
the reconstruction of the country under their own direction. The Communist Party has almost no indigenous support and is able to influence government policy only through Soviet assistance. The USSR desires an Austrian regime subservient to Soviet policy. Unsuccessful in its attempts to influence the Austrian Government by infiltration and intimidation, the USSR has concentrated on establishing control over the Austrian economy. The USSR has implemented its policy in Austria by propaganda aimed at discrediting the government and by actions designed to disrupt its political and economic authority. In order to further their economic aims, the Soviets have removed industrial machinery on a large scale, seized industrial assets, and forced factories to produce for the USSR. The Soviets are now attempting to induce the Austrians to agree to a settlement of Soviet claims to alleged German assets in eastern Austria which will give the USSR permanent control over important industrial properties in this area. The Soviets want a treaty which imposes maximum restrictions on the sovereignty of the Austrian Government and legalizes future Soviet interference in Austrian affairs. Confronted by political difficulties and Anglo-American support for the present government, the USSR would probably accept as a temporary expedient a government under Soviet influence through dependency on economic ties with Eastern Europe. The Soviets, however, are unlikely to make any major concessions for the sake of early agreement, since the best interests of the USSR may be served by a protracted military occupation of Austria, whose government is considered fundamentally anti-Communist.

[...]
The Austrian people are primarily interested in putting an end to the occupation, which they regard as an intolerable burden on the nation’s depleted resources. They realize that it is necessary “to make peace” with the Soviets, yet they do not desire to come under Soviet domination in order to accomplish this. The Austrian Government therefore wants to steer a middle course between Eastern and Western Europe. This policy is most difficult to effect in view of the fact that Austria requires close economic relations with the central European and Danubian states now under Soviet domination. The future of Austria as an independent state will rest upon such support from the West as will enable her not only to recover economically but also to bargain with the Soviet-dominated neighbors on a footing of equality. Lacking this support, Austria will inevitably be forced to yield to the influence exerted by the USSR.

[...]


SECRET

Summary

Though the importance of Austria to the US is largely negative, US commitments and interests there require maintenance of a Western-oriented government which can be given eventual full independence. Despite its position on the fringes of the Soviet sphere of in-
fluence, virtually surrounded by Satellite countries, and partially occupied by the Soviet Army, Austria remains one of the most politically stable and anti-Communist countries in Europe. The people are apparently determined to maintain their identity with the West. The USSR could absorb Austria only by military force, or by a combination of economic and political pressures supplemented by Satellite interference following quadripartite troop withdrawal.

[...]

If Austria should survive quadripartite occupation intact and if its political and economic autonomy could be re-established, its economic prospects would be good and thus its chances of eventually becoming an economic asset to the economy of Western Europe. Under present conditions, however, it is unlikely that Austria can achieve full economic stability within the next four years.

The Importance of Austria to the US

Austria, from a US point of view, is of considerable importance but almost entirely in a negative sense. The country contains little of intrinsic value to the US: it is economically weak to such an extent that it must remain an economic liability for some years to come, and its military capacity is negligible. Austria is, however, to be numbered among those European nations which are of great intrinsic importance to the US because they only wish to attain the status of free and independent democracies. The United States has, moreover, firmly committed itself to a policy directed toward the early establishment of an independent Austrian state. The defeat of this policy by the USSR would have a far-reaching and deleterious effect on the US-European position as a whole, disproportionately magnified by the fact that a part of Austria is presently occupied by US troops. The early establishment of Soviet control over Austria would have a seriously adverse psychological effect throughout Western Europe and would have the immediate concrete result of greatly facilitating Communist penetration of Italy. Possibly of minor importance but still of some consequence to the US would be the loss of one of the few remaining valuable US sources of information concerning the USSR.

[...]

Possible Future Developments

No drastic changes in the current situation in Austria are expected in the near future. It is unlikely that the USSR will sacrifice its present hold over the economy of Austria in order to reach a treaty settlement with the Western Allies, until the USSR decides that quadripartite occupation is blocking communization of Austria.

[...]

While the USSR would be capable of communizing its zone of occupation by violence or by forced partition of the country, such moves are unlikely in the near future. From the Soviet point of view a putsch would seem undesirable because it would forfeit western Austria to the US, UK, and France. On the other hand, it is probable that a breakdown of the present treaty negotiations would cause the USSR to increase substantially its economic and political pressure on the government.
Under the circumstances, no drastic change in the Austrian economic situation is anticipated, although in the event that shipments of food are interrupted, a major crisis will arise in the food supply position in late May. The slow rise in the level of industry is expected to continue, but Austrian industry cannot be expected to become stable in less than four years.


SECRET

The major points of Soviet-Western disagreement concerning an Austrian treaty include: (a) Yugoslav territorial and reparations claims, (b) the lump sum to be paid by the Austrian Government to the USSR for German external assets returned to Austria, and (c) the amount and type of properties to be transferred to the USSR as German external assets. [...] Regardless of any tactical moves the Soviets may take with or without a treaty, their ultimate objective will continue to be the establishment of a Soviet-dominated government in Austria, and the integration of that country into the satellite political and economic bloc. [...] A blockade of Vienna, similar to that of Berlin, is a Soviet capability and may not be entirely discounted. It is, however, considered unlikely. Such a blockade would mean partition of Austria, withdrawal of the Austrian Government to the western zones, and probably withdrawal of the US, UK, and France from Vienna; it would imply denunciation of the Moscow Declaration of November 1943; it would split Austria economically, probably to the benefit of the West, and would open the USSR to more severe UN censure than did the Berlin blockade. To offset such disadvantages, the USSR could hope for little more than somewhat diminished confidence among Western European nations in US protection with the possible consequent growth of unilateralism rather than cooperation in US defense plans; and slightly enhanced Soviet prestige among the Satellites. Finally, the Kremlin would be reluctant at this time to take the risk of war entailed in a blockade of Vienna.