Creating a New Historical Perspective: EU and the Wider World

CLIOHWORLD
READERS
I

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Developing EU–Turkey Dialogue

A CLIOHWORLD Reader

Edited by
Guðmundur Hálfdanarson and Hatice Sofu

Education and Culture DG
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Contents

The Rise of Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire

Identities and Power in the Turkish Republic

Note

Emanuel Buttigieg, *"Clash of civilizations", Crusades, Knights and Ottomans: an analysis of Christian- Muslim interaction in the Mediterranean,* was originally published in Joaquim Carvalho (ed.), *Religion and Power in Europe: Conflict and Convergence*, Pisa 2007, pp. 203-219.

Ali U. Peker, *A Retreating Power: the Ottoman Approach to the West in the 18th Century,* was originally published in Ausma Cimdiņa, Jonathan Osmond (eds.), *Power and Culture: Hegemony, Interaction and Dissent*, Pisa 2006, pp. 69-86.

Gábor Demeter, *Hungarian Travellers' and Emigrants' Images of Turkey from the 16th to the 19th Centuries,* was originally published in Mary N. Harris (ed.), *Sights and Insights: Interactive Images of Europe and the Wider World*, Pisa 2007, pp. 123-142.

Hana Sobotková, *The Image of Balkan Muslims in Czech and French Journals around 1900,* was originally published in Steven G. Ellis, Luďa Klusáková (eds.), *Imagining Frontiers. Contesting Identities*, Pisa 2007, pp. 339-351.

Çağla Caner, Pelin Yoncacı. *(Re)reading the Grand Ceremonial Hall in the Dolmabahce Palace,* was originally published in Pieter François, Taina Syrjämaa, Henri Terho (eds.), *Power and Culture: New Perspectives on Spatiality in European History*, Pisa 2008, pp. 45-72.

Kenan İnan, *The Making of* Kanun *Law in the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1600,* was originally published in Günther Lottes, Eero Medijainen, Jón Viðar Sigurðsson (eds.), *Making, Using and Resisting the Law in European History*, Pisa 2008, pp. 65-75.

Darina Martykánová, *Matching Sharia and 'Governmentality': Muslim Marriage Legislation in the Late Ottoman Empire*, was originally published in Andreas Gémes, Florencia Peyrou, Ioannis Xydopoulos (eds.), *Institutional Change and Stability: Conflicts, Transitions and Social Values*, Pisa 2009, pp. 153-175.

Markéta P. Rubešová, *Living in a Multicultural Neighbourhood: Ottoman Society Reflected in Rabbinic Responsa of the 16th and 17th Centuries*, was originally published in Luďa Klusáková, Laure Teulières (eds.), *Frontiers and identities: Cities in Regions and Nations*, Pisa 2008, pp. 137-153.

Elena Brambilla, *Convivencia Under Muslim Rule: the Island of Cyprus since the Ottoman Conquest (1571-1640)*, was originally published in *Routines of Existence Time, Life and Afterlife in Society and Religion*, Pisa 2009, pp. 3-20.

Dimitrios Stamatopoulos, *From Millets to Minorities in the 19th-Century Ottoman Empire: an Ambiguous Modernization*, was originally published in Steven G. Ellis, Guðmundur Hálfdanarson, Ann Katherine Isaacs (eds.), *Citizenship in Historical Perspective*, Pisa 2006, pp. 253-273.

Iakovos D. Michailidis, *From Christians to Members of an Ethnic Community: Creating Borders in the City of Thessaloniki (1800-1912)*, was originally published in Luďa Klusáková, Laure Teulières (eds.), *Frontiers and identities: Cities in Regions and Nations*, Pisa 2008, pp. 169-180.

Iakovos D. Michailidis, *The Formation of Greek Citizenship (19th century),* was originally published in Steven G. Ellis, Guðmundur Hálfdanarson, Ann Katherine Isaacs (eds.), *Citizenship in Historical Perspective*, Pisa 2006, pp. 155-162.

Alexandre Massé, *French Consuls and the Greek War of Independence, 1821-1827. The Consequences of Consular Representations of Greek and Ottoman Identities*, was originally published in *Crossing Frontiers, Resisting Identities* edited by Luďa Klusáková, Martin Moll with Jaroslav Ira, Aladin Larguèche, Eva Kalivodová, Andrew Sargent, Pisa 2010, pp. 173-180.

Ivan Ilchev, *To Call You a Bulgarian is the Greatest Joy for Me ,* was originally published in Steven G. Ellis, Guðmundur Hálfdanarson, Ann Katherine Isaacs (eds.), *Citizenship in Historical Perspective*, Pisa 2006, pp. 275-287.

Sinem Türkoğlu Önge, *Spatial Representation of Power: Making the Urban Space of Ankara in the Early Republican Period,* was originally published in Jonathan Osmond, Ausma Cimdiņa (eds.), *Power and Culture: Identity, Ideology, Representation*, Pisa 2007, pp. 71-94.

Cânâ Bilsel, *Remodelling the Imperial Capital in the Early Republican Era: The Representation of History in Henri Prost's Planning of Istanbul,* was originally published in Jonathan Osmond, Ausma Cimdiņa (eds.), *Power and Culture: Identity, Ideology, Representation*, Pisa 2007, pp. 95-115.

Constantia Soteriou, *The Female Body as a Tool for the Identity Formation of the Turkish State during the Kemalist Modernization Project*, was originally published in *Citizenships and Identities: Inclusion, Exclusion, Participation*, edited by Ann Katherine Isaacs, Pisa 2010, pp. 91-96.

Ceren Katipoğlu, Çağla Caner-Yüksel, *Hagia Sophia 'Museum': A Humanist Project of the Turkish Republic*, was originally published in *Constructing cultural identity, representing social power*, edited by Cânâ Bilsel, Kim Esmark, Niyazi Kızılyürek, Ólafur Rastrick, Pisa 2010, pp. 205-225.

Preface

We are very please to present *Developing EU-Turkey Dialogue. A CLIOHWORLD Reader*. It comprises a selection of recently published research materials and has been designed by Work Group 4 of CLIOHWORLD, a group of eight academics and researchers from eight countries.

Under the leadership of the editors, Guðmundur Hálfdanarson and Hatice Sofu, the Work Group has elaborated this volume, as part of its general strategy, building on the many insights and resources created over the last ten and more years by the European History Networks. Most relevant in this connection are the activities of the History Networks CLIOHnet and CLIOHRES. The first was an Erasmus Thematic Network, which in collaboration with PLUS, the Pisa University Press from 2001 to 2003 completed two Culture 2000 projects, publishing 10 volumes based on actual multinational learning/teaching situations in a series of Erasmus Intensive Programmes. Furthermore, one of the CLIOHnet and CLIOHnet2 Task Forces (active from 2001 to 2008) was explicitly dedicated to "enlarging the historiographical space". This meant realising that European history must by told by many voices, not 'just' those of Britain, France and possibly Germany. CLIOHnet and CLIOHnet2 in the course of their work developed some of the ideas which underlie the present Reader: that the Ottoman Empire is part of the European experience, that Balkan and eastern European countries in general as well as Turkey are usually not adequately considered in western European learning and teaching programmes, and that their histories need to be better known and integrated into our worldview.

Part of the inspiration for CLIOHRES, the Sixth Framework Network of Excellence for History, derived from these CLIOHnet insights. The full title of CLIOHRES is "Creating Links and Innovative Overviews for a New History Research Agenda for Citizens of Growing Europe". In this title, we understood 'growing' in more than one sense: as a geographical fact, linked to the enlargement of the European Union, and also as a qualitative fact. We hoped that there could be a sense of European citizenship and a way of practicing it that might entail greater knowledge of and respect for diversity. We were and are convinced that a new way of practicing historical research will be important in achieving this result.

During the five years of its activities (which concluded in November 2010) the 180 CLIOHRES researchers from 35 countries addressed the challenge of creating new research agendas and sharing their results: the Network has produced 51 books, including about 700 scholarly chapters, on a variety of subjects, including the Ottoman Empire and its successor states – amongst which the Republic of Turkey. These books, published on-line and in book form, are freely available and may be used as desired so long as the source is acknowledged. Some of these resources have been selected to compose this Reader.

On 1 October 2008 CLIOHWORLD, the youngest of the CLIOHs was born. CLIOHWORLD grew out of the previous Networks, and continues on their path, but with particular emphasis on the History of European Integration, of the European Union and of Europe as an entity which cannot be understood without reference to and knowledge of the 'wider world'.

CLIOHWORLD is an Erasmus Academic Network, supported by the European Commission through its Lifelong Learning Programme. One of its many tasks is to review the materials created by CLIOHRES and propose them in various contexts as learning/teaching materials.

In the CLIOHWORLD agenda, developing EU-Turkey Dialogue (for the reasons which are further illustrated in the Introduction) is a central objective. The relations between the Republic of Turkey and the European Union entail much debate, some of it vitriolic, and very little of it based on up-to-date critically founded information.

In our view it is important to overcome such forms of myopia. Not only in the case of Turkey of course, although Turkey's long and strong links with today's 'European' countries make it in some ways a special case. But developing dialogue with such a close neighbour may help in extending such efforts to other countries and continents, farther away, but that also share with us the challenges and responsibilities of belonging to the same global world.

A slightly shorter version of this Reader has been successfully used and tested in several member Universities. This second expanded edition includes new chapters and also a brief general Chronology o to give orientation to students who may not be familiar with the diachronic framework that links the various facets and aspects of the histories of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic that it deals with. This Reader and a previous longer version of it have been placed on the CLIOHWORLD website (www.cliohworld.net).

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Introduction

Is Turkey a European country or not? This question has been vigorously debated in recent years, because it is closely related to the discussions around the possible entry of Turkey into the European Union. There is no agreement on how to respond to the question, however, as people's definitions of 'Europe' vary greatly, reflecting their general political visions and opinions. Some argue, for example, for the exclusion of Turkey from the European Union on the basis of geographical factors, claiming that Turkey is an Asian country and thus it should not be invited into the European fold. Others want to draw the lines between Europe and the neighbouring regions on religious grounds, emphasizing the importance of the Christian faith and traditions to the development of European identities, cultures and political organizations. According to this perspective, a country where Islam is the dominant religious creed cannot be regarded as European – it must be considered as something else, or the 'other'.

From a historical or cultural point of view, it is impossible to draw such fixed and clear boundaries between 'Asia' and 'Europe', or between a 'Christian' and a 'Muslim' world. Through two millennia Anatolia and the neighbouring areas to the north or west, most of which are undisputedly European, belonged to the same empires, which were governed for a large part of that period from the city that we now call Istanbul. For this reason the precursor to modern Turkey, the Ottoman Empire, was at least partly a European empire, controlling at its height large parts of central and south-eastern Europe. This common history has set its mark on the culture of the whole area, which now forms a considerable part of the European Union. In spite of frequent tensions between the various ethnic groups of the region, they share a wide range of cultural attributes and customs which can only be understood on the basis of their 'dialogues' with each other and 'Turkey' through the centuries.

Moreover, in spite of numerous wars between the 'Turks' and various European states, and a mutual desire of forcing the 'true religion' on the 'infidels' on the other side, relations between the Ottoman Empire and 'Europe' were always more complex than the simple Muslim-Christian dichotomy seems to indicate. Thus, peaceful trade relations were just as important for both sides as their military adventures, and the Ottoman Empire was not only a common enemy for European princes, but also an essential ally in their struggles for hegemony in Europe. The gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire during the 19th and early 20th centuries also set its mark on European politics. Moreover, it was closely related to the break-up of other European empires, such as the Habsburg Empire, and happened for similar reasons. It was, therefore, no coincidence that the founders of the Turkish Republic sought inspiration and ideas in Europe, adapting the new state to most of the patterns and premises which are seen as crucial for the construction of modern European nation-states.

Finally, the large Turkish minorities in many European countries today have set their mark on European culture and politics which cannot – and should not – be ignored. This is another reminder of the fact that Europe has always been a multicultural space, with no clear boundaries between ethnic, religious or national groups.

The critical study of the past should alert us to these complexities and ambiguities in defining 'Europe' in the present. The reality is, however, that the writing and teaching of history has not always served to build bridges between Turkey and (the rest of) Europe. 'History' is, of course, rarely an innocent recording of facts or simple interpretations of things 'as they were' in the past. It necessarily reflects the mental outlook of those who write and study historical developments and, conversely, our set ideas about the past shape how we view the present. History is therefore a powerful tool in forming national identities, emphasizing and fostering conceptions about the differences between 'us' and the 'others' around us, however unhistorical these ideas and prejudices may be.

This is the second and expanded edition of a Reader which was published for the first time in 2010. In the new edition we have added three new chapters and an annotated chronology or brief overview of Ottoman/Turkish history. The idea behind the two editions is however the same, that is to counteract tendencies of this sort by collecting historical studies which present a more nuanced picture of the relationship between the Ottoman Empire/Turkey and the rest of Europe through the centuries. It has been compiled by a workgroup on the EU-Turkey dialogue, which is one of five workgroups in the Erasmus Network CLIOHWORLD. The main objective of the network as a whole is to increase the critical understanding of both European students and citizens in general of Europe's past, present and future, and its role in the wider world. The underlying motive is to fight xenophobia at its base, encouraging an inclusive European citizenship by providing the necessary tools for learners of all ages. The task assigned to the workgroup on EU-Turkey dialogue was to develop increasing awareness of the common history of European Union countries and modern Turkey. The group did not focus on developing special teaching programmes on European history in Turkey or Ottoman/Turkish history in EU countries, but rather on promoting the integration of European and Turkish history in the regular university curricula, and to propose strategies of improvement in this respect. It is our belief that it is of crucial importance to recognize the various connections and contacts between 'Europe' and the Ottoman Empire/ Turkey in the past, both in order to better understand European and Turkish history – as well as improving relations between Turkey and the European Union in the present. The goal is not to advocate for Turkey's membership in the European Union, but to enhance mutual understanding between the citizens of Turkey and Europe and thus to facilitate informed debates on how to arrange the relations between them.

These goals are, of course, very much in line with recent trends and emphasis in university teaching in general and in the teaching of history in particular. In fact, both improved understanding of cultures and customs of other countries, and the appre-

ciation of cultural diversity and multiculturality are regarded as generic competences in the Tuning guidelines for universities. What this means is that when a student completes her or his studies, in all academic subjects, s/he should be well equipped to live in a multicultural world and to work in international context. The list of subject specific learning outcomes for history also contains various competences which are of crucial importance for a meaningful EU-Turkey dialogue. These include the critical awareness of the relationship between current events and processes and the past; awareness of the differences in historiographical outlooks in various periods and contexts; awareness of and ability to use tools of other human sciences (e.g., literary criticism, and history of language, art history, archaeology, anthropology, law sociology, philosophy, etc.); and awareness of and respect for points of view deriving from other national or cultural backgrounds.

All the chapters in this Reader are taken from the publications of CLIOHRES.net, which was a Network of Excellence and a sister network of CLIOHWORLD, funded by the 6th Framework Programme of the European commission from 2005 to 2010. The network was formed through a consortium of 45 universities and research institutions in 31 countries. Each institution was represented by two senior researchers and two doctoral students coming from various academic fields – primarily from history, but also from art history, archaeology, architecture, philology, philosophy, political science, sociology, literary studies and geography. The 180 researchers active in the network were divided into six 'Thematic Work Groups', each of which dealt with a broadly defined research area – 'States, Institutions and Legislation', 'Power and Culture', 'Religion and Philosophy', 'Work, Gender and Society', 'Frontiers and Identities', and 'Europe and the Wider World'. Furthermore, the Network as a whole addressed 'transversal themes' of general relevance, including 'Citizenship', 'Migration', 'Discrimination and Tolerance', 'Gender' and 'Citizenships and Identities'. As a Network of Excellence, CLIOHRES was not an ordinary research project. It focussed not on a single research question or on a set of specific questions. Rather it was conceived as a forum where researchers representing various national and regional traditions could meet and elaborate their work in new ways thanks to structured interaction with their colleagues. The objective was not only to transcend the national boundaries that still largely define historical research agendas, opening new avenues for research, but also to use those very differences to become critically aware of how current research agendas have evolved through time. Thus, the goal was to examine basic and unquestioned attitudes about ourselves and others, which are rooted in the ways that the scientific community in each country looks at history and historical research.

Through the five years of their work, each of the six thematic workgroups in CLIO-HRES published five volumes presenting the results of their work. In addition, the whole network published one collective volume each year, dealing with one of the transversal themes mentioned above. Gradually, the network has therefore built up a

rich resource of historical studies, which is open for all to use, online or in printed form, as long as the source is clearly acknowledged. The chapters reprinted here deal with various aspects of Ottoman/ Turkish history and the relations between the Ottoman Empire and (the rest of) Europe through the centuries. The chapters were not written specifically with EU-Turkey dialogue in mind, and thus they give only a partial picture of that complex theme. Together however the 18 chapters present an unusually diverse and broad view on the subject, because the authors have been trained in and represent various national and methodological traditions. Moreover, all the chapters are informed by intensive discussions and debates in the CLIOHRES Network of Excellence, with the participation of young and more established academics, coming from all over Europe and beyond.

University teachers are invited to use the Reader, either partly or as a whole in courses dealing with the relations between 'Europe' and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey in the past, or in survey courses on various aspects of European history.

The Reader is divided into five sections, arranged both chronologically and thematically. The first section consists of four case studies exemplifying the mutual perceptions between the Ottomans and (other) Europeans. From early on, the images that people had on societies on the other side of the Ottoman-European divide were characterized by what can be called 'otherization' – that is, to the Ottomans, the non-Muslim Europeans were classified as the Other, from whom they distinguished themselves, at the same time as the 'Turks' were regarded as different from the 'Christian Europeans'. In both cases, people 'on the other side' were regarded as 'infidels', who rejected the 'true' faith. These perceptions were never clear-cut however, and changed both in time and according to their varying contexts. Thus religion was not always seen as the main marker of differentiation – as can be seen from the fact that the Christian warriors of the St. John's Order of Malta looked at the Muslim Berbers in North Africa as potential partners in their common resistance to the Ottoman expansion in the Mediterranean area in the 16th century. Nor were those defined as the 'Other' seen as a homogeneous mass, as we learn from the attitudes of French 19th-century journalists towards the Ottomans; they distinguished clearly between people of the upper-classes (who were regarded as indolent) and rural 'Turks' (who were thought to be open to progress). It is also instructive to see how the perceptions of the Ottomans in the West change as the Ottoman Empire was transformed from the expansive and dynamic power of the 15th century to the so-called "sick man of Europe" of the 19th century. To the 'Europeans', the image of 'the Turk' followed a similar trajectory, from the fierce warrior of the 16th and 17th centuries, who was feared and thus admired, to the backward and lethargic bureaucrat of the 19th century. One can see a comparable transformation of the 'West' in the descriptions of Ottoman envoys in Europe, or in the change from contempt to growing respect for the culture and lifestyles of the Western European elites. Finally, these changing attitudes can be observed in symbolic manner in the design of the Dol-

mabahçe Palace in Istanbul, which was built in the mid-19th century. Unlike its anteced-ent, the Topkapı Palace, which had served as the Sultan's residence since the mid-15th century, the new palace was partly designed according to patterns imported from Europe. Thus the 19th-century sultan sought to forge an image of himself as a European ruler.

The second section deals with legal history of the Ottoman Empire from the so-called *ka-nun* legal codes of the so-called 'classical period' (14th–16th centuries) to the Decree on Family Law instituted in the final phase of the Empire during the early 20th century. The central theme of the two chapters in the section is that the connections between the reli-gious law codes of Islam, the Sharia, and Ottoman law were certainly tight, but they were far from simple. Thus the Ottoman lawmakers respected the Sharia law, but they were far from fundamentalists in their interpretations of the "true law". The *kanun* decrees, which dealt with non-religious matters in the Ottoman legal tradition, took heed of the Islamic laws, but modified them to meet the empire's needs. Similar tendencies can be seen in the marriage codes in the Ottoman Empire, where the *müfti*s, or scholars of Islamic law, had considerable leeway in interpreting the law. There was, however, a clear limit to this ambi-guity, as can be seen from the strong conservative reaction to the fairly radical overhaul of the Ottoman marriage code carried out in 1917. This had to be abrogated two years later, as it was seen to veer too drastically from the Islamic legal traditions.

The third section explores the relations between various minorities in the Ottoman Empire and the rulers of the state. The identification of the Sultan with Islam and the Caliphate was of course fundamental, however both the idea and the reality of the Empire at its height included benevolent acceptance and protection of many of the faiths present in its large and expanding territory. In general the Ottomans were tolerant of other reli-gious creeds, at least the monotheistic ones, and gave both Jews and Christians fairly large space to practice their faith and to govern themselves, although they subjected them to a number of limitations and special taxation. This was organized on the basis of the so-called *millets*, or confessional communities, each of which had substantial autonomy in their internal affairs. On the basis of this autonomy and separation, the religious groups managed to live together in relative peace through most of the long history of the Otto-man Empire. In theory, the millets were separated along strict religious lines, but in reality the system also allowed some choice as well as ample interaction, as many communities were multi-cultural and in places like markets (and coffee houses) people of all religious communities met. There was a degree of overlap and flexibility in jurisdictions: in some cases Christians and Jews brought their cases before a Muslim kadi, while Muslims might choose between courts that applied different legal traditions. In time, the millet system became more rigid, and in some ways the heads of the non-Muslim communities could be considered supervisors of their fellows on behalf of the imperial bureaucracy. Until the 19th century, the millets had no clear ethnic implication, as they were based on religious allegiances rather than cultural or political identities. This began to change in the last stages of the Ottoman Empire, following the general trends in Europe. Thus the Muslim

and Christian Cypriots began to define themselves as 'Turks' and 'Greeks', or 'Turkish' and 'Greek' Cypriots. In places of great multicultural variety, such as the city of Thessaloniki, this caused great havoc. There the nationalist idea of 'one nation, one state' makes limited sense, and was bound to lead to conflict as borders between ethnic communities are difficult to draw, and in a multicultural society it is in practice impossible to separate people into neat categories.

The fourth section deals with the growing ethnic divisions in the Balkans as the Ottoman Empire begins to break down in the 19th century. One of the first cases of nation formation within the imperial territory was Greece, which has its origins in the War of Independence of the 1820s. The development of Greek independence was inspired by the French Revolution and the Enlightenment (as well as Romanticism), but at the same time it was firmly rooted in the millet system. Therefore, religion became the real marker of 'Greek ethnicity', although it competed with cultural (language) and geographic (place of birth) identifications. To the outside world, especially those of the educated elites, the war was a true struggle for freedom, but in reality it proved extremely difficult to define the lines between Greeks and non-Greeks, or to transform a region from a multicultural space to a nation-state. For this reason, the movement of 'national liberation', whether in Greece or in other Balkan countries, such as Bulgaria, has often led to oppression and conflict. Some of the issues which emerged in the 19th century haunt us still today, and they can only be solved with open dialogue and acceptance of difference.

The fifth and final section centres around another national construction, that is, the creation of the Turkish nation and of the Turkish nation-state. As the empire disintegrated, the 'Turks' imagined their own nation – based on language and territory rather than history or tradition. The founders of the Turkish Republic sought to distinguish the new nation-state as completely as possible from the empire of the past; in the new world, power was strictly secular and it was expressed in the Turkish language. The four chapters in this section deal with some aspects of this complex transformation; they do not tell the whole story, but give the reader an idea of the radical restructuring that has taken place in the Turkish Republic in the nine decades since its beginning. The first two chapters show how the Turkish authorities hired European architects and town planners with the aim of reconstructing the two most important cities of the republic, that is, the new capital of Ankara and the old one, Istanbul. The general idea was to distinguish the new republic from the old empire, by moving these two cities into 'modernity'. The nature and context of the two projects was, however, quite dissimilar. Istanbul had glorious history, but the republic deprived it of most of its political significance; Ankara, however, was transformed from a declining provincial town into a capital of a new and ambitious state. This affected the modernization of the two cities, as for Istanbul the challenge was to integrate history into the plan of the modern town – and then it was not entirely clear what history was to be emphasized. For Ankara, the main problem was the rapid growth of the city, following its change of status. Urban spaces are difficult to control, especially where the authorities

cannot keep up with a rapidly expanding population. The 'new' Ankara did, therefore, not always follow the western paradigms – in as sense, it became a dialogue between the old, ideas of modernity, and the practical solutions to local problems. The third chapter analyses the modernisation of women's role in Turkey and their place in Turkish society after the establishment of the republic. In the modern state, women were to be allowed to be seen in public, should dress according to 'western' codes, should have equal access to education and were given equal constitutional rights to men. We see, however, similar ambiguities in the 'emancipation' of women in Turkey as can be detected in most other modern nation-states – be it in other parts of Europe or the United States. 'Modernity' does not automatically eradicate 'traditional' patriarchy or modes of gender constructions, and equal access does not necessarily mean gender equality. The section, and the Reader, concludes with an analysis of how these changes of Turkish society have affected the building today known as the Hagia Sophia. Originally constructed as a church in the 6th century, it was converted to a Roman Catholic Cathedral in the 13th century and to a mosque in 15th century, after the Ottoman conquest of the Byzantine capital. With the foundation of the Republic, this religious building was desacralised and turned into a museum as part of the laicisation programme of the early Turkish Republic. This has caused intense debates: some would like to turn the building again into a mosque, while others would like to transform it into a church – and others still are happy to have such a historically and artistically significant space open to all. It is a symbol of the fact that monuments change their meaning with time, but history cannot be erased.

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A Short Chronology of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic

I. FROM BEYLIK TO EMPIRE (1299-1453)

Sultans:

1299-1324	Osman I
1324-1362	Orhan I
1362-1389	Murad II
1389-1402	Bayezid I
1402-1413	Interregnum, also called "the Ottoman Triumvirate"
1413-1421	Mehmed I, "The Affable"
1421-1444	Murad II, "The Great"
1444-1446	Mehmed II, "The Conqueror"
1446-1451	Murad II (second reign)
1451-1481	Mehmed II (second reign)

The embryo of the future empire emerged in the space between the Byzantine Empire and the Seljuk Sultanate. Of the various Ghazi principalities that formed in Anatolia, the one led by Osman Bey, later Osman I, started to develop as an independent unit (the word 'Ottoman' is the English equivalent of Osmanli, meaning 'of Osman'). It gained both territory and influence via conquest and diplomacy (including marriage with Christian princesses), forming alliances and exploiting internal conflicts in the Byzantine Empire and other states in Anatolia and in the Balkans. In 1354 the Ottoman armies crossed the Dardanelles conquering an important foothold for further expansion into the Balkans. Thessaloniki was conquered from the Venetians in 1387, and the Serbians were defeated in the battle of Kosovo in 1389. Two years later (1391) the Ottomans made an unsuccessful attempt to conquer Constantinople. However in Nicopolis 1396, they defeated a major concentration of Christian princes (Hungarian, French, Burgundian, German and Dutch, allied in what is often called the "Last Crusade") opening the way for further expansion in the Balkans.

This development came to a temporary halt due to the invasion of Turkic tribes led by Tamerlane, who defeated the troops led by the Ottoman sultan in Ankara in 1402, pushing the sultanate into disorder and internal strife between Bayezid I´s sons. Eventually Mehmed I emerged victorious and restored and expanded Ottoman rule in Anatolia and the Balkans. In the Balkan countries, alongside factions which opposed them, there were others ready to support the Ottomans. Gradually, an em-

pire emerged in which efficient central rule was combined with a high degree of autonomy for the newly conquered regions. When Mehmed II, who fashioned himself as a representative of the millennial Mediterranean imperial tradition, conquered Constantinople in 1453 the Ottomans gained a prestigious new centre of gravity for centuries to come.

The early Ottomans still possessed some characteristics of charismatic tribal leaders, but as their domains expanded and their dynastical power consolidated, they come to rely heavily upon a regular military power, especially the Janissaries who were the core of the Ottoman infantry. Furthermore, the cavalry (the *sipahi*) was linked to the ruler by a system of fief-tenure. Sultans also come to an agreement with the religious establishment, the *ulema*, among whose members judges were recruited. Remarkably strong centralized administrative structures developed, while at the same time, the central government shared and negotiated power with local authorities. The frontier forces played a central role for the expansion of the empire. New lands became state property, however, the previous owners were sometimes able to continue to possess their old lands, but now as *timar*-holders under state control. New populations were integrated into the empire with at least basic respect for their religions and traditions, thanks to the policy of *istimalet*, reconciliation. While trade, particularly in Bursa and Edirne increased, and commercial ties with different European, Asian and African regions were maintained and strengthened, the Ottoman policies of military expansion contributed, together with the troubled times in Central Asia, to create periods of instability which forced the Portuguese, Spanish and Italian merchants to try to find new routes to the East.

II. THE GROWTH AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE EMPIRE (1453-1566)

Sultans:

1451-1481	Mehmed (second reign)
1481-1512	Bayezid
1512-1520	Selim
1520-1566	Suleiman, "The Magnificent", "The Lawgiver"

After 1453, under Mehmed II the domains of the Ottoman dynasty grew rapidly to stretch from the Danube to the Euphrates.

In the East the Ottomans became the official landlords of the Islamic world gaining supremacy over Mecca and Medina in 1517. By 1520 the Eastern Mediterranean was in Ottoman hands and in 1534 they took Baghdad. By the mid-16th century, Ottoman power acquired stronger Sunni Islamic features. Islamic heterodoxy was often ruthlessly persecuted, as the Shiites were perceived as hostile to Ottoman rule and potential allies of the rival Persian Empire.

In 1555, with the Amasya peace treaty, the Ottomans and Iran (Persia) agreed to divide in Transcaucasia and Middle East between them. By 1535 the Ottomans controlled Bosnia-Herzegovina (1464), the Crimea (1475), Moldavia (1476), Eastern Anatolia (1514), Rhodes (1522) Belgrade (1521), and Buda, as a result of the battle of Mohacs (1526). During this period, the Ottoman Navy delivered several blows against the Venetian Navy (1463-1479) – and again against Venice and Charles V whose fleet was defeated in the battle of Preveza (1538) (although usually Venetians and Ottomans found a mutually profitable *modus vivendi*) – and laid siege to Malta (1565). The navy extended its actions even further to Portuguese holdings, taking Muscat and Hormuz (1552).

The centralization of state structures proceeded, civil law was codified and the military grew in size and importance. Strong naval forces were created, integrating privateers, that could challenge the Venetian Navy. The Empire became a major player in European politics, partly through further military pressure against South Eastern Europe (including the first siege of Vienna in 1529) and partly through diplomacy, for instance through an alliance with France in 1536. The rule of Suleiman I has become known as the "Golden Age" of the Ottoman Empire, earning him the title "The Magnificent" in the Christian Europe while Ottoman subjects remembered him for his legislative activity as "The Lawgiver".

III. The mature Empire (1566-1687)

Sultans:

1566-1574	Selim II
1574-1595	Murad III
1595-1603	Mehmed III
1603-1617	Ahmed
1617-1618	Mustafa I
1618-1622	Osman II
1622-1623	Mustafa I (second reign)
1623-1640	Murad IV, "The Warrior"
1640-1648	Ibrahim I
1648-1687	Mehmed IV, "The Hunter"

After Suleiman I's death the policy of expansion continued. The Ottomans intervened in European politics, supporting opposition against the Pope and the Habsburgs, through both diplomatic and economic means. The highly desirable Levant trade was reopened to European merchants. Allied countries received privileges: France in 1569, England in 1580 and the Dutch Republic in 1612. Conquered territories were administered by representatives of the central government together with local elites, both Muslim and Christian. These forces acted in shifting and precarious balance and

mélange, which, however, proved to be a very efficient way, in the long run, of accommodating differences, limiting conflicts and assuring the survival of the Empire. The confessional communities (sometimes denominated *millet*) enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, regulating the lives of their members.

However, in the late 16th century the Empire headed towards economic and political crises. State institutions were often inefficient in the management of vast territories, as well as in channelling the activity of military men outside of the battlefield. Furthermore, the despotic power around the court provided a hotbed for corruption and misuse of power. Additionally American silver now found its way to the Empire in such quantities that the currency collapsed, causing deep financial crises in the 1580s and 1590s. These contributed to internal unrest, as did bad harvests. The authorities developed a twofold strategy that consisted of co-opting the rebels or brutally suppressing them. On the whole, the Ottoman communities and institutions adjusted to the new situation, and emerged from the crisis transformed. While the transformation was perceived as deviation from 'good old ways' both by many contemporary Ottoman critics as well as by some modern historians, recent research has shown how these institutional, social and economic changes permitted the Ottoman Empire to survive – and often thrive – for several more centuries.

As the Empire grew larger, the traditional policy of avoiding two-front wars – which gave the Ottomans a possibility to focus on the West and on the East in turns – became hard to follow. The late 1570s represent the beginning of a series of Iranian-Ottoman wars that lasted until 1639. These wars coincided with major military efforts in the west against the Holy Roman Empire 1593-1606 and with resistance in the European parts of the Empire, for instance in Macedonia. However, in the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries the Empire faced military, political and economic difficulties. A difficult naval setback came at the battle at Lepanto in 1571 when the combined naval forces of the Holy League (Venice, the Pope, the King of Spain and his Italian allies) defeated the Ottoman Navy. This defeat prevented the Mediterranean from becoming a "Turkish sea", although the Ottoman fleet continued to be a major military actor.

In central Europe the Empire was able to exploit the extremely unstable political situation created through the Thirty Years War. The Empire supported Bethlen Gabor and the rebellious Hungarian estates by accepted the Hungarians under Habsburg rule as a protectorate (1620) and the Bohemian estates when they elected Frederick V ("the Winter King"), as king of Bohemia (1619). By supporting the Hungarians and the Bohemians in particular, and the Protestant and Calvinist movements in general, the Ottoman statesmen sought to contribute to the destabilization of Central Europe. In 1621, and again in 1672, military expeditions targeted Poland, and in 1669 Crete was conquered from the Venetians.

At the beginning of the Austro-Ottoman wars (1683-1697) the Ottoman forces besieged Vienna, again without success. Instead in 1687 the Ottoman forces experienced a crushing defeat against the Holy Roman forces at the second battle of Mohacs. The war ended with the battle of Zenta in 1697, with further catastrophic results for the Ottoman Empire. In the following treaty of Karlowitz (1699), much of the Ottoman influence in Central Europe came to an end and Russia now emerged as a major player threatening the Ottoman interests particularly in the Black Sea region. The Treaty of Karlowitz marks the start of the stagnation of the Ottoman Empire in terms of its geopolitical position.

IV. THE STAGNATING EMPIRE 1699-1839

Sultans:

1687-1691	Suleiman II
1691-1695	Ahmed II
1695-1703	Mustafa II
1703-1730	Ahmed III
1730-1754	Mahmud I
1754-1757	Osman III
1757-1779	Mustafa III
1774-1789	Abdülhamid I
1789-1807	Selim III
1807-1808	Mustafa IV
1808-1839	Mahmud II

During the first part of the 18th century, the Ottoman rulers had mixed success in warfare and the Empire became further integrated into the European game of alliances. Thus for example, King Charles XII of Sweden succeeded in persuading Ahmed II to attack Russia, after the Swedish King's catastrophic loss against that empire in 1709. Going reluctantly into war, the Sultan nevertheless succeeded in delivering a major blow against Russians in the Battle of Pruth (1711).

The first part of the 18th century was also a period of growth of the economy and the importance of internal markets. During the entire century, Ottoman domains were becoming further integrated into the world economy. Certain groups were able to consolidate great power. The expansion of foreign trade boosted the importance of non-Muslim Ottoman merchants. Provincial notables acted as mediators between the local populations and the central administration, growing indispensable both for the collection of taxes and for the mobilization of military forces. Scribal service gained prominence within the central administration. The Janissaries, unable to compete with modern drilled infantry on the battlefield, turned

into a sort of urban militia that often voiced popular discontent and opposition to certain policies promoted by the rulers. Thus for example in a context of military losses, economic difficulties of city-dwellers and ostentatious luxury of the ruling elites, a rebellion led by Patrona Halil deposed the sultan Ahmed III, replacing him with his nephew (1730).

During the 18th century, many parts of Euro-Atlantic area entered the era known as the Enlightenment and European political, social and economic transformations gained speed. Similar trends appeared only gradually in the Ottoman Empire. In this context, the Ottoman Empire started to orient itself more towards Europe, particularly during the "Tulip Era" (1718-1730) and then again in the 1780s and 1790s. Ottoman rulers took interest in the printing press, Prussian and other European methods of military training and new war materials. At the same time, Ottoman elites participated in promoting rococo architecture and decorative painting. Non-Muslim Ottoman subjects often went to study in European universities. The diplomatic relations with European powers became ever more important and embassies were often sent to European capitals.

In warfare, the advances made by the European powers, even the emerging ones like Russia, were not matched by the Ottomans. This became evident in the wars against Russia (1774, 1792 and 1812), as the Ottomans lost the northern shore of the Black Sea. The Black Sea monopoly was lost already in 1783, enabling the Greeks to come into direct contact with the Russians. During the century the Ottoman Empire became one of the powers taking part in the political-military alliances in Europe, rather than representing an outside threat to Christian Europe as it had usually been perceived in the 16th and 17th centuries. By the end of the 18th century, Ottoman territories even became object of European colonial interest.

The internal situation was marked by readjustments in the distribution of power between the local notables and the central government. Several provincial warlords attempted to consolidate their dynastical rule, becoming highly autonomous with respect to the central regime. The Janissary corps acted as a very powerful social body with sufficient power to stop any development that its leaders deemed contrary to its interests. When Selim III tried to introduce European-style reforms and to modernize the army and the navy, he in the end was overthrown (1807) and killed (1809). However, his successor Mahmud II was eventually able to dismantle the Janissary corps (1826) and to introduce reforms that would strengthen central government and prevent territorial losses. One should bear in mind that by then territorial losses were due not only to conquest by other empires, but also to internal separatist movements. The independence of Greece, with the help of European powers (1832), and the French occupation of the Ottoman province of Algeria (1830) mark the first steps of the gradual breakdown of the Empire. Nicolas I of Russia minted the expression "the sick man of Europe" to characterize the weakness

of Ottoman rule. Nevertheless, sometimes it was precisely modern political, economic and social patterns that stimulated the centrifugal trends.

V. The Disintegration of the Empire, the Emergence of Nation-States

Sultans:

1839-1861	Abdülmecid I
1861-1876	Abdülaziz I
1876	Murad V
1876-1909	Abdülhamid II
1909-1918	Mehmed V
1918-1922	Mehmed VI, 36th and last Ottoman sultan
1922-1924	Abdülmecid II, last Ottoman caliph

The period of radical transformation that culminated with the dissolution of the Empire and the foundation of the Republic of Turkey started with vigorous reforms, known as the *tanzimat*, that implied a reorganisation of the Empire and of its government. The first steps were already made in the late 1820s; the process gained momentum in the second third of the 19th century. It was an attempt to modernize the Empire and achieve both internal and external stability.

One of the most important reform acts was the "Rescript of the Rose Chamber" of 1839. Among other rulings, it declared the equality of all subjects and guaranteed them certain rights. The Rescript was not, however, a true constitution, as the sultan continued to be the sole sovereign. The reforms had mixed effects, sometimes seen as insufficient, while at the same time criticized for disrupting the complex and fragmented system of power balance. Foreign countries often intervened to shape the reforms and their implementation in the direction that they thought would benefit their own momentary interests.

On the whole, the growing weakness of Ottoman imperial rule stimulated the competition of European powers for influence in the various Ottoman domains. This resulted in the Crimean War (1853-56) and the subsequent Treaty of Paris (1856). The Treaty was unfavourable for Russia as it was forced to disband its Black Sea Navy; and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was now guaranteed by the Great Powers. At the same time, the Ottoman Empire kept the markets open for West European trade and products, a policy that convinced the major European powers that it was beneficial to support the integrity of the Ottoman territory, at least until early 1870s. For instance the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 made it even more important for the British to keep Egypt stable and recognize, on paper at least, the nominal Ottoman sovereignty over Egypt. Nevertheless, especially in the last three decades of the century, several European powers (Austria-Hungary, Russia and others) gave up this principle and opted

for supporting the national movements in the Balkans and elsewhere – for example, in the cases of the Bulgarian uprising (1876) and the Serbo-Turkish war (1876) which lead to the Russo-Turkish war (1877-1878).

The interdependence of the Ottoman territories and European countries grew, and was often articulated in terms of the Ottoman dependence on European finances, products, and know-how. At the same time, Ottoman territories became a stage for great railway projects, expansion of mining and marked-oriented agricultural production, etc. On the whole, the lands under the Ottoman rule became even more integrated in the world economy. Within the Empire new forces were taking the initiative. The first constitution from 1876 can be understood as a political culmination of the *tanzimat* process. The opposition groups, defending a return to traditional Islamic values, were partially appeased by sultan Abdülhamid II who de-activated the constitution, continued the technical and institutional reforms but, at the same time, emphasized the Islamic religious and cultural aspects of his rule. However, the slower pace of reform work, autocratic style of government and the obvious disintegration of the empire led to the emergence of an opposition movement with nationalist features which opted for national unity and further modernization: the Young Turks. In 1908 they staged a coup, Abdülhamid II was overthrown, a constitutional monarchy was proclaimed and a Parliament was opened. The constitution guaranteed the Ottoman citizens many rights, but, in spite of the initial optimism shared by Ottomans of different creeds and tongues, in the end it proved unable to create a new basis for the legitimacy of power that could be accepted by all major groups.

With the incapacity of the Ottoman government to defend the integrity of its territory, despite improvements in the organisation and training of the army with the help of German officers, it became more and more obvious that Ottoman imperial power had started to fall apart. In 1881 the British invaded Egypt, in 1882 the French took Tunisia, in 1897 there was a war with Greece, in 1908 the Austrian-Hungarian Empire annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the same year the Cretans declared Greek rule over Crete.

One piece after another was falling away from the Empire, either transformed into independent nation-states or falling under colonial rule. This trend accelerated in the 1910s, culminating with the Ottoman Empire joining the Great War (1914-1918) as one of the Central Powers. Their defeat resulted in the Empire's being divided up by the victors. Territorial losses in the wars, continuing external threats and internal tensions created a highly explosive situation that resulted in severe atrocities within the remaining territory of the Empire. Hundreds of thousands of Armenians, Muslims and other civilians died because of war, inter-ethnic violence and famine during and after World War I.

Unable in the end to create a common basis for equal citizens of different creeds, tongues and ethnicities, that would legitimize its imperial power, the Ottoman Empire

nevertheless left its heritage to the new nation-states that emerged from its domain, a heritage that included the reforms, ideas, practices and institutions that developed in the 19th and early 20th century.

VI. THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

In 1922, the insurrection armies, joined by popular guerrillas, expelled the occupying powers from Anatolia and the sultanate was abolished. The Republic of Turkey was proclaimed on 29 October 1923, with Ankara as its capital. The Parliament adopted a new constitution and the caliphate was abolished, too. Mustafa Kemal, with the honorary surname Atatürk (meaning father of the Turks), became the Republic's first president. Turkish leaders planned to create a modern democratic and secularized nation-state; secularizing and modernizing reforms were indeed introduced in the 1920s and 1930s (popular sovereignty, complete secularization of education and legal system, abolition of polygamy, women's right to vote, etc.). However, Turkey's political system continued to be dominated by a single party until 1945. In regard to the economy, Turkish leaders adopted a policy of industrialization and development of the national economy within the framework of capitalism.

Turkey remained neutral until the very last months of the World War II. It became one of the founding members of UN in 1945. In the context of the Cold War, Turkish elites opted for accepting the alliance with the USA and Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952. In a region where autocratic regimes were the norm, Turkey maintained a democratic system of government, with free elections and several competing political parties. Nevertheless, the army developed a highly interventionist attitude, pressing for particular policies (particularly on issues regarding secularism and the Kurdish question) or even intervening by means of military coups d'état (1960, 1971, 1980). The second half of the 20th century was marked by several major conflicts and power struggles that divided Turkish society. They developed mainly around the question of national unity versus minority rights and claims and the issue of the position of Islam in politics and in everyday life. Furthermore, the socio-economic issues (distribution of resources, workers' rights, welfare, etc.) also constituted an important point of conflict; leftists and trade-union activists were often victims of violent repression well as of attacks by far-right activists.

Another constant of the Turkish politics has been the Kurdish question, the debate, indeed the political and intermittently armed struggle about the rights and status of the part of the Kurdish peoples who live within the territory of Turkey – largely in the south eastern part bordering on Iraq, Iran and Syria where there are substantial Kurdish populations. The fighting in the southeast has been the bloodiest in the history of the Republic.

In the last two decades, moderate Islamists have become a major force in the Turkish political panorama, governing since 2002. After a severe economic crises in 1994, 1999 and 2001, Turkey is experiencing remarkable economic growth, benefiting from a young and increasingly educated population. The emigration to Europe that had been stimulated by poverty and for political reasons, has been gradually replaced by circulation of students, white-collar professionals and all kinds of entrepreneurs. The traditional alliance with the USA has been complemented by a diplomatic effort to establish a multi-polar web of alliances, particularly with other regional powers.

'Clash of Civilizations', Crusades, Knights and Ottomans: an Analysis of Christian-Muslim Interaction in the Mediterranean

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Abstract

In a world that has become so powerfully gripped by a possible escalation of a 'clash of civilizations' that could spiral out of control, interest in the history of Christian-Muslim encounters and violence is on the rise. The aim of this chapter is to provide some historical depth to a debate that often tends to be shallow in its appreciation of a complex legacy of interaction between different people. It will commence with an overview of the recent debate that emerged in response to the ideas of Samuel P. Huntington. It will then consider the historical implications of the crusades in the way they have come to colour contemporary West-Muslim relations. Finally, the chapter will consider a number of naval battles between the Knights Hospitallers of St. John the Baptist and the Ottoman Empire as a case study in early modern Christian-Muslim interaction. This relationship will be looked at from the religious angle, but other factors that informed this conflict, such as status and masculinity, will also be considered.

L-interess fl-istorja tar-relazzjonijiet u l-vjolenza bejn l-Insara u l-Musulmani qed jiżdied, hekk kif qed tikber il-biża ta' xi konflitt bejn iż-żewġ ċiviltajiet. Minkejja li hu maħsub li r-reliġjon m'għadiex importanti fil-ħajja tal-lum, kwistjonijiet li jmissu b'xi mod il-fidi għadhom kapaċi llum daqs il-bieraħ li jqajmu reazzjonijiet qawwija. Dan l-artiklu jibda billi janalizza l-kunċett komtemporanju ta' 'konflitt bejn iċ-ċiviltajiet' u b'ħarsa ġenerali lejn r-relazzjonijiet moderni bejn l-Ewropa u l-Mediterran. Minn hemm jagħti ħarsa lura lejn l-idea tal-Kruċjati, bħala esperjenza li ħalliet impatt fundamentali fuq ir-relazzjonijiet bejn l-Insara u l-Musulmani. Fl-aħħar parti, l-artiklu jittratta l-Mediterran fil-perjodu modern bikri, b'ħarsa partikolari lejn il-Kavallieri ta' San Ġwann u t-Torok Ottomani. Hemm tendenza li s-sekli sittax u sbatax jiġu bħal mgħafġa bejn il-Medju Evu u ż-żmien ta' wara l-1798, u jiġu mejjusa bħala perjodu ta' taqbid kważi infantili bejn kursara, li wħud minnhom kienu jilbsu s-salib, filwaqt li oħrajn kienu jilbsu n-nofs qamar. Fil-fatt dan l-artiklu jiffoka propju fuq dan il-perjodu sabiex jitfa dawl fuq il-varjetà ta' relazzjonijiet soċjali, ekonomiċi u reliġjużi li kienu jseħħu bejn l-Insara u l-Musulmani f'dan iż-żmien.

L-interazzjoni bejn l-Insara u l-Musulmani kienet, inevitabilment, affettwata minn kunċetti u twemmin reliġjuż. Minkejja dan, fatturi oħra bħal ma huma l-politika, klassi

soċjali u maskulinità, ħallew ukoll l-effett tagħhom fuq dawn ir-relazzjonijiet. Meta dawn l-elementi jiġu meqjusa flimkien mat-twemmin reliġjuż, wieħed ikun jista' jifhem b'mod aktar sħiħ u wiesa r-relazzjonijiet bejn l-Insara u l-Musulmani. Mill-banda l-oħra, huwa mportanti li jkun magħruf il-fatt li jekk id-dinja kontemporanja trid tgħix fil-paċi, t-twemmin reliġjuż irid jinżamm fil-qalba ta' kull ħsieb w inizjattiva li jipprovaw iqarrbu lil-Insara u lil l-Musulmani sabiex jifthemu fuq dawk l-affarijiet li ma jaqblux dwarhom.

Introduction

Fascination with a 'clash of civilizations' between Christians and Muslims has gripped people's imagination and there is growing interest in the history of Christian-Muslim encounters and violence. For all the talk about secularism and a decline in religion, issues of faith are as capable today, as ever, to stir deep and widespread passionate reactions. This chapter will commence with an analysis of the contemporary idea of a 'clash of civilizations' and with an overview of current European-Mediterranean relations. The chapter will then move backwards in time to consider the impact which the Crusades of the Middle Ages had on Christian-Muslim relations. It will analyse how a particular understanding of the Crusades moulds modern discourses about Christian-Muslim relations. The third and main part of this chapter deals with the early modern Mediterranean. The main focus is on the Hospitaller Knights of St. John and the Ottoman Turks. The 16th and 17th centuries, sandwiched between the Middle Ages and the post-1789 era, tend to be dismissed as a time of petty squabbles between marauding corsairs, some donning the cross, and others the crescent. This chapter focuses precisely on this period to highlight the extensive social, economic and religious encounters and exchanges that took place between Christians and Muslims in the Mediterranean.

A clash of civilizations?

A series of Danish newspaper cartoons that appeared in the year 2005 depicting the Prophet Mohammed, as well as Pope Benedict XVI's lecture in Germany in September 2006, aroused passionate and at times violent reactions among Muslims, which made many think back on Samuel P. Huntington's article and book about civilizations and the ways they clash. The term a 'Clash of Civilizations' was first used by Bernard Lewis in an article he wrote in *The Atlantic* in 1990, in which he outlined the grievances which the Arab / Islamic world had toward the West / Christianity[1]. Huntington elaborated the term in an article he published in 1993. In his vision, the Third World War would see the Judeo-Christian West ranged against a Confucian-Islamic alliance[2]. Under the generic labels of 'West' and 'Islam' he set down a pattern of thinking which followed strict black and white contours, and which was found to be exceptionally convenient following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack upon the World Trade Centre in New York City. This latest act seemed to be the logical culmination of the Confucian-Islamic connection designed to promote acquisition by its members of the weapons and weap-

ons technology to counter the military powers of the West[3]. In reality, however, the attack upon the US was not done through ballistic missiles or chemical weapons, but by the carefully planned suicide attack of a small group of deranged militants who used American civilian planes[4].

The main criticism hurled at Huntington is that of oversimplification. His eight-civilizations division was too categorical and it implied an exaggerated level of civilizational isolation and homogeneity. According to him a civilization is the "highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have"[5]. But the concept of civilization is a complex and imprecise one, used along with or instead of other notions such as culture, race and nation[6]. Sweeping statements about civilizations can only therefore lead to imprecise readings of past and current events. Huntington considers the 'West', primarily North America and Western Europe as a whole, disregarding the fundamental differences not only between the two but also within Europe itself[7]. Even 'Islam' cannot be taken as one homogenous group. There are, for instance, noticeable differences between Muslims in the Middle East and Muslims in North Africa (the latter's belief in saints brings them quite close to South European Catholics in fact). There is then, particularly in North Africa, the traditional dichotomy between the Muslims of the cities and the Berbers of the desert, a dichotomy forever immortalized by Ibn Khaldun[8]. The Persian Gulf War (1990-91) brought traditionally anti-American Syria to join the US in its war against Iraq. Once aggression had occurred, the United States and other Western governments became involved for geopolitical reasons that transcended cultural differences[9]. West-Islam co-operation over Kuwait was not the first of its kind. Fernand Braudel observed that in the 17th-century Mediterranean, 'Men passed to and fro, indifferent to frontiers, states and creeds...'[10]. Around 1548, Jean de la Valette, an official of the Catholic military-religious Order of St. John, agitated for the transfer of their headquarters from Malta to Tripoli in North Africa. Among other reasons he gave for such a move, he argued that he felt confident enough that the Catholic Order and the Muslim Berbers of North Africa could co-operate in their opposition to the Muslim Ottoman Turks[11].

Points of convergence such as those outlined above have a tendency to be ignored. After all, the Crusades of the Middle Ages are enough of a potent example to anyone who sees the possibility of a 'West' vs. 'Islam' conflict. In popular mentality and in some official discourses in the Arab World, Israel is regarded as a Crusader state and as such it should be wiped out just like the medieval crusader states were. According to Mehmet Ali Agca, who tried to kill Pope John Paul II on 13 May 1981, the Pope was the 'supreme commander of the Crusades'[12]. Although Huntington makes it clear that he sees Western intervention in other civilizations as a dangerous source of instability, his ideas are often taken to imply the contrary[13]. Paul Johnson, on the other hand, was very blunt when he put forward his argument that the 'civilized nations' ought to take it upon themselves to recolonize Third World Countries 'where the most basic conditions of civilized life had broken down'. This evocation of 19th-century imperialist language found immediate resonance among US policy-makers and the media[14]. Works like

Huntington's and Johnson's serve to heighten discourses of the familiar (Europe, the West, 'us') and the strange (the Orient, the East, 'them')[15]. The phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism is a sign of bewilderment and guilt that the border with the 'other' has been crossed[16]. The 'other', in this case, is modernity, which has become inseparable from the West and by implication evil, as well as attractive[17]. Just like Communism, Islamic Fundamentalism is bred in a situation of lack of democracy, huge social inequalities, poverty and deprivation. This was why in 1948, Ernest Bevin (post-war British Foreign Secretary), underlined how the real danger seemed to lie in the moral and material exhaustion of Western Europe, which made it ripe for communist infiltration[18]. That was why Marshall Aid was an all-encompassing programme of political, economic and social regeneration and integration. Similarly the challenge of achieving stability in the Mediterranean has to address security not in a vacuum, but in conjunction with the socio-economic base of that challenge, and with an awareness of the historical heritage of the region[19].

Over time, a situation of 'centre and periphery' has developed in the relationship between Europe and the Mediterranean. It is a relationship of inequality existing in geographical space and in historic time. The theories of Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein – emphasizing the expanding control and exploitation of the material resources of the periphery by the core[20] – can be seen in operation in the control of Europe over the gas pipelines on the southern shores of the Mediterranean which fuel the energy needs of Europe[21]. The idea of the Mediterranean as the periphery of Europe leads to the implication that 'Europe' and 'Mediterranean' are two mutually exclusive categories[22]. This is a discourse that harks back to the Pirenne thesis and debate. According to Henri Pirenne, the cultural and economic unity of the two shores of the Mediterranean was broken in the 7th and 8th centuries with the Muslim invasions[23]. For centuries after the Mediterranean Sea witnessed incessant battles between cross and crescent. In the post-1989 era, the return to such a conflict seems to preoccupy many leading analysts[24]. Between the 16th and the 17th centuries, first the economic, then the political hearts of Europe shifted from the Mediterranean to North-Western Europe. The Mediterranean became important only in terms of its validity to European plans. Thus, in the days of European colonial empires, the Mediterranean was the highway of Europe to the East. In the post-1989 era it is turning into the first line of resistance against Islamic fundamentalism and against illegal immigrants from less developed countries[25].

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have been seeking to establish and develop bilateral relations with a select group of Mediterranean non-member states, rather than adopt a comprehensive approach or collective security plan for the whole Mediterranean region[26]. Such a strategy contrasts sharply with the better-organized approach of these same organizations to Eastern Europe, which shows that their commitment to Mediterranean security is at best a limited one. The failed attempts at forging a trans-Mediterranean international institution, such

as the 'Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean' (CSCM)[27], contradict notions of Mediterranean unity. It is clear that the three subregions of the Mediterranean, that is, Southern Europe, North Africa, and the Levant (not to mention the individual countries) all follow independent and sometimes conflicting aims[28]. The 19th-century Eastern Question and NATO membership of Greece and Turkey were primarily concerned with keeping Russia out of the Mediterranean. In a similar fashion, it is now being perceived that NATO's main strategy is to keep Islamic Fundamentalism out of the Mediterranean.

Perceptions of the crusades

The French historian Joseph François Michaud said: "The history of the Middle Ages has no more imposing spectacle than the wars undertaken for the conquest of the Holy Land"[29]. The Crusades certainly had an overarching impact on the development of European and Mediterranean medieval societies. Their legacy has reverberated throughout the ages since, and discourses about the crusades continue to be heard in the contemporary world. As already outlined above, the crusades come up with incredible regularity in the Arab / Muslim world. The response of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to Pope Benedict XVI's speech was to remark that this was "the latest chain of the crusade against Islam started by America's Bush"[30]. In the Western hemisphere, interest in the crusades is evident during occasions such as when a briefing by the Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding (CAABU), given in the year 2000 in the British House of Commons, was entitled 'The Crusades Then and Now'[31]. A main thrust of this presentation was that the crusades fundamentally affect contemporary Muslims' perceptions of the West. Three years earlier the same House of Commons had set up a commission to investigate Islamophobia and the situation of Muslims in the United Kingdom[32].

The crusades were launched in support of a cause which can be portrayed with equal force as the most noble and the most ignoble. To contemporaries a crusade was an expedition on behalf of Christ, which had been authorised by the Pope, and whose participants took vows and enjoyed the privileges of protection at home and indulgences. At the basis of any crusade lay the premise that one was fighting to recover Christian property or to resist aggression. Death met as a crusader was equated with martyrdom so that immediate entry into paradise was to be expected. Essentially, anyone who took the necessary vow could be a crusader. By taking such a vow, one became subject to ecclesiastical authority, with all the duties and privileges that this brought with it (such as exemption from secular law courts). This vow also implied that a person would put his/her normal occupation aside for a while to go crusading[33].

In the 19th and 20th centuries, images and perceptions of the crusades proliferated in Europe. In the 19th century, many commentators were critical of the crusades, but they also espoused a rather rosy-coloured image of Christian chivalry engaged with an exotic Muslim foe. The Victorians were much attracted by the ideas and precepts of medieval

chivalry. In both England and France crusading pedigree was proudly displayed in heraldic devices. In music, art, and literature, crusading themes kept re-emerging – Sir Walter Scott, for instance, wrote a number of novels about the crusades (e.g. *Ivanhoe*, 1819, *The Talisman*, 1825). In the 20th century, crusading language found resonance in the great wars that afflicted it. Some accounts of the First World War, brushing aside the harsh realities of trench warfare, saw the war as 'a noble crusade fought in defence of liberty, to prevent Prussian militarism dominating Europe and to free the Holy Places from Muslim domination'. Crusading imagery also re-emerged during the Second World War, when General David D. Eisenhower published his account of the campaign under the title *Crusade in Europe*[34].

According to Jonathan Riley-Smith, the obsession with the crusades in the Arab / Muslim world originated when the Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II (ruled 1876-1909) publicized his conviction that the European powers had embarked on a new crusade against him and his empire[35]. It was a theme first picked up by pan-Arabism and later by pan-Islamism, with the latter steadily overtaking the former. The Lebanese author Amin Maalouf laments the fact that the crusades had the effect of making the Muslim world turn in upon itself and miss out on world-wide developments, leading to a dichotomy between Islam and modernism. This is because progress came to be seen as the embodiment of 'the other'[36]. Political and religious leaders of the Arab world constantly refer to Saladin, the fall of Jerusalem and its recapture. President Nasser of Egypt was often compared to Saladin and the Suez expedition of 1956 by the French and English was also portrayed as a crusade[37]. Moreover, pamphlets in Libya in the 1980s depicted the Americans as crusaders[38]. Against such modern perceptions of the crusades, it is useful to analyse what Arab chroniclers who were contemporaries of the crusades observed. In their writings the terminology changes from 'Saracen dogs' to 'Christian pigs'; from the urge to acquire the Holy Sepulchre to maintaining control of the Holy Rock from where Mohammed rose to Heaven; from the 'pious Geoffrey' to the 'pious Saladin'[39]. Just as Joinville recounted how King St Louis wept whenever he thought of God's power and benevolence, so Maqrizi described the Sultan of Egypt, Malik al-Salih in the same terms. The chronicler Abu Shama II reported Saladin's appeal to raise an anti-Crusade movement. He quoted Saladin as reproaching the Arabs for their lack of unity when compared to the great solidarity shown among the infidels. Saladin described the Franks as giving their utmost, sacrificing everything and sharing everything between themselves, all in the name of their faith in God[40]. Heeding Saladin's appeal, the Arabs and Muslims managed to reverse the conquests of the crusaders. The Emir Faisal was, in fact, prompt to remind this to the French representative at Versailles after the First World War, when France was trying to stake its claim to Syria dating back to the crusades[41].

That the term 'crusades' should feature so much in today's world is a result of the particular spin that 19th- and 20th-centuries Europeans and Sultan Abdulmahid II gave it. There is a strong trend among Arab and Muslim scholars to evaluate and reinterpret the crusading phenomenon in the light of recent experiences such as colonialism, Arab

nationalism, the establishment of the state of Israel, the liberation of Palestine and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism[42]. The single greatest grudge that the Arab world holds against the West is that it helped to create and still sustains the state of Israel. On the other hand, it is also very probably the case that hatred of Israel is what galvanises the Arab world and gives it some sense of cohesion, without which it is quite likely that Arab countries would be at each other's throat. If, according to Akbar Ahmed, the West does not recognise this heritage, understanding between West and East will be hampered[43]. The use of the term crusade by Osama bin Laden and his followers is therefore pregnant with political and religious significance. They are expressing both a historical vision, as well as an article of faith that have helped to provide moral justification for the actions of both Arab nationalists and radical Islamist[44].

HOSPITALLERS AND OTTOMANS IN THE EARLY MODERN MEDITERRANEAN (C.1565-C.1700)

The Knights Hospitallers of St John the Baptist and the Ottoman Empire represented, in theory, if not always in fact, the essence of religious militancy. The Hospitallers had originated a few years before the First Crusade as a hospice dedicated to the care of the sick, poor and pilgrims that went to Jerusalem. The socio-political situation of the Levant over the next two centuries caused the evolution of the Hospitallers into an institution that merged without any effort the double mission of *servus pauperum* and *miles Christi*. Their subsequent stay on the islands of Cyprus and Rhodes led to them becoming formidable sea-faring warriors and by the early 16th century they could be described as one of the most formidable foes which the Ottomans had to face[45]. The Ottoman Turks had risen as warriors in the Anatolian marches of the decaying Byzantine Empire, and as Ottoman sultans they always remained *gazi* (Holy War) sultans, but they extended the concept of *gazi* to bring the whole Islamic world under their protection[46]. The claims to universal empire by the Ottomans had their foundation in the will of God, but they were also based on the concept of the justice of conquest. God had imposed on Muslims the duty to propagate Islam by force of arms, and the Koran adjured believers 'not [to] think that those who were slain in the cause of Allah are dead. They are alive and well provided for by Allah;...'[47]. Much of the early modern Mediterranean was under Ottoman control, though this was continually contested by the Christian powers in the west, especially by Habsburg Spain. The final colossal battle of the 16th century occurred at Lepanto in 1571, where an alliance of Christian navies defeated the Ottoman one. One of the most potent depictions of this battle is that of Giorgio Vasari (1511-1574), in which he shows Christ, St Peter and other saints helping the Christian fleet, while demons try in vain to help the Turks. It is a powerful reminder of how faith underpinned the beliefs and actions of early modern people. After Lepanto, Spain had to focus its energies on the low countries in revolt and its colonial possessions, whereas the Ottomans had to deal with a reinvigorated Safavid Empire to their East[48]. Both sides were therefore engaged in conflicts with their co-religionists. The result of this was that Christian-Muslim conflict in the Mediterranean was 'down-

sized', allowing the two sides to adjust to a *modus vivendi* and occasionally even find points of convergence.

A number of early modern texts are utilised here to gain as contemporary a view as possible of this situation, in terms of the encounters between Hospitallers and Ottomans. These sources consist mainly of the diary of Francisco Balbi di Correggio about the 1565 Siege of Malta, the diary of the 17th-century Spanish adventurer Alonso de Contreras, and a series of printed accounts of naval encounters between the navies of the Hospitallers and the Ottomans. Balbi and Contreras left a written record of what the life of early modern adventurers was like. Their works allow us to obtain an intimate glimpse of a life dominated by war and religion, where the boundary between these two was often blurred.

Balbi was a 16th-century Italian-Spanish who left the most extensive first-hand account of the 1565 Ottoman siege of Hospitaller Malta. He was not a member of the Order but he served in the Spanish corps throughout the siege[49]. Balbi, being a Christian, spared no literary effort to show that the Christians were better than the Muslims, however, throughout his work one can read the subtle recognition by a soldier of the others' military abilities. At the beginning of his account, he outlined the many good qualities that the leader of the Hospitallers, Grand Master Jean de la Valette, possessed. He went on to say that it took "... a man of his wisdom and courage to be able to resist the onslaught of Suleiman ...", thereby recognizing that only someone who was equally portent could match the great and fearsome Sultan Suleiman the Great[50]. Most of the time Balbi referred to the Ottomans as either the 'Turks' or the 'enemy', avoiding pejorative terms such as 'barbarians'. However, after the fall of the Fortress of St. Elmo, when the Ottomans massacred most of the remaining defenders, and threw into the sea the mutilated bodies of the dead Christians, he could not desist from calling them "Turkish barbarians"[51]. At the same time, Balbi also recorded how one Ottoman commander accused the other of cruelty in his treatment of the Christian captives, and how the other replied that there was to be no quarter[52]. What Balbi fails to mention is that La Valette, upon seeing the floating corpses, first wept, and then responded with equal savagery by having some of the Turkish prisoners beheaded, and their heads shot, instead of cannonballs, into the enemy camp[53]. Thinking, perhaps, that such a vindictive act was less excusable than that of a Pasha, since it emanated from a Christian knight, Balbi thought it best to leave it out of his account. One could almost say that in these bloody acts, Christians and Muslims found a point of convergence – there was a sullen recognition by both sides that even more than before, the context was now one of 'an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth'[54].

The second character to be considered here is that of Contreras. He was a 17th-century Spaniard from Madrid, who travelled throughout the Mediterranean and the Caribbean, served the Order on many occasions, and was finally received as a Hospitaller brother servant-at-arms in the Priory of Castille[55]. He wrote a diary of his life, which commenced with his setting off to serve the King of Spain at the age of fourteen in 1595[56]. Besides being involved in a number of duels and fights with all sorts of people,

Contreras was actively engaged throughout all his life against the two main foes of his native Spain – the Ottoman Turks and Muslims in the Mediterranean, and the Protestant English in the Atlantic. His first proper military engagement was on board the Spanish galleys that sailed from Naples and Sicily to lead an attack on the western coast of Greece, then part of the Ottoman Empire[57]. During one of these early expeditions, when he was not even eighteenth years old, he narrates how he managed to single-handedly capture a gargantuan Turk:

> I poked him with my sword and said in Arabic to him, 'Lie down on the ground.'
> This gargantuan Turk looked at me and started to laugh. At that time, though I was equipped with a sword and shield, I had a face as smooth as a girl's.'[58]

It is telling that both the Turk and Contreras shared a common notion of manliness, and the lack of it, as denoted by facial hair. In early modern times beards were an essential denominator of masculinity[59]. The growth of facial hair denoted that a boy had effectively passed from the feminine realm of women and children, to that of men and adults. Contreras was therefore perfectly capable of understanding the Turk's mocking of him because his face was still "smooth as a girl's." It emerges that in early modern times, Mediterranean men, whether they donned the cross or the crescent, shared a similar understanding of the role of the body in forging one's manliness.

In Contreras' diary, as in Balbi's account, there are references to moments of sheer savagery, committed by both Christians and Muslims alike, such as when a skirmish with some Moors at Cape Bonandrea in North Africa led to some brutal acts being committed by both sides[60]. From Contreras's diary, however, there also emerges an example of how the religious beliefs of Christians and Muslims could converge. He described a cave on the island of Lampedusa in the central Mediterranean which contained an altar of the Blessed Virgin, as well as the tomb of a Turkish marabout (a West African Muslim spiritual leader) who was considered by Muslims to be a saint. In this cave, visiting Christians and Muslims would both leave offerings at their respective shrines – food, clothes, money, and so on. The reason for these offerings was that the cave was used by escaping galley slaves – of both faiths – as a safe haven until they could be rescued by their own people. If anyone else besides the escaping slaves – and excepting the Hospitallers – dared to remove these items, it was believed that their galley would be precluded from leaving the harbour[61]. This story indicates how beneath the wider labels of 'Christianity' and 'Islam', there were sub-practices peculiar to certain regions and people. It also shows how geographical conditions (e.g. Lampedusa's location) and human factors (the need to provide for escaping slaves) led Christians and Muslims to find a common solution to their shared problem, one that was underpinned by religion and war.

The conflation of religion and violence led to the development of tracts that dealt with naval encounters between Christians and Muslims. These printed accounts – described as either a *Relazione* (a report) or an *Avviso* (a notice)[62] – tended to be short pamphlets that gave a day-by-day and a blow-by-blow account of a particular naval encounter. It

was a genre well known in early modern Europe through which states and individuals sought to glorify themselves. The medium of the printing press was therefore harnessed by the Order of St John to spread the fame of its warriors and their actions. Such tracts served to show the continued relevance of a religious-military order dedicated to defending a Christian Europe from its Muslim foes. They were also meant to capture the imagination of prospective candidates aspiring to join the Order who would be lured by the promise of adventure, glory, and the salvation of their soul through the ultimate Christian sacrifice – the laying down of one's life in defence of others and in the name of God. Since Christians wrote these texts, it is necessary to be aware of the inevitable bias against the Muslim side. At the same time, such bias may not be totally unwelcome. After all, objectivity is hardly ever an achievable goal and subjectivity brings us closer to what contemporaries thought and felt. Though Muslims were naturally demonised in such writings, they were not always dismissed as barbarians. The Christian gentlemen who wrote or inspired such texts could at times fraternise with the gentlemen on the other side, even if they were Muslim. The unwritten code of chivalry was like a common meeting ground for both Christians and Muslims, and for some it may have felt like a religion all of its own. Therefore, these tracts allow one to look at Christian-Muslim war from the religious angle, but they also highlight the importance of status and masculinity in informing conflict.

Such expeditions served three purposes. Firstly, they served an economic purpose, not only through the capture of booty and slaves, but also by diminishing the potential of attacks on Christian lands and vessels. Secondly, they served a religious purpose, in that war was waged to glorify God. Finally, it was also a way of keeping the knights themselves busy at sea, rather than idle at land[63]. These tracts were generally penned by an anonymous author, in praise of the Captains and Knights that partook in such battles[64]. The qualities of these men were highlighted – nobility of birth, Christian charity, proficiency in the use of arms, and a readiness to give everything and sacrifice everything for the Order and for God[65]. The wearing of the red habit with the white eight-pointed cross of the Order was a badge of excellence and distinction in Europe, and a symbol that instilled fear and resentment among Muslims[66]. Manly excellence was also linked to nationality – hailing from France or Italy, in particular, was seen as a guarantee of one's naval aptitude[67]. The language used was vivid, active and gripping, and it sought to place the reader in the midst of the action and to show the great valour of the knights[68]. Many of these tracts, by finishing with the words *LAUS DEO* (Praise be to God) gave the whole text (and the battle described therein) the character of a prayer[69]. Through the placement of prayer at the heart of the narrative and action, these tracts could almost be describing a pilgrimage. Before a battle commenced, knights and soldiers prepared themselves through confession, prayer and the invocation of God and the saints to their cause. After all, at the end of their pilgrimage-battle, death could be waiting, and one had to be on guard and ready[70]. Moreover, when the galleys returned victorious to Malta, street processions were held to praise God and the Virgin Mary for the victories obtained, thereby bringing the pilgrimage-battle to a fitting end[71]. A final

but crucial element to be considered here is the attitude towards their Muslim enemies, called generically the 'Turks'. Although the title of 'barbarians' was at times attributed to the latter, there often was a subtle hint that Christian valour was met by Muslim valour[72]. The good military qualities of the Turks – their soldiers, their artillery and their leaders were recognised and taken into account[73]. After all, if the courage of the knights was to shine properly, it could only do so when opposing equally courageous warriors. The stubbornness of the Turks was also admired, although it could easily turn into irrational obstinacy, and that was deemed to be unmanly[74].

Conclusion

This chapter provides an overview of the history of Christian-Muslim interaction (both conflict and convergence) in the Mediterranean from the Middle Ages to modern times. It was concerned with showing how the concept of 'clash of civilizations' oversimplifies and glosses over a more complex social and historical palimpsest. The case was also made for giving due consideration to the Crusades as a central organising principle that underlines contemporary Christian-Muslim relations. In early modern times, then, encounters and violence between Hospitallers and Ottomans serve as a case study into the multi-faceted nature of relations between faiths or civilizations. Both Hospitallers and Ottomans were religious warriors, committed to fight each other, even unto death. Moreover, they shared a certain understanding of what constituted military valour and manliness. Christian-Muslim interaction has, inevitably, been underwritten by religious concepts and beliefs. However, it has been argued here that other factors, such as politics, status and masculinity also informed these exchanges, both amicable and hostile. By taking these elements into account, alongside religion, a fuller understanding of Christian-Muslim relations in the past can be achieved. On the other hand, it is important to recognise that if peace is to have a chance in the contemporary world, faith has to form an important part of the equation in solving Christian-Muslim issues.

Notes

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60   Dallas, *The Adventures of Captain Alonso de Contreras* cit., pp. 51-3.

61   *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

62   Anon., *Relazione della Presa che hanno fatto le Galere della Sacra Religione di Malta sotto il Comando del Sig. Bagliuo della Morea*, Florence 1638. Anon., *Avviso nuovo della Presa della Città di Maometta in Barberia fatta dale Galere della Sacra Religione, & Illustrissima Milizia di San Giovanni*, Rome 1602.

63   *Ibid.*

[64] Anon., *Relazione della Presa che hanno fatto le Galere della Sacra Religione di Malta* cit.; Anon., *Relazione della Presa fatta a' Turchi dale 7, Galere della Sacra Religione Gierosolimitana venuta all'Illustriss. Sig. Commendat. D'Eviev*, Rome-Florence 1652; F. Scalletari, *Condotta Navale e Vera Relatione del Viaggio dell'Illus & Eccell Sig. Gioanni Gioseppe d'Herberstein*, Graz 1688, p. A3, 2, 46, 194, 370.

[65] Anon., *Avviso nuovo della Presa della Città di Maometta in Barberia* cit.; L. Grignani, *Relatione del Sanguinoso Combattimento e Presa d'una Galera e d'un Pinco de Turchi, fatta dale Galere di Malta*, Malta-Rome 1644; Scalletari, *Condotta Navale e Vera Relatione del Viaggio dell'Illus & Eccell Sig. Gioanni Gioseppe d'Herberstein* cit., p. A3, 2, 46, 194, 370.

[66] Anon., *Avviso nuovo della Presa della Città di Maometta in Barberia* cit.

[67] Anon., *Avviso nuovo della Presa della Città di Maometta in Barberia* cit.; Anon., *Relazione della Vittoria ottenuta dalle Quattro Galere della Santa Religione Gerosolimitana, d'una Soltana nominata Binghen, comandata dal Famoso Rais Solimano*, Rome 1700.

[68] Anon., *Avviso nuovo della Presa della Città di Maometta in Barberia* cit.; Grignani, *Relatione del Sanguinoso Combattimento e Presa d'una Galera e d'un Pinco de Turchi, fatta dale Galere di Malta* cit.; Anon., *Relazione della Vittoria ottenuta dalle Quattro Galere della Santa Religione Gerosolimitana, d'una Soltana nominata Binghen, comandata dal Famoso Rais Solimano* cit.

[69] Anon., *Relazione della presa della Fortezza, e Porto di Seleucia, fatta da Sei Galere della Religione di Santo Stefano il giorno dell'Ascensione*, Florence, 1613; Anon., *Relazione della presa di due Galere della Squadra di Biserta fatta dalle Galere della Religione di Santo Stefano*, Florence 1628.

[70] Anon., *Relazione della Vittoria ottenuta dalle Quattro Galere della Santa Religione Gerosolimitana, d'una Soltana nominata Binghen, comandata dal Famoso Rais Solimano* cit.

[71] Anon., *Avviso nuovo della Presa della Città di Maometta in Barberia* cit.; Anon., *Relazione della Presa che hanno fatto le Galere della Sacra Religione di Malta* cit.

[72] Anon., *Relazione della Vittoria ottenuta dalle Quattro Galere della Santa Religione Gerosolimitana, d'una Soltana nominata Binghen, comandata dal Famoso Rais Solimano* cit.

[73] Anon., *Relazione della Presa che hanno fatto le Galere della Sacra Religione di Malta* cit.

[74] Anon., *Relazione della presa di due Galere della Squadra di Biserta fatta dalle Galere della Religione di Santo Stefano* cit.

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A Retreating Power: the Ottoman Approach to the West in the 18th Century

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Bu makale, onsekizinci yüzyılda, Batı'nın Osmanlı dünyasındaki değişen algılanışı üzerinedir. Karlowitz Barış Antlaşmasının (1699) imzalanmasından sonra, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun askerî gücünün azalmasıyla birlikte Osmanlı elitinin Batı düyasına eğilimi artmıştır. Avrupa'ya giden eğitimli seyyah ve elçilerin yazdıkları seyahatnâme ve sefaretnâmeler Batı'ya yaklaşımdaki değişim üzerine ilk elden bilgi sağlamaktadır. Sefaretnâme yazımında zaman içinde farklılıkların imâ edildiği ve Batı'nın teknolojik üstünlüğünün kabul edildiği bir yaklaşım hâkim olmaya başlamıştır. Bu metinlerde ilk defa Hristiyan ve İslâm kültürleri arasında -kapalı bir şekilde olsa da- karşılaştırmalar yapılmaya başlanmıştır. Yüzyılın sonunda, bir Osmanlı elçisi devletin istikrarının korunabilmesi için muzaffer Avrupalıların taklit edilmesini önerir. Bu yüzyılda, Osmanlı aydınının 'kayıtsızdan', 'etki altında kalana' dönüştüğünü görüyoruz. Öte yandan, elçiler bu yüzyılda da Osmanlı'nın kültürel olarak 'üstün' olduğu fikrindedir. Osmanlı devleti, Avrupa'nın askerî metotları uygulandığı, reformlar yapıldığı taktirde tekrar en güçlü devlet olacaktır. Elçiler için Batı hâlâ kendi medeniyetleri ile karşıtlık içine yerleştirdikleri 'Öteki'dir. Batılı insan ve maddi kültür Batı'nın o dönemde kullandığı 'egzotik' tanımına girecek şekilde 'yabancı' olarak görülüp dışarıdan değerlendirilmektedir. Yakın dönemde Osmanlı toplum tarihi, askerî ve ekonomik tarihi üzerine yapılan yayınlar bu yüzyıldaki 'Batı'ya açılmanın' on altı ve on yedinci yüzyıllarda çeşitli idarî değişimlerin belirlediğini ortaya koymuştur. Farklılaşan yaklaşım tarzının sadece Batı ile iletişim ve etkileşimin sonucu olmadığı, aynı zamanda Osmanlı toplumundaki iç değişimin bir ürünü olduğu belirtilmiştir. Vergi toplama biçimindeki değişim, kıtalararası ticaretin gelişimi ve askerî kurumlarda yapılan reformlar toplum sınıflarının organizasyonunu etkilemiş ve yeni grupların ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Batı ile etkileşim artık askerî gerilemenin kaçınılmaz bir sonucu olarak değil, daha geniş bir bakış açısından, 'sınıf hareketliliği' görüşü üzerine temellendirilmiş olan 'toplum dönüşümü' paradigması ile açıklanmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, on altıncı yüzyıldan itibaren yükselen bir 'kent ve eşraf burjuvazisi' ve yeni bir 'yönetici sınıf' grubu, bir yandan Doğu'nun görsel ve edebî geleneklerine bağlılıklarını sürdürürken, bir yandan da Batı Avrupa kökenli sanat ve mimarlık ögelerinin aktarımını sağlamıştır. İlk defa bu dönemde, Barok ve Rokoko tasarımlar ortaya çıkmıştır. Batı Avrupa kültürü ile gittikçe artan etkileşim içinde değişen bir toplum sınıfının estetik tercihleri farklılaşmış ve Rokoko üslûbu, belli bir ölçüde de olsa, resim ve mimarlık tasarımında etkili olmaya başlamıştır.

Introduction

Lady Mary Wortley Montagu (1689-1762), wife of the British ambassador to Istanbul, Edward Wortley Montagu, lived in the city from 1716 to 1718. In a letter to the Abbé Conti, she wrote that the Turks, 'are not so unpolished as we represent them. "This true their magnificence is of a different taste from ours, and perhaps of a better. I am almost of the opinion that they have a right notion of life: they consume it in music, gardens, wine, and delicate eating, while we are tormenting our brains with some scheme of politics or studying some science to which we can never attain, or if we do, we cannot persuade people to set that value upon it we do ourselves [...] I allow you to laugh at me for the sensual declaration that I had rather be a rich Effendi with all his ignorance, than Sir Isaac Newton with all his knowledge"[1]. This restrained admiration of Turkish manners by an educated British lady at the beginning of the 18th century is an indication of the changing image of the 'Turk' in Western Europe. This revision had already started in the second half of the 17th century, when, as Ahmet Evin states, the West began to regard Turkey not as a land of barbarians but as a political entity embodying its own benefits and drawbacks[2]. Concomitantly, Western culture gradually became a centre of attraction for the educated Turk in the East, who sought to emulate recent technological and urban growth in the West.

The historiography

Studies of the Ottoman outlook and approach to the West focus mainly on embassy letters and observations on art and architecture. The former represent the viewpoint of state representatives while the latter demonstrate the influence of Western aesthetics through Baroque and Rococo elements. The travels of the envoys who recorded their eye-witness experiences have attracted an increasing number of researchers. Likewise, the attention paid to modern transliterations/translations of some of the foremost travel accounts has also increased in Turkey and abroad of late. Recent studies on the social, military and fiscal history of the Ottoman Empire have revealed that 18th century openness to the West was conditioned by 16th and 17th century adjustments in a variety of spheres. The altered approach was not only an end-product of contacts and interaction with the West, but also of social change in Ottoman society. Governmental inclinations and decrees regarding tax collecting, intercontinental trade and military institutions affected the organisation of social classes, bringing about new cadres and social groups. Rather than being viewed as an unavoidable result of military retreat, increasing interaction with the West in the 18th century is now seen from a wider perspective, in light of recent research on social transformation and mobility. This new research also illustrates the integration of forms and motifs borrowed from Western art in the 18th century. As a result, we now understand that the aesthetic preferences and choices of a rising bourgeoisie and a new group of ruling elites (who were also fond of their own Oriental visual and literary traditions) opened the gates for new Western European artistic elements. This article draws on this research in order to give an overall impression of the 18th century Ottoman approach to the West.

THE FORMATION OF A NEW CLASS

There are sociopolitical reasons for this new era of interaction. The defeat of the Ottoman army outside Vienna in 1683 began the retreat of Ottoman power in Europe. A series of defeats and disadvantageous peace treaties followed. The political conjuncture in Europe allowed for a gradual Turkish retreat from Eastern Europe which lasted almost two centuries. Rivalry among the great European powers shaped their foreign policies. The French, who were at this time seeking an eastern ally against the Habsburgs and Romanovs, turned to the Ottomans. Louis XIV had not sent troops to defend Vienna during the Ottoman siege and later refused to take part in the War of the Holy League, financed by the Pope against the Ottomans. At the end of this war, the allies – Russia, Austria, Poland and Venice – signed the Peace Treaty of Karlowitz with the Sublime Porte in 1699. Later, the Treaty of Pasarowitz (1718) strengthened the political power of the Habsburg Empire in Central and Eastern Europe. In 1719, the inauguration of the port of Trieste by Charles VI heralded Austria's economic ascendancy in the Mediterranean. Hence, one of the most important outcomes of the Second Siege of Vienna was the strengthening of the Habsburg Empire's power and the improvement of its commercial position[3]. In the middle of the 17th century, the Ottomans and the French signed an agreement that brought a minor three per cent customs duty to all goods imported from France[4]. In the same period, commodities produced in Ottoman lands were subject to higher tax rates. Shortly after this convention French goods invaded Ottoman bazaars. Their number increased in the second half of the 18th century. The Baroque-Rococo decorations on objects imported from France were highly significant in the creation of a new decorative style in Turkey[5]. A class of military men with higher incomes, as well as the members of the ruling class in Istanbul, were the chief consumers of the imported merchandise[6]. Meanwhile, the houses of ordinary people remained unadorned, preserving a traditional simplicity. D'Ohsson relates this to the lack of knowledge of living in foreign countries[7]. Since travelling was unsafe and risky, only merchants and official envoys could venture it[8].

European commercial ascendancy in the Middle East brought about political and social change. Western governments started to back their respective companies in order to maintain economic dependencies in the Ottoman lands. As political power was dependent on economic power, the delegates of trade companies acquired a great deal of influence and indeed became the official representatives of their countries. The *Bâbıâli* (Sublime Porte) acknowledged their new status and started to discuss diplomatic, political, commercial and even religious issues with them[9]. Thus, the Ottoman state entered into an age of lively relationships with the West European capitals and their representatives in the East. In the second quarter of the 18th century, a new political atmosphere changed attitudes towards Western civilisation, which until then had been considered inferior. Agreements with Western governments no longer contained statements stressing the supremacy and glory of the Sultan[10]. As noted by Lewis, the Ottomans became aware of the fact that they were 'no longer the Empire of Islam confronting Christendom but one state among several, among whom there might be allies

as well as enemies'[11]. The waning hostility of the Westerners towards the Turks and a new Turkish approach to the Europeans opened avenues for dialogue. The accounts of French travellers contributed much to this development[12].

From the 1660s, prestigious roles opened up for Greeks in the Ottoman Empire, and conversions to Islam probably became less frequent[13]. Greeks and other minority groups resided mainly in coastal towns where intercontinental trade was intense. Traders and financiers from these and Levantine groups had been in a close relationship with Western culture. This was not only because of their commercial ties with Europeans, but also because they could access and read printed material that they had had the right to publish and circulate since the 16th century[14]. While Muslim merchants were concentrating on local trade[15], Christians and Jews profited from intercontinental trade. In the 18th century, the latter accumulated wealth and started to pursue a European lifestyle in the major cities of the Empire. Hence, minority groups emerged as a kind of commercial bourgeoisie. The same century witnessed the appearance of a new class among Muslim subjects of the Sultan in the towns. Beginning in the second half of the 18th century, a new group of officials was trained in a Western style. This led to the Ottoman-Muslim-Turkish bureaucratic-bourgeois formation, with bureaucrats ready to become faithful instruments of administrative reform[16]. Together with non-Muslims, the Muslim ruling class and high officials were influential in the Westernisation of the Empire. On the other hand, the Ottoman elite's increasing western orientation caused a growing alienation of the traditional, conservative groups from the upper classes[17].

In his seminal book, Abou-El-Haj emphasised that there are 'indigenous roots for internal change in Ottoman society'. In the later 16th century, population growth, the flow of American silver and the rise of raw silk and cotton prices, generated an economic crisis. The spread of tax farming and an increase in the power of the tax farmers followed this. At the very end of the 17th century, life-time tax farms, so-called *malikane*, had been given to the local ruling elite. *Malikanes* proved to be a threat to the power of central administration and the state entered into a 'process of decentralisation of power'[18]. In the 18th century, local dynasties were even granted large tracts of land as private property. Foreign trade also contributed to their wealth[19]. Thus, with the decentralisation of the Ottoman Empire, a semi-feudal aristocratic class appeared in the provinces, following the social and economic transformations that took place at the end of the 16th century. These were wealthy and powerful provincial magnates (a kind of semi-feudal aristocracy, *âyan*, *eşraf*, *aga*) who eliminated the *timariots* (fief-holder), their cavalry, traditional land use and taxation system, and became influential agents between the common people and the Sublime Porte[20]. The state depended on them – a 'civilian oligarchy' – for internal security[21]. Hence, the 18th century witnessed the emergence of a new class, which was mainly composed of Muslim high officials, merchants from non-Muslim minority groups, Levantines in the urban centres, and local dynasties in the provinces. Abou-El-Haj connects the diminished number of pious institutions founded by the members of the Sultan's household, and the number of similar foundations augmented by the new members of the ruling elite in the 17th and 18th

centuries, to the loss of the palace's power[22]. The aesthetic preferences and the choices of donors from the emerging new class engaged in the design of a now much more syncretic artistic milieu. This followed the previously-dominant era of classical Ottoman art and architecture, which had been conditioned primarily by the tastes of the uppermost ranks of the Sultan's household.

Cultural interaction

In the 18th century, like almost all European nobilities, the Ottoman ruling class fell under the charm of the French palace. According to Max Beloff, in 18th-century Europe, ceremony and outward show were so essential for monarchy that to create a Versailles was the first step towards acting like its master (for example, Frederick the Great's palace of Sanssouci)[23]. Turkish-French relations strengthened throughout the 18th century, as the French language gained in popularity in intellectual circles. A contemporary Ottoman intellectual, Seyyid Mustafa, says that he dedicated himself to learning French because he thought it more efficient and universal than other languages[24]. Of course, French at this time was in any case the vehicle of international interaction, and in many countries it was the mode of expression of polite society. When, in 1774, the Russians and the Turks negotiated the important treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, both sides used French[25], as did the Ottoman state in its diplomatic correspondence with the West. From the 15th to the early 20th century, among the Western words in the Ottoman-Turkish language (6,930), words of French origin predominated (71 per cent)[26]. The first Western experts who were invited to reform the Ottoman military were of French origin. These included De Bonneval (1675-1747) who established *Hendesehane* (a school of geometry) (1734) and trained Humbaracı (*bombardier*) corps (1734). Under Mustafa III, books on astronomy were ordered from the French Academy in Paris[27]. During Louis XVI's reign, the French ambassador to Istanbul, the comte de Vergennes, became minister of international relations, and France supported the Ottoman Empire against Austrian and Russian expansion. France contributed to military reforms through De Vergennes' secretary, Baron de Tott (1734-35), who established a new rapid-fire artillery corps, supervised the rehabilitation efforts of the Ottoman Navy, and founded a naval mathematics school (1773) and an engineering school (1776). In 1784, the comte de Choiseul-Gouffier, a member of the French Academy, came to Istanbul as the French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. Choiseul-Gouffier brought a team of 30 military instructors and two artists to contribute to the modernisation of the Ottoman army and navy. French teachers taught students in the new military engineering school (opened in 1783) in the same way that J. Lafitte-Clavé, Monnier and Brune taught at the navigation school. From the middle of the 16th century, the French embassy in Istanbul provided a setting from which European perceptions of the Ottoman Empire were to some extent fashioned. Diplomats, travellers, artists, designers and writers found a safe haven under its roof, especially in the 18th century. They published their works mostly in Paris and shaped the image of the Turk in Europe. Books written in French on the Ottoman Empire were more numerous than those written on America

and Russia[28]. On the other hand, the 18th century was also a time when France's eastern policy had a Janus face. Voltaire, for instance, was turning the French public against the Ottomans and the comte de Choiseul-Gouffier, and in the introduction of his travel account on Greece, advocated the liberation of Greece from Turkish dominion[29]. At the end of the century, public mistrust originating from this western policy governed reactions on the part of Muslim subjects to the reforms introduced by the Ottoman elite.

At the end of the century, the sisters of Selim III were sympathetic to western ideas. Hatice Sultan hired an architect from Karlsruhe, Antoine Ignace Melling, who built a palace for her private use. Sultan Selim III ordered the calendars to be organised according to Cassini's Astronomical Tables. Mahmoud Râif Efendi wrote a book in French on the reforms introduced by the Sultan (*Tableau des noveaux réglements de l'Empire Ottoman*, 1797). He presents the new Ottoman system (*Nizam-i cedid*) to the West as a new civilisation. On 3 November 1839 an imperial script, read by Reşid Pasha at Gülhane, initiated the era of reform called Tanzimat, which was an end product of the 17th and 18th century transformations. It was in the Tanzimat period that Western institutional forms and administrative laws began to be adopted openly.

The viewpoint of the envoys

Marquis de Bonnac, the ambassador of France to Istanbul (1716-1724), was one of the closest European friends of Sadrazam Damat Ibrahim Pasha, prime minister of Ahmed III[30]. He was asked to bring the plans of French palaces and gardens to Istanbul for the construction of the Sadabad Palace complex[31]. This friendship bore fruit and Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmet Efendi was sent to Paris as an envoy on 7 October 1720. Marquis de Bonnac arranged the itinerary and provided a galleon for the voyage of Çelebi, who had been given the mission of restoring French-Ottoman relations after a period of dissonance during the reign of Louis XIV. He landed at Toulon and went to Paris via Toulouse, Bordeaux and Orléans. He was warmly greeted by Louis XV who accompanied him in a hunting party. Çelebi stayed in France for nine months. He was given the task of signing a pact with the French king. However, from the beginning, Çelebi also intended to collect detailed information about French civil and courtly life[32]. This approach signals the beginning of a new era in which Ottoman intellectuals started to probe Western culture.

In Paris, Çelebi visited palaces, gardens, plants, a medical school, a botanical garden (le Jardin du Roi), the zoo and a printing house. He twice visited the famous Paris observatory and went to an opera performance[33]. During his observatory visits, Çelebi discussed astronomical matters with Cassini, the director of the obervatory, and examined the modern instruments. He received a written report from Cassini and communicated this report to Ottoman astronomers[34]. The visits of Çelebi in Paris made a great impression on the Parisian nobles. He helped dispel the legendary suspicion of the 'cruel Turk' and stimulated a fashionable interest in *turquerie*[35]. On his return home after almost a year, Çelebi brought back gifts for the Sultan that included wigs, commodes and bot-

tles of champagne. As was reported by the ambassador of Venice, Emo, he also brought pictures and plans of French palaces and gardens[36]. Çelebi also presented an embassy letter (*sefaret takriri*) in the form of a travel account to Sultan Ahmed III and Sadrazam Nevsehirli Damat Ibrahim Pasha[37].

Çelebi, for the first time in the genre of Ottoman embassy reports, gives a detailed description of the daily life of the French nobles, their palaces, gardens and the ceremonies that took place there. Shortly before him, İbrahim Pasha had been sent to Vienna in 1719. In the embassy letter (*Sefaretnâme*) written by a member of Pasha's entourage, the social and cultural life of the villages, towns and fortresses they visited was only superficially described with a few words like "prosperous, has stores, abandoned"[38]. On the other hand, Çelebi describes Saint-Cloud, Meudon, Versailles, Trianon and Marly palaces, emphasising certain characteristics of the architectural complexes he had visited. His comments concern the systematic organisation and grandeur of the gardens, the specific role played by water, the type of royal architecture created for ceremonial settings and mere entertainment, and the splendour of the buildings and furniture. Çelebi remarked especially upon the cultivation of nature in architectural settings which were specifically created for aesthetic enjoyment and royal ceremonies[39]. However, Çelebi's conceptual tools and terminology were not adequate to give every detail of the urban milieux, palaces and gardens that he visited in France. Said Efendi, the son of Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed Efendi, accompanied his father during the travels. When he returned home, he encouraged İbrahim Müteferrika (d. 1745) to open a printing house. In 1726, with the permission of Sultan Ahmed III, Muteferrika established the first printing house and started to print a series of books in Ottoman Turkish that included historical and geographical treatises, a monograph on governmental issues, a study on magnetism, chronological tables of the Ottoman sultans, an Arabic-Ottoman dictionary and a French-Ottoman grammar book[40]. In his writings, Muteferrika advises learning from Western civilisation and military order to regain success[41]. Twenty years later, in 1742, Mehmed Çelebi's son, Said Pasha, made a second visit. Said Pasha's visit engendered a new wave of *turquerie* in France. Shorty after this visit, the parade organised in 1748 by the students of the French Academy in Rome, was named *La Caravane du Sultan à la Mecque*[42].

Although French customs and traditions occupy a minor place in the *Travels*, Çelebi Mehmed Efendi's text was the first and only reliable source written on contemporary life in Western Europe[43]. Before Mehmed Efendi, traveller and romancer Evliya Çelebi (1611-1682?), had written a *Seyahatnâme* (book of travels) that included chapters dedicated to some European countries. However, Evliya never attempted to authenticate his sources of information. In 1655, the Ottoman geographer and polymath, Kâtip Celebi, wrote a book on the history of the Greeks, the Romans and the Christians. However, he relied on *Atlas Minor* and other Western sources and gives very limited historical and geographical information. The other two notable historians, Hüseyin Hezarfen (d. 1691) and Münejjimbaşı (d. 1702), like Kâtip Çelebi, based their knowledge of Europe on the same sources[44]. Mehmed Efendi can therefore be regarded as the

first modern Ottoman envoy and traveller who related his knowledge on Europe from personal experience, and demonstrated control over the biases and stereotypes which limited his predecessors.

German lands such as Austria and Prussia also aroused the interest of Ottoman administrative circles. Following the death of Osman III, Ahmed Resmi Efendi was sent to Vienna in 1757-58 to announce the coronation of Mustafa III. Ahmed Resmi Efendi wrote an embassy letter on his mission to Vienna. This letter includes information on political factions in the Habsburg Empire, Maria Theresa, Frederick the Great and the city of Vienna. Later, Ahmed Resmi Efendi wrote another embassy letter during his ambassadorship in Berlin (1763-64). This report, which fastidiously gives details of the towns visited and Frederick's policies, was widely read among the upper segments of the Ottoman governing class. Virginia Aksan has studied Resmi Efendi's encounter with West-European culture. According to Aksan, Resmi Efendi's impartial observations, and occasional admiration regarding the customs of the infidels, characterises his narrative. This distinguishes the style of the report from its precursors which include insulting and despising reflections on European culture. At the end of the century, Ottoman statesmen were advising imitation of the victorious infidels in order to secure the stability of the state. However, Ahmed Resmi was still sarcastic about European society, traditions and customs[45].

In the era of Selim III (1789-1807), Ebu Bekir Ratib (1749-1799) was sent to Vienna in 1791 as an envoy of the Sultan. He brought back a detailed report not only on military and administrative establishments but also on technology and social advances, which noticeably expresses this new trend[46]. He had a clear vision to observe Austrian institutions and to collect information on them. Ratib Efendi gives a detailed account of the military institutions, political, social, economic and cultural aspects of the Habsburg Empire in his five-hundred-page ambassadorial report (*Layiha*). The first chapter of the book is dedicated to the Austrian military system. It is so detailed that it even provides tables of officers' wages. The second chapter includes administrative, fiscal, economic and social institutions in Austria. He not only systematically gives detailed information on institutions, but also interprets the philosophy behind European civilisation and institutions[47]. In this book, Ratib Efendi criticises the Ottoman system and praises Europe in sections on military technology, the military status of the king, taxation policy, proper customs duties, consumption habits, protectionist policies aimed at domestic industry, the power and fame enjoyed by the nobility, the material well-being of the people, employment, the idea of citizenship, art and trades, agricultural conditions, and liberty in the areas of speech, diet, drink, dress and belief[48]. According to Fatih Bayram, Ratib Afendi showed an admiration for Western customs, but was proud of his own identity. He did not question the truth of the Ottoman world-view, but criticised the prevailing practices and corruption in the Ottoman state. Ratib Efendi held that Europe's material standards were high but its moral aspects were poor[49]. On the whole, Ratib Efendi held a positive image of the West. In his critics of secularism and freedom of women, he was not a captive of bigotry. He regarded these latter as a way of

life and praised the freedom of citizens in general[50]. In his letter (*nâme-i hümayûn*) to Leopold II, Ratib Efendi depicts Austria as a land of merits (*vasıf ve haslet*) and marvels (*harikulade*)[51].

All envoys sent to Europe in the 18th century emphasised the superiority of the Ottoman Empire, either overtly or by implication. Ottoman diplomats in this age still regarded themselves as representatives of a world power. A traditional Ottoman viewpoint dominates observations made by the envoys. According to them, if the Ottomans applied the military methods used in Europe, it would again become the most powerful state. Arrogance and some distaste for the West continued to prevail, but scientific and technological developments dazzled their eyes. However, the high esteem felt by envoys of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century is not to be found in their reports[52]. According to Hasan Korkut, the envoys shared a holistic approach to the Other (Europe). They were mainly interested in the differences, and not in the scientific inventions and ideologies of Europe. According to them, the Ottoman Empire with its traditional moral system, cultural accumulation, statecraft and resources was still self-sufficient, great and unique and only needed a series of reforms. They focused mainly on moral standards, but not on religious life. Women's different status from men and the non-separation between the harem and the man's section of the house were concerns of all the envoys. This, and other striking contrasts with Ottoman habits, plus the culture of eating and drinking and of entertainment, were especially emphasised. However, the tone of the observations on social life could and did alter in accordance with the state of political affairs between the visited country and the sublime Porte. Art and architecture and the urban characteristics of European cities were points of intense concern for the envoys. They admired the order but were bewildered by their pomp and organisation[53]. Even in a century when the power of the Empire was severely eroded, educated members of the Ottoman administration asserted the superiority of their cultural background and, at the end of the century, recommended reforms so as to remedy corrosion in the administration. Again, they mainly emphasised cultural differences rather than similarities, partly because of their own amazement, and partly because they felt themselves to belong to an entirely different cultural realm. On the other hand, the curiosity and interest in Europe that they felt – an aspect of 18th century culture – is evident in the detailed accounts they gave of daily life, the customs, and the towns and cities of the countries they visited.

Novelties in art and architecture

The appearance of the first Baroque-Rococo decorative elements coincided with the dissemination of new ideas in the decade when Çelebi was sent to France as an envoy. The Ottoman palace pioneered the circulation of the Rococo style by ordering innovative decorations for architectural works like fountains and *sebils*. They were acclaimed by Sultan Ahmed III, his vizier and their entourage. It was a period of tulips, symbols of luxury and prestige[54]. The Great-Vizir Damat İbrahim Pasha organised tulip festi-

vals (Lale Çırağanı, illumination of tulips) for Sultan Ahmed III at his waterside villa (Çırağan Yalısı) on the Bosphorus. Gardens were decorated with crystal lamps which were illuminated tulips arranged in the form of pyramids, towers and arches[55]. Minorities, Levantines and provincial Muslim magnates were vigorous in the dissemination of Rococo, which invaded their houses and mansions from the middle of the century onwards. These residential units in Istanbul and provincial towns and villages reflected the modified living habits and material culture of the elite. It is significant that Western-style mural paintings according to the rules of perspective first appeared in these 18th-century houses[56].

According to Tülay Artan, at the same time the role of the Sultan was transformed, and his vigorous image as a war leader on horseback faded. As a result, his authority and strength was pronounced by the erection of new waterside palaces and ceremonies attached to their use. They provided the Sultan with a screen of magnificence[57]. The banks of the Bosphorus and Golden Horn never saw such a proliferation of royal châteaux. A similar development had taken place earlier in Europe, when the development of the city-palace and villa meant a loss of importance for the feudal seat, the castle, and the need for a substitute within the city[58]. The shift of the royal centre from Topkapı to the city followed a similar socio-political change in the Ottoman Empire. This challenge to the authority of the Sultan in the provinces was probably one of the motives that led to an announcement of might and grandeur in the capital. Seashore palaces served this purpose[59].

Rococo was associated with femininity and private life in Paris. This was not surprising when the shared nature of private life in Eastern houses and new French domestic spaces is taken into consideration. Rococo ornamentation spread in the Ottoman realm, in the halls and *boudoir*-like private rooms functioning as bedrooms and guestrooms in the Topkapı Palace Harem, and mansions (*yalı* and *kiosk*) of the elite. The Ottoman harem adopted French Rococo, perhaps because of the underlying commonality in the creation of a feminine style in the West. Ottoman princesses (*sultanefendi*) liked Rococo probably for the reason that it was more domestic and feminine, and therefore closer to the spirit of their life, than the Baroque of the preceding century, which did not find the slightest echo in Ottoman interiors. However in the 18th century, we may talk about an 'Ottoman Occidentalist mode' in art and architecture[60]. It is well-documented that in the second half of the 18th century, *sultanefendi* built Rococo-decorated seaside mansions in Istanbul for their own use[61]. In a similar way to the reallocation of châteaux in France, princesses moved from the ancient inner city, Topkapı Palace, to seaside mansions on the shores of the Bosphorus and Golden Horn. Tülay Artan points out that in the 18th century, moments of privacy from the life of the thriving rich and elites were for the first time expressed in miniatures and 'representation of the private realm' became possible; hence, intimate (*mahrem*) prevailed over formal and 'public' (*kamu*) was given emphasis as an autonomous realm[62]. Redefinition of the 'private realm' in the Ottoman capital facilitated new aesthetic appeals, which led to artistic renovations. Ottoman Rococo was one of these trends introduced by the upper middle classes, but historicism still reigned among the learned (*ulema*) and bureaucrats[63].

When we compare these houses with Parisian *hôtels*, we might say that both were expressions of the thriving bourgeoisie in their own domains. While Rococo invaded interiors, classical orders still governed the design principles of royal and public buildings in France and the Ottoman lands alike. There was nothing new that we might call Rococo applied in the planning of the town houses which still followed the academic canons formed by Jules-Hardouin Mansard (1646-1708) and Louis le Vau (1612-1670)[64]. Rococo was basically a style of ornamentation. In Ottoman architecture it also remained as a decorative elaboration, and proposed no change in the design and planning standards of the Classical Age, shaped by Sinan, architect of Süleyman the Magnificent. Rather than being the result of attempted Westernisation, Rococo decoration reveals the openness of the Ottoman ruling class to the West[65]. Western European art now reached the Ottoman ruling class through increased trade relations facilitated by a stronger bourgeois class.

Ottoman exoticism

The exotic basically denotes the non-European. As Barnard Smith puts it, "[exoticism] was a category of accommodation by means of which the European perceived and interpreted the Other"[66]. Christa Knellwolf writes similarly that the "exotic describes fantasies as well as historical responses to otherness"[67]. The exotic object is signified in a historical perspective, derived from geography and cultures outside of the Greco-Roman and Christian worlds. This use appeared in the 18th century, when medieval cosmography was still conditioning approaches to the outsider. Western perception was conditioned by imaginative pictorial representations of the other continents and vice versa. This created a distance between the exotic object and the Western subject. We know that the Ottomans were equated with Muslims in the 18th century and considered as iconic of the Other. On the other side of the divide, as evidenced through the writings of the envoys sent to Europe by the Sultans, the Ottomans also placed a distance between themselves and non-Muslims. For them, Christian and Jewish subjects, Levantines and Europeans were dissimilar, hence the Other. Until the 17th century, the theme of Ottoman superiority was central to literature on Europe. As Bernard Lewis has demonstrated, the first Ottoman writer who broke away from the traditional pattern of uninformed contempt was Evliya Çelebi. Çelebi does not overtly state points of difference or superiority of the West: he implies them. Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed Efendi likewise makes implicit comparisons[68]. While visiting the gardens of Marly, Mehmed Efendi makes a witty remark and recites a saying that 'the world is the prison of the Muslims, heaven of the infidels'[69]. In this sentence, there is a sharp distinction made between the Muslim 'we' and the infidel 'Other'. Çelebi implies his compassion for the 'poor' Muslims who suffer, while the Others find pleasure in the world.

The reforms of Mahmut II and Tanzimat followed the now institutionalised 'imitation paradigm' at the beginning of the 19th century. The 18th century is then a critical stage in the transformation of the Ottoman intellectual from unconcerned to susceptible.

However, this was a lengthy process, and the outlook of the average Muslim did not alter greatly until the end of the 19th century. For him, Europe was still an exotic land.

Notes

1. C. Pick (ed.), *Embassy to Constantinople:The Travels of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu*, D. Murphy intro., London 1988, p. 199.

2. A. Evin, *1600-1700 Arası Batılılar'in Türkiye'yi Görüşlerinde Olan Değişim*, in O. Okyar - H.Ü. Nalbantoğlu (eds.), *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri, Metinler/Tartışmalar (8-10 Haziran, 1973)*, Proceedings of a Seminar on the Economic History of Turkey, Texts/Discussions [June, 8-10, 1973], Ankara 1975, p. 173.

3. R. Hatton, *Europe in the Age of Louis XIV*, London 1969, p. 98; İ. Ortaylı, *The Problem of Nationalities in the Ottoman Empire Following the Second Siege of Vienna*, in G. Heissund - G. Klingenstein (eds.), *Das Osmanische Reich und Europa 1683 bis 1789: Konflikt, Entspannung und Austausch*, Vienna 1983, p. 230.

4. R. Mantran, *XVII. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında İstanbul: Kurumsal, İktisadi, Toplumsal Tarih Denemesi*, vol. 2, translated by M.A. Kılıçbay - E. Özcan, Ankara 1986, p. 172 [org. *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié du XVIIe siècle*, Paris 1962].

5. A. Arel, *Onsekizinci Yüzyıl İstanbul Mimarisinde Batılılaşma Süreci*, Istanbul 1975, p. 10.

6. M. Genç, *18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Sanayii*, "Toplum ve Ekonomi", 2, 1991, pp. 107-108.

7. I.M. D'Ohsson, *18. Yüzyıl Türkiyesinde Örf ve Adetler*, Z. Yüksel trans., Istanbul, p. 115 [org. I.M. D'Ohsson*, Tableau général de l'Empire Othoman*, Paris 1787].

8. D'Ohsson, *18. Yüzyıl* cit., p. 152.

9. Mantran, *XVII. Yüzyılın* cit., p. 219.

10. İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 4/1, Ankara 1988, p. 250.

11. B. Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe*, New York-London 1982, p. 45.

12. Evin, *1600-1700 Arası* cit., pp. 173, 181.

13. W.H. McNeill, *Hypothesis Concerning Possible Ethnic Role Changes in the Ottoman Empire in the Seventeenth Century*, in *Social and Economic History of Turkey (1071-1920)*, Papers Presented to the First International Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey [July 11-13, 1977], Ankara 1980, p. 129.

14. Muslim subjects were denied this privilege until the middle of the 18th century.

15. D'Ohsson, *18. Yüzyıl* cit., p. 135.

16. F.M. Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*, New York-Oxford 1996, pp. 96, 138; H. İnalcık, *Political Modernization in Turkey*, in *From Empire to Republic: Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History*, Istanbul 1995, p. 134.

17. H. İnalcık, *Some Remarks on the Ottoman Turkey's Modernization Process*, in E. İhsanoğlu (ed.), *Transfer of Modern Science and Technology to the Muslim World*, Istanbul 1992, p. 51.

18. R.A. Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, New York 1991, p. 12, pp. 53-54.

19. Abou-El-Haj, *Formation* cit., pp. 64-65.

20. Halil İnalcık, *Political* cit., p. 125.

21. Abou-El-Haj, *Formation* cit., pp. 17, 41; For this social change and emergence of the new groups see Göçek's work (above) and B. McGowan, *The Age of the Ayans, 1699-1812*, in H. İnalcık - D. Quataert (ed.), *Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1914*, Cambridge 1994, pp. 639-757;

H. İnalcık, *Osmanlı Toplumsal Yapısının Evrimi*, "Türkiye Günlüğü", 11, 1990, pp. 30-41; H. İnalcık, *Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration*, in T. Naff - R. Owen (ed.), *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, Carbondale-Edwardsville 1977, pp. 27-52; Y. Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ayanlık*, Ankara 1977; K. Karpat, *The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908*, "International Journal of Middle East Studies", 3, 1972, pp. 243-81.

22 Abou-El-Haj, *Formation* cit., p. 58.

23 M. Beloff, *The Age of Absolutism 1660-1815*, New York 1962, p. 47.

24 S. Mustafa, *Diatribe de l'ingéniuer sur l'état actuel de l'art militaire, du génie et des sciences à Constantinople*, Scutari 1803 [2. (ed.), Paris, 1910], p. 17 quoted by Arel, *Onsekizinci* cit, 1975, p. 85.

25 Beloff, *The Age* cit., p. 47.

26 Göçek, *Rise* cit., p. 121.

27 E. İhsanoğlu, *Tanzimat Öncesi ve Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Bilim ve Eğitim Anlayışı*, in *150. Yılında Tanzimat*, Ankara 1992, p. 348; Recent studies have demonstrated that 18th-century Ottoman science was in a stage of transformation like social-political life. For the contributions of Ali Münşi's (d. 1733) *Bidaatü'l-Mübtedi* (1731) to the field of iatrochemistry (medical science based on chemistry) see A. Koç-Aydın, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki Bilimsel Faaliyetler Işığında Kimya Çalışmalarının Değerlendirilmesi*, unpublished Ph D. Dissertation, Ankara 2002.

28 P. Mansel, *Tableau Générale de L'Empire Othoman as Symbol of the Franco-Ottoman, Franco-Swedish and Swedish-Ottoman Alliances*, in S. Theolin et. al. (eds.), *The Torch of the Empire: Ignatius Mouradgea d'Ohsson and the Tableau Général of the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century*, Istanbul 2002, pp. 78-79; For Ottoman-France relations also see C.D. Rouillard, *The Turk in French History, Thought, and Literature (1520-1660)*, Paris 1940.

29 M. Le Comte de Choiseul-Gouffier, *Voyage Pittoresque dans l'Empire Ottoman, en Grèce, dans la Troade, les Iles de l'Archipel et sur les Côtes de l'Asie-Mineuer*, Paris 1842.

30 F.R. Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Seyahatnameleri*, Ankara 1987, p. 54.

31 S. Eyice, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Türk Sanatı ve Türk Mimarisinde Avrupa Neo-Klasik Üslûbu*, "Sanat Tarihi Yıllığı" [Art History Yearbook], 9-10, 1981, p. 168 [org. *L'architettura Turca del secolo XVIII e lo stile Neoclassico nell'arte Turca*, in *Celebrazioni Vanvitelliane MCMLXXIII - Luigi Vanvitelli e il '700 in Europa*, Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Studi, Naples - Caserta, 5-10 Novembre 1973, Naples 1979, 2, pp. 421-432].

32 G. Veinstein, *İlk Osmanlı Sefiri 28 Mehmet Çelebi'nin Fransa Anıları: 'Kafirlerin Cenneti'*, translated by M.A. Erginöz, Istanbul 2002, p. 26 [Or. Mehmed efendi, Le paradis des infidèles: Un ambassadeur ottoman en France sous la Régence, Paris 1981].

33 Unat, *Osmanlı* cit., p. 56.

34 E. İhsanoğlu, *Introduction of Western Science to the Ottoman World: A Case Study of Modern Astronomy (1660-1860)*, in E. İhsanoğlu (ed.), *Transfer of Modern Science and Technology to the Muslim World*, Istanbul 1992, p. 107.

35 A. Palmer, *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire*, New York 1992, p. 34.

36 M. Aktepe, *Patrona İsyanı (1730)*, Istanbul 1958, p. 50.

37 Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi, *Fransa Seyahatnamesi*, edited and tranlated by Ş. Rado, Istanbul 1970, pp. 5-6; This text was translated from Turkish into French and published in France in the eighteenth century as *Relation de l'Ambassader de Mehmed Efendi a la Cour de France en 1721 ecrite par lui meme et traduite du turc*, Paris 1757.

38 H. Korkut, *Osmanlı Elçileri Gözüyle Avrupa (1719-1807)*, unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Marmara University, Istanbul 2003, p. 19.

39 Arel, *Onsekizinci* cit., p. 25.

[40] G. Toderini, *İbrahim Müteferrika Matbaası ve Türk Matbaacılığı*, translated by Rikkat Kunt, edited by Şevket Rado, Istanbul 1990, pp. 25 ff. [org. L'Abbé Toderini, *De la litterature des Turcs*, l'Abbé de Gournand (trans.), Paris 1789].

[41] Veinstein, *Fransa* cit., p. 202.

[42] A. Boppe, *Boğaziçi Ressamları*, translated by Nevin Yücel-Celbiş, Istanbul 1988, pp. 96-97 [org. *Les Peintres du Bosphore au dix-huitieme siècle*, Paris 1911].

[43] Çelebi was much more interested in scientific, technological and artistic inventions. As Marquis de Bonnac, ambassador of France in Istanbul, remarked, Çelebi's boldness in praising the beauties of France and splendours of the French Palace in an embassy letter which could have been read by Sultan himself, was regarded as exceptional and astonishing by the Turks (Veinstein, *Fransa* cit., pp. 40-41, 197). For a comprehensive study of Çelebi's observations see F.M. Göçek, *East Encounters West: France and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century*, Oxford 1987.

[44] Lewis, *The Muslim* cit., pp. 112-113, 135-136, 158.

[45] V. Aksan, *Ahmed Resmi Efendi (1700-1783)*, translated by Ö. Arıkan, Istanbul 1997, pp. 66, 100-101, 201 [org. *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi (1700-1783)*, Leiden 1995].

[46] Lewis, *The Muslim* cit., p. 117.

[47] Korkut, *Osmanlı* cit., pp. 32-33.

[48] F. Bayram, *Abubekir Ratib Efendi as an Ottoman Envoy of Knowledge Between East and West*, unpublished M.A.D. Thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara, pp. 22, 74.

[49] Bayram, *Abubekir* cit., p. 108.

[50] C. Bilim, *Ebubekir Ratib Efendi Nemçe Sefaretnamesi*, "Belleten", 54/209, 1990, pp. 275, 293.

[51] H. Tuncer, *Osmanlı Elçisi Ebubekir Ratib Efendi'nin Viyana Mektupları (1792)*, "Belleten", 48/169-172, 1979, p. 80.

[52] Korkut, *Osmanlı* cit., pp. 64, 152-153.

[53] Korkut, *Osmanlı* cit., pp. 153 ff. Envoys were meticulous in their descriptions; for Ratib Efendi's accurate description of a ball in his smaller sized embassy letter (*Sefaretnâme*) see A. Uçman (ed.) *Ebûbekir Râtib Efendi'nin Nemçe Sefâretnâmesi*, Istanbul 1999, p. 19.

[54] For this age see A. Refik, *Lale Devri* [*Tulip Period*], Istanbul 1997.

[55] Aktepe, *Patrona* cit., pp. 60 ff.; F. Yenişehirlioğlu, *Western Influences on Ottoman Architecture in the 18th Century*, in G. Heiss - G. Klingenstein (eds.), *Das Osmanische Reich und Europa 1683 bis 1789: Konflikt, Entspannung und Austausch*, Vienna 1983, p. 165.

[56] For such innovations in 18th-century painting see G. Renda, *Batılılaşma Döneminde Türk Resim Sanatı 1700-1850*, Ankara 1977.

[57] T. Artan, *Boğaziçi'nin Çehresini Değiştiren Soylu Kadınlar ve Sultanefendi Sarayları*, "Istanbul", 3, 1992, p. 112.

[58] C. Norberg-Schulz, *Baroque Architecture*, London 1986, p.16.

[59] A.U. Peker, *Western Influences on the Ottoman Empire and Occidentalism in the Architecture of Istanbul*, "Eighteenth Century Life", 26:3, 2002, p. 148.

[60] Peker, *Western* cit., p. 157.

[61] Artan, *Boğaziçi'nin* cit., pp. 110-111. Rococo designs applied in the rooms of these palaces can be seen in the engravings of artist-architect A.I. Melling, who was entertained in Hatice Sultan's palace, and himself designed buildings and interiors for Sultan Selim III's family. For the drawings of these palaces and their interiors see Meeling's album: MM. Treuttel - Würtz (eds.), *Voyage pittoresque de Constantinople et des rives du Bosphore, d'après les dessins de M. Melling, architect de l'Empereur Selim III, et dessinateur de la Sultane Hadidgé sa soeur*, Paris 1819; for the life and deeds of Melling in Turkey see C.

Boschma - J. Perot (eds.), *Antoine-Ignace Melling (1763-1831), artiste-voyageur*, Paris 1991.

[62]   T. Artan, *Mahremiyet: Mahrumiyetin Resmi*, "Defter", 20, 1993, pp. 107, 109, 111.

[63]   According to Evin, "[...] until the Young Ottomans, the modernising bureaucrat remained loyal to Near Eastern ideals of government" (A. Evin, *The Tulip Age and Definitions of Westernization*, in *Social and Economic History of Turkey (1071-1920)*, Papers Presented to the First International Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey, Ankara: Hacettepe University, July 11-13, 1977, Ankara 1980, p. 132. For the historicist trends in Ottoman architecture see M. M. Cerasi, *Historicism and Inventive Innovation in Ottoman Architecture 1720-1820*, in VII Centuries of Ottoman Architecture, A Supra-National Heritage, Istanbul 1999, pp. 34-42.

[64]   A. Blunt (ed.), *Baroque and Rococo: Architecture and Decoration*, New York 1978, pp. 135, 141.

[65]   As Ahmet Evin states, 'wide-ranging social implications of the term 'Westernization', are inapplicable to Turkish society at large in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries' (Evin, *The Tulip* cit., p. 133); S. Hamadeh recently questioned the 'Westernization' paradigm in the studies on 18th-century art and architecture in *Ottoman Expressions of Early Modernity and the 'Inevitable' Question of Westernization*, "Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians", 63/1, March 2004, pp. 32-51.

[66]   B. Smith, *Imagining the Pacific: In the Wake of the Cook Voyages*, Melbourne 1992, p. 10 quoted by C. Knellwolf, *The Exotic Frontier of the Imperial Imagination*, "Eighteenth Century Life", 26:3, 2002, p. 10.

[67]   Knellwolf, *The Exotic* cit., p. 11.

[68]   Lewis, *The Muslim* cit., pp. 113-115; Göçek, *East* cit., p. 26.

[69]   Çelebi, *Fransa* cit., p. 64.

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Hungarian Travellers' and Emigrants' Images of Turkey from the 16th to the 19th Century

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Abstract

Using the memoirs of Hungarian travellers, emigrants and official deputies from the 16th to the 19th century, in this contribution I investigate the survival and the transformation of stereotypes of 'the Turks'. I trace the common elements and differences in the assessment of Christian and Muslim populations constituting the Ottoman Empire. I intend to focus on the opinion of Hungarian travellers regarding the decline of the Empire and the modernisation of Turkey, as well as everyday life. An attempt is also made to identify the different layers of inherited, original, persisting or disappearing features in widespread stereotypes. A comparison is made between the Roman image of Carthage and the Hungarian image of Turkey.

A tanulmány a magyar utazók és emigránsok törökökröl alkotott véleményének átalakulását mutatja be a 16. és 19. század között, melynek során a negatív ellenségkép részben politikai célok miatt is pozitív irányba tolódott. A kiválasztott források közül három hivatalos követjárás beszámolója a 16. századból, a későbbi korokból pedig a Rákóczi-, illetve a Kossuth- féle szabadságharc emigránsainak írásaira támaszkodtunk. Ezen dokumentumok egyszerre alkalmasak a sztereotípiák és nemzeti sajátosságok élettartamának és értelmezéseik idöbeli módosulásának követésére, valamint a kortárs dokumentumokban megjelenö jellegzetességek olykor ellentétes értelmezésének vizsgálatára. Az általunk választott források között pozitív és negatív kicsengésü egyaránt akad, mindazonáltal e müvek többsége nem járult hozzá a tömegkommunikációs offenzívához, melynek során a törökökröl alkotott vélemény pozitív irányba tolódott el; magánszemélyek véleményének foghatók fel, melyek nem a közvélemény befolyásolására születtek. Figyelembe véve az 1849-es emigránsok érzelmi állapotát, hangulatát, objektívnek nem lehet tekinteni öket, de célunk éppen a felfokozott érzelmi állapot által kiváltott benyomások, felerösített sztereotípiák nyomon követése volt. Mivel ugyanazt a jellemvonást a szerzök gyakran ellentétes módon értelmezték, vagy egy tulajdonság és ellentétpárja éppúgy elöfordult, ezeket irrelevánsnak vettük és a jellemvonások mindenkinél elöforduló közös halmazát vettük alapul. Kísérletet tettünk továbbá a punokra vonatkozó, római és görög auctoroktól örökölt és a "keleti rassztól" függetlenül létezö vagy újonnan kialakult sztereotípiák azonosítára és elkülönítésére, így a Török Birodalomra vonatkozó elöítéletek eredetének meghatározására.

In this contribution I seek to demonstrate the transformation of opinions and attitudes of Hungarians towards the inhabitants of the Turkish Empire between the 16th and 19th centuries. In so doing, I aim to trace the origins, persistence, adaptation and the reasons for such stereotypical attitudes, as well the role of attitudes that were not in keeping with these stereotypes. I have chosen to focus mainly on the first half of the 19th century when the number of works describing the Turkish Empire increased, making this period unique due to the growing diversity of opinion, whereas earlier the same stereotypes were repeated. The influence of the chosen publications on public opinion was not considerable. They reflect personal impressions influenced by the political situation, pre-existing prejudices and generalizations; thus their objectivity is at least questionable. Since my aim is to analyse the stereotypes, this kind of material seemed to be adequate, therefore have I omitted works describing Turkey generally based on secondary sources, works of scientific interest, or travel accounts from the second half of the 19th century[1].

The hostile attitudes towards the Turks developed in the 15th and 16th centuries turned into a positive attitude in the second half of the 19th century. The negative image and stereotypes that spread across Europe as well were partly due to the clash between the Turkish Empire and Hungary, and partly due to different cultural heritages. A thorough explanation of this phenomenon, as well as a rejection of the unjust stereotypes, is to be found only in the travel account of the exiled ex-prime minister and ex-minister of the interior, Bertalan Szemere.

The growth of more positive opinions was partly caused by the intensifying conflict between Turkey and Russia, which fuelled the pan-Slavonic aspirations of the southern Slavs subjected to Turkish rule. The activity of Russia and the political awakening of the Slavs also endangered the stability and plans of Austria-Hungary. Another reason for the development of a positive attitude was that the Turks supported the anti-Habsburg efforts of the Hungarians, and therefore Turkey became a target country for Hungarian emigrants hoping to exact revenge in a probable Austrian-Turkish war. The two greatest waves of emigration took place in 1711 and in 1849 after the decline of the wars of independence led by prince Ferenc Rákóczi and later by Lajos Kossuth. However, as decades passed, the Turks became unable to take effective action and had to abandon their ambitions to regain their former significance. The disillusioned Hungarian emigrants became effective instruments in the game for the survival of Turkey, then forced on the defensive. Therefore, in their memoirs, these emigrants often accused Turkey of impotence, hesitation, indecision, irresolution, obscureness, decadence, and inability to secure their own political interests. Partly in response to these accusations, Szemere wrote his memoirs, which are an apologia indeed.

The formulators of Hungarian foreign policy[2] considered Turkey a natural enemy of the Russians, and one that could act as a dam in the Balkan peninsula while securing the interests of the Monarchy. This concept had a permanent influence on cultural policy and – through the press – on public opinion, culminating in the announcement of a Hungarian-Turkish friendship from the 1850s. However, the positive attitude towards

Turkey was not typical in the period under examination, which is the last period undisturbed by mass communication.

The sources I have chosen to examine vary in both timescale and genre. Of these documents, three were written by official deputies in the 16th century[3]. Hungarian emigrants had longer and deeper relations with the Turkish Empire. Kelemen Mikes, living in exile in Rodosto/Tekirdag wrote his letters between 1717-1760 (first published in 1794). The material concerning Turkey shows no significant changes during these years, indicating both the long life of stereotypes and the uniformity and persistence of Turkish structures as well.

This investigation includes the memoirs of general György Klapka (1820-1892), Bertalan Szemere (1812-1869) ex-Prime Minister, Gábor Egressy (1808-1866) acting government commissioner and general Lázár Mészáros (1796-1858) ex-Minister of War, written between 1849-1853[4]. These memoirs were compared with Count István Széchenyi's (1791-1860) travel account of 1818-1819, who made a journey also to the West, as Szemere did in the 1830s. Széchenyi compared the western and eastern modernisation in order to define Hungary's position between East and West. The contrast between the two regions had a negative influence in assessing Turkey. The comparison of contemporary and earlier conditions is observable mainly in the work of Szemere, the only one of the writers under discussion who, besides describing the land and the people, also tried to understand them.

The emotional state of the emigrants and travellers also influenced their opinions and value judgements. Count Széchenyi started his journey because of the failure of his military career and to alleviate his severe depression. His social status also influenced his behaviour, which manifested itself in his incomprehension, intolerance and pride, sometimes turning into arrogance. Moreover, he did not appreciate the slow eastern way of life. In contrast to Széchenyi's account, Szemere's Turkey at least shows the the will to live: it is a picture of an awakened though not enlightened nation. The ironic Mészáros mainly dealt with the political situation in Turkey and the tensions among the emigrants. The sensitive Egressy, worrying for his family, complains in every situation. Most of the emigrants were desperate, nervous and impatient, which also influenced their impressions of Turkey.

By the time Klapka's and Mészáros's diaries became available the positive change in opinion of the Turks had already taken place. In this process only Szemere's work could be influential (published in 1870). Széchenyi's account was published in German for a small circle (in Hungarian only in 1979), while the diary of Mészáros remained unknown until the present millennium. This was because he was a utopian socialist, which would have been shocking to public opinion. Egressy's work was published in 1851, but he usually spoke negatively about the Turks, thus he could not be said to have contributed to the change in the attitude. His imagery is not a set of prejudices but of stereotypes, as it is not the result of uninformed pre-conceptions but a summary of his experiences[5]. My goal is to demonstrate how these personal experiences promoted stereotypes.

Other subjects of the Empire were at least as incomprehensible for a Hungarian mind as were the Turks, since they were also considered infidels and unreliable due to their orthodoxy. The defeat of the war for independence in 1849 was brought about by Russian intervention, which made the distrust towards the southern Slavs, who had awaited the Tsar as the Messiah, understandable. Considered servant-nations without a sense of identity, their abilities were underestimated even in comparison to those of the Turks. However, while Széchenyi's defeatism saw no hope for the small nations, only three decades later Mészáros and Szemere saw Turkey's survival among the Slavs in Europe as hopeless, and they advised the abandonment of Rumelia, retreat to Asia and the reorganisation of a pure, ethnically Turkish Turkey, which was promoted by the Young Turks. Turks would have to resign from power, since they were no better than others and therefore not entitled to supremacy.

THE NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS — STEREOTYPES

Before analysing the Hungarian image of the Turks, one must also deal with Turkish opinions of and prejudices towards other nations. These were not negligible, since negative opinions about a nation often generate similar feelings from the other side. How a nation judges others is part of its identity, which has two more important components: self-image, the positive image it seeks to present to other nations, and the opinion of other nations, which ruins the illusions while creating others through prejudices, stereotypes, attitudes and deeds at different levels. How did the Turks judge other nations? Karagöz in the 19th century cited the famous song of Meali from 1535:

> The Albanese are bad enemies, itchy as lice,
> and the infidel Serbs are even worse, twice,
> the Russian cooties are surely dangerous,
> but the Hungarian bedbugs are the worst[6].

Furthermore, perceptions of physical features often depend on the observer: the same feature can be evaluated in different ways: "Our claws are sharper than eagle claws, we dig our nails into the flesh, grab, and never let it go until our claw is cut down," claimed the Turks. The Christian responded,

> Tatars are... not human beings, they are similar to wolves: if they grab something, they escape with the prey, and never dare to oppose us. If they had been as resolute and lion-hearted as we are, and had searched for military glory rather than for cows, they would have perished by now[7]

Opinions of the ferocity of the Turks had changed by the 18th century. Mikes wrote: "The more the Turks speak about war, the more they wish peace if the Turks are beaten, they accept peace immediately"[8].

A simple description of Turkish habits often affords the opportunity for abstraction, which can then lead to generalisations, and thus to stereotypes:

> They were sipping coffee, enjoying the smoke of their pipes, and when they are satisfied, they twirl the Turkish rosary among their fingers, which is both a religious practice and an amuse-

ment or pastime. Turks scarcely have needs, if they own a little property, there is no other nation on Earth which can enjoy or go without better[9].

This viewpoint is confirmed by Egressy, who wrote along very similar lines:

No one could understand how the Turkish urban people subsist – they smoke, sit quietly all day long and never work – if we did not know that the Turkish lifestyle is so simple and cheap and they settle for less[10].

In this case the descriptions are positive, though that does not mean that these were widespread perceptions: these were time- and class-specific images extended to the whole society.

Another stereotype – though not always confirmed by the sources – is the hospitality of Turks. The description by Szemere illustrates the nature and quality of services:

On the fourth day I disembarked at Silistria... where all the eastern comfort and convenience that a Turkish *han* [hostel] can offer awaited me: when I asked for candles, I was kindly shown the way to shop, when I needed meat, I was advised to go to the butcher's, when I wanted fresh fruits, I was guided to the market, when I wished to eat bread, I was sent to the bakery to buy it. Our room had no glass on the window, so I was able to enjoy all the blessings of the climate[11].

The same is confirmed by Széchenyi in 1818, when he wrote that he had to go to his lice-infested room through the beggars and dogs guarding the doorway instead of having a door: "their homes are stinky, nests of disgusting worms and diseases"[12]

A typical stereotype is judging a nation from its external features and first impressions. Szemere dressed up as a Turk, which did not mean that he understood Turks' behaviour better, but at least it demonstrates the positive attitude of the writer towards the people he examined. "My first thing to do was to buy a Turkish hat (fez) and pipe, Turkish slippers with pointed toes, a Turkish rug and a scarf-like belt in which I put a pistol and a knife."[13] The others, like Széchenyi, did not try to acclimatise at all: "Constantinople and the East lack any taste"[14]; "Whoever has seen one Turkish town, has seen them all... Constantinople is a real dump"[15], complained Egressy. "Everything brings here melancholy [...] The landscape looked beautiful, but to me it signified an unhappy and dying country"[16].

We must also pay attention to the significance of *aslama* (islam) and the resignation, meekness and indolence: these all were part of the Turkish self-image, which they thought to be the sign of intellectual and moral greatness, but which European travellers found quite annoying and strange:

The trees were burning [...] as giant torches around us. This resembled hellfire in my mind, [...] the rustling and groans of falling trees imitated the agony of the damned, which was emphasised by the shrieks of birds trying to escape. I asked, who would stop this fierce destruction, and my coachman pointed upwards. I thought he was hoping to have a rainfall from the darkened sky, but when he started to call Allah, I realised that these people expect everything from their God[17].

According to Szemere's dervish friend, influenced by sufism, the Muslim moral code was based on the following sentences:

> The best human being is the one who seeks help for his fellows. The one who makes others do good is equal – in God's eyes – with the one who does good. The existing world is a jail for believers, a paradise for infidels. This world is a carcass, and those who desire its treasures are dogs[18].

In fact, the Turks were not really concerned about justifying their actions and were not fond of sweet talk, though in the vague pragmatism of the following sentence we can observe that they tend to moralize: "Only Allah knows whether I'm good or evil." This pragmatism (denied by sufism!) gave them an excuse for the consequences of their actions.

Before the death of Mohammed one of his followers stood up and admitted that he was a doubter, a hypocrite, and therefore not a good disciple. When the angered crowd wanted to expel him from the mosque, shouting that it was unnecessary to reveal what Allah knew but tolerated to be hidden, Mohammed defended him stating that it was better to feel shame in this world than to suffer in the next world[19]. The social significance of this adapted principle is that in Ottoman Turkey, after punishment for a crime, everybody could return and be reintegrated into society, while elsewhere such people often became outlaws and were expelled to the periphery.

The above mentioned attitudes are in sharp contrast to the opinion of Habardanecz from the 16th century: "There is one common feature in the different territories bound together and subjected to the Sultan's power: fear [...]. According to the Koran: the origin of wisdom is the fear of God."[20] This turned into a fear of the state and the sultan.

According to Széchenyi and Szemere, human life was not respected by the Turks: "It was really astounding that Turks prefer birds, snakes, dogs and horses to Christians... my valet killed a snake and a soldier immediately asked the reason of our deed, pointing out the snake did not do any harm to us."[21] The often described cruelty of Turks was explained with the pragmatic words of the prophet, justifying cynical behaviour and refusing to accept responsibility: "If the person killed is one chosen to go to heaven, we have to promote the way; he loses nothing because of death. If the one killed is one of those condemned to fail and fall it is a merit to get rid of him..."[22]

Turks had different ideas about death as well: "[...] there's a candle on each grave glowing at night in the gardens. After sundown the Turkish family goes to have a coffee and to smoke in the garden around the grave. This is almost inconceivable to Christians, whose religion dresses death in black and surrounds it with sorrow."[23]

> The houses are colourful like flowers, and made of wood. They are not built for eternity; as the Turks used to say: life is a journey, man is a wanderer, home is only a hostel, which we [...] leave so easily. Why should we erect buildings from stone, if we, wanderers, won't stay on Earth for a long time[24]?

This characteristic was also judged in negative terms. "The Turks build nothing, they let the old buildings perish." The personal opinion of the travellers and emigrants led to many contradictory opinions on the same habit[25].

The clothes worn by Turks were generally considered the external signs of the inner features and values of a nation. In this respect the above-mentioned calmness of the Turks did not reflect in their clothing:

> While the European citizen in his black suit looks funereal, the inhabitants of the eastern cities with their colourful and flying dresses look like waving flags. I was totally amazed by the Turkish people, by this eastern race, that dresses like the flowers of the meadows and birds of the sky[26]

> There is no other people on Earth for whom family ties are so important [...]. Apart from religion, limitless hospitality and charity are their most prominent characteristics [...]. The ideal happiness for a Turk is calmness and silence, bordering on indolence, apathy and unconcern. He lacks the eternal fever that forces Europeans into permanent motion. He loves comfort and commodity above all. A Turk is never a rambler, like the Persians and the Arabs, he is moderate, serious, thoughtful, honourable in each situation no matter what fate arises or submerges him. He always finds his place under the sun. The former servant remains ever unrecognisable in a present-day *pasha*: the man had not changed, just his position, which is open for all. Thus Turks don't know the meaning of the word "parvenu" [...] . Never judge this nation by what you have heard about its *pashas* and others. Their crimes are sins of individuals, not of the nation. Generally speaking the Turks are a temperate and sober race. What they prefer are fruits, vegetables, milk and black coffee five times a day[27].

In contrast to Szemere's opinion, Széchenyi criticized the opportunism of newcomers – but his was also a criticism of a system which made a negative selection of immigrants, to the indifference or the lack of concern of the natives:

> Has there ever been a country which attracted more adventurers? It is a great depository of scum: those who have tried everything and been expelled from everywhere else have a chance to be treated as honest, moderate persons here. I advise every ignorant rascal and villain to come to the Levant, and they will find their happiness and welfare, if they look good, because here it is enough to make a career[28]

Mészáros, who stayed in Turkey just before the great reforms of 1856, as well as Szemere was also

> fed up with the behaviour and treatment of the bureaucrats, their talent for blackmailing and bribing [...]. I cannot see any loyal, straightforward, non-hesitating, outspoken, truthful and righteous deeds. I only saw flattering, slimy, downward cruel, arrogant treatment. I've got to loathe them [...] Pragmatists are right: a rotten race [...]. Poor Turks, they play the role of the strong and behave like this, but they dance as others wish[29].

"I love the Turks very much as individuals, but I hate them as a nation"[30] wrote Széchenyi.

> As is known, the inhabitants of the Isle of Chios have more rights than other Greeks, and the Turks who usually stick to the old ways constantly and obstinately – even more than Hungarians – do not want to change this tradition [...]. Greeks buy new books, order equipment from Paris – everything happens in secret not because of the Turks, who consider learning and teaching a waste of time, but because of the Greek priests, who fear that this would endanger their supremacy[31].

Szemere tried to explain the mental darkness:

> Asia is the mother, Europe is only an appendix: the mystical tree of knowledge grows in the East. The West was only able to create denominations, while Asia produced religions. I know

that the East is the home of tyranny, superstition, slavery, cruelty, wildness, spleen, sloth, mental darkness, where everything is in opposition, [...] but as the most beautiful flora is created by the previous rottenness, so the most brilliant minds and ideas emerge from the darkness of centuries and light the fire of humanity[32].

Beyond natural kindness, amiability, and personal magnetism[33], Széchenyi recognised many features which acted against the consolidation of the state: "Mistrust is a charming feature of Turks, and there is nothing strange about this: why should the fool be trustful towards the clever if he has finally realised the fatal power relations?"[34]. "Anyway, I can't imagine a thing more ridiculous on Earth, than the stupid pride and arrogance of Turks and the more simpleminded patience of Christians with which they tolerate the former."[35] In contradiction to Egressy's account which praised the simplicity and directness of Turks (not Christians) belonging to the lower orders, Széchenyi saw no differences between the different classes of society. "The Turkish *pasha* is similar to other Turks I have met: he has natural talent, but has so little information about the present-day situation [...]. They constantly fear a congress in Vienna dealing with the partition of Turkey."[36]

Here I quote some examples to illustrate the differences in the characteristics of different social classes. Ungnad's fellow-traveller quoted a *pasha* from the 1570s:

Why do you bring me wine? You know precisely that I'm not allowed to drink it! If you want to give me a proper gift, bring me weapons, so that I can beat you all [...]. The Turkish *pasha* is a real epicurean. He wants to live in the lifestyle that he enjoys most[37].

This account is in complete opposition to the simplicity we quoted above, but at least it conserved the personal greatness that had disappeared by the 19th century. "The Turkish *pashas* are sodomites and paedophiles"[38], claimed Ungnad's fellow-traveller. This perception was based on a typical stereotype of the "infidels" – though this deviant behaviour was forbidden by the Koran too. The statement was based on the observation that in a new empire with an "international" elite, the proportion of nonconformists and deviants is usually higher, since the state is attractive to elements who cannot integrate into their original society.

I quote below a dialogue from the 1850s, between a Hungarian emigrant and a corrupt Turkish official who embezzled the money given by the Sultan for the relief of emigrants. The Hungarian major, Fiala, wanted a duel, which the Turk refused.

Fiala: "So you never fight a duel?
Faik *pasha*: Never.
Fiala: Then how do you take recompense for an insult?
Faik: We are not so sensitive and self-respecting. Our society is made up of hierarchic relations between lords and servants and between them there is no honorary relationship, no point of honor.
Fiala: But what about the relationships among those of the same rank, who are equal in certain respects? How do you avenge an insult in this case?
Faik: Then we kill our enemy. If we trust in our strength and in the invulnerability of our class, we do it immediately and publicly. If we have to fear from court jurisdiction or the revenge of the relatives, we assassinate our enemy by waylaying. I had such a case.

Fiala: And how did you handle the situation?

Faik:[...] To pour bravery into my soul, I brought a bottle of rum. I was drinking while waiting until I collapsed, totally drunken[...]. I understood on that very night that Fate had sent me word that my enemy was in the right and I gave up my plan to assassinate him[39].

The negative features of the bureaucracy were projected onto the whole nation in many cases. But the lower class deeply despised their leader's morality and attitude in the 19th century. Egressy cites a conversation between him and his houselord: "We gave him wine, but he refused to drink. Why don't you drink, when Turkish soldiers used to drink wine?" "Yes, but they need it, dire necessity compels them to." "But your *pashas* drink spirits as well!" "They are not good Muslims at all"[40]. This deterioration of confidence in the abilities of the elite highlights the crisis of the state and the failure of reception and integration of newcomers into the society. The state's inability to overcome this promoted its collapse and dismemberment.

According to Ferhad *pasha* (a renegade, Maximilian Stein, an exiled general of the independence war in 1849), since translation of the Koran into other languages was forbidden, only educated people could keep the Muslim laws, and the poor obeyed the superstitions thought to be in the Koran. Because of this prohibition, the text was not contaminated by other nations' customs, but since even the leaders, who were able to read Arabic, did not obey the laws, as the elite consisted in many cases of newcomers, the Koran could not function as a civil code as Ferhad wished[41].

The following quotation from Egressy illustrates the misconceptions regarding Islam:

[...] Islam is based on the needs of the body, representing animal needs. Therefore laziness, emptiness, inactivity and superstition characterise the Turks[...]. Turks can think – driven by their desires – only about women, money and their stomachs. Turks are always mocking other nations' customs, while they demand respect from others[...]. The wildness and rude impatience of this folk is in serious contradiction with their friendly behaviour towards the Hungarians[42].

But "real sympathy characterises only the lower class. The officers are ready to fulfill the orders of the Sultan, because they were ordered to do so, but they are rough, cheating, impertinent people [...]. The *pasha* says that we do not have to work to cover our needs and maintain our life: and this is the desire of all Turks."[43]

Though there is a 250-year gap between them, both Szemere and Ungnad reported in their accounts that bribery was common. The janissaries – like the pretorians in ancient Rome (these are common features of empires, such as the rootless "international" aristocracy) – were also bribed when a new ruler wanted to take over. If he did not raise the janissaries' salary, his days would be numbered[44]. The Turks had a natural sense of justice: not only did they punish the fugitive slaves and those who helped them, but they also condemned to death those who gave them up[45]. This image of some kind of "barbarian justice and morals" existing in the 16th century disappeared and the stereotype of bribery became emphasised[46].

Quoting the opinion of Ferhad *pasha*, Klapka wrote that the reforms of the 1850s were forced, and initiated by those Turks who had been educated in Europe for a few years:

definitely not enough to become entirely familiar with European customs and systems, which they wanted to apply without sufficient knowledge of the recent Turkish situation. Public affairs were handled under foreign influence to promote foreign interests. Minor improvements were made without any deep change in the system. The result of these reforms was the extinguishing of old customs without substituting new values and principles for them. The decline of traditional authority without the creation of a replacement proceeded quickly, while the parallel process, the extermination of bad habits was slow. As a result, if authority is diminished, no one can exercise control, carry on and effect the transformation. (But if this traditional authority remains intact no one dares to continue the transformation). Ferhad wanted conservative reforms like some of the Young Ottomans did, which the Young Turks later refused. According to Ferhad, Turkey needed to take three steps: to create a "code civil" based on the Koran, to reduce the number of officials, and finally to construct railways to link with the European "economic space", thus accelerating the pace of development[47].

According to the liberal Szemere, the reason for the slow pace of reforms lay not in the inability of the Turks to change, but in the fact that the reform plans implemented did not suit to the character of the population, because the worst model was chosen: that of the French. Centralization is dangerous; it promotes despotism where it did not exist before, and helps to perpetuate it, where it is a serious problem. Since France was almost homogenous, the reform process did not cause problems there, but the Turkish Empire consisted of many coexisting races that were not united, by origin, aims, moral code, nor by common political perspectives.

Some – like general Mészáros – saw the collapse of the empire as unavoidable:

> [...] If the Turks do not prepare to take arms within three years, the Russians will raise the Christian people and force Turkey back into Asia[...]. Our friends, the Turks trust only in Allah and in England, waiting for the future inactive, unaware and unprepared, coming up with half-finished and unripened reforms which need at least two centuries at the present rate of progress to bring results... Turks have English, French, Russian parties, but not Turkish[48].

Many in Europe still shared the intolerance that Szemere quoted from de Maistre:

> [...] they are just as they were in the middle of the 15th century: Tatars who are only temporary visitors in Europe. Nothing can bring them closer to the conquered. There are two opposing laws[...]. They just stare and watch each other until the end of time without accepting the other. Reconciliation, peace, harmony and agreement are impossible[...]. How disdainfully they regard our culture, science and art, they are eternal enemies of our faith! War is a natural state between us, peace has always been forced. Once Christians and Muslims get in touch with each other, one must be the lord, the other has to fall[...]. Is this the Christian tolerance – I ask? Is it the Koran that opposes peace, alliance and progress or the Bible[49]?

Since even within a single work there are contradictory statements regarding the Turks[50], we should compare the characteristics described by different authors. In order to obtain a realistic picture, the contradictory or misinterpreted characteristics have to be omitted (Tables 1 and 2) and the common set of characteristics should be examined. Among the common positive elements of Szemere's and Egressy's opinion are honesty,

nobility of mind and humane behaviour. The antonyms arise mainly as a result of the contingent circumstances or mood. Thus these features cannot be considered specific traits, but rather as common patterns of human behaviour in certain circumstancs or as habits of individuals.

If we compare the characteristics attributed to the Greeks or Bulgars with those of the Turks we can come to the conclusion that there is no significant difference between the characteristics ascribed to Muslim or to Orthodox people – surprisingly. The reason for this generalisation and the disappearance of boundaries may be that many writers met only Turks living in Bulgarian lands, with the exception of officials, and extended the characteristics to all inhabitants regardless of their nationality. Alternatively, we meet with the phenomenon of 'acculturation', mutual assimilation, integrating elements of culture and behaviour into a unifying culture.

Beside these problems, an exciting question is to what extent possible stereotypes of Turkish populations changed and were associated with stereotypes referring to Islam or with other stereotypes. I have begun to explore the layering of positive and negative images and their interplay by comparing the stereotypes of an originally eastern people, the Phoenicians, or rather their Carthaginian descendants, well-known from the writings of the ancient Romans and Greeks, with the traits Hungarians ascribed to 'the Turks'. Since both the objects and the subjects of the stereotyping differ, it is perhaps possible to find some specific characteristic that tended to be ascribed to cultures perceived as 'others', which reappear through the centuries. Certainly stereotypes by their nature – not needing to be based on fact, but on elements of perception and prejudice – readily draw on one another. So 'typical' Turkish features can be seen as having something in common with the ancient stereotypes.

In the case of the *interpretatio Romana* [Roman interpretation], the negative features attributed to Carthaginians are dominant, and these seem to have many traits in common with the supposed Turkish characteristics. The Greek interpretation was a little more favourable than that of the Romans: as Table 3 shows, many of the characteristics listed were also attributed to the modern Greeks.

One might think that ancient and modern stereotypes differ enough to be completely incomparable. However, the results seen in Table 3 show not only the same features and stereotypes applied both to modern and ancient peoples, but also the adaptation of the same features on the peoples of the Turkish Empire regardless of their ethnicity. In the previous discussions we mainly focused on the Turkish element of the Empire, but the latter consisted of other different peoples, like the Greeks. It is interesting though to compare the features attributed to peoples considering the Christian element as well as those categorised as 'Turkish'.

Szemere wrote:

> The Greek race – wherever it be – is clever, imaginative, inventive, full of the spirit of volunteers, but is gripped by vanity as every woman[...] and it is furthermore selfish, ready to intrigue, infidel, unreliable, toady, a minion who serves the Turks with pleasure if he finds any advantage in it,

but at the same time is consumed with hatred for them[...] In Galata people are in contact with each other with the help of interpreters who cheat and trick both buyers and sellers[51].

Another voice could be heard three decades earlier from Széchenyi who saw nothing attractive in the behaviour of the Greeks:

A man with self-esteem cannot be treated and humiliated as they are: this pale face, the deep furrows on their skin can only be the results of long lasting deep oppression and the consequences of their shameful and dishonourable habit which enables others to oppress and exploit them. These men with fake humility and torn souls wore their miserable feelings – which predicted and determined them by God to be slaves – on their faces[...]. I guess the Greeks are people who can be cooked and burnt on fire without any objections being raised, since they lack almost every virtue, with the exception of virility – that is why this nation never dies out[...]. Turks,[...] treat Greeks like animals,... they made a humiliated servant-race from this nation[52].

The Turk is fair in need, while a Greek would try to benefit from an emergency situation[53].

His words might be interesting because within few years the Greeks revolted against Turkey and the public opinion of Europe compared the Greek heroism (that Széchenyi could not find anywhere) to their ancestors'. Had there been a sudden change merely in the assessment of the nation's features or in the nation's virtue itself? Another opinion to add to the palette of contradictory judgements comes from Egressy after the successful freedom fight (in 1850). Reading his lines based on personal impressions one can hardly believe that these people were resolute enough to revolt:

How knavish and degenerate the Greek nation has become! The nation which gave wisdom, science and arts as heritage to the other nations![...] It is a terrible example of a people committing collective suicide! The present day Greek cannot understand the language of his fathers, nor can he feel their emotions and virtue in his veins. In respect of mentality he is at the same level as Serbs, Bulgars and other Slavic people. His religion, fate and sentiments are Russian, he dresses like a Turk, he has not inherited anything from the character of his ancestors but the drawbacks, of which he cannot be proud: finesse, shrewdness, perfidy, and disloyality[54].

So was it a Hungarian misjudgement of Greeks, or was it the 'romantic' Europe that identified Greeks with heroism: which is reality and which is a stereotype? These questions need further investigation

The mentality and behaviour of the oppressed is typical in the following situation too as Egressy reports of his experience of accommodation in the villages:

We asked for food from the Bulgarian houselord; I don't have – he responded; [...]. But we pay with cash. Sorry. We complained about this to the *bimbasi* (colonel), that we would starve to death as the guests of the Sultan. Beat them all, beat the dogs – he advised. – And you will see he will give everything to you[...]. The Bulgarian discovered that we had gone to complain, so when we arrived back, a laid table awaited us. But the Turk beat him up – just to remind him of the "law" and not to return "empty-handed". So there is nothing strange about the fact that these people trust no one[55]. Their houses look poor from outside, but rich inside indeed. This is for tricking the Turkish tax-collectors and to prevent harrassment[...]. The Bulgarian houses are crowded, full of secret rooms, small backdoors and corridors connecting the whole Bulgarian town without going onto the street. On the one hand these are used as emergency exits in case of danger, if they have to escape from the Turks, on the other hand these shelters are used for conspiring[...]. The Bulgar-

ian is a raffish, unworthy, impertinent fellow: selfish, lying, cheating, utilitarian, crude, insidious, malevolent, inhuman and bigoted. He hates Catholics as well as Turks... He is a Russian indeed. He hates us as well, and though he sells even his soul for money, he would not have accommodated us hospitably even for money, if the Turks had not ordered it[...]. These people under Turkish rule had lost all of their features, customs and original identity; with the exception of his language they have no national character[56].

[...] The Bulgarian is not a good peasant, willingly he would never decide to cultivate the land even among the most favourable conditions[...] once he collected and saved 50 piasters, he starts swapping and trading immediately, tricking even his brother and the Turks heartlessly[57].

The state of the countryside often affords an opportunity for generalisation in order to assess the mental state of a nation:

I travelled through nearly whole Valachia with closed eyes sunken deeply into my dreams: this is such a boring, bold, bleak, flat landscape. Where the folk are unfree and illiterate, there the land is an uncultivated wasteland[...]. We travelled more than half a day between two villages, with their sunken pitch-houses looking like molehills. Are these mentally and emotionally sunken people the descendants of Trajan and Caesar's Rome?... and if they are, how can they be compared with the people of demi-gods that settled on the Capitol, without any shame on their faces?"[58] "The uncultivated land is always the sign of deep misery, referring to sloth or limitless oppression."[59]

Turkish rule brought nor development neither relief for these nations.

In this contribution I investigated the survival and the transformation of the image of 'the Turks' emphasizing the role of stereotypes. I traced common elements in the assessment of Christian and Muslim populations constituting the Ottoman Empire.

My conclusions can be summed up as follows: many of the stereotypes investigated were based on misunderstandings; they originated from the different interpretations of the same acts or behaviours, thus yielding a number of contradictory assessments of the people observed. The images registered in the texts analysed display many common features, but also show variations according to the culture and experience of the observer; some of negative stereotypes were similar to those already attested in ancient times, with regard to the Carthaginians. The negative stereotypes included the non-Muslim population; the Slavic population of the empire were underestimated; a transformation in the way Hungarian emigrants perceived and described the 'Turk' between the 16th and 19th century can be observed and was shown in this study.

Table 1.
A comparison of features mentioned in the text analysed. The words in italics have antonyms or are interpreted differently in the other column

Negative	Positive
TURKS (16th century)	
not human beings, wolves (Tatars)	honour and reputation (relatively)
not resolute and lion-hearted (as we are - opposition pairs)	self-discipline
sodomites and paedophiles	good farmers
tyranny and oppression, violence	
TURKS (19th century)	
different	*noble-minded*
lacking taste	*sublime virtues*
uniformity	*honesty*
scarcely have needs	*humanity*
there is no nation which can enjoy or go without	bravery
better	*adoration of water*
never working, contempt for work	*colourful*
simple and cheap	hospitality
settle for less, minimalists	charity
stinky, worms and diseases	*calmness*
indolence	silent
resignation	moderate, serious,
shortsightedness	*thoughtful*, honourable
tyranny, superstition, slavery, cruelty,	*temperate and sober*
wildness, spleen, sloth, mental darkness,	a natural talent
contradiction	*pure mind*
convenience	oracle
depot of scum	*can be trusted*
not loyal, straight, non-hesitating,	fair in need
not outspoken, truthful or righteous	*soft, polite, honest, gentle* (if not in power)
flattering, *slimy, prostrating*	*humbleness*
crude, cruel, arrogant	noble, courageous, religious,
a rotten race	virtues inducing admiration and respect,
stick to old things constantly and obstinately	grand emotions
consider learning and teaching as a waste of time	humane,
silly	solid, but *tolerant*
mistrust	sharing the passion
stupid pride	reliable
poor information (ignorant)	tells the truth
no honorary relation (hierarchic society:	despising insincerity
in self- image: democracy!)	dignity
exaggerated trust in strength and in the	*politeness*, staidness and deliberation
invulnerability of the higher-class	*not slimy*
lustful women	*not proud,*
laziness, emptiness, standstill	*natural kindness, amiability,*
mocking	personal magnetism
demand respect	*religious piety*
rude impatience - intolerance	open society (outwards)
uneducated, not sophisticated	reintegrating
weak in explaining and rationalising opinions	principled
rough, cheater, impertinent	
inactive and cold, unaware and unprepared	
passivity	
contempt	
perdition	
bribery	

GREEKS (19th century)	
simple-minded patience	*clever, imaginative,*
vanity	*inventive,*
feminine	full with the spirit of volunteers,
selfish, ready to intrigue,	virility
infidel, unreliable,	
toady, minion	
hypocrite	
tricky cheaters	
without self-esteem	
fake humbleness	
shameful and dishonourable habit	
lacking almost every virtue	
miserable feelings	
slaves	
utilitarian	
knavish	
finesse, shrewdness	
perfidy, and disloyalty	

Table 2.
Traits mentioned in the texts analysed as typical of various Balkan populations in the 19th century

BULGARIANS	ROMANIANS
trust no one	unfree and illiterate
raffish, unworthy, impertinent	mentally and emotionally sunken folk
selfish, liar, cheater, utilitarian, crude, insidious,	molehill-like houses
malevolent, inhuman	uncultivated land, a sign of deep misery connected
Russians, bigoted zealots	with sloth
losing national identity	
tricking heartlessly	

ARMENIANS	SERBS
honest, clever, active and tidy	distrustful
	haughty
	selfish, self-conceited, blind, bigot (orthodox)
	despising all nations, glory and culture
	uneducated and illiterate

Table 3.

The "common Eastern heritage": a comparison between Carthaginians as described by the Ancients and Turks/Islam

CARTHAGE (Two points of view)	"Turks"; and Balkan peoples in the 19th century
A dangerous enemy (Greek interpretation)	
calliditas (shrewdness)	Greeks (shrewdness)
insidiae (treachery)	Greeks
fraus (dishonesty, cheat)	Greeks, Bulgars (cheaters)
dolus (dishonesty, cheat)	Bulgars, Greeks (cheaters)
versutia (finesse)	Greeks (finesse)
strategema (military knowledge)	Turks, only in the 16th century (military knowledge)
perfidia (perfidy)	Greeks (perfidy)
fides Punica (trustless)	Turks, Bulgars, Serbs (infidels, cannot be trusted)
foedifragi – foederum ruptores (covenant breaker)	Turks in the 16th century
periuria (misjudgement)	Serbs, Turks (haughty)
superbia (arrogance)	infidels
nullum deum metuunt (not fearing any God)	"barbarian justice"
nullum iusiurandum (no jurisdiction)	Turks, Bulgars, Serbs (infidels)
nulla religio (no religion)	
An untrustworthy nation (Roman interpretation)	
crudelitas (cruelty)	Turks (cruelty)
dirus (severe, crude)	-
saevitia (rage)	-
barbara feritas (irrationalism, cruelty)	-
furor (fury)	-
luxuria (luxury, convenience)	Turks (luxury, convenience)
avaritia (greed, avarice)	Turks (the case of 25 000 piasters)
philargyrous (love of money)	Turks (bribery)
impotentia (impotence, sloth)	Turks (sloth, passivity)
levitas(levity)	-
infidi (infidels)	Turks, Greeks (infidels)
vanitas (vanity)	Greeks (vanity)
ingenium mobile[1]	

[1]   For the image of the Carthaginians see, M. Dubuisson, Das Bild des Karthagers in der lateinischen Literatur, p. 237. Original: L'Image du Carthaginois dans la littérature latine. "Studia Phoenicia I/II." Eds.: E. Gubel E. Lipinski, Leuven 1983. pp. 159-167.

Notes

1   Among those omitted we have to mention S. Decsy, *Osmanografia, azaz a Török Birodalom természeti, erkölcsi, egyházi, polgári és hadi állapotjának és a magyar királyok ellen viselt nevezetesebb hadakozásainak summás leírása,* Bécs, 1788-89 /1799. Hungarian writers of the 19th century (even the famous Mór Jókai) used this work as a source for their novels. Another work is: S. Kováts, *Mohammed élete és históriája*, Pesten, 1811, and I. Lassu, *A török birodalom statisztikai geografiai és históriai leírása*, Pest 1828. The peak of the pro-Turkish sentiments was represented by the orientalist-turcologist Ármin Vámbéry *(Dervisruhában Közép-Ázsián át)* and by Ignác Goldzieher (*Adalékok a keleti tanulmányok magyar bibliografikájához,* 1880. I. Goldzieher, *A keleti tanulmányok történetéhez hazánkban a XVIII. században*, 1883). Balázs Orbán *(Utazás Keleten, Pest 1861)* and Elek Fényes *(A török birodalom leírása*, Pest 1854) also described Turkey. The latter was based on secondary sources and not on personal impressions, though it had great influence on forming the public opinion. In the early 20th century we have to mention the ethnologist István Györffy, who also dealt with the Turks. I have no knowledge of recent investigations of the image of Turks. In the works I have chosen the image of Turkey is of secondary importance: historians keep focusing on the personality and political ideas of the authors who are important because of being the members of the Hungarian political elite and not because of visiting Turkey.

2   The Minister of Finance and later Foreign Policy István Burián, the secret councilor Lajos Thallózcy, and Benjamin Kállay, Minister of Finance and Governor of Bosnia.

3   Laski, a Polish nobleman, as a career diplomat was the delegate of the Hungarian king, János Szapolyai in 1528. Habardanecz, a Slav in origin, was a soldier, and represented the Habsburg king, Ferdinand I, in Constantinople. Their descriptions of the negotiations show a small segment of the empire: individual and national character influencing decision-making. The journey of David Ungnad took place in the 1570s.

4   The diaries of Egressy, Széchenyi, Szemere and Mészáros are available at: *www.terebess.hu/keletkultinfo/index2.html.*

5   The last page of Egressy's diary is in total contradiction to what he wrote earlier: "Farewell, noble-minded nation of the East, brothers in race and in most sublime virtues of soul. Farewell, state of honesty and humanity, who gave shelter for the refugee, and bread for the hungry..." *Egressy Gábor Törökországi naplója 1849-1850*, Budapest 1997, 12 August 1850, p. 241. This duality will be important in the discussion below. (All quotations have been translated by the author).

6   B. Szemere, *Utazás Keleten a világosi napok után,* Budapest 1999, 6 August 1850, p. 120.

7   H. Laski, *Két tárgyalás Sztambulban,* Budapest 1996, p. 125, 139.

8   K. Mikes*, Törökországi levelek*, Budapest 2000, p. 9, 19.

9   Szemere, *Utazás,* cit. 1850, "indolence", p. 92, p. 37.

10   *Egressy* cit., 25 March, 1850, p. 171.

11   Szemere, *Utazás* cit*.,* 15 January 1850, p. 11.

12   *Egressy* cit., 17 September 1849, p. 34.

13   Szemere, *Utazás* cit. 15 January 1850, p. 9.

14   I. Széchenyi, *Morgänlandische Fährt,* Budapest 1999, p. 48.

15   *Egress*y cit*.,* 30 June, 1850, p. 207.

16   Széchenyi, *Morgänlandische* cit*.,* 9 November 1818 and 4 January 1819, p. 84, 128.

17   Szemere, *Utazás* cit., 15. January 1850, pp. 13-14.

18   *Ibid.*, Chapter X, 6 August 1850, p. 159.

19   Szemere, *Utazás* cit*.,* 1850, Chapter 17, p. 257

20   *Két tárgyalás* cit., Habardanecz, p. 176.

21   Széchenyi, *Morgänlandische* cit., 21 September 1818, p. 43.

22   Szemere, *Utazás* cit., Chapter X, 6 August 1850, p. 110.

23   *Ibid.*, Chapter V, 26 March 1850, pp. 38-39.

24   *Ibid.,* Chapter VIII, 1 June. A good example of the differences between cultures, and also of the intolerance, corruption and material utilization of this religious principle is the following: "...A Bulgarian wanted to build a house made of stone, and he was condemned to death for building a fortress. He had to pay 25000 piasters to have his life spared... According to the Alkoran it is a sin to build houses made of stone challenging eternity. Allah permits only a few years stay on Earth...", *Egressy* cit.*,* 17 Sept. 1849. p. 33.

25   *Ungnád* cit., p. 113. Another example: "A typical eastern custom is the adoration of water: even the water not blessed by priests is considered as holy and temple-like wells are erected as shelters. Water is not only used to eliminate thirst but it is also a part of ritual ceremonies". Szemere, *Utazás*, cit.*,* Chapter II. 15 January 1850, p. 15. But Mikes interprets this custom in a different way: "The Turks think that what makes the body dirty, makes the soul dirty, and what cleans the body, cleans the soul too". Mikes, *Törökországi* cit.*,* p. 127.

26   Szemere, *Utazás* cit.*,* Chapter V. 26 March 1850, pp. 36-37.

27   *Ibid.*, Chapter X. 6 August 1850, pp. 93- 95.

28   Széchenyi, *Morgänlandische* cit.*,* 29 November 1818, p. 106.

29   *Mészáros Lázár Törökországi naplója, 1849-1850,* Budapest 1999, 2 June 1850, p. 75.

30   Széchenyi, *Morgänlandische* cit.*,* 28 October 1818 p. 64.

31   *Ibid.*, 28 November 1818. p. 99.

32   Szemere, *Utazás* cit.*,* Chapter V, 26 March, 1850, p. 40.

33   Széchenyi, *Morgänlandische* cit.*,* 29 November 1818, p. 106.

34   *Ibid.*, 12 September 1818, p. 36.

35   *Ibid.*, 13 Novembe 1818, p. 91.

36   *Ibid.*, 6 January 1819, p. 131.

37   *Ungnád* cit., p. 158.

38   *Ibid.,* p. 109.

39   *Egressy* cit.*,* Shumla, 10 January 1850, p. 139.

40   *Ibid.*, Samoden, 20 November 1849, p. 95.

41   Gy. Klapka, *Emlékeimből,* Budapest 1986, pp. 443-444. For some misinterpretations and superstitions in connection with the Koran see the following quotation: "There is no emancipation. The women have only one right: to get married without previously being seen. But the husband can send them back within 10 days. They are considered merely as goods, marriage as a deal[...]. Turkish women cannot go into the mosques to praise the Lord [...]. If she is accused of being false to her husband, and it proves to be an untrue rumour, she has the right to be false to her husband for three days in front of her husband's eyes[...]. As not having any rights, Turkish women have no duties at all[...]. Therefore the men work here: sewing, cooking and washing[...]. Anyway the women here are lustful and they love to flirt[...]. A woman with an open cloak means: You can do with me whatever you wish". *Egressy* cit., Vidin, 2 October 1849. pp. 52-54. The above mentioned are definitely against the laws of Islam, though they could have been practised in Arabia in ancient times.

42   *Egressy* cit., 17 September 1849, pp. 33-34.

43   *Ibid.*, 17 September 1849, pp. 33-34.

44   *Ungnad* cit.*,* p. 145.

45   *Ibid.*, p. 173.

[46] Orbán*, Utazás Keleten*, Pest 1861, p. 38.

[47] Klapka, *Emlékeimből* cit., p. 440. *"*Since Europeans cannot see the legislative corpus, they think that Turks suffer from a limitless autocracy. But Turks do not think they have to make laws, because everything is written in the Koran; they only have to apply and explain the law by the *ulemas* [bodies of Muslim doctors of theology] as a controlling power, while the execution is the duty of the Sultan as the main executive power. His power is not unlimited, and the people have rights to hinder the officials and the Sultan to break the law of the Koran", Szemere's dervish friend explains.

[48] *Mészáros* cit.*,* 10-13 January 1850, 1-2 May 1850, pp. 38, 72, 75.

[49] Szemere, *Utazás* cit., 1850, p. 307.

[50] For positive images see footnote 3, and Szemere, *Utazás* cit., pp. 305-306 *"*[...] the Turks as a race are the first and most honorable among those constituting the empire. The Turk's character is noble, his courage is undeniable. Religious, with civil virtues inducing admiration and respect in the spectators. His emotions are grand, his heart is humane, his decisions and convictions are solid, but tolerant. His soul is full with warm, amicable feelings, with tendency towards charity, sharing passion in good or bad. He is reliable in promises, honest in deeds, always tells the truth, despises insincerity. Dignity shines on his forehead, he speaks with politeness, staidness and deliberation when he talks, neither is he slimy in his behavior, nor prideful, keeping his dignity in all situations[...]. It is a race of contemplators". See also p. 93.

[51] Szemere, *Utazás* cit.*,* Chapter VIII, 1 June 1850, p. 77.

[52] Széchenyi, *Morgänlandische* cit.*,* 5 January 1819, pp. 130-131.

[53] *Ibid.*, 15 February 1819, p. 154.

[54] *Egressy* cit., 20 August 1850, pp. 239-240.

[55] *Ibid.*, 14 November 1849, pp. 90-91.

[56] *Ibid.*, 16 November 1849, p. 92, and 12 October 1849, p. 66. Even the rich Bulgars build small houses to avoid the harrassment of Turks.

[57] *Ibid.*, 16 November 1849, p. 93.

[58] Szemere, *Utazás* cit.*,* Chapter II, 15 January 1850, pp. 8-9.

[59] *Egressy* cit.*,* 27 August 1849, p. 20.

[60] For the image of Carthaginians see, M. Dubuisson*, Das Bild des Karthagers in der lateinischen Literatur,* p. 237. Original: *L'Image du Carthaginois dans la littérature latine*, in "Studia Phoenicia I/II", eds. E. Gubel, E. Lipinski, Leuven 1983, pp. 159-167.

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The Image of Balkan Muslims in Czech and French Journals around 1900

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Abstract

This chapter offers a comparative analysis of the image of Balkan Muslims in French and Czech public discourse in the period 1875-1914, by using the evidence from Czech and French periodicals. Balkan Muslims constitute only a part of the overall discourse of the region, but this was nonetheless a very important and frequent theme, and constituted a common public image. The background for this chapter is a wider study of the complex occidental reflection on the peninsula[1], which takes Czech and French discourses as a representative sample.

Článek je věnován komparativní analýze obrazu balkánských muslimů ve francouzské a české publicistice v letech 1875-1914. Balkánští muslimové tvoří sice jen část komplexního obrazu, ale objevují se jako velmi časté a důležité téma veřejného diskursu. Příspěvek je založen na zevrubném výzkumu komplexní "západní" reflexe Balkánu pro nějž české a francouzské časopisy slouží jako jeho reprezentativní vzorky. V úvodu autorka představuje korpus časopiseckých textů, který se stal základem pro rozbor a komparaci zkoumaných obrazů. Analytickou část autorka rozčlenila na tři oddíly podle typů obrazů: muslimský válečník, reflexe vztahu muslimů k modernizaci a pohled na ženu z muslimského prostředí. Stať sice předložila pouze tři typy obrazu, přesto předvedla, že studovaný obraz je rozmanitý. Komparace dokazuje, že na jedné straně oba diskursy, český a francouzský, tvoří součást "západního" diskursu o Balkánu, na druhé straně poukazují i na národně specifikované pohledy a potvrzují, že neexistoval unifikovaný západní přístup. Studie poukazuje i na celou řadu pohledů vlastních oběma společnostem současně, které by si zasloužily pozornost badatelů.

Introduction

Before embarking on an analysis of the image of Muslims itself, we should first present some basic information on the historical background to the subject and also comment briefly on the nature of the sources used in the research. The chronological framework is the period 1875 - 1914. The year 1875 was a turning point in that it saw the outbreak of anti-Turkish rebellions in the Balkans which proved to be the first in a chain of conflicts in the last third of the 19th century – conflicts which fundamentally changed

the political and cultural situation in the Balkan region. The year 1914 serves an apt terminal date, not just because of its seminal nature in global terms, but also because the context in which information about the Balkans was gathered and communicated changed very substantially with the outbreak of the First World War.

In southeast Europe, the turn of the 20th century was a very complex period, marked by major political and social changes. This process of transformation, often referred to as the 'Eastern Crisis' or the 'Eastern Question' in historiography, started at the end of the 18th century when the Ottoman Empire began to lose its status as a great power, and culminated after the First World War with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The main features of this complex period are generally considered to be the deterioration of the position of the Ottoman Empire as a political great power, the growing tensions within the empire, manifested above all in increasingly powerful movements for national emancipation that ultimately resulted in the creation of independent nation states, and the interventions of the great powers on the side of the various actors in the struggle, against the background of shifting international political concerns and rivalries[2].

The aim of this research has been to explore in comparative perspective how authors from Czech and French cultural conditions perceived the area today known as the Balkan Peninsula, and to find out what kind of information on the Balkans these sources offered the public. Czech and French society here represent two types of European society that were in different socio-political situations at the end of the 19th century: Czech society was an example of a small nation striving for national and cultural emancipation within the context of a multi-ethnic (Habsburg) monarchy, while French society was an example of a major nation, and a great cultural and colonial power. For source material I chose magazines, often accompanied by illustrations, since these are more extensive and analytical than newspaper articles which were a direct reaction to political events and often unconcerned with identifying the broader cultural and historical context. In any case, the readers of these magazines were also informed about current political events in the special magazine sections, for the most part designed specially to give a brief summary of the latest developments. I have, however, also used newspaper material particularly when they described fundamental and significant events. The comparative perspective made it necessary to select magazines that were similar in terms of genre. The following titles were chosen: the Czech magazines *Zlatá Praha* [Golden Prague], *Osvěta* [Enlightenment], *Vlasť* [Fatherland], and the French magazines *L'Illustration*, *La Revue des Deux Mondes* and *Le Correspondant*.

Zlatá Praha was a Czech literary and cultural fortnightly magazine, designed to be both entertaining and informative, with a readership drawn from the middle strata of Czech society. It contained articles on a diverse range of subjects, with pictorial accompaniment being a very important element in each case. The second Czech magazine analysed, *Osvěta*, was a popular scientific revue that also appeared fortnightly throughout the period surveyed. It contained articles of a more academic type than those published in *Zlatá Praha*, especially historical and ethnographic studies that were often printed in

instalments and sometimes came out later in book form. The third Czech magazine was the fortnightly *Vlasť*, a magazine for Czech Catholics and conservatives. This revue, subtitled *A Magazine for Entertainment and Instruction*, was the organ of a society of the same name founded to spread Catholic faith and culture.

The French magazine *L'Illustration* was the most successful illustrated French periodical at the turn of the 20th century. It offered a view of the week's events with commentaries, as well as information from Paris, metropolitan France, the colonies and the rest of the world. As time went by its cultural section, containing information on theatre and the arts, extracts from literary works and numerous feuilletons, acquired greater importance. The French *La Revue des Deux Mondes* was a monthly periodical devoted to French cultural life, especially literature, history and art. It was a non-illustrated, more academic revue aiming to offer general information, especially on the novel, travel literature, politics, economics and art. The third French magazine analysed was the fortnightly journal of moderate Catholics, *Le Correspondant*. Like the *Revue des Deux Mondes* it carried relatively academic articles that were often several dozen pages in length and not infrequently later published in book length. It featured a regular political section entitled *La revue de quinzaine*, devoted to political events at home and abroad.

Overall, several dozen authors contributed to the magazines studied. Roughly sixty French or French-speaking authors were published in the French magazines over the period, most of them professional experts (diplomats and academics), but also journalists, travellers and writers. They were very varied in terms of education: many had a legal education, but they were also technicians, journalists and philologists. Generally they were active in political and cultural life, though they were not necessarily directly interested in the Balkan region. The number of Czech authors was roughly a third less than the number of French or Francophone writers. The Czech authors had mainly received their education at modern secondary schools or classic secondary schools (gymnasiums). Those authors with university education for the most part had degrees in the humanities (predominantly in history, Slavonic studies, philology with a stress on Slavic languages, and, occasionally, geography). The best known and the most important of the Czech authors in terms of social standing was Konstanin Jireček (1854-1918). Jireček was a Czech intellectual and university teacher who, for several years from the 1880s, occupied a high position in the Bulgarian government. Another author cited was Jaroslav Bidlo (1868-1937), a Czech historian and university lecturer, whose academic interests were mainly in the history of the Slavs and their cultures. The journalist, writer and translator Josef Holeček (1842-1907) had a reputation mainly as an enthusiastic Slavophile and the author of travel literature and fiction. Josef Wünsch (1842-1907) was a well-known cartographer and traveller, while Jiří Václav Daneš (1880-1928) made his name primarily as a traveller and journalist but was also a university teacher and diplomat. I have only managed to obtain information about two of the four Francophone authors cited. Jean Erdic was the pseudonym of the French economist Eumén Quiellé, who like Jireček was invited to assist the Bulgarian government in the 1880s, in his case as auditor of state finances. Emil de Laveley (1822-1892),

likewise an economist, was born in Belgium but lived and worked in France as well. In his specialist works he focused on the causes of economic decline and land ownership. No details have been established regarding the other two French authors cited, Yves Reynaud and Léon Lamouche.

The core of my research concerns ideas surrounding and responses to the religious, ethnic and cultural plurality of the peninsula. Specifically in relation to religious communities it is very interesting to see how the Czech and French pictures of Muslims and Islam were formed, how they differed and in what they agreed.

In these popular scientific journals of Czech and French provenance, the Balkans appear in three basic types of material: in short articles of an informative nature reporting on political events of the day, in longer articles considering history and culture, and in travelogue sketches. With few exceptions the authors whose articles were published in the journals concerned all had a university education or at least more than a basic education. Most had been in the Balkans on some short study or professional trip, or in some cases they had lived in the Balkans for some time, and so their articles reflected their personal experiences. Their texts, or rather the journals in which they published, were addressed to a broad readership.

In 19th-century European culture the perception of the 'Muslim' and the evolving contours of the image of Muslims were generally very strongly influenced by cultural stereotypes that were partly the effect of the cultural tradition of Orientalism[3], but also reflected the historical experience of Europeans. Although in Czech and French encyclopaedias of the time 'Muslim' was dryly and succinctly defined as "person avowing the Islamic Faith"[4], in general cultural consciousness the image of the Muslim widespread in Europe in the 19th century was quite negative; that is, a Muslim was an oriental whose main salient features were fanaticism and violence, conservatism and a lack of civilization, laziness and debauchery[5]. In analysing material on the Balkans, I therefore had to ask myself the fundamental question of how Czech and French authors described Muslims in a region that in the European mind lay on the borders between Europe and the Orient[6].

Analysis – The image of Muslims

Comments on Muslims appear in these sources in various different contexts and in all three types of article, but mostly in the context of describing the Balkan population. When encountering the nationally, ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous population of the Balkan Peninsula, authors tried to distinguish between groups on the basis of different features – most often language, religion or region. Constructs of different groups, most often based on the construct of 'nations' or 'peoples', or in some cases minority or religious groups therefore emerge from their writings. The perception of the Balkan population in the periodicals reflects the situation at the turn of the century when the term 'nation' or 'people' (Czech *národ*) was starting to be used in a markedly modern sense and was employed in various contexts, often very loosely, and generally as a term for ethnic groups rather than peoples necessarily having nation states.

In this chapter there is no space for consideration of all the details of the image of Muslims, and so we shall focus just on three basic sub-images that appeared repeatedly. First, the image of the Muslim as a fanatical warrior, which emerges from commentaries on war in the Balkans[7]. Second, the image of the Muslim and the process of modernization, which emerges on the one hand from analysis of material devoted to the internal development of the Ottoman Empire, and on the other from articles considering the historical development of the Balkan provinces, as well as general comments on Islam. Finally, there is the image of the Muslim woman, which can be traced particularly in the travelogue pieces but also in the political news.

The image of the Muslim as warrior

In the Czech and French publications analysed, Balkan themes appear most frequently at the times of most dramatic political disturbance in the Balkans. In the Czech press there was a particularly strong response to the various forms of struggle by Balkan peoples against Ottoman rule, and especially the struggles of Slavic peoples. The Czech authors consistently sympathised with these opponents of the Ottoman regime, and especially the Slavs. The enemy in the armed conflicts, the Ottoman Empire, was always described in very negative terms, and Ottoman soldiers – Muslims (of whatever ethnicity) were seen as personifying the enemy. On the Czech side there was therefore a one-sided, black-and-white picture, with the Balkan nations – Christians – lined up against the Muslim Ottoman army. In the texts the Turkish soldiers were often described by such expressive phrases as "fanatical killers, Muslim dogs, beasts in human shape" and so forth[8]. In the Czech historical consciousness (or subconsciousness) this negative vision of the Muslim was linked to the figure of the Turk as the eternal arch-enemy of Christians, and was in some ways simply a revival of an old image from the early modern period[9].

In the French press of the same period we do not, however, find so strongly polarised a picture. Although there was criticism of violence committed by Ottoman soldiers against Christians, especially civilians, and some authors openly supported the Christian Slavs in their efforts at emancipation, essentially the criticism was of war and the Ottoman supremacy in general. In the French texts the issue was more one of politics – what to do about "the sick man on the Bosphorus", and less a question of precise contours in the image of Muslims.

Criticism of Muslims and a negative image of Muslims appeared most strikingly in reports of Albanian conditions. The Albanian Muslims were described as the mercenaries of the Turks, who murdered helpless Christians for money, and whose lack of principle and venality were emphasised. Another example of negative perception of Muslims as warriors related to Bosnia. Both Czechs and French saw the Bosnian Muslims as generally Serbs as far as ethnicity was concerned, or in some cases in a wider sense as South Slavs, but they nonetheless sometimes wrote about them as Turks and attributed to them the same characteristics as were attributed to Ottoman soldiers - Turks and Albanians, i.e. fanaticism in religion and in the fight against Christians.

Czech authors saw Balkan rebellions as a just cause and described rebels as "brave undaunted fighting heroes". One typical subject of such Czech idealisation were the Montenegrians, a particular object of interest for the Czech author Josef Holeček. In his articles he compared the two warrior nations – Montenegrians and Albanians – and tried to explain the origins of their national characters. Both these peoples, he claimed, were "brought up to the sound of gunfire" but while the Montenegrians had become a "chivalric nation", the Albanians had turned into "base brigands" and mercenary soldiers[10].

In the writings of some Czech authors we find words of defence for Slavic Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina as people who are good at heart because they have a "good Slav foundation". This vision was entirely consistent with the widespread Czech pan-Slavist sympathies of the end of the 19th century[11]. For example, Josef Holeček considered the core element of Bosnian Muslims to be the Bosnian nobility, who in his words were "nationally conscious and powerful and also outstanding for their Slav goodness and greatness of mind." In his view, therefore, Islam was merely "silt on the good Slav foundation". Holeček expressed the hope that in the course of time the good Slavic nature would triumph over the negative characteristics that were the result of Islamicization; the Slavs would become civilized and return to European customs[12].

The image of the Muslim in the process of modernisation: is it possible to civilize the Muslim?

In both Czech and French sources the theme of the relationship of Muslims to civilization appears consistently and in various contexts, with civilization generally understood by writers to mean technical modernization and the European lifestyle of the 19th century. Generally the authors concur in the view that the obstacle to modernization and progress among Muslims is the conservatism and fatalism inherent in their religion, which prevented them from progressing. This stereotypical view appears very frequently and was applied to Muslims in general, with more than one author concluding that Islam was incompatible with modernization. Nonetheless, in individual cases we find a range of opinions and ideas that were not so categorically negative and conceded the possibility that progress might be consistent with Islam. This kind of view appeared primarily in relation to accounts of the Turks and Bosnian Muslims. Authors saw hope for the salvation of the Turks and of their whole empire in "enlightenment, education, reforms and emancipation from the Koran". In some cases, however, we encounter the counter-argument that an educated Turk would actually lose his identity, because education and Islam were not, apparently, compatible. The Czech author Josef Wünsch claimed, for example, that as a result of modernization the Turk was ceasing to be a Turk and becoming a "Frenchman, because an educated Turk does not exist"[13]. Here the term Frenchmen should be understood in wider cultural context, as a European[14]. In Wünsch's view any Turk who continued to lead his life according to the principles of the Koran was bound for certain destruction. He could only save himself from extinction by education, but as a consequence of enlightenment he would automatically lose his Turkish identity and become a different person – a European, and so one way or

another the Turkish nation would still cease to exist. For Wünsch, then, not just the fall of the empire, but also the end of the Turkish nation was inevitable.

It is interesting that the notion that the Turks were incapable of civilisation can be found among French authors as well. Alfrède Gilléron made much the same point as Wünsch when he stated that all progress is alien to the Turks; and as soon as they leave the atmosphere of patriarchal and primitive Islamic civilisation they degenerate and succumb to moral corruption. They therefore have only two alternatives: either to become civilized, and cease to be Ottoman, or to entrench themselves in their oriental character and sink even deeper into a struggle against civilisation[15].

In the French magazine *L'Illustration*, however, an image of educated figures in Turkish political life was promoted with a series of profiles of leaders of the Ottoman Empire. In these kinds of article we can see an image of modern and progressive politicians (the Young Turks) taking shape, and being presented by journalists as a promise of the modernization and Europeanization of Ottoman society[16]. Reflections on modernization also appeared in comments on everyday life, which drew attention to the apparent Europeanization of local society, manifest, for instance, in the way people dressed. European responses to these changes in Turkish society were mixed. On one hand they were regarded as welcome signs, while there was also ridicule and criticism directed at Turks who had become Europeanized.

French authors also commented on the social hierarchy in Ottoman society. Emil Laveley, for example, made a distinction between the higher and lower ranks of society. The higher social ranks he called Ottomans, characterizing them as bureaucrats and criticising them for their luxurious life in palaces and for oppressing the population – not just Christian but also Muslim – with taxes. The lower levels of society – and the Christian population, which the author calls Turks, in his view represented the healthy core of the nation. What emerges from Laveley's account is therefore the image of the powerful Muslim official "described as a lazy Turk, jealous and sensuous, a conservative Muslim who cannot bear enlightenment, innovation and progress". By contrast he presents us with the "rural Turk", described as a good man, and the hope for a better future, even though attention is drawn to aspects of his "oriental character", and in this context particularly his "fatalism".

The debate on Turkish attributes and the prospects for modernisation and Europeanization also involved comments on the ethnogenesis of Turkish culture. The overall consensus tended to be that Turks were a non-European element and did not belong to Europe. The Frenchman Jean Erdic, however, pointed out in this context that if the ethnogenesis of the various European nations was investigated, the conclusion would be that nobody is actually at home in Europe because all the existing peoples of Europe originally arrived from outside the continent[17]. Another French writer, Léon Lamouche, went so far as to claim that that the Turks were not an entirely heterogeneous element in Europe. He pointed out that the Turks had taken over many features of Byzantine culture and so were, in their way, the heirs of Byzantine culture[18]. Lamouche be-

lieved that a Byzantine influence could be observed particularly in court ceremonial at the sultan's court, in the system of government, and also in architecture and aspects of material culture[19]. In Lamouche we find an attempt to see Muslims, specifically Turks, as an integral part of the mosaic of European history.

In a similar way the Czech author Josef Bidlo, in an article on the decline of Turkish power, argued that the Turks had been civilized by contact with the Greeks and that this cultural influence was apparent, for example, in the way the peninsula had been conquered not just by brute force, but through the use of considerable intelligence and diplomacy[20]. Bidlo propounded the notion that in their way Turks were the allies of the Greeks. He claimed that because the Greeks had failed to control the Balkan Slavs by themselves they had found allies in the Turks, who had then won a certain share in power in the framework of Byzantine government. Thus he alleged that the Ottoman Empire was a continuation of Byzantium – a new Roman Empire of the Turkish nation[21].

In Czech articles we may encounter opinions on the possibility of modernizing and civilizing Muslims primarily in the context of the efforts of the Austrian government to improve Bosnia and Herzegovina. Josef Holeček expressed the view that the Bosnian Muslims were the most educated stratum of the population in Bosnia. Indeed, it is in Holeček's writings that we can see for the first time the emergence of the image of the "nationally conscious, educated Muslim" in contrast to the images of the "fanatical warrior" or "dull, ignorant layabout" that prevailed up to this time. Another Czech author, Josef Daneš, however, called the Bosnian Muslims "an obstacle to the progress of the country"[22].

The Muslim woman – The gender aspect of the problem

At the end of the 19th century the view of the oriental woman was not monolithic in European culture, but the idea of the 'unfree woman' imprisoned in the harem and forced to cover her face in public was prevalent. More broadly, the persistent image was of the Muslim woman as passionate, sometimes sinful, oppressed but also mysterious and exotic[23].

The subordination of women in Islam, allegedly based on the principles of the Koran, was one of the traditional stereotypes to be found in European culture of the 19th century. Yet, as specialists on Islam and its culture have demonstrated, the position of women was not based only on the Koran, and was modified by different traditional structures and social environments. These specialists have drawn attention to the fact that nowhere in the Koran are there direct prohibitions and commands relating to the role and position of women, but only exhortations on what women should or should not do. The practise has therefore always depended on the interpretation of individual citations from the Koran in a particular society. The prohibition on women leaving the house was derived for example from the interpretation of the following verses: "Oh ye wives of the Prophet! Ye are not like any other women [...] And stay in your houses. Bedizen not yourselves with the bedizenment of the Time of Ignorance [...]" (*Koran* 33: 23-33). The command to veil the face was an interpretation of the verses: "O Proph-

et! Tell thy wives and thy daughters and the women of the believers to draw their cloaks close round them. That will be better, that so they may be recognised and not annoyed [...]." (*Koran* 33:59). Women were deliberately disadvantaged by interpretations of the Koran that legitimised the rule of men over women[24].

However, the powers of women also depended on their social and regional origins. For example women from the highest strata of Ottoman society were in charge of the running of the harem and household[25]. In this sense they were the heads of families, to whom the whole household – sons, daughters, daughters-in-law and servants – were subordinate. A woman's status increased if she gave birth to a male child. The woman also had full responsibility for the upbringing of children. In the sources studied we find comments on or accounts of women in Muslim society in Bulgaria, Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania and European Turkey. Generally the authors had either travelled in areas inhabited by the poorer strata of the population or stayed in Istanbul, which naturally had a very specific character as the political and cultural centre. In their articles we therefore find reactions to two opposite poles in society: the poor village population in Bosnia or Albania or, by contrast, the women of the urban society of rich and busy Istanbul. Among French authors it was the theme of Muslim women from the capital that predominated, while Czechs tended to write about the position of women in the Muslim societies of the Balkan provinces.

In the texts analysed most of the comments on the position of women in society are critical. With a mixture of humour, bitterness, anger and regret, the authors describe women as helpless creatures imprisoned in harems and dependent on their men. It is nonetheless evident that authors also noticed differences between the regional Muslim communities. For example, both Czech and French authors drew attention to the fact that Bosnian Muslim men did not practise polygamy. We can find remarks of this kind in articles by Josef Holeček, Konstantin Jireček and Emil Lavaley.

At the beginning of the 20th century comments appear that reflect wider debate on the theme of the position of women in society and the importance of women in the process of modernization. Some authors saw the inferior status of women in Muslim society as a hindrance to progress, and argued that unless the position of women and their level of education were improved, Islamic society would never advance to modernity. When describing relationships in Bosnia, Lavaley, for example claimed that:

> [...] even if a Muslim has only one wife, she is a subject being, a personal slave isolated from all culture. And because the task of woman is to bring up children, in this respect I see only miserable consequences...[It is] in the situation of women that we can identify the main obstacle to the modernisation of this territory...we are talking of very primitive human creatures who know absolutely nothing. In this context do we not reflect on the kind of position women have in Christian families? On the important role that women play here? We may ask ourselves if this is precisely not the reason why Muslims cannot assimilate to western culture [...][26].

We find the same kinds of ideas expressed by another French author, Yves Reynaud, in his article *La femme dans l' Islam* of 1911. He criticised Muslim society as a whole and argued that the betterment of the position of women was the precondition for any social progress[27].

On the other hand, the sources also contain comments to the effect that life in the harem was relatively comfortable for women, who had complete material security and did not need to work. Some authors went so far as to ask whether women were not actually content in these conditions. They described the position of female Muslims in positive terms, describing how songs, laughter and music came from the harem, how Muslim women led carefree lives while the men had to take care of all the practicalities[28]. Even Reynaud wrote that "some Oriental women have adapted ... many of them are satisfied and would not exchange their life for that of European women, who have numerous duties and responsibilities"[29]. This is a point of view developed in relation to the lives of Christian women by an anonymous Czech author, who in 1907 compared their existence with that of Muslim women. He suggested that the position of "civilised women" was actually worse than the position of Muslim women, as Muslim women were "materially fully taken care of", a state he viewed as more advantageous than the lot of their "civilized" sisters in Europe. He asked "How many civilized women, whose life passes in the shadow of modern laws in hunger and cold, would not happily exchange their work at the sewing machine or in a school for residence in a harem?"[30]. Here we have an interesting elaboration of the theme of the negative impact of civilization, modernization and female emancipation. In general, however, we can say that the Christian woman appears as mirror opposite to the Muslim woman – as hardworking and unveiled. The author himself ultimately presents a positive image of the Christian woman, considering her to be superior in morals and character to the Muslim woman[31].

Conclusion

Although we have looked at only three types of image that can be analysed in these periodicals, it is clear that the image of Muslims was very colourful, and we can in fact go further and state that when comparing images from sources of a different provenance we find a shared single image of Muslims in some cases, but elsewhere divergent or qualified and localized images of Muslims. A clearly negative image of Muslims emerges from the Czech sources in the period of armed conflicts in the Balkans, and is mirrored by the correspondingly positive image of Balkan Slav-Christians. The issue here is one of confrontation between Muslims – represented by Turks and Albanians – and Balkan Christians on the other. In the French sources, however, we do not find such a sharp polarization of the image of Muslims and Christians in this context.

Yet another image of Muslims appeared in remarks surrounding the question of modernisation. Here the situation was essentially one of contrast and confrontation between Islamic culture and the 'modern European civilization' from which the writers themselves came. Two images of Muslims took shape in this context – on the one hand

a negative stereotype, and, on the other, a new, unconventional and often positive image that deviated from the stereotype. Both these images were common to both the groups of writers, Czech and French. The stereotypical image presented the Muslim as uneducated and uneducable, and badly behaved towards women. In the framework of this negative image the Muslim woman was perceived as a helpless subject of male tyranny, and Muslim society was the precise opposite of the 'European' society from which the writers came, and into which they refused to admit Muslims, specifically Turks. The positive image of Muslims deviated entirely from the stereotypical view. Turks were in this perspective considered a part of European history; the existence of an educated social elite (among Turks, the Bosnian Muslims) was accepted; and Muslim women were considered happily liberated from the need to work, unlike European women.

My research indicates that a comparison of the Czech (Central European and Slav) view with the image created in the French (West European) environment shows many similarities of perspective: they were both part of a broadly conceived 'Occidental' discourse about Balkans. This research also suggests that there is no one common Occidental approach and that there are interesting themes for further research. As might be expected, agreement between French and Czech writers exists particularly in relation to the "established negative stereotypes" concerning the perception of Islam and Muslims that form the dominant part of the image. What is particularly fruitful about the study, however, is the discovery that authors also showed an interest in exploring issues of the relationship between modernization, civilization and religion. In this context the stress that some authors, like Reynaud and Laveley, placed on the role of women in the process of the modernization of society and the need to improve their position is surprising. Another important aspect revealed by this research has been the perception of social differentiation within Muslim society. There remains a great deal of room for further scholarship in questions surrounding the relationship of religion to modernization, social structures and gender roles.

Notes

[1]   See the author's *Obraz balkánské ženy v české publicistice*, in J. Polišenský (ed.), *Češi a svět. Sborník k pětasedmdesátinám Prof. Dr. Ivana Pfaffa*, Praha 2000; *The Bulgarian Intelligentsia and "inteligencija" (a contribution to the history of the study of the Bulgarian intelligentsia in the 19th century and the testimony of Konstantin Jireček)*, in L. Klusáková (ed.), *"We" and "the Others": European societies in search of identity. Studies in comparative history*, Studia historica LIII, AUC Philosophica et Historica 1/2000, Prague 2004, pp. 153-165; and also *Raum und Zivilisation. Zur Stellung des Balkan im kulturellen Horizont der tschechischen Gesellschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts*, in A. Bauerkämper, H.E. Bödeker, *Die Welt erfahren. Reisen als kulturelle Begegnung von 1780 bis heute*, Frankfurt - New York 2004, pp. 95-114.

[2]   See for example, B. Jelavich**,** *History of the Balkans, I, 18th and 19th Century*, Cambridge 1985, and Id., *History of the Balkans, II, Twentieth Century*, Cambridge 1993.

[3]   Ch. Peltre, *Orientalisme*, Paris 2005; E. Said*, L'orientalisme: L'Orient crée par l'Occident*, Paris 2005.

[4]   *Ottův slovník naučný: ilustrovaná encyklopedie obecných znalostí* [Otto's Educational Dictionary: An illustrated encyclopaedia of General Knowledge]. Prague 1888-1909, 28 vols. Also accessible at http://coto.je; *Larousse du XIXème siècle*, VIII, p. 326.

[5]   Peltre, *Orientalisme* cit., Said, *L' orientalisme* cit.

[6]   On the image of the Balkans in European culture of the 19th and early 20th century see M. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans,* Oxford 1997.

[7]   In the period studied there were a number of geopolitical changes that substantially changed the borders in the Balkans and also had an impact on the socio-economic conditions of Balkan societies. Milestones included the year 1875, which saw the outbreak of a rebellion, the Russo-Turkish War in 1877-78, the annexation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary and Young Turk Revolution in 1908, and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. For a detailed account see B. Jelavich, Ch. Jelavich, *The Balkans in Transition,* Berkeley - Los Angeles 1963, and Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, II,* cit.

[8]   These expressions appeared frequently in *Národní Listy* [Czech daily news], especially during the Balkan Wars 1912-13.

[9]   For more on the image of Turks in Czech culture in the early modern period see T. Rataj, *České země ve stínu půlměsíce: Obraz Turka v raně novověké literatuře z českých zemí* [The Bohemian Lands in the Shadow of the Crescent: The image of Turks in Early Modern literature in the Bohemian Lands], Prague 2002.

[10] Josef Holeček, *Černohorci ve zbrani* [Montenegrians in Arms], in "Osvěta", 1880, pp. 278 ff.

[11] On Czech Pan-Slavism see V. Šťastný, *Slovanství v národním životě Čechů a Slováků [Slavdom in the National Life of Czechs and Slovaks]*, Prague 1968.

[12] Holeček, *Černohorci* cit, pp. 278 ff.

[13] "[...] already some Turks – but so far they are only rare exceptions - are learning modern sciences, educating themselves and ceasing to be Turks, becoming French in speech and manners. An educated Turk is an impossibility. Here there is just the cruel choice: to be an educated man or a Turk [...]". J. Wünsch, *Cařihrad*, in "Osvěta", 1876, p. 515.

[14] The fashion and customs coming from Western Europe were called *alafranga*.

[15] A. Gilléron, *Gréce et Turquie. Notes de voyages*, in "Revue des Deux Mondes", 1877, p. 283.

[16] For more on the history of the Young Turk movement see F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, *The Commitée for Union and Progress 1908-1914*, Oxford 1969.

[17] J. Erdic, *Autour de la Bulgarie*, Paris 1884, pp. 5, 40-41, 132.

[18] L. Lamouche, *La péninsule balkanique*, Paris 1899, pp. 118-120.

[19] *Ibid*., p. 118.

[20] J. Bidlo, *Úpadek moci turecké a osvobození balkánských Slovanů* [The Fall of Turkish Power and the Liberation of the Balkan Slavs], in "Slovanský Přehled", 1912, pp. 149-151.

[21] *Ibid*., p. 150.

[22] J. V. Daneš, *Před jubileem okupace*, Prague 1908, p. 11.

[23] A. Grosrichard, *La structure du sérail: La fiction du despotisme asiatique dans l' Occident classique*, Paris 1999.

[24] I. Kouřilová, *Žena a sexualita – fatální téma islámu* [Woman and Sexuality – the Fatal Theme of Islam], in *Cesta k prameni*, Prague 2003, pp. 35-44, p. 58

[25] F. Hitzel, *L' Empire Ottoman*, Paris 2002, pp. 235-236.

[26] E. de Laveley, *La péninsule des Balkans*, 1885, vol. I, p. 235.

[27] Y. Reynaud, *La femme dans l' islame*, in "Correspondant", 10 October 1911, p. 59.

[28] Holeček, *Bosna*, in "Osvěta", 1876, p. 808.

[29] Reynaud, *La femme* cit., p. 76.

[30] *Svatební obřady* [Wedding Ceremonies], in "Zlatá Praha", 1907, p. 628.

[31] *Komentář k obrazu Kratochvíle* [Commentary on Picture Entitled Leisure], in "Zlatá Praha", 1888, p. 815.

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(Re)reading the Grand Ceremonial Hall in the Dolmabahçe Palace

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Abstract

The changes in the Ottoman palatial tradition in the 19th century reflected two major developments: firstly, the altering power relations within the State and the relations of the Empire to the outside world, and secondly, the newly introduced palace culture. These changes can be seen in the architecture of the newly built Dolmabahçe Palace. The *Muayede Salonu* [The Grand Ceremonial Hall] in this new palace is of paramount importance, for it was the setting for state ceremonies organised according to the changing palace protocol and it also functioned as the splendid face of the Empire, representing its prestige to the world. The Grand Ceremonial Hall is situated in the centre of the palace, between the *Selamlık*, representing the official image of the palace, and the *Harem*, which was the hub of the private life of the Sultan. It is differentiated from other parts of the palace by its height and façade when viewed from outside, and by its huge dome and rich ornamentation when viewed from inside. However, historical documents and personal memoirs show that this 'centre' was not used as a public area, apart from the *Muayede*s [The Traditional Ceremony of Religious Observances], which was held twice a year and for certain receptions given to very distinguished foreign guests. When the architectural features of the hall within the palace complex are analysed, both in terms of their physical and visual accessibility and their particular relationships with the side rooms inside and out, it is worth noting that this so-to-speak central hall acts like an introverted space, having little interaction with the adjacent spaces. In a similar way, from studies of the personal memoirs of some historical figures from the Ottoman court, the Sultan's family and European travellers and officials, the Grand Ceremonial Hall remained at the periphery of the "social space" of the Dolmabahçe Palace, while being located in the centre of its "material space". Exploring the spatiality of the hall from this point of view leads to an alternative re-reading of its "multi-faceted" character, a revelation in fact. In short, this chapter attempts to re-read the Grand Ceremonial Hall by combining personal 'memoirs' with the real, physical, three-dimensional environment, while using as its methodological tool Lefebvre's ideas

on space, particularly his distinction between "material and social space" and his tripartite formulation on space.

Osmanlı saray geleneğindeki dönüşümler, 19. yüzyılda Dolmabahçe Sarayı'nın inşasıyla birlikte mimari anlamda somutlaşmıştır. Yeni saray, devlet içindeki ve dışındaki güç dengelerinin değişimine işaret etmekte, aynı zamanda, gelenekselden yeniye evrilen saray kültürünü temsil etmektedir. Saraydaki Muayede Salonu, değişen saray protokolünün beraberinde getirdiği büyük devlet törenlerine ve ziyafetlerine ev sahipliği yapması ve de imparatorluğun dışarıya göstermek istediği aydınlık yüzünü temsil etmesi bakımından fevkalade önemlidir. Muayede Salonu, sarayın kütlesinin merkezinde, Sarayın resmi yüzünü temsil eden Selamlık ile hanedanın özel hayatının geçtiği Harem arasında yer alır. Dört katlı kütlesi ile bu salon, sivil bir yapı olmasına karşın kentte yalnızca camilere tanınan anıtsallığa ulaşmış, denizden ya da karadan saraya yaklaşımda öncelikle göze çarpacak şekilde tasarlanmıştır. Bu ifade, Selamlık ve Harem kanatlarının iki katta çözülmüş olmasıyla da pekiştirilmiştir. Salon, ilk bakışta bu konumuyla, iki kanadı birbirine bağlayıp, yapı içinde genel bir dolaşım sağladığı ve saray hayatının odağında yer aldığı izlenimini verir. Ancak, bu mekân, yılda iki kere gerçekleşen muayedeler, diğer bir deyişle bayramlaşmalar ve de çok önemli yabancı devlet temsilcilerine verilen büyük ziyafetler gibi devlet törenleri dışında kullanılmamaktadır. Varolan fiziki özellikler, tahmini ilişki güzergâhları, sarayın iç mekân – dış mekân ilişkileri ve kullanım şemaları incelendiğinde ve özellikle, dönemin saray yaşantısına tanık olanların anılarında yazdıkları ile karşılaştırıldığında, Muayede Salonu'nun, sarayın fiziksel mekânının merkezinde, fakat sosyal mekânının periferinde olduğu görülecektir. Salonun mekânsallığını, kullanıcıların deneyimleri doğrultusunda şekillenen kişisel tarihler üzerinden araştırmak, salonun çokyüzlülük özelliğini ortaya çıkarmakta yardımcı olacak ve bu bağlamda salon üzerine yeni bir mekân okuması yapmanın yolunu açacaktır. Çalışmanın yöntemi 'Lefebvre'in mekân kavramları' -özellikle fiziksel mekân "material space" ve sosyal mekân "social space" ayrımı, sosyal mekânın çokyüzlülük "multifaceted" özelliği ve de sezilen ve algılanan "perceived", tasavvur edilen "conceived", ve yaşanılan "lived" olarak çeşitlenen üçlü mekân anlayışı- etrafında kurgulanmıştır. Bu doğrultuda varolan fiziksel mekânla birlikte farklı kültürel kimlikler ve kişisel tarihler üzerinden biçimlenen 'bellek'lerden ana kaynak olarak yararlanılmıştır.

From the Topkapı to the Dolmabahçe Palace

The Ottoman Empire's 'westernisation' process, which had been felt in state organisation and in social life from the beginning of the 18th century, was taken very seriously and increased in pace in the 19th century, especially with the initiatives of Sultan Abdülmecit. Triggered by the *Tanzimat Fermanı* [Administrative Reforms] in 1839, the improvements and changes in a large number of areas ranged from urban design to interior design and furniture making. İstanbul, the capital city of the Empire, was

where the greatest changes affecting everyday life were seen. The borders of the city expanded with the construction of open-air places, of public recreational spaces, of leisure resorts, of summer palaces and mansions along the Bosphorus. The centre of gravity began to move from the Topkapı Palace complex, the former heart of the government, towards Galata and Pera, where most commercial activities were located[1]. New types of buildings enlivened the cityscape; most were not designed for the administration of the state, but were developed to meet new requirements for the Sultan's own lifestyle. Sultan mosques, which were once part of "public endowments" and Sultan *külliye*s, which had served charitable purposes, were turned into private chapels reserved for the Sultan and his entourage[2]. There was a rapid increase in the construction of winter and summer royal palaces in the 'western' style, and these populated the shores of the Bosphorus. Yet, with changing state protocol, the existing Ottoman 'palace' was inevitably challenged to meet the new requirements, particularly the new diplomatic rules established during the Congress of Vienna in 1815[3]. In short, the Ottoman palatial tradition, which had informed the architecture of the Topkapı Palace, underwent great changes in the 19th century.

A 'palace' in the Ottoman Empire was an appropriated space, designed and then gradually modified in order to serve the needs of a ruler both in the political and the private spheres. The former palace, the Topkapı Palace in Sarayburnu, had been both the centre of government of the Empire and the Sultan's residence, from the reign of Mehmet the Conqueror, in the middle of the 15th century and continuing right up to the middle of the 19th century. The floor plans and the articulation of the volumes indicate a formally effective but hybrid result, due to the fact that each new structure was added by a new Sultan after his enthronement. There are wide open spaces, within which these masses are constructed. Architecturally speaking, the Topkapı palace kept changing over the centuries with each new structure[4]. However, at the same time, these masses complemented each other within the silhouette of the palace and pointed to an integrated design with complementary fragments. The plan, moving from the most public to the most private, involved four courtyards, which were surrounded by building masses, arranged consecutively. While the outermost courtyard, an important node of urban life, was used for state ceremonies and other public events, the innermost court was reserved for the Sultan's private mansions (Fig. 1).

By the 19th century contemporary formality, European state ceremonies and new state protocols called for certain specialized ceremonial spaces, which the Topkapı Palace did not have. Consequently, between 1849 and 1856, a new palace, the Dolmabahçe Palace, was constructed for the court of the Sultan on the site of the old Beşiktaş Palace, within the colourful gardens along Bosphorus.

Fig. 1
Ground Floor Plan of the Topkapı Palace (after Esemenli)
Source: D. Esemenli, *Osmanlı Sarayı ve Dolmabahçe* [Ottoman Palace and Dolmabahçe], İstanbul 2002, p. 7.

Different from the Topkapı Palace, the Dolmabahçe Palace shows an integrated architectural design, which provides for all the required functions in one unified, monumental, imposing building mass (Fig. 2). The receptions and ceremonies that once took place partly in the scattered structures and partly in the open courtyards in the Topkapı Palace were moved from the outdoor spaces to indoor rooms, following the introduction of a new palace protocol.

Fig. 2
Exterior View of the Dolmabahçe Palace
Source: Yücel İ. et. all, *Dolmabahçe Sarayı* [Dolmabahçe Palace], *TBMM Milli Saraylar Daire Başkanlığı Yayın No: 28* [Department of National Palaces Publication No: 28], İstanbul 2005, pp. 6-7

Due to the changes in state organization, the active power of the Sultan was also challenged, and thus governmental actions and operations were almost totally moved to the *Bab-ı Ali*, [the Sublime Porte] near the Topkapı Palace, rather than to the palace complex itself [5]. The new palace housed only a few rooms reserved for the administrative cadres on the ground floor. Similarly, the *Enderun* [the Imperial School], located in the Topkapı Palace complex, had already begun to lose its importance in the early 1800s. Hence, the *Enderun* buildings, where the future administrative cadres of the Empire were educated, were not spatially represented in the new palace (Fig. 3).

In fact, the integrated character of the Ottoman palatial tradition, which used to hold together government activities and state affairs in the royal residences was challenged and, to a certain extent, destroyed. There were separate structures for government functions, the most significant of which was the *Bab-ı Ali,* located outside the palace complex. The only state spaces inside the Dolmabahçe Palace were ceremonial halls, reception rooms and the study rooms of the Sultan and his entourage. Not surprisingly, the interior layout of the new palace was very simple and regular: groups of rooms on a straight line, opening to a central public hall and forming cohesive units, very appropriate for differing receptions. Both within the organisation of the plan and in the

articulation of the building masses, the grand space located in the centre prevails. This grand space is four storeys high and flanked by two-storey high wings on the left and right, containing the public and private rooms respectively (Fig. 2-3).

Fig. 3
Schematic Comparison of the Site Plans of the Topkapı and Dolmabahçe Palaces (after Aksit and Eldem)
Source: İ. Akşit, *The Palaces of Topkapı and Dolmabahçe*, Istanbul, pp. 50-51; S. H. Eldem, *Boğaziçi Yalıları* [Mansions in Bosphorus], Istanbul 1993-1994, pp. 23-24.

THE *MUAYEDE SALONU* [THE GRAND CEREMONIAL HALL] IN THE DOLMABAHÇE PALACE

This centrally situated grand hall, named the *Muayede Salonu* [Grand Ceremonial Hall], is the most noteworthy space within the Dolmabahçe Palace. It reflects the changes in the power relations of the State and the shifts from the traditional to the 19th century palace culture. It is in the centre of the palace, between the *Selamlık*, representing the official image of the palace, and the *Harem*, the focus of the private life of the Sultan. Whether approached from the sea or from the land, the hall is seen clearly as a distinguished space. It measures 40 metres by 45 metres: paired columns support

semi-domes, which in turn support the 36 metres high, 24 metres wide central dome. The hall is surrounded by a corridor on its sea side, which is in fact the only connection between the *Selamlık* and the *Harem* (Fig. 4). In this way, even though physically separated from the main body of the building, it has the passageway on its periphery, providing general circulation within the palace, by linking the Selamlık and the Harem. Yet, the main question here is whether this hall, though physically occupying the centre, also constituted the social centre of the palace.

Fig. 4
Grand Ceremonial Hall in the Plan of the Dolmabahçe Palace (after Akşit)
Source: İ. Akșit, *The Palaces of Topkapı and Dolmabahçe*, İstanbul, pp. 46-47.

At this point, it needs to be said that the centrally located hall has been highlighted and analyzed by historians of architecture mostly for its architectural features and physical properties[6]. In other words, it has been studied mainly in terms of its "material space"[7]. In addition, even though it was a civic structure, the Grand Ceremonial Hall was built on a scale that had traditionally only been attributed to mosques in the city[8]. In this sense, this reception room bears a resemblance to the greatest religious spaces of the time because of the dimensions of its dome. The hall is even compared to the Hagia Sophia and claims are made that it speaks of universal sovereignty, because of the ideology lying behind the design of such a great dome[9]. Alternatively, as the only space in which the throne of the Sultan was placed, it might have recalled the throne rooms

of European palaces. From the same point of view, the hall might also be compared with the *Bab-üs Saade,* in front of which the Throne of the Sultan was placed in the Topkapı Palace. All these features may provide some clues as to how heterogeneous the "social space"[10] of this centrally located hall might be. Hence, this study takes into account Lefebvre's claim about the "multi-faceted" nature of social space and formulates its methodology around it.

In Lefebvre's terms, a space may display various identities depending on the various times and users of various backgrounds. In his words, "Social space is multi-faceted: abstract and practical, immediate and mediated. Religious space did not disappear with the advent of commercial space; it was still the space of speech and knowledge. [...] There was room for other spaces – for the space of exchange, for the space of power"[11]. Based on Lefebvre's conception of space, a study of the Grand Ceremonial Hall of the Dolmabahçe Palace may lead to a different perspective when considering the methodological approaches in this subject area within architectural history. For this purpose, written historical accounts mentioning the events and activities taking place in this space are used to unfold the "social space" of the Grand Ceremonial Hall.

The first account about this hall is an article from a newspaper. The text describes the eye-catching ceremony in the Grand Ceremonial Hall for the opening day of the Dolmabahçe Palace in 1856, which was combined with a great banquet held in honour of the French commander, Maréchal Pélissier. The banquet was a celebration of both the opening of the palace and the signing of the Peace Treaty after the Crimean War. The "Journal de Constantinople", one of the Beyoğlu newspapers published in İstanbul, gives a detailed account of the reception in its issue dated 17 July 1856. "L'Illustration", another newspaper published in Paris, gives a detailed description of the same event[12].

> The guests, who began to arrive at six o'clock in the evening by boat, caique [a light rowing boat used on the Bosporus], coach or horse, were ushered by court officials into the magnificent ante-chamber next to the Throne Room, where the Grand Vizier and all the viziers were already in attendance. Sultan Abdülmecit finally entered and presented a medal encrusted with brilliants to the French commander, Maréchal Pellisier, at the same time giving an identical medal to the British Ambassador for presentation to the British commander, General Sir William Codrington, who had not yet returned from the front. At seven o'clock, the guests entered the dining-room, where places were set for a hundred and thirty guests at a table decorated with vases of flowers and gold candlesticks. The Grand Vizier, Ali Pasha, was in the seat of honour, with the British Ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, on his right, and the French commander, Maréchal Péllisier, on his left. Opposite him sat Mehmet Ali Pasha, Minister of the Fleet, with the French Ambassador, M. Thouvenel, on his right. The banquet began with the Abdülmecit March, followed by the French and British national anthems[13].

Written for a newspaper, this account creates a clear, non-partisan mental picture. It objectively describes the ceremony before people entered the Grand Hall, referred to a "dining room", the richly decorated table and the important *personae* at the opening

reception. Appropriate for the linguistic *habitus* of newspapers, the intention here is probably to describe the hall and the distinguished guests by equating the glory of the hall with the Empire and the Sultan, and to have the readers assimilate the information as part of their general knowledge. But such a reading may result in oversimplifying the actual historical reality of this hall and the ways people read it. The physical and the social position of the hall within the palace has a crucial role in the creation of different 'readings,' as the Ottoman palace is a wide social system, involving not just the physical building but a heterogeneous, hierarchically organized community living under the same roof. The Grand Hall is not just a highly ornamental structure, but a material artefact and a social product, one that requires the addition of sociological descriptions of the space to the common analyses of physical properties, which can then be supported by referring to personal accounts. In Benjamin's terms, "a memoir does not aim to convey an event *per se*, which is the purpose of information; rather, it embeds the event in the life of the storyteller in order to pass it on as experience to those listening"[14]. Accordingly, the basic constituents of this study are extracts from personal memoirs containing perceived details about the general context or setting of an event in this hall.

Put another way, memoirs of the Sultan's family, of palace officials, of European travellers and officials, which represent the spatial experiences of different users and social groups, may reveal personal and subjective readings of the very same space. When evaluated with the physical properties of the hall, in other words with the "material space" of the Hall, such an approach might point to Lefebvre's triadic formulation on space as "perceived", "conceived", and "lived"[15]. The tension in memoirs, between reveries and dreams of the past being free and personal on the one hand and the reconstruction of the past under the influence of collective memory on the other, strengthens the idea of different spatialities in a defined time being expressed simultaneously. This study, by emphasizing a methodological approach based on Lefebvre's conception of space, and by making use of memoirs as the main source, alongside the existing space, attempts to show a different viewpoint about the spatialities of the Grand Ceremonial Hall.

Exploring ceremonies in personal memoirs

After the opening ceremony, which reflected the newly changing palace protocol in the architectural medium, whereby the palace represented the prestige of the Empire to the Western world, the Grand Ceremonial Hall witnessed significant, large state ceremonies and banquets involving distinguished foreign guests. After Abdülmecit, his brother Abdülaziz was enthroned as the next Sultan. During the rule of Abdülaziz, great receptions continued to be held in honour of eminent foreign guests like the Austrian Emperor Franz Josef and the French Empress Eugénie. The arrival of the Empress was one of the most amazing events at the Dolmabahçe Palace. She was received by the Sultan in the Palace of Dolmabahçe, where a magnificent banquet was held in her

honour on 13 October 1868. The written accounts of Willy Sperco, a foreigner residing in İstanbul, provide significant information:

> Eighteen different courses were served at the magnificent banquet held in the Muayede Salonu (the Reception Hall), and all eyes were dazzled by the gilt on the men's uniforms and the jewels on the ladies' dresses. In her description of the Palace itself Mary de Larminat, one of the Empress' maids of honour, writes: "It is beautiful, very beautiful. But there is too much gold. Far too much gold[16].

While describing the beauty of the palace and particularly the Ceremonial Hall, Mary de Larminat touches upon the excessive amount of gold and glitter. Yet, she emphasizes an exaggerated flamboyance rather than serene grandeur, which differs from the spatial experiences of Şadiye Osmanoğlu, the daughter of Sultan Abdülhamit II, about the Hall. Şadiye Osmanoğlu sees only the grandeur of the Hall: "I have visited all the palaces in Europe, but never met with the glory of the grand domed hall"[17].

Abdülhamit II, the successor of Abdülaziz, moved to the Yıldız Palace, located on the hills of Beşiktaş. The preference for a more secluded and secure site for a palace rather than the Dolmabahçe, situated on the sea front and surrounded by public routes on its three sides, was probably dictated by security considerations, which were taken seriously by the new Sultan[18]. In those years, the receptions for distinguished foreign guests were held in the *Şale Köşkü* in the Yıldız Palace. Şadiye Osmanoğlu states that, "The *Şale Köşkü*, among the other kiosks in the Yıldız Palace, was the one where my father received the foreign delegates and held banquets in their honour"[19]. However, the Grand Ceremonial Hall in the Dolmabahçe Palace was still reserved for important events. Abdülhamit continued the tradition of the *Muayede* ceremonies, which were held twice a year in this Hall.

Later, during the reign of the next Sultan, Mehmet Reşat, the palace once again moved to Dolmabahçe. The already infrequent receptions and banquets were held even less often in the Grand Ceremonial Hall. For instance, as *Mabeyn Başkatibi* [the Chamberlain's Chief Clerk] Halit Ziya writes in his memoirs about the Dolmabahçe Palace, the banquet in the honour of *Mısır Hıdivi* [the Governor of Egypt] was held in the *Zülvecheyn Sofa*, a hall in *Selamlık* instead of in the Grand Ceremonial Hall.

> Workers were gathered in the great *sofa* [the central space in a traditional Turkish residence], which was called the *Zülvecheyn* [the two sided] Hall. All day long, the sounds of adzes were heard in the palace, while a patched up, but at the same time a firm, *sofra* [dinner table] was being installed. Instead of the splendid dining ware of gilded silver, a small silver dining set, which would suffice for a limited number of the board of governors, was brought. The dining set was named as Ulah ware because of its having probably being sent to Ulahya for a banquet given in honour of the Russian Tsar. In short, on that particular evening, a banquet appropriate to the prestige of the sultanate was held with a reception that included members of the *Hademe-i Hassa* [the Imperial Guards], the *Muzıka-i Hümayun* [the Imperial Band], and the *Enderun* [the Imperial School][20].

Over and above its use during certain receptions given to very distinguished foreign guests, this grand ceremonial hall, the *Muayede Salonu* was used during the *Muayede*s, the traditional events of the Sultan receiving greetings on the occasion of annual religious observances. The male members of the royal family, viziers and ministers, the *ulema* [Religious Officials], and deputy officers were all received by the Sultan here. On these occasions, the Throne, which stands as the symbol of the Ottoman dynasty, was brought from the Treasury of Topkapı. As regards the use of the Throne in the ceremony, the Hall is sometimes compared to European ceremonial throne rooms. However, the temporary use of the Throne, the difference from the vaulted, quadrilateral or oval ceremonial halls, and the infrequent usage make such a comparison unfounded. Safiye Ünüvar, one of the instructors responsible for the education of the little princesses in the Dolmabahçe Palace, explains the preparations in the Hall before the ceremony of the *Muayede*.

> At the behest of the Sultan, this significant object is brought in a closed carriage, accompanied by the chiefs of the *Enderun* [the Imperial School], the treasury keeper and the chief chamberlain, together with eight soldiers and one officer, from the Topkapı Palace to the Beşiktaş Palace, and arrives at the stone staircase of the *Mabeyn* [the Public Spaces of the Palace]. The treasury keeper has the keys of the door of the carriage. The chiefs of the *Enderun* carry the throne, which is in pieces, to the *Muayede Salonu* [the Grand Ceremonial Hall] and put them together. [...] During the *Muayede* [the Traditional Greeting Event], the person whom the Sultan commands holds the tassel at the level of his chest. The visitors do not kiss the hand or the coat tail of the Sultan. They kiss this tassel. After the preparation of the throne the other people retire. Until the *Muayede* ceremony next day, the officer and the soldiers keep guard for the whole night[21].

The *Muayede* ceremony has a public character that must be highlighted. Statesmen, deemed worthy to be received by the Sultan, foreign ambassadors, eminent guests and members of the royal family offer their greetings to the Sultan according to a pre-determined arrangement. The greeting ceremony includes only the upper-class members of society. Even so, from the fact that people with various identities are associated with such an elite group, the ceremony turns into a joint experience, just as the ceremonial hall turns into a shared, experienced space. The *Muayede* performance in the grandeur of the *Muayede* Hall (the space for this performance), is repeated twice a year. Yet these religious and, at the same time, state ceremonies, which have their particular rhythm and order, take their place in the collective memory of the palace residents. Şadiye Osmanoğlu, the daughter of Abdülhamit II, describes these ceremonies in detail.

> There was a big, wide room called the *Muayede Salonu* in the Dolmabahçe Palace. The throne of my father was kept here. [...] The ceremonies held in the throne room, especially the congratulation rituals, were splendid; these were such sublime scenes that whenever I remember them, I still feel that thrill where everything quivers. [...] For the celebration, the state's and the foreign states' high officials took their preset places. My father came to the front of the throne, stood there and the ceremony began. *Şeyh-ül-İslam* [the Chief Religious Official] as

the first and the *meşayih* [a Religious Official], in their official costumes of white *maşlah* [a particular cloak] and turban with gilded tassels on their heads, approached the throne again and again, bowed and kissed the sacred symbol of our religion and moved away. My father accepted the greetings of the religious officials standing up, and spoke a couple of words to everyone with a smiling, cheerful face. They were followed by the representatives of the Christian and Jewish religions in the Capital – patriarch, bishop and rabbis in their vestments. My father accepted their greetings standing up, just as he did for the religious officials. Later on, ambassadors, officers, aides, soldiers, subjects of the Sultan, and finally delegates of foreign embassies participated in the ceremony. The wives of the embassy delegates, "*madams*", as they are called, were taken to a corner of the Hall and just watched the ceremony from there. However, at a later time, in his particular presence, they were saluted and complimented. The members of the royal family – my uncles and brothers at the front; grooms, the spouses of my sisters and aunts in the second row – stood behind the throne during the ceremony. At the end, they, too, came to the front of the throne and gave their greeting one by one[22].

It has to be emphasized that none of the private ceremonies of the family of the Sultan were held in the *Muayede Salonu.* Usually, daily religious practices, wedding ceremonies, some official receptions, banquets and the like took place in the *Zülvecheyn* Hall, the main space in the *Selamlık* section. In addition, the collective prayer activities during Ramadan, the month of fasting and religious exercises in Islam, also took place in this space. Halit Ziya describes how these prayer activities unfolded in the *Zülvecheyn* Hall.

> For *teravih* [the Ritual Practice in Ramadan Evenings] prayer rugs were laid on the floor of the *zülvecheyn* [the double sided] hall, a special place with fences set at the end of the hall for the women from the *Harem-i Hümayun* [the Private / Women's Quarters of the Palace]. *Müezzin-i şehriyari* [the Sultan's Private *Muezzin*] – he was one of the *Hademe-i Hümayun* [Palace Officials] and at times participated in the Sultan's classical music orchestra – had a beautiful voice. *İmam-ı Şehriyari* [the Sultan's Private *İmam*] was also an able singer/musician. With all these preparations *teravih* was practiced[23].

Even, during the reign of Sultan Mehmet Reşat, receptions in honour of some royal foreign guests were held here instead of in the Grand Ceremonial Hall. Halit Ziya mentions the banquet given in honour of the King of Bulgaria in the *Zülvecheyn* Hall.

> The first great banquet was held in the Dolmabahçe Palace for the visit of the King of Bulgaria. Beforehand, the new palace, not yet complete, was the location for a banquet for the regular visit of the *Mısır Hıdivi* [the Governor of Egypt] to İstanbul. However, because of government decisions, this banquet was quite short and simple, but was nevertheless an experience for the palace. The court took the bold step of giving a banquet for the King of Bulgaria, who had a demanding and selective nature and who had very definite views on the glorious banquets held in European palaces. [...] During that time, there was only one appropriate space for such feasts: the wide *sofa,* whose one façade faced the land and the other faced the sea and which is located between the inner and outer *Mabeyn,* and which, probably for that reason, is called the *zülvecheyn.* [Halit Ziya gives a detailed account of the

preparations in the hall and concludes]: it was a scene, rich, pleasing and beautiful beyond expectation[24].

As can be seen from these personal accounts, the multiplicity of users of different identities experiencing the Grand Ceremonial Hall can result in a variety of "conceived" spaces. Every individual has his/her own mentally constructed space, pointing to the diverse facets of spatiality inherent in this Hall. When the activities taking place there are fully considered, the Grand Ceremonial Hall only hosted significant receptions for distinguished foreign guests and the ceremonies concerning the honours of the *Muayede*s, which included both upper-class Ottomans and foreign ambassadors and officials[25]. Yet, the Hall has a separate entrance from outside, along the sea shore, called the *Yalı Kapısı.* It is an elaborate entrance, with monumental stairs and an ornamental façade. From here, the Hall can be accessed without encountering the flanking *Harem* and/or the *Selamlık* blocks on both sides, and can function independently from these buildings. In this respect, this space is isolated from the daily routine of the palace, which somehow can reflect the supreme importance and sublime character of the State. This imposing 'domed space' is far too sacred to be used for the private services of the Sultan and his family. With its grandeur, it represents the prestige of the State to the world and witnesses glorious banquets and receptions like those of the European palaces[26]. In such receptions, the Sultan takes his place as the actor, through whom the State is personified. Facing the sea and turning its back to the city, which in fact mirrors the general positioning of the palace in the cityscape, the Hall functioned like a stage for international politics. Accordingly, it can now be asked how this stage, showing the splendid face of the Empire to the world, is physically and visually accessible.

ENTERING AND VISUALISING THE GRAND CEREMONIAL HALL

When the Hall is analyzed architecturally for its accessibility, its relations with the outside and with the side rooms, its relations with circulation patterns and the like, it is surprising to see that this so-to-speak central hall acts like an introverted space which has little interaction with the adjacent spaces. Even though the palace seems to be a single mass, the Grand Hall is separated from the main block architecturally and is not physically related to it except for a narrow corridor. The corridor on the edge facing the sea is concealed by connecting the terraces above the vaulted kitchens on the ground floor to the walls of the Hall. Two staircases located on the corners of the Hall facing the sea provide vertical circulation between the ground floor, the connecting corridor and the upper floor galleries (Fig. 5).

Halit Ziya explains the circulation between Selamlık and Harem sections provided by the adjacent corridor of the Grand Hall.

> This passageway to the *Harem,* beginning by the end of the *Mabeyn* section, and encircling the *Muayede Salonu*, reaches the *Harem-i Hümayun* [the Private / Women's Quarters of

Ground Floor Plan,
showing Entances and Exedras

First Floor Plan,
showing *Harem* Corridor

Fig. 5
Ground and First Floor Plans of the Grand Ceremonial Hall (after Akşit and Merey)
Source: Akşit, İ., *The Palaces of Topkapı and Dolmabahçe*, Istanbul, pp. 46-47 and Merey L. Ş., *Dolmabahçe Sarayı Muayede Salonunun Isıtma Donatımı* [The Heating System of the Grand Ceremonial Hall of the Dolmabahçe Palace], in "Istanbul Devlet Mühendislik ve Mimarlık Akademisi Dergisi", 1978, 4, p. 126.

the Palace], where it attaches to the Hall and it is very long. […] I have walked through this passageway several times and was allowed to move to the *Harem* from the *Mabeyn*. On the *Mabeyn* side there was an iron door and the *Musahip* [the Sultan's Private Officer], keeping guard, opened this door with his key, locked it again when I entered the passageway, and after quite a long walk, having reached the end of the passageway on the *Harem* side, I came to a second iron door. The *Musahip* knocked on this door with either his fist or the key, the other *Musahip,* inside keeping guard, opened the door, and after this, that door was locked again after I entered the *Harem*[27].

Along the corridor, there are six doors, two of which are of iron. These corridors are connected at the same time to the staircases of the Grand Hall, the pantry below the symmetrical terraces and the waiting rooms of the *Musahip*s [the Sultan's Private Officers]. Access to the corridors is by permission and there are guards on duty, waiting by the doors. According to Halit Ziya's memoirs about the Dolmabahçe Palace, it is almost impossible for the visitors to use these corridors. Window openings are placed on the ground level on both sides of the corridor (Fig. 6). The windows facing the interior are fenced and are also hidden from view behind the exedra arches. The windows of the corridor facing the sea can be seen just like the other windows within the whole façade. That is why it is unlikely any visitor would be able to see this corridor behind the fences. The corridor on the lower floor is interpreted as the landing by the façade of the Hall and is closed by glass doors. In this way, by eliminating any access on the ground floor, the designers keep the privacy and isolation of the main hall. As a consequence, the most monumental and the grandest space of the palace cannot be seen without difficulty. At this point, Esemenli's description of the Hall as "this imposing Hall, where

the official face of the palace reaches its centre"[28] can be questioned, for the Hall is introverted, separated from the other spaces and is not physically related to daily life.

Fig. 6
View of the Harem Corridor
Source: Yücel İ. et. al., *Dolmabahçe Sarayı* [The Dolmabahçe Palace], *TBMM Milli Saraylar Daire Başkanlığı Yayın No: 28* [Department of National Palaces Publication No: 28], Istanbul 2005. p. 110.

The visitors approach the Hall from different points according to their position in the hierarchy of those giving their greetings to the Sultan. Consequently, people's visual perception and ultimately, their spatial experiences of the Hall vary according to the identity of the subject participating in the ceremony. Some visitors draw near the palace quays from the seaside and enter the Hall directly from its façade facing the sea or enter the *Binek Salonu* [the Major Waiting Room] first and then the Hall. Some visitors come from the land side by carriage and first enter the *Binek Salonu* and then the Grand Ceremonial Hall.

When they approach from the seaside, the visitors are welcomed by the monumental gateway known as the *Yalı Kapısı* (Fig. 7). Here, for the first time, the visitors face the grandeur of the Hall. After they enter the Grand Hall, what strikes them most is the effect of the crystal lighting focusing the eye on the centre: they are aware of the spaciousness, the airiness and the serenity of the interior space rather than the ornamental features and details of the interior design (Fig. 8). In describing the Hall in detail, Şadiye Osmanoğlu mentions its huge dimensions and its acoustic properties and underlines

Fig. 7
View of the Façade of the Grand Ceremonial Hall Facing the Sea
Source: İ. Yücel et. al, *Dolmabahçe Sarayı* [Dolmabahçe Palace], *TBMM Milli Saraylar Daire Başkanlığı Yayın No: 28* [Department of National Palaces Publication No: 28], Istanbul 2005. p. 39.

the effect that the immense crystal chandelier hung in the centre has on the user of this space.

> There was a very high and big dome in the Hall. The dome was designed to increase even the tiniest whisper. Footsteps could be heard, no matter how slowly one walked on the floor, which was covered with precious carpets and runners. The great, ornate and impressive chandelier, which was suspended at the centre attracted everybody's admiration. When the lights were on, the great radiance emanating from the crystals of the chandelier, provided a dazzling brightness, particularly on my father's gold, his medals and the diamonds of his throne[29].

This initial impression, step by step, encourages a thorough, visual perception of the space. On the opposite façade, there is the Sultan's Throne, placed in front of a wide niche, with great window openings set at the floor level. On the left and right, there are exedras, which are curtained and framed by two columns. Of these auxiliary spaces, the one on the *Selamlık* section is the access point for the visitors approaching from the land side, who then pass through the palace and enter the Grand Hall. The visitors who arrive from the sea are prepared for the splendour of the Hall through the ceremonial approach from the seaside façade, while the ones moving inside the palace, through the narrow corridors, enter this grand space suddenly and with little preparation. The auxiliary space on the *Selamlık* side does act as an interface for visitors coming from inside: it

Fig. 8
Interior View of the Grand Ceremonial Hall
Source: İ. Yücel et. al., *Dolmabahçe Sarayı* [Dolmabahçe Palace], *TBMM Milli Saraylar Daire Başkanlığı Yayın No: 28* [Department of National Palaces Publication No: 28], Istanbul 2005. p. 202.

stops them for a moment and then they see the grand space. A similar set-up exists with the single entrance on the *Harem* side. However, there is insufficient evidence about the use of this *Harem* side. Most probably, this entrance was not used as frequently as the one on the *Selamlık* side because of privacy issues (Fig. 5, 8).

Whether coming from the sea or the land side, some visitors proceed to the galleries within the deep arches that are accessed through the staircases placed on the corners. The gallery on the right of the main entrance is reserved for official guests, the one on the left for the *Mızıka-ı Hümayun* [the Imperial Musical Band], and the one above the entrance, thus facing the Throne of the Sultan, is reserved for foreign ambassadors.

Halit Ziya talks about this seating arrangement in his memoirs (Fig. 9).

> The *Muayede Salonu* was prepared a couple of days before the ceremony. The golden-coated throne, which was mentioned as being historically significant, was brought and placed on the edge of the land side of the Hall. The chairs were arranged and a buffet was set up on the upper floor of the Hall, facing the throne, for the ambassadors, their attendants and foreign

Fig. 9
Section showing the Interior Elevation of the Façade of the Grand Ceremonial Hall Facing the Sea (after Merey)
Source: Merey L. Ş., Dolmabahçe Sarayı Muayede Salonunun Isıtma Donatımı [The Heating System of the Grand Ceremonial Hall of Dolmabahçe Palace], in "İstanbul Devlet Mühendislik ve Mimarlık Akademisi Dergisi", 1978, 4, p. 127.

notables. For those who had had permission to watch the *Muayede* ceremony, even though they did not have official titles, the gallery on the right on the upper floor was allotted, and the imperial band occupied its preset place again on the upper floor[30].

Nevertheless, Leyla Hanım, the daughter of one of the palace doctors, İsmail Paşa, during the rule of Abdülmecit, states in her memoirs on the Dolmabahçe Palace that the people in the *Harem* watched the *Muayede*, the greeting ceremony, in the galleries like the official guests, the foreign ambassadors and the *Mızıka-ı Hümayun*.

There is a balcony surrounding the three walls of the ceremonial hall, which can be seen from the sea with its two-storey high ceiling and pitched roof. The balcony parallel to the pier on the sea side is connected to the upper floor rooms of the *Harem*. This balcony is hidden so as to provide an opportunity to watch the throne without being seen, by way of the ornamental fences. The daughters of the Sultan and their attendants watch the ceremony in this semi-closed balcony[31].

Similarly, the daughters of Abdülhamit II write about their arrival from Yıldız Palace to the Dolmabahçe Palace and about watching the ceremony from the galleries in the upper floor.

> The head of the *Musahip*s informed the chief secretary about the beginning of the *Muayede* ceremony. Then he came to the *Valide Sultan*'s [the Mother of the Sultan] room and said the *Muayede* ceremony was to begin. *Valide Sultan*, in her stylish costume, leading at the front of all the other Sultans [that is, the female members of the royal family who are also called Sultans] and their attendants, together walked through the great halls of the *Harem* and passed through the *Mabeyn* corridor; they then entered the lodges on the upper storey of the Grand Ceremonial Hall, sat on the raised cushion which were made ready beforehand and watched the ceremony. In the open lodges on the other sides of the Grand Ceremonial Hall, there stood the foreign ambassadors"[32].

> For the female members of the royal family, on the uppermost storey of the Grand Ceremonial Hall, balconies were prepared, which were skilfully constructed. While we could see the ceremony in all its details from the top, it was not possible for those in the hall to raise their heads and see us[33].

However, as we learn from the accounts of Safiye Ünüvar, during the reign of Sultan Mehmet Reşat, the doors of the *Harem* corridor opened after a call to the *Valide Sultan*, and the women of the *Harem* watched the ceremony through the fenced windows placed on the floor of the corridor (Fig. 5, 6, 9).

> The elites of the *Harem* watch the *Muayede* ceremony from the fenced low windows of the *Harem* corridor by the Grand Ceremonial Hall. Then they return to the *Harem,* and have their coffee served in half an hour. The coffee set is brought from the Topkapı Palace[34].

Ünüvar's writings display similarities with the information about the palace and palace life given by Halit Ziya.

> When looking from the Grand Ceremonial Hall, it is possible to detect this corridor, which is located behind the low fences, but only partially. The members of the *Harem* watched the *Muayede* ceremony in front of these fences, sitting on cushions[35].

It seems that during the reigns of Abdülmecit and Abdülhamit II, most of the members of the *Harem* watched the ceremony in the galleries. During the reign of Mehmet Reşat, however, the female members of the royal family observed the ceremony in the *Harem* corridor on the second storey level. Considering the uncertainty associated with personal memoirs, one could say that this may be due to the personal preferences of the *Harem* women to use this corridor rather than the galleries. They could have used both the galleries and the corridor. Or it may be argued that the women of the *Harem* were not allowed to use the galleries any more because of the changes in palace traditions. This highly speculative issue has to be studied further.

It is still worthwhile, however, to study the people's sighting of the Hall from these two levels. The first noticeable elements from the galleries might be the ornamentation on the surface of the dome and the architectural elements with their unrealistic

perspectives on the rear walls. Here, due to the height of the gallery level, the visitors experience the space, not from within but from outside. Thus, the visitor becomes the viewer, rather than the participant, while the Sultan and the guests on the ground floor level become part of the spectacle. The visual perception of the viewers situated in the *Harem* corridor can be evaluated in a similar way. The arrangement of the windows, which are set alongside the floor of the corridor, prevent any view of the side elevations and direct the eye specifically to the Throne, thus to the Sultan. The *Harem* members watch the ceremony focusing on the Sultan through the hidden windows behind the screens (Fig. 6, 9).

Whether watched from the galleries or from the *Harem* corridor, the Sultan, who directs the hierarchical flow during the ceremony, is visually the absolute focus for all the viewers of the ceremony. Quite differently from the privileged guests and women on the upper levels, the guests standing in the centre, on the ground floor, have another visual environment. They are mostly constrained to follow the 'choreography' within the assembled people, while trying to keep to the obligations of protocol. Experiencing the space from within, they have difficulty in conceiving the whole most of the time during the 'play.' Standing on the same level, the eye is compelled most probably to focus on the Sultan, and ultimately on the state officials who share the 'stage' with the Sultan. So, while being 'viewed' by those watching from upper levels, they are also 'viewers' considering the acts happening around them.

Final Remarks

To cite Lefebvre in conclusion, every society produces its own appropriated space in the light of its unique spatial practices, for space is accepted as a social product. For him, to "decode" the material space, social space should be "read" through existing specific codes, established at specific historical moments[36]. Throughout these analyses it may be stated that the Hall is necessarily, if not purposefully, detached from the daily life of the palace. In spite of its central location, the Hall does not contribute to circulation within the palace, for the corridor around it was not accessible for most of the inhabitants of the palace. When evaluated as a space in itself, it is introverted and surrounded by auxiliary spaces, which are designed at three different levels. The Grand Ceremonial Hall of the Dolmabahçe Palace, in fact, lies at the periphery of the "social space" of the palace, while located in the centre of its "material space."

On another note, the Hall can be also interpreted as a special stage, used for particular occasions and designed to be the setting for state theatrical ceremonies, where the Sultan is the leading figure[37]. The participants, in other words, the 'audience', in fact form the ceremony, like a 'performance' created through their own behaviour and personalities. Thus, the ones perceiving, conceiving and living this space are also the participants themselves. Their perception differs according to their identity: whether a member of

the Sultan's family, or just a foreign guest. In other words, the mental construction of the same space in the minds of each visitor may differ considerably. For instance, the spatial experiences of Ayşe and Şadiye Osmanoğlu, both female members of the royal family, point to the grandeur, splendour and glory of the Hall and the ceremony. Within their writings, the holy and blessed character attributed to the Sultan, who represented the power of the Empire, is underlined. Şadiye Osmanoğlu expresses her feelings thus:

> The ceremonies held in the throne room, especially the congratulation rituals were splendid; these were such sublime scenes that whenever I remember them, I still feel that thrill where everything quivers[38].

> The religious observances occurring twice a year brought forth a particular spirit in the *Harem* of the palace. The mutual greetings had a special place. The ceremony began on the first day of the *Bayram* [the Religious Celebration] in the throne hall of the Dolmabahçe Palace and continued in our houses[39].

Ayşe Osmanoğlu underlines the absolute and spiritual authority associated with her father, Sultan Abdülhamit II, in her descriptions of a severe earthquake that happened during the greeting ceremony in 1901.

> We finally recovered consciousness. At that moment, we ran to the windows wondering what had happened to our Highness. We began to look around. The hall was in a mess. Nobody stood at his place. My father leaned on his sword in front of his throne, stood up alone, and listened to the call for prayer. Slowly, everyone calmed down. Pashas and gentlemen began to take their places. My father sat on his throne, impassive. He ordered the ceremony to begin. The Imperial band started. The ceremony continued. As we saw my father in that attitude, we congratulated each other with delight and said we should forget about the event[40].

On the other hand, Halit Ziya says that he did not participate in the *Muayede* during the reign of Abdülhamit II, even though he was invited. However, he was present in the ceremonies as part of his duty during the rule of Mehmet Reşat. The enthusiasm for the ceremony experienced by members of the royal family was not shared by Halit Ziya, who was not a supporter of autocracy and an involuntary participant in the greeting ceremony.

> Finally, as everything finished and the Sultan came from the *bayram* cortege and the prayers, and took a rest for a while in the private room on the corner of the Grand Ceremonial Hall, he left the room and slowly proceeded to the throne. At this time, just as in the *selamlık* ceremonies, five or ten of the people applauding gathered in a circle, made a lot of noise in one loud roar, which could not be identified as a prayer, an applause or whatever, and all at once the band played the anthem of the Sultan. This anthem was bizarre, weird; in fact it was something funny. [Halit Ziya criticises the anthem of Mehmet Reşat so much that he judges it quite unsuccessful in comparison to the former Sultans' anthems and the national anthem of the Republic.] Whenever we heard this anthem, – it is not possible to figure out whether it is derived from an operetta, another anthem, a traditional song or something else – we were concerned whether we were in any way supposed to be responsible for such

a choice [...] and in this way, the official part of the *Muayede* ceremony, which lasted for hours, ended. I don't know whether during this time the visitors upstairs enjoyed the ceremony, but the one standing up until the end probably got tired and thus had aches that lasted for days.

There was something amusing actually, a noise that could numb the brain: the music!

There is no way to call this other than noise. The Grand Ceremonial Hall is extremely wide and an extremely high building with its dome that occupies the intersection of the *Mabeyn* and *Harem* rooms. This place echoes so much that, when you shout at one of its sides, the sound of the voice travels, rolling over and over and hits the walls. Yet, apart from human voices, the strength of the sounds of the copper and wooden instruments has to be imagined as they hit the ear, sounding like a clap of thunder[41].

Lastly, pointing to the varied ways of conceiving of the Grand Hall as a space, the spatial experience of Mary de Larminat, one of the French Empress Eugenie's maids of honour, is worthy of mention. Writing her impressions of the Dolmabahçe Palace and of the great banquet held in the Grand Ceremonial Hall, Mary de Larminat evaluates the space with reference to its elaborate ornamentation, its huge scale, the valuable dishes used, the eye-catching clothes and the glamorous jewellery of the guests. She describes the beauty of the space, touches upon the excessive amount of gold and glitter. In brief, she emphasizes exaggerated flamboyance rather than serene grandeur.

Seen in this light, the Ceremonial Hall may be said to have functioned at several levels. Beside its function as a meeting place, it had a quality which evoked the idea of the Sultan as the representative of the State along with the other attributes of Empire implied by its material architectural space. As stated by Foucault, "a whole history remains to be written about spaces, which would at the same time be the history of powers"[42]. Most strikingly, any event in this space constitutes a spectacle at least in two ways: a "space of power", manifesting the absolute and eternal power of the Empire; and a "space of representation" for the people, who were honoured by being received by the Sultan. What is most important is the fact that all these different perceptions emanated from one unique central space, and throughout this chapter we have attempted to show the different faces of this space coexisting in a defined time.

Notes

[1]   A. Batur, *Beşiktaş Sarayları* [Beşiktaş Palaces], in "Istanbul Dergisi", 1995, 15, pp. 60-73.

[2]   H. Crane, *The Ottoman Sultan's Mosques: Icons of Imperial Legitimacy*, in I. A. Biermann, R. Abou-el-Haj, D. Preziosi (eds.), *The Ottoman City and Its Parts: Urban Structure and Social Order,* New York 1991, pp. 191-193.

[3]   İ. Ortaylı, *Osmanlı'yı Yeniden Keşfetmek* [Reinventing the Ottoman], Istanbul 2006, p. 92.

[4]   For a more detailed account of the Topkapı Palace, G. Necipoğlu, *Architecture, Ceremonial, and Power: the Topkapı Palace in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries*, Cambridge Mass. - London 1991; N. Sakaoğlu, *Tarihi, Mekanları, Kitabeleri ve Anıları ile Saray-ı Hümayun: Topkapı Sarayı* [Topkapı Pal-

ace: History, Spaces, Inscriptions and Memories], Istanbul 2002. M. Sözen, *Saray: Devletin Evi* [Palace: the House of the State], Istanbul 1990.

5   "Ottoman Sultans governed the state in *Bab-ı Hümayun* until the 17th century. Later, *Paşa Kapısı*, where the grand viziers steadily worked , was established. Then *Paşa Kapısı* bore the name *Bab-ı Ali* and functioned as the administrative centre. *Bab-ı Ali* was placed in the same location from then onwards, on which the Governorship of Istanbul stands today." C. Kayra, *Istanbul, Zamanlar ve Mekânlar* [Istanbul, Times and Spaces], Istanbul 1990, p. 28.

6   The studies of Akşit, Aykut, Çelik, Esemenli, Gülersoy, Merey, Sözen and Yücel are significant contributions, which cover mainly the architecture and architectural features of the Hall. Full bibliographical information about these studies is given in the bibliography.

7   H. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space,* Oxford - Cambridge Mass. 1991, p. 159: "Formal, functional and structural analyses are concerned with clearly determined forces, as with the material relationships obtaining between those forces- relationships which give rise to equally clearly determined spatial structures: columns, vaults, arches, pillars and so on."

8   For instance, the diameter of the dome of Süleymaniye Mosque is 26.5m; that of Sultanahmet Mosque is 23.5m; and Nuruosmaniye Mosque, 25.75m.

9   D. Esemenli, *Osmanlı Sarayı ve Dolmabahçe* [Ottoman Palace and Dolmabahçe], Istanbul 2002, p. 150.

10   Lefebvre, *The Production* cit., p. 73: "Itself the outcome of past actions, social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others. Among these actions, some serve production, others consumption. Social space implies a great diversity of knowledge."

11   H. Lefebvre, *The Production* cit., p. 266.

12   This description is published in Esemenli, *Osmanlı* cit., pp. iv, 154; Ç. Gülersoy, *Dolmabahçe Sarayı: Palace and Its Environs,* Istanbul 1990, p. 55.

13   "Journal de Constantinople, Echo de l'Orient", 13 July 1856. Translation from French into English, cited in Gülersoy, *Dolmabahçe* cit., p. 54.

14   W. Benjamin, *On Some Motifs in Baudelaire*, in M. Bullock, M. W. Jennings (eds.), *Selected Writings*, 4, Cambridge Mass. 1938-1940, pp. 316.

15   Lefebvre, *The Production* cit., pp. 40, 46. "The perceived-conceived-lived triad (in spatial terms: spatial practice, representations of space and representational spaces) loses all force if it is treated as an abstract 'model'. [...] It is reasonable to assume that spatial practice, representations of space and representational spaces contribute in different ways to the production of space according to their qualities and attributes, according to the society or mode of production in question, and according to the historical period. Relations between the three moments of the perceived, the conceived and the lived are never either simple or stable, nor are they 'positive' in the sense in which this term might be opposed to 'negative', to the indecipherable, the unsaid, the prohibited or the unconscious." See also pp. 38-41, 224, 369, 371-372.

16   W. Sperco, *Istanbul Indiscret*, Istanbul 1976, p. 155 and following; translation from French into English, cited in Gülersoy, *Dolmabahçe* cit., pp. 69-70.

17   Ş. Osmanoğlu, *Hayatımın Acı ve Tatlı Günleri* [Bitter and Sweet Days of My Life], Istanbul 1966, p. 12.

18   Gülersoy, *Dolmabahçe* cit., pp. 92-93.

19   Osmanoğlu, *Hayatımın* cit., p. 29.

20   H. Z. Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve Ötesi* [Palace and Beyond], 1, Istanbul 1940, p. 85. See also the recent edition of the same publication edited by N. Ö. Akın: H. Z. Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve Ötesi* [Palace and Beyond], N. O. Akın (ed.), Istanbul 2003, pp. 121-122. Translated by the authors, the original is as follows:

"Zülvecheyn *(iki taraflı)* denilen büyük sofaya, amele üşüşdürüldi, bütün bir gün saray keser taktaklarile gümgüm öterek orada tahta ayaklar üzerinde dermeçatma, fakat muhkem *(sağlam)* bir sofra kuruldu, sarayın asıl muhteşem vermeil ziyafet takımı alınamayarak ancak adedi mahdud bir hey'eti idareye kifayet edebilecek *(yetebilecek)* olan ve sarayda galiba bir tarihte Rusya Çarına ziyafet verilmek için Ulahyaya gönderildiğinden dolayı Ulah takımı diye anılan küçük gümüş takım getirtilebildi. Velhasıl muayyen gecede Hademe-i Hassa'dan Muzıka-i Hümayun'dan, Enderun efendilerinden mürekkeb bir resm-i kabul töreni ile şan-ı saltanata layık bir ziyafet verildi".

[21] S. Ünüvar, *Saray Hatıraları* [Palace Memories], Istanbul 1964, p. 97. Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "Padişah iradesi ile Topkapı Sarayı'ndan kapalı araba ile Enderun-u Hümayun ağaları, hazine kâhyası, başmabeynci mahiyetinde sekiz neferle jandarma zabiti olduğu halde bu mühim emanet Beşiktaş Sarayı'na ve Mabeyn'in taş merdivenine araba yanaşır. Araba kapusunun anahtarı hazine kâhyasındadır. Parçalardan ibaret tahtı Enderun ağaları Muayede Salonu'na getirirler ve yekdiğerine rabtederler. [...] Muayede esnasında padişah kime irade ettiyse saçağı göğüs hizasında olarak o şahıs tutar. Ziyaretçiler ise padişahın el veya eteğini öpmezler. Bu saçağı öperler. Taht hazırlandıktan sonra diğer zevat çekilir. Ertesi günü muayede merasimine kadar zabit ve askerler gece de dâhil olmak şartıyla beklerler."

[22] Osmanoğlu, *Hayatımın* cit., pp. 9-12. Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "Dolmabahçe Sarayında, Muayede Salonu adını taşıyan büyük ve geniş bir daire vardı. Babamın tahtı burada idi. [...] Taht salonunda yapılan merasimler, bilhassa tebrik törenleri muhteşem olurdu, bunlar öyle ulvi birer tablodurlar ki, hatırladığım vakit, heyecanlarını bütün raşeleriyle, aynen duyarım. [...] Tebrikat için devletin ve yabancı devletlerin erkânı salonda tahsis edilen yerlerinin alırlardı. Babam, tahtının önüne gelir durur ve merasim başlardı. Şeyh-ül-İslam başta olmak üzere ve meşayih, sırma püskülleri yandan sarkan sarıkları ve beyaz maşlahlarından ibaret resmi kıyafetleriyle, tekrar tekrar intizamla tahta yaklaşırlar, dinimizin mukaddes alametini eğilerek öperler ve geri çekilirlerdi. Babam, ulema sınıfının tebriklerini ayakta kabul ederdi, beşuş ve mütebessim bir çehre ile herkese bir kaç söz söylerdi. Ulemayı, payitahttaki Hıristiyan ve Musevi dinlerinin temsilcileri -patrik, piskopos ve hahamlar - üniformalarını giymiş oldukları halde, takip ederlerdi. Babam, onları da aynı suretle, ulemayı kabul ettiği gibi ayakta kabul ederdi. Daha sonra, sefirler, memurlar, yaverler, askerler, bendegân ve en nihayet yabancı sefaret hey'etleri tebriklere katılırlardı. Sefaret hey'etlerine mensup zevatın zevceleri, Osmanlı tabiri ile "madamları", salonun bir köşesine alınırlardı, merasimi yalnız oradan seyrederlerdi, fakat bilahare sureti mahsusada kabul ve kendilerine iltifat edilirdi. Hanedan mensupları, amcalarım ve kardeşlerim önde, hemşire ve halalarımın zevceleri (damadlar) ikinci sırayı teşkil etmek üzere, merasim süresince tahtın arkasında ayakta dururlardı. En son onlar da, teker teker tahtın önüne gelerek tazimlerini arzederlerdi."

[23] Uşaklıgil, *Saray* cit., 2, 1941, p. 132. (2003 edition, p. 425). Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "Teravih için zülvecheyn *(iki taraflı)* salonunda seccadeler yere serilmiş, Harem-i Hümayun'dan gelecek kadınlar için de salonun nihayetinde kafeslerle hususi bir yer ayrılmış olurdu. Müezzin-i şehriyari *(Hünkarın müezzini)* –ki bunlar Hademe-i Hümayun zümresine dahil idiler ve icap ettikçe incesaz takımına da iştirak ederlerdi- aralarında pek güzel sesliler vardı, imam-ı şehriyari *(Hünkarın imamı)* sadasıyla edasıyla pek iyi bir tesir yapardı. İşte bu istihzarat *(hazırlık)* ile teravih kılınırdı."

[24] Uşaklıgil, *Saray* cit., 2, 1941, pp. 81-82. (2003 edition, pp. 371-372). Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "Bulgaristan kralının ziyareti vesilesi ile Dolmabahçe sarayında ilk büyük ziyafet verilecekdi. Bundan evvel yeni saray, henüz tamamiyet *(bütünlük)* kesb etmemiş vesa'itile *(kazanmamış vasıtalarıyla)*, Mısır hıdivi Abbas Hilmi Paşanın yazın mu'tadı *(âdeti)* olan Istanbul seyahati esnasında bir ziyafet tertib etmişdi; fakat hükümetçe görülen lüzum üzerine bu ziyafet pek muhtasar *(kısa)*, pek basit idi; ma'amafih saray için bir tecrübe dersi vazifesini gördü. Onun için Bulgaristan'ın müşkülpesent *(zor beğenen)*, Avrupa saraylarında gördüğü mutantan *(görkemli)* ziyafetlerle müşahedatı *(gözlemleri)* pek yüksek olan, kralına verilecek bir ziyafet için saray cesaret gösterdi. [...] Yalnız Dolmabağçede böyle yüzü geçen da'vetliler için münasib tek bir yer vardı: Bir cephesi karaya, diğer cephesi denize nazır olan

ve iç mabeynle dış mabeyn arasında bulunan ve galiba bunun için zülvecheyn nam-ı ile tanınan geniş sofa intihab edildi *(seçildi)*.[...]sonra temaşasına *(seyrine)* doyulamaz zengin ve dilnişîn *(hoşa giden)* bir manzara vücuda getirildi."

25   L. Simavi, *Başmabeynci Lütfi Bey; Osmanlı Sarayının Son Günleri* [Chamberlain Lütfi Bey, The Last Days of the Ottoman Palace], Istanbul, p. 91; Osmanoğlu, *Hayatımın* cit., pp. 9-10; Uşaklıgil, *Saray* cit., 2, 1941, pp. 143-145; Uşaklıgil, *Saray* cit., 2003, pp. 436-441.

26   The scene of the banquet held in the Tuileries Palace in Paris is markedly similar to the image illustrating the banquet given in honour of Maréchal Pélissier. Compare I. Dunlop, *Royal Palaces of France,* London 1985, p. 138, Figure 14 with the figure in Esemenli, *Osmanlı* cit., pp. iv, 154, and in Gülersoy, *Dolmabahçe* cit., p. 55. This resemblance, which can be supported by other examples of banquet scenes in European palaces, suggests that similar spatial use and formation may result in similar architectural designs.

27   Uşaklıgil, *Saray* cit., 1, 1940, pp. 141-142. (2003 edition, p. 183). Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "Bu harem yolu mabeyin son kısmından başlayarak ve mu'ayede salonını dolaşa dolaşa giderek Haremi Hümayunın bu salonla ittisal peyda eden *(birleşen)* kısmına müntehi *(ulaşan)* olan bir yoldır ki oldukça uzundır. [...] Ben bu yolı mükerreren *(defalarca)* geçerek mabeynden hareme celb edilmiştim *(alınmıştım)*. Mabeyn cihetinde demir bir kapı vardı ve mabeynde nöbet tutan musahip bu kapıyı anahtarile açar, yola girlince tekrar içeriden kilidler, bir hayli yürünüp yolın harem cihetinde müntehasına *(sonuna)* varılınca burada da bir ikinci demir kapı karşısında bulunulırdı. Musahib buna yumrüğile yahud elindeki anahtarla vurur, içeriden harem nöbetini tutan musahib kapıyı açar ve bu suretle hareme girilince tekrar kapı kilidlenirdi."

28   Esemenli, *Osmanlı* cit., p. 39.

29   Osmanoğlu, *Hayatımın* cit., p. 10. Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "Salonun çok yüksek ve büyük bir kubbesi vardı, en ufak bir fısıltıyı büyültecek kabiliyette idi. Kıymetli yol halılarıyla döşenmiş zemininde, ne kadar yavaş yürünse ayak sesleri, bu kubbeden duyulurdu, çok aşağılara kadar sarkan, büyük ve süslü meşhur avizesi, salonda bulunan herkesin hayranlığını uzun uzun üzerine çekerdi. Işıklar yandığı vakit, avizenin kristallerinden etrafa yayılan büyük bir aydınlık, bilhassa, babamın sırmalarına, nişanlarına ve tahtının elmaslarına, gözleri kamaştıran bir parlaklık verirdi."

30   Uşaklıgil, *Saray* cit., 2, 1941, pp. 143-144. (2003 edition, p. 438). Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "Bir kaç gün evvelden başlanarak mu'ayede salonı hazırlanmış olurdı. Hazine'i hümayundan, tarihi bir kıymeti olduğundan bahs'edilen altın kaplı taht getirilmiş, salonun kara tarafına dibde yerleşdirilmiş bulunurdı, sefirlerle ma'iyetlerine, ecnebi mu'teberana *(ileri gelenlere)* salonın yukarı katında tahta nazır olan *(bakan)* kısımda sandaliyeler konulmış, bir de büfe kurulmış olurdı. Bir sıfatı resmiyesi *(resmi bir sıfatı)* olmadığı halde mu'ayede merasimini temaşa etmek müsa'adesini alanlar için de gene salonın yukarısında sağ taraf ihzar edilir *(hazırlanır)*, mabeyn fanfare *(çalgı)* takımı gene yukarıda mahalli mahsusunı *(özel yerini)* işgal ederdi."

31   L. Saz, *Şair Leyla Hanım; Anılar 19. Yüzyılda Saray Haremi* [Poet Leyla Hanım; Memories in Harem of the 19th Century Palace], Istanbul 2000, p. 132. Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "Sarayın öbür bölümlerinden iki kat yüksek tavanlı ve sivri çatısı denizden de görülen büyük tören salonunun üç duvarını çevreleyen bir balkon vardır. Deniz tarafında, rıhtıma koşut olan balkonun, harem dairesinin üst katlarıyla bağlantısı vardır. Bu balkon görülmeden taht odasını izleme olanağı veren bir kafesle süslenerek gizlenmiştir. İşte sultan efendiler ve yanlarındakiler el öpme törenini bu yarı kapalı balkondan seyrederler."

32   A. Osmanoğlu, *Babam Sultan Abdülhamid, Hatıralarım* [My Father Sultan Abdülhamid, My Memories], Ankara 1984, pp. 78-79. Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "Muayede-i Hümayun'un başladığını musahip ağalar, başkatibeye haber verirlerdi. O da valide sultanın yanına gelir, yerden bir temenna ederek Muayede-i Hümayun başlıyor, buyurunuz, derdi. Valide sultan şahane tuvaletiyle önde ve bütün sultanlar onun arkasında, vükela haremleriyle birlikte büyük salonları ve Ma-

beyn koridorunu geçerek Muayede Salonu'nun üstündeki localara girer, evvelden hazırlanmış yüksek şiltelere oturur, muayedeyi seyrederlerdi. Muayede salonunun diğer tarafındaki açık localarda ecnebi sefirler bulunurdu."

33   Osmanoğlu, *Hayatımın* cit., p. 12. Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "Hanedanın kadın mensupları için, Muayede Salonunun en üst katında, büyük bir maharet ile inşa edilmiş balkonlar tahsis edilirdi. Biz buradan, kuş bakışı, töreni bütün teferruatıyla görebildiğimiz halde, salondakilerin başlarını kaldırıp bizi görmeleri mümkün değildi."

34   Ünüvar, *Saray* cit., p. 98. Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "Harem üst düzey halkı Muayede Salonu'ndaki Harem Koridoru'ndaki kafesli basık pencerelerden Selamlık muayedesini izlerler. Sonra Harem'e dönülür ve yarım saat kahve ikram edilir. Takımlar Topkapı Sarayı'ndan getirilir."

35   Uşaklıgil, *Saray* cit., 1, 1940, p. 141. (2003 ed., p. 183). Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "Mu'ayede salonundan bakılınca bu yolu kısmen, basık kafeslerle örtülmüş olarak fark etmek mümkindir. Haremi Hümayun halkı mu'ayede merasimini bu kafeslerin önüne serilmiş minderler üzerinde oturarak temaşa ederlerdi *(izlerlerdi)*."

36   Lefebvre, *The Production* cit., p. 17.

37   Ç. Caner, P. Yoncacı, *Bir İmparatorluk Sahnesi: Dolmabahçe Sarayı Muayede Salonu* [An Imperial Stage: The Ceremonial Hall in Dolmabahçe Palace], in K. Kahraman (ed.), *150. Yılında Dolmabahçe Sarayı Uluslararası Sempozyumu, Bildiriler II* [The Dolmabahçe Palace – 150 Years Old, an International Symposium, Proceedings II], 23-26 Kasım 2006, Dolmabahçe Palace - Istanbul 2007, pp. 95-112.

38   Osmanoğlu, *Hayatımın* cit., p. 10. Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "Taht salonunda yapılan merasimler, bilhassa tebrik törenleri muhteşem olurdu, bunlar öyle ulvi birer tablodurlar ki, hatırladığım vakit, heyecanlarını bütün raşeleriyle, aynen duyarım".

39   *Ibid.*, p. 20. Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "Şeker ve Kurban Bayramlarımızın da, Sarayın haremine getirdiği, müstesna bir manevi havası vardı. Karşılıklı tebriklerin mühim yeri vardı. Bayramın birinci günü tebrik merasimi, Dolmabahçede taht salonunda başlar ve evlerimizde de devam ederdi."

40   Osmanoğlu, *Babam* cit., p. 82. Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "Bize gayret gelmişti. O zaman "Aman, Efendimize ne oldu?" diye pencerelere koştuk. Bakmaya başladık. Salon karmakarışık olmuştu. Hiç kimse yerinde değildi. Babam, yalnız başına, tahtının önünde kılıcına dayanmış, ayakta duruyor, ezan-ı Muhammedi'yi dinliyordu. Yavaş yavaş herkes sükûnete geldi. Paşalar, beyler yerlerini almaya başladılar. Babam, metanetle tahtına oturdu. "Muayede başlasın!" emrin verdi. Muzıka başladı. Muayede devam etti. Babamı böyle görünce hepimiz sevinçle birbirimizi tebrik ettik, geçmiş olsun dedik".

41   Uşaklıgil, *Saray* cit., 2, 1941, pp. 144-146. (2003 edition, pp. 438-440). Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "Nihayet her iş bitip hünkâr da bayram alayından ve namazından avdet edince, bir müddet mu'ayede salonunun bir köşesinde bulunan hususi odada istirahat ettikten sonra odadan çıkar ve tahta doğru yavaş yavaş ilerlerdi. Bu sırada selamlık resimlerinde *(törenlerinde)* olduğu gibi alkışçıların beşi onu bir halka halinde toplanarak, du'a mıdır, alkış mıdır, ne olduğuna dikkat edilemeyen yekavaz *(tek sesli)* bir gulgule *(gürültü)* içinde bağırdıkları işidilir ve gene bu sırada fanfare hünkârın marşını çalardı. Bu marş, garib, tuhaf, daha doğrusı gülünc bir şey'di. [...] Bir opéretten mi çıkmışdır, nereden doğmuşdır, marş mıdır, bir oyun havası mıdır, ne olduğuna akıl ermeyen bu marşı her vesile ile işitdikçe bunın intihabı *(seçimi)* mes'uliyetinden bizlere de bir hacalet *(utanma)* hissesi sıçrar mı diye sıkılırdık. [...] ve bu suretle mu'ayedenin sa'atlerce süren resmi kısmı hitama *(sona)* ermiş bulunırdı. Bu müddet zarfında yukarıda seyirciler eğlenirler miydi, onı bilemem, fakat herhalde işin bitmesine ayakda muntazır *(hazır)* olanlar günlerce sızıları devam edecek bir yorgunluk geçirmiş olurlardı.

Bu rasimenin bir eğlencesi, daha ziyade beyinleri uyuşdıran bir gürültüsü vardı: Fanfare!

Buna gürültü demekden başka çare yokdır. Mu'ayede salonı mesaha'i sathiye *(alan)* i'tibarile hadden aşırı geniş ve kubbesinin irtifa'ı *(yüksekliği)* i'tibarilede gene ma'kul ölçüleri tecavüz edecek (a*şacak)* derecede yüksek bir binadır ki mabeyn ile harem da'ireleri arasını işgal eder. Burası o kadar tannandır *(yankılanır)* ki bir tarafında bağırılsa ses bir uğultı halinde yuvarlana yuvarlana gider, duvarlara çarpar. Artık insan sesi değil, bakır ve tahta aletlerin olanca kuvvetlerile çıkardıkları seslerin nasıl bir gök gürültüsünü andıracağı hisab edilmelidir."

[42] M. Foucault, *The Eye of Power*, in C. Gordon (ed.), *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 by Michel Foucault*, London 1980, pp. 146-165.

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The Making of *Kanun* Law in the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1600

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Abstract

This chapter analyses the making of *kanun* law in the Ottoman classical period. After considering the origins of *kanun* law in other Islamic states, it focuses on the same process in the Ottoman Empire. Some early examples of *kanun* are mention and special attention is paid to the idea and the justification of *kanun* in the Empire. However, it is also important to note that the Ottoman authorities who prepared the *kanun* had to be very careful in order to obtain the consent of the religious authorities without which the *kanun* could not be implemented. The chapter closes with a brief consideration of the relation between *kanun* law, which was secular, and *şeriat* law, which dealt with religious matters.

Osmanlı Devleti'nin kuruluşuyla birlikte yeni ve orijinal bir hukuk sistemi başlamış değildir. Osmanlı hukuku denilince İslam hukuku, Roma hukuku, Anglo-Sakson hukuku gibi bütün esasları ve kurumlarıyla kendine has bir hukuk anlaşılmamalıdır. Diğer İslam devletlerinde olduğu gibi Osmanlı Devleti'nde de hukuk esas itibariyle İslam hukukundan oluşmaktadır. Ancak Osmanlılar İslam hukukunu uygularken zamanın gerektirdiği düzenlemeleri ve ilaveleri yapmışlardır. Bunu yaparken İslam hukukunun devlet başkanına tanıdığı geniş takdir ve düzenleme yetkisinden faydalanmışlardır. İslam hukukunun özellikle Kitap ve Sünnet tarafından teferruatlı olarak düzenlenmemiş alanlarda devlet başkanına belirli bir takdir hakkını tanımış olması Osmanlı padişahlarının uzun asırlar boyunca özellikle ceza hukuku ve mali hukuk alanında yaptıkları düzenlemelere müsait bir zemin hazırlamıştır. Osmanlı padişahlarının münferit ferman ve kanunlarıyla yapılan bu düzenlemeler zaman içerisinde önemli bir yekûna ulaşınca oluş biçimine bakılarak kendi içinde bir bütün olarak değerlendirilmiş ve ayrı bir isimle anılmaya başlamıştır. İşte Osmanlı hukuku esas itibariyle şer'i hukuk ile bunun yanında zaman içerisinde oluşan örfi hukuktan ibarettir. Tarihi kaynaklarda örfi hukuk terimine ilk defa Fatih döneminde rastlanmaktadır. İlk örfi verginin bir Pazar vergisi olarak Osman Gazi zamanında konulduğu göz önüne alınırsa örfi hukukun devletin kuruluşuyla birlikte ortaya çıkmaya başladığını söylemek mümkündür. Örfi hukuk denilince bir örf ve adet hukuku anlaşılma-

malıdır. Örfi hukuk bir kanun hukukudur. Örfi hukuk hukukçuların ilmi içtihatlarıyla değil padişahların koydukları kanunlarla teşekkül etmiştir. Osmanlı Devleti'nde örfi kanunların hazırlanmasında Divan-ı Hümayun'un ve özellikle örfi hukuktan sorumlu bulunan nişancıların önemli rolleri vardır. Osmanlı Devleti'nde örfi hukukun şer'i hukukla çatışmamasına özel bir itina gösterilmiştir. Örfi hukuk şer'i hukukun hükümlerini ortadan kaldırmak veya değiştirmek iddiasıyla ortaya çıkmış değildir. Bilakis şer'i hukukun tanıdığı yetki çerçevesinde veya bu hukukun düzenlememiş bulunduğu alanlarda hüküm koyması söz konusudur. Esasen Osmanlı Devleti'nde her iki hukukun aynı kaza mercii tarafından uygulanması, bir diğer ifadeyle örfi hukuk için ayrı mahkemeler kurulmayıp şer'iyye mahkemelerince tatbik edilmesi bu iki hukukun belli bir bütünlük içerisinde yürütülmesinde müspet bir rol oynamıştır[1].

This chapter analyses the making of *kanun* law in the Ottoman classical period[2]. The Ottoman state was founded at the turn of the 14th century, and eventually absorbed the holdings of the Byzantine Empire (including much of south-eastern Europe) and the Middle East, including Egypt. While it was by far the greatest power in the eastern half of the Mediterranean throughout the early modern and much of the modern periods, and the most powerful state within the Islamic world as a whole, signs of decline began to appear in the 1590s. Thus the decades around 1600 marked the main dividing line in Ottoman history and can be seen as end date of what is traditionally called the classical age[3].

A principal focus of interest for researchers of Ottoman law during this era is its general structure and its religious and secular characteristics. Some scholars hold that Ottoman law was simply the implementation of Islamic Law, while others believe that it borrowed little from Islamic law and thus must be regarded as something wholly new[4]. However, the Ottoman Empire was not founded upon an original legal system of its own. Instead, it borrowed heavily from the financial, administrative, and legal systems of the Turkish-Islamic states of Middle Asia and the Middle East[5]. Among these borrowings was what became known as *kanun*, or decrees dealing ostensibly with non-religious matters.

Ottoman *Kanun* law making

As in other Turkish and Muslim states, law in the Ottoman Empire was Islamic. However, in implementing this law the Ottomans made certain modifications, and added regulations when it was necessary. This was done in accordance with Islamic legal tradition, which gave the ruler authority to add regulations relating to matters which were not dealt with in the Holy Quran and in the Sunnah[6]. This made it possible for the Ottoman sultans to legislate in the fields of criminal and financial law. In doing so they

drew on the preceding political and administrative systems of the Abbasids, the Ilkhanids, and the Seljuks[7].

The 15th-century Ottoman historians Aşıkpaşazade[8] and Tursun Bey provided important information about the Ottoman rulers' making of *kanun*. One extract from Aşıkpaşazade's history in which Osman Gazi, the founder of the Ottoman principality, proclaims *kanun*, reads as follows:

> *Kadı* and *sübaşı* were appointed. And a market was opened. And *hutbe* was delivered after the Friday prayer. And these people began to ask for *kanun* to be established. A person came from *Germiyan*[9] and said "sell the *bac* of this market place to me". The people answered "you should go to the Khan". That person went to the Khan and repeated his words. Osman Gazi said "What is *bac*?" and the person answered "Whoever comes to sell something in this market will give me some money". Osman Gazi said "Do the people of this market owe you something? The person said "My Khan! This is *töre* and it is in use in all cities and the rulers take it". Osman Gazi said "was it ordered by God or did the rulers order it? That person again said "It is a *tore*, my Khan, and it has been in use for a long time". Osman Gazi got angry with the person and said "when someone earns money why should other people have a share in it? The one who earns it owns the money. I did not put money in his trade and so I cannot ask him to give me money. O man! Go away and do not say these words any more to me or I will punish you". This time the people said "My Khan it is an *adet* that when a person watches a market place he is expected to get some money from the traders". Osman Gazi said "since you put it like this, anyone who brings goods to the market and sells them will give two *akça*s, if he does not sell he will not give any money". And he added "whoever breaks my *kanun* God may disturb [in] his religion and [in] his world… may God be pleased with whoever follows my *kanun* …"[10]

The quotation shows that one of the first *kanuns* ever proclaimed in the Ottoman Empire was about *bac*, or market dues. Aşıkpaşazade's explanation proves that *kanun* was in effect in the Ottoman Empire from the beginning of the 14th century.

Another vital term for understanding Ottoman *kanun* lawmaking is *örf*. This is what is known as in the western legal tradition as *lex principis*, and refers to local usage or custom[11]. In Islam, the term *örf* is used to describe the decrees of a ruler outside the sphere of religious law. As far as the Ottoman sources are concerned the term *örfi hukuk* was mentioned for the first time during the reign of Mehmed II (1451-1481)[12]. In *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth* (1444-1488)[13], or "History of the Father of Conquest", Tursun Bey wrote a long introduction in which he attempted to prove society's need for the existence of a ruler[14]. Quoting from the famous Tusi[15], Tursun Bey justified the existence and the supremacy of the Sultan and his authority to make *kanun*. He further argued that in society both *örf* and *şeriat* are needed to preserve order. The ruler proclaimed *kanun* or *örf* in order to preserve society, and *örf* was based on reason[16]. It seems, therefore, that Tursun's purpose in writing this passage was to defend the increase in *kanun* lawmaking during the reign of Mehmed II[17]. Significantly, from the second half of the 15th century

the Ottoman sultans' personal *fermans* and *kanuns* were gathered together and called *kanunnames*. A great number of these dealt with penal and fiscal regulations[18].

The preparation of *Kanun*

In the preparation of *kanun* law the *Dîvân-ı Hümâyun* – which consisted of the Vezir-i Azam, the Vezirler, the Defterdar, the Kazasker, and the *Nişancı* – played a significant role. The *Kanun* was formed in meetings of the Imperial Chancery. The *Nişancı* – an official whose role in preparing official documents resembled that of western chancellors – played an essential part in preparing the *kanun* decrees. He was always chosen from among the people who had graduated from the *medrese* and had, therefore, been educated in Islamic law. In Islamic history the *Nişancı* is also referred to as *muvakki*, *tevkii* and *tuğrai*. The first Islamic administrations, especially during the Abbasid period, used the title *tavki*. Later the Abbasids, the Seljuks, and the Anatolian Seljuks also retained this post in their governments. For example in the Seljuk Empire, among the high government officials, there was an officer called *sahib-i tuğra* or *tuğrai* who performed exactly the same tasks as the Ottoman Empire's *nişancı*. A great deal of information about the duties and the responsibilities of this important official is provided in the *kanunname* of Mehmed II[19].

The *Nişancı* was important until the beginning of the 18th century. The *Nişancı* knew *kanun* law well and had the power to compile and to compare the new legislation with older religious legal principles. His thoughts and remarks on the *kanun* and related subjects were respected in the *Dîvân-ı Hümâyun*. In addition to this he wrote rough drafts of the important *fermans* and *berats*. For this reason he was sometimes called *müfti-i kanun*.

Kanun law had to be accepted by the sultan before it could be implemented. The validity of a *kanun* was limited to the life of the sultan who had created it. For this reason when a new sultan succeeded to the throne the *kanuns* had to be renewed. In fact, *kanun* law was formed slowly and according to the evolving needs of the Ottoman Empire. This was especially the case in the fields of land and tax laws, where custom, tradition, and local conditions were taken into consideration. Thus, instead of making a general *kanun* for the whole empire the Ottomans created laws designed for the peculiarities of specific regions. During the reigns of Sultan Bayezid II (1481-1512)[20], Yavuz Sultan Selim (1512-1520), and Kanuni Sultan Suleyman (Suleiman the Magnificent, 1520-1566) *kanunnames* were officially codified. Why did the sultans make laws? And why were these laws put together as the *kanunnames*? One reason was the need to establish the authority of the *kanun* and to prevent office-holders from acting illegally. In numerous *kanunname*, judges and provincial administrators were urged not to act against the *kanun*. In addition to this, and in order to reinforce the domination of the

law, copies of the *kanunnames* were sold to the public at a low price. It is also known that public criers sometimes read *kanunnames* aloud to the people[21].

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ŞERIAT AND *KANUN*

The Ottomans took great care that the *şeriat* and the *kanun* did not contradict each other because conflicting regulations could cause difficulties in people's daily lives. In the Imperial chancery two representatives of religious law were present. This suggests that the codification of *kanun* law was closely controlled. *Kanun* law was not to abrogate or contradict the principles of religious law. The Ottoman sultans were very careful not to declare a *kanun* on matters where the *şeriat* already contained a regulation. Morever, *kanun* law was checked by the *Şeyhülislam* to see if there were any points contrary to religious law. Sometimes the *Şeyhülislam*s were opposed to the *kanuns* and other regulations of the sultans. For example, in the so-called capitulations or treaties with foreign powers non-Muslims who were not Ottoman citizens were given the right to testify before courts, but *Şeyhülislam* Ebussuud Efendi rejected the idea, arguing that "something which is not legitimate cannot be ordered"[22].

CONCLUSION

It is clear that the Ottomans followed Islamic law and made amendments and additions according to the needs of the government. The ruler's authority to legislate in this area derived from Islamic law. This made it possible for Ottoman rulers to make fiscal and criminal law for centuries through the device of either *fermans* or *kanuns*. After a while Ottoman legal language started to employ the terms *şer'i* and *örfi* law. Though we know that *kanun* was in use in the Ottoman Empire from its inception, the term *örfi hukuk* was first used during the time of Mehmed II. In the preparation of *kanun* law the *Divan-ı Hümayun* and the *Nişancı* had significant responsibilities. Government officials were very careful not to make a *kanun* that contradicted the *şeriat*. *Kanun* law was required to establish order in society but could not impinge upon a principle of religious law. In fact, up until the *Tanzimat* (1839) period cases related to *kanun* and *şeriat* applications were brought to the same court, that is to the tribunal of the *kadi*. This helped to ensure that both codes complemented each other.

NOTES

1   F. Emecen, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Medeniyeti Tarihi*, Istanbul 1994, pp. 375-389.

2   For the meaning of and detailed information concerning *Kanun* see C.l. Huart, *Kanun,* in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Eskişehir 1997, vol. 6, pp. 167-168. In this chapter technical terms appear in their original forms, and are explained in the glossary at the end of the text. Further explanation of the terms used can be found in V. Bahadır Alkım, N. Antel, R. Avery, J. Eckmann, S. Huri, F. İz, M. Mansuroğlu, A. Tietze (eds.), *Türkçe-İngilizce Redhouse Sözlüğü*, Istanbul 1992.

3   For a succinct introduction to this period, see H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, London 1997.

4   For a discussion of the origins of Ottoman law and later developments see H. İnalcık, *Osmanlı'da Devlet, Hukuk, Adalet*, Istanbul 2000; H. İnalcık, *Essays in Ottoman History*, Istanbul 1998.

5   Emecen, *Osmanlı Devleti* cit., p.375. For detailed information on the origins of the Ottoman institutions, see İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatına Medhal*, Ankara 1988 (4th edition); M. Fuad Köprülü, *Bizans Müesseselerinin Osmanlı Müesseselerine Tesiri,* Istanbul 1981; Yahya b. Mehmed el-Katib, *Menahicü'l-İnşâ*, in Ş. Tekin (ed.), *The Earliest Ottoman Chancery Manual*, Roxbury MA 1971, pp. 9-12.

6   *Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you* in "Qur'an, Sura" VII.171, Al-Madinah Al-Munawarah 1990.

7   Emecen, *Osmanlı Devleti* cit., pp. 381-382.

8   The dating of Aşıkpaşazade's history continues to be debated. According to Çiftçioğlu the text dates from 1478. For detailed information on the Ottoman historian Aşıkpaşazade and his work see N. Atsız Çiftçioğlu, *Osmanlı Tarihleri, Aşıkpaşaoğlu Ahmed Aşıkı Tevarih-i Al-i Osman*, Istanbul 1949; H. İnalcık, *How to Read Ashık Pasha-zade's History*, in his *Essays in Ottoman History*, Istanbul 1988, pp. 31-50; V.L.Menage, *The Beginnings of Ottoman Historiography*, in B. Lewis, P.M. Holt (eds.), *Historians of the Middle East*, London 1962, pp. 169-179.

9   "Germiyan" or "Germiyanoğulları" was one of the strong principalities established in western Anatolia after the collapse of the Anatolian Seljuk Empire in the early 14th century. The principality was annexed to the Ottoman territory in the first half of the 15th century.

10 Çiftçioğlu, *Osmanlı Tarihleri* cit., p. 104; F. Reþit Unat, M. Altay Köymen*, Mehmed Neþri, Kitab-i Cihan-nüma Neþri Tarihi*, Ankara 1949, vol. I, pp. 111-113.

11 *Lex Regia* (Law of Imperial Authority) or more properly *Lex de Imperio Principis*. For more details see W. Smith, *A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, London 1875, p. 697.

12 For Mehmed II's life and reign see, H. İnalcık, *The Policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek Population of Istanbul and the Byzantine Buildings of the City*, in *The Ottoman Empire, Conquest, Organization, and Economy: Collected Studies*, London 1978, pp. 231-249; S. Tansel, *Osmanlı Kaynaklarına Göre Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in Siyasi ve Askeri Faaliyeti*, Ankara 1999.

13 There are six manuscripts of Tursun Bey's *Târîh-i Ebu'l-Feth*. For detailed descriptions see A. Sırrı Levend, *Gazavât-nâmeler ve Mihaloğlu Ali Bey'in Gazavât-nâmesi*, Ankara 1956, p. 16; H. İnalcık, R. Murphey, *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror by Tursun Bey*, Chicago 1978. The *Târîh-i Ebül-Feth* was most probably written between the years 1490 and 1495. Tursun Bey, *Tarih-i Ebül-Feth*, Haz. M. Tulum, Istanbul 1977, p. 24. Further analysis of this text can be found in K. Inan, *The Effects of Ornamented Prose Style on Ottoman Historiography: The Târih-i Ebü'l-Feth [History of the Father of Conquest] of Tursun Bey*, in J.S. Amelang, S. Beer (eds.), *Public Power in Europe: Studies in Historical Transformations*, Pisa 2006, pp. 125-141.

14 For information on Tursun Bey's life see H. İnalcık, *Tursun Beg, Historian of Mehmed the Conqueror's Time*, in "Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes", 1977, 69, pp. 55-71. The historian gives his name as Tûr-ı Sînâ, adding that he was known as Tursun Beğ, a nickname that had been given to him. Tursun Bey, *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, edited by M. Tulum, Istanbul 1977, p. 5. In his *Tezkire*, Sehi Bey also mentions in connection with Tursun Bey's name that the poet Hayati was killed because of a couplet which he wrote for Tursun Bey. See M. Şükrü (ed.), *Tezkire-i Sehi*, Istanbul 1907, p. 69.

15 The famous philosopher and astronomer was born in Tus in 507 AD and died in Baghdad in 692 AD. Tusi claimed that he wrote his book *Ahlak-ı Nasıri* at the wish of the ruler of Kuhistân, Nasırıddin Abdurrahim b. Ebu Mansur. He entitled it after the name of his sponsor. See C. Rieu, *Catalogue of the*

Persian Manuscripts in the British Museum, London 1879, vol. I, p. 441. For detailed information about Tusi's life see Nasır al-Din Tusi, *The Nasirean Ethics*, trans. G.M. Wickens, London 1964.

[16]   Tursun Bey, *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth* cit., pp. 12-13.

[17]   According to İnalcık, Mehmed II made tremendous efforts to build a unified and centralized empire. He needed large resources for military expeditions and his radical financial measures created a very tense atmosphere in the country in his later years. These measures included: minting a new silver coin; extending state ownership over most of the agricultural lands which were in possession of the old families in the forms of *mülk* [real estate] or *wakf* [pious foundation]; extending the monopolistic tax-farming system to many necessities of life and the strict implementation of the laws governing these monopolies. Further details in his *Mehmed The Conqueror (1432-1481) and His Time*, in *Essays in Ottoman History*, Istanbul 1988, pp. 108-109. For law-making during this reign and Mehmed II's *kanunname* [law book], see H. İnalcık, R. Anhegger, *Kanunnâme-i Sultânî Ber Mûceb-i Örf-i Osmâni, II. Mehmed ve II. Bâyezid Devirlerine ait Yasakname ve Kanunnâmeler*, Ankara 1956; *Fatih Sultan Mehmed Kanunname-i Al-i Osman (Tahlil ve Karşılaştırmalı Metin)*, edited by A. Özcan, Istanbul 2003.

[18]   Emecen, *Osmanlı Devleti* cit., pp. 383-384. See for example, İnalcık, Anhegger, *Kanunnâme-i Sultânî Ber Mûceb-i Örf-i Osmâni* cit.; Y. Yücel, S. Pulaha, *I. Selim Kanunnamesi (Tirana ve Leningrad nüshaları – 1512-1520)*, Ankara 1995; A. Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri*, Istanbul 1994; H. İnalcık, *Osmanlı'da Devlet, Hukuk, Adalet*, Istanbul 2000.

[19]   For the post of *Nişancı* see M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "*Nişancı*", in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Eskişehir 1997, vol. 9, pp. 299-302.

[20]   For detailed information on Bâyezid II's life see S. Tansel, *Sultan II. Bâyezid'in Siyasi Hayatı*, Istanbul 1966.

[21]   Emecen, *Osmanlı Devleti* cit., pp. 378-381.

[22]   *Ibid.*, p. 386.

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Source

This introductory passage from the imperial secretary Tursun Bey's panegyric of the reign of Mehmed II written in the early 1490s mentions the need of the people for the existence of the Sultan as the Shadow of God. For the original text, see Tursun Bey, *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, edited by M. Tulum, Istanbul 1977, pp. 12-13; for the meaning of the terms in Turkish, see the Glossary below.

...Ve bu nev-ʻi şerîf, bunca kemâlât ile, Fâ'il-i muhtâr ihtiyâriyle müdenî bi't-tabʻ vâkıʻ olmıştur; yaʻni emr-i intiʻâşında ve ahkâm-ı maʻâşında ictimâʻ -ki ana temeddün dirler ki, örfümüzce ana şehr ve köy ve oba dinülür-. anı tabîʻatten ister, ve nice istemeye ki yardımlaşmak içün biribirine muhtâcdur. Ve bu emr-i teʻâvün müyesser olmaz, illâ bir arada cemʻ olmağla olur. Ve insân eğerçi ünsten müştakdur dimişler, ammâ devâʻî-i efʻâli ve merâtib-i ahvâli muhtelif ve mütenevviʻdür. Lâ-cerem bu ihtilâf ü tebâyün ve tefâvüt ü temâyüzden -ki anâsır-ı beşeriyyette mecbûldür- lâzım geldi ki metâlib-i tavâyif-i ehl-i âlem ve meʻârib-i tabakât-ı evlâd-ı benî âdem muhtelif ü mütefâvit ola... Pes eğer tabiʻatleri muktezâsınca konulurlarsa, aralarında şol kadar tenâzüʻü temânüʻ ve husûmet ü tedafüʻ vâkıʻ ola kim asl-ı ictimâʻdan maksûd olan teʻâvün ve yardımlaşmak hâsıl olmaz; belki biribirin ifsâd ü ifnâ eder. Zarûrî nevʻ-i tedbîrden gereklü oldı ki her birini müstahkk olduğı menzilde koya; kendü hakkına kâni idüp dest-i tasarrufını hukûk-ı gayrdan kûtâh kıla. Ve benî nevʻ arasında umûr-ı teʻâvüni mütekeffil şuğl ne ise ana meşgûl eyleye. Ve bunun gibi tedbîre siyâset dirler. Ve eğer şöyle ki bu tedbîr ber vefk-ı vücûb ve kâ'ide-i hikmet olursa -ki müʻeddî ola bir kemâle ki bi'l-kuvve benî-nevʻün eşhâsında konulmıştur ki ol kuvvet iktisâb-ı saʻâdeteyndür- ana ehl-i hikmet siyâset-i İlâhî dirler, ve vâzıʻına nâmûs dirler. Ve ehl-i şerʻ ana şerîʻat dirler, ve vâzıʻına şâriʻ ıtlâk iderler ki, peygamberdür. Ve illâ, yaʻnî bu tedbîr ol mertebede olmazsa belki mücerred tavr-ı akl üzre nizâm-ı âlemi zâhir içün, meselâ tavr-ı Cengiz Han gibi olursa, sebebine izâfet iderler, siyâset-i sultânî ve yasağ-ı pâdişâhi dirler ki, örfümüzce ana örf dirler. Keyfe mâ-kân, her kankısı olursa, anun ikâmeti elbette bir pâdişâh vücûdına mevkuf. Hattâ şöyledür ki, her rûzgârda vücûd-ı şâriʻ hâcet değüldür; zîrâ ber-vazʻ-ı İlâhî, meselâ din-i İslâm "alâ vâzıʻihi efdalü's-selâm" nizâm-ı âlem-i zâhir ü bâtın içün, "ilâ yevmi'l kıyâm" kâffe-i enâm üzre kâfîdür, bir peygamber dahı hâcet değüldür; ammâ her rûzgârda bir pâdişâhun vücûdı hâcettür ki anun tasarruf-ı cüz'iyyâtta, ber haseb-i maslahat, her karn u her rûzgâr vilâyet-i kâmili vardur...

...And this noble kind, with so much perfection, was created by God with a civic nature; that is to say, in his creation and living statutes the assembly was given to him. That is called

'*temeddün*', or becoming civilized according to our *örf*, it is also called *şehir, köy*, and *oba*. Men want this naturally and in order to get help they need each other. And this mutual assistance cannot take place unless they live in a society, and although men started out being sociable, because of variousness and diversity of their deeds and conditions of ranks which arose from the disputes, inconsistency, difference, and privileges that are natural to men since their beginnings, it was necessary that the classes of the demands and wishes of men in the world and the wishes of the different ranks of Adam's sons be various and dissimilar... If men be left to their own nature, quarrels, impediments, enmity, and mutual repulsion will happen among them and the aims of society, which are mutual assistance and help, cannot be obtained, rather they will corrupt and destroy each other. Of course, one requires an administration that each one may be content with. It will restrain each man's hand from depredation and from contravention of the rights of others, and man will content himself with collaboration. Such a regulation is called *siyaset**. And if it so happens that this regulation is in accordance with necessity and wisdom, and if it leads to the perfection which potentially is implanted in individuals, then this potential is called the acquisition of *iktisab-ı sadeteyn*. The philosophers called it *Siyaset-i İlahi* and they call the legislation of it *namus*, and the religious scholars call it *şeriat* and the person who lays down the religious law is called *şari*, he being a prophet. If this measure is not at that high level but simply a rational measure for the good ordering of the external world, for instance like the manner of Chingiz Khan, then it is referred to as reason, and they call it *Siyaset-i Sultani ve Yasağ-ı Padişahi*, which in our common usage, is called *örf* . In all cases its existence is dependent upon the existence of a Sultan who has perfect authority in the disposal of particulars for the *maslahat* in every age and century...**

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*   For the term "*siyaset*" and its meaning in the Ottoman Empire see M. Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, Istanbul 1993, vol. 3, pp. 240-241; Tursun Bey, *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth* cit., pp. 10-30; Ahmet Mumcu, *Osmanlı Devletinde Siyaseten Katl*, Ankara 1985; A. Yaþar Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar Ve Mülhidler (15.-17.Yüzyıllar),* Istanbul 1998, pp. 71-103.

** Tursun Bey, *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth* cit., pp. 12-13.

Glossary

Adet: Custom, practice, usage, habit.

Akça: Small silver coin, asper (the basic unit of the ancient Ottoman money system, one third of a para).

Bac: Market dues.

Berat: Royal or imperial diplomas, letter of privileges.

Defterdar: Minister of finance.

Divan-ı Hümayun: The Imperial State Chancery.

Ferman: Imperial edict, command, order.

Hutbe: Sermon delivered after the Friday prayer.

Kadı: Judge of Islamic canon law, and, in Ottoman history, governor of a kaza.

Kanun: means law, order, rule, system and regulation. The development of trade and industry, and the establishment of regular armies in the Islamic empires of the Umayyad and the Abbasids, resulted in contact with nations which had already codified kanuns. These developments forced governments to issue special decrees using the principle of örf, or custom. These decrees were named kanun.

Kanunname: Code of laws, law book.

Kazasker: Chief military judge, high official in the hierarchy of the Muslim judiciary.

Köy: Village.

Maslahat: The proper course, the right thing to do.

Medrese: Muslim theological school.

Müfti-i kanun: Official expounder of the kanun.

Muvakki: The person who affixes a signature to documents.

Namus: Law.

Nişancı: Title of an officer whose duty it was to inscribe the Sultan's imperial monogram over all imperial letters-patent.

Oba: Encampment.

Örf: Custom or common usage.

Örfi hukuk: Common law.

Şari: Law giver, legislator.

Şehir: City.

Şeriat: Religious law.

Şeyhülislam: Dignitary responsible for all matters connected with canon law, religious schools, etc. Next to the Grand Vizier in precedence.

Siyaset: Managing, governing, ruling, government.

Siyaset-i İlahi: Divine Government.

Siyaset-i Sultani: Sultanic siyaset.

Subaşı: Police superintendent.

Sunnah: Practices and rules not laid down in the Quran but derived from the Prophet's own habits and words.

Tanzimat: The political reforms of Abdulmejid in 1839 and the period following.

Tevkii: The Sultan's signature.

Töre: Custom; rule; law.

Tuğrai: Employee in the office where the imperial monogram was inscribed on documents.

Vezir: Vizier, minister.

Vezir-i Azam: The Grand Vizier.

Yasağ-i Padişahi: Imperial Law.

Matching Sharia and 'Governmentality': Muslim Marriage Legislation in the Late Ottoman Empire

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Abstract

Marriage and family were widely debated topics in the final decades of the Ottoman Empire. They were related to the different projects of reform which attempted to save the Empire and restore it to its former glory. In spite of this, major reform of family law did not take place until the very last years of the Empire. Such reluctance had to do with the fact that marriage was traditionally regulated by principles based on the holy texts of each religious community, and any attempt at change meant an open confrontation with the Muslim, Christian, and Jewish religious establishments. It was only after the Young Turk Revolution that a cautious transition from divine law to legislative activity based on reason took place. While the Decree on Family Law of 1917 based its rulings concerning Muslim marriage on Islamic law, it made flexible use of different interpretations of the Sharia. The choice among these different scholarly opinions was justified by reference to the need for change, stemming from the negative experience of previous arrangements, as well as from the recognition that change was also taking place outside the Empire. The more important novelties this short-lived, but highly interesting, legal document introduced included the age of marriage and limits on polygamy.

Manželství a rodina se během posledních desetiletí existence Osmanské říše staly předmětem horečných diskusí. Byly systematicky spojovány s nejrůznějšími reformními projekty, jejichž cílem bylo zachránit Říši a obnovit její bývalou slávu. Významnější reforma rodinného práva se nicméně uskutečnila až na samém sklonku dějin Říše. Tato zdráhavost měla co do činění se skutečností, že manželství bylo tradičně regulováno v souladu se zásadami vycházejícími ze svatých textů té či oné náboženské komunity a jakýkoli pokus o změnu by znamenal otevřený střet s muslimskými, křesťanskými a židovskými náboženskými autoritami. Opatrný přechod od božského práva k zákonodárné činnosti založené na rozumu se tak uskutečnil až po Mladoturecké revoluci. I když Dekret o rodinném právu z roku 1917 zakládal svá nařízení ohledně muslimského manželství na islámském

právu, pružně a inovativně využíval různé sunnitské interpretační školy šaríy. Volba mezi různými názory islámských právníků byla hájena argumenty o potřebě změny vzhledem k záporným zkušenostem s dříve používanými interpretacemi a také vzhledem k nové době a mezinárodním souvislostem. Věk sňatku a omezení polygynie představují nejdůležitější novinky zavedené tímto právním dokumentem, který přes svou krátkou životnost vyniká jako důležitý mezník ve vývoji právního systému nejen na území dnešního Turecka, ale i dalších oblastí, které počátkem 20.století tvořily součást Osmanské říše.

The final decades of the Ottoman Empire, one of the most prominent and long-lasting empires in European history, witnessed a broad debate on the reasons for its declining power and relevance. Both Ottomans and foreigners offered different observations, arguments, and proposals to explain this complex and multilayered phenomenon. During the 18th century, the discourse of *freng* intellectuals (European foreigners, especially from Catholic and Protestant countries) on the one hand, and internal Ottoman debates on the other, advanced along different paths, though there existed contacts between the two. In the 19th century the intensification of interaction contributed to a lively circulation of knowledge, interpretations, and arguments[1]. The fact that the *question* was articulated in many different ways makes its analysis extremely difficult. Debates about Ottoman 'decline' had radically different motives and implications inside and outside the Empire. Even on a purely internal level the *question* had a different meaning for – let us say – liberal and conservative Ottoman Greeks, religious communities in Lebanon, Egyptian dignitaries striving to pursue independent policies, or Ottoman bureaucrats in Constantinople. Taking into consideration such complexity, the chapter focuses on the interpretative community of Turkish-speaking Ottoman Muslims[2]. It treats in particular the issue of family and family law as they appeared in discourse that centred around the idea of saving the Empire.

The debate, which had started as an attempt to explain and remedy Ottoman military failures and the serious difficulties in controlling the Empire in the 17th and 18th centuries, broadened as time went by. The initial debate about military issues expanded to include questions of technological knowledge and production, state finances, and the political and legal system. A particular boom in this respect took place during the last fifty years of the Empire, that is, approximately from 1870 to 1920. During this period the debate extended beyond senior members of the state bureaucracy to involve lower-level officials and civil servants, as well as liberal professionals. A growing consensus held that a reform of state institutions was necessary but insufficient and that a profound economic, social and moral revolution had to take place in order for the realm to be saved and its former glory recovered. Commerce, education, science, health, and family became prominent topics in newspapers, essays, theatre, novels, as

well as in private and public debates in cafés, secret societies, and educational institutions. Paradoxically, the strict censorship imposed during the absolutist regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1878-1908) focused attention on certain topics, including family and health, while it severely restricted the possibility of discussing explicitly political issues. On the other hand, social reform was not perceived as a matter of individual well-being but as a highly public issue closely connected with the state of the Empire. Therefore, this kind of debate continued to flourish even after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, which limited censorship and fostered public discussion of political issues under a constitutional guarantee of the freedom of the press.

This chapter deals with one of the issues over which the battle to create a new Ottoman society was fought: marriage. Marriage represented a social institution which was universally considered as fundamental to the family, the community, and to mankind in general. Beginning in the 1870s, Ottoman Muslim intellectuals systematically linked the wellbeing of the realm to an alleged crisis of the Muslim family. The authors who eventually contributed to this debate differed radically in identifying the reasons and solutions for this crisis. Thus the discussion help define ideological positions – with all the necessary nuances – along the general lines of Westernists, conservatives, Ottomanists, or Turkish nationalists. However, it can be said that a gap separated those who interpreted the alleged crisis as a consequence of external contamination from others who identified it as mainly an internal problem and did not hesitate to propose new, original remedies. The state, the principal motor of change in some areas, adopted a rather passive attitude in this matter for reasons that will be discussed below. During the 19th century state intervention was limited to attempts to place marriage under the control of the public authorities and to issue a number of decrees regarding specific questions. Systematic legal reform materialized only in the very last years of the Empire in the form of a Decree on Family Law (*Hukuk-i Aile Kararnamesi* [HAK]). This was passed in 1917 during the Young Turk regime. A product of the difficult task of reconciling Islamic law and new ideologies such as populationism or the defense of individual liberty, the decree was rather short-lived. Strong conservative opposition led to its revocation in 1919. A civil code inspired by the Swiss *Code Civil* – needless to say, this meant a radical break with Islamic law – replaced it during the first years of the Turkish Republic. This chapter gives pride of place to analysing the question of marriage in this extremely interesting Decree on Family Law. It interprets the document in the normative and historical context of Islamic law, as well as within the framework of previous and contemporary ideas and debates on marriage among the Ottoman Muslim elites. Its overall approach concentrates on government policies and public debate, not on the application of legislation, nor on the social and demographic dimensions of marriage patterns in the Ottoman Empire.

MARRIAGE IN THE CORE CENTURIES OF THE EMPIRE (16TH – 18TH CENTURIES)

In the middle centuries of the Ottoman Empire, when the remnants of the Central Asian tribal way of life were giving way to the basic patterns of eastern Mediterranean urban civilization, marriage was seen as extremely important for maintaining and re-producing the social order[3]. Research on marriage patterns indicates that there existed strong social pressure on single people to get married, and even the divorced or wid-owed were expected to remarry, with the exception of the very old, who lived in their children's household[4]. People who remained celibate, both men and women, were seen as a potential threat to the social and moral order. Single men were perceived as po-tential sexual predators, dangerous for women and young boys, as well as rioters and trouble-makers, and their energy had to be controlled and directed towards socially acceptable ends such as warfare. Women of fertile age were considered as vulnerable beings – lacking both physical force and the capacity for self-control – who desper-ately needed male protection and supervision[5]. The construction of male and female sexuality in Muslim thought has been subject of ongoing debate. On the one hand, it is generally accepted that there existed a consensus around the idea of an active man who requires legitimate sexual satisfaction in order not to disrupt the established order by seeking it outside the home. There is less agreement over the question of female sexual-ity. Some specialists, such as Fatima Mernissi, argue that there existed a fear of the dis-ruptive and threatening potential of female sexuality, which was seen as aggressive and hard to control[6]. Others, like Leslie Pierce or Shahla Haeri, contend instead that such fear did not necessarily attribute an active sexual role to women, but rather referred to their capacity to generate undesirable behaviour in men[7]. Though the latter hypothesis strikes me as more convincing for the period under discussion, there are certain indica-tions that – unlike in 19th-century Europe – the notion of marital duties in Islamic law did not imply a vision of a needy husband and an acquiescent dutiful wife. Some legal arrangements actually highlight the importance of the satisfaction of the wife's needs in marriage: for example, the right of women in a polygamous marriage to an equal dis-tribution of nights in the household of each spouse. Also, the woman had the option to ask for an annulment of the marriage if her husband was unwilling or unable to have sex with her[8]. Other measures, such as the 'cuckold tax' the Law Code of Sultan Süleyman (1522 -1566) imposed on the husbands of adulterous women, might indicate that wor-ries about the disruptive potential of female sexuality existed, leaving aside the issue of whether it was perceived as active or passive. The law held the husband responsible for controlling it, either by supervision or even confinement of his wife, as well as through the satisfaction of her needs[9]. In my opinion, the sexual act was charged with gender-power interpretations in the popular imagination, and as such it represented a sort of ritual of reaffirmation of the patriarchal order inside the family[10].

In this general world-view, having children, especially sons, constituted a key aspect of both male and female identity, a final confirmation of one's adulthood. Children

represented continuity of the lineage, as well as a useful labour force and a guarantee for their parents' security in old age. Marriage was the accepted and legitimate means of achieving sexual satisfaction and offspring. Men had another option, which consisted in taking in a slave-girl: sexual relations with one's own slave woman was not considered adultery and the children born of such a union were legitimate heirs according to Islamic law. However, not everyone could afford such a luxury and there existed other reasons why it did not become an alternative to marriage, but rather a complement to it practiced by the well-off. One reason was the fact that marriage constituted an important means of creating or strengthening the links between families or between different branches within a single kin group. Networks had a key importance during the core centuries of the Ottoman Empire[11]. A strong and extensive web of kinship provided its members with mutual aid in hard times or in the case of migration, as well as constituting a means of obtaining various advantages. Extending or strengthening a network of such vital importance was considered too essential to be left to the individual choice of a young man, let alone a woman. Moreover, due to the growing physical separation of the sexes in urban areas from the 16th century on, especially among higher-status families, it became difficult for young people to get to know each other[12]. Therefore, selecting a suitable partner and marrying out the children was understood as one of the most important tasks of the family as a whole.

The importance of marriage as the constituent bond of a household was recognized by Ottoman Muslim writers who created, perpetuated, and modified a hybrid image of the ideal household as a fundamental unit of mankind. This vision was derived from diverse sources, including the different Turkish tribal customs, concepts and practices incorporated through contact with the Persian and Byzantine Empires and Balkan kingdoms, and the long tradition of Muslim literary production on this subject. From the 16th century onwards, Ottoman Muslim intellectuals of Anatolian and Balkan origins were directly inspired by the works of Arab and Persian Muslim scholars such as Avicenna or Nâsiruddîn Tûsî, who drew on ancient Greek philosophers and incorporated in their work Aristotle's and other Greek theorists' notions of *oikonomia*, which they translated as *ilm-i tedbir-i menzil*, or "management of the household"[13].

The fundamental role ascribed to marriage did not entail, however, direct intervention by the public authorities. Until the last decades of the Ottoman Empire the state's role was very limited. Every religious community had its own rules related to marriage that believers were supposed to follow. In the case of Ottoman Christian communities, this autonomy involved direct oversight by religious authorities based upon the understanding that marriage was a sacred bond that should be sealed in the presence of a priest. Among Muslims and Jews marriage was a verbal or written contract based on an agreement between two families, between a man and a future wife's tutor, or between the man and the woman themselves. It was regulated by Islamic and Jewish law respec-

tively. In the case of mixed marriages between a Muslim man and a Christian or Jewish woman, Islamic law applied.

The state's intervention in this contract in the Ottoman Empire was indirect, as it consisted in supervising the semi-autonomous religious establishment (*ulema*). The system worked in the following way: the *ulema* as *müftis* (juriconsults, persons who dictate legal opinions or *fetvas*) created the legal framework of Muslim marriage by interpreting the sources of Islamic law. The *müftis* dictated *fetvas* with respect to all aspects of marriage and married life which were related to the teachings of the Qu'ran; sunna, hadiths, and other authoritative oral traditions; or even the common law (*örf*). The *ulema* also held the office of *kadı* (a judge in the Sharia court) and thus resolved disputes relating to marriage. The *kadı* intervened in cases of dispute over the validity of marriage and about its functioning or dissolution in conformity with Islamic law. Thus, religious authorities regulated marriage without its becoming a religious institution itself, in contrast to the Catholic and Orthodox Christian Churches, where the conversion of marriage into a sacred bond or sacrament took place. In theory, every scholar of Islamic law could act as a *müfti*, so the state did not necessarily play any role in creating a legal framework for marriage. However, the sultan's administration managed to establish a monopoly over higher religious education and to tie the religious establishment to the state and make it serve the ruling dynasty. The most important *ulema* were actually men in the service of the Sultan, especially in the post of *şeyhülislam*, that is, the supreme authority in the interpretation of Islamic law in the Ottoman territory[14]. The judges at the Sharia courts were also linked to the Ottoman state as they were appointed and dismissed by the *şeyhülislam*. By subordinating religious authorities and integrating them into the bureaucracy the Ottomans actively influenced their activity; the willingness of the secular authorities to pressure the religious establishment became clear in issues like land ownership or crimes against the state. However, there was no significant pressure on jurists and judges to interpret the Sharia flexibly in the case of marriage, so traditional Arab sources were applied to elaborate its legal context. Although there were some attempts during the Classical period to introduce an obligation to ask the permission of the *kadı* to get married and to register the marriage in a court, unregistered marriages sealed without previous permission were never considered invalid and the attempts to place marriage under the control of the courts failed[15]. Ottoman Muslim men and women often made use of *imams* and of the Islamic courts in matters related to the sealing of marriage contracts, but in these cases the role of the judge and his helpers was limited to writing, revising, and registering the marriage contract in order to prevent or help resolve future disputes. Their intervention can be compared to the tasks of a notary in Christian Europe.

The *fetvas* explained which rules had to be followed for a marriage contract to be valid. Moreover, they offered solutions to disputes in accordance with Islamic law, serving as guides for the decisions of judges. The following are some examples:

Case: The closest legal tutor of the little Hind is her mother Zeynep. If Zeynep's mother, Hatice, marries Hind to Amr without Zeynep's permission, is such a marriage contract valid?
Answer: No, it is not [16].

Case: If Zeyd repudiated his wife three times when he was out of his mind after he had eaten henbane [a poisonous plant that can create hallucinatory trances] and drunk boza [a beverage made of slightly fermented millet], should such divorce be taken seriously?
Answer: If he could not distinguish between the sky and the ground, it should not[17].

Case: If Zeyd's divorcee Hind says after Zeyd's death: "he owed me 5,000 filori of mehr" basing her proof on Zeyd's verbal declaration, and Zeyd's heirs say "your mehr is 5,000 aspers" proving it, whose proof is more convenient?
Answer: Hind's proof is more convenient[18].

Unfortunately, the state of research on this matter makes it impossible to confirm whether the *müftis* actually pursued a specific policy in their *fetva*s, or whether there existed schools of interpretation inside each *mezhep* that differed by period and territory. Analysis of the production of fetvas on marriage in the Ottoman Empire seems to indicate that the *müfti*s tended to simplify the material produced by Hanefi Islamic jurists in previous centuries, omitting some questions and reducing the number of legal categories they used[19]. In general, the image we now have of the Ottoman *müftis*' interpretation of Sharia in relation to marriage is rather static, while the research focusing on judges' decisions seems to indicate the existence of a more varied panorama.

People approached the *müftis* with doubts about how to live according to Islamic law or in order to find out whether they had sinned. The *kadı* was expected to intervene in Muslim marriage only in the case of a conflict, that is, if an accusation was brought up related to it. Sometimes Christians and Jews – especially women – went to the Sharia court when they thought Islamic law was more favourable to their interests than the rules that governed marriage in their own religious community. Muslims also tried to negotiate the boundaries of the Sharia by choosing the most favourable interpretation among the four Sunni schools (*mezhep*) of Islamic law (Hanefi, Shafiʹi, Maliki and Hanbali). However, if everything went smoothly, no contact with the authorities was actually necessary, either for getting married or for getting divorced, and then applying to a *kadı* of that school.

This statement should not lead us to conclude that marriage was a wholly private matter. Such an interpretation would wrongly assume a modern division of private and public, neglecting the fact that the separation of spheres that existed in the Ottoman Empire was construed in a rather different way[20]. Marriage was certainly not a private matter. It was public in the sense that it was connected to a series of ritualized proceedings, centred around matchmaking and the wedding itself, which were meant to gain public recognition for the bride and the groom. It was not the presence of any state or religious authority that gave legitimacy to a marriage but that of the witnesses, who attended the closing of the marriage contract, and of the neighbourhood, which acknowledged and accepted the new *status quo* through its participation in the wedding. The customs linked to matchmaking and the wedding varied greatly, depending on re-

gion, ethnic group, wealth, and other factors. In general, they had hardly any relation to Islamic law, though some included religious elements or were interpreted in a religious way. Among these customs was the invitation of an *imam* to give his approval to the marriage contract and to participate in the ceremony.

Among the main features of marriage in Islamic law, the power attributed to words has to be emphasized. A marriage contract (*akıd*) became real when people, in the presence of witnesses, pronounced the words that expressed their will to marry or, in the case of legal tutors (*veli*), to marry their tutees, when there existed no legal impediments to the two people being married and when an adequate *mehr* ('dower') was transferred from the husband to the wife. In the interpretation of the Hanefi *mezhep*, the dominant school in the Ottoman Empire, a marriage contract was valid even if the words of consent were pronounced under threat. On the other hand, a man could find himself divorced by pronouncing certain formulae in a heated quarrel with his wife or by swearing on his marriage and then not fulfilling the promise[21].

Marriage was generally not a contract between two individuals but rather between two families. Arranged marriages were common, many of them being contracted between children. The children were married by their legal tutors (*veli*) and women needed a tutor to get married even in their adulthood, except in certain specific situations[22]. Even adult men were helped by their female relatives to choose an adequate wife. As is well known, the Sharia authorized men to marry up to four women. However, they were obliged to pay their wives the *mehr*, treat them equally, and provide each one with a house, or at least with a separate room. Such regulations made polygamy quite rare in the cities[23].

Islamic law recognized some impediments to marriage, especially certain kinds of religious difference, as well as links of consanguinity and fosterage. Islamic law also acknowledged a principle of equality (*kafa'a* or *kuvuf*) between the spouses. Certain kinds of inequality constituted an impediment to the marriage, while others offered grounds for annulment if a party requested it. The principle of equality protected the woman, but at the same time was interpreted in a gender-biased way to imply that the man's dominant position in the marriage was a desideratum. For example, a woman or her tutor could ask *kadı* to annul a marriage to a man of inferior status as such a bond could be considered humiliating for both spouses. On the other hand, there was no shame involved when a man married a woman of lower origin[24].

> *Case:* Is the ignorant shopkeeper Amr equal to [compatible with] Hind, a daughter of Zeyd of the *ulema* [the religious establishment]?
> Answer: No, he is not[25].

The young age of a bride or groom was not an impediment to marriage, although consummation was postponed in such cases. Married children remained with their parents

until they reached maturity or, in the case of girls, until they were considered "carnally desirable" (*müşteha*). Only then could the married couple begin their life together.

In many cultures marriage served as a space wherein to produce legitimate heirs and transmit property to the next generation, and such was the case in the Ottoman Empire. More remarkable is the fact that according to Sharia law, marriage did not mean the fusion of property, nor the wife's property passing to her husband. On the contrary, the husband and wife preserved their own personal property and had no right to dispose of that of their spouse. Men were obliged to pay a certain sum of money (*mehr*) to the bride as a part of the marriage contract, as well as her maintenance (*nafaka*) during the marriage. However, the right of women to inherit the property of their husbands was strictly limited, although research on the 18th-century Ottoman Empire shows that husbands sometimes managed to secure the administration of their property after their death by their widows through charitable foundations[26]. Children were considered the property of their father and his family and women were granted only a temporary right of caretaking (*hızanet*) in the case of divorce or the husband's death. Only if the husband designated his wife as legal tutor for their children in the case of his death could she keep them in her custody and make important decisions in their name until they were adults[27].

Islamic law permitted divorce and archival documents from Ottoman Sharia courts show that it apparently was quite widely practised[28]. The rules Islamic law imposed on the practice of divorce assured masculine hegemony; for a man, divorce by repudiation (*talak*) was extremely easy, at least in theory, as it was enough to express aloud three times the will to divorce. For a woman, however, divorce was difficult if the husband refused to collaborate. Hanefi *mezhep* was particularly restrictive on the possibility of annulment or judicial divorce. There existed an option, widely used in the Ottoman Empire according to Madeline C. Zilfi and Svetlana Ivanova, of divorce by mutual agreement (*hul*)[29]. The research on *hul* divorce shows that the wife often exchanged a sum of money or the right for the maintenance of the children in her care, for the husband's consent to divorce. Although, in principle, divorce legislation favoured men, especially among poor people where no important property was in question, it has to be pointed out that in the Ottoman Empire practice differed slightly from theory as families found ways to protect their daughters from being repudiated by their husbands. The bride's family could introduce barriers to an easy divorce into the marriage contract, for example through fixing a delayed *mehr* or *mehr-i mueccel*, which was a dower paid in the case of divorce and was usually much higher than the one paid at the beginning of the marriage. Moreover, divorcing a woman from an influential family could mean losing important kinship ties or even gaining influential enemies, which was another factor that could discourage men from repudiating their wives.

It can be safely concluded that the legal framework of marriage was designed to guarantee the husband's authority. In this respect it was more 'androarchal' than 'patriarchal', in the sense that it was not fathers but husbands as individuals who had the main say in

the majority of cases. This differed from Turkish tribal traditions which granted more power to family elders, thanks to which the father of the bride had an important influence and could effectively protect the position of his daughter by, for example, marrying her to a poorer man who depended on the clan[30]. These traditions also included a more egalitarian notion of compatibility, expressed in the idea that the spouses should be close in age and physical beauty[31]. The introduction of classical interpretations of Islamic law to urban Turkish Muslim communities transformed or eliminated many of the remnants of these traditions. Also, the advance of urban life itself promoted a 'nuclearization' of family units by the 16th century which ended up shattering the clan structure. To counter all this, a series of mechanisms based on Islamic law were applied in order to protect women against their husband's arbitrary use of marital authority. Ottoman women were ready to benefit from them, as is evident from the active use they made of Sharia courts in the case of disputes[32].

The winds of change: marriage as a matter of state

The thorough transformation of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century raised questions about many established truths and posed new challenges. In this context by the early 20th century a broad consensus emerged among those Ottomans who were active in public debate that the Muslim family was in crisis. This opinion was shared by many representatives of the traditional religious elites, as well as by reform-minded bureaucrats and officials. Furthermore, the notion of crisis was vigorously defended by men and women who constituted the emerging urban, middle classes that included liberal professionals, lower-level officials, and civil servants and their families. However, these men and women radically differed in identifying the causes of the crisis. The corrosive effects of Westernization upon Ottoman Muslims, the oppression of women, poor education, the lack of paternal authority, or its opposite, the mindless imposition of such arbitrary power, child marriages, frequent divorce, the lack of respect for Islamic law or, on the contrary, the adoption of the Arab interpretation of it while giving up Turkish 'democratic' traditions: all these and many other alleged causes jostled together in the discourse of Ottoman authors. Many of the writers, journalists, and activists who contributed to the debate were ambiguous in their attitudes. For example, while they defended the Ottoman family from the negative comments and prejudices of the not always well-informed *frengs*, they did not hesitate to criticize different aspects of the Ottoman Muslim family when they wrote for domestic readers.

Despite numerous attempts at reform in other areas, the state was conspicuously silent regarding this lively debate on marriage. The first important impulse came from playwrights and writers, who not only introduced new literary genres into Ottoman literature but also seduced their public by reshaping concepts such as love, freedom, and harmony. Journalists and essayists helped disseminate a sense of Ottoman back-

wardness in contrast with Europe, as well as opening space for a systematic discussion of solutions, including reform of the family. The reformers based their efforts on the notion of *muasırlaşma*, that is, catching up with modern times. *Muasırlaşma* did not only mean the adoption of 'modern manners'. It also consisted in breaking with traditional family structures and reorganizing personal relations around the principles of individual liberty, social responsibility, and forward-looking education. In particular, marriage as partnership, freedom of choice, and a harmonious home where children could be provided with attention and education, occupied a prominent position in this vision of a better future[33].

In general, these authors did not fight against arranged marriages as such. Rather, they argued for flexibility. Above all, they insisted on the right of the bride or the groom to refuse the candidate proposed by their family. This implied the prohibition of child marriages, which were incompatible with the principle of consent based on free will, and which tied men to an undesired partner through material obligations (*mehr*). Moreover, reformist intellectuals defended the right of the couple to meet and come to know each other before they got married so that they could find out whether they were compatible. The intervention of a matchmaker or family member was an acceptable option provided that the young people had the right to step back if they realized their incompatibility. Furthermore, the case of people choosing their partner themselves was also discussed and the authors generally agreed that families should give their approval to the marriage if the partner was suitable and honourable. The opinion of the family was considered legitimate, but many authors were convinced that families had to have strong reasons to refuse a union desired by two people in love.

The notion of (in)compatibility played a fundamental role in redefining discourse on marriage. The idea that the partners should be compatible was rooted in the vision of marriage as partnership that appeared in this period. According to 'modern manners', the husband and wife were supposed to spend more time together, not only at home, but also socializing in public[34]. Moreover, the idea of love as a prerequisite for a marital relationship was a seductive vision introduced by foreign and local novels, which were widely read among the growing literate population. The vision of the home as a shelter for men from the whirlwind of modern urban life combined with the idea of the domestic sphere as a centre of instruction and patriotic education, wherein new generations could be trained to compete with foreigners in order to restore the Empire to its former importance in a changing world[35].

Two intertwined arguments can be identified in the texts written by the advocates of change. The first developed around the notion of individual liberty and the right to pursue happiness. These key principles of the Enlightenment had been accepted by a growing number of people all around the world, including within the Ottoman Empire. The authors stressed the suffering, or even illness and death, that forced marriage wrought on young people[36]. Parents, both fathers and mothers, were denounced for

obliging their children to marry a person chosen at whim. Particular emphasis was placed on the lack of liberty and the helplessness young women suffered, and the often tragic consequences of parents' arbitrary decisions were underlined. Change implied enlarging the space for the interaction of both sexes so that young people could meet and get to know each other. Moreover, the authors argued for greater female access to education in order to increase mutual understanding between husband and wife[37].

The second line of argument connected the compatibility of the couple with the stability of the household, and in so doing raising the question of social responsibility. The reformers maintained that the marriage of two people who hardly knew each other, who disliked each other, or who were unable to decide for themselves, was actually a socially irresponsible act that threatened the stability of the entire Empire. An unhappy marriage led to an unhappy home, or even to divorce, which meant the disintegration of the household, quarrels and lawsuits between the families, and a damaging environment for children. The authors drew a parallel between unstable family life and the chaotic situation of the realm:

> The households in a realm (*mülk*) are like rooms in a house; will there be peace in a house if all its rooms are shattered by permanent hate and everyday quarrels, will it flourish, will it reach happiness[38]?

Moreover, in keeping with the new importance attributed to the education of children from an early age, parents were urged to devote maximum attention to their sons and daughters. It was believed that the ignorance and immaturity of parents jeopardized this process. As the education of new generations was considered a fundamental part of the project of social reform, neglecting it meant threatening the future of the Empire itself.

The growing influence of the liberal professions is evident in the medical and hygienic references which marked the discourse on marriage and family. These were rooted in the tactic of appealing to the authority of experts in order to make arguments more convincing. Thus, young women were considered too weak and immature to give birth and bring up children. Therefore, forcing teenage girls to marry meant putting in danger not only their physical integrity, but also the health and education of future generations. Furthermore, both young men and women had to be given a suitable education before they got married in order to perform well as parents according to the principles of modern hygiene. Thus, early marriage was not only an imposition on young people but also a menace to the health of individuals and of society as a whole. It threatened the success of demographic and hygienic policies promoted by the state and the reformers. The latter typically identified their interests as physicians or civil servants with those of the Empire, not only in a search for greater credibility but also as a means of enlarging their professional field of action and influence.

Proponents of reform of the Ottoman Muslim family defended a vision of marriage which included the idea of partnership based on free will. This did not entail full equality between wife and husband; the man was supposed to lead and guide the woman and act as the head of family. Nevertheless, partnership included emotional closeness amid compatible morals, character, and interests. The ideal marriage would be formed by adult, educated people, capable of producing and raising healthy children and providing them with discipline and a suitable education[39]. Achieving this ideal rested on the education of women, as well as the maturity of the bride and the groom. Moreover, the reformers pleaded for a relaxation of the norms of sexual segregation, so that men and women could meet, get to know each other, and find out whether they were compatible. One may even observe how marriage began to be seen as a sort of "sacred bond" in the sense of its being understood as a long-lasting emotional relationship charged with tasks that surpassed the confines of a single family[40].

Research based on oral history and demographic data confirms that urban elites and the middle classes absorbed these new attitudes to marriage. However, there was hardly any change in the legal system, which in the case of family law remained based on the Sharia, the exclusive domain of the *ulema*[41]. Even a major legislative reform such as the introduction in 1876 of the Civil Code (*Mecelle-i Ahkam-i Adliyye*) omitted family law. There was no single codified legislation regarding marriage. Instead, each religious community continued to apply its own internal norms in this area as had always been the case in the Ottoman Empire. In the case of Muslims this meant that judges continued to base their decisions on *fetvas*. However, the state renewed its efforts to place marriage under its control, trying to tie it to the previous permission (*izinname*) of the *kadı* or a corresponding religious authority for Christians and Jews. This effort is expressed in article 33 of the Regulations on the Register of Population (*Sicilli Nüfus Nizamnamesi)* of 2 September 1881. This law also obliged an *imam*, who had to be present at the closing of the marriage contract, or a rabbi or cleric who celebrated the wedding in case of minorities, to inform the Department of Population of the marriage within 15 days. Religious leaders who did not fulfil this obligation could be penalized. In the case of divorce, those involved had to inform the religious authority so that he could pass on the information to the same department. Such measures thus institutionalized the role of the *imam* at the marriage, as well as entitling religious leaders in general to act as civil servants, collecting and conveying information to the state. Nevertheless, these novelties did not alter the hegemony of Islamic law, as a marriage (among Muslims) was still valid even if it was concluded without prior authorization. In order to force obedience to the regulations the state had to increase the punishment for people who married without the *kadı*'s permission and for the *imams* who ratified the agreement, replacing fines with imprisonment in the early 20th century. It is clear that the state had to face the fact that the legitimacy of any legal measure that did not have support in the Sharia remained questionable.

THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE: THE DECREE ON FAMILY LAW OF 1917

Beginning in the reform period of *Tanzimat* (an attempt at thorough reform from above, undertaken by the Ottoman sultans and high bureaucrats and articulated in two major decrees dated to 1839 and 1856) the Ottoman government did not hesitate to promote radical changes in the legal system. These included the introduction of French-style mercantile law and of new regulations concerning land tenure. Moreover, the *Tanzimat* decrees proclaimed the equality of all subjects before the law, a principle that directly contradicted the Sharia. Furthermore, special courts, *nizamiye mahkemeleri*, were created to deal with cases issuing from the new codified legislation of 1871 and a Civil Code was introduced during the first constitutional period in 1876, although it did not include personal and family law. Thus, the Sharia courts' field of action gradually shrank, and was restricted to questions of family law, inheritance, and the like.

The passivity of the state regarding the question of family law can be explained in several ways. The Sharia courts remained one of the last reserves of the religious establishment, the *ulema*. These influential families, closely tied to the dynasty through their monopoly on the interpretation and application of Islamic law, were losing ground during the 19th century as a consequence of the growth of a secular bureaucracy. Depriving them of the Sharia courts would have certainly sparked off furious opposition. But not only did the Muslim religious establishment cherish its hegemony over personal and family law: the Christian and Jewish religious establishments also considered these areas as their exclusive domain and were not ready to give up powers they had held for centuries. Still, it is important to ask why it was that family law, in particular, was left out of a legal reform that was considered essential in other areas of social life. I would argue that the family was perceived as a space where "authentic" values were cherished, shaping the very identity of the People, and Muslim identity was still understood as fundamental. Hence, this space more than others needed to be preserved from pollution by foreign influences that might have been accepted, even by conservatives, as inevitable in other domains.

Nevertheless, the idea of a codification of family law received wide support beginning in the early 20th century. As Halil Cin points out, an important number of Islamic reformers defended the codification of Islamic law, while the so-called Westernists supported the adoption of a European-style family law and its incorporation into the *Mecelle*. Turkish nationalists maintained that the legislation on family in European countries was closer to original Turkish family values than the interpretation of Islamic principles that prevailed in the Ottoman Empire[42]. Although the debates on family, women's status, polygamy, and 'premature' marriage were very intense during the Second Constitutional Period, no major legislative change actually took place until 1917. On 25th teshrin-i evvel 1333 A.H., a Decree on Family Law (*Hukuk-i Aile Kararnamesi*, HAK) was adopted. This was the first systematic codification of family law in the history of the Ottoman Empire.

The reform took place in the context of the Great War, which brought important changes to the lives of many Ottoman women. The massive mobilization of Muslim men left the Empire with many jobs open and the state tried hard to convince women to work outside the home. Women engaged in patriotic activities such as serving as nurses or sewing clothes for soldiers. Through this experience urban, middle-class women gained self-confidence and political consciousness. Furthermore, many reformers were convinced that the state of the *patria* depended on the wellbeing of women and that there could be no real progress if they were kept in a position often compared to slavery and which prevented them from being good mothers of healthy, educated, and well-bred children[43]. In this view, the legal status of women had to be improved in order to remedy the deplorable state of the realm.

The most revolutionary aspect of the Decree on Family Law was its codifying a single interpretation of Islamic law, a principle which clashed with centuries of tradition. In former practice, the *müftis* prepared their *fetvas* by basing themselves on the compendia that the principal authorities of their *mezhep* had elaborated during the Middle Ages out of the basic sources of Islamic law (Qu'ran, Sunna, hadiths, and common law). The judges adopted decisions by choosing among the *fetvas* of the contemporary *müftis* or by appealing directly to the medieval sources of their *mezhep*. In the HAK, the authors combined the four schools of Sunni Islamic law at their convenience. The final result was a single, original interpretation of the Sharia. Moreover, this codified interpretation was not justified as the one closest to the fundamental sources of Islamic law, which would be traditional argumentative logic based on reference to authorities. Instead the reformers justified it on the grounds of utility and by appealing to the use of reason, to *raison d'état*, and to negative experiences with the application of existing rules.

The Decree on Family Law did not introduce a single, unified law for every Ottoman citizen. On the contrary, since its authors had decided to anchor the Decree in religious tradition, it would have been unacceptable to impose it on Ottoman Christians and Jews. Therefore, the HAK included separate sections for Muslims, Christians, and Jews, each based on their respective religious tradition. Thus for example, while the regulations for Muslims and Jews permitted polygamy, it was strictly prohibited for Christians.

As this chapter deals with Muslim marriage the following paragraphs will focus primarily on the implications of the HAK for the Muslim community. The HAK introduced the obligation to make public the decision to marry, so that anyone who objected to the union had time to speak up. This measure was a novelty and lacked precedents in Islamic law. Moreover, the marriage contract had to be sealed in front of a judge or his deputy. Muslims were supposed to appeal directly to the judge, while a Jewish or Christian religious leader notified the court so that the judge could be present at the ceremony. The judge was obliged to register the marriage, and to provide specific information regarding the spouses. However, as was the case in earlier legal measures that attempted to establish state regulation of marriage, the contract was held valid even

if no judge was present, and it was only through punishment by imprisonment that the law was imposed. Such measures reveal an attempt to standardize legal procedures and register information in accordance with the policies of the Young Turk regime. To paraphrase Michel Foucault, the Young Turks regarded the *population* as an economic and political problem, and realized that they were not dealing with "subjects", nor even with "people", but rather with a "population", with its "mortality", "marriage patterns", "birth rates", housing quality, health, and hygiene[44].

Marriage was to be based on the principle of free will[45]. The authors of the HAK refused to accept the Hanefi interpretation that considered valid the marriage contracts agreed to under coercion, and opted instead for the Shafi'i interpretation that dismissed such contracts as invalid. They were also careful to emphasize that the will to marry should be expressed in unambiguous language. The HAK maintained the possibility of polygamy for Muslims, in accordance with traditional interpretations of Islamic law. However, it introduced an important novelty in this respect: it permitted a woman to impose a condition in the marriage contract that prohibited her husband from taking another wife without her consent. If the husband did marry a second woman despite the prohibition, either the first or the second wife would be divorced automatically. The introduction of such conditions to the marriage contract represented an area in which the four *mezheps* differed in important ways. The authors of the HAK opted again to leave aside the more restrictive Hanefi version, traditionally dominant in the Ottoman Empire, which considered such conditions invalid, and adopted instead the more liberal opinion of Hanbali *mezhep*.

Another measure designed to strengthen the position of the wife was divorce negotiated in a family council. The authors defended it as a measure that protected women from the misbehaviour of their husbands. It appeared as article 130, based on the point of view of Maliki *mezhep*:

> If there appears a conflict and incompatibility between the spouses and one of them appeals to the judge, the judge appoints one arbitrator from each family. If an arbitrator cannot be found in one or both families, or if the person does not have the required qualities, then the judge designates suitable people from outside of the family. The family council created in this way examines the explanations and defence of both sides, trying to reconcile them. If it is not possible and the fault is the husband's, the couple separates. If it is the wife's fault, they are divorced and the wife returns a part or all of the mehr [dower]. If the arbitrators do not agree, the judge either appoints another family council of suitable people or a third arbitrator who has no relation to either side. The decision of the arbitrators is irrevocable and no protest is accepted.

The authors justified the introduction of this measure as follows:

> The fact that in this paragraph the point of view of the Maliki mezhep has been adopted and article 130 has been written according to this principle is due to the fact that it will serve to remove and eliminate much inappropriateness present in the families in our coun-

try, according to the opinion that it will end the unfair treatment of wives who do not have any other possibility to act than to give up their maintenance, especially when [husbands] oppress and do injustice to their wives and the right of divorce by repudiation is in their hands.

The novelty of article 130 consisted in the fact that the husband had to accept the separation proposed by the family council if he was held responsible for the marriage's problems. In particular, the authors of the law had in mind the problem of mistreatment of the wife. Undoubtedly, this measure widened the possibility for women to divorce and placed serious limitations on the husband's authority in the marriage. On the other hand, the right of decision was not given to the wife but to the family council: social consensus had preference over the free will of the individual.

The most important change the *Hukuk-i Aile Kararnamesi* introduced was the prohibition of child marriages. This reasoning behind this was rooted in the notion of marriage as a contract based on free will and was supported by a new social category which introduced the notion of adolescence to the legislation. While the traditional interpretation of the Sharia established a single division between childhood and adulthood, the HAK fixed the age of maturity for marriage at 17 years for women and 18 years for men. A new category of *mürahik/a* was introduced for young people who reached maturity according to Islamic law, that is, when signs of their reproductive capacity appeared, but who were considered too young to be considered adults by the criteria of the authors of the HAK. These adolescents needed the permission of a judge to get married (in the case of women the permission of the legal tutor was also required). As for girls below nine years of age and boys below twelve, article 7 firmly prohibited marriage.

The authors of the HAK were conscious of the break with existing practice it posed and devoted many lines to justify the more controversial articles:

> Although the authorities in Islamic law approved the marriages of children arranged by their tutors and they took place until now, the necessity of another attitude has become evident in our era, because times have changed. In every period, and above all in this one when a hard struggle for life is being fought, the first obligation of parents to their children is to educate them and to bring them up to be people who will be able to triumph in this world of battles and to form an orderly family. However, in our country parents often neglect the education and instruction of their children, betrothing them in the cradle in order to see them married and with rights to an inheritance, so these poor children who know nothing about the world are married and thrown to catastrophe. Families created in this manner, composed of children who have not seen school, who do not know how to read and write, nor the commands of the faith, are like a dead-born faetus, condemned to decomposition in the very first months of their existence. This is one of the causes of the instability of families in our country[48].

Not only child marriages were denounced, but also the fact that girls were married too young, even if they were already considered adult and able to start married life according to Islamic law. Particular emphasis was placed on the damage early motherhood wrought on the physical and psychological health of young women and their children:

> The wife and husband constitute a family and they should collaborate in its management. While the boys spend their time playing in the street. ...girls of the same age are burdened with the greatest obligation in human society, that is, to be the mother of a family and the one who manages its affairs. Poor girls, whose physical constitution has not yet developed fully, suffer nervous problems all their life due to maternity, they get chronically ill, the child that is born is fragile and nervous ... these are some of the reasons for the degradation of the Islamic element[49].

A radical change in the understanding of law and in the perception of time can be observed in the reasoning of the authors of the HAK. They cautiously refused the timelessness of a legal measure, pointing to the negative experience of the existing interpretation of Islamic law, as well as to the changing times that require the adoption of new regulations. In this respect, the HAK can be interpreted as a transition from the notion of eternal and immutable divine law to legal measures based on negotiation and reason within a changing historical context.

Reform was justified by references to the well-being of the families, endangered by the instability provoked by the incompatibility and immaturity of the husband and wife. Moreover, the damage to the mental and physical health of the population early maternity caused was considered a further impediment to the widely accepted necessity of raising healthy, educated and well-bred new generations. The instability of families and the poor health of mothers and children were believed to constitute an important threat to the survival of the Empire. Finally, the new legislation was supported by scientific arguments derived from medical discourse, as well as by references to the common good.

Still, the authors could not base their proposals solely on reason and modern science. They had instead to anchor the prohibition of child marriages in Islamic law. For that reason, they appealed to the authority of medieval Muslim religious leaders who expressed doubts regarding child marriages:

> ... ibn Shubruma and Abu Baker say that the guardianship over small children has to be undertaken for their benefit. For example, a child does not need a tutor to receive presents, nor in any other case when he is clearly of no use. Since children do not need marriage as there is no important natural reason for it nor because of the offspring, [ibn Shubruma and Abu Baker] come to the conclusion that as a child does not need marriage until he/she is adult, it is not valid to arrange it in his/her name. In principle, marriage is not a temporary matter, but a life-long contract. These two scholars add: in the case of the validity of a marriage contract closed by the tutors in the name of a child, it is supposed that the contract continues even in adulthood. However, nobody has a right to act in a way that imposes on a person a commitment that would limit his action in adulthood. The opinion of the above-mentioned is confirmed by the catastrophes that have continued for centuries, so their point of view has been adopted and article 7 has been settled in this way[50].

The new marriage legislation introduced in 1917 was a cautious reinterpretation of Islamic law that strove to enhance the principle of free will and the status of women, according to the vision of marriage as a partnership. Greater importance was given to aspects such

as the "stability of families" or the quality of the population, revealing the demographic concerns of the Ottoman state during the Young Turk regime. In conclusion, the *Hukuk-i Aile Kararnamesi* could be interpreted as a particular reading of Islamic law based on individual liberty and *raison d'état* defined as the protection of population ultimately aimed at the survival of the Empire.

Conclusion

Despite the fact that the HAK actually introduced only minor modifications to existing practice it immediately provoked a wave of opposition and it had to be revoked in 1919[51]. The conservatives accurately identified the threat that a codified version of Sharia constituted for the *ulema* as interpreters of Islamic law. Moreover, they were particularly sensitive to any restriction of male authority, as is clear from the hostile reaction to the article that empowered the wife to refuse to share her husband by introducing the condition of monogamy into the marriage contract. The conservatives denounced it as an un-Islamic attack on the concept of polygamy[52]. In general, they refused to accept the union of the four *mezheps* of Sunni law and dismissed the very idea of codification as a dangerous novelty.

For their part, the Christian and Jewish minorities interpreted the new legislation as limiting their autonomy through an imposition of the Ottoman state upon their traditional right of self-administration. In this respect, the Ottoman government found itself in an extremely difficult position: on the one hand, it was supposed to modernize a "backward" system, bringing it up to date with other continental European countries, a step that demanded the introduction of a codified legal system in which all individuals would be treated equally. On the other hand, the Ottoman state was under constant pressure from the European powers to protect the minorities and respect the autonomy they preserved from the Classical Era. This constituted one of the key dilemmas of reformist activity in the Ottoman Empire, and one that was to remain unresolved.

When they overturned the *Hukuk-i Aile Kararnamesi* in 1919 the conservatives did not suspect that only a few years later (1926) they would have to swallow a much more bitter pill: a full-blown civil code. The republicans, led by Mustafa Kemal, did not mind hurting the *ulema*'s feelings. On the contrary, the republican project of modern Turkey questioned the very existence of a religious establishment. The new legislation on marriage and family was not the cautious compromise of the recent past, but rather a revolutionary statement[53].

Notes

1   N. Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, Istanbul 1978.

2   I use this term in preference to 'Turks', as the category in question included a great number of people of different origins, especially from the Ottoman Balkans, or even political immigrants from Hungary or Poland.

3   Such changes can be observed by comparing for example Keykavus, *Oğul Terbiyetin ve Beslemeğin Beyan Eder*, in O.Ş. Gökyay (ed.), *Kabusnâme*, Istanbul 1974, pp. 172-181 (a popular book written in Persian in 1082, translated into Turkish several times since the 14th century) with Kınalızade Ali Çelebi, *İlm-i Tedbirü'l-Menzil*, in *Ahlâk-i Alai*, Istanbul 2007 (a text written in the 16th century).

4   Research on the period prior to the late 19th century is severely hampered by the lack of adequate sources. Some long-term trends can be elucidated from the data obtained for the final decades of the Ottoman Empire or from studies which concentrate on elite families. See A. Duben, C. Behar, *Istanbul Households. Marriage, Family and Fertility 1880-1940*, Cambridge 1991; M.L. Meriwether, *The Kin who Count: Family and Society in Ottoman Aleppo, 1770-1840*, Austin 1999.

5   L. Pierce, *Seniority, Sexuality, and Social Order: The Vocabulary of Gender in Early Modern Ottoman Society*, in M.C. Zilfi (ed.), *Women in the Ottoman Empire*, Leiden - New York - Cologne 1997, pp. 169-196.

6   F. Mernissi, *Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in a Modern Muslim Society*, Bloomington 1987.

7   Pierce, *Seniority* cit., p. 195; S. Haeri, *Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage in Shi'i Iran*, Syracuse 1989.

8   In this respect it is important to emphasize that while the Maliki *mezhep* acknowledged this option for a woman at any time during the marriage if the husband refused to or was unable to have intercourse, the Hanefi *mezhep* limited it to a situation when intercourse between the husband and wife never took place. H. Cin, *İslâm ve Osmanlı Hukukunda Evlenme*, Ankara 1974, pp. 181-182.

9   On the cuckold tax see Pierce, *Seniority* cit., pp.169-196. On reclusion see C. Imber, *Women, Marriage, and Property: Mahr in the Behcetü'l-Fetâvâ of Yenişehirli Abdullah*, in Zilfi (ed.), *Women* cit., pp. 81-104.

10   The fact that the husband's impotence or refusal to have intercourse was one of the very few legitimate reasons for the wife's demand of judicial annulment or divorce might be one of the arguments to support such a hypothesis.

11   For a valuable case-study on this subject see Meriwether, *The Kin* cit.

12   Although it is certainly correct to state that the presence of women on the streets or at the court was much higher than has been traditionally supposed, the interaction of the sexes was indeed becoming strictly regulated and there are examples of cases dealing with "illegal mixing of the sexes" found in the Ottoman court registers. See Pierce, *Seniority* cit., p. 192.

13   Sabri Orman, *İlm-i Tedbir-i Menzil. Oikonomia ve İktisat*, in *Sosyo-kültürel değişme sürecinde Türk ailesi I*, Ankara 1992, pp. 265-310.

14   I.M. Lapidus, *State and Religion in Islamic Societies*, in "Past and Present", 1996, 151, pp. 3-27.

15   Cin, *İslâm* cit., pp. 283-284; G. Jäschke, *Türkiye'de İmam Nikahı*, in *S.Ş. Ansay'ın Anısına Armağan*, Ankara 1964, pp. II-34.

16   This is a *fetva* of a 17th-century Ottoman *şeyhülislam* Çatalcalı Ali Efendi (from his work *Fetava-i Ali Efendi*, 1685), published in G. Art, *Şeyhülislam Fetvalarında Kadın ve Cinsellik*, Istanbul 1996, p. 62.

17   A *fetva* of the distinguished 16th-century Ottoman *şeyhülislam* Ebussuud, published in M.E. Düzdağ, *Şeyhülislâm Ebussuûd Efendi Fetvaları ışığında 16. Asır Türk Hayatı*, Istanbul 1983, p. 45.

18   Another *fetva* of Ebussuud, *ibid.*, p. 43.

19   Cin, *İslâm* cit., p. 151.

[20] On the construction of the private and the public see for example D. Rizk Khoury, *Slippers at the Entrance or Behind Closed Doors: Domestic and Public Spaces for Mosuli Women*, in Zilfi (ed.), *Women* cit., pp. 105-127.

[21] See the *fetva*s of Ebussuud in Düzdağ, *Şeyhülislâm* cit., p. 49.

[22] The Hanefi *mezhep*, the principal school in the Ottoman Empire, permitted a man and a woman to get married under certain circumstances without the intervention of the bride's legal tutor.

[23] M.C. Zilfi, *'We Don't Get Along': Women and Hul Divorce in the Eighteenth Century*, in Zilfi (ed.), *Women* cit., p. 268.

[24] Such legal figures attempted to protect a pious woman from being married to a man of low morals. See Imber, *Women, Marriage* cit., in Zilfi (ed.), *Women* cit., p. 87.

[25] A *fetva* of Çatalcalı Ali Efendi, in Art, *Şeyhülislam Fetvalarında* cit., p. 81.

[26] M.L. Meriwether, *Women and Waqf Revisited: The Case of Aleppo, 1770-1840*, in Zilfi (ed.), *Women* cit., pp. 128-152.

[27] J. Tucker, *The Fullness of Affection: Mothering in the Islamic Law of Ottoman Syria and Palestine*, in Zilfi (ed.), *Women* cit., pp. 232-252.

[28] Zilfi, *'We Don't Get Along'* cit., pp. 269-271.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 290; S. Ivanova, *The Divorce Between Zubaida Hatun and Esseid Osman Ağa: Women in the Eighteenth Century Sharia Court of Rumeli*, in A. Sonbol (ed.), *Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History*, Syracuse 1996, pp. 112-125.

[30] Although no longer defended by distinguished writers and despite its serving as a possible cause of the invalidity of marriage according to Hanefi law, the custom among Ottoman elite families of marrying female family members to clients of lower status survived for a long time. Daughters, granddaughters, sisters, and aunts of an important dignitary were often married to men of humble origin. The ruling dynasty also adopted the practice, as the Sultan's closest female relatives were married to high bureaucrats who were actually *kul,* that is, the sultan's slaves. In theory, Ottoman Muslim scholars did not see the action of a bride's father in this respect as logical and positive and opted for defending the husband's authority in the marriage, considering it humiliating for a man to accept a marriage that would leave him in a subordinate position. In practice, however, Ottoman families continued to opt for what Keykavus openly defended in the 11th century and accepted the agreements, which certainly strengthened the position of the wife, while offering the husband a means of upward social mobility.

[31] Keykavus, *Oğul Terbiyetin* cit., pp. 172-181.

[32] R.C. Jennings, *Women in Early 17th-Century Ottoman Judicial Records – the Sharia Court of Anatolian Kayseri*, in "Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient", 1975, 18, pp. 53-114; H. Gerber, *Social and Economic Position of Women in an Ottoman City, Bursa, 1600-1700*, in "International Journal of Middle East Studies", 1980, 12, p. 233; F.M. Göçek, M.D. Baer, *Social Boundaries and Ottoman Women's Experience in Eighteenth-Century Galata Court Records*, in Zilfi (ed.), *Women* cit., pp. 48-65.

[33] This section is based on the analysis published by the author in *La pareja – el Nuevo ideal del matrimonio en el Imperio Otomano*, in "Awraq", 2008, 25, pp. 75-107.

[34] N. Meriç, *Âdâb-ı Muâşeret: Osmanlı'da gündelik hayatın değişimi (1894-1927)*, Istanbul 2007.

[35] J. Malečková, *Úrodná půda. Žena ve službách národa*, Prague 2002; D. Martykánová, *Láska, disciplína a udoucnost. Diskurz osmanských intelektuálů o dětech v rodině (1870-1918)*, in "Historický časopis", 2008, 56, 2, pp. 249-266.

[36] The playwright and writer Namık Kemal in *Aile*, in *Sosyo-kültürel değişme sürecinde Türk ailesi III,* Ankara 1992, pp. 1017-1019, (first published in 1872). The playwright İbrahim Şinasi in *Şair evlenmesi*, Istanbul 1860.

[37] See for example the essay of the writer, lexicographer, and journalist Şemseddin Sami*, Kadınlar*, in *Sosyo-kültürel değişme sürecinde Türk ailesi III*, Ankara 1992, pp. 1026-1032 (first published in 1879/80).

[38] Namık Kemal, *Aile* cit., pp. 1017-1019.

[39] See for example the contrasting vision of the "Europeanized" and "oriental" family construed by the editor and essay-writer Tüccarzade İbrahim Hilmi in *Avrupalılaşmak, Felaketlerimizin Esbabı (Aile Hayatımızda Avrupalıla Avrupalılaşmanın Tesiri)*, in *Sosyo-kültürel değişme sürecinde Türk ailesi III* cit., pp. 1073-1079 (first published in 1916).

[40] Şemseddin Sami spoke about a "honourable and chaste girl who finds a heart to tie her heart to in a sacred bond of marriage", in *Kadınlar* cit., pp. 1026-1032.

[41] Duben, Behar, *Istanbul Households* cit.

[42] Cin, *İslâm* cit., pp. 289-290.

[43] Malečková, *Úrodná půda* cit.

[44] M. Foucault, *Governmentality*, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon, P. Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality,* Chicago 1991, pp. 87-104.

[45] However, the HAK, in concordance with the traditional interpretation of Hanefi law, did permit the marriage of mentally disabled people.

[46] *Hukuk-ı Aile Kararnamesi. Münâkehat-Müfârekât*, book II, paragraph 130, in *Sosyo-kültürel değişme sürecinde Türk ailesi III* cit., p. 1134.

[47] *Münâkehât ve Mufârakât Kararnamesi Esbâb-ı Mucibe Lâyıhası*, in *Sosyo-kültürel değişme sürecinde Türk ailesi III*, Ankara 1992, p. 1149.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 1141.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 1141.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 1142-1143.

[51] However in Syria, which was part of Ottoman Empire in 1917 when the Decree was passed, it remained in effect for 25 years.

[52] Cin, *İslâm* cit., p. 305. The possibility of imposing conditions on the marriage was limited according to the Maliki, Hanefi and Shafii mezheps. The Hanbali mezhep was the most liberal in this respect and permitted any condition which was not against the fundamental principles of marriage (as would be a condition to live as a celibate) and which was in favor of the wife. The measure introduced by the HAK, which permitted the wife to refuse polygamy, is used nowadays in several countries where Sharia applies in family law.

[53] At this point, it is worth mentioning that in recent years there have appeared attempts to lower the legal age of marriage in Turkey to fourteen. Welcomed as a recognition of the *status quo* in some rural communities, such proposals have received criticism not only from Turkish human rights and feminist organizations, but also from a wide spectrum of Turkish press and society.

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Living in a Multicultural Neighbourhood: Ottoman Society Reflected in Rabbinic *Responsa* of the 16th and 17th Centuries

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Abstract

This chapter contributes to the current discussion on how concepts related to frontiers and identities may be useful for research on early modern urban societies. It focuses on a specific type of space – "Ottoman urban space" – and shows how this was perceived and represented by its Jewish inhabitants in the 16th and 17th centuries. The principal primary source used is the so-called *Responsa* literature, a special genre of rabbinic literature, based on a question-and-answer format. Responsa texts dealt with various situations and problems that confronted Jews and which were too complicated to be resolved by one individual. The issue of language has meant that for some time this source has not been used by historians. The present study sees Ottoman society as heterogeneous, comprising multiple individual and collective identities, and divided by mental boundaries which were dynamic, fluid and often permeable. The aim here is to illustrate different types of identity from the Jewish perspective, with a special emphasis on the fact that Jewishness (which may be understood in religious, ethnic, and cultural terms) was only one way of self-identification. Specifically, three types of border are explored: administrative, cultural and religious – thematic fields which are richly documented in the Responsa literature.

Osmanské město raného novověku lze chápat jako specifický typ prostředí, v němž docházelo k setkávání mnoha kulturních, náboženských a etnických skupin. Mluvíme-li o setkávání jednotlivců a skupin, nevyhnutelně se dostaneme k otázce existence hranic mezi nimi a také k otázce kolektivních identit. Referenční rámec tohoto příspěvku tvoří každodenní zkušenost příslušníků osmanských židovských komunit v multikulturním prostředí osmanského města v centrálních oblastech říše (Istanbul, Soluň) a druhotně i názory a interpretace židovských učenců, tak jak jsou zachyceny a prezentovány v rabínské responsivní literatuře. Tato literatura má podobu otázek a odpovědí, které se dotýkají všech životních situací a které řeší aktuální problémy, se kterými si tazatel sám nevěděl rady. Problém (jádro dotazu) je vždy vylíčen v širších souvislostech, podává detailní popis vzniklé situace, chování aktérů, někdy dokonce cituje či parafrázuje jejich přímé výpovědi. Na poli responsivní literatury se tak střetávají dva světy – svět učenců a svět „lidových" vrstev. Přestože je tento pramen

mimořádným zdrojem informací, jeho využití zůstává v celosvětovém měřítku stále marginální, především vinou jazykové bariéry.

V příspěvku jsou pojednány tři tématické okruhy, v nichž problematika hranic a identit zaujímá centrální místo. Osmanská vláda explicitně nezakazovala (ale ani nepovolovala) činnost křesťanských a židovských soudních dvorů a autorit, pokud v případu nefiguroval muslim. Tato tichá tolerance administrativní a soudní činnosti náboženských minorit se omezovala pouze na sféru rodinného a občanského práva (sňatky, rozvody, dědictví) a nikoli na trestně-právní oblast. Rabíni jakožto představitelé soudní moci židovských komunit apelovali na důsledné využívání této tolerance a ostře kritizovali jedince, kteří vyhledávali osmanské soudy a úřady v interních záležitostech komunity. Administrativní hranice a její překračování je tedy jednou dělící čarou mezi židovským společenstvím a okolím, její legitimita i reálná účinnost však zůstávala diskutabilní a proto neustále zdůrazňovaná.

Prostor osmanského města nabízel jeho obyvatelům množství příležitostí k vzájemné komunikaci. Přestože příslušníci jednotlivých náboženských skupin projevovali tendenci usazovat se v blízkosti svých souvěrců, nevznikaly uzavřené čtvrti s obyvatelstvem pouze jedné denominace. Bezprostřední styk Židů s muslimy a křesťany se tedy neodehrával pouze v místech obchodních aktivit, ale také neformálně „na ulici", v nejbližším sousedství nebo i v soukromé sféře, a jeho charakter určovalo leckdy spíše sociální postavení než náboženská příslušnost. Nežidovští obyvatelé osmanského města nebyli vnímáni jednotně formou obecně přijímaného stereotypu. Mezi Židy a nežidy byla navazována přátelství, jindy ale slyšíme o nebezpečí, které číhá na každého, kdo udržuje neformální styky s nežidovským okolím.

Představa, že mezi židovskou komunitou a okolní spřečností existovala tlustá zeď znemožňující vzájemný kontakt, je stejně neudržitelná jako představa o kompaktnosti osmanské židovské komunity. I v ní byly přítomné různé rozdělující momenty, které jedince nebo určitou skupinu mohly odsunout na okraj židovské společnosti nebo dokonce z jejího středu vyloučit.

Conventionally, scholars have viewed the 16th-century as the zenith of the Ottoman Empire: as it expanded from Buda in the west to the Persian Gulf in the east, its political and economic power increased. The presence of an expansive Ottoman empire had a profound effect on Europe's Jewish population. In the 1490s Jews in the Iberian Peninsula were both expelled and forcibly baptised, and many left for other Christian European countries, the Americas, and the Ottoman Empire. In many cases, the latter destination proved to be the best option, and up to the 19th century Ottoman territory retained a positive image among Jews. Among the factors which made the Empire more favourable to the Jews than Christian Europe included an already significant Jewish presence, less state interference in religion, and relative security of person and property. One of the chief sources for this chapter – the writings of Rabbi Shemuel di Medina – observed the more favourable conditions in the Ottoman Empire compared to Italy,

concluding that Ottoman cities such as Salonica (today Thessaloniki) had Jewish majorities and protected Jewish culture, religion and property[1].

The Jewish influx to the regions under Ottoman rule did not abate throughout the 16th century, and the Sephardim (Spanish Jews) were by no means the only newcomers that relocated to the Empire. Ottoman urban space offered safety, commercial opportunities, and freedom to associate with co-religionists. Consequently, Jewish migration to the countryside was rarer, and the overall character of Jewish settlement remained firmly urban. Moreover, the rabbinic establishment was urban-based in its perception of the world – though it claimed a general validity and aimed to influence lives of the Jewish people in rural as well as urban areas.

'Ottoman urban space' was simultaneously strictly segregated and integrated. Generally speaking influences 'from above' – the secular and religious authorities – endeavoured to maintain firm boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims. Institutions such as Mosques and Koranic schools were clustered together and non-Muslims were debarred from entering them. On the other hand, spontaneous impulses 'from below' attempted to promote a fluid and less constrained everyday life. Coffee houses, for instance, were accessible to all. Unconsciously, 'survival strategies' were developed by citizens of a multicultural society, in an environment where strict application of Shariah law would be inconvenient for Muslims as well as others. In terms of residential structure Ottoman towns were truly multicultural neighbourhoods, and there was no institution parallel to that of the ghetto, found in Christian cities. The only restrictions that were enforced prevented non-Muslims from residing in the proximity of Muslim religious buildings. Otherwise, non-Muslims and Muslims could live side-by-side. Thus many neighbourhoods were actually multicultural, comprising Muslim, Jewish, as well as Christian elements.

One of the features of early modern European cities was the regulation of trade by the city within its borders. Town officials controlled the buying and selling of goods. The economic restrictions found echoes in the fortified character of many towns: enclosed spaces with restricted access. However, the situation in the Ottoman realm was rather different. The Jewish sources attest to considerable freedom. Of the Greek city of Ioannina it was written that:

> the city [remains] open without walls, its gates opened day and night; who wants to enter enters, who wants to leave does so; it stands to reason and to sense, that the Jewish inhabitants of a certain city have no power to keep the Jews from different a city, or from this or another kingdom, from coming; on the contrary, who needs to come and trade is allowed to do so, according to his will[2].

The author portrays the city-borders as permeable, although their existence is not denied. It is assumed that the potential reader is familiar with the limits of the town space, and no additional clarification is found necessary. Moreover, in the eyes of the author,

the Ottoman city does not constitute an autonomous and independent unit: quite the contrary.

It seems that common 'secular' interest was a prime reason for Jewish merchants of Ottoman cities to stick together, and this interest could have been shared with merchants of another religion as well. This leads us to another complex issue: the question of multiple identities. An analytical tool developed by sociologist Norbert Elias, so-called "figurations", may help us to understand various identities within larger groups[3]. Figurations are evolving networks of interdependent individuals, which the individual enters and leaves in the course of his lifetime. The more diverse the societies the more complex were the chains of figurations they contained. Using the concept of figurations allows us to treat the individual, with his or her multiple identities, as an active factor in society, while at the same time retaining the idea of social structure. We can imagine the multiple identities of an individual – usually linked to different kinds of collective identities – as chains of figurations.

Primary sources

The empirical part of this chapter is based on *Responsa* literature. The books of Responsa constitute a special genre of rabbinic literature. Originally these works, which take the form of a set of questions and answers, aimed to resolve specific problems and to regulate and preserve legal, religious, and social norms within the Jewish society; they also attempted to reconcile the Jewish lifestyle in a non-Jewish setting. Thus, we can classify them as religious-legal treatises – and they constitute a useful source for historians. The enquirers asked their questions either in a written or an oral form (by themselves, but frequently also through another rabbi or some literate member of the community). Although the authentic formulations might not have been preserved in the text, the key information remains traceable and enables the reader to investigate everyday life in the Ottoman realm over several centuries. Regarding authorship, it may initially appear that the Responsa are the product of the learned elite, but in fact, we hear also the voices of the ordinary, often illiterate and uneducated, people. Their experiences are documented and we may therefore acknowledge their 'co-authorship'. The Responsa texts may be viewed as a document of a meeting of worlds – the scholars and the ordinary people.

Despite their richness and detail one has to bear in mind the limits of this type of source. Some emendations by the original scribe or later editors may be detected. They also present some interpretive challenges. To help resolve these, we may divide the text (the questions, as well as the answers) into two levels of attainable 'testimony'. The core of the text relates to the legal, or *halachic*, dimension: the presentation of the problem to which a solution was sought. A second layer is the 'embellishment' of the problem – including detailed accounts of incidents, and sometimes speech. While the core usu-

ally presents a deviation from social or legal norm, or records complicated and extraordinary situations (otherwise no question would have been posed), the narrative 'embellishment' provides a window onto the everyday life of the actors.

The Responsa volumes used in this chapter originate from the central parts of the Ottoman Empire (Istanbul, Thessaloniki) and Jerusalem. However, questions were also submitted from other cities (such as Bitola and Ioannina), and in a number of cases the location remains unknown. As mentioned earlier, the urban-orientated range of perceptions, ideas, and opinions of the Jewish scholars deeply influenced and shaped the texts of the Responsa. Therefore, we can read the texts and interpret them as an outcome of the urban life experience, even if some of them deal with events beyond the town walls.

Jewish and non-Jewish authorities in the Ottoman city

Ottoman law acknowledged *de iure* only Ottoman public administration and courts. Yet, in reality, non-Muslim official bodies also functioned in the city, and, though not explicitly licensed by the government, were tolerated. The state allowed non-Muslims to deal with personal and religious matters that did not involve a Muslim subject, within their own legal system; but Muslim legal authorities were superior to Jewish or Christian courts and could override their judgements. Still, some historians have argued that the Jewish population had considerable economic, social and administrative and judicial self-sufficiency[4]. But to clarify further these legal observations, we need to look at the role and powers of the Kadi, or Ottoman civil judge.

The Kadi's daily agenda encompassed a wide range of activities: he worked as a local judge, as a public notary, he dealt with various fiscal issues, and registered marriages, divorces, collective agreements of professional groups, and real estate transactions. The Kadi also represented the state authority in the town or district. All the imperial decrees sent from the capital were directed to the local Kadi, who was responsible for their local implementation.

Many Jews and Christians appealed to the Shariah court even in internal matters, which could have been very well resolved in the framework of the Jewish or Christian legislative. At a first glance, this behaviour may seem strange. The picture becomes clearer when we consider the diverse motivations of those who appealed to the Ottoman court or authority rather than to the rabbinic court. Sometimes the need for official and generally accepted approval proved stronger than the appeal of a purely Jewish settlement. On other occasions, however, the motivation was simple pragmatism, as one litigant shows:

> You also know what my dear father-in-law Yakob Katalani did to me. He emptied my house and took all my belongings and goods away in containers. And also what my wife Rachama did, that is she escaped our house and went to the house of her father on the 9th of Av, when

> I was praying in the synagogue. They want me to divorce her and to abandon my firstborn son, who had been born to us, and not to see him any more. What is more, they menace me and threaten me saying that they will hand me over to the non-Jews with the help of the Lady, who has a good name before the King and before the notables[5].

The view of the greater Jewish population seems to have been an influence on rabbis. In one example a rabbi refused to perform a divorce ceremony in the presence of Muslims merely out of fear that the ordinary people would regard the ceremony as forced:

> This wicked initiator [of the divorce ceremony] wanted to disregard deliberately the simple people and he enabled [the girl to undergo] *halitzah*[6] and gave her a *get*[7] in front of three or two messengers of the non-Jewish judge, even though I had said to those people before they came to my house: "remember, that I won't do anything unless you send the men of the white turban [i.e., Muslims] away, for I don't want people to think this divorce ceremony was performed unwillingly, under pressure and with a help of the non-Jews"[8]. But he paid no attention to this[9].

Such a cautious approach to the affair indicates not only what people might have thought of this procedure, but also that the community could refuse to accept a forced divorce. Thus, the limits of rabbinic jurisdiction were set by the rabbinic discourse and the state regulation on the one hand, but on the other, by the consent of the greater Jewish community.

The Responsa texts clearly define the status of non-Jewish authorities within Jewish law: it supported the law of the secular state, unless it directly contradicted the Torah. In the Ottoman Empire, however, the legal system was a complex of several parallel institutions. In the eyes of the Jewish legal system, the Kanun – a collection of the laws issued by the Sultan – represented state law. However, the Ottoman courts and administrative bodies also upheld the religious Shariah law and custom. This created a dilemma for the Jewish authorities, which they attempted to resolve in the Responsa. In one case regarding a widow's property, a Jewish judge wrote:

> There is no need to take into account the decree of a royal judge [Kadi]; that is to hand the said house over to the brother of the deceased, for the royal law [i.e. the state laws], about which we say "the state law is valid law" [*dina de'malchuta dina*] does not apply here. These authorities administrate justice in compliance with the books of their own law [...] The rules of the authorities cannot invalidate just laws and decrees held by the holy Jewish nation, and these authorities have no power to invalidate the Christian religious law, for according to the Christian law a Christian widow is the property-owner [...] And it follows that Reuven has a right to hold this house.

The Istanbul rabbi, Moshe Benvenisti, came to a similar conclusion: "Although the King insists consistently on strict observance of the law [...] the rules applied by the authorities are not of a royal origin, but in fact these authorities decide according to their own [system of rules]"[10]. Although an appeal to an Ottoman court could have been justified on the grounds of the rule of *dina de'malchuta dina*, many rabbis urged members of the

community to follow and rely on rabbinic verdicts when possible. It was rare for Jewish courts to transfer litigants to Ottoman authorities. Such cases involved notorious and intractable individuals: "I dare say that one who is cruel and relentless should be handed over to the non-Jews, in order to protect the oppressed from his oppressor [...] Moreover, we are entitled to act for the sake of the oppressed, and it is stated that this is indeed our duty"[11]. The demand for communal solidarity dictated the exclusion of elements who were considered threats to the well-being of the wider community. In general, no definitive and consistent attitude prevailed among rabbis regarding the right of a Jew to appeal to a non-Jewish authority, and this made the task of delineating a clear border between the Jewish and non-Jewish administration and jurisdiction even more complicated. Moreover, Jewish official bodies lacked effective tools for the complete consolidation of their legal proceedings, and relied to some degree on cooperation with the local authorities (for example, the imprisonment of Jewish convicts in state gaols). It was not exceptional for Ottoman judges to favour rabbinic law over royal law. One judge rejected the Kadi's decision:

> [I have] rejected [the legal decision of the Kadi] and forbade the division [of the inheritance] among the family members in the above mentioned manner [according to Shariah law], and this [manner] would be acceptable only if they asked [the Kadi] to divide [the inheritance] among them according to the glorious Shariah, [demonstrating that] they abandon [a religion], which is their confession[12].

A more surprising example of Muslim use of rabbinic law was the case of the man who looked to the Jewish legal system in order to avoid future controversies over property acquired:

> Reuven owned a shop according to the law of *hazakah* and pledged it to a Turk for a certain sum of money, because a purchase was impossible according to their [Ottoman] law. The Turk told Reuven "what shall I do in case you default on payments? No Jew will come to settle in the house and no Turk will buy it". Therefore, the Turk asked a Jew for advice and was told "Provide yourself with a contract issued according to our laws"; and so he did, and Reuven gave the purchase contract to the Turk in accordance with Jewish law[13].

Besides the mutual agreement between the Muslim and the Jew based on Jewish law, the concern of the Muslim for finding Jewish or Muslim tenants deserves our attention. The Muslim obviously had a broad knowledge of Jewish commercial habits. This familiarity could only be attained by consistent exposure to Jewish society. This leads us in return to the notion of the multicultural character of the Ottoman urban space, which encouraged mutual knowledge of the norms of other societies.

Everyday encounters of Ottoman subjects

Jews, then, were not completely isolated within the greater Ottoman urban environment. Yet the inclination to concentrate into co-religious groupings of various sizes was understandable. The Responsa evidence is illustrative of everyday interaction between

societies. First, let us clarify our pre-suppositions regarding a 'typical' Jewish individual in a 16th-century Ottoman city. Certainly, he is a member of a nuclear and a wider family, a town dweller and a subject of the Sultan (and as such shares this quality with all the subjects under the Sultan's rule). Undoubtedly, he belongs to some social stratum, and at the same time, he must be a member of one of the Jewish congregations[14]. Very likely, he has a trade or profession, and enters the local market. Perhaps he is a member of one of the Jewish or mixed professional corporations (*esnaf*). His mother tongue can be Ladino or Greek, or another language that was spoken among the Jews (and he thus also belongs to a group marked by language), but there is a great chance that he speaks also Ottoman Turkish and maintains contacts with his non-Jewish neighbours or co-workers. There are plenty of coffee houses in which to socialize, and the streets are always crowded during the day. If he is a merchant, he has many contacts throughout the Ottoman Empire and beyond. If he is a shopkeeper, he will have strong ties to the local market and to 'his' city. This 'profession-based solidarity' of shopkeepers would be outwardly manifested when they felt jeopardized by economic rivals that entered without permission into 'their' domain demarcated by the borders of the town. If we carried on, we would possibly find many other links between the individual and his surroundings. Each of these affiliations implies a wide range of experiences, sometimes of a different or even conflicting nature.

There was no single experience which characterised Jewish life in Ottoman cities. This is one reason why no single stereotype related to the 'Turk' – which we encounter in contemporary Christian European civilization – emerged in Jewish communities in Ottoman cities. In fact, Jewish perceptions of the Sultan as both institution and personality were generally positive. Rather like the European idea of 'evil council', Jews blamed officials and servants for misconduct, corruption or injustice, but not the sovereign. The Responsa literature affirmed the supremacy of the Sultan as divinely-authorised and with Scriptural legitimacy:

> Those who do not hold our King, a great and merciful King (may his majesty be exalted and Kingdom elevated) in high regard are not worthy to come into this world. For everyone who claims for himself the name Israel[15] is obliged to follow with a great awe his ordinances and fulfil his orders and decrees in the same manner as he fulfils the commandments of the Lord of the World. As [King] Solomon (may he rest in peace) wrote: "Fear God, my son, and the king, too", and this is even more true for such great and merciful King like this, under whom we find our haven, which is the will of the Lord of the World[16].

In the Responsa literature, non-Jews are often identified as friends and beloved ones. Friendships may have been genuine. An interesting example came from an observer of a pilgrimage to Jerusalem (though the story may have taken place in another Ottoman city):

> One of the guest pilgrims asked me about Reuven, who was a passionate smoker of what was called in all the languages *tutun*[17], all the weekdays including the nights, until he fell asleep.

> He was deeply troubled on the Holy Shabbath, when the evil inclination tempted him to visit a non-Jew who smoked, to enjoy the fragrance of the smoke coming out of his mouth, and so he did and he was calmed. It followed that Reuven became his friend[18], and he noticed Reuven's pleasure from the fragrance. Moreover, the non-Jew himself told Reuven on the Holy Shabbath to open his mouth and inhale the smoke, and to fill his mouth with smoke, and to emit it slowly afterwards. And this is what Reuven did every Holy Shabbath. It came to such a point that when the non-Jew saw Reuven approaching on Shabbath, he made an effort to light the smoking-machine[19] in order to please Reuven, who came and sat down next to him and carried out the above-mentioned action, even though the non-Jew originally did not intend to smoke. He did so only to pay honour to his friend Reuven[20].

What is of great importance is that a rabbi did not see anything wrong with socializing with non-Jews, or even becoming firm friends. And given the significance attached to concepts of honour in Muslim society, the relationship between Reuven and his Muslim friend must be evidence of mutual regard and acceptance of 'the other'. Alternatively we may say that different aspects of one's identity are stressed in different situations – or different social figurations, to utilize Norbert Elias' term – according to the nature of the situation and the character of the participants in the figuration. In this particular case, the social identity outweighed the religious identity, even though the latter does not lose its significance: after all, Reuven's adherence to Jewish religious observance brought him closer to a non-Jewish neighbour.

Quite often Muslims figured as eyewitnesses in cases related to so-called *agunot* (deserted wives); such cases are especially valuable as evidence for interaction between Jews and non-Jews in everyday life. Any married woman could fall into the category of 'deserted wife', if her husband had been missing for a long period. Even if there was a valid reason to assume he had died, his wife could not be proclaimed a widow unless two Jewish witnesses confirmed the identity of a corpse as the husband. If no such testimony was available, Jewish courts were prepared to accept, under clearly defined conditions, a testimony of a non-Jew. The non-Jewish witness had to describe the situation in detail, and he had to narrate the event in front of Jews without having been influenced in favour of the woman. The very fact that non-Jews exercised readiness and capability to testify, and that a Jewish jurisdiction relied on their testimony, indicates close ties between the societies. The following story shows the initiative of a non-Jew who reported the death of his Jewish friend to his community:

> It happened once that a non-Jew came to a Maskalor market [...] and told a couple of the Jews standing at the market place, that, on his way from Platamona, he encountered the body of Yakob Ezrah, who was lying in a field dead, and he was obviously dead for a long time, may God avenge the blood of his friend and colleague [...] And the dead Yakob was a very good and old friend of his[21].

Here, we can see the multiculturalism of the market place: apart from its commercial function, it was a locus of informal social interaction. The non-Jew knew exactly where

to seek out someone who would listen to his news. A similar incident recorded in the Responsa literature ran:

> A certain Jew came and said "I have been in the *bedestan*[22] and encountered one Turk, whom I know, and he said to me 'Avraham, don't you know Avraham's son-in-law, who had a blotched face? One *emir* said to me: "I was on the same boat like him and there was no other Jew there. And the boat sank and I escaped with other few Ishmaelites. He was thrown out from the sea at one of the islands and I have recognized him and buried him"'[23].

For a non-Jew's evidence to be acceptable it would have to be clear that the deponent was offering evidence of his own volition, that he named the victim and his father, that he referred to distinguishing marks by which the body's identity could be confirmed, and that the deponent had buried the corpse. In the case cited, the non-Jewish deponent fulfilled all the above criteria, except mentioning the father's name. It is therefore likely that the non-Jew was aware that his information could be crucial with regard to the future of the widow. Everyday contact meant that various groups were familiar with the norms and laws of other groups, especially if friendly relations between them existed.

The following extract from the Responsa offers insights into the life of inter-city merchants, the relations between Jews and Christians and between urban and rural dwellers:

> And we also ask you to explain, whether [this woman] can remarry on the grounds of these testimonies; the above mentioned Reuven was actually killed on his trade journey in the countryside. The incident happened as follows. The above mentioned Reuven travelled together with his friend, and since the day was Thursday, he slaughtered five or six hens with the intention to enter the city and spend there the Holy Shabbath. He said to his friend "Go ahead [...] and we will meet in such and such village and we will spend the Shabbath in the city"; and the friend proceeded to that village and waited for him. When he saw that he was not coming, he turned back and searched for him in all the villages, but he did not find him. So he went to the city to report that bad affair to the brother [of his friend], who started to look for him. He did not find him, and so he went to a village called Istoriplis, from where his brother departed, and walked in the house of certain non-Jewess, who knew the murdered Reuven. He asked her in a roundabout way if she had some wax or almonds to sell as always in the past and the non-Jewess replied: "I know you didn't come to buy either wax nor almonds, but you came to look for your brother Reuven. Right now eight days have passed since my husband saw him dead on the hill called Kinoliri, his cattle grazing around him. And the *veyvoda*[24] saw him too, when he passed by and collected almost 3000 *levanim* in the villages". Therefore, his brother climbed the hill, but he could not find him [...] Another time two of us went there, with a judge and with a couple of Jews, who testified that the judge's auxiliaries caught a Greek and wanted him to say what had happened to the Jew. The Greek replied: "I know nothing, I just went once to tend the cattle, and a Greek called Jorgo Lionei came up and warned us against climbing the hill called Kinoliri and against tending the cattle there, for he saw there a murdered Jew, and cattle grazing around him. Do not pass through that place, so that no harm and no loss may happen to you from the *veyvoda*". And this Greek Jorgo Lionei is a husband of the above mentioned non-Jewess, who testified on his behalf to the brother of the victim[25].

It appears that the villagers knew the fate of the Jew, but refrained from reporting it to the authorities, since they could have been interrogated in the connection with a murder. Note that the victim's brother, after an unsuccessful search for his sibling, decided to visit a very specific Greek woman who worked as a local shopkeeper, expecting to receive useful information on passers-by. The remark made about the local official and tax collector is of high importance. Since the corpse disappeared, there was no tangible evidence of Reuven's death. Therefore, the more reliable eyewitnesses were available, the more likely it was that the victim's wife would be proclaimed a widow. In this respect, a testimony passed by a local authority representative, whose presence in the locality at a given time was held indubitable, was extremely valuable.

Jew as 'the Other': strategies of social exclusion/inclusion

Up to now, we have explored aspects of Jewish experience in a largely non-Jewish environment. There were, however, internal borders within the Jewish community; there were cases in which the Jewish community saw some of its members as 'others'. This usually occurred in cases of apostasy, or a transgressing of the secular rules, which was punishable by excommunication. The implications of excommunication, apart from social degradation inherent in the denial of public services and membership of the synagogue, also included economic sanctions. Members of a congregation, and sometimes even the Jewish population in the city or region, were forbidden to purchase products which were subject to *halachic* regulations, such as wine, diary products, or bread, from an excommunicated person. He was an outcast from Jewish society, and his word was devalued in the eyes of the Jewish judiciary. Yet, theory aside, the wishes of the congregation were crucial: if a local rabbi decided to excommunicate a certain transgressor of social or legal norms and the congregation itself refused to follow his decision, the individual in fact remained within the borders of the congregation as a full member.

An extreme case of religious deviation was conversion – mainly to Islam, but sometimes also to Christianity. Although we would expect an individual, who abandoned Judaism, to leave the Jewish congregation, it was not uncommon for converts to stay in the community, maintaining contacts with their Jewish families. Paradoxically, in some cases the representatives of the Jewish congregation appealed to the local Ottoman authority, asking them to persuade converts to move[26]. The individual stories contained in the Responsa texts suggest that social and economic factors were most important in cases of conversion. Apostates, for instance, were sometimes held in higher regard by the Ottoman authorities than practising Jews:

> An apostate frightened Reuven and denounced him [to the authorities]. He told him that unless he gave him 500 florins, he would inform on him to the Muslims, and say he had cursed the King and his religion [...] When Reuven saw the catastrophe falling upon him, he went to the friends and begged them to pacify and bribe the apostate [...] they went as Reuven wished, and succeeded in pacifying him with a bribe of 4000 *levanim*[27].

Minorities in the Ottoman Empire

With a new religious status, a convert gained a higher social position, which accorded him an advantage over the members of Jewish community. However, despite the fact that the Ottoman authorities considered conversion to Islam to be irreversible, there were opportunities for former Jews to return to the old faith. Jewish law enabled this; moreover, the expansion of the Ottoman Empire made in easy for former Jews to relocate and reintegrate themselves into the Jewish community:

> A year after the great plague [Mordechai Gim'ah] went to the city of Safed (may God soon rebuild and renew it in our days) and he embarked the ship together with Yehoshua de Yanko, and he found there also Yosef Amigo, who was in these days a Turk. When he got to Safed, Dona Sol la Galdita, mother of the above mentioned Yosef, came over and when she came near to the city, her son Yosef met her halfway, and she wailed, breaking her head with two stones, [saying] she had no children any longer and remained childless. Her son Yosef tried to comfort her, asking her to stop crying, [promising] he would become a Jew, but she replied, better he would die because of the apostasy like his brother Yakob. She came to the house of her two daughters, where all these mourned for her son Yakob, who had died here in Thessaloniki[28].

While we do not know if the apostate returned to his former religion, it is significant that it was considered to be a viable option.

The Responsa texts also refer to conversion to Judaism. In most cases, the converts were servants (mostly Muslim) in Jewish households. Ottoman law, of course, forbade this practice, but even the most severe sanctions could not eradicate it completely. Less frequently, we also encounter sincere converts to Judaism, who reportedly abandoned their possessions and families in order to become members of the Jewish community: "[t]his man was a righteous convert [to Judaism], and he had given up all the wealth, property, and pleasures in order to hide under the wings of the Divine presence, and those who mock him deserve a severe punishment"[29]. Unfortunately, the sources remain silent about the background of such individuals and about the details of their conversion. What seems clear, however, is a resolute rabbinic order to accept the convert without hesitation; nevertheless, once again successful integration into the community depended on the nature of each congregation and the elasticity of its symbolic borders.

Sometimes a Jewish congregation consciously built its collective identity on a common history, language and family relations that could not have been shared by the rest of the city's Jewish population. This is especially true for the Iberian Peninsula Diaspora and their descendants, who portrayed themselves as a unique 'Spanish nation', in opposition to other Jewish ethnic and cultural groups (Ashkenazic Jews, Romaniots, and Jews from the Arab provinces)[30]. The "Spanish nation" was, admittedly, far from homogeneous. It embraced those Jews who left Spain in 1492 for other European countries as well as Portugal, where Jews were tolerated until the late 1490s when forced baptism was introduced. Many of the "New Christians"[31] consequently left Portugal. Some of the

expellees headed directly to the Ottoman Empire; some reached the Ottoman realm only after a period in the European Christian countries. What made the choice of the Ottoman Empire even more attractive was the fact that the *anusim* (those forcibly baptised) could freely return to Judaism there. The position of the *anusim* in the Jewish community was, however, ambivalent. Sometimes they were denigrated by other Jews; at other times they were recognised as full members of the Spanish nation. A legal case brought before Rabbi Shemuel di Medina forced him to draw a distinction between Jews and their former co-religionists:

> Reuven has died and left behind all his property in the hands of the Jewish court, until his heir comes to claim it. But the heir lives in Portugal as a non-Jew, and there is a Jewess called Leah standing in front of us, who is a sister of the above-mentioned heir, whose father was a non-Jew, and she raises a legal claim upon the inheritance left by the above mentioned Reuven. She maintains that her brother and a relative of the deceased should be considered dead, since he lives as a non-Jew, and that she is the only legal inheritor, and all the rights and issues related to her brother are to be transferred to her [...] The answer: I believe the case is clear, for the heir had an opportunity in the past few years to return to the Jewish law [...] Apparently, the legal decision stands as follows: the inheritance passes to his sister for the above-mentioned reason, that is, as if the heir had died [...] The inheritance [...] passes to this woman called Leah, who is a Jewess and stands in front of us, and maintains a truly Jewish lifestyle. And we do not need to wait for a removed relative, for such relative could have come during the past couple of years, but this did not happen, and as such he lost all the rights as an heir [...] Even though in the case of levirate marriage we recognize those *anusim* as Jews [...] in property issues they are not to be taken into account [...] and in our case [...] since they could have come, but they did not, he is not to be called a Jew or brother in the question of property[32].

Here Rabbi di Medina was clearly cautious in declaring *anusim* separate from the Jewish community. Only when he had to solve a question of property ownership, did he deny the Christian relatives of the deceased their inheritance rights.

Conclusion

Borders existed within the Jewish community, but at any moment these borders were liable to alter, or even disappear, when such action was considered to be essential for the wider community. These alterations to inner and exterior frontiers decided by Jewish congregations could be formal or informal. Meanwhile, relations with the wider Ottoman urban population ranged from cordial to hostile, depending on specific circumstances and personal experiences. As a result, we encounter multiple images that correspond to multiple experiences and to the heterogeneity of the Ottoman urban population. In this respect, we should consider also the role of the individual's own experiences and the way this helped to shape his perceptions of the environment. Ultimately, individuals were able to select the most suitable image or conception, and apply

it to the appropriate circumstance: this characterised Jewish life in the 'multicultural neighbourhood' that was the Ottoman city.

Notes

[1]   R. Shemuel di Medina, *Shu"t Maharashdam*, IV, 434, a reprint of the Lvov edition from 1862, undated. Rabbi Shemuel di Medina (Maharashdam, 1506/7- 1589) worked in Thessaloniki. He was an outstanding Torah scholar and his legal decisions have had far-reaching impacts on Ottoman Jewry and beyond.

[2]   R. Shemuel di Medina, *Shu"t* cit., IV, 407.

[3]   N. Elias, *The Court Society*, Oxford 1983, p.18.

[4]   H. Gerber, *On the History of the Jews in Istanbul in the 17th and the 18th centuries*, in "Pe'amim", 1972, 12, pp. 27-46.

[5]   R. Shemuel di Medina, *Shu"t* cit., III, 214. The lady mentioned here is probably Dona Gracia Mendez, a very rich and influential Jewess with access to the royal harem and to the Palace.

[6]   *Halitzah* is a name for a ceremony connected to the levirate marriage, in which the brother of the deceased husband refuses to marry the childless widow, and thus enables her to marry somebody else.

[7]   *Get* is a divorce document presented by a husband to his wife during the divorce ceremony.

[8]   Literally *umot ha-olam,* the nations of the world.

[9]   R. Shemuel di Medina, *Shu"t* cit., III, 93.

[10]   R. Moshe Benvenisti, *Sefer Penei Moshe* (reprint of the Istanbul edition from 1669-1713), II, 116.

[11]   R. Shemuel di Medina, *Shu"t* cit., IV, 378.

[12]   A. Cohen, *Jews in the Moslem Religious Courts. Society, Economy and Communal Organization in the XVIth Century Documents from Ottoman Jerusalem*, Jerusalem 1993, document no. 424. This legal decision was issued by Ebu's Su'ud Efendi, who worked as a royal judge during the reign of Süleyman I and Selim II.

[13]   R. Shemuel di Medina, *Shu"t* cit., IV, 352.

[14]   Some confusion may arise over terminology. Herein *Congregation* relates to a religious and administrative unit with a rabbi, synagogue, and secular leadership at its centre, often congruent with a certain fiscal unit. The aim of achieving fiscal control meant that congregations were well-defined and autonomous collectives. *Community* is taken to mean the overall Jewish population of the town, irrespectively their belonging to one or another congregation. In some Ottoman towns there was an official Jewish community encompassing all the congregations, in head of which was a supra-congregational court.

[15]   i.e. a Jew.

[16]   *Ibid.*., II, 124.

[17]   i.e. *tütün*, tobacco.

[18]   Literally "beloved".

[19]   i.e. a pipe.

[20]   R. Nisim Haim Moshe Mizrahi, *Admat kodesh*, Bar Ilan Responsa Project version 11 on CD-ROM, I 4.

[21]   R. Shemuel di Medina, *Shu"t* cit., III, 35, the text does not allude to the non-Jew's religious affiliation.

[22]   *Bedestan,* or bazaar, was a covered marketplace in the city-centre, typical of Oriental urban architecture.

[23]   *Ibid.*, p. 70. In Hebrew sources, the term *emir* indicates an upper class Ottoman Muslim.

[24]   *Veyvoda* was lower-ranking governor appointed by the central government.

25 *Ibid.*, III, 75.

26 A. Cohen, *Jews* cit., document no. 119.

27 R. Shemuel di Medina, *Shu"t* cit., IV, 359.

28 *Ibid.*, III, 59. The Responsa literature has no data on conversions to Christianity within the Ottoman Empire.

29 *Ibid.*, IV, 354. The said Avraham Mindo became a tax collector and another Jew aimed to deprive him of this function. This behaviour was condemned unreservedly by the rabbi.

30 The term *uma* (nation), which was used to designate the Spanish nation, differs from the term used to designate the Jewish nation as a whole, i.e. *am Jisra'el* (the People of Israel). This linguistic distinction deserves a broader elaboration, but this is not our aim here.

31 Sometimes the derogatory term *marranos* (swine) was, and still is, used. In Jewish sources, they are called *anusim* (those, who were forced to do something against their will).

32 *Ibid.*, 315.

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Convivencia under Muslim Rule: the Island of Cyprus after the Ottoman Conquest (1571-1640)

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Abstract

This contribution examines the conditions of the religious communities in Cyprus since 1571, when the Ottoman Empire conquered the island from its former sovereign, the Republic of Venice. Thanks to extensive research in the archives of local district courts, whose judges were named *kadis*, it has been found that there prevailed for a long time – up to 1640, but in fact up to the end of the Ottoman Empire – a relatively easy coexistence between the religious majority on the island – Orthodox Greeks – and a tiny but growing Muslim minority, partly forcibly transferred from Turkey. Islam was the official religion of the Ottoman Empire; but Muslim tradition admitted limited tolerance for Jews and Christians, as monotheistic religions based on a written revelation (the "Peoples of the Book") which was thought to anticipate the true and final revelation by God to its Prophet Muhammad. Therefore, toleration of Jews and Christians in the Muslim world recognized these as self-governed religious communities (*millet*), tolerated on the basis of the payment of a tax and subject to conditions of political exclusion and to some other conditions of inferiority. In Cyprus after the Ottoman conquest, however, Muslims were a minority group; but *Kadi* court registers show that they lived peacefully side by side with the majority of Orthodox Greeks and with smaller groups of Jews and Catholics. The end of this *convivencia* came after the 19th century and the fall of the Ottoman Empire as a multiconfessional, multiethnic political system. Combined with a new consciousness of differences in language, culture and ethnicity, the idea of nation and the goal of national independence put an end to religious coexistence in Cyprus, and after a bloody war "Christian Greeks" and "Turkish Muslims" divided, and remain blocked today in a condition of reciprocal opposition and hatred.

Questo saggio considera le relazioni tra le comunità religiose esistenti a Cipro dopo la conquista Ottomana, che sottrasse l'isola alla Repubblica di Venezia nel 1571. La chiesa greco-ortodossa era maggioritaria sull'isola, ma era stata sottomessa dall'Islam, la religione ufficiale dell'Impero ottomano, che provvide anche a trasferimenti forzati di musulmani a

Cipro per aumentarne la popolazione. Tuttavia, lo studio dei registri delle corti dei giudici distrettuali, i kadi*, ha mostrato che le due comunità religiose coesistettero senza tensioni, anche se nell'Impero ottomano le religioni monoteiste (ebrei e cristiani, i "Popoli del Libro") erano tollerati come precedenti dell'Islam, ma a condizione di pagare una tassa e di accettare diverse inferiorità politiche e religiose. Questo regime di mescolanza e coesistenza venne progressivamente distrutto dall'affermarsi, sulla base di elementi di comunità linguistica, etnica e culturale, sommati a quella religiosa, dell'idea di nazione e degli opposti nazionalismi dei Greci e dei Turchi. Dopo una dura guerra, ancor oggi le due comunità politico-religiose sono politicamente divise e reciprocamente ostili.*

Historical research in the Ottoman archives since the 1960s and 1970s, especially by Andrew C. Hess[1], has deeply altered Western views of the balance between Christian and Muslim forces in the Mediterranean in the 16th century. The significance of the battle of Lepanto (1571), as a turning point in favour of the Christian States, in the history of the military and religious clash between Europe and the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean, has been profoundly revised and has shown that there was not such a great victory over the Turkish enemy as was celebrated and exalted by the Catholic League and all Catholic Europe. Hess has shown that, on the basis of Ottoman sources and history, the balance was much more even, and that considerable progress was still made by Istanbul. To prove this, it will be enough to mention the quick and easy rebuilding of the Turkish fleet, the advances made after 1571 by the Ottoman Empire in North Africa, such as the conquest of the key Spanish fortress of La Goletta near Tunis (1574), the defeat of Portugal at Alcazar in Morocco (1578), and, most of all, the successful occupation since 1571 of the very island of Cyprus, for whose possession the war had begun the year before. Venice was compelled to accept the loss of this strategic outpost, and in 1573 retired from the Holy League to strike a separate peace with the Sultan, even agreeing to pay a heavy tribute in order to protect its still extant commercial positions and naval routes within the territories under Ottoman control.

Thus, after 1571, Cyprus became a Christian island under Muslim rule, after having been colonized by Frankish and Venetian elites which had come to the island, respectively, following the Crusader Kingdom of the House of Lusignano in 1192, and the Venetian takeover in 1489. We shall try here to show how, under Islamic law, the Christian, specifically Greek Orthodox, majority of the population, joined by a few other tiny confessional groups (Jews, Armenians, Maronites) gained the status of *zimmis* (Arab *dhimmi*), that is, of tolerated, if inferior, religious minorities, which were allowed to live peacefully alongside the growing Muslim population that came to occupy the vacant spaces in this new Ottoman possession.

A historian from the University of Illinois, Ronald C. Jennings, has explored extensively the judicial archives and registers (*sicil*) of the *kadis*, the local judges whose courts applied

the *sharia* (Islamic law) in Cyprus[2], as everywhere else in the Ottoman Empire. Each *kadi* court had its territorial district or *kaza*; the districts in the island had their centres in Lefkoşa (Greek Nicosia, in the interior), Girniye, Mesariye, Magosa (Greek Famagusta), Karpas, Tuzla-Larnaka, Morfo (Greek Morphou, in the interior), Pendaye, Baf (Greek Paphos). Jennings' study of these judicial records from the main *sharia* court of Lefkoşa and other minor courts, from 1571 to 1640 (that is, up to the death of the powerful Sultan Murad II), shows in fine detail not only what the social and economic conditions of the island were under Turkish rule, but also, and most importantly in our perspective, how both Christian Greeks and Muslims used the same Islamic courts of the *kadis* to settle their differences. These records show that Orthodox and Muslim inhabitants lived in close proximity in the same neighbourhoods, and that there was none of the nationalist hatred between Greeks and Turks that has plagued the island since the 20th century.

Data about the population of Cyprus, before and after the Ottoman conquest of 1571, are hard to come by. Only the non-Muslim population which survived on the island after the devastating 1570-1571 war and the flight of the former Venetian rulers and Latin (Catholic) clergy[3], are partially accounted for, due, as we shall see, to the special personal and fiscal status of confessional minorities under Islamic law. That is to say, they had the status of *zimmis*, evolved since the reforms by Suleyman the Magnificent into the statute of separate confessional communities, according to the so-called *millet* system (*millet*, plural of *millah*, meaning religious communities)[4].

According to Braudel[5], Cyprus just before the Turkish conquest had been an almost "empty" island. Only around 180,000 inhabitants are presumed to have lived there in 1570, 140,000 of whom seem to have been rural serfs and poor peasants in scattered villages. Only 40,000 dwellers lived in the two main Venetian fortified urban centres, namely the capital and main city of Nicosia (perhaps the only one worthy of the name, and also the only town to be located in the interior of the island, which came to be called Lefkoşa under Ottoman rule) and the fortress of Famagusta (which became known by its Turkish name as Magosa). To these could be added some minor towns and harbours along the coasts, such as Limassol (Limosa)[6], Girniye (Kyrenia), Tuzla-Larnaka (Larnaca) and Baf (Paphos).

The Latin clergy had abandoned the island with the defeated Venetian lords; but a traveller, Jean Baptiste Tavernier, still testified around 1650 that "everybody, men and women, dressed in the Italian style"[7]. The majority of the population, however, belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church, even if many of the inhabitants may have converted to Islam, as we shall see, to avoid the taxes imposed on the tolerated religious minorities, or *dhimmi* (Turkish *zimmi*). These were the poll tax or *gizyia* (Turkish *cizyie*) and the tithe on land or *karaĕ* (Turkish *harac*).

Soon after the conquest, fortifications which had been destroyed during the war were restored, and Ottoman rule was imposed through the location of garrisons in all the

strategic places. Military corps of Janissaries (chosen slave infantry, conscripted and converted from the conquered Christian populations in the Balkans and drilled in the royal palace in Istanbul) and *Spahis* (noble Turkish cavalrymen, paid, through the *timar* system, with the agricultural revenues of villages allotted to their maintenance in the island) were located in the castles, all of them on the coast except Lefkoşa (Nicosia). Almost four thousand men were involved, about a thousand soldiers from the military elite of the Janissaries and *Spahis*, and a small force of almost 2800 cannoneers to garrison the castles[8], especially the three main fortresses of Tuzla (or Larnaka), Lefkoşa and Magosa (Famagusta), and also for Baf (Paphos), Girniye (Kyrenia), Limosa, for a total expenditure of almost 9 million *akce*.

In 1571-72 the Istanbul government (effectively led by the famous Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokollu, 1506-1579) ordered the governor of the island (*emir, begler begi*) to conduct one of the characteristically thorough and extensive Ottoman surveys of the 16th century, in this case to evaluate the tax-paying population of the newly-conquered island. This first estimate of the prospective revenues and budget from Cyprus gave a total of 23,000 male adult payers of the poll tax or *cizye*, corresponding with their families to a total population of between 70,000 and 80,000 non-Muslims on the island[9].

Even taking into account the flight of most Venetian lords and inhabitants, and of the Latin or Catholic clergy, the non-Muslim population seems to have shrunk drastically from the numbers proposed by Braudel for the end of the Muslim rule. This drop cannot be explained by an early and massive conversion of Orthodox Christians to Islam to avoid the taxes imposed on non-believers in the protected condition of *zimmi*, since the very same survey accounts for only 25 Muslim adult males, or *re'aya*, scattered in the villages throughout the island.

Either Braudel's numbers were inflated, or one must take into account not only the flights from the island, but also the numbers killed or enslaved during the sieges of Lefkoşa and especially Magosa. In both cases, it must be concluded that the population, soon after the Cyprus war of 1570-1571, was far below normal. Some thirty years later, the non-Muslim population had grown again, reaching a level of between 93,000 and 110,000.

At the same time, by 1606 a substantial Muslim minority had appeared in Cyprus[10]. It is unfortunately impossible to evaluate the relative proportions of Muslims and *zimmis* on the island in the period under consideration. However, some guesses can be made. Even without accounting for the military corps, a Muslim population was formed both by conversions of former Christians and by the traditional Ottoman policies of forced population transfers or immigration. Although the records do not give information on the Muslim inhabitants, we may surmise some rough proportions on the basis of information by travellers[11]. In 1598 a Venetian cleric named Cotovicus[12] left an account of his visit which includes a good deal of authentic-sounding data: he estimated that there were roughly

28,000 non-Muslims, which (if we interpret his numbers as referring only to heads of family and not to the whole population) is remarkably close to the 27,500 *cizye* non-Muslim taxpayers accounted for by Ottoman sources for 1604. Thus we may also credit his figure of 6,000 adult male Muslims for the same date. The proportion could then be inferred to be between 1 Muslim to 4 to 6 non-Muslims, or around 20% of Muslims in the whole population (Jennings surmises an even more precise proportion of 18%[13]).

The non-Muslim population probably grew steadily from 1571 to 1607, in keeping with the general trend of the whole Mediterranean and European population in 16th century[14]. It must have grown especially in the thirty years after the conquest: the highest numbers were probably reached around 1604-1607, when the *zimmis* accounted for by the population and tax registers (*defter*) reached 30,000 adult taxpayers, corresponding to a minimum total non-Muslim population of 93,000 (on the hypothesis of 3-3.5 members per family) or a maximum non-Muslim population of 110,000 (corresponding to 4-5 members for family). A peak in demographic recovery may have been reached around 1600-1610, when between 36,000 and 42,000 *zimmi* taxpayers were counted.

But even taking account of such numbers, the island seems to have been under-populated. Moreover, during the years 1620-1650, severe setbacks affected the number of inhabitants: three powerful negative factors were locusts, plague and malaria. These series of disasters again reduced the non-Turkish population to around 20,000 adults in 1626, meaning a total population reduced to half its late 16th-century level; thousands of *re'aya* (tax-paying subjects) were said to have fled or died on account of excessive taxation or oppression on the part of the governor; the number of taxpayers was reduced to 17,000 in 1636[15], and to the minimum level of 12,000 in 1656.

The Turks tried to respond to this demographic crisis by transferring peasants from Anatolia to Cyprus; indeed, forced population transfers were an important part of Ottoman social and economic policy, particularly from the times of Mehmed the Conqueror[16]. Thereafter, all peasants could be confused under the general category of Turkish subjects, *re'aya*.

Even just after the conquest, it seems that the island had been severely under-populated, not only because of the ravages of the Cyprus war, but also because of more ancient and permanent causes. The Venetian regime had already tried to encourage immigration; but the peasants, according to the testimony of widespread sources, Venetian and otherwise, had the status of *parici*, who accounted for almost 80% of the population and whose condition was virtually that of slaves. With the Ottoman conquest, agricultural slavery all but disappeared among *zimmis*; but it was a well consolidated custom by the Turkish government to provide for the colonization of its new and under-populated conquests by forced movements of population or "banishments" (*surgun*). For instance, Rumelia had been steadily populated, by imperial decree, by Anatolian peasants, especially by the previously nomadic Yuruk tribes.

The same kind of deportations were ordered to fill Cyprus. Adding to the one thousand Janissaries and the almost 3,000 cannoneers stationed in the main castles, as mentioned above, and who were all converted to Islam or born Muslims, the government tried to increase the Muslim population of the newly-conquered island by various kinds of deportations, not always along coherent political lines. From some districts of the mainland, governors were ordered to send to Cyprus one in ten families; in some others the immigrants seem to have been chosen from amongst the destitute and criminals. However, the magnitude of the population movements thus envisaged was matched by great resistance, desertion, and flight from the island, even after the forced immigrants had arrived there. Results are however uncertain, for, without meting out penalties for disobedience (since this was forbidden by the *sharia* law[17]) the problem of forcing the banished and deported people to stay in their new destination was impossible to solve. According to an order to the governor of Cyprus in 1581[18], twelve thousand families (*hane*) had been "banished" to the island, but the *emir* later claimed that he had been able to locate only 800 in the related register (*defter-i cedid*) and that even half of those had escaped soon after. If this is to be believed, only 7% of the transferred population had remained. But on other considerations, this total failure seems highly unlikely, although it does confirm that Muslims remained a minority in the island even after their increase through conversion and deportation[19].

An analytical survey has been conducted of all the papers, notarial acts, decrees and registers still extant in the archives of the courts of the *kadis* (by Ronald Jennings, as has already been said) for three groups during the sample years of 1580 and 1640. Almost three thousand (2975) cases[20] were consulted, concerning a whole gamut of cases registered or discussed in the *kadi* courts from the profound to the trivial, listed in a series of record books (called *sicil*). The *kadi* courts acted both as an official registry office for questions of identity and legitimation (such as marriage, separations, property transfers and other voluntary registrations of the kind that would have been dealt with by notaries in Italy or Spain, or by seigneurial courts in northern France or England) and also as a court of justice, for both civil and criminal procedures.

Of these 2975 cases nearly a quarter involved at least one woman; and in this smaller sample, more than 73% of the registered or decreed cases involved at least one Muslim[21]. The *kadi* courts were used by all social strata, including Janissaries and *Spahis*[22], and by members of all confessions, both Muslims and *zimmis,* including in principle all the "People of the Book" (Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, as we shall explain later). But in the specific conditions of Cyprus after the Ottoman conquest, a massive majority of those addressing the *kadi* courts as *zimmis* (confessional non-Muslims) were Orthodox Christians[23]. The *sicil* of the *kadi* courts offer therefore an exceptionally vivid and direct testimony of the day-to day lives and relations prevailing on the island between Muslim overlords and inhabitants, and the religious minorities called *zimmis*. They present an almost unique picture of the *convivencia* [coexistence] prevailing in Cyprus, in the late

16th and the first half of the 17th century, of members of the dominant Islamic religion and the tolerated confessional groups of Orthodox Christians (a minority in terms of confessional ascription, but a majority of the population of the island), together with tiny groups of Jews and "Latins" (Catholics or Maronites).

These confessional minorities appear to have had free recourse to the *kadi* courts, where the Islamic law or *sharia* (Turkish *sheriat*) was fully applied. It is therefore time to delve into the special juridical and fiscal status accorded to non-Muslims by Muslim law: this had its origins in the laws revealed to the Prophet in the *Quran*, and applied to subjected peoples during the expansion of the Arab Empire since the early Middle Ages[24]; but the same conditions were granted to most religious minorities, according to the same *sheriat* law, by the Ottoman Empire.

Pre-Ottoman Islamic empires had extended over a vast territory, where followers of monotheistic religions had been accorded a special legal status. The Quran and the religious tradition stemming from it (*hadith*, *sharia*) recognized the Hebrew Torah (Arab *Tawrâth*) and the Christian *Injil* (*Evangelum*, New Testament) as Revealed Books which contained authentic, although partial, revelations from Allah to minor prophets who had come before the last and supreme Prophet Muhammad. Material derived from these Books is contained in the Quran, and Adam, Abraham, Moses, Jesus are recognized as predecessors to Muhammad, although minor and partial in their knowledge of divine law.

Jews and Christians followed monotheism, as revealed by Allah to his true and supreme Prophet; like Islam, Jewish and Christian religions were monotheistic (although some doubt could be directed towards the Christian Trinity), and so was Zoroastrianism. Moreover, Jews and Christians were "scriptuaries", that is, as they were commonly called, they were "People of the Book" (*ahl al-kitab*), whose faith was based on a written revelation by the one and only God. In the course of the holy war (*jihad*)[25] to bring the one and only true religion of Islam to the whole world, idolatrous and polytheistic tribes were given the choice of death or conversion; apostasy from Islam was punished by death; and no faith but Islam was (and still is) tolerated in the Arab peninsula, from whence all Jewish and Christian tribes were banished. However, since the "People of the Book" were partial precursors of the true religion, the Arab conquerors followed a different course with regard to them during their conquests, establishing a pact or contract, *dhimma*, whose most famous version is the "Covenant of Umar" (636/38)[26].

This covenant stipulated that monotheistic religions were to be tolerated under the conditions of *dhimmi*. They were not given just two, but three choices by the conquering armies: to convert, or to submit and pay tribute, and only if they chose to resist, war and possibly death. The term *dhimmi* was therefore used to designate non-Muslims living in an Islamic state. They were subject to a compact of "protection"[27], on condition that they paid a personal tribute or poll tax, called *gizyia* (Turkish *cizye*), and that they

be kept in a subordinate or inferior position: that they be "humiliated", according to a famous Quranic verse, 9:29.

In various versions and periods, therefore, diverse monotheistic religions were tolerated; but their members were subjected to a series of stigmata of inferiority and discrimination. They could not carry arms, nor ride horses, but only donkeys or mules; they could not give testimony against Muslims, nor marry Muslim women, while the contrary was allowed; they could not wear green, the colour of the Prophet, and sometimes they had to wear special robes, or signs on their robes, indicating their condition of *dhimmis*; they could not build new churches or synagogues, but only repair the old ones; they could not make themselves heard publicly and loudly in their religious prayers or singing, nor make use of bells or other public means to call to prayer. Moreover, the *dhimmis* had only a few old churches for their use, as the Ottoman conquerors, faithful to tradition, converted most Latin churches in Cyprus into mosques, though they also handed over several of them to the large Greek Orthodox community, and at least one to the Armenians[28].

In fact, these restrictions clearly recall the restrictions imposed on religious minorities under a public, State or "universal" Christian church, such as those meted out to Calvinists or Baptists by the peace of Augusta (1555) or the later peace of Westphalia in Germany (1648): their churches were tolerated but did not have the exalted status of "public" churches, their members had to abstain from all exhibition of public ritual, and had to limit themselves, modestly, only to forms of "private" worship; their civil rights were recognized, but they were excluded from public office.

Within analogous limits, however, the status of *zimmis* was relatively acceptable, if compared, for instance, to the policies used against Jews and Muslims in Spain from the end of the 15th century. Conditions varied accordingly to the political and religious status of Islam: waves of persecution characterized, for instance, the Almohad Medieval kingdoms of Spain and Morocco, or followed, in reaction, the period of the Christian Crusades. The Seljuk Turks, while converting to Islam and building the Ottoman Empire, did not alter the Islamic tradition regarding *zimmis*: it is well known, for instance, that Jews under persecution in Spain found help and refuge in the Ottoman Empire under Suleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566), and built flourishing colonies in many cities, and especially ports, such as Salonica[29]. The *zimmi* pact was confirmed by the reforms carried out by Suleyman, who recognized confessional minorities as communities or *millet* (sing. *millah*), regulated their ecclesiastical hierarchy, especially the Patriarchs of the Orthodox and Maronite Churches, and made them responsible for self-government and the payment of the poll-tax due by the "People of the Book": the *gizyia* or (Turkish) *cizye*, and the land tax, *karač* or (Turkish) *harac*[30]. However, in Cyprus there was no trace of an organized Orthodox Church, and many priests (*pope, papas*), as we shall see, used the *sharia* courts just as other *zimmis*.

Cyprus then offers a case in point (thanks to the patient research conducted by Ronald Jennings in the judicial archives of the *kadis*) of how the *zimmi* or *millet* system operating under Ottoman rule did not put any strain on the lives of the differing religious communities. On the contrary, there seems to have been an easy *convivencia*, after the Ottoman conquest, between the Muslim population and the religious *millet*, the Greek Orthodox Christians[31], and also lesser minorities of Jews, Armenians and "Latins" (*Nasari*). In Cyprus confessional groups coexisted: no *ghettos*, no discriminations have surfaced from the *kadis* files, although the basic Islamic law must have prevailed, as in the prohibition of Muslim women to marry non-Muslims, and in the punishment of apostates by death[32].

In some respects, however, Cyprus was a special case, and for this reason an even more remarkable one. The Orthodox Greeks were not only the main religious minority, but also represented the majority of the population, while Islam was the dominant religion but accounted for a minority of the inhabitants. There is no doubt, however, that the *kadis* meted out equal justice, under the protection of the same *sheriat* law, both to Muslims and "infidels" belonging to the "People of the Book" (*ahl al-kitab*). The conditions, however, seem to have been quite exceptional, due to the recent Ottoman conquest of the island. The Orthodox Greeks were unquestionably a majority: unfortunately, as we have seen, Jennings cannot give us the precise proportions of Christians and Muslims who went for redress or registration to the *kadi* court, as compared to the general proportion of the two confessions in the whole of the population. Islamic tolerance, moreover, was *not* religious freedom[33]. There is no doubt, however, that the conquering minority did not feel threatened by the subjected majority. The governor, the military corps, the judges were part of a solid network of control: under their care and surveillance (there was also a police corps, accountable to the governor of the island and the *kadis*), the Christian and Muslim populations seem to have intermingled freely, and even the tiny minorities of Armenians, Catholics and Jews did not enter the *kadi* court but for common or trivial questions of property and debt, small litigation and insults. They do not seem to have had any problems of religious identity. All were included in one of the two great classes into which Ottoman society was divided: they were *re'aya*, subjects who paid taxes, as opposed to the noble authorities or *askeris*, serving the state as governors or *kadis*, Jannissaries or *Spahis*.

Ottoman *kadis* were obliged to apply the same *sheriat* law and the same standards of justice to both *zimmis* and Muslims. A measure of discrimination was applied to the "inferior" religion: the law did not suppose the same level of integrity of *zimmis* as of Muslims, so that Christians' testimony against Muslims was suspect. But if they came to court, they could perform the same acts and do the same things: they could produce witnesses (but they had to be Muslims if testifying against other Muslims), present written evidence, and have their oath accepted, "by God who sent down the Gospel

(*Incil*) by means of Jesus *('ala 'Isa)*", just as Muslims took their oath by Allah, who sent down the *Quran* by means of Muhammad.

The *kadi* courts assured the same wide range of legal services to all communities. Broadly speaking, as we have already pointed out, they exercised at least three functions that are normally separated in the European judicial systems: the registration of acts of private law (transfers and registrations of land and property, deeds of credit and debt, identity declarations, quittances), as performed by public notaries (but also by seigniorial courts, as in England); the issue of decrees or sentences, always on the basis of written evidence, in civil law litigation (marriage and dowry cases, divorce and maintenance allowances, property and goods litigation, claims by peasants against *Spahis* and landlords, regulation of prices according to the information by the officials, or *muhtesib*, charged to keep order in the markets); and also criminal cases, from small fights and curses up to the attribution of blood money (*dem* and *diyet*) in cases of violent death; and also the mediation, or registration, of voluntary accords or "reconciliations" *(sulh)*.

In addition to these strictly judicial functions, *kadis* could be called upon to appoint overseers of pious foundations (*Vafk* or *Evkaf*), guardians for orphans and minors; to generally supervise tax collection and to see that population and fiscal records were kept accurately and safely. They heard complaints against minor officials, and also against Janissaries and *Spahis*, and could receive government orders to carry out a detailed inspection of their diligence in service[34]. They also investigated cases brought before them by local police officers (*su başis*, accountable to the governor of the Cyprus province, or *eyalet*)[35], especially responsible for order at night, taverns, drinking and moral misconduct. No legal profession was involved in the *kadi* courts' judicial decisions: public attorneys were unknown, and legal representatives (*vekil*) were not professionals, but relatives or friends of the parties appearing before the court: they are present in only 13% of the almost 3,000 legal cases studied by Jennings[36].

Zimmis used the *sharia* courts with considerable frequency. Of 2800 cases out of 2975 (excluding the 175 of 1607-1610) in samples from *sicil* going from 1580 to 1637, more than one third involved at least one *zimmi*; no less than 15% involved only *zimmis*, suggesting that there was then in Cyprus, so recently conquered, no Orthodox ecclesiastical or self-governing court, as in more self-reliant and organized Orthodox *millet* or communities; and another 19% were interfaith, or intercommunal, indicating some economic and social interaction. Around 60% of the intercommunal actions were initiated by Muslims, and 40% by *zimmis*; but this is not a good indicator, since it does not distinguish between hard litigation, innocuous civil cases and notary registrations. Surprisingly, the highest level of recourse by *zimmis* to the *kadi* was in 1580, with 43% of cases. Thereafter, a more regular trend followed, with lower levels of recourse, and a slight but steady increase in *zimmi* participation between 1593 and 1637.

Muslims and *zimmi* went to court for the same reasons, mostly transfers of land and moveable property. 20% of transfers involved only *zimmis (*whose holdings surely far exceeded those of Muslims) but another 23% were mixed. Muslims went to court for this reason more than *zimmis*: out of the total of all land and property transfers found, 81% involved Muslims, 43% involved *zimmis*. Sometimes, the act was a concession of land in a *timar* by a *Spahi* to one or more of his Christian tributary peasants[37]. But in any case, such a frequency of exchange seems to point to a pattern of living, both in the capital and outside, which excluded segregation, or even self-inflicted isolation in confessional neighbourhoods[38].

Although the *sharia* could require a different style or colour of dress by members of different confessional groups, the court records give little evidence of such cases. In fact, there is more to distinguish between different Muslim classes than between Muslims and non-Muslims. The courts also record registrations of membership to Islam[39]; as it is well known, apostasy was punished by death. But there were also many Christian conversions to Islam in the decades following the conquest; without entering into the disputed question of the economic and social pressures for conversion (coercion was denounced by Christian travellers, but, at least in theory, was prohibited by Islamic law), it is possible to glean some indications of the trend. In 1593-1595, 66 out of 225 of the adult male Muslims (whose names are registered, either because they acted as legal representatives [*vekil*] or witnesses) were converts, something more than a quarter; 58 out of 143, not much less than half, were converts among witnesses to notarial acts. This is the highest proportion that results from the registers. Afterwards, the proportion declined to 17-30% in 1609-1610, and to 6-18% in 1633-1637.

Strictly speaking, conversion to Islam required only a statement of faith (*shahada*, *shehadet*), but converts had to register their change of religion at court to adjust their tax status. In the surviving registers, Jennings has found no instance of mass conversion, but only individual cases of voluntary registration. The Ottoman bureaucracy needed accurate records of Muslims and *zimmis* for tax purposes, and the court was to ascertain that the conversion was voluntary. The records for Nikolo v. Yorgi read:

> Until now I have been an infidel in error (*zalal*). I have become a Muslim. When I said the words of faith (*kelime'-i shehadet*): "There is no God but God; Muhammed is his messenger", I confessed clearly and eloquently. I turned from the false religion (*batile din*).
>
> It is hereby ordered that he has entered Islam. When he turned from the tax obligations of the infidels (*tekalif-i kefere*) this document was drawn up[40].

Conversions were registered also for children and women, the latter sometimes through a *vekil* for modesty, and frequently in the wake of a marriage with a Muslim. Obviously, exemption from the poll and land tax on the *zimmis* (*cizye/harac*) must also have worked as an incentive. But in the later years of the period here considered, there is also some indication that Latin (*Nasara*) friars, perhaps in contrast with Greek Orthodox *papas*,

tried to act more forcefully, if still surreptitiously, to discourage too strict relations with Muslims, and especially intermarriage[41]. Milu bint Andoni of the Tuzla district says:

> Until now, like my ancestors, I have belonged to the Christian millet (*millet-i Nasara*). I have not become a Muslim. I am an infidel (*kafire*). When I wished to perform our false rites at our church, the monks who were our priests prevented me from entering saying: "You married a Muslim". It is probable that when I perish they will not bury me in accordance with infidel rites (*ayin-i kefere*). I want a memorandum showing that I am an infidel[42].

One could hardly find a clearer testimony of the impartiality of the *kadi* court, neutrally registering such individual declarations. In 1596, Friar Girolamo Dandini spent over three months *incognito* in Cyprus, sent by the general of the Franciscan order to the Patriarch of the Maronites in the Levant, and reported thousands of converts, "who become Mahometans, to render their lives more easy and supportable"[43]: he believed they would easily return to the old faith in case of Christian reconquest, a theme quite common among Christian travellers, such as Cotovicus, mentioned above.

There are no obvious signs, however, of an uncomfortable relation between converts and "old Muslims", as was the case in early modern Spain, with its tragic history of persecution against *marranos* and *moriscos*, Jews and Muslims who were forcibly converted. On the contrary, the Orthodox clergy can be found coming frequently to the *kadi* courts, since they had to care for extensive properties[44]. They are among the few *zimmis* who can be easily identified in the records; they were partially exempt, like the Muslim clergy of the *ulema*, but they registered sales of their agricultural products, payments and credits, more often in the role of borrowers than lenders – perhaps a sign of some economic discomfort. Their business also involved disputes over donkeys, oxen, water rights, a further confirmation of their living on income from the land. However, quite a few cases are also found of *zimmis* claiming debts from *papas*, or even accusing them of crimes such as theft, one of rape, and one of murder. Only seldom, inversely, did the *papas* pass information on to the court, acting ostensibly as communal or *millet* leaders.

Prior to the Ottoman conquest, 25 families of Levantine, Sicilian and Portuguese Jews already lived in Magosa (Famagusta); *kadi* records bear some more traces of a small Jewish community[45] living in Lefkoşa (Nicosia), or in other court districts (*kaza*) in the island. For example, there was a tax farmer, but also a family in which, after the death of the father, the mother became the legal guardian of her minor daughters; or landed Jews who registered some property, including a house, arable fields and a garden near one of the harbours on the coast. Although the numbers are tiny, Jennings also detected six Armenians; a whole community of Maronites (known as *Suryani*) living in 19 villages according to the expert Dandini, (though very few must have used the *kadi* court), and an equally tiny Latin community (*millet – i Nasara*, surviving Roman Catholics), who may also have been in fact Maronites, confused because of their common obedience to the Pope.

All these minorities lived intermingled with Muslims, in the same villages and neigh-bourhoods; they do not seem to have been bearers of any controversial or confronta-tional religious identity. To complete this overview of confessional minorities under Ottoman rule in Cyprus, one must end by mentioning the well-known special status conferred upon consuls and merchants from foreign nations, a class of protected people called *muste'min*. Although little is known of Latin and Venetian properties abandoned after the Ottoman conquest, it stands to reason that they were confiscated as booty, and went to accrue the land assignments to constitute new *timars* for the *Spahis*; many of the Latin nobility themselves became *Spahis*, first as Christians and then being gradually Islamicized[46]. But Friar Dandini could still report, in 1596, the presence of a Franciscan convent at Larnaka, serving Italian merchants; consuls and merchants were represented in Cyprus from three Christian countries: Venice, France and Holland. The name given to the consuls (*balyos*) was the same given to the Venice ambassador to the Porte; their main interests were in Cyprus' well known "industrial" products, cotton and sugar.

Studies such as this one by Jennings (confirmed by parallel studies elsewhere[47]) into the conditions prevailing in Cyprus in the period 1571-1640 – that is, in the first sev-enty years the island spent under Ottoman rule – have shown that different religious communities could live peacefully side by side, without tensions, thanks to the *millet* or *zimmi* system protecting religious minorities in Islam, under the *pax ottomanica*[48]. This contrasts starkly with the contemporary hatred and warfare between the Turk and the Greek Orthodox communities in Cyprus. It must be underlined, however, that the *zimmi* "protected state" was addressed to confessional *minorities*, considered as such only on religious and not on national and linguistic grounds; and in fact the Greek Or-thodox population in Cyprus, while superior in numbers to the Muslim population on the island, remained a minority within the larger unity of the vast Ottoman Empire.

The *zimmi* status of Orthodox Christians was valid in a context in which they were a religious minority. However, this changed dramatically when they came into the fore-ground as a political, linguistic and ethnic majority, that is, when a "nation-island" of Cyprus began to develop a new identity and self-assurance, seeking emancipation from Ottoman rule. Under Islam, Orthodox Christians were not called by their ethnic or con-fessional name, *rum*: they were simply *zimmis*. For the first time, in the 19th century, the emergence of the idea of the "nation-State" added language and ethnic origin to confessional identity, to forge the new and more complex sense of a "nation"[49]: thus, the Greek Orthodox population of Cyprus began to think of themselves as *rum*, belonging to the "Greek" nation of Cyprus, and sharing their origins, language and religion with the continental Greeks of the nation of Greece. As Greece was born as a nation state in the 19th century through its wars of independence, this also moved the Greek Ortho-dox Cypriots to want to bring about an end to almost 250 years of Ottoman rule, and to unite Cyprus with Greece. This aim was called *enosis* [union], and it was typical of the "patriotic" movements and national wars of the 19th century. New political and confes-

sional conditions, quite different to those existing for the Greek Orthodox people, as *zimmis* or *millet* under the Ottoman Empire, emerged under British colonial rule, which operated from 1878 (Congress of Berlin) until 1914, when Turkey entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers, and Great Britain declared Cyprus a British colony.

We do not know if we can trust information from secondary sources[50] asserting that British colonial rule favoured the separation of the ethnic Greek Christian Orthodox majority, who had inhabited the island since ancient times, and the Muslim and Turkish-speaking minority, partly, as we have seen, forcibly transferred on the island by Ottoman rulers, and partly heir to the Frankish and Venetian pre-conquest populations, which had not abandoned the island after the Ottoman conquest. However, it has been claimed that the two communities (now more commonly known, in national rather than in religious terms, as "Greek Cypriots" and "Turkish Cypriots") continued to live much as before all over the island, although there gradually emerged, alongside the mixed villages, separate villages containing only one or the other of the two communities, and that in the capital, Nicosia-Lefkoşa, specifically "Turkish" and "Greek" neighbourhoods developed. As we have seen, these were not the conditions under the Ottoman Empire, when there seems to have been no segregation of ethnic or religious minorities (which were a majority on the island) from the Muslim (Ottoman) majority (demographically in the minority).

It may be concluded, then, that the easy relations between the "religious communities" of Christians and Muslims, living in peaceful *convivencia* under Ottoman rule in Cyprus in early modern times, could not last when the more complex and powerful idea of "nation" emerged in the 19th century, and came to reinforce confessional identity by linking it with other closely-connected factors, such as language and ethnic origin. Moreover, it should be emphasised that the coexistence between *zimmis* and Muslims was based on a kind of limited tolerance, conditional to the status of *subjected* minority, and linked with the concept of communal or group identity: this still had nothing to do with the modern concept of individual freedom of worship or conscience. In fact the *zimmi* pact, or *millet* system, was obtained only as long as Islam was the *dominant* religion; and therefore it remained valid, in Cyprus as elsewhere, only as long as the island was subjected to an Islamic Empire, which provided the overarching identity of the *universal* Muslim religion. Later, as Bernard Lewis has underlined in more general terms, this peculiar combination of religious superiority and tolerance gave way to new conflicts, because of two concomitant factors: the emergence the "nation-States", with their "multiple identities"[51], and the collapse, after World War I, of former multiethnic and multinational empires. Cyprus is a particularly dramatic case in point, since *convivencia* began to fail there after the formation of the Greek nation-state, and after the decline and fall of the multi-ethnic multiconfessional Ottoman Empire. Coexistence gave way to increasing enmity between two "national" communities, the Greeks and the Turks, which are now divided in hatred by their different language and ethnic origins, as well as by their different faiths or creeds[52].

Notes

[1] A. Hess, *The Battle of Lepanto and its Place in Mediterranean History*, in "Past and Present", 57, 1972, pp. 53-73. And more generally B. Lewis, *The Ottoman Archives as a Source for the History of Arab Lands (1951)*, in Id., *Studies in Classical and Ottoman Islam (7th-16th Centuries)*, London 1976.

[2] R. Jennings, *Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean World, 1571-1640*, in "New York University Studies in Near Eeastern Civilization", XVIII, New York - London 1993.

[3] Latin emigration from Cyprus seems to have peaked in the first decade after the conquest (Jennings, *Christians and Muslims* cit., p. 214); some Orthodox Greeks too may have emigrated to Venice or elsewhere.

[4] See note 30.

[5] F. Braudel, *Civiltà e Imperi del Mediterraneo nell'età di Filippo II*, vol. I, Turin 1976, pp. 153-154.

[6] Jennings, *Christians and Muslims* cit., p. 193. The main "cities" were Famagusta or Magosa and Nicosia or Lefkoşa. At the conquest in 1571, Famagusta-Magosa had 1741 registered adult males, of whom only 113 were taxpayers: it must therefore have been mainly manned by Muslim Janissaries and other soldiers, and this may be confirmed by the fact that 27% were unmarried. An estimate of the total population would be around 6,000 or 6,600 people. The capital, Lefkoşa-Nicosia, was in fact tiny and run-down, with 235 paying males, almost all married, and thus probably Christian Orthodox *zimmis*, with a population hardly reaching a thousand people. In the smaller urban centres of Tuzla/Larnaka, Girniye or Limosa and Baf, numbers must have ranged from 600-700 to 1200-1300. However, often villages and rural districts were larger in population, matching or even doubling the city dwellers.

[7] J. Tavernier, *Les six voyages qu'il a fait en Turquie, en Perse et aux Indes*, vol. I, Paris 1681, p. 180.

[8] Jennings, *Christians and Muslims* cit., p. 214.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 191-203 (with detailed data in Tables).

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 193.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 197.

[12] J. Cotovicus (Ioanne Cootwujk), *Itinerarium Hierosolimitanum et Syriacum*, Antwerp 1619.

[13] Jennings, *Christians and Muslims* cit., p. 197.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 192, also for the data above.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 212.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 227.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 226, 239 (quoting Orholu).

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 222-236.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 17. 130 cases from 1580; 958 cases from the years 1593-1595 (a.E. 1002-1003); 175 cases in 1607-1610 (1016-1018); 1184 cases in 1609-1611 (1018-1019); 528 cases 1633-1637 (1043-1046).

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 110-121.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

[24] Y. Courbage, P. Fargues, *Christians and Jews under Islam*, London - New York 1997; *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plural Society*, eds. B. Braude, B. Lewis, New York - London 1982.

[25] P. Partner, *God of Battles: Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam*, London 1997; M. Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History. Doctrines and Practice*, Princeton - Oxford 2006; D. Cook, *Storia del Jihad*, Turin 2007; Id., *Understanding Jihad*, Berkeley - Los Angeles 2005.

26   The "Covenant of Umar" is commonly attributed to Umar I (634-644), but some Islamic scholars think it more likely that it may have developed after the first four caliphs under Umar II (717-720), or even under early Abbasid rule (after 750).

27   Some militant scholars object to this term, interpreting the *dhimmi* status as active discrimination. It is in fact true that *dhimmi* status meant that religious minorities were discriminated against, since they were excluded from political and even part of their civil rights; it is no wonder that European powers, during the pre-colonial period, pressurized the Ottoman Empire for abrogation of *zimmi* status, which on their insistence, was inserted in the Hatti Humayan Edict of 1856. It may be pointed out, however, that a recent anti-Arab, militant movement has interpreted *dhimmi* conditions, under the neologism of *dhimmitude*, as a degrading inferiority status, actively discriminating against Christians and especially Jews, and accompanied by occasional but frequent persecutions; this movement denounces every positive interpretation of *dhimmi* status as dangerously yielding to Arab intolerance, and is best represented by the highly polemical writings of Bat Ye'Or (a pseudonym), such as: *The Dhimmi. Jews and Christians under Islam* (transl. from the French), Rutherford 1985; and by the same author the more recent, stridently militant *Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide*, Madison 2002; *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis*, Madison 2005. Also see the author's website, http://www.dhimmitude. org/d_history_dhimmitude.html. For an exhaustive, much more balanced analysis of the relations between tolerance and coercion, *dhimma* and *jihad* in Islamic exegesis see Y. Friedmann, *Tolerance and Coercion in Islam. Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition*, Cambridge 2006, which is however strictly limited to the theoretical Islamic tradition as represented by the *sunna*.

28   Jennings, *Christians and Muslims* cit., p. 156.

29   E. Benbassa, A. Rodrige, *Storia degli Ebrei sefarditi. Da Toledo a Salonicco*, Turin 2004.

30   On the *millet* system see S.J. Shaw, *The Ottoman Millet System: an Evaluation*, in *Tolerance ad Movements of Religious Dissent in Eastern Europe*, ed. B.K. Kiraly, New York - London 1975, pp.183-184; for differences of opinion, M. Kunt, *Transformation of Zimmi into Askerî*; B. Braude, *Foundation Myths of the Millet System*, in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plural Society*, eds. B. Braude, B. Lewis, pp. 55-67, p. 69ff.

31   In the files (*sicil*) of the *kadi* archives, however, the Orthodox Greeks are never designated by their confessional name, *Rum*; they are always called *zimmis*.

32   For instance, see Jennings, *Christians and Muslims* cit., p. 141.

33   G. Veinstein, *Retour sur la question de la tolérance ottomane*, in B. Bennassar, R. Sauzet (dir.), *Chrétiens et musulmans à la Rénaissance,* Actes du 37ème Colloque international du CESR (1994), Paris 1998, pp. 415-426, where it is argued that Muslims, however tolerant against *zimmi* infidels, were not tolerant of internal dissent.

34   1611 (a.E.1016), Jennings, *Christians and Muslims* cit., p. 74.

35   *Ibid.,* pp. 121-130 (also for other types of moral police).

36   *Ibid.,* p. 82.

37   *Ibid.,* p. 119.

38   *Ibid.,* pp. 135-136.

39   *Ibid.,* p. 126.

40   *Ibid.,* p.139 (a.E. 1044).

41   It must be remembered that Muslims could marry Christian women, but Christians could not marry Muslim women. For a more pessimistic view of the pressures for conversion to Islam, see C.P. Kyrris, *Symbiotic Elements in the History of the Two Communities of Cyprus*, in "Kipriakos Logos", 8 (1976), pp. 243-282, commented upon by Jennings, *Christians and Muslims* cit., notes, pp. 170-171.

[42]   Jennings, *Christians and Muslims* cit., p. 142 (a.E. 1046). A Franciscan convent was mentioned by the Franciscan friar Girolamo Dandini in Larnaka in 1596 (see note 43). On this point, I do not follow Jenning's suggestion that the Church in question may have been Greek Orthodox: the term *Nasara* and the attitude are much more congruent for Catholic friars ("monks").

[43]   Fr. Jerome Dandini, *A Voyage to Mount Libanus; wherein is an account of the Customs and Manners &tc. Of the Turks; A Description of Candia, Nicosia, Tripoli, Alexandretta, &tc.* (1596, originally written in Italian), in J. Pinkerton, *A General Collection of the best and Most Interesting Voyages and Travels in all parts of the world*, vol. X, London 1811, pp. 222-304.

[44]   Jennings, *Christians and Muslims* cit., pp. 150-155.

[45]   *Ibid.,* pp. 143-146.

[46]   *Ibid.,* p. 157.

[47]   Id., *Urban Population in Anatolia in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of Kayseri, Karaman, Amasya, Trabzon, and Erzurum*, in "International Journal for Middle Eastern Studies", 18, 1975, pp. 21-57; Id., *Zimmis (non-Muslims) in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records – the Sharia Court of Anatolian Kayseri*, in "Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient", 21, 1978, pp. 225-293. I was unable to consult R. Jennings, *Studies on Ottoman Social History in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Women, Zimmis and Sharia Courts in Kayseri, Cyprus and Trabzon*, Istanbul 1999.

[48]   E.K. Shaw, *The Ottoman Aspects of the Pax Ottomanica*, in B.K. Kiraly (ed.), *Tolerance and Movements of Religious Dissent in Eastern Europe*, 1976, pp. 165-182.

[49]   K. Karpat, *Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era*, in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plural Society*, pp. 141-170. Also, for the more general problem N. Biggar, J. Scott, W. Schweiker (eds.)*, Cities of God. Faith, Politics and Pluralism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, New York - Westport Conn. - London 1986 ("Contributions to the study of religion", 16).

[50]   http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problema_di_Cipro#Origini

[51]   B. Lewis, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, London 1998. Also, on more general terms, M. Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging. Journeys into the New Nationalism*, London 1994; B. Lewis, *Nationalism and Toleration*, in S. Mendus (ed.), *The Politics of Toleration. Tolerance and Intolerance in Modern Life*, Edinburgh 1999, pp. 77-106.

[52]   Useful insights, from an open religious point of view, in R. Neville, *Political Tolerance in an Age of Renewed Religious Warfare*, in M. Razavi, D. Ambuel (eds.), *Philosophy, Religion and the Question of Intolerance*, New York 1997, pp. 28-40; Mendus, *The Politics of Toleration* cit.

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From Millets to Minorities in the 19th-Century Ottoman Empire: an Ambiguous Modernization

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Το άρθρο αποπειράται να μελετήσει με ένα τρόπο συγκριτικό την ιστορική εξέλιξη των μιλλέτ (των αναγνωρισμένων δηλαδή από το Οθωμανικό κράτος θρησκευτικών κοινοτήτων) μέσα στην Οθωμανική αυτοκρατορία. Περιγράφει τις επιδράσεις που είχε στην εσωτερική τους δομή το μεγαλεπήβολο εγχείρημα των μεταρρυθμίσεων του Τανζιμάτ (1839-1876) αλλά και η αναστολή τους κατά τη βασιλεία του Αμπντούλ Χαμίτ. Η προώθηση των μεταρρυθμίσεων από την Οθωμανική γραφειοκρατική ελίτ αλλά και η έκρηξη των εθνικών επαναστάσεων στα Βαλκάνια διαμόρφωσαν ουσιαστικά άνισες συνθήκες ανάπτυξης των τριών μη μουσουλμανικών μιλλέτ κατά τον 19° αιώνα αλλά και τις προϋποθέσεις της εσωτερικής διάσπασής τους και της δημιουργίας νέων μιλλέτ.

In one sense, the history of the gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire during the 19th and 20th century, i.e., the famous 'Eastern Question', could be described from another, entirely different standpoint: that of the progressive collapse of a cultural value system based on the predominance of the religious element, and its replacement by the principle of the nation-state, as formulated in Western Europe during the Great Revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries.

It is well known that during what has been called the "classical age" of the Empire, there were three non-Muslim *millets* [religious communities] recognized by the Ottoman authority: the 'Rum' (Greek-Orthodox), the Armenian (Gregorian), and the Jewish millet. The first included all the Balkan or Asia Minor populations, subject to the authority of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople[1]. The second included the (Gregorian) Armenians primarily, but also and more generally, all Christian religious groups, chiefly pre-Chalcedonean monophysites, that were not subject to the Orthodox Patriarchate, for example the Copts of Egypt or heretical groups like Paulicians and Bogomils[2]. The third included all Jewish populations in the empire (Romaniotes, Ashkenazi, and Sephardic Jews). Naturally, there were a number of gradations along this path of recognition: the Jewish millet was characterized by a decentralized administrative structure and was only officially recognized by the Ottoman state in the mid-19th century, whereas the Orthodox and Armenian millets operated according to a pyramidal, hierarchic principle from the fall of Constantinople in 1453[3].

But recent historical research has shown that the awarding of privileges by the Ottoman state to religious functionaries of the millets occurred through *berats* [titles of privileges

given to the laic or clerical officials on behalf of the Ottoman state] which did not necessarily presuppose recognition of the Orthodox or Armenian Patriarchates as institutionalized mechanisms of the Ottoman state or, to put it in modern terms, as public legal entities[4].

The concept of the millets in the Ottoman Empire frequently treads a fine line in historical analyses (chiefly those of the Balkan historiographers) between being defined as a strictly religious community recognized by the Ottoman state and being referred to as a more or less unified ethnic-religious whole which in some fashion constituted the mould from which emerged the nationalist groups which laid claim during the 19th century to state fulfillment[5]. In reality, this confusion reflected an inability to define the use of the term "millet" historically within the framework of the Ottoman legal system. From this standpoint, the related studies by Benjamin Braude[6], carried out during the 1980s, were ground-breaking, for they linked the use of the concept with the famous hypothesis of 'privileges', presumed to have been awarded by Ottoman authority to these religious groups during the first centuries of the Ottoman conquest. The fashioning of many of these privileges after the fact by the political or intellectual elite of the nationalist groups which during the 19th and 20th centuries were claiming an enhanced degree of political and cultural self-governance would suggest that the institutionalization of the millets was actually something belonging to approximately the same period[7].

Braude claimed that the use of the term *millet*, at least in the case of the Greek-Orthodox population, dates no earlier than the 19th century. However, it seems that the term already appeared in the Ottoman state terminology during the 18th century. Official Ottoman documents from the 16th to the 18th centuries employ the concept of the *taife kâfirlerin*, i.e. of a group of non-believers, to define Orthodox populations that came under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. It was natural that the Orthodox population be considered as the most important group of non-believers, given that they greatly surpassed in numbers all other non-Muslim ethnic-religious groups, such as the Armenians and the Jews. Nonetheless, a fundamental conceptual shift took place around 1700. The Patriarch of Constantinople no longer appears in the official *berat* ascribed to him as "Patriarch of the non-believers," but as "Patriarch of the *Romaioi* (Orthodox, usually Greek-speakers, inhabitants of the Empire)". The use of this term from the beginning of the 18th century essentially prepared the way for the introduction of the term *Rum millet* (or *millet-i Rum*), i.e. the religious group of *Romaioi* (or *Romioi*), as replacement for the former term *taife kâfirlerin*[8]. Moreover the term of millet had been established before the 19th century in order to describe the community of Jews of the Empire[9].

The appearance of the term in fact coincides with the concession of increased powers to the Patriarchate of Constantinople (as well as to the leaderships of the other millets), which was directly connected with the first military defeats of the Ottoman Empire in the wars with Hapsburg Austria, resulting in the Treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and Passarowitz (1718) as well as with the appearance of another great opponent to the North, Russia. In Istanbul, the rise of a new social class with enormous political and cultural influence, the Phanariots, was actually a consequence of this same historical development[10]. This Greek-speaking aristocracy, ideologically gathered around the Patriarchate and exercising

a host of commercial and civic functions, managed to control the promotion of leaders in the Danube Principalities and to occupy important posts in the Ottoman administration. It would appear that the Phanariots, a social group guaranteeing the maintenance of Ottoman legitimacy in border-states vital to the empire, and the influence they had over internal political issues, may be considered responsible for the definition of the Orthodox millet as *Rum*.

Accordingly, the problem of defining the term *millet* in relation to its introduction to Ottoman political terminology may also prove useful in defining its contents. Simply put, this means that from the moment we see it appearing in the Ottoman legal system, we know that the terms for the construction of an internal hierarchy of ethnic-linguistic groupings that compose it had developed. The Greek Orthodox population, represented chiefly by the Phanariot elite and the higher Orthodox clergy, gradually acquired greater political and social power and laid the groundwork for imposing its own (primarily) cultural predominance over the other Orthodox peoples of the Balkan peninsula, mostly Slavs but also Moldo-valachians and Albanians. The outcome of the Russo-Turkish Wars at the end of the 18th century (1768-1774, 1788-1792) also contributed to this development: Catherine the Great made Russia the protector of the Orthodox populations of the Empire and gave the opportunity for enormous economic development to the rising bourgeois elements of the Greek peninsula[11].

It would probably be anachronistic to consider the cultural hegemony of the Greek-speaking merchant and bureaucratic element as an expression of some form of 'proto-nationalism' (in accordance with Hobsbawm[12]), or to conceive the identity of the various ethnic-linguistic groups which in fact existed within the millet as a model for the nations which were to arise from the revolutions of the 19th century (according to Anthony Smith[13]). However, the pre-eminence of the Greek-speaking Orthodox clergy and the cultural dominance in the 18th century of the Phanariots created the presuppositions for a relatively early revolutionary uprising (essentially the consequence of a chain of events set in motion by the French Revolution), but which necessarily turned against the imperial model – the only framework within which the above-mentioned social groups could reproduce their social dominance. This important fact did not prevent other Orthodox peoples of the Balkans from construing Greek Orthodox cultural dominance as an impediment to their own course of nationalist self-awareness. Nineteenth-century Serb and Bulgarian intellectuals, for example, viewed the movement by the Patriarchate in Constantinople in 1766-67 to abolish the arch-dioceses of Peć and Ohrid (historical centers of the medieval Serbian and the first Bulgarian kingdoms, respectively)[14] as moves which militated against the nationalist reformation of their peoples, while the Romanians for their part built their modern national identity in opposition to everything represented by the Phanariot leaders, who controlled the thrones of the Danube Principalities for more than a century (1711-1821).

The 19th century would also reveal the same internal separation of ethnic-linguistic groups in the case of the dominant Muslim element: both Arab Muslims (particularly during the period when Pan-Islamism held sway as the preeminent ideology of the Ottoman state) as well as Albanian nationalists would be forced by events to distance them-

selves from – and to manifest nationalist movements which in the end turned against the unity of – the Ottoman Empire.

The early 19th century was marked by the outbreak of the Serbian Revolution (1804) and then the Greek Revolution (1821), in consequence of which the Ottoman Empire would for the first time come to know the phenomenon of the secession of European territories not included among its traditional opponents (like Russia and Austria), but which constituted new state entities, independent or autonomous. This process, like the pressure exercised by England (chiefly) – in parallel to the unsuccessful attempt by the Ottomans to squelch the Revolt of Mohammed Ali in Egypt – to open the Empire's market to importation of Western products (a direct result of this pressure would be the Anglo-Ottoman Trade Pact of 1838), imposed a new phase of reforms which have become known in history as the Tanzimat reforms. The chronological starting-point for these reforms is considered to be the issuing of the imperial decree of Hatt-i Şerif in1839, which contained declarations of equality, freedom, and isonomy by which the Ottoman state bound itself to treat its non-Muslim subjects. These declarations were repeated immediately following the end of the Crimean War in the famous decree of Hatt-i Hümayûn (Imperial Rescript) in 1856 as a consequence of the terms established by the Paris Conference[15].

But, beyond the influence of national revolutions at the beginning of the Tanzimat reforms, which affected the character of the millets, for one to understand the importance of the reforms it is necessary to understand the "development" phase of each millet, or rather the new relationships created either between or within millets. The Greek War of Independence resulted in the collapse of the old Phanariot world. The Phanariot families were either eradicated or compelled to find refuge outside the territorial bounds of the Empire (some settled in Moldo-Valachia). The tolerance or concealed support of the Phanariots vis-à-vis the Greek revolution led the Ottomans to re-define the privileged position which the Rum millet had occupied on the political stage until that time. This meant the position of the other millets in the Empire was automatically improved, in particular that of the Armenians: in fact, during the first decades of the 19th century Armenian money-changers, the famed *saraffs*, acquired especially great influence, becoming involved in the process of tax sub-contracting, in close cooperation with Muslim officials[16].

Meanwhile, however, the same process also created centrifugal tendencies within the millets themselves: in the case of the Rum millet, there appeared for the first time, especially after the 1840s, a national movement (namely, the Bulgarian) which claimed not only a separate national entity but also the independence of its people/faithful from control by the Patriarchate of Constantinople. At the same time, in the midst of the 'favored' (in some sense) Armenian millet, there also appeared centrifugal tendencies, for example the recognition for the first time of a Catholic millet, whose base was composed primarily of the Armenian Catholics of Istanbul. Indeed, their spiritual leader, Yakob C'uxurean, was recognized in 1835 as Patriarch (the Catholic millet was already established in 1831 under the influence especially of the French embassy of Istanbul), with the consequence that the Armenian millet, in common with the Orthodox one, underwent a process of dangerous deconstruction[17].

At the same year, in 1835, the Orthodox millet confronted some important turnovers: the patriarch Constantios II was forced to resign and Gregorius VI was elected in his

place – a clergyman well-disposed towards the Russian factor and controlled by the Great Logothete of the Patriarchate, Nikolaos Aristarchis (it is worth remembering that he was of Armenian origin). This change in the patriarchal throne was immediately connected with the strengthening of the Ottoman Empire's control on the Danubian Principalities after the withdrawal of the Russian army (so this could not happen without the consent of Russia) and meant the dominance of the pro-Russian wing in the Patriarchate for a five-year period.

These two tendencies recognizable in the historical development of the two largest millets, the first one of reversal (the process of upgrading/downgrading in relation to the degree of legitimacy they claimed vis-à-vis Ottoman authority) and the other a parallel process (the appearance of centrifugal tendencies which would lead to the Sultan's recognition of 'new millets') are very important for our understanding of the different but at the same time, similar phase of development in which the Tanzimat reforms found them. Precisely as a number of splits in the Armenian millet created the presuppositions for the institutionalizing of both the Protestant and the Catholic millets, the break-up of the Orthodox millet resulted in the creation of nationalized churches (the Greek Church in 1850, the Serbian in 1879, the Rumanian in 1885, and finally, after a lot of cruel confrontations, the Bulgarian in 1945). In a rather odd sense, this process began with the declaration of the Greek Church as autocephalous in 1833, a decision promoted by the English and French embassies to cut off the Orthodox clergy of the newly-formed Greek state from Russian influence, of which they considered the Ecumenical Patriarchate to be a bearer. But the latter refused to recognize the Greek Autocephalous Church for 17 years[18]. A compromise solution between the two sides was finally reached in 1850, but the concession made by the Patriarchate proved decisive for developments in the 19th century: national secession from the Empire now automatically entailed the establishment of national churches.

The Jewish millet was, also, influenced by the reform process, and we might say that its position was also enhanced following the chaotic decade of the 1820s.

However the violent breakup of the Janissaries in 1826 and the extermination of certain Jews, who had been collaborating with them, represented a disaster for the Jewish community of Istanbul but also of the other regions of the Ottoman dominion. Many Jewish tradesmen, lenders (bankers) and suppliers had developed narrow economic bonds with the members of the Janissaries' orders. The dissolution of the Janissaries undermined temporarily the Jewish urban elite's power and constituted a comparative disadvantage for the Jewish bankers against their main economic competitors, the Armenians.

In any case the course to Tanzimat and the implementation of a more liberal economic policy allowed a part of the Jewish bankers to recover their power, already at the beginning of the decade of 1830. Among them, Abraham Camondo, was the dominant figure[19].

A prelude to the strengthening of the Jewish millet was the first recognition of its institutional presence, and the enforcement of a type of internal centralism. More specifically, in 1835 there was created by imperial decree (*ferman*) the rank of Hahambaşı, i.e., Chief Rabbi[20]. In reality, the Porte gave institutional form to the Jewish millet for the first time,

recognizing as a unified whole all Jews in the Empire. Apart from the early centuries of the Empire (1453-1526), when the rank of Chief Rabbi for the Jewish community of Constantinople had been acknowledged, the Jewish millet had never been a formally institutionalized entity, despite the fact that the Ottoman Empire had been a genuine shelter, especially for the Sephardic Jewish of the Iberian Peninsula, who finally prevailed on the demographic and political level over the other Jews communities in the great urban centers of the Empire (Istanbul, Adrianople, Salonica, Smyrna)[21].

Karmi Ilan was the first to point out the simultaneity of the recognition of the Catholic and the Jewish millets, although he was not able to interpret it sufficiently[22]. Actually in 1834-5 a simultaneous intervention of the Ottoman state is observed (more precisely: of different interest groups of the leading Ottoman personnel) in the administrative structure of the three millets which can be described as follows: an interference inside the Orthodox millet with the appointment of a new patriarch well-disposed to Russia; a relative weakening of the Armenian one through the recognition of the Catholic millet (movement that had the approval of the Great European Catholic Powers, like France and Austria, and was promoted by powerful Armeno-Catholic families, such as the Duzian); and, finally, the strengthening of the centralism in the Jewish millet with the nomination of a Hahambaşı.

These movements could be interpreted as consequences of the Treaty of Hunkiar Iskelessi (1833) and the increase of the Russian influence in the internal affairs of the Empire. We could indeed hold that the last two 'interventions' comprised a remedial movement regarding the first: the support of the pro-Russian wing of the Patriarchate under Nikolaos Aristarchis (well-disposed to Husrev paşa, minister of military affairs, who starred in negotiating the Russian-Ottoman treaty), should have been faced with a controlled split of the Armenian millet, in which it was necessary to discourage pro-Russian and to strengthen pro-Western trends, and with the imposition of a type of centralism in the Jewish millet, where the preferential treatment of the Sephardic element, would constitute another answer to an excessive development of the Russian 'East''s charm.

The Venture of Ottomanism

The announcement of the Hatt-i Hümayûn in February 1856 marked the start of a second, more important period of reforms in the Ottoman state. To a certain extent, the imperial decree was the result of concessions the Ottoman Empire had been compelled to make after the end of the Crimean War[23], with the object of minimizing the possibility of further interference by Russia in the Empire's internal affairs.

The decisive role played by France and England, and particularly by the English Ambassador in Istanbul, Lord Stratford Canning de Redcliff, in publishing the decree, aimed not only to secure the Empire a strong negotiating advantage at the Paris Conference (March 1856), but also at the long-term exclusion of Russia from similar types of intervention. Of course, as we know, defeat in the Crimean War contributed to a changed alignment for the Russian Empire: the policy of defending Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire, which the victorious wars of Catherine the Great had established in the 18th

century, was followed by embracing the basic aspirations of the Pan-Slavic movement and the defense of the Slavic peoples of the Balkan peninsula, particularly the Bulgarians[24].

On the other hand, important representatives of the Ottoman political stage, such as Mehmet Emin Âli paşa and Keçecizade Mehmed Fuad paşa, had understood the necessity for reforms. Both were intellectual descendants of Mustafa Reşit paşa, a leader of the first Tanzimat period, which had been inaugurated by the declaration of Hatt-i Şerîf in 1839. The basic thrust of both decrees, and in particular that of Hatt-i Hümayûn[25], was the strengthening of conditions of equality before the law and religious tolerance for all citizens of the empire, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. In addition, the Hatt-i Hümayûn guaranteed the safety of their lives, fortunes, and honor. But it went one step further: aiming at the homogenization of the empire's population through the establishment of new administrative institutions and the construction of a new Ottoman identity (this was the basic goal of the ideological attempt at Ottomanism, identified with the Tanzimat effort), it promoted the reorganization of religious communities (the millets). In fact, according to its second article, which confirmed the validity of the privileges that had been granted to the Patriarch of Constantinople by various sultans in the past[26], it foresaw the formation of special "assemblies" under the supervision of the Sublime Porte. The assemblies would discuss the necessity of affirming these privileges, and the introduction of the required reforms to update the structure of the millets, "which (sc. reforms) time and the program of men and civilization demand"[27].

As Roderic Davison has very rightly noted, the imperial decree of 1856 was characterized by one essential contradiction ('dualism'): while it insisted on the theme of equality among Ottoman subjects, irrespective of their religion, at the same time it preserved the millet system as a basic organizing principle of Ottoman society[28]. While the force of the religious factor was theoretically being done away with in the face of the constitutionally based equality of subjects, the millet acquired legal substance, consolidating the differentiation of the empire's populations into millets.

This contradiction may naturally be explained by the fact that reforms in the Ottoman state were almost always the result of political choices made by the higher echelons[29]. Thus their consolidation presupposed the reorganization of the millets' leadership structure. This effort was of enormous importance, as it was necessary to control the means by which the reforms would be received by the empire's populations. For this reason, as we will see in what follows, the intervention of the Ottomans in the Orthodox millet had the goal of confirming the preeminence of those leadership circles identified to a greater or lesser extent with the policy of reforms.

The goal of reorganizing the millets, apart from affirming the privileges which had been accorded them – whether administrative, judicial, or educational – was to institutionalize the introduction of the lay element into the management of the millets' finances, as well as to eliminate corruption among the higher clergy in the provincial regions (especially in the case of the Orthodox millet)[30]. With respect to the entrance of lay individuals, the hope of the reforms was to extend the social support of Ottomanism into the inner structure of each millet, while simultaneously promoting the separation of the political and religious fields (comparable to the separation of church and state in Western Europe)[31]

by means of a separation of spiritual and material duties, and consequently the reduction of the jurisdictions of the highest-ranking members of the clergy[32]. As for the eradication of phenomena of corruption on the part of the provincial bishops, which normally burdened the Slavic-speaking rural populations and accentuated the problems caused by the demands of Bulgarian nationalism for secession, the ultimate goal was to prevent a new intervention by Russia in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire.

As regards the Orthodox millet, the 'National' (namely, Millet-i) Assembly (*Ethnosinelefsi*, in Greek) called upon to implement the provisions of the Hatt-i Hümayûn took place from 1858-1860. The result was the composition of a constitutional text that has remained known as the "General Regulations". The articles it included were ratified by the Sublime Porte, from 1860-1862, but an important change took place: the addition of the article no. 8 of the First Regulation concerning the Election of the Patriarch, which provided the Sublime Porte's right to exclude from the electoral process persons she did not like.

Enactment of the General Regulations permitted the regular intervention of representatives from Neo-Phanariot circles (families which substituted the old Phanariots after the end of Greek Revolution) and the rising social strata (merchants and bankers) in managing the 'material affairs' of the Patriarchate. Firstly, the Regulations provided for the formation of the "National" Mixed Council, an organ in which the laity would participate (8 laymen with 4 cleric members of the Holy Synod), to undertake the auditing of the economic and administrative functioning of the Patriarchate. At the same time, a new type of Holy Synod was enacted into law, in which all the priests and bishops in the Patriarchate's service would participate on a rotating basis. This meant doing away with the old regime of 'Gerontismos' i.e. of that administrative system which had obtained in the Patriarchate up until the mid-19th century and which in essence gave the possibility to the Synod's bishops (the 'Gerontes') of co-rule in concert with the Patriarch[33]. In any case, the most important reform concerned the legislation of participation by the laity in the process of electing the Patriarch, even though its final phase (i.e., election of the individual who would become Patriarch among three candidates) remained under the control of the Holy Synod[34].

Simultaneously, the reform wing drastically limited the role of guilds, both in the process of electing the Patriarch and in the administration of the Patriarchate, to the benefit of the Neo-Phanariots and the bourgeois merchants and bankers. The leaders of the guilds of Istanbul had played a decisive role in the election of patriarchs as early as the mid-18th century, in spite of often being controlled by powerful Phanariots.

Yet behind the officially declared objectives, there were two basic parameters in the promotion of the reforms: a) the eradication of all support for Russian foreign policy within the Ecumenical Patriarchate (i.e., the marginalization of the Great Logothete, Nikolaos Aristarches) and b) the overturning of the balance in favor of the Neo-Phanariot families who were pro-Western and supported reforms in the Ottoman state (and who were closely bound to Stephanos Vogoridis, a Neo-Phanariot of Bulgarian origin, and to a lesser extent, Ioannis Psycharis, the Supervisor of the island of Chios).

But if the importance of the General Regulations in the formation of this new political field proved to be a catalyst, the same did not happen with the financial restructuring of

the Patriarchate's functioning provided for in the reform program. The payroll for the highest-ranking clergy was particularly important for the goals of Ottoman reformers. With the implementation of this measure the Porte's goals were: a) to impose its control on ecclesiastical real estate and the income of bishops, probably as a solution to meeting its own financial needs; b) to turn the Orthodox clergy into civil servants of the Ottoman state in order to limit their political activities, and c) to satisfy corresponding Bulgarian demands, which aimed at a precise determination of the income of bishops in order to eliminate the phenomenon of heavy taxation on provincial populations.

Both the conservative as well as the reformist wings of the 'National' Assembly refused to implement the salary scheme and supported the solution of a grant, in fact a form of ecclesiastical tax, with the following differences from previous forms of bishopric incomes: a) it was a monetary remuneration, and b) it was uniform, but based on the population of each province and not on that of the population of the Empire as a whole. This was to create extreme imbalance in the distribution as well as in the collection of this specific tax.

The consolidation of the new system of bishops' remuneration would lay the basis for the smooth expansion of reformist efforts from center to periphery. Consequently, it constituted a critical moment in the reformist movement. Nevertheless, the reasons which led to failure in implementing this specific Regulation (inertia exhibited by the provincial bishops and some of the Elders, unequal distribution of amounts among the population of the provinces, reactions by local notables that were related to the development of philanthropic and educational foundations, and national antagonisms) resulted in the deterioration of the Patriarchate's finances and the assignment to the Porte, on the part of then-Patriarch Sophronios and the Holy Synod, of the right to collect the amounts from the state. This action called forth the reaction not only of the pro-clerical wing but of a large proportion of the reformers as well, led by S. Karatheodoris; it was the cause for raising once again the issue of reviewing the General Regulations[35].

But the most important problem of internal unity that the leadership of the millet had to deal with was the Bulgarian one. The 'National' Assembly of 1858-1860 was the first opportunity for the Bulgarian nationalist movement to display its opposition to the Patriarchate. The demand of Bulgarian nationalists for the creation of an autonomous national church (a demand which had matured following twenty years of claims centered around the use of Church Slavic in the liturgy instead of ancient Greek, and on the creation of schools to teach Bulgarian) met the opposition of the Patriarchate for two basic reasons: first, since a nation state had not already been formed, it was not possible to recognize an autocephalous 'national' church on analogy with Greece, Serbia, and Romania. And secondly, it was not possible for two ecclesiastical authorities of the same faith (i.e., the Patriarchate and the Exarchate) to co-exist within the same territory; i.e., two bishops of the same faith could not co-exist within the same city[36].

After the collapse of numerous attempts at mediation between the two sides during the 1860s, there ascended to the Patriarchal throne two Patriarchs, Gregorios VI (1867-1871), known for his pro-Russian sympathies, and Anthimos VI (1871-1873), both aiming basically at a compromise solution. But attempts at compromise collapsed under the pressure of the extreme nationalistic wings of the two sides. Thus, in February 1870, the

Sublime Porte issued a firman establishing the Bulgarian Exarchate. The Patriarchate refused to accept the decree, and in September 1872 summoned a Local Synod to the Ottoman capital, in which the occupants of the Patriarchates of Alexandria and Antioch also participated, as well as the Archbishop of Cyprus (Kyrillos, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, refused to participate). The Local Synod not only renounced the Exarchate and its supporters, but also what it called the "Heresy of Ethnophyletism", namely Nationalism. But if this renunciation confirmed at the ideological level Ecumenism as the dominant ideology of the Patriarchate, it also signaled the beginning of a lengthy antagonism between Greeks and Bulgarians in the Ottoman territories for the realization of their mutually exclusive dreams. It is especially interesting that their conflict was not conducted according to national terms but according to religious ones: not between Greeks and Bulgarians, but between supporters of the Patriarchate and supporters of the Exarchate.

Developments on this front resulted in the separation of the leadership elite of the Greek Orthodox community of Istanbul on the basis of two alternative strategies: a) direct opposition to the "Pan-slavist danger" and towards this purpose the creation of an alliance between Greeks and Ottomans. The ideological form of this strategic alliance, around which the millet's leadership elite allied itself, remained known as 'Helleno-Ottomanism' (the very process of introducing reforms was at the same time an attempt to marginalize both clerical and lay elements within the Patriarchate that were directly influence by Russian foreign policy[37] and b) second, the strategy of a policy of moderate concessions to the Bulgarians so as not to disturb relations with Russia. Both these strategies were in fact a further development of the views that had been expressed during the previous period by the reformist and pro-clerical wings, respectively.

In any case, it would be a mistake to attribute to the Patriarchate claims to Greek nationalism, or to see it as a tool for the domination of the latter in opposition to the demands of the other Balkan nationalisms for one very simple reason: the groups which operated within it and which competed for leadership were harmed by the creation of nationalized churches[38].

In the case of the Gregorian Armenians the dominance of the lay element, the *amiras*, (a title given by the Sultan to the strong laic Armenians, bankers or officials, who were financially connected to the Sublime Porte) in the election of Patriarchs was the standard until 1846. Reform had the character of bringing into question the precedence of the money-changers (sarrafs) by new lay powers, which arose and sought redistribution in the area of policy management[39]. In the provinces of Anatolia with Armenian populations, it was a frequent phenomenon for the sarrafs as well as local notables to collaborate with members of the Ottoman state machine in jointly exploiting their "compatriots" (chiefly in regards to taxation)[40]. In any case, within the leadership elite of the Armenian laity of Istanbul there appeared the same dichotomy as that within the Greek Orthodox community – that is to say, between a class of bourgeoisie, merchants, and bankers (who were engaged in speculation either by loaning money to the Ottoman public sector to cover its deficits, or by undertaking to make available to Ottoman officials funds for purchase of tax-farms in the Asiatic and European provinces[41], and a number of the powerful officials who held civil service positions in the Ottoman state machine. But this opposition,

in contrast to the case of the Greek Orthodox, had already appeared in the 1830s, over control of the newly-founded (1838) college in the Istanbul suburb of Üsküdar. Members of the guilds also became involved in this conflict, taking the side of the powerful civil servants[42]. The lessening of the social power and economic influence of Armenian money-changers and money-lenders was tied directly to the end of tax-farming imposed by the Tanzimat reforms. Many of the old amiras were financially destroyed by unfilled contracts[43]. The Crimean War later struck the Armenian money-changers another blow, when the Greek Orthodox community's bourgeoisie, taking advantage of emergency needs to cover the public debt due to purchase of military armaments[44], created the pre-suppositions to break their monopoly on loans to the Ottoman public sector.

These conditions proved favourable to strengthening the presence of the guilds in managing the financial affairs of the millet. The Armenian guilds, in contrast with the Greek-Orthodox ones which had undertaken a leading role in the election of Patriarchs and the financial management of the Patriarchate's finances as early as the mid-18th century, began to get involved with common affairs and to claim a level of representation on the institutional organs of the millet only in the mid-19th century (for example, as late as 1834, when the clerical-lay Armenian assembly elected a ten-member committee to undertake responsibility for the financial management of schools, a hospital, and other institutions, this committee was simultaneously entirely controlled by the amiras). The economic crisis the Armenian money-changers confronted was for them an opportunity to claim a larger share in the distribution of power in their millet. But in 1842, when the Porte once again legalized the sub-contracting of taxes, the position of the amiras was temporarily elevated, and the guilds were forced to give up control of the Committee of Twenty Four, the collective body of the millet which had been established in 1840 by Patriarch Yakobos to oversee the finances of the Patriarchate and the other institutions of the millet[45].

When Mattheos took over as Patriarch, the political power of the artisans' guilds grew. Mattheos was elected Patriarch in July 1844, hoping to establish a *modus vivendi* between the opposing factions. Attempting a historic compromise, the Patriarch convened a council of the laity, in which guild members, as well as tradesmen and bankers, would be represented (14 of the former, 16 of the latter). Yet the aspirations of the latter to power within the millets, coupled with their desire to control the election of bishops in the provinces, led the Patriarch to side with the guild leaders. The reform Mattheos enacted in 1847 should be understood as a consequence of this alliance; it consisted of the founding of two new councils, one of the clergy and one of the laity, each with its own respective duties.

Actually, the example of the 1847 reforms in the Armenian millet, which functioned for about a decade, was followed in the Orthodox millet with the 'National' Assembly of 1858-60. In the latter case, however, the imposition of a distinction between spiritual and secular duties did not lead to the marginalization of the bankers, but rather to the beginning of their social and political supremacy.

Oddly enough, however, this was brought about neither through the marginalization of the higher ranks of the Orthodox clergy by the millet leaders, nor through the development of anticlerical discourse. Instead, it was achieved by the supremacy of certain groups

of clerics (chiefly revolving around the Patriarchs Joachim II and Joachim III), who succeeded in gradually weakening their rival clerics, i.e. those who were controlled by the old Neo-Phanariot families. But the peculiar nature of the political conflict among the various groups of clergy undermined the potentially radical character of the reformation that began with the National Assembly of 1858-60 and was confirmed by the Sublime Porte with the recognition of the text of the General Regulations. This meant that an institution dominated by the laity could be founded beside the Holy Synod, but the critical question of the election of the Patriarch would be left to the Holy Synod's discretion.

In the case of the Armenians, by contrast, the intensity of the confrontation between the amiras and the new social strata that had won political representation through the millet resulted in the definitive establishment of the laity's dominance through Hatt-i Hümayûn's reformation of 1856. Indeed, in 1860, after two earlier proposals by the conservative amiras and the clergy were rejected, a plan for an Armenian National Constitution (*Azgayin Sahmanadrut'iwun Hayoc*) was finally agreed on, and then confirmed by the Sublime Porte in 1863. According to the Constitution, the two collective institutions created during the days of Patriarch Mattheos remained in operation, but both they and the election of the Patriarch were subject to the discretion of a National Assembly of which the laity made up an overwhelming majority (only 20 of its 140 representatives were clergymen). The number of lay representatives included Armenians both from Istanbul (80) and from the large cities of the provinces (40). The latter were elected via a pyramidal process (that is, by electors from the level of the nahiyes and the kazas all the way up to that of the Vilâyet. In contrast with the Greek Orthodox system, this process was used only in the selection of a new Patriarch, not in determining the representation of provincial populations in the collective mixed body (except in the days of Patriarch Gregorios VI, when it was composed exclusively of lay members) that functioned as an institutional check on the Holy Synod. Therefore, the potentially radical nature of the reforms in the Orthodox millet was tempered on that level as well. In the case of the Armenians, the representation of the provinces, though there was some, was not proportionate to the millet's demographic breakdown: the 90% of the population that lived in the provinces was represented by barely 2/7 of the representatives in the Armenian National Assembly. Yet the provincial councils, which were founded, of course, as a result of the Vilâyet Law (1864), functioned in a similar fashion in both the Greek Orthodox and the Armenian Gregorian millets, since they fulfilled a number of functions vital to the survival of their respective communities (both tax-related and administrative)[46].

Davison believes that the Ottomans primarily intended to reorganize the two large millets, i.e. the Greek and the Armenian, for in the case of the Jewish millet, the Chief Rabbi did not stand at the top of a large ecclesiastic hierarchy as did the Greek Orthodox and Armenian Gregorian Patriarchs. Rather, in the case of the Jewish millet, the powers and duties of the Chief Rabbi (*Hahambaşı*) of Istanbul were actually expanded by the Regulations of 1834, which made him, as we have seen, the leader of all Jews in the Empire. The object of the reformation under dispute was the reduction of the duties of the clergy. As in the Orthodox millet, the 'reformers' were led by a powerful banker, in this case Abraham Camondo[47]. Camondo led within the Jewish millet, supporting the election of two 'reformist' Chief Rabbis in the 1860s: Ya'akov Avigdor (1860-63) and Yakir Gueron

(1863-71). In contrast with the National Assembly convened by the Orthodox, however, the 'General Regulations of the Rabbinate' (*Hahamhane Nizamnamesi*) agreed on by the Jewish millet in 1865, having to confront the historical facts both of the expansion of the Chief Rabbi's powers and of the dominance of the Istanbul synagogue over the others in the Empire, established the participation of the laity in a more radical fashion. Namely, the Chief Rabbi would be elected not only by the circle of other rabbis, but by a mixed convention consisting of 20 rabbis, 60 lay representatives from Istanbul, and another 40 lay representatives from the provinces. Yet these Regulations were never fully implemented, and the 'conservatives' strove to restore the earlier Chief Rabbi's expanded powers until the early 20th century[48].

Therefore, when uncovering the similarities and differences between the Greek Orthodox and Jewish cases, we must first note that here, in contrast with the Armenian millet (where we saw the gradual decline of the amira bankers), the groups of bankers who endeavored to promote their social supremacy through the attempt at reformation found common ground. But the depth of their radicalism differed due to the powerful position of the Orthodox clergy. While the 'conservatives' of the Jewish millet had adopted the political position of supporting the expansion of the Chief Rabbi's powers, in the case of the Rum millet, Joachim II (1860-1863), as the chosen candidate of the bankers' circle, made sure to balance the 'conservative' political stance with the fulfillment of the expectations of the up-and-coming bourgeoisie, and the model of patriarchal centralism with the interests of his supporters.

The Dissolution of Empire: from millets to "Minorities"

Yet the conclusion of the Ottomanist endeavor, which led to the outbreak of the Eastern crisis and the ascendance of Abdul Hamid to the Ottoman throne in 1876, signaled a drastic change in the treatment of the old millets. The brief parliamentary hiatus experienced by the Empire's non-Muslim populations, culminating in the first Ottoman constitution introduced by Grand Vizier Midhad paşa in 1876, collapsed along with the blows the Empire sustained from the Russo-Turkish war the next year. The gradual fragmentation of the Empire's new lands, following the creation of a Bulgarian nation-state on the basis of the Treaty of San Stefano and the Congress of Berlin, finalized the Ottoman elite's alienation from any reforms that might have led to the incorporation of the Christian peoples of the Balkan Peninsula. Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamism, as a strategic proposal for the Empire's Muslim populations to come together, now became the dominant national ideology, and remained so until the Young Turk Revolution (1908)[49].

This new framework definitely affected the position of the non-Muslim millets. As for the Orthodox millet, the new regime soon sought to limit its 'privileges': both in 1883-84 and in 1891, the Ottoman government demanded the transfer of powers previously claimed by the Patriarchate of Constantinople to the Ottoman state. Specifically, the Patriarchate's right to adjudicate the cases of priests accused of political rather than spiritual misdeeds was brought into question. And more importantly, the Ottoman state targeted the relative autonomy enjoyed by the Greek Orthodox communities in the matter of managing their own education and activities. Although the Patriarchate protested in both cases and

managed to avert harmful developments, the Ottoman Empire's Ministries of Justice and Education began gradually to replace the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs as chief negotiators of the privileges accorded to the Greek Orthodox population. It is interesting to note that two very significant events occurred during this period. Firstly, within the higher echelons of the Orthodox clergy, there appeared a split between those who sympathized with nationalistic ideals and those who insisted on preserving the Patriarchate's ecumenical character (in practical terms, this meant maintaining its bridges with the Russians and with the other Slavic peoples of the Balkans). An external divide corresponding to this internal one also appeared at this juncture, namely a confrontation between the faction of the Orthodox clergy that believed in the ecumenical ideal, and therefore the preservation of the imperial model, and the faction that condoned the irredentist policies that the Greek state had set into motion with particular fervor in the late 19th century. Actually, this latter faction was merely composed of the groups organized in earlier decades by clerics dependent on the bankers – namely, Joachim II and Joachim III.

Joachim III especially became a symbolic figure of the Patriarchate, from his original ascension to the ecumenical throne in 1878 to his death in 1912, while serving his second term as Patriarch. It should be noted that the Patriarch's political protector, Georgios Zafiris, eventually became the personal banker of Abdul Hamid himself, having acquired tremendous influence over the economic life of the Empire. The fall of Joachim III during his first term as Patriarch in 1883-84 was a result of the fierce opposition exercised by nationalist circles reacting to the Ottoman state's attempts to challenge the Patriarchate's privileges. From 1884 to 1901, the Greek Embassy and its supporters in Constantinople prevented Joachim from being restored to the Patriarchal throne, believing that his political views favored the survival of the Empire more than the expansion of the Greek state[50]. However, after the Greco-Turkish war of 1897, which proved ill-fated for the Greeks, and the increasing tension between Greek Orthodox and Bulgarian populations in the Macedonian area, the Greek Embassy consented to the re-election of Joachim III (1901). Of course, the Patriarch's political orientation had also changed, as he now saw that the blend he had attempted to achieve during his first term through the ideological model of Ecumenicalism was now encountering limitations: the preservation of the Empire's integrity was very difficult to reconcile with a Pan-Orthodox policy, which would of course favor the spread of Russian influence within the Ottoman state.

The internal division of the Orthodox millet, the largest one of the Empire, was not only heightened by the rise of nationalisms and the creation of nation-states on lands formerly belonging to the Empire, but also by of the collapse of the Orthodox world, now that its former champion, Russia, had changed political orientation.

The same factors influenced developments in the Armenian millet. The dynamic intervention of Russia, with its declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire, kindled the hopes of Armenians that the problem of their own national consolidation might be solved, just as it had been solved for the Balkan peoples. Yet the extensive migrations of Armenian populations to the coast of Asia Minor, and the coexistence of those Armenians who had remained in the lands of historical Armenia (especially its western areas) with numerous groups of Turks and Kurds, made the problem particularly thorny. The Armenian bour-

geoisie was scattered throughout the Empire's urban centers, from Istanbul to Smyrna to Cairo to Alexandria, which rendered impossible the task of organizing a political agenda for liberation in which the social strata of farmers and artisans could be incorporated. If one considers, furthermore, the conservative political role of the Armenian clergy, who insisted on lawful conduct towards the Ottoman government, it is clear why Armenia made no clear demands for national liberation until the mid-19th century (this may further explain the intensity of the discussions in the Armenian millet regarding the imposition of new reforms: the redistribution of power among the ruling elite carried more significance than in the other millets)[51].

In the early 1860s, the important revolt at Zeitun in 1862 (provoked by the mass migrations of Muslims from the Transcaucasian regions that had just been conquered by Russia, as well as by the mass slaughter of Christian Maronites in Lebanon that year), was the first of a series of revolts and even some early political moves aiming at secession from the Empire. Nevertheless, such moves remained marginal until 1876: the Armenians (and Grigor Odian in particular) actively participated in the formulation of the Constitution of 1876. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 was not only waged in the Balkans, but also in Western Anatolia. The Russian army invaded Western Armenia, where Armenian populations were at the mercy of Turkish, Circasian, and Kurdish irregulars. Russia, based on the Treaty of San Stefano, annexed Kars, Ardahan, Batum, Alashker, and Bayazid, while the Russian army extended its stay in the remaining regions of Western Armenia until the Ottoman state kept its promises of political equality as expressed in the Constitution of 1876. The Congress of Berlin, which overruled Russian policy on the foundation of a Great Bulgaria, also forced Russia to depart from the regions of Alashkert and Bayazid, as well as from the provinces of Western Armenia, and did not even mention the possibility of the foundation of a semi-autonomous Armenian territory (after the example of Lebanon), in favor of which an Armenian mission led by the former Patriarch of Istanbul Khrimian attempted to argue.

Russia's military intervention into Western Armenia increased Sultan Abdul Hamid's displeasure with the Armenians, among whom he could see pro-Russian sentiment increasing. After all, the dominant ideology of Pan-Islamism left no room for a powerful, independent Christian population "interrupting" the communication between Ottoman Muslims and the Muslim populations of the Caucasus and Central Asia (which were also of Turkish descent). So the pogroms of the 1880s, executed by military teams of Circassians and Kurds and organized by the government of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (the very pogroms which had provoked the creation of Armenian military self-defense groups), peaked in the 1890s with the great massacres of 1895-96. The potential foundation of an Armenian state on Anatolian territory would cast doubt on the only region where a modern Turkish national identity could be constructed (especially after the mass migration of Turkish and other Muslim populations from the Balkans and the Caucasus). The number of victims these massacres incurred in the six provinces of Western Armenia is calculated at between 100,000 and 200,000, but we should also not forget the thousands who were forced to emigrate to Europe, the USA, and the Arabian peninsula; all of this was merely prefiguring the genocide of 1915. Just as Abdul Hamid's massacres in 1895 were inspired by the Pan-Islamic ideal, and gained social and political support among the populations

of Turkish descent that had been expelled from the Balkans and the Caucasus, the geno-cide of 1915 derived its political legitimacy from the ideology of Pan-Turkism as intro-duced by Ziya Gökalp[52], and its political support from a new wave of refugees, mostly resulting from the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1908 and the Balkan Wars in 1912-13. The parenthesis of the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 re-kindled some hopes of cooperation between Turks and Armenians, and of the fulfillment of old promises of legal and political equality. These hopes quickly expired (with the slaughter of 15,000 Armenians in Cilicia, which was the result of Hamid's coup in April 1909, but in which many supporters of the Young Turk movement nonetheless participated).

The Young Turk Revolution essentially proclaimed the equality of all citizens of the Em-pire, but now considered the millets to be 'minorities': although the Empire had not yet collapsed, the mentality of the nation-state prevailed. Of course, most of the Empire's Christian populations had already become incorporated into the Balkan nation-states af-ter the 1912-13 Balkan Wars, and with them the majority of Jewish populations, apart from that of Istanbul and Izmir. The Balkan Jews, in turn, constituted a prime example of an ethnic minority, and eventually became themselves the target of more organized anti-Semitic persecutions.

Notes

1   Here we should recall that the remaining Orthodox Patriarchates of the old Byzantine Empire – Jerusalem, Alexan-dria, and Antioch – had come under Islamic control as early as the first centuries of Arab conquest. For the history of the Ecumenical Patriarchate see G. Georgiades-Arnakis, *The Greek church of Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire*, "Journal of Modern History", 24, 1953, pp. 235-252, H. Inalcik, *The status of the Greek Orthodoxe Patri-arch under the Ottomans*, "Turkica", 21-23, 1991, pp. 407-436. See also for its history during the 19th century, D. Stamatopoulos, *Μεταρρύθμιση και Εκκοσμίκευση: προς μια ανασύνθεση της Ιστορίας του Οικουμενικού Πατριαρχείου τον 19ο αιώνα* [*Reform and Secularization: towards a reappraisal of the History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the 19th century*], Alexandria-Athens 2003.

2   P. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804*, Washington 1977, p. 277.

3   *Ibid.*, pp. 45-49. Generally, for the millet issue in the Ottoman Empire, see also, B. Braude - B. Lewis (eds.), *Chris-tians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: the function of a plural society*, vol. 2, New York 1985; B. Gülnihâl, *Alman-Ingiliz Belgerinin ve siyasî gelişmelerin isiği altında: Gayrimüslim Osmanlı vatandaşlarının hukukî durumu (1839-1914)* [The legal status of the non-muslim Ottoman subjects under the light of the German-English documents and political developments], Ankara 1989; E. Bilal, *Osmanlı Devletinde Gayrimüşlim tebaanin yonetimi*, [The adminis-tration of the non-muslim subjects in the Ottoman state], Istanbul 1996. Most recently, S. Anagnostopoulou, *The Passage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nations-States*, Istanbul 2004, pp. 37-55.

4   P. Konortas, *Οθωμανικές θεωρήσεις για το Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείο,17ος –αρχές 20ού αιώνα* [Ottoman perspectives on the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 17th – beginning of the 20th century], Alexandreia-Athens 1998, p. 123. See also A. Cohen, *Communal Legal Entities in a Muslim Setting Theory and Practice: The Jewish Community in Sixteenth-Cen-tury Jerusalem*, "Islamic Law and Society", 3, 1996, pp. 149-181.

5   The problem of the modern use of the term is related to the problem of the perspective selected by each historian: that is, whether he chooses to study the national-linguistic groups that comprised the millets based on the identity attributed to them by the Ottoman state, or whether he chooses to face the problem of these groups' collective self-orientation. Naturally, the second option is much harder, for the danger of an anachronistic projection of the 19th-or 20th-century reality into the 16th- or 17th-century past is always present. The reconstruction of the past according to the demands of the century of nationalisms presents a true obstacle to our comprehension of the millet as a religious unit. For this complex issue, see I.K. Hassiotis, *From the "Refledging" to the "Illumination of the Nation": Aspects of Political Ideology in the Greek Church under Ottoman Domination*, "Balkan Studies", 40, 1999, pp. 41-55.

6   B. Braude, *Foundation Myths of the Millet system*, in Braude - Lewis, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire* cit., pp. 69-88.

7   *Ibid.*, p. 72.

8   P. Konortas, *From tâi'fe to millet: Ottoman Terms for the Ottoman Greek-Orthodox Community* in D. Gondicas - Ch. Issawi (eds.), *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism: Politics, Economy and Society in the Nineteenth Century*, Princeton 1998, pp. 169-179. See also E.A. Zachariadou, *Δέκα Τουρχικά Έγγραφα για την Μεγάλη Εκκλησία (1483-1567),* [Ten Turkish Documents for the Great Church (1483-1567)], Athens 1996, pp. 91-97.

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10   On the Phanariot class, see, among others, *L'Epoque Phanariot*, Symposium, 21-25 Octobre 1970, Thessaloniki 1970, S.C. Zervos, *Recherches sur les Phanariots et leur idéologie politique (1666-1821)*, Thése de doctorat nouveau, 2 vols., Paris 1990.

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[33] For the establishment of the Gerontismos regime, see Th.H. Papadopoullos, *The History of the Greek Church and people under Turkish domination*, Brussels 1952.

[34] Stamatopoulos *Μεταρρύθμιση και Εκκοσμίκευση* cit., pp. 121ff.

[35] Stamatopoulos *Μεταρρύθμιση και Εκκοσμίκευση* cit., pp. 185-193.

[36] Z. Markova, *Bâlgarskata Ekzarhija* [*The Bulgarian Exarchate*], 1870-1879, Sofia 1989.

[37] E. Skopetea, *Το «Πρότυπο Βασίλειο» και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα. Όψεις του εθνικού προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα (1830-1880)*, [The "Pattern" Kingdom and the Megali Idea. Aspects of the National Issue in Greece,(1830-1880)], Athens 1988, pp. 309-324.

[38] The re-election of the patriarch Joachim II in 1873 confirmed the hegemony of the circle of bankers (who in the meantime had also gained social predominance through their energetic participation in the collective organizing of the Greek Orthodox communities in the Ottoman Empire) in the political sphere of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This hegemony continued with the election of Joachim III in 1878 following the death of Joachim II. The Pan-Orthodox policies of these two Patriarchs, as well as G. Zarifis' 1878 plan for the creation of a unified Greek-Ottoman empire along the model of the Austro-Hungarian one, demonstrated that this circle had by no means abandoned its defense of the imperial-ecumenical model. However, it was clear that aborting the consequences of the Schism presupposed the Patriarchate's making an advance to Russia; in contrast, the attempt at Greek-Ottoman coexistence was based on repulsion of the Slavic threat. The contradictory nature of these political choices between the circle of bankers and the clerics who represented them to the Patriarchate must be sought in the quality of dependency relations obtaining between laity and clergy: see Stamatopoulos *Μεταρρύθμιση και Εκκοσμίκευση* cit., pp. 349-352.

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[40] Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire* cit., p. 118.

[41] Artinian, *The Armenian Constitutional system* cit., pp. 20-21.

[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

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[45] Artinian, *The Armenian Constitutional system* cit., p.58.

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Sources

Rum Millet

Article no. 8 of the First Regulation, concerning the Election of the Orthodox Patriarch (translation from the Greek text of the General Regulations of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 1860-1862):

Given that the person who will become Patriarch, as the spiritual leader at the ecclesiastical level, is thus a medium of the High Government at the political level for implementing its decisions regarding the secular affairs of Christians belonging to his Patriarchate· for this reason, as regards the nomination of the most capable individual vis-à-vis spiritual and national affairs, the election (viz., of the Patriarch) belongs to the spiritual and lay leaders but inasmuch as the High Government does not wish to find itself forced to exercise its natural right to exclude candidates acclaimed by common election for the position of Patriarch, the List of eligible individuals (...) should immediately be dispatched to the Sublime Porte and if, from among those included in this List, there be some not considered capable as regards the political level, then the Sublime Porte, having excluded them from the List, shall inform the Patriarchate (...) so that the election of the Patriarch may take place from among the remaining candidates.

Armenian Millet

Five of the nine points found in the report of the Armenian National Committee, on which was based the revised version of the Armenian National Constitution (1863) (Azgayin Sahmana-drut'iwun Hayoc):

The office of the Patriarch as the medium between the nation and the Sublime Porte should remain as it was in the old system

The organization of the National (millet-i) General Assembly should be reformed. The national delegates, instead of being elected by the esnafs, should be elected by the different Quarters in Istanbul

The administration of religious affairs should belong to the Religious Council, and that of mixed affairs to the Mixed Council, which shall consist of the two Councils together.

The Religious and Political Councils should manage through appointed committees all national affairs including churches, schools, hospitals, monasteries, and other national institutions.

The administrative center should be the national Patriarchate. The patriarch, as the official head of the Patriarchate, should preside over both the National General Assembly and the two Councils and, under the inspection of the National General Assembly, he should manage all affairs concerning the nation, directly or indirectly.

(......)

Jewish Millet

Anonymous, "The Jews of the East", originally published in The Occident and American Jewish Advocate, Volume I, No. 1 Nisan 5603 / April 1843

"…All the Jews of Constantinople are under the control of a Grand Rabbi, (Haham Başı) who, to distinguish him from other rabbis, is called "Haham Hakolel". He represents the whole nation (millet) at the Ottoman Porte, receives the capitation tax, and is judge in all the civil and religious controversies of the Jews. Even the Christians, in their quarrels with the Jews, always refer to him, this functionary having long enjoyed a character of strict impartiality in all his decisions; his verdict is irrevocable; he has the power to order the infliction of the bastinado, but not to pronounce a sentence of death. The Government allows him two soldiers to execute his commands; he may ask for more assistance, if it be required. He enjoys the privileges of the other functionaries of the country, and stands on the same footing as the patriarchs of the other Rajahs. In council his place is above theirs, and the pipe is first offers to him; a courtesy highly appreciated among Eastern nations. He is assisted by a sanhedrin of rabbis, who, however, have only a deliberative voice. It must not be presumed that the Grand Rabbi is always chosen as being the most intelligent and the most pious. When he is to be elected, the representatives of the different communities (each quarter has a community) assemble to elect him, and their choice is generally approved by the Porte. The other Rajahs have a political influence, and in the election of their patriarchs disputes and cabals often occur, particularly among the ambassadors of foreign powers. But not so in the election of the Grand Rabbi. The representatives generally choose a man whom they think they can influence; they even exact a promise of him to that effect. If he should afterwards refuse to comply with his promise, an application for his dismissal from office can easily be made, and will be most generally complied with. The Grand Rabbi does not receive a very large salary, it being only about 500 francs; but he receives many presents".

Catholic millet

From the Imperial Edict (ferman) which established the Catholic Millet in the Ottoman Empire (Artinian, The Armenian Constitutional system cit., p. 38):

"Whereas the tax-paying Catholics of the Empire have hitherto been under the jurisdictions of the Greek and Armenian patriarchs, without a bishop of their own, and on account of the Catholic rites being different from the Greek and Armenian liturgies, have been unable to

observe their own rites, and compelled to frequent the churches of the foreigners and to ask them to perform their marriages and other rites, have experienced great distress and suffering.

Therefore, I, on this 21st day of the month of *Rejeb*, in the year 1246 [May 24, 1831], in order that they may refrain from attending the churches of the foreigners and be able to perform their rites in their own churches, have appointed Yakob C'uxurean as *episkopos* over all Catholics living in my imperial City and other parts of my dominion".

<div align="center">Protestant millet</div>

From the Imperial Edict (ferman) which established the Protestant Millet in the Ottoman Empire (Artinian, The Armenian Constitutional system cit., p. 42):
"Whereas, hitherto those of my Christian subjects who have embraced the Protestant faith, in consequence of their not being under any specially appointed superintendence, and in consequence of the patriarchs and primates of their former sects, which they have renounced, naturally not being able to attend to their affairs, have suffered much inconvenience and distress. Whereas, by reason of their faith, the abovementioned are already a separate community, therefore it is my Royal compassionate will, that...a respectable and trustworthy person, acceptable to and chosen by themselves, from among their own number, be appointed with the title of Agent of the Protestants, who shall be attached to the Prefecture of the Police" [November 27, 1850].

From Christians to Members of an Ethnic Community: Creating Borders in the City of Thessaloniki (1800-1912)

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Abstract

The chapter focuses on the division of the Christian millet of the city of Thessaloniki into different and ambivalent ethnic groups during the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. The formation and operation of the Greek and Bulgarian communities of the city, the relations between them and the policy of the Ottoman authorities are some of the related subjects analyzed. As a result of this ethnic clash, the Bulgarian community of the city declined gradually until eventually it disappeared. This was a general phenomenon, a by-product of the policy of national homogenization followed by almost all the Balkan nation states at the beginning of the 20th century.

Το άρθρο εστιάζει στις σταδιακή διαίρεση του ορθόδοξου χριστιανικού μιλίετ της πόλης της Θεσσαλονίκης σε αντιμαχόμενα εθνικά στρατόπεδα κατά τη διάρκεια του 19ου αιώνα και στα αρχές του 20ου αιώνα. Ειδικότερα, εξετάζεται η συγκρότηση και η λειτουργία της ελληνικής και της βουλγαρικής κοινότητας της πόλης, οι μεταξύ τους σχέσεις και οι αντιπαραθέσεις καθώς και η στάση που τήρησαν οι οθωμανικές αρχές. Αποτέλεσμα της σύγκρουσης των δύο εθνικών στρατοπέδων υπήρξε η σταδιακή παρακμή και η εξαφάνιση της βουλγαρικής κοινότητας της πόλης, φαινόμενο που όμως δεν αποτελεί εξαίρεση, αλλά χαρακτηρίζει εν πολλοίς την πολιτική της εθνικής ομογενοποίησης που ακολούθησαν όλα τα βαλκανικά κράτη στις αρχές του 20ου αιώνα.

Brief historical note

The city of Thessaloniki, also known as Salonica in English, was founded by the King of Macedonia, Kassandros in 316 BC, and got its name from his wife, who was Alexander the Great's sister. During the years after its foundation, Thessaloniki acquired great reputation, mainly due to its strategic location, and developed into an important political and economical hub in southeastern Europe. Galerius, who was the ruler of one

of the two provinces of the Eastern Roman Empire, chose Thessaloniki in 300 AD to become the seat of his empire. During the Byzantine era the city developed into '*Symvasilevousa*' [co-reigning], a term suggesting that at that period it was ranked second following Constantinople. Thessaloniki was conquered by the Ottoman Turks in 1430. It remained under Ottoman rule for about five centuries, until 1912, when the Greek army entered the city. During these centuries the city managed to maintain its reputation, although it was hit by severe natural disasters, such as destructive earthquakes and epidemic diseases. At the same time, it became a center of attraction for thousands of new inhabitants from its hinterland, but mostly for thousands of Sephardic Jews who arrived at the city during the 15th and 16th centuries, mainly from the Iberian and Italian peninsulas, fleeing the Inquisition's persecutions.

THE YEARS OF MISLEADING COSMOPOLITANISM

On 22 February 1908 Theodoros Askitis, an interpreter of the Greek Consulate in Thessaloniki, was assassinated while walking along one of the city's busy main roads. Askitis' assassination shocked the Greek community of Thessaloniki and his funeral turned into a protest demonstration. The results of the investigation carried out by the Ottoman authorities of the city revealed that Askitis was assassinated by Bulgarians[1]. In retaliation the Greeks killed three Bulgarians and injured another one[2].

Askitis' assassination was just one incident in the dispute between the Greeks and Bulgarians of Thessaloniki at a time when the conflict between the two countries over the acquisition of the geographic region of Macedonia had reached its peak. However, only a few decades earlier, these groups along with other ethnic groups in Thessaloniki coexisted more or less peacefully.

In the winter of 1812, the English traveller Henry Holland had made a stop in Thessaloniki as a part of his tour through Macedonia and Thessaly. According to his testimony, at the time the city's inhabitants amounted to 70,000 and it was the Ottoman Empire's third largest city in the Balkans after Constantinople and Adrianople. Holland was impressed by the busy life of the city, as well as by the commercial activities of its port. The English traveller distinguished four notable population groups, the Greeks, the Turks, the Jews and the Franks (i.e. Westerners), who lived together in harmony. The characteristic scene in a Turkish café in the city described by Holland in which "Turks, Greeks and Albanians slept, while others smoked, sang or spoke loudly", is indicative of a multinational and tolerant city. The Greeks amounted to approximately 2,000 families and most of them were involved in commerce[3]. Holland made no reference to other Christian communities in the city, which is justifiable since in the early 19th century the population in the Ottoman Empire was distinguished according to religion. Thus, the Ecumenical Patriarchate was the protector of the subjugated Orthodox Christians, regardless of ethnicity and language. Holland's report was confirmed a few decades

later by Sir Henry Layard. In 1842 Layard visited the city in order to investigate the political movement that was developing among its Slav-speaking inhabitants, which some had considered to be Bulgarian, but found them stating that they were Greek[4]. Thus, by the end of the 1860s, the Christian inhabitants, Greek-, Slav- and Vlach-speaking, were loyal to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and when asked if they were Greek or Bulgarian, the educated replied that they were Greeks, while the rest said that they were Christians.

That was the cosmopolitanism era for the city of Thessaloniki, the 'golden' era of the 19th century, when the only discernible, but not particularly strong, frontiers were religious. These frontiers separated the Muslims from the Christians, the Jews and the Armenians. The city had evolved into an important trade hub, enjoying the prosperity of its economic growth. Tens of steamboats made sure that it had a regular connection to Constantinople, Piraeus, Corfu, and Triest, while the European retailers and trade agents were taking care of the Macedonian inland product export, especially cotton, to the markets of the west[5]. Nevertheless, barriers to economic growth and social prosperity were still being created by pirates who ravaged the Thermaic Gulf. Thus, in June 1832, about seventy to eighty pirate ships seized the cargo of many of the ships of the western powers which stayed in the harbor. Only six years before, in 1826, a great fire had turned a large part of the city into ruins[6].

CREATING ETHNIC CAMPS

The situation started to change gradually after 1850, especially during the last quarter of the 19th century. On the one hand, the outbreak of national liberation revolutions in the Balkans, with the Greeks in the lead, gradually poisoned the relations among the inhabitants, especially between the subjugated Christians and the ruling Moslems[7]. So, in 1853 Ottoman soldiers who were passing through the city's Greek quarter caused damage to many of the houses, including the Greek and Russian Consulates[8]. This was followed by the gradual deterioration of relations within the Christian community itself, particularly after the national disillusionment of the Bulgarians, which was indicated by the symbolic move of establishing the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870. This fact constituted the dividing line in the Macedonian Issue, since it split the Christian Orthodox millet. All Christians who followed the Bulgarian Exarchate were gradually incorporated into the Bulgarian national camp. To the contrary, all those who remained loyal to the Ecumenical Patriarchate identified themselves with the Greek side.

This gradual division of the Christian Orthodox millet of the Ottoman Macedonia into ethnic camps was the main feature of the last quarter of the 19th and early 20th century. It divided not only the different Christian language groups, but whole families too. Thus, it was a very common phenomenon that members of the same family would accede to different ethnic camps. Equally common was the phenomenon that

people, families, or even whole villages would change over from one religious camp to the other, either because of necessity or due to other pressures. The English journalist Henry Brailsford who traveled in Macedonia at the beginning of the 20th century asked a peasant: "Is your village Greek … or Bulgarian?" "Well it is Bulgarian now but four years ago it was Greek" the peasant replied[9]. Language diversity and the difficulty of attributing ethnic identities on the basis of language are clear from Victor Berard's travelling memoirs. Berard was a French traveler who visited Macedonia at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Two peasants, faced with they replied to one of his questions on that subject replied: "'We don't speak Greek here. We are not Greeks. We are Bulgarians', a reply given using the clearest Greek of the Greek world"[10]. Here is how one of the Greek representatives in Macedonia at the beginning of the 20th century describes the situation:

> The other day, five peasants, whom we always thought of as being on our side, came to the consulate. But last year they rose up in arms on the side of the *comitadjiis*[11]. So I tell them, you are *comitadjiis*. Of course not, they replied, but we want our freedom and so we are either on the Greek side or on the Bulgarian. This depends on which direction the wind of freedom blows from, the south or the north [...] The self serving notables were blackmailing the consulates. I remember a notable at Poroiia[12], after not having succeeded in enrolling his older son as a scholar in the Greek High School, he enrolled him at the Romanian school and created a Romanian community at Ano Poroiia. Next year, after not having succeeded in enrolling his second-born son as a scholar, he enrolled him at the Bulgarian School and created a Bulgarian community at Kato Poroiia. This constitutes a sad example of self serving attitude and liquidity of views, which luckily did not happen very often[13].

There was virtually a form of civil war among the Christian Orthodox people of the Ottoman Empire, creating civic frontiers between them[14]. Indeed, according to some of the observers, the division at the same time constituted a form of political discrimination of employment[15], since the rich and educated traders and bourgeois acceded to the Greek camp, while mainly the non educated and poor peasants constituted the Bulgarian group[16].

This split was soon detected in the city of Thessaloniki where followers of the Patriarchate and the Exarchate forged their own paths, with the former being increasingly identified with the Greeks, and the latter with the Bulgarians. According to the available statistical data, in 1863 the Slav-speaking families were no more than 500, approximately 6,000 individuals who were mainly builders and shop owners (dairymen), and they lived together with the remaining Christian families. After 1870 the number of Slav-speaking families increased with labourers from Central and Western Macedonia streaming into the city due to urbanisation. Indeed, a distinct Exarchist community began to form, which also differed from the Greek one spatially. The population increase of the Exarchist community was also accompanied by spiritual progress. Thus, in 1871 the city's first Bulgarian School was founded[17] , and in 1876 the first Exarchist church opened. This was preceded in 1862 by the opening of the first Bulgarian bookshop by

V. Mantsov[18]. Also, in 1869 a newspaper titled "Salonica" was published in four languages and circulated every Friday. In September 1880, the city's renowned Bulgarian Gymnasium was founded and was attended in the following years by many great figures of the Bulgarian nationalist movement. Lastly, the founding of the Bulgarian Commercial Agency contributed to the developing conflict with the Greek element[19].

In the early 20th century the population of Thessaloniki amounted to over 130,000 inhabitants. According to some estimates, of these, about 80,000 were Jews, 30,000 were Greeks, 20,000 were Moslems and only 1,000 were Bulgarians and generally members of the Exarchist community[20]. On the other hand, the official Bulgarian statistical data of the same period gave 10,000 Bulgarians and only 16,000 Greeks[21]. The different population figures regarding the city's Greek and Bulgarian communities are due to the different criteria used by the two statistical surveys for recording the Slav-speaking population. The Greeks used the inhabitants' national conscience as a criterion, whereas the Bulgarians used language. In this way they both interpreted, according to their own judgements, the feelings of a significant population group, that of the Slav-speaking people, who in the early 20th century were distinguished much more by their religious faith than by their ethnic choice[22]. However, it is reasonable to suggest that in the early 20th century the Bulgarian community of Thessaloniki could claim over 5,000 members, who were retailers and labourers living in separate quarters in the area of the railway station, as well as in the western and south-eastern parts of the city. Also living in the city were approximately 10,000 Western and central Europeans who were gathered in a quarter near the port and the marketplace, whereas there was also a scanty Armenian community with 474 members[23]. In the early 20th century, 86 schools of all levels, which represented 13 ethnic communities, operated in the city. Of the existing Orthodox Christian schools, 20 were Greek and had a total of 3,857 pupils, six were Bulgarian with 698 pupils, two were Romanian with 140 pupils and four were Serbian with 240 pupils[24].

Thessaloniki had a remarkable port with a mooring capacity of over 3,000 ships in 1904. It was the seat of the *vilayet* (administrative unit in the Ottoman Empire), whereas its railway links to Constantinople (Istanbul), Monastir (Bitola) and Belgrade gave the city a cosmopolitan air. In 1905 the Scottish journalist John Foster Fraser had made a stop in the city. He was impressed by the European atmosphere, the elegance of the women and the hotels along the waterfront that could be compared to those in Chamonix. The population lived in peace, they dressed in almost the same way and one had to pay particular attention to the people's characteristics in order to distinguish the Turks, the Greeks, the Armenians, the Bulgarians or the Jews. "There are three Sundays a week in Salonika" noted Fraser, "Friday for the Moslems, Saturday for the Jews and Sunday itself for the Christians. Or rather there is no Sunday at all, for there is never a day when you notice any cessation in businesses"[25]. The observations of Allen Upward, another traveller who visited Thessaloniki three years later, were more or less similar[26].

Minorities in the Ottoman Empire

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE NON GREEK CHRISTIAN ELEMENTS

The city of Thessaloniki constituted the conspiratorial centre for Bulgarian activity in Macedonia. Here the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) was formed in 1893. This was an armed organisation which aimed at the autonomy of Macedonia and its final union with Bulgaria[27]. The Bulgarian revolutionary campaign reached its peak in April 1903 when Bulgarian anarchists blew up the French steamship *Guadalquivir* and planted a bomb in the Ottoman Bank. The Ottoman reaction was particularly harsh. Over 100 Bulgarians were killed during that same night, with many others tortured in the local prisons[28]. Among them were distinguished members of the city's Bulgarian community[29]. Both this and subsequent Bulgarian revolutionary movements was a source of discontent among the Greek community of Thessaloniki. In fact, in February 1904 the city's Greek inhabitants held a massive protest demonstration[30].

However, despite the noteworthy activities of the Bulgarian revolutionary organisations in the city, efforts to consolidate the Bulgarian community proved to be exceptionally difficult. The difference was not only in terms of numbers, it was also in relation to the financial strength of the city's Greek element. As a result, the Bulgarians remained in the shadow of the Greek community[31]. In fact, Bulgarian activities inevitably provoked the reaction of the Greek element. In early 1906 Athanasios Souliotis Nikolaidis, a young Greek army second lieutenant, settled in the city in order to coordinate the Greek defence. Very soon thereafter Souliotis formed the "Thessaloniki Organisation", an active, yet secret Greek network. In the beginning, the members of the Organisation changed the signs of their stores into Greek. Afterwards, members of the Organisation gathered information on the activities of their opponents and watched for suspicious activity. They often started economic struggles, mainly against the Bulgarians, since they forbade all Greeks to deal with them, resorting to violent actions such as threats, beatings and damaging property. Thus, for example, the activities of the Greek organisation led to the opening of Greek shops in Bulgarian quarters, whereas Greek construction workers from Epirus moved to the city, earning approximately the same wages as the Bulgarians. The number of Greek construction workers in the city soon quintupled. At the same time, the three sectarian grocery stores in the Greek quarter of Agia Triada were forced to close down, whereas a large building plot in the Bulgarian quarter known as Transvaal was purchased by Greeks with the financial help of the Organisation. Also, in April 1907, following the orders of the Greek Organisation, the city's Greeks attempted to cancel a festive show that was being prepared by the Bulgarian community. It is characteristic that the Greek employees of the neighbouring café went on strike on the day of the show, whereas the Ottoman owners were informed that the Greeks were displeased with the fact that the venue was offered to the Bulgarians and were threatening to boycott them[32]. Indeed, in certain cases the violation of the Organisation's orders brought about harsh punishment. For example, in June 1907 a well-known Greek real estate agent of the city was executed by the Organisation's

Execution Department for continuing to sell building plots and houses to Bulgarians. A well-known Bulgarian merchant had the same fate. He was executed by the Organisation's agents. The house of the priest of the schismatic church of Agia Triada was also burnt down and so he was forced to leave the area in the end. The Bulgarian population of Thessaloniki was practically the exclusive target of the Greek Organisation. It is indicative that during the same time the economic cooperation between the city's Greek and Jewish communities continued harmoniously[33]. Summing up the work of the Thessaloniki Organisation, the instigator Athanasios Souliotis Nikolaidis mentions in his memoirs:

> One of the main accomplishments of our Organisation was that it protected the Greek community of Macedonia from our great passion and frailty, political parties' disputes. The initiates were the ones who were setting the example. But above all, it was the participation of almost every person of the same descent that benefited the real anti-Bulgarian struggle. They were past words, they were no longer declaiming among themselves (Greek people of Thessaloniki) against the Bulgarians and the other enemies of the Nation. Instead, they were taking systematic, drastic action against them, each one according to his powers. Due to the fact that each day they were sensing the common danger and quite often they could see their struggle vindicated, they felt as if they were comrades-in-arms[34].

Political assassinations, such as those just described, became common practice throughout Macedonia and were of course also adopted in the city of Thessaloniki. "Terrorism was necessary", writes Konstantinos Mazarakis-Ainian, an officer of the Greek army, who was serving in the Greek Consulate of Thessaloniki[35]. Summing up the purpose of political assassinations were serving, the officer of the Greek army Dimitrios Kakkavos observed:

> ... every assassination of political nature had to be specifically intended, and not just to saturate blood-thirsty instincts. Instead, it had to satisfy specific causes, such as to break off transportation, punish someone who had been corrupted by money and had turned into a traitor, punish a spiritless defector, to elevate our orders' status, and finally to eliminate personal reactions of a capable and courageous opponent... It was usual practice for each political assassination to place on every assassinated person's body a letter justifying the punishment, so as not to create any confusion that the death was a result of a random accident, but it constituted the fulfillment of a specific cause, for which the victim had been chosen[36].

According to the available archival records, out of the 4,000 assassinations with political motives that were recorded in the whole of Greek Macedonia in the period between 1901 and 1912, 13 took place in the city of Thessaloniki[37]. Of these, only Askitis was Greek, whereas another one of the assassinated individuals was considered to be a Vlach traitor who was executed by the Greeks for being an instigator of the assassination of the Greek metropolitan bishop of Korytsa. The remaining eleven were Bulgarians and were probably executed in retaliation for the assassination of Askitis. They included a Bulgarian churchwarden, a doctor, a merchant and eight labourers who worked at the

Allatini brick factory. Apart from the aforementioned 13 executed individuals, there were also many unsuccessful attempted murders, such as those that took place in central parts of the city against the interpreter of the Bulgarian Commercial Agency and the inspector of the Romanian schools, as well as the injury of the Bulgarian interpreter of the Russian consulate. A regime of terror was being imposed, which the Ottoman authorities of the city could not or did not attempt to contain, considering that none of the perpetrators were ever arrested[38]. The Ottomans had every reason to incourage disputes among the Christians, sometimes helping one side and then the other, in an attempt to protect themselves from losing power. An indication of the indifference which surrounded the way the Ottoman authorities were treating the Greek-Bulgarian conflict is the fact that Askitis' assassination took place right across the building where the Ottoman police had its headquarters, without the slightest reaction on the part of the Ottoman authorities.

This third period of the confrontation among Christians in the city of Thessaloniki is characterized by the distinct constitution of ethnic camps and identities, as well as the strict spatial entrenchment of the rival ethnic groups, mainly the Greeks and the Bulgarians. They were living in separate quarters, avoiding any kind of exchange and remained in a constant state of tension.

The economic retaliation and political assassinations finally brought results that were to the advantage of the Greek side. By 1908, both in the city of Thessaloniki and in south Macedonia, Bulgarian revolutionary activity had subsided significantly, whereas that on the Greek side had significantly increased. The Young Turk Revolution in 1908 in Thessaloniki temporarily interrupted the Greek-Bulgarian dispute regarding the future of the region, however it was unable to turn back the division between the two different communities that no longer communicated spatially or economically with each other[39]. Eventually the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and the cession of Thessaloniki to Greece in October 1912, just a few hours before the arrival of the Bulgarian army, signalled the gradual decline of the city's non-Greek communities. Right after Thessaloniki's administrative incorporation into the Greek state there was a period of assimilation of the different ethnic and religious groups into the newly-acquired territories, which at some points was accompanied by pressures on minority populations in order to make them flee the country[40]. As regards the Bulgarian community of the city, it rapidly declined since Greek-Bulgarian relations were particularly strained after 1910. Greece and Bulgaria found themselves on different sides during the Second Balkan War in 1913, and were also engaged into a harsh conflict during the First World War. This fact had very unpleasant consequences on both ethnic communities. According to the census data, in 1916 the population of Thessaloniki amounted to 165,704 inhabitants, out of which 68,205 were Greek, 61,400 were Jews, 30,000 were Moslems and only 1,800 were Bulgarians[41]. Thus, within a decade the city's Bulgarian population decreased from around 6,000 to 1,800 individuals. At the same time, the Bulgarian school closed and the build-

ing which housed it was destroyed in the following years. During the inter-war period nothing remained of the Exarchist tradition of the city.

NOTES

1   Museum of the Macedonian Struggle (ed.), *Η τελευταία φάση της ένοπλης αναμέτρησης στη Μακεδονία (1907-1908). 100 έγγραφα από το Αρχείο του Υπουργείου των Εξωτερικών της Ελλάδος* [The Last Phase of the Armed Conflict in Macedonia (1907-1908). 100 documents from the Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry], Thessaloniki 1998, pp. 202-215.

2   D. Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913*, Thessaloniki, 1966, p. 373, see also A. Zannas, *Αναμνήσεις* [Memoirs], in Ίδρυμα Μελετών Χερσονήσου Αίμου [Institute for Balkan Studies] (ed.), *Ο Μακεδονικός Αγώνας. Απομνημονεύματα* [The Macedonian Struggle. Memoirs], Thessaloniki 1984, p. 117.

3   H. Holland, *Ταξίδι στη Μακεδονία και Θεσσαλία (1812-1813)* [Journey in Macedonia and Thessaly], Greek trans. Giorgos Karavitis, Athens 1989, pp. 181-211.

4   M. Mazower, *Salonica. City of Ghosts. Christians, Muslims and Jews 1430-1950*, London 2004, p. 258.

5   K. Vacalopoulos, *Οικονομική λειτουργία του μακεδονικού και θρακικού χώρου στα μέσα του 19ου αιώνα στα πλαίσια του διεθνούς εμπορίου* [Economic operation in Macedonia and Thrace in the middle of the 19th century], Thessaloniki 1980; see also Emile Themopoulou, *Salonique, 1800-1875: Conjoncture Economique et Mouvement Commercial*, unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Paris 1994.

6   K. Vacalopoulos, *Πως είδαν οι Ευρωπαίοι πρόξενοι στη Θεσσαλονίκη την κατάσταση στη Μακεδονία τον περασμένο αιώνα* [How the European consuls have described the situation in Thessaloniki in the last century], in "Μακεδονικά", 1980, 20, pp. 54, 59.

7   The only distinct difference up to 1850 in the city was the contrast between the Christians and the Moslems. In fact, both during the 1821 Greek Revolution and during every other Greek revolutionary movement, the Ottoman authorities punished the city's Christian element harshly. See A. Vacalopoulos, *A History of Salonica*, Thessaloniki 1993, pp. 99-120.

8   K. Vacalopoulos, *Πως είδαν οι Ευρωπαίοι πρόξενοι στη Θεσσαλονίκη την κατάσταση στη Μακεδονία τον περασμένο αιώνα* [How the European consuls have described the situation in Thessaloniki in the last century], in "Μακεδονικά", 1980, 20, p. 60.

9   H. Brailsford, *Macedonia. Its Races and their Future*, London 1906, p.102.

10   V. Berard, *Τουρκία και ελληνισμός. Οδοιπορικό στη Μακεδονία* [Turkey and Greece. Travelling in Macedonia], Greek trans., Athens 1987, p. 141.

11   Bulgarian rebels at the beginning of the 20th century.

12   A village in Greek Macedonia

13   P. Argyropoulos, *Απομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs], in Ίδρυμα Μελετών Χερσονήσου Αίμου [Institute for Balkan Studies] (ed.), *Ο Μακεδονικός Αγώνας. Απομνημονεύματα* [The Macedonian Struggle. Memoirs], Thessaloniki 1984, pp. 27, 46.

14   V. Gounaris, *Εθνοτικές ομάδες και κομματικές παρατάξεις στη Μακεδονία των Βαλκανικών Πολέμων* [Ethnic Groups and Political Parties in Macedonia during the Balkan Wars], in *Η Ελλάδα των Βαλκανικών Πολέμων*, 1910-1914 [Greece in the Balkan Wars, 1910-1914], Athens 1993. pp. 189-202.

15   H. Vermeulen. *Greek Cultural Dominance among the Orthodox Population of Macedonia during the Last Period of Ottoman Rule*, in A. Block, H. Driessen (eds), *Cultural Dominance in the Mediterranean Area*, Nijmegen 1984, pp. 225-246.

16   J. K. Cowan, *Dance and the Body Politics in Northern Greece*, Princeton 1990, pp. 40-41.

[17] On the activities of the Bulgarian gymnasium in the city see B. Raionov, *Преди половин век. Обществена и просвета деиност на солунските Балгари през 1881-1883 Г.* [Half a Century ago. The Civic and Educational activities of the Bulgarians of Thessaloniki], Sofia 1934.

[18] A. Ilieva, *Парвата балгарска книзарница в Солун* [The first Bulgarian gymnasium in Thessaloniki], in Πολιτιστική Εταιρεία Επιχειρηματιών Βορείου Ελλάδος [Cultural Society of Businessmen in Northern Greece] (ed.), *Θεσσαλονίκη και Φιλιππούπολη σε παράλληλους δρόμους 18ος-20ός αιώνας* [Thessaloniki and Philipoupoli in parallel roads], Thessaloniki 2000, pp. 373-387.

[19] On the establishment of the Bulgarian community in Thessaloniki, also see the article by B. Lory, *Soloun, ville slave?*, in G. Veinstein (ed.), *Salonique 1850-1918. La "ville des Juifs" et le reveil des Balkans*, Paris 1992, pp. 129-137.

[20] The data on the population composition of Macedonia comes from the Ottoman census that was carried out by the city's Ottoman governor Hilmi Pasha. See A. Chalkiopoulos, *Μακεδονία. Βιλαέτια Θεσσαλονίκης-Μοναστηρίου* [Macedonia. Vilaets of Thessaloniki and Monastir], Athens 1910, p. 1.

[21] V. Kancov, *Избрани происведения* [Selection of Works], vol. 2, Sofia 1970, p. 440.

[22] For a comprehensive analysis over the population variety in geographical Macedonia and the Balkan irredentist visions on it see I. Koliopoulos, *Η «πέραν Ελλάς» και οι «άλλοι» Έλληνες (1800-1912)* ['Yonder' Greece and the 'Other' Greeks], Thessaloniki 2003.

[23] I. K. Hassiotis (ed.), *The Armenian Community of Salonica. History, Present Situation and Prospects*, Thessaloniki 2005, p. 24.

[24] On education in the city of Thessaloniki, see S. Ziogou-Karastergiou, *Η εκπαίδευση στη Θεσσαλονίκη: Η περίοδος της Τουρκοκρατίας* [Education in the City of Thessaloniki: The Ottoman Period], in I. Hassiotis (ed.), *Τοις αγαθοίς βασιλεύουσα. Θεσσαλονίκη. Ιστορία και πολιτισμός* [Thessaloniki. History and Civilization], vol. 2, Thessaloniki 1997, pp. 238-257.

[25] J. Foster Fraser, *Pictures from the Balkans*, London 1912, pp. 183-189.

[26] A. Upward, *The East End of Europe. The Report of an unofficial Mission to the European Provinces of Turkey on the Eve of the Revolution*, London 1908, pp. 160-162.

[27] For the establishment of IMRO see D. M. Perry, *The Politics of Terror. The Macedonian Revolutionary Movements*, 1893-1903, London 1988.

[28] Zannas, *Αναμνήσεις* cit, pp. 74-77.

[29] On the events of 1903 see Y. Megas, *Οι 'βαρκάρηδες' της Θεσσαλονίκης. Η αναρχική βουλγαρική ομάδα και οι βομβιστικές ενέργειες του 1903* [The anarchic Bulgarian group and the bomb explosions in 1903], Athens 1994.

[30] V. Georgiev, S. Trifonov, *Гръцката и сръбската пропаганди в Македониа,краиат на XIX – нацалото на XX век* [Greek and Serbian propaganda in Macedonia, late 19th - early 20th centuries], Sofia 1995, p. 17.

[31] G. Abbott, *The Tale of a Tour in Macedonia*, London 1903, p.21.

[32] Museum of the Macedonian Struggle (ed.), *Η τελευταία φάση της ένοπλης αναμέτρησης στη Μακεδονία (1907-1908)* cit., pp. 104-105.

[33] A. Souliotis-Nikolaidis, *Απομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs], in Ίδρυμα Μελετών Χερσονήσου Αίμου [Institute for Balkan Studies] (ed.), *Ο Μακεδονικός Αγώνας. Απομνημονεύματα* [The Macedonian Struggle. Memoirs], Thessaloniki, 1984, pp. 326-330.

[34] Souliotis, Nikolaidis, *Απομνημονεύματα* cit., p. 330.

[35] K. Mazarakis-Ainian, *Ο Μακεδονικός Αγών. Αναμνήσεις,* [The Macedonian Struggle. Memoirs], in Ίδρυμα Μελετών Χερσονήσου Αίμου [Institute for Balkan Studies] (ed.), *Ο Μακεδονικός Αγώνας. Απομνημονεύματα* The Macedonian Struggle. Memoirs], Thessaloniki 1984, p. 206.

[36] D. Kakkavos, *Απομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs], Thessaloniki 1972, p. 87.

[37] These data come from British and Austrian diplomatic reports of the time, which have been entered into the electronic database of the Research Centre for Macedonian History and Documentation of the Thessaloniki Museum of the Macedonian Struggle.

[38] Kakkavos, *Απομνημονεύματα* cit., pp. 91-93.

[39] For a comprehensive analysis of the Young-Turk Revolution and for the situation that followed see D. Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913*, Thessaloniki 1966, pp. 375-421.

[40] The policy of assimilation based on ethnic, religious and linguistic "purity" was not only a Greek paradox. It was followed by almost all the Balkan states at the beginning of the 20th century.

[41] Sp. Loukatos, *Πολιτειογραφικά Θεσσαλονίκης, Νομού και πόλης, στα μέσα της δεκαετίας του 1910, in Κέντρο Ιστορίας Θεσσαλονίκης* [Thessaloniki History Centre] (ed.), *Η Θεσσαλονίκη μετά το 1912. Συμπόσιο* [Thessaloniki after 1912. Symposium], Thessaloniki 1986, pp. 101-129.

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The Formation of Greek Citizenship (19th century)

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Το άρθρο αναλύει τη διαδικασία συγκρότησης νομοθετικού πλαισίου σχετικά με την απόκτηση της ελληνικής ιθαγένειας κατά τον 19° αιώνα. Ιδιαίτερα επικεντρώνεται στις σχετικές απόψεις κατά την επαναστατική περίοδο αλλά και τις πρώτες δεκαετίες του ελληνικού βασιλείου και διερευνά τη σύνδεσή τους με την πολιτική της Μεγάλης Ιδέας. Υποστηρίζεται πως η νομική διαδικασία απόδοσης της ελληνικής ιθαγένειας κατά τον 19° αιώνα υπήρξε εν πολλοίς αποτέλεσμα πολιτικών συγκερασμών, κατά κανόνα αντίθετων προς τις ιδέες του φιλελευθερισμού.

The outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in 1821 and the establishment of the independent Kingdom of Greece in 1830 caused the first breach in the Balkan unity of the Ottoman Empire. Inevitably, it also caused the fragmentation of the control exercised by the Orthodox Church by introducing into the Balkans, for the first time since the middle ages, terms (necessarily borrowed from western Europe) determinative of the inhabitants of the newly-created state.

Manifestly influenced by the European Enlightenment, the Greek revolutionaries endeavoured from the outset to create a modern state embodying the liberal ideas of the West. In the middle of the War of Independence the 1822 *Προσωρινόν Πολίτευμα της Ελλάδος* [Provisional Polity of Greece], one of the first constitutions of the insurgent nation, specified religion and place of origin as determinant elements of Greek citizenship. Article 2 stated that "native-born residents of the Hellenic state, who believe in Christ, are Greeks". Similarly, Articles 4 and 5 provided that "aliens" who came to live in Greece could be invested with the status of Greek nationals by naturalisation. The insistence on religion was perfectly natural because the Greeks wanted to distinguish themselves in every possible way from the Ottoman Muslim conqueror by projecting their revolution as a national liberation. A separate law, however, provided that any Muslim who voluntarily adopted the Christian faith would be deemed to be Greek. This was obviously a political decision, judged to be in the interests of the Greek state, since in this way "failing the fathers, we shall at least have as good Greeks the children of those baptised".

The National Assembly of Astros in 1823 added to the existing criteria of religion and place of origin that of language: Article 2 stated that "similarly those coming from abroad who speak Greek as their mother tongue and who believe in Christ are Greeks". The Political Constitution of Troezene added the factor of parentage (article 6): "those living abroad who are born of a Greek father". And as the Assembly of Salona (1824) stated: "Those Christians who flee from the enslaved provinces for refuge in the free parts of

Greece shall be accepted as brothers, receiving the same rights as the Greeks, and shall be treated on the national soil as nationals, paying and receiving the same as the native-born, and the word alien shall not be used between Greeks"[1].

The first law on Greek nationality after independence was promulgated in 1835. Greek citizens, according to this law, were those whose parents were Greek nationals (*ius sanguinis*)[2], philhellenes who had fought for at least two years in the Greek War of Independence and any Christians who had emigrated to free Greece following the Protocol of 16 June 1830. Also, anyone born in Greece of parents who are foreigners could acquire Greek citizenship after coming of age (*ius solis*). Lastly, anyone born abroad of a Greek father acquired Greek citizenship by right[3]. The 1835 law remained in force for the next twenty years, when all matters relating to nationality were codified in Articles 14-28 of Civil Law 301 of 1856. Since then, each successive Greek Constitution has reiterated the statement that "all persons possessing the qualifications for citizenship are Greek citizens"[4].

Despite these limitations, however, it is certain that few Greek citizens of the day could have identified the nation with the citizen. At the beginning of the 19th century there was admittedly a general confusion about how to define the Greek nation. Neither language nor religion had proved to be a sufficient element. Theodore Negres, one of the principal architects of the Greek polity, held language to be an "imperfect" criterion, since freedom-loving Greeks from every region of the country had fought for its liberation: "Serbs, Bulgarians, Thracians, Macedonians, men of Epirus and Thessaly, of Aetolia and Phocaea, of Locris and Boeotia, of Athens and Euboea, the Peloponnesian and the Rhodian, the Cretan and the Cypriot, men of Psarros and Limnos and Samos and Kos, men of Tenedos and Mytilene, of Chios and Axios and Tinos, men from Antioch and Syria, Ephesus and Bithynia, Caesarea and Smyrna, and all the other Christians who for centuries groaned under the crushing weight of the Sultan's heathen yoke"[5].

The criterion of Orthodox Christianity created other stumbling blocks. What, for example, should be the status of the Greek Catholics of the islands of the Aegean who had played a role in the War of Independence? The revolutionary government of 1822 had made it clear that it considered them as Greeks, with exactly the same rights and obligations as the rest of their compatriots: "the islanders of the Western Church" were indisputably Greek, stated the relevant decree. Many Catholics, however, rejected Greek nationality, preferring the protection of France as better security[6].

These were all legal and political matters, but most of all they were ideological issues that had to be clarified if the newly-created Kingdom of Greece was to take its place among the civilised nations of Europe. One further difficulty was the friction between native and non-native Greeks, defined respectively as those who were living within the narrow geographical boundaries of the first Kingdom of Greece in 1830 and those who had come to revolutionary Greece from other parts of the Ottoman Empire either to fight or to serve in the civil bureaucracy. The latter came mainly from the Phanar, the Greek quarter of Constantinople, and were a cultured and well-educated elite with a fondness for Western modes and manners, at least in comparison to their humbler and unlettered compatriots from the Peloponnese and the Greek mainland. In 1828, Ioannis Kapodistrias, the first President of Greece, thought that Greek citizenship should be extended to all who

fought against the Turks and settled in Greece. This, in his view, would strengthen the Greek population of the newly-liberated regions and increase the number of tax-paying citizens.

The question of native and non-native Greeks was hotly debated by the National Assembly in 1844, revealing another interesting aspect of the issue, namely, that the conflict between them was essentially a power struggle, since up until that time the non-natives had furnished the highest ranks of the public administration while the natives struggled to secure a place in the civil service. The non-natives insisted that the Greek War of Independence concerned the entire Greek race and the Kingdom of Greece should therefore recompense all Greeks, free or otherwise. The natives, on the other hand, argued in favour of a geographical limitation of the War meaning the specific region in the southernmost extremity of the Greek peninsula in which only they who lived within its borders had any rights. Dissension also arose with regard to the chronological end of the War of Independence. For the native-born Greeks, the War ended in 1827, when Ioannis Kapodistrias was elected as the first President of Greece. For the non-natives, the crucial date was 1829, when the boundaries of the newly-established kingdom were finally fixed after those two intervening years of negotiation. The essence of the dispute, however, lies in the fact that most of the non-natives who had come to Greece to staff the civil administration sided with Kapodistrias. These men, scornfully described by the native-born Greeks as "Frenchified", were resented because, with their education and manners and language skills, they inevitably dominated Greek public life[7].

In the end the Constitution of 1844 largely justified the positions of the native-born. There had been a proposal on the part of some of the plenipotentiary delegates that only native-born Greeks should be eligible for public office. Indeed, in a speech to the National Assembly Nikolaos Korfiotakis argued that those who came to live in Greece should first learn the customs of the place and the condition of the nation and only then assume responsible positions in Greek administration and political life. In the end, Article 3 of the new Constitution gave particular weight to place of birth in defining the qualification for citizenship; and thus, in compliance with the decisions of the National Assembly (Resolution B) [see Source], several dozen non-natives were dismissed from their posts.

These decisions, however, caused a great outcry and were described as one of the most shameful moments in Modern Greek history. "The nation has been shattered", lamented General Makryiannis, one of the leading figures in the struggle for independence. Alexandros Soutsos commented that "this unjust resolution would, it was greatly to be feared, estrange the Greek nation as purportedly betraying an inherent hostility between the fortunate free Greece and the unfortunate and enslaved nation", and he described the politicians of the Peloponnese, whose decisions had divided the nation in two, as "dwarfs". Ioannis Kolettis, too, denounced his colleagues, whose inadmissible obsession had led them into vain distinctions between Greek and Greek, Christian and Christian[8].

The decree of 1844 lies at the root of the conflict between the Helladic Greeks and the unliberated Hellenes. It was also responsible for the establishment of the patronage system that entrenched certain powerful native-born Greek families and enabled them to achieve great power within the kingdom after 1844. Nor was it by chance that the short-

The rise of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire

sighted decisions of 1844 rapidly led to counter rassemblements and the promulgation of the doctrine of the *Μεγάλη Ιδέα* [Great Idea], since the "tiny kingdom of the native-born" could not satisfy the aspirations of all Greeks. Addressing the National Assembly on 14 January 1844, Greek Premier Ioannis Kolettis argued that the War of Independence had been fought by all Greeks and that any divergence from the line of the unity of the Greek nation was entirely foreign to the meaning of that struggle. "By her geographical position Greece is the centre of Europe. Standing with the East on her right hand and the West on her left, she was predestined by her fall to enlighten the West and by her renaissance the East". The Great Idea was in its essence profoundly unifying between the enslaved and the liberated Greeks.

The political prevalence of the native-born in 1844 was based on an ideological view that held Greece to be limited to what was included in the Kingdom of the Hellenes in 1830. In that framework the newly established realm claimed only ancient Greece as its cultural heritage. By contrast, the histories of the Macedonia of Philip and Alexander and of the Byzantine Empire were considered as foreign, since they occupied territory that lay for the most part outside the borders fixed in 1830[9].

In his *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους* [History of the Greek Nation] (1860-1876) the historian Constantine Paparrigopoulos attempted to bridge the gap between the Greece within and outside those borders. With Paparrigopoulos Byzantium gradually recovered its place in the continuum of Greek history, re-establishing the triplex of antiquity – middle ages (Byzantium) – modern era. With Byzantium, Christianity too was restored to its former position, recovering all that it had been stripped of by the Enlightenment[10]. The Great Idea thus acquired the historical legitimacy necessary to claim the realm of the Byzantine Empire and present the Kingdom of the Hellenes as its sole legitimate successor. The claiming of the Byzantine heritage by the Greeks of the 19th century also made it possible to claim as Greeks thousands of non-Greek-speaking Christians living in the northern districts of Macedonia and Thrace, on the basis of their essential convictions and the Isocratic principle that anyone with a Greek education is Greek. The success of Greece's irredentist policy was thus assured, and within just eight decades of the establishment of the first independent Greek kingdom in 1830, it had more than doubled the national territory and peacefully incorporated hundreds of thousands of non-Greek-speaking Christians, many of whom had fought selflessly for Greek rights. Paparrigopoulos' *History* also functioned as a response to the work of the German historian Jacob Fallmerayer, who a few years before, in 1830, had argued that the Greeks of his time had no relation to the ancient Greeks[11]. "For two thousand years nobody had questioned our material existence by claiming that the Greek nation had vanished from the face of the earth", stated a Greek newspaper of the time, whereas another added that "the issue was not clearly scientific, namely the proof of our existence in the past, but mainly our current fortune"[12].

Another aspect of the conflict between native and non-native Greeks, which falls under the more general discussion on whether the country belongs to the East or West, is the debate regarding the Autocephalous Greek Church. In July 1833, Theoklitos Farmakidis, theologian and advisor of King Otto on matters of the church, led the secession of the Greek Church from the Ecumenical Patriarchate[13]. This move constituted a clear criti-

cism of the primacy of the Patriarch over the Christian Orthodox millet on the Balkan Peninsula. Farmakidis believed that the Greek nation identified with the national state that had been created after the Greek War of Independence, and considered the involvement of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the internal affairs of Greece to be illegal[14]. Farmakidis' actions certainly derived from the liberal version of the Balkan Enlightenment movement, as expressed by Adamantios Korais, an ideology which undermined the Christian Orthodox world in the name of the national interests of the Balkan states[15]. His actions were also linked to the intention of the Bavarian rulers in Greece to control the proceedings in the sphere of the church and to prevent the further involvement of the Patriarch in the internal affairs of Greece[16]. This was due to the fact that during the 1830s, the Ecumenical Patriarchate's influence on the education of the free Greeks was determinative, and even more so because the official Greek state had not yet managed to create a reliable education system which would help lead the thinking of its subjects in the direction of its choice. Otto's Bavarian advisors also believed that for many years the Ecumenical Patriarchate had acted as a propaganda centre for Russia, which already, since the Treaty of Kioutsouk Kainartzi in 1774, had appeared as the protecting power of all Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, King Otto failed to assert himself on the conscience of the Greek people, who frowned upon a monarch who did not adopt the Orthodox faith, but was Catholic[17]. Lastly, the absolute dependence of the Patriarchate on the stance of the Sublime Porte was considered to be an obstacle to the conduct of foreign policy. "Constantinople has been tainted by a lawless tyrant", wrote Korais, and therefore "it was a shame for the clergy of free and autonomous Greeks to obey the orders of the Patriarch, who was obliged to submit to the tyrant".

As was to be expected, Farmakidis' views caused a storm of reactions. The "Αιώνας" newspaper, for example, accused him of libelling and of attempting to "kill national unity", whereas, at the same time, he claimed that the 1821 War of Independence was a "national, Greek war, and not a local war of the Peloponnese, Roumeli and the islands". The newspaper's columnist also claimed that the struggle of 1821 did not aim at "the reign of Athens as a part, but of the empire of Constantinople as a whole", accusing the Bavarians of being the instigators of the whole situation[18]. Similar accusations against Farmakidis and his followers referred to the creation of obstacles in the attempt to approach other Balkan nations. According to the accusations of Αιώνας, the enemies of Orthodoxy prevented the Serbs, the Bulgarians and the Albanians from becoming fully Hellenised.

It is a fact however that Farmakidis' views formed part of the same climate that characterised the native Greeks who fought for the creation of a relatively homogeneous state, in terms of religion and language, thus opposing the catholicity of the Patriarchate, which condemned national racism and promoted the idea of re-establishing the Byzantine Empire.

Eventually, and despite the strong objections and reactions, Farmakidis' views prevailed. However, they provoked the angry reaction of the Patriarchate, which cut all spiritual ties with Greek hierarchs. It took almost two decades for the situation to settle down in 1850, when the Ecumenical Patriarchate, by means of the Synodic Volume, eventually recognised the autocephalous nature of the Greek Church. However, this was not done

The rise of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire

in exchange for nothing, since the 1844 Constitution had already incorporated article 40, which stipulated that all successors to the Greek throne had to be Christian Orthodox[19]. Thus, the King of Greece would no longer be Catholic, an achievement which the Patriarch understandably considered to be his success.

The autocephalous nature of the Greek Church caused further harm to the cohesion of the enslaved Christian population of the Balkans, which remained loyal to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, especially in the geographic region of Macedonia. The creation of internal borders separating the Christian communities of the region was inevitable and was certainly the result of the conflict between warring Balkan nationalisms. In 1870 a decision was made, by means of the Sultan's firman that was issued by the Sublime Porte, to establish the Bulgarian Exarchate, which would henceforth no longer be subject to the Ecumenical Patriarchate[20]. This development caused further harm to the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. A second national church, the Bulgarian one, was created according to the Greek model, indeed fishing for followers in the same seas of the Sultan's Orthodox subjects. This created obstacles to the *Μεγάλη Ιδέα* policy, since Greece was forced to abandon the idea of ecumenism and rely on elements such as national conscience rather than on language for its territorial expansion.

The supremacy of the policy of the *Μεγάλη Ιδέα* and its adoption, with minor differences, by all Greek political parties after 1850 attenuated the differences in the opposition of free to unliberated Greeks. This rapprochement is evident in the Civil Code of 1856, which reflects a totally different point of view from the resolutions of 1844, establishing Greek parentage rather than place of origin as the primary criterion for Greek citizenship. This, with very minor changes, was to be the cornerstone of Greek policy for nearly a century and a half. In 1955, by means of Legislative Decree 3370, the New Greek Citizenship Code was enacted; however it did not differ discernibly from the corresponding Code of 1856[21]. Not until the early 1990s were any substantive changes made to the legal framework for the acquisition of Greek nationality; and they were made in response to the mass influx of new refugees and immigrants, manifestly a result of the different social and political necessities that Greek society was then and still is called upon to confront.

In conclusion, it can be argued that the process of forming a legal framework for the determination of Greek citizenship during the 19th century did not rest on a conscious ideological basis, but was the result of short-term political trade-offs. In my opinion these were coincidental political decisions which resulted, on the one hand, from the failure to impose on Greece a nation state on the Western European model, according to which the citizen's status prevailed in cases of granting citizenship. On the other hand, it was the consequence of swinging back and forth between the East-West pattern that for decades had troubled Greek political parties. The successful territorial expansion of Greece is undeniable; however it was not the result of consistent national policy, but rather the outcome of personal choices and diplomatic concurrences. That is why soon thereafter, as early as the beginning of the 20th century, Greek society entered a period of ideological rigidity by seeking internal enemies and marginalising minority groups, the very same people, that is, that Greece had keenly fought for in the 19th century.

Notes

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2 A. Bendermacher-Gerousis, *Ελληνικόν Δίκαιον Ιθαγένειας* [Greek Law on Citizenship], Athens-Thessaloniki 1971, p. 14, P. Vallindas, *Δίκαιον Ιθαγένειας κατά τον κώδικα της ελληνικής ιθαγένειας του 1955* [Greek Law on Citizenship according to the Greek Citizenship Code of 1955], Thessaloniki 1957, pp. 36-37.

3 A. Svolos - G. Vlachos, *Το Σύνταγμα της Ελλάδος* [The Constitution of Greece], Athens 1954, p. 425.

4 E. Vogli, *«Έλληνες το γένος»: Η ιθαγένεια και η ταυτότητα στο εθνικό κράτος των Ελλήνων (1821-1844)* ["Greek by Birth": Nationality and Identity in the Hellenic Nation-State (1821-1844)], unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Thessaloniki 2003, pp. 413-416.

5 E. Skopetea, *Το «Πρότυπο Βασίλειο» και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα. Όψεις του εθνικού προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα (1830-1880)* [The "Model Kingdom" and the Great Idea. Aspects of the National Problem in Greece (1830-1880)], Athens 1988, p. 25, Svolos - Vlachos, *Το Σύνταγμα της Ελλάδος* cit., p. 242.

6 Koliopoulos, *Ιστορία* cit., p. 69.

7 Skopetea, *Το «Πρότυπο Βασίλειο»* cit., p. 53.

8 Vogli, *«Έλληνες το γένος»* cit, pp. 416-423.

9 D. Tsaousis (ed.), *Όψεις της ελληνικής κοινωνίας τον 19° αιώνα* [Aspects of 19th-century Greek Society], Athens 1984, pp. 23-32.

10 K. Dimaras, *Ελληνικός Ρωμαντισμός* [Greek Romanticism], Athens 1982, pp. 422-427.

11 M. Herzfeld, *Πάλι δικά μας. Λαογραφία, ιδεολογία και η διαμόρφωση της σύγχρονης Ελλάδας* [Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece], Athens 2002, pp. 136-147.

12 Skopetea, *Το «Πρότυπο Βασίλειο»* cit., p. 165.

13 On Theoklitos Farmakidis and the Autocephalous Greek Church see "Ιστορικά", 6 July 2000.

14 P. Matalas, *Έθνος και Ορθοδοξία. Οι περιπέτειες μιας σχέσης. Από το «ελλαδικό» στο βουλγαρικό σχίσμα* [Nation and the Orthodox Church. Adventures of a Relationship. From the Greek to the Bulgarian Schism], Herakelion 2002, pp. 106-111.

15 P. Kitromilides, *Η Γαλλική Επανάσταση και η νοτιοανατολική Ευρώπη* [The French Revolution and South East Europe], Athens 2000, pp. 82-86.

16 Vogli, *«Έλληνες το γένος»* cit, p. 167.

17 *Ibid.*, p. 171.

18 Matalas, *Έθνος και Ορθοδοξία* cit., pp. 111-112.

19 G. Kyriakopoulos, *Τα Συντάγματα της Ελλάδος* [Greece's Constitutions], Athens 1960, p. 137.

20 Matalas, *Έθνος και Ορθοδοξία* cit., pp. 242-247.

21 Bendermacher-Gerousis, *Ελληνικόν Δίκαιον Ιθαγένειας* cit., p. 22.

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SOURCE

"Resolution B" of the Greek National Assembly (1844)
Ψήφισμα Β'

Η Κυβέρνησις οφείλει αμέσως μετά την δημοσίευσιν του Συντάγματος να σχηματίση το προσωπικόν της δημοσίας υπηρεσίας διορίζουσα εκ των υπαγομένων εις τας εξής κατηγορίας:

α)   *τους αυτόχθονας κατοίκους της Ελληνικής Επικρατείας και τους μέχρι τέλους του 1827 αγωνισθέντας εν αυτή, ή ελθόντας και διαμείναντας μέχρι του αυτού έτους. Προς δε και τους λαβόντας στρατιωτικώς και αποδεδειγμένως μέρος και εις τας μετά ταύτα, ήτοι μέχρι του 1829 κατά ξηράν και θάλασσαν γενομένας κατά των εχθρών μάχας;*

β)   *τους μεταναστεύσαντας κατοίκους και τους αγωνιστάς των μερών της Στερεάς και των νήσων, των λαβόντων τα όπλα εις τον υπέρ ανεξαρτησίας αγώνα, ελθόντας μέχρι του 1837, και εγκατασταθέντας οικογενειακώς εις ένα των δήμων του Βασιλείου. Και τα τέκνα όλων των εις τας ανωτέρω κατηγορίας υπαγομένων;*

γ)   *τους μη εμπεριλαμβανομένους εις τους ανωτέρω δύο παραγράφους η Κυβέρνησις οφείλει να μη διατηρήση, ουδέ να διορίση εις τας θέσεις της δημοσίας υπηρεσίας, ειμή τους μεν ελθόντας και εγκατασταθέντας εις την Ελλάδα μετά το τέλος του 1827 μέχρι τέλους του 1832 μετά δύο έτη από της δημοσιεύσεως του Συντάγματος. Τους δε μετά το τέλος του 1832 μέχρι τέλους του 1837 μετά τρία έτη, και τους μετά το τέλος του 1837 μέχρι τέλους του 1843 μετά τέσσαρα έτη.*

Resolution B

The Government must, directly after promulgation of the Constitution, staff its civil service, appointing persons from the following categories:

a)   native-born residents of Greece and those who fought in Greece before the end of 1827 or who had arrived and taken up residence in Greece by that year. Also those who demonstrably took part in land or sea battles against the enemy after that date, to wit up to and including 1829;

b)   those immigrant inhabitants and combatants of continental Greece and the islands who took up arms on behalf of the struggle for freedom and who had settled with their families in one of the municipalities of the Kingdom by the end of 1837. And the children of those in the above categories;

c)   those not included in the above two paragraphs the Government shall not retain in or appoint to positions in the public service, save for those who came to and settled in Greece between 1827 and 1832, after two years from the publication of the Constitution, those who came between 1832 and 1837, after three years, and those who came between 1837 and 1843 after four years.

French Consuls and the Greek War of Independence, 1821-1827. The Consequences of Consular Representations of Greek and Ottoman Identities

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ABSTRACT

In 1821, the Greeks rebelled against their legitimate sovereign, the Ottoman Sultan. The consuls of France were witnesses of this uprising. In their reports, they expressed various ideas regarding this insurrection. Was it legitimate? Was it necessary to colonize Greece? What were the legitimate borders this insurrection aimed at? For all these questions, the answers to them were based on representations that the consuls had of Greeks and Turks.

En 1821, les Grecs se sont soulevés contre leur souverain légitime, le Sultan. Les consuls de France ont été témoin de ce soulèvement. Ils ont avancé diverses idées à propos de cette insurrection. Était-elle légitime? Fallait-il coloniser la Grèce? Quelles étaient les limites légitimes de cette insurrection? Pour toutes ces questions, leurs réponses reposaient sur les représentations qu'ils avaient des Grecs et des Turcs.

With the present chapter we move on 100 years later, we change considerably the epoch and the nature of resistance. The insurrection of Orthodox Greeks against Muslim Ottomans also certainly had religious motives; nevertheless it mainly represented a fight for political and national independence. In this regard Greek resistance engendered international interest. But in the first half of the 19th century, with memory of the French Revolution still in mind, the different monarchies of Europe feared more than ever all uprisings and discredited democratic aspirations in advance. Finally, however, some positive representations of the Greeks and their glorious fight by foreign (in our case French) consuls helped considerably to overturn these fears and provoked much sympathy.

On 25 March 1821, the Archbishop of Patras (a town in the Peloponnese) proclaimed the independence of Greece. On 21 May, Greek armed forces registered their first victory. For this uprising, the Greeks took advantage of the growing weakness of the Ottoman Empire. But, beyond this situation of circumstances, the Greek uprising can be seen as a part of the nationalist movement which stirred up Europe and the New World throughout the 19th century and which led to the creation of new political entities, the so-called nation states, such as Greece, Italy or Germany.

The fight between the Greeks and the Ottoman Empire seems, at first, to be a mismatch – an unfair fight. The Greeks immediately called for help from the Great European Powers. For the latter, the question of the legitimacy of the Greek uprising arose: is it right for the Great Powers to intervene in the conflict? What role would or could they play in the struggle? And finally, should they consider the Greek uprising a justified fight or an unjustified revolution against the Greeks', until now, legitimate sovereign?

Indeed, the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) did not acknowledge the legitimacy of the national aspirations of the people. On the contrary, it reasserted the principle of the legitimacy of established sovereigns and the duty of obedience of their subjects. Adopting the proposals of the congress, Austria, Russia and Prussia, joined by France, concluded a pact of mutual assistance, called the Holy Alliance. By this alliance, they could provide mutual, even military, assistance to eradicate any uprising against an established sovereign. For example, in 1820, following this treaty, France intervened militarily in Spain to quash a liberal insurrection which aimed at imposing a constitutional charter for government on King Ferdinand VII[1]. So it could be expected that similarly the members of the Holy Alliance would help the Sultan to suppress the Greek insurrection. However, the situation became more complex[2].

The hesitations of French and European diplomacy have already received full attention from many historians[3]. In this essay, it is not a question of coming back to these diplomatic hesitations. The objective of this chapter is to focus on one particular element of the decision-making chain: the consuls[4]. Furthermore, the history of mentalities and representations is greatly helpful to us. The French consuls had been residing in the main towns of the Ottoman Empire, especially the port cities, where their principal mission was to protect Frenchmen and to watch over French interests. Confronted with the Greek uprising, they wrote many reports and letters to the Foreign Ministry in Paris. The study of these texts allows us to see how the representations of Greeks by the French consuls influenced the ideas of the central government and its projects and decisions. How did the consuls perceive the Greeks and Greek identity? What were the political consequences of these representations, notably with regard to the question of the Greek uprising's legitimacy? If the Greek uprising was seen as legitimate, what would therefore be the justified borders of Greece? The limited space allowed for this article does not afford a detailed study of consular discourses; nevertheless we would like to draw a general outline of them.

By its internal decree of 19 April 1821, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered its consuls "to remain absolutely apart from internal divisions which agitate Turkey at present"[5]. This official neutrality did not prevent the consuls from expressing their opinions and proposing their solutions for the conflict to their hierarchy. If we study the correspondence of the French consuls in Athens, Corfu, Coron (Peloponnese), Candia (Crete), Larnaca (Cyprus), Chania[6] (Crete), Patras, Rhodes, Salonica (actually Thessalonica), Scio and Smyrna[7], we do not find any single absolute condemnation of the Greek uprising. Actually, by their very function, the consuls had a duty of impartiality, at least in principle. Nevertheless, differences of opinions are detectable between them, particularly between Hugues Pouqueville's philhellenism[8] (consul at Patras) and Louis François Sébastien Fauvel's mishellenism[9] (consul at Athens)[10]. However, the prevailing feeling was commiseration for the Greeks and anxiety for the future of this people that the consuls believed were inevitably destined to be massacred by the Ottomans[11].

In fact, not one consul believed the Greeks were capable of winning independence for themselves. They all thought the Greeks would be defeated if a great power did not help them[12]. But, for a European power to decide to intervene in favour of the Greeks, would firstly require the Greek uprising to be perceived as legitimate. Furthermore, the consuls could not agree on the causes and origins of the uprising – a confusing situation for the European Powers. For example, some of them, such as Augustin Arasy, consul at Coron, thought that in fact, a foreign power was at the origin of the uprising[13], while Pierre Etienne David, general consul at Smyrna, did not believe there was foreign influence. To Smyrna's Pasha, David explained that Europe, itself in excitement, feared revolutions and had "to be on one's guard against these movements"[14].

From their side, the Greeks and Turks developed arguments which they put forward to the consuls. For example, the Patras' Turkish authorities wrote to Hugues Pouqueville to emphasize that the conflict between them and their "rebel raïas"[15] was "an irrelevant and irregular war"[16]. Simultaneously, Archbishop Germanos wrote to Pouqueville and pleaded in favour of European intervention. He developed three main arguments. Firstly, he highlighted the fact that the Turks did nothing for their Greek subjects' welfare. Secondly, he laid particular stress on the religious nature of this struggle. Thirdly, he reminded Hugues Pouqueville of the glorious origins of the rebels' ancestors, the ancient Greeks[17].

Concerning the first pro-Greek argument, all the consuls had been writing with the same pen to denounce the Turkish authorities accusing them of a breach of trust. They all emphasized that the Ottoman Empire was unable to maintain the happiness and the prosperity of people under its dominion[18]. Only when fully independent would the Greeks become more capable of governing their own destiny. This is what was asserted by most consuls in the framework of their reflections on the state of French trade in the Ottoman Empire; Antoine Louis Vasse Saint-Ouen, the consul in Chania, provides the best example:

> The Greeks would have more activity, but they do not dare to undertake anything for fear of thrilling the jealousy of the Turks who would not forgive them in case of the success of their

speculations. They have to stay in retreat, content themselves to look like as if they were in inaction and not to run the risk of being assassinated or hung in front of their boutiques as several people were[19].

So, for the consuls, it was the Turks who harmed the Greeks and prevented them from progress. Concerning the second argument, a relative unanimity was prevalent among the French consuls. For them, the Greeks fought in the name of their religion and, for that, the Greek uprising differed from the liberal uprisings that Europe had witnessed up to this point[20]. It was the general consul of Smyrna, Pierre Etienne David, who expressed this idea best by analyzing Greek proclamations:

> You will point out there, your Highness, a religious accent which seems to sanctify the patriotism of these people and that forms such a marked nuance between the mind of this insurrection and that of some recent rebellions[21].

Concerning the third argument the consuls agreed. Not one of them contested the validity of the ties between ancient and modern Greeks; the latter were really perceived as the clear descendants of the former. However, beyond these accepted ties, the consuls differed on interpretation. For most of them, modern Greeks, above all, had inherited the ancient Greeks' faults, which had deteriorated with slavery. For example, Alexander Claude Couteaux, the consul in Corfu, reminded others that "if Greece was the cradle of European Civilization Quinte-Curce[22] and Juvénal[23] (forgiveness your Highness) have already reproached this country for having also been the cradle of democratization[24] in Europe". The consul goes on: "However, if Greece recovers its political existence, its ancient reputation and its deep intelligence will have a big influence on the mind and customs of other nations". Couteaux concluded: "It would seem therefore essential for the interest of public morals , as well as for political balance, that revived Greece should be subject, during two or three generations, to the combined influence of the whole of Europe"[25]. In the final analysis, the consul's perception of the Greek uprising led to justifying it:

> The Greeks, in spite of many faults will go on raising much interest among the civilized nations, thanks to souvenirs of Antiquity, then, because they are Christians and then because they try to escape the hardest slavery exercised by masters who, really, are barbarians with no possible comparison to other people of Europe[26].

For the consuls, the Greek insurrection was legitimate because the insurgents were the descendants of the ancient Greeks, because they were struggling as Christians against Muslims and because their masters were 'barbarians' and, therefore, unable to ensure their happiness. Since the representation of Greek identity by the consuls justified the rebels' right to rise up, it could also justify a European intervention. What would be the nature and scope of this intervention?

Many consuls, such as Alexandre Procope Couteaux and de Chantal at Corfu, Jerome Isaac Méchain at Larnaca, and even Auguste Mathieu Arasy at Coron, suggested to their superiors an intervention of European Powers, or of France alone, would be appropriate. Such an intervention would have had the aim of colonizing Greece. Their

main argument was based on their representations of Greek identity and Greek "national character". So, for these consuls, the Greeks were the ancient Greeks' descendants and accordingly, they preserved the main element of their past character: a tendency towards anarchy. According to them, if the Greeks were to gain independence without the help of a 'civilized' power, they would never govern themselves properly and they would be even unhappier than under the Ottoman rule[27]. The manager of the consulate of Corfu affords us an example for this reasoning:

> And me who believes to know the character of this nation, that I have been observing for a long time, I have the opinion that in spite of the advantage [this nation] achieves over the Turks, in spite of more that it maybe will be able to obtain, Greeks will never achieve the establishment of a stable government without strong support or strong protection from outside, to which this nation has a right as being a Christian nation[28].

So, for the goodness of monarchical Europe, for the happiness of the Greeks (in order to spare them the agonies of civil war and anarchy) the consuls suggested the colonization of Greece in order to 'civilize' its inhabitants. This is an example of a case where the image of a people and of their character had political consequences; an example where the representation of an identity had consequences for the life of a people engaged in resistance against its sovereign to gain independence.

However, let us remember that the consuls were not as important diplomats as ambassadors. They only represented French economic and political interests in a specific region. They were not experts and therefore did not interfere in international relations between governments. Their plans for colonization were only advanced proposals sent in the direction of their hierarchy. The consuls were the men "in the field". When studying their actions on the ground we can nevertheless see what the political consequences of their representations were. As part of this study on the correlation between resistance, identity and borders, the best example is that of the island of Syra[29].

If the huge majority of the Greeks belonged to the Orthodox religion, there were important communities of Catholic Greeks in the Cyclades, in Tine or Santorin, for example, and especially, in Syra. These populations are called "the Latins". The Capitulations[30] between the Sultan and France gave an argument for reclaiming their right to protect the Catholic religion to the latter. In 1821, the Orthodox Greeks took up arms. The Latins followed France and declared themselves as neutral. Tensions between both communities mounted quickly. The Orthodox insurgents attempted to extend the territory under their domination. The Latins called for French help to remain neutral. The question was if France as the protector of Catholicism could justify, or not, her right to intervene in favour of the Latins and prevent Orthodox insurgents from taking control of Syra while having already proclaimed French neutrality?

The problems were numerous. Indeed, the Capitulations gave France the right to protect Catholicism, its clergy, property and the exercise of religion. This protection was not valid for the Catholic populations[31]. However, the consuls, especially Fauvel, the consul in Ath-

ens and a refugee in Syra, and Pierre Etienne David, voted for the protection of the Latins. To stress their idea, they used one of the elements of traditional representations of Greek identity: fanaticism. On the one hand, they represented the Greek Orthodox as fanatics ready to slaughter Latins[32]. On the other hand, the Sultan did not ask France to intervene in the conflict. By preventing the Greeks from taking control of Syra, France risked annoying the Sultan[33]. It is this last argument which won the day and France allowed the Greek insurgents to take control of the island. A new debate opened afterwards. Should Latins contribute to the war effort of the Greek insurgents? Was religious Orthodoxy one of the fundamental criteria of Greek identity? And if the answer is yes, did this criterion have territorial consequences, that is to say, should Syra be a part of Greece?

First of all, we may wonder if the Latins were considered to be Greeks. The consuls, Fauvel and David considered Latins to be Greeks, in spite of the two different denominations categorizing these populations. When Fauvel reported the attitude of the Orthodox insurgents towards the inhabitants of Syra, he exclaimed: "The Greeks, adversary Greeks[34] of the Latin Greeks, cut our throats"[35]. Here we see the ambiguity of the terms employed. Fauvel, although a Frenchman, was situated in the camp of the Latin Greeks because, for him, religion was a factor of identity. Nevertheless, the Greeks of Syra, even Catholics, were first and foremost Greeks, only secondly Latins. Also for David, the Latin inhabitants of Syra and other islands were Greek but he thought that "the cause of the Greeks should be foreign to the Latins until something [concrete] is decided; if they get their independence it is sure that all inhabitants of their territory are required to pay contributions"[36]. Therefore, we see that, both for Fauvel and for David, the Latins were Greek and Syra was an integral part of a hypothetical, future Greek state. Nevertheless, on the basis of religion, they excluded Syra from the uprising Greek territory. Thus, David and Fauvel did everything possible to assure the protection of the Catholics and to try to prevent the insurgents from taking control of the island.

As for the Greeks themselves, this partition of the Greek nation in uprising, based on religious criteria, was contested. This is clearly explained by the Greek Senate and the Greek Minister of the Interior "to the Greeks of Western Churches" in August 1823:

> Neither natural law, nor civil laws founded on the nature of man will ever allow that any nation is divided for difference in worship or religion, because nationality does not lay on bases which concern worship or religion; but it is founded on an endless number of interests and common morals all over the nation, which, as other links, join and keep all nations in unity. [...] The Greek Nation took up weapons to liberate itself from the horrible tyranny of the Turks, live as a people, an independent people, a free people, a people which is governed by laws establishing equality, and to consider as its own members all Greeks born in Greece, both those of the Oriental Church and those of the Western Church and in general all those who believe in Jesus Christ[37].

So, in this proclamation, the Greek authorities ruled out a definition of national identity based on religious differences and put forward a more territorial definition

of the nation. For them, the Greeks could be Catholic or Orthodox but not Muslim. To conclude this point, French diplomacy influenced the French government to authorize the Greek insurgents to occupy Syra and levy taxes from people living there which were similar for Orthodox and for Catholics[38]. French diplomacy even went as far as allowing the Greeks to levy the same taxes on French trade as the Ottoman Empire had.

The study of consular correspondences demonstrates interactions between the representations of Greek national identity and the political ideas of French consuls. From a negative perception of Turks derived a negative perception of the Ottoman administration, which seemed to be illegitimate because it was perceived as incapable of ensuring the happiness of its populace. On the other hand, the perceptions the consuls had of Greeks as the descendants of ancient Greeks legitimated the Greek insurrection. In all cases, the representations of Turks and Greeks by consuls legitimated a foreign intervention; notably France was supposed to help these populations to find happiness. The representations of the other and the self could even have political consequences for legitimating, or making illegitimate, the national aspirations of a people, without territorial consequences. Finally, we can note that France, England and Russia ended up intervening by destroying the Ottoman battle fleet at Navarino in 1827. These three "protector powers" organized the new Greek state; they fixed its borders, chose a regime and placed a sovereign in power. They profited from the Greek resistance which they had legitimated on their own behalf.

Notes

1   Ferdinand VII had been dethroned by Napoleon I in 1808. He regained his throne in 1815 and abolished the liberal constitution of 1812. His authoritative government provoked a revolt in 1820. Rebels imposed a return to the constitution of 1812 on him. In 1823, the French army re-established his absolute power.

2   At first, notably under the influence of Austrian Chancellor Metternich, the European courts were very firm regarding the Greeks. They refused to accept any delegation from the insurgents. Austria even planned to use force against the Greeks. However, the position of England and of France quickly softened towards a more friendly position, i.e. benevolent neutrality. These two powers officially admitted the validity of the blockade of the Ottoman forces by the Greek troops. It was forbidden for French dealers to trade with the besieged Ottoman fortresses.

3   For example, E. Driault, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce*, Paris 1925. In this article, the history of representations replaced traditional diplomatic history; therefore the study of the question of Orient has been left aside. For the history of English diplomacy, G.R. Berridge, *British diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to the present. A study in the evolution of the resident embassy*, Leiden 2009.

4   O. Augustinos, *French odysseys: Greece in French travel literature from the Renaissance to the Romantic era*, London 1994.

5   Cf. Archives of the Foreign Ministry of Paris (AFMP), Commercial and consular correspondences (CCC), Smyrne 38, f 38. All citations are translated from French by the author of this chapter.

6   *La Canée* in French.

7   These correspondences are preserved in the Archives of the Foreign Business Ministry in Consular and Commercial Correspondence funds and Political Consul Correspondence (CPC).

8   For example, AFMP, CCC, Patras 4, f 81bis.

9   Mishellenism is a hatred of Greece, Greeks and Greek culture; philhellenism is the opposite.

10 For example, AFMP, CCC, Smyrne 36, f 158; Athènes 4, f 65-66.

11 For example, AFMP, CCC, Arta 4, f 241-242; La Canée 23, f 276.

12 For example, AFMP, CCC, Athènes 3, f 253; Patras 4, f 1; Coron 6, f 452; Patras 4, f 36.

13 Cf. AFMP, CCC, Coron 6, f 449.

14 Cf. AFMP, CCC, Smyrne 36, f 99.

15 Raïas were the non-Muslim direct subjects of the sultan. They had to obey him absolutely in exchange for "official protection".

16 Cf. AFMP, CCC, Patras 4, f 10bis.

17 *Ibid.*, f 14.

18 For example, CCC, Arta 4, f 164 (28-10-1817); Corfou 7, f 79, 465-466; La Canée 23, f 181bis, 258bis; Larnaca 16, f 284bis; Rhodes 3, f 318, 319; Smyrne 42, f 164bis.

19 Cf. AFMP, CCC, La Canée 23, fol. 258bis.

20 In France, there was a main debate on the nature of the Greek uprising, especially in the press. For this subject, see J. Dimakis, *La guerre de l'indépendance grecque vue par la presse française (1821-1824)*, Thessaloniki 1968; Id., *La presse française face à la chute de Missolonghi et à la bataille navale de Navarin*, Thessaloniki 1976.

21 Cf. AFMP, CCC, Smyrne 39, f 357; but so we can see La Canée 23, f 268.

22 A Roman historian probably of the 1st century AD.

23 Latin satirical poet of the end of the 1st century and the beginning of the 2nd century AD.

24 The French Revolution showed that a people could have an important influence on other peoples. The ancient Greeks, notably the city of Athens, invented democracy. In the context of the Europe of the Holy Alliance, the European kings could fear that the modern Greeks influence other peoples. They could fear that it may influence other democratic uprisings against their thrones.

25 Cf. AFMP, CCC, Corfou 7, f 89-90.

26 Cf. AFMP, CCC, Corfou 7, fol. 435.

27 For example, AFMP, CCC, Corfou 7, f 57, f 84-85; Larnaca 17, f 39bis; Coron 6, f 567.

28 Cf. AFMP, CCC, Corfou 8, f 296.

29 Syra or Syros is an island of the Cyclades.

30 The Capitulations are a series of rulings or conventions, between France and the Ottoman Empire in 1536, regarding the status of Catholics in the Ottoman Empire and the rules of trade between the two states.

31 Cf. AFMP, CCC, Smyrne 38, f 279-2.

32 Cf. AFMP, CCC, Smyrne 38, f 268.

33 Cf. AFMP, CCC, Smyrne 38, f 395, f 395bis.

34 Underlined in the original.

35 Cf. AFMP, CCC, Smyrne 38, f 268.

36 Cf. AFMP, CCC, Smyrne 39, f 356.

37 Cf. AFMP, CCC, Smyrne 39, f 151-f 151bis.

38 Cf. AFMP, CCC, Smyrne 39, f 246.

To Call You a Bulgarian is the Greatest Joy for Me

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Предложеният текст опитва да набележи основните измерения на образа на етническите и религиозни малцинства в България в периода 1878-1912 г. Основно внимание се обръща на официалната държавна политика, намерила израз в училищата и армията. Анализират се и произведения на известни български писатели, наред със стихотворения, песни и текстове, публикувани в песнопойки, алманаси и календарчета. Авторът стига до основния извод, че образът на малцинствата в общи линии е негативен, макар изключения да могат да бъдат намерени. Държавата като цяло не им обръща внимание на практическо ниво, оставя ги да живеят в своя собствен свят и не ги включва в своите модернизационни усилия.

It may sound a little bit strange but maybe this is the first time I have ever written a text starting with the title[1] and only then beginning to gather the materials. The title seemed to me to be quite impressive and self explanatory. Unfortunately, the beautiful edifice of my thoughts began to crumble almost immediately.

I began my research with a pre-conceived thesis. The modern Bulgarian state was founded in 1878 after one of the recurring Russo-Turkish wars of 18th-19th century on a part of the nation's ethnic territory. At least this is what Bulgarian politicians and the Bulgarian people in general thought. From the very beginning it was a state which repeatedly declared in words and in deeds its yearning for modernization, a state which set before itself an important national goal – to bring together under one political roof all lands thought to be inhabited by Bulgarians. I felt pretty sure that I might expect the modern state to have made enormous efforts during the period and what is more those efforts should have been conscientious, purposeful and well thought out in order to unite the citizens of the young country in a single will; that it should have thought out how to turn them into a sharpened dagger of its national ambition, into an instrument for winning a leading position in the Balkans. In other words, I planned to trace part of the process of transformation of the individual who lived in a closed patriarchal society into a citizen of a modern society – as regards its philosophy and its political achievements. I was quite sure – I thought I knew – that such efforts, though different in intensity, had been made for the mass of the population. I did not want to dwell on them in so much as those problems have been discussed in length by a number of historians. Therefore, my interest lay rather with those groups that were, to a certain extent, marginal i.e. ethnic and religious minorities. I wanted to see how the Bulgarian rulers had tried to change the socium of the minorities, to make them believe that the environment they lived in was a part of a politi-

cal organization of which they were an inalienable part, that granted them rights but at the same time required the fulfilment of certain obligations.

In one of his books, not the famous *Open Society and Its Enemies,* but in a study on logics of the scientific analysis written in the 1960s, Karl Popper argues that, as a rule, in the beginning of his research the scholar diligently, in good faith and impartially picks out different pieces of information, builds up a plausible hypothesis and afterwards energetically keeps gathering specific information throwing out as of small importance what does not correspond to his thesis and declaring of utmost importance what is in accord with the already established facts. It is exceptionally rare, the philosopher says, that the researcher gives up his initial hypothesis. But this is what happened to me.

Let me start by describing the clay legs of my arguments. There was nothing original in them. It was rather a medley of universally recognized truths. The presumptions ensuing from them, however, turned out to be wrong.

The first one was based on the ethnic and religious structure of the population of the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia which united in a single country in September 1885.

According to the census of 31st December 1887 the population of united Bulgaria was 3,154.375 inhabitants. The Bulgarians, or rather those whose mother tongue was Bulgarian, were less than two thirds. Turkish speakers were over 600 thousand, Greek speakers were about 60 thousand, Gypsies over 20 thousand (they were probably grossly underestimated), Jews about 30 thousand, Wallachians (Romanians), perhaps 34 thousand.

|	
■ Bulgarian speakers	2326
□ Turkish	607
■ Greek	58
□ Roma	23
■ Others	88

Fig. 1
1887 Bulgarian Census (Population in thousands).

According to religion about 700 thousand or over 22% were Moslems and the vast majority of the rest of the population were Orthodox with a sprinkling of Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. In other words, there were considerable ethnic and religious minority groups among the Bulgarian speaking Orthodox.

The second clay leg was the nature of the Bulgarian national program. Without going into details, it can be defined by one general and approximate formula – the boundaries of Greater San Stefano Bulgaria set by Russia in the end of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 and destroyed by the great Powers at the Berlin Congress several months later. San Stefano Bulgaria encompassed virtually all territories inhabited by Bulgarians on the Balkan Peninsula. In Berlin, Bulgaria was deprived of more than one third of what it thought was its due. San Stefano Bulgaria became the hue and cry of virtually all Bulgarian politicians between 1878 and the beginning of the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. It was difficult to expect and hardly anyone sober-minded politician anticipated that this goal might be attained without overcoming the persistent resistance of all Bulgaria's neighbours and, in the first place, that of Turkey. Whatever the approach to the methods for achieving this goal was – cultural propaganda in Macedonia and the Thrace Edirne area; support of the Bulgarian national church; support of the Bulgarian language education in the irredenta; relying on the policy of one or another Great Power; secret or open support for the revolutionary movement in the Turkish-held regions – behind the events, perhaps not so openly but discernibly for the careful, there was the shadow of the Bulgarian state and of its army. The state as a political organization and the army as an instrument of politics inevitably played an exceptionally important part as a basis and as means for realization of national ideals. Historical analogies, no matter how unreliable they may be in certain cases, also underlined the role of these two factors. The unification of Italy in the 1860s, as well as the unification of Germany in the 1870s, quite fresh as a historical memory (most of the Bulgarian statesmen had witnessed those event) eloquently spoke of their paramount importance.

Even for the blindest patriot however the power of the Bulgarian state and of its army paled in comparison with that of the Ottoman Empire. For more than three decades the expenses for the army were the basic item in the Bulgarian budget. The results were impressive, but could not turn the tables. Even the most sustained and rigidly done recruiting could not bring the Bulgarian army to even one half of the size of the army of its principal adversary. The only hope was to prevail not by sheer numbers or by economic power but with unity, with the complete confidence of its citizens in one ideal. Such a unifying political ideal constituted the vigor and the energy of a modern polity. It had to bring the obsolete Ottoman empire to its knees. Virtue is the child of necessity. Thus Bulgarian military theoreticians eagerly embraced the French idea of *élan* as a basic prerequisite for military victory.

The process of turning the peasant into a citizen, the transformation of the local consciousness into a national one had proved to be a difficult task in Western Europe. There was no reason to think that it would be easier in the Balkans. But it was clear – or at least that is what I optimistically thought – that the lessons of the West should have been learnt and implemented.

The rise of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire

According to the American sociologist James Aho every society attempts to secure social order against threats; tries to erect institutional barriers against threat. In a word, uniting the entire society should have been a consistent and persistent goal for all Bulgarian governments who needed as much staunch support for the inevitable conflict with the Ottoman Empire as they could garner. This, argued I, had to encompass various ideas, instruments, initiatives in order to convince all Bulgarian citizens that they are part of an integrated or at least to a great extent integrated national state organism.

The main paths for unifying the population are well known – education, army, religion and economics. The part played by national culture was paramount. The problem is that at this point of development, unlike the other above mentioned instruments, it was unpredictable. In those decades it was not guided – gently or otherwise – by the state. Such a heresy still had not dawned on anybody. Nevertheless I presumed that we could expect to find a fairly close relationship between popular culture and the stereotypes imposed by education.

It turned out that in most of my assumptions I was a mere babe in the woods.

EDUCATION

The educational system developed rapidly after liberation. It was completely in the hands of the state and its central institutions. The private and the minority schools were subjected to strict scrutiny and were chaperoned by the Ministry of Education. At least in theory. The results were encouraging when compared with pre-war levels of literacy and education. The Bulgarians shortened the distance that separated them from Europe although they did not succeed in catching up. Literacy was on a higher level than that in neighbouring countries but lagged far behind that in developed countries. Education in the country until the Balkan Wars remained predominantly elementary, or, at best, secondary. The graduates of Sofia University founded in 1888, figuratively speaking, could be counted on the fingers of a hand. Contemporaries estimated that on the eve of the Balkan War of 1912 two thirds of the heads of offices in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had managed to attain only secondary education. Only 5 out of the 12 regional governors had university education and 3 did not even have a secondary school diploma. Not one of the 62 district chiefs had a university education and three fourths had not graduated from secondary school.

In other words, when the tens of thousands of recruits donned their khaki in September 1912 their ideas, attitudes, notions had been created and moulded by their elementary or, sometimes, secondary school. The textbooks, mostly those in history, geography and literature, shaped their basic ideas about the world in general and the place of Bulgarians in it. The lessons that children studied – mostly up to 14-15 year age when they had to leave schools to earn their bread and if they were lucky -butter - gave them basic ideas of Bulgarian literature, the past of the Bulgarians and their place in Europe. Whatever we might think of the quality of that education, it cannot be denied that it corresponded to the basic requirements of its time. This was an education for the children of Bulgaria. This education had to change them into citizens of Bulgaria, conscious of their social responsibilities and obligations. Such were the instructions of the ministries.

But which children of Bulgaria and what was meant by Bulgaria? Textbook writers had a prompt definition:

"*Fatherland is called the land in which one people lives*".

And if more than one people lived there? Whose fatherland it was?

All methodological instructions of the ministries referred exclusively to the children of Bulgarian speaking families. In theory the children of the so called national and religious minorities (if we attempt to use modern terminology) could study and should have studied in Bulgarian schools where the teaching process, again in theory, was supposed to make them proud that they were part of the Bulgarian nation and to induce them to be ready to make every sacrifice in order to achieve its ideals. But few chose this path – sometimes for economic, sometimes for personal reasons. While one could meet at least some representatives of most ethnic and religious groups in primary schools, the percentage diminished progressively at each higher educational level. The only members of a minority among the nearly 900 students in First Sofia Girls' Higher School were 40 Jewish girls. One might say that this was the situation in Sofia where the number of Moslems was negligible anyway. But in the Girls' Higher School in Shumen in North East Bulgaria where there was a substantial Moslem presence, there was not a single Moslem among the students. Taking together the 5 pedagogical schools of the Principality a the beginning of last century, in a total of nearly 3000 students, there were 66 Jews, 7 Armenians, 8 Greeks and 5 Turks (the Moslems were male without exception).

We have mentioned that at least some children from the minority groups frequented primary schools. This is true. The problem was that they – or rather their parents – preferred their own minority schools whose existence was allowed by the Constitution.

With the exception of Jews and Armenians, the children of the rest of the minorities, insofar they attended school at all (among most of the minorities the percentage of elementary literacy was incomparably lower than that among Orthodox Bulgarians), they attended their own minority schools[2].

Although in theory the schools had to follow the regulations of the Ministry of Education, the teaching in them in general left much to be desired. The administration paid them only furtive attention. It is true that it provided them with the necessary teachers in Bulgarian language and once in a while sent inspectors to visit them. This effort seemed to exhaust the Ministry's energy. The inspectors as a rule had no knowledge of the language the students and the teachers spoke (and the Ministry doggedly refused to appoint inspectors from the relevant ethnic or religious groups). The result were justified complaints from both sides. Minority schools felt neglected and cut off from government funding. The Ministry judged the quality of teaching as abominably low. Moslem schools in particular were a thorn in the flesh. Students dropped out of them in droves. Most of the teachers were semi literate imams who could not and even at their best did not motivate students to continue their education. But complaints did not lead to effective action. It seems that the administration did not regard the students of these schools as a part and parcel of the Bulgarian cultural and educational space but rather as an appendage, a tedious obligation that could not be just swept under the carpet[3].

The rise of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire

The textbooks which could have been used in the minority schools (and it is not clear to what extent they were used), were the textbooks used all over Bulgaria. From those in history the little Turks could learn that they were descendents of a bloodthirsty people, guilty of the disasters that had befallen on the lands they lived in for the last five centuries. Already in an early and very popular textbook, the one compiled by Dragan Manchov, the Turks were defined "fanatic riff-raff of the religion of Mohamed". In the small town of Zlatitza during the April Uprising of 1876 – the culmination of the national liberation struggle of the Bulgarians against the Ottomans – the Moslem irregulars – the bashi-bazouks – "looted everything up to the very and last needle and did not spare honor of females and children". In the Rhodope village Batak "pomaks[4] converted to Mohammedanism attacked the Christian Bulgarians .... They gouged out the eyes of some victims, cut their hands and other parts of the body off and then finished them off; the wombs of pregnant women were ripped up and children were butchered in front of the eyes of their parents".

These were the texts the Bulgarian Moslems – both Turks and Pomaks – had to study. On the other hand, children who spoke a language different from Bulgarian at home could learn nothing about themselves at school. Not a single textbook, be it on Bulgarian literature, history or geography contained a single word which could bring them responsibly and emotionally closer to the state they lived in. In the textbooks the presence of large areas populated by minority groups was usually omitted. Thus, describing Melnik area in Pirin Macedonia it was mentioned that "the region had 78 villages inhabited by Bulgarians". That in Melnik itself there lived Greeks and Hellenised Bulgarians was not even mentioned.

In the textbooks the boundaries of the Bulgarian nation ran along the outer, broadest limits of the Bulgarian ethnos. No account was taken of the other groups that remained within these boundaries. The authors dutifully stressed that the Bulgarians were the most numerous Slav people on the peninsula – "in Macedonia – Bulgarians are mixed here and there with Greeks, Turks and Aromanians (tsintsars)...in Thrace – Bulgarians are mixed with a few Turks..."

In geography textbooks, it is true, it was mentioned that in the capital of the Principality there lived quite a number of Jews. Immediately the author added that in their residential district "the streets are quite unclean" – as if in the other neighbourhoods the cobblestones were washed with soap.

The literature taught was not much different. Nowhere in the readers on Bulgarian literature could there be found any example of the creative work of non-Bulgarians living within the boundaries of the common fatherland.

The authors of the official programs of the primary and secondary schools had mentioned that the whole population of the country and the religious groups in it had to be studied, but this remained only a good intention. Much space was allocated in textbooks to Bulgaria's neighbours: to the Greeks perhaps in the first place, then to the Turks but as it occurred to no one that numerous groups of these two peoples lived on the territory of the Principality of Bulgaria. As one regional school inspector said: "Some teachers can-

not stir up patriotic feelings in the students when they study the historical events or the biographies of dedicated fighters for our freedom; yet others lean over backwards – they stir up chauvinistic feelings against Greeks, Turks and Serbs."

The trend was evident in the instructions for studying Bulgarian history where the stress was put on the conflict with the neighbours, many of whom still had co nationals living in the Principality.

That language is of paramount importance for the national identification goes without saying. According to Aristotle, language constitutes a fundamental distinction between humans and non humans.

Though the chance of inspectors being well read in the works of the Greek philosopher was slim indeed, serious attention was paid to the teaching of Bulgarian language. Serious but limited to those who were part or were considered apt to be drawn into the civic nation. That is to say, language was considered to be one of the most reliable means for recovering the lost national consciousness among "marginal groups" like Hellenised Bulgarians or Bulgarian speaking Moslems.

According to the prominent university professor and no less prominent Minister of Education Ivan Shishmanov: "Bulgaria is inhabited by a certain number of minorities which enjoy the political and civil rights bestowed to them by the constitution. For them the doors of our primary school are wide open, but to be of benefit to them, they should at least more or less know the official language. And this can be achieved in special preparatory classes or even better, in kindergartens."

This was, however an innovative thought that was not realized for almost a century.

RELIGION

Religious images, and religious differences are also fundamental in the division between the ethnic groups. Mircea Eliade claims that man is a religious being – *homo religious*. In his view 'we', the representatives of the new, of our religion, are fighting against the representatives of the outgoing cosmos, in our case the Turks or the Moslems as a whole and to a certain extent the Greeks.

No doubts troubled the minds of the authors of textbooks. For them a Bulgarian was a Slav who spoke the Bulgarian language and professed the Orthodox faith. Not by chance in the textbook *Father Tongue* by D. Manchov it was underlined: "Since that time the Bulgarians hold tight to their faith Christian and Orthodox. They will never betray it."

What about those who had betrayed it willy-nilly, who had embraced Islam? Were they Bulgarians? The answer is not clear. The right to be Bulgarians was not explicitly denied to the Bulgarian Catholics or Protestants although this was not expressed openly and the attitude towards them was rather condescending. In the geography textbooks their existence was only indicated without any comments. Bulgarian speaking Moslems constituted a knottier problem. As a rule, in the textbooks they were called Pomaks with the almost inevitable additional definition, Bulgarian Moslems. In other words in this case the linguistic element came first while the religious principle took second place. One of

the popular textbook authors emphasized that "the brighter and the braver Bulgarians were forced to turn Turk." In other words, those who changed their religion, passed over to another ethnos. (One is tempted to make the unpleasant conclusion that the less bright and brave clung to their Bulgarian identity)

This ambiguity was quite evident in literary works. In *A Bulgarian Woman* by the patriarch of modern Bulgarian literature Ivan Vazov, the defining line was drawn either on religious basis -- "*We are Christians*", explained the heroine of the story -- or on an ethnic basis -- "Oh, God, protect him, he is a Bulgarian, he has set off to offer himself as a scapegoat to defend Christian faith". The pathetic pages on the Batak massacre in G. Dimitrov's book, *The Principality of Bulgaria*, used in many places as a textbook, left little space for reconciliation: the word Pomak all but rhymed with the word 'savage'.

Even hazier was the question of the Bulgarians in Macedonia who still clung to the Greek Patriarchy. They were considered Bulgarians, although temporarily misled, but in textbooks the methods to be used to make them return to the lawful bosom of their motherland and become part of the civic nation, were carefully avoided. The silence or rather the lack of proclaimed intentions suggested that their return would be a natural process, which could hardly be prevented by small religious differences. Not by chance, one of the first geography textbooks underlined that, "The Bulgarians profess the Eastern Christian faith; they have their own church administration whose chief is the Bulgarian Exarch". There were no Patriarchists, according to the author and the Moslem Bulgarians were not even mentioned. Yet more significant was the statement that part of the Bulgarians in Macedonia "are still [sic] under the Greek Patriarchy".

The conclusion was obvious – differences were temporary and would wither away. All Bulgarians had to become part of the Orthodox nation. The most genuine Bulgarians, according to the educational system, were the Orthodox, followed by the Patriarchists in Macedonia and then by the Pomaks. The levels of the Bulgarian-ness were clearly defined.

The official holiday system imposed after the Liberation played a similar role, too. It comprised of the traditional Christmas, Resurrection of Christ, the Ascension of Christ, New year, Epiphany, the Annunciation, the Assumption, St. Dimitri's Day and St. Peter's Day, but there were also new holidays and old holidays filled with a new content, like the Liberation of Bulgaria, St. George's day, St. Cyril and Methodius, the Ascension to the Throne, the Independence of Bulgaria days. The state, regional and municipal institutions were closed down on the name day of Her Majesty the Queen, on Friday and on Saturdays of the Passion Week and on the days before Christmas and New Year. To remind the Moslems of what state they lived in, commercial public places in predominantly Moslem villages could stay open even during most of the holidays. The exceptions were three – for the Liberation and Independence of Bulgaria and the Ascension of H.M. the King to the Throne.

The Army was the institution which during these decades played an enormous and in many respects incomparable socializing role. In the army many recruits got their first lessons in literacy. Classes were provided in what nowadays we might call patriotic educa-

tion. It seems that the army command did not realize that according to the Constitution representatives of different nationalities were supposed to do their military service shoulder to shoulder. Henceforth the paradox -- both Bulgarians and Turks had to admire heroism of the leaders of the national revolution and to abhor the Pomaks, the destroyers of Batak in the eloquent patriotic interpretation of zealous junior commanders or master sergeants. It is true that half of the Moslems avoided military service by money payments, but it is also true that half of them served as solders.

Even one of the best historians of the time, Nikola Stanev in his *Short Bulgarian History,* prepared on purpose for soldiers, depicted the tragedy and the triumph of the April uprising in words that plainly show that he never thought that in the Bulgarian army Moslems served side by side with Bulgarians: "The Turks and the Pomaks assaulted the Bulgarian population, plundered its property, burnt down its villages and in Batak the Pomaks slaughtered the miserable Bulgarians on a stump in the middle of the village".

Mass culture. We shall not debate here on what is mass culture and what is a traditional one. At any event, many of the works written by the best Bulgarian writers turned into a part of the mass culture.

In the traditional culture the image of the non-Bulgarian neighbour comprised traditional negative elements but as a whole they were not very strong. The attitude towards both ethnic and religious minorities usually was slighting and hostile, although perhaps not at a concrete level.

The Wallachians were absent even in most of the stories written by Mihalaki Georgiev, born in the Vidin region[5]. Variations of the theme "dirty and thievish Wallachian" were words politicians used to vilify their political opponents in Northern Bulgarian newspapers.

In one of the folk songs from Liaskovo, in North Bulgaria, created around the Liberation and titled *A Brother in the Dungeon*, a Jewish maiden from Constantinople "a yellow kike sitting on a high veranda with pretty plank fences" begged Radka, a "white Bulgarian girl" to convince her brother Stoian, lying in prison, to take her as a wife. In return she promised to give him money. The brother refused; he preferred to lie in prison nine more years…. Radka urging him:

> I told you to marry her not to live with her!
> Take her, my brother, take her,
> We'll go to the seaside…. to wash her
> And into the sea we'll push her.

The derogative ethnonym 'kike' gained wide currency in the political squabbles. On the other hand, a young Jew who turned down a public office in order to study a trade was a positive example in a story by Ivan Vazov.

The attitude towards Greeks was always negative. Inherited from the religious conflicts of the National revival and influenced by the struggles in Macedonia, it never became civilized. This is proven by the wide-spread anti-Greek pogroms in 1906. Vazov defined one of his female characters as "a girl…half Bulgarian, half Greek with a Byzantine cunning". He pushed his readers towards the idea that the anti-Greek feelings were rooted in his-

The rise of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire

tory: "The Greek crimes in Macedonia had stirred up violent instincts... a hot atmosphere of hatred and rage that were both sincere and unquenchable... We were going through the passions of the era of Kaloian, the Greeks were burning with the brutal hatred of Vassilii the Bulgarian Slayer"

Newspapers and journals held the flag of anti Greek feelings high, but this is a separate and very relevant topic.

The attitude towards the Turks was ambiguous. It was not straightforwardly negative. Turks were duly blamed for their imperial past and its bloody crimes. In a popular story a mother from Macedonia was singing a lullaby: "Sleep, go to sleep, my baby! Your mother is an orphan. Your father is rebel. Evil Turks attacked the village, put the house on fire, murdered everyone". In the play R*ouska* by Vazov, the Turk is not even human.

> Ivan (scared) – *Whom did you kill! You have killed a man?*
> Rouska – *I did not kill a man.*
> Ivan – *But?...*
> R. (imploringly and slowly) – *I've killed a Turk! Uncle, do not betray me.*
> I. – *A Turk? ... Ah! You have killed a Turk.*
> R. – *The worst one! A damned brute!*

On the other hand, the Turks were given credit for certain noble qualities: "Ah, the Turks, damn it, are given both the splendour and the lordship...No, there was kindness in the Turks. They beat us but they cared for us, too...Merciful people they were. We are brutes, God forgive me!"

More subtle was the attitude towards the Bulgarian Mohammedans. In his travel notes *In the Womb of the Rhodope Mountains* Vazov alleged that their "eye looks towards Asia despite the government's concerns to nail them to the land of their fathers and grandfathers... They do not cherish the fatherland where the green prophet's flag is not flying, dominant over all others"

A certain desire to include them in the Bulgarian civic nation existed but it went together with a deep lack of confidence in its success. Vazov asked his guide, a Bulgarian Mohammedan, 'as if innocently': "Alyu, you are a Bulgarian, aren't you?" He answered to me in the affirmative with one muffled 'oh' and his face changed. And at once he began to speak of other things... After that short, dry 'oh' which resembled a growl I did not take the risk of asking my guide such questions ... This good Alyu is a wonderful man, calls the language of the Turks 'swine's language', his imam a 'priest', drinks brandy and wine, maybe he would eat bacon, too; he admits in his mind that he is a Bulgarian, but will never allow himself to be told that – a contradiction meaningless in a dark soul, caught in the strangling arm of fanaticism..."

Gypsies were absent except maybe as an Oriental though quite a shabby element of colour in the canvases of painters like I. Murkvichka, A. Mitov and J. Oberbauer. In a popular school reader compiled by Ivan Vazov and K. Velichkov and in the school aids of D. Manchov, gypsies were given a major role in a short story which tried to explain why they lied, begged and drank so much. On the other hand, in public discourse they were considered to be pliable enough to be an invariable element of political machinations and fraudulent elections.

THE SONGBOOKS

But the literary works listed so far have been traditionally considered an important instrument for shaping the mind of the public. On the other hand, collections of songbooks and almanacs, printed sometimes in tens of thousands of copies, up to now have been slighted by historians. Their role in shaping public ideology has been neglected.

The selection of the songs in a song book as a rule was patriotic. Along with standard texts of patriotic ballads like *Hadji Dimitar* and *The Hanging of Vassil Levski,* songs of the Macedonia insurgents ending with the appeal "Long live freedom!" were a must. They all breathed hatred towards 'the other' – be he a Serb, a Turk or a Greek – "the Greek-Turkish centuries-old yoke".

Often the verses were quite naïve but such as to influence a virgin mind: "But the angry Bulgarian chases with hair sweating and knife in hand the Serb to catch him... The Serb had robbed his brother. The Bulgarian rose up to smash the Serbian obstinacy".

The patriotic works were larded with fearful stories that decried the atrocities of the Turks. This is how the death of three Bulgarian shepherds in Macedonia was described in an almanac: "They are tied to one another... First they cut off their ears, then their noses and then the tortures become serious, Barbarian in cruelty. The Turks began their serious work. 'Let' skin their hands', their leader said...." And so on and so on.

And while it is hardly correct to mix the policy of the state with relations described in literature, art and folklore, we have to note that the authors and compilers were spokesmen of the prejudices of the society.

And in the end what was the image of the neighbour developed in those years? Some historians would say that it was the image of the enemy. In my opinion the conflict was not so sharp.

The enemy as a rule is connected with the fight between good and evil -- we can hardly use such categories in our situation – it is rather a difference between the 'enemy' and the 'friend' – the minority groups in Bulgaria gravitate between these two notions, with a definite unbalance toward the negative.

The image of the minorities, created in those years was more cognitive than affective. Usually it was distorted. The image of the minorities gives creates many opportunities for psychological, social-psychological and sociological research on the majority. I agree with the assertion of Karl Schmidt that the state is the institution which pinpoints the enemy and the friend. The easiest way to define the enemy is to show that he is fundamentally different from us. At the same time the differences were not always realized – in one and the same textbook the Bulgarian Mohammedans who slaughter the Bulgarians on a stump are enemies, and are alien and bad, while the Bulgarian ruler Khan Krum who cuts the heads of the Byzantines and drinks red wine in their skulls is good and is ours.

If we come back again to the arguments of Aristotle we will see that the members of the minority are not members of the *polis* or of the political society based on conscious and shared activity. They stand outside of it. Those who do not belong to political society are either beasts or gods – for explainable reasons ethnic and religious minorities could

become gods and the other alternative continued to exist no matter how much it was softened by civilization. Those who do not partake in the conscious and shared activity are not part of the society. They are a lawful prey, along with beasts.

The situation in Bulgaria correlates closely to the research of Michel Foucault who shows how the role of the other is to be excluded in the process of comparing his behaviour to that of the majority. The goal is to isolate the otherness, to limit it to where it can be monitored and controlled.

We should always remember that strict dichotomies are not always part of society. It prefers more neutral tones, chiaroscuro and shade effects.

As a rule the Bulgarian state and Bulgarian culture did not pay attention and did not show curiosity towards the ethnic and religious minorities. They were abandoned both by the Bulgarian state and society to live in a world of their own, moving slowly according to the traditional canons, a world in which modernity was always a novelty. From the Liberation to the Balkan Wars hundreds of towns and villages, pure Bulgarian or mixed, were renamed. Their Turkish names were exchanged for Bulgarian ones. The names of villages where the majority of inhabitants were Turks were left untouched as if to symbolize that they lived in their own world.

It is true that the minorities could develop a kind of a cultural life but it was only within the framework of their own community with almost with no meaningful contact with the dominant nation.

The official policy left a strong alien nucleus within the state. In other words, the modernization processes in Bulgaria, the ambition to create a modern citizen were not directed to the entire population but only to a part of it. Decades would pass before reaching the understanding that all citizens of the country should be equal participants in development of society.

On the other side, the situation was not much different in the other European countries at that time. We could hardly expect that the Bulgarians who wanted to fulfil their cherished national program would show the way in treating the minorities. As a contemporary poet says:

> I sentence you to death through indifference.....
> I sentence to death through distrust....
> I sentence you to death in order for me to live[6].

Notes

[1]   The title of this chapter is a paraphrase of two lines of one of the most popular poems of the 'national' poet, the 'patriarch' of Bulgarian literature Ivan Vazov (1850-1921). The lines in question in reality are: "To call Myself a Bulgarian is the Greatest Joy for me". Written in the 1880s and extolling the virtues of being a Bulgarian the poem has been included ever since in virtually every textbook for the small children.

[2]   In 1897 the ratio of literate recruits was 53% - among Jews the literate were 84%, among Armenians 80%, Bulgarians and Greeks 56%, Turks 5%, Roma 4%.

[3]   Minority schools:

Bulgarian catholic	5
Bulgarian protestant	7
Bulgarian Moslem	20
Turkish	1297
Greek	40
Jewish	33
Armenian	12
French	4
Tartar	54
German	1
Romanian	2
Lipovan	1
Catholic	6
Roma	1

[4]   The Bulgarian-speaking Moslems, living in general in the Rhodope mountains and North central Bulgaria, were known as Pomaks.

[5]   Many Romanians or Wallachians lived in this area.

[6]   V. Hanchev, *Sentence.*

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Spatial Representation of Power: Making the Urban Space of Ankara in the Early Republican Period

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Abstract

The proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 marks the beginning of a new era for Ankara which was proclaimed capital of the new nation-state. In parallel with the modernization efforts and nation-building strategies of the Republican government, Ankara, as the new capital, was intended to be constructed as a model city for the whole country. The aim was the creation of a modern cultural environment with new institutions, sociocultural practices and a new physical townscape. This study argues that making the urban space of Ankara based on a town planning practice should be seen as part of the Republican modernity project. The priorities of this project were represented by a comprehensive building programme that resulted in the emergence of diverse public buildings in the urban space of Ankara from the early years of the Republic. Within this context, this chapter aims to review the state-sponsored urban planning and architectural practices, representing the power of the new regime in the capital-making of Ankara, focussing on the single-party period from 1923 to the end of the 1940s.

Cumhuriyet'in ilan edildiği 29 Ekim 1923 tarihi, Türkiye için aynı zamanda geniş kapsamlı bir modernite projesinin de başlangıcını sembolize etmektedir. Erken Cumhuriyet dönemi modernite projesi, yıkılan bir imparatorluğun ardından ulus kimliğinin inşa edilmeye çalışıldığı, sosyal, kültürel, ekonomik ve politik boyutlarıyla çok yönlü bir modernleşme sürecini tanımlamaktadır. Bu süreçte, Cumhuriyet rejimi ile birlikte değişen kurumsal yapı ile değişen sosyal ve kültürel pratiklere paralel olarak, mekânsal stratejilere de büyük önem verilmiş ve tüm ülke için bir model-kent olması amaçlanan yeni başkent Ankara, Cumhuriyet'in ilk yıllarından itibaren hızlı bir değişim geçirmiştir. Bu çalışma, erken Cumhuriyet dönemi Ankarası'nın başkent olarak imarını, cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarından 1940'ların sonuna kadar olan dönemde devlet eliyle yürütülen kentsel planlama çalışmaları ve kapsamlı yapı programeına odaklanarak incelemektedir.

Ankara'nın ilk planı, Alman C.C.Lörcher tarafından 1924-25 yıllarında hazırlanmış ve Yenişehir Bölgesi'nin sonraki yıllarda kentsel biçimlenmesini büyük ölçüde belirlemiştir. Ancak, Lörcher planının, büyüyen kentin ihtiyaçlarını karşılamada yetersiz bulunması nedeniyle hükümet tarafından 1927 yılında uluslararası bir proje yarışması düzenlemiştir.

Yarışmayı kazanan Alman şehirci-mimar H.Jansen'in Ankara kenti imar planı, 1932 yılında resmen uygulamaya konmuştur. Plan, Ankara'nın tarihi kent merkezini, kentin "geleneksel" merkezi olarak korumuş ve kentin "modern" yüzünü, Yenişehir bölgesi için getirdiği önerilerle biçimlendirmiştir. Ankara'nın başkent olarak planlanması sürecinin modernliği, fonksiyonel olarak organize edilmiş düzenli bir kentsel strüktür getirmesinin yanı sıra, bu yapı içerisinde modern yaşamı destekleyen kentsel mekânlar önermesinden ileri gelmektedir. 1930'ların sonuna doğru Ankara geniş bulvarları, meydanları, parkları ve özelleşmiş yönetim, konut, endüstri ve rekreasyon alanları ile modern bir kent strüktürüne sahip olmuştur. Ancak bu süreç, giderek artan nüfus, paralelinde gelen düzensiz yerleşim sorunu, yetersiz teknik ve hukuki altyapı, planlama sürecine müdahale eden farklı aktörlerden kaynaklanan sorunlar gibi nedenlerle başta öngörülenden farklı gelişmeye başlamıştır. 1939'da Jansen'in sözleşmesinin feshi, Ankara'nın bu "en planlı" dönemi için bir kırılma noktası olmuştur.

Erken Cumhuriyet dönemi Ankarası'nın Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin modern başkenti olarak planlanması süreci, devlet eliyle yürütülen geniş kapsamlı bir yapı programmeı ile paralel ilerlemiştir. Bu programmeda öncelik, yeni ulus-devletin ve yeni rejimin erkini sembolize eden yapılar ile modern bir toplum yaşamını desteklemek üzere inşa edilen yapılara verilmiştir. Bu yapıların dönemsel olarak incelenmesi 1920'lerin sonundan itibaren eğitim, sağlık, yönetim ve finans yapıları ile sosyal ve kültürel programmeı yapıların yeni başkentin kentsel mekânının şekillenmesinde oynadıkları önemli rolü ortaya koymakta ve yeni rejimin politik, ekonomik ve sosyal modernite projelerindeki öncelikleri hakkında fikir vermektedir. Kentsel planlama pratikleri sonucu gelişen kentin özellikle Yenişehir bölgesinde inşa edilen bu yapılar, 1930'ların sonundan itibaren Türkiye'nin başkentinin çehresini değiştirmiş; dönemin modernist estetik anlayışı ile tasarlanarak yeni rejimin "asrileştirme" ve "medenileştirme" çabalarının araçları olarak görülmüşlerdir.

Introduction

The opening of the Grand National Assembly in 1920 and then the proclamation of the Turkish Republic on 29 October 1923 mark the beginning of a new era for Ankara as the capital city of the young Republic. In parallel with the modernization efforts and nation-building strategies of the Republican Government, Ankara, as the new capital in the making, was intended to become a model-city for the country. It was to become a modern cultural environment with new institutions, socio-cultural practices and a new physical landscape.

The relocation of the new Republican capital in Ankara symbolized not merely a transition from an Empire to a nation-state, but also marked a new era in Turkey's modernization attempts. Following the First World War and the National Independence War, the new Republican government embarked on a modernity project, to 'construct' the national identity and to create a modern socio-cultural and physical environment. Although it was inspired by Western modernity, Turkey's modernity project should be interpreted as a multi-sided national endeavour that evolved in parallel with the chang-

ing social, cultural, economic and political dimensions of the new republican regime[1]. This chapter argues that making the urban space of Ankara during the early Republican period was also a comprehensive spatial modernity project, which was characterized by the state-sponsored urban planning practices and new building programmes. At that period, constructing the urban space of Ankara according to the principles of town planning was actually a modern project that proposed a systematic approach to the organization of the urban functions of the new capital. The modernity of this project lies in the expectation that a modern public realm and the ways of a modern urban life would flourish through the proper organization of public spaces. The government executed a comprehensive building programme in parallel with the implementation of urban plans from the late 1920s. In this programme, the priority was given to the construction of administrative buildings symbolizing the power of the new regime, and to the educational, financial, social and cultural buildings, which were intended to support the institutional modernization as well as a modern social life.

Focusing on the single party period from 1923 until the end of the 1940s, this chapter aims to explicate the urban planning and architectural practices during Ankara's capital-making process. After examining the planning attempts and their results on the urban fabric of the new capital, the building activities, reflecting the social, cultural, educational, administrative and economic priorities in the republican multi-sided modernity project, will be studied chronologically.

The making of a new capital

It is obvious that there is a direct relationship between the building of a new state and its capital. According to Tankut, the making of a capital should be perceived as a state-sponsored political operation[2]. What is intended while planning a new capital is to create a symbol for a new political system and to realize different political and social operations. Besides its political character, a capital should also have a particular physical image that requires a planned urban development, impressive architectural expression and a standardized environment. Many scholars writing about the politics of urban planning argues that planned capitals should be conceived, first of all, as expressions of the "pride and glory" of nation building[3]. This is the pride and glory of making the capital "out of nothing"[4].

To be sure, Ankara was not a city that was created "out of nothing"; on the contrary, it had been settled since prehistoric times. Inhabited by a multi-cultural society, Ankara was an important production and commercial town of the Ottoman Empire throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, but lost its economic importance in the following century. Centred around its citadel, Ankara entered into the 20th century as a degraded, insignificant Anatolian town, which allowed republican administrators to implement their visions for a modern and contemporary capital.

Fig. 1
Ankara in the early 20th century.
Source: S. Türkoğlu Önge Archive.

PLANNING THE URBAN SPACE: TOWARDS A NEW CAPITAL

The declaration of Ankara as the new capital, and then the proclamation of a modern nation-state governed by a republic in October 1923 marked also the beginning of a

comprehensive spatial planning project for Ankara. Since it was envisioned by the re-publican administrators as a model-city for the whole country, planning attempts of Ankara started as a state-propelled initiative, for which the government was given by the Grand National Assembly large-scale administrative and fiscal power[5]. However, where to begin and how to execute a planning process were major questions that the republican government faced with in the early 20th century[6].

The foundation of *Mübadele, İmâr ve İskân Vekâleti* [Ministry of Population Exchange, Development and Settlement] in October 1923 can be accepted as the initial stage for an institutionalized and planned urbanization process for Republican Turkey. Just after its foundation, the Ministry prepared a situation report and outlined the general principles and urgent needs of the city as the reorganization of the municipality, preparation of a development plan, installation of a sewage system, water system and electricity network, provision of housing, construction of roads, transportation and financial support[7].

As stipulated in the programme, Ankara *Şehremaneti* [Municipality] was founded by law in 1924. According to *Şehremaneti* Law,

> The city of Ankara constitutes a *Şehremaneti* including the vineyards, gardens, fields and pas-tures inside the limits that will pass through the surrounding hills. This boundary is determined and the map of the city is prepared by the Municipality. This map becomes valid after its ap-proval by the Ministry of the Interior[8].

This was the 1924 *Şehremaneti* Map, which showed the current situation of Ankara.

Fig. 2
Şehremaneti Map.
Source: Archive of Turkish Grand National Assembly.

Actually, the initial attempts to prepare a development plan for Ankara started at the end of 1923. In December 1923, an Istanbul-centred enterprise with German capital, *Keşfiyat ve İnşaat Türk Anonim Şirketi* [*Société Anonyme Turque d'Études et d'Entreprises Urbaines*], was commissioned to prepare a survey report and a plan for the new capital. In May 1924, Carl Christoph Lörcher, the German architect working for this enterprise, submitted the first development plan of Ankara with a detailed report to the Municipality[9]. However, Lörcher's 1924 plan, comprising only the old part of the town, was rejected by the municipal commission because of the design ideas that it brought forward to transform the historical urban fabric[10].

In 1925, the Grand National Assembly passed an important law for the expropriation of 300 hectares of land located on the south of the railway for the future extension of the city.[11] In the same year, Lörcher was asked to prepare a new plan for the 150 hectares of land that had just been expropriated in Yenişehir [new town] area. By this plan, Lörcher brought new ideas on the urban plot-block organizations, infrastructure, planning of streets and public squares, building heights, etc. This plan was approved by the Municipal Commission because "the housing crisis dictated that residential construction begin immediately[12]." Lörcher's 1925 plan determined the planning and construc-

Fig. 3
The Lörcher Plan.
Source: Cengizkan, 2004.

tion of the Yenişehir area to a large extent in the following years[13]. However, due to the uncontrolled growth of the city, the plan was found out to be limited in size and scope, which forced the government towards new measures.

In May 1927, Ankara *Şehremaneti* sent a technical delegation to Berlin. Under the guidance of the Turkish Ambassador and the Mayor of Berlin, the Turkish envoys first-ly contacted an eminent professor of architecture and planning, Ludwig Hoffmann, who had prepared the extension plans of Athens, and asked him to prepare the develop-ment plan of Ankara. Hoffmann declinted to prepare such a long-term project, but he recommended Professor Hermann Jansen and Professor Joseph Brix, from the *Berliner Technische Hochschule*, for this important task[14].

On their return to Ankara, the delegation decided to organize a project competition with a limited number of participants. Since an international competition would re-quire larger funds and a complex organization, the republican government preferred to obtain the plans by way of a competition by invitation. In addition to the two German planners, they also invited a French architect-planner, Léon Jausseley, to prepare the plan for Ankara[15]. In July 1927, the three contestants were called to conduct field sur-veys in Ankara and they were given the necessary instructions and specifications about the scope of the project and three base maps of Ankara[16]. Six months after the submis-sion of the projects, in May 1929, the competition jury declared the proposal prepared by Professor Hermann Jansen the winner[17]. Upon winning the competition, Jansen was charged by the government with preparing detailed development plans for the capital, which was executed by approval of the Council of Ministers in 1932.

During the ongoing process of the competition, *Ankara İmar Müdürlüğü* [Directorate of Development of Ankara] was founded as a governmental institution affiliated to the Ministry of the Interior, the major responsibility of which was the successful applica-tion of the development plan of Ankara. According to its foundation law, the main executive board of this directorate was *İmar İdare Heyeti* [Commission of Develop-ment Management] that would be the major body responsible for the development of Ankara in the following decades[18].

The division of the town into functionally specialized zones, which was new to the Turkish urban landscape, was one of the most outstanding aspects of Jansen's planning proposal for Ankara. Around a main axis from north to south, these zones for administra-tive, residential, industrial, educational and recreational uses were separated by wide green belts and interconnected by a regular street network[19]. Jansen's conservative ap-proach was another principle in his plan, in which he defined Ankara's citadel and its immediate environment as a separate zone, representing the "traditional" pre-modern past of Ankara. The "modern", on the other hand, would be symbolized by the new town. Jansen envisioned the *Regierungs-Viertel* [government quarter] of the new Turk-ish Republic as a symbolic and spatial counterpoint to the citadel. Besides *Vekâletler Kartiyesi* [Ministries quarter] as the centre of the new town with modern governmental buildings, Jansen's *Siedlung* [settlement] approach for middle-and low density residen-

tial areas was also new to Turkish urban settlement patterns at that time. For these areas, the plan proposed 18 low-density quarters around the town, including houses with gardens or maximum three storey blocks on small parcels[20].

Gönül Tankut identifies the years between 1929 and 1939 as the "most planned period" of Ankara[21]. Following the pre-application period, the application period started with the approval of Jansen's plan in 1932 and lasted until the end of his contract at the end of 1938. This planning period had several actors, each of whom had leading

Fig. 4
The Jansen Plan.
Source: Mamboury, 1933.

roles during this process. The republican government, representing the administrative power, was the leading actor in Ankara's first planning period. The members of the Parliament, who made laws and regulations, controlled financial sources and gave political decisions on the city at macro and micro levels, were also influential figures. Ankara İmar Müdürlüğü and its decision mechanism, İmar İdare Heyeti, whose mission was to prepare the plans and control their application, had the principal responsibility in this process. Until its commitment to the Municipality in 1937, the directorate had been the most active and autonomous actor in Ankara's planning period and took many critical decisions on buildings, building lots, expropriation or local plan applications. The major role of the Municipality during this period was to develop and apply projects for the basic urban services. The planner, Hermann Jansen, in contact with *İmar İdare Heyeti,* several pressure and interest groups, and the citizens were other actors in this planning process[22].

Actually, the application of Ankara's Development Plan was a problematic process for several reasons. One of these was the lack of urban laws and regulations or the deficiencies of the existing ones[23]. Between the years 1932 and 1939, the Law of Building and Roads had been the only law in force. Though a few regulations had been enacted defining the principles of building and road construction and urban plot-block arrangements, they were not sufficiently effective for the implementation of Jansen's plan. The technical problems arouse from the absence or defective implementation of plans or cadastral maps; fiscal problems and the communication problems between the planner and decision mechanisms of the government were other issues during this process.

The end of the 1930s was a breaking point in the planning process of Ankara. In parallel with the increasing needs for housing due to unpredicted demographic growth of the capital, the urban space of Ankara was subject to a substantial transformation, which followed a different path than was proposed and predicted by Jansen. Parallel to uncontrolled demographic growth from the 1930s, illegally developed settlement areas, i.e. squatter areas, began to emerge in different parts of the city. Moreover, as a result of increasing speculations on the urban fabric, which were particularly focussed on the new areas around Yenişehir and Çankaya, Ankara began to expand beyond the limits of the Jansen plan. In September 1938, the government decided to enlarge the boundaries of Ankara's development plan from 1500 ha to 16,000 ha. According to Yavuz, this was the greatest achievement of the speculators, most of whom were members of parliament, bureaucrats and wealthy residents of Ankara[24]. Following the decision on the enlargement of the boundaries of the city, the Municipal Commission cancelled Jansen's contract in December 1938. Being in a critical political and economic conjuncture on the eve of the oncoming World War, this marked the beginning of a new era for the Republic, and the end of the "most planned period" of Ankara.

CONSTRUCTING THE CAPITAL: THE NEW BUILDING PROGRAMME OF THE REPUBLIC

It should be pointed out that planning the new capital of the Republic according to the principles of an urban plan was actually a modern project at that period. The modernity of this project lies in its systematic approach to the organization of a functional urban structure. Within this structure, a public realm and modern ways of life were expected to flourish by the creation of public spaces such as large boulevards, squares, recreation areas, and the organization of specialized administrative, residential and industrial areas. As a result of these planning activities, Ankara began to reflect a modern city image from the 1930s[25].

In parallel with the planning practices of the new capital, the Republican state executed a comprehensive building programme that should be seen as the tools of the social, cultural, administrative and economic modernization attempts of the new regime. What was intended in this programme is to disseminate modern ways of life to the nation, as well as to construct the model city for the new Republic. The building programme of the early republican period focused on the construction of social, educational, financial, governmental and cultural buildings, which had been emerged in the public space of Ankara as the symbols of the new regime from the early 1920s[26]. Within this context, examining these architectural practices in a chronological order so as to see to which building groups were given priorities through the ongoing social, administrative and economic modernization attempts of the Republic may be useful.

Around the years following its declaration as the new administrative centre of the new Republican State, Ankara was still confined within the limits of the old city around the citadel. Therefore, the architectural practices meeting the urgent needs of a changing order in the early years of the Republic took place in and around these spatial limits. The first buildings constructed in the new capital in the 1920s were the administrative ones that were the first National Assembly (1924), *Maliye Vekâleti* [Ministry of Finance] (1925), *Adliye Sarayı* [Hall of Justice] (1925-26) and *Hariciye Vekâleti* [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (1927). Following the opening of new development areas by the 1925 Lörcher plans on the south, a new street, *Bankalar Caddesi* [Avenue of Banks], was opened between Taşhan Square and the southern edge of the city, on which the first bank buildings, *Osmanlı Bankası* [Ottoman Bank] (1926), *Ziraat Bankası* [Bank of Agriculture] (1926-29) and *İş Bankası* [Bank of Business] (1926), were constructed as the earliest financial buildings of the capital[27].

The institutional and architectural modernization attempts for educating the nation had a priority in the Republican nation-building strategies, among which the acceptance of *Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu* [The Law for the Unification of Education] for a secular national education system – instead of a religious based system – and the acceptance of the Latin alphabet were the first acts. Within this ideological agenda, a special importance was given to the construction of new school buildings, *Halkevleri* [People's Houses] and other centres, housing educational, social and cultural activities. The Ethnography Museum (1925-27) and People's House (first built as *Türkocağı*)

Fig. 5
Ankara in the 1930s. Kızılay Square and Atatürk Boulevard (above); Istasyon Street towards the old city centre (below).
Source: Sözen-Tapan, 1973.

Fig. 6
Bankalar Street.
Source: Sözen-Tapan, 1973.

(1927-30), located on the southern edge of old Ankara, were two early examples of buildings representing the priority of education in Republican social modernization plans[28].

Following the invitation of Hermann Jansen to prepare the plan of Ankara in 1927, the government invited many foreign architects and planners to Turkey in order to formulate the new building programme of the Republic along the principles of European modernist architecture of that period[29]. These architects, most of which were from German-speaking countries, not only designed most of the state-sponsored buildings in the capital, but also taught architecture and urban planning in the Academy of Fine Arts and, then, in Istanbul Technical University, until the 1950s[30]. According to Bozdoğan, these foreigners became the true 'architects' of Republican Turkey, as they played key roles in the development of architectural education in the universities and generated the architectural culture of the period in Turkey[31].

Parallel to the development of Yenişehir area first along Lörcher's and then Jansen's plan from the end of 1920s, many education buildings, most of which were designed by these foreign architects, began to emerge in the urban scene of Ankara, particularly around these new developing areas. In terms of their architectural characteristics and specialized programmes, these buildings became the physical symbols of both the spatial and social modernity projects of the Republic. The first and most outstanding education buildings of Ankara were designed by a Swiss architect, Ernst Egli, who was

appointed as the consultant of the Ministry of Education and became the head of the Department of Architecture of the Academy of Fine Arts in 1930. Besides his mission at the Academy, Egli designed *Musiki Muallim Mektebi* [State Conservatory of Music] (1927-29), *Ticaret Lisesi* [High School of Commerce] (1928-30), *Yüksek Ziraat ve Baytar Enstitüsü* [Higher Agricultural and Veterinary Institute] (1928-33), *İsmet Paşa Kız Enstitüsü* [İsmet Paşa Girls' Institute] (1930), *Mülkiye Mektebi* [Faculty of Political Sciences] (1935-36) and *Türkkuşu Sivil Havacılık Okulu* [Türkkuşu School of Civil Aviation] (1937-38) as the early examples of the Modernist [Modern Style] architecture in the new capital[32]. *Hıfzısıhha Okulu* [School of Hygiene] (1928-32) by Robert Oerley, *Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi* [Faculty of Humanities] (1937-39) by Bruno Taut, Cebeci and Atatürk High Schools (1938) by Bruno Taut and Franz Hillinger and the Faculty of Law (1938-40) by a Turkish architect, Recep Akçay, were other important educational buildings that were erected in Ankara in the early Republican Period[33].

The construction of health buildings in Ankara from the 1920s onwards should also be related to the priorities of the Republican modernization programme, in which the qualities of "health" and "youth" were idealized as the symbols of the new modern nation-state[34]. *Sıhhat ve İçtimai Muavenet Vekâleti* [Ministry of Health and Social Aid] (1926-27), designed by a foreign architect, Theodor Jost, was the first governmental building that was constructed in the new part of the city, Sıhhıye. In this area, the initial planning criteria of which was determined by 1925 Lörcher plan, two more health buildings were constructed just after the construction of the Ministry. These are *Refik Saydam Hıfzısıhha Enstitüsü ve Okulu* [Refik Saydam Hygiene Institute and School] (1928-32), and Numune Hospital (1933) that were designed by Theodor Jost and Robert Oerley as early Modernist examples in the Republican building programme[35]. In the years after the 1950s, Sıhhıye region became a specialized area where many hospitals were erected as indispensable facilities of a modern urban life.

Parallel to the continuing institutional reforms for the new administrative order of the Republican regime, the state-propelled building programme proceeded with the construction of governmental buildings. From the early 1930s, the triangular urban block that was proposed by Jansen as *Vekâletler Kartiyesi* [Government Complex] on the southernmost end of Yenişehir area was to become the administrative centre of the new state. The government commissioned the projects of almost the entire Government Complex to an Austrian architect, Clemens Holzmeister. He designed his first governmental buildings, the *Milli Müdafaa Vekâleti* [Ministry of National Defence] (built in 1928-31) and *Erkân-ı Harbiye Reisliği Dairesi* [General Staff Headquarters] (built in 1929-30) in 1927, at his office in Vienna. However, since the development plan of Ankara was not definite at that time, these two buildings were constructed on a vacant site in the countryside, next to which the triangular urban block of *Vekâletler Kartiyesi* would later be planned[36]. After the approval of the Jansen plan in 1932, Holzmeister designed the administrative buildings of the Government Complex, which were the *Dahiliye Vekâleti* [Ministry of the Interior] (1932-34), *Nafia Vekâleti* [Ministry of Public Works] (1933-34), *İktisat ve Ziraat Vekâleti* [Ministry of Economy and Agriculture]

Fig. 7
New education buildings of Ankara. Ismet Paşa Girls' Institute (above); Faculty of Humanities
(below).
Source: Sözen-Tapan, 1973.

(1934-35) and *Yargıtay* [Court of Appeal] (1930)[37]. Nevertheless, Holzmeister's most important building in Ankara is *Büyük Millet Meclisi – Kamutay* [Grand National Assembly]. The project was selected as one of the three first prize winners of the international competition held in 1937. Of the three first prize-winning projects, all of which presented an imposing and monumental official aspect, the government decided to implement Holzmeister's project as the new Grand National Assembly Building of the Turkish Republic. The construction process started in 1938; however, since it was interrupted during the years of the Second World War, the building could only be completed in 1960[38].

Fig. 8
Jansen's *Regierungs-Viertel* (left); Holzmeister's Grand National Assembly Building Project (right).
Sources: Cengizkan, 2004, and "Arkitekt", no. 4, 1938.

Within the ideological agenda of the republican revolutions, economical and industrial development was seen as one of the major driving force behind the social modernity project. Therefore, in order to meet the requirements of developing building and industrial sectors and to encourage the investments in these sectors, the state established several public banks from the early 1930s, which resulted in the emergence of new finance buildings in the urban fabric of the capital[39]. What was interesting is that although the governmental quarter was developed in the Yenişehir area, these buildings were all constructed in the old part of Ankara, as the commercial centre of the city was located there. Concomitant with other bank and finance buildings, being constructed in the 1920s, the construction of the buildings of *Divan-ı Muhasebat* [Court of Public Accounts] (1930) designed by Ernst Egli, the Central Bank (1931-33) and *Emlak ve Eytam Bankası* [Bank of Estate] (1933-34) by Clemens Holzmeister, *Etibank* (1935-36) by Sami Arsev, *Belediyeler Bankası* [Bank of Municipalities] by Seyfi Arkan and

Sümerbank (1937-38) by Martin Elsaesser transformed this part of the city into the financial centre of Ankara[40].

The Republican government placed special importance on the construction of social and cultural gathering places that were meant to support a modern urban life and to play a significant role in nation building. *Sergi Evi* [The Exhibition Hall] that was designed by Şevki Balmumcu was the most prominent of these buildings. From its completion in 1934, *Sergi Evi* became the symbol of Republican modernization attempts in the public space of the capital[41]. From the mid 1930s, a number of sports buildings and open public recreation areas were built in Ankara. The 19 Mayıs Stadium (1934-1936), designed by an Italian architect, Paolo Vietti-Violi, *Gençlik Parkı* [Youth Park] (1936-37) and Çubuk Dam Recreation Area and Casino (1937-38) planned by a French architect, Théo Leveau, and *Atatürk Orman Çiftliği* [The model farm and forest of Atatürk] were the most significant recreation areas in Ankara at that period[42]. According to Bozdoğan, these spaces, introduced within the socio-cultural context of the early republican period, became truly popular and were where people of all ages came "to stroll, to see, and to be seen"[43].

Fig. 9
The Exhibition Hall (*Sergi Evi*).
Source: S. Türkoğlu Önge Archive.

By the 1930s, communication and transportation played a significant role in the agenda of the Republican state, where the construction of railways and station buildings became one of the major enterprises. Within this context, the Central Railway Station and *Gar Gazinosu* [Station Casino] buildings, which were designed by Şekip Akalın and constructed between the years 1935 and 1937, formed an "impressive" entrance gate to the new capital[44].

The death of Atatürk on 10 November 1938 and the cancellation of Jansen's contract one month later was a breaking point for the planning process of Ankara and for the comprehensive building programme of the Republican Government. During the 1940s, the construction of public buildings was decelerated due to the economic difficulties of the War period. On the other hand, parallel to the unpredicted demographic growth of the capital, the building activities in Ankara tended towards housing construction, which was widely directed by the private sector. Besides the continuing construction of the Grand National Assembly, the most important investment in the building programme of the Republican government during the 1940s was the building of the mausoleum of Atatürk, *Anıtkabir* [Monument-Tomb]. In 1942, an international project competition was held for *Anıtkabir*. The first prize-winning project, which was designed by two Turkish architects, Orhan Arda and Emin Onat, was built and completed in 1955. From its completion, *Anıtkabir* was identified with Ankara and has since been the symbolic monument-building of the capital of the Turkish Republic[45].

The building programme of the Republican government represents the priority given to the educational, social and cultural domains for the formation of a modern society. In this context, architecture was perceived as the most significant medium to symbolize the modernity of the new Republican regime. Within the architectural agenda of the early republican period, the public buildings were mostly described as the symbols of the power of state. As Sedad Hakkı Eldem stressed in one of his articles, "the Revolution should have the power to express its own character and should have a style compatible with its importance"[46]. In most cases, it was a Modernist architectural style that was used in the public buildings to represent the power of the state and its social and spatial modernization attempts.

The architectural tendencies in the very early years of the Republican period reflected a national style, which is also seen as the continuation of Ottoman neo-classicism in Turkish architectural historiography. However, this revivalist nationalist approach became obsolete and lost its importance from the end of the 1920s, parallel with the invitation of European architects to design the public buildings of the new capital. According to Bozdoğan, what these architects brought to the Turkish architectural agenda in that period was an "austere, heavy and official-looking modernism"[47]. At one side of this modernism, the impacts of the "Viennese" school, using the aesthetic features of neo-classical architecture, were dominant. Particularly, most of the governmental buildings – such as Holzmeister's Grand National Assembly, General Staff Headquarters or ministerial buildings in *Vekâletler Kartiyesi* – or some of the school buildings are typical of this architectural style[48]. With their crushing monumental masses, these buildings

were erected as the symbols of Republican power in the public space of Ankara from the early 1930s. In other cases, the "modernism" of the Republican architecture at that period referred to the aesthetic features of the "Modern Movement" or "International Style" that was pioneered by the Bauhaus and the CIAM [International Congress of Modern Architecture] in Europe. This style, entailing a functional-rational planning approach by means of using pure vertical and horizontal architectural forms, was identified as *kübik* [cubic], *yeni* [new] or *asrî* [modern] within Turkish architectural discourse from the 1930s[49]. In this context, Ernst Egli was the first European architect to introduce "new architecture" into Turkey. His school buildings were praised as early modernist examples in the public space of Ankara. His appointment at the head of the Department of Architecture of the Academy of Fine Arts also resulted in a modernist transformation of the architectural curricula of the Academy, which also influenced the first-generation architects of the Republic. In the following years, the buildings of these architects – such as the *Sergi Evi*, Station Casino or Bank of the Municipalities – emerged as the modernist contributions to the new capital by young Turkish architects. From the end of the 1930s, however, the search for a "modern Turkish style" by means of using more "national" or "regionalist" forms began to dominate the architectural discourse[50]. This attempt at "Nationalizing the Modern", which was adopted by many of the Turkish architects during the 1940s, is identified by Bernd Nicolai as an "International National Style"[51].

CONCLUSION

The making of the urban space of Ankara according to the principles of an urban plan was actually a modern process that was supported by a comprehensive building programme in the early Republican period. What makes this process modern was its systematic approach towards a functionally organized urban space, in which the public spaces – such as the large boulevards, squares or recreation areas – were planned to supply the needs of a modern social life and enhance a public realm. Parallel to these planning practices, the building programme of the government, as part of the republican spatial modernity project, began to change the public space of Ankara, from the 1930s. Examining the emergence of these buildings from a historical perspective, it can be seen that from the 1920s, the architectural practices in the capital were focused on the construction of educational, governmental, financial and cultural buildings in parallel with the priorities of republican social, administrative and economic modernization attempts. Symbolizing the new regime and imposing – or at least suggesting – modern ways of life to the society, these buildings were used as the tools of the republican project of modernity.

Obviously, it was a courageous attempt if the lack of experience of the administrators and poor economic conditions and deficiencies in legal, technical and administrative mechanisms of the early republican period are considered. Looking back to this period from today, the spatial modernity project that was conducted parallel to social modernization attempts can be identified as a successful project while creating a model city

for the country, in parallel with the revolutionary ideology of the new regime. However, from the 1940s, the urban space of Ankara began to develop in a different way from what was initially intended. As a result of uncontrolled demographic growth, illegal squatter areas began to emerge outside the proposed limits of the city. Moreover, the rising speculative demands, which were mostly coming from the bureaucratic elites and wealthy residents of the capital, resulted in an unplanned urbanization from north to south, particularly around Yenişehir and Çankaya. In this period, the building programme shifted from the public buildings towards the construction of housing in different parts of the city. After the 1950s, the urban fabric of Ankara was transformed far more than it had been by the early republican interventions. Though the main lines of the modern capital of Turkey were drawn by these early interventions, Ankara, with its over 4 million residents, has a more complex urban structure today.

Notes

1   This was epitomized as "to be Western in spite of the West" in the discourses of the era as an expression of the modernism of the *Kemalist* ideology. İ. Tekeli, *Modernite Aşılırken Kent Planlaması*, Istanbul 2001, p. 23.

2   By comparing Ankara, Canberra, Brasilia and Islamabad, which were four newly established planned capitals in the 20th century, Tankut analyzes physical, social and political components of a capital-making process. G. Tankut, *Bir Başkentin İmarı: Ankara 1929-1939*, Istanbul 1993, pp. 21-38.

3   *Ibid.*, p. 45; L. Vale, *Architecture, Power and National Identity,* New Haven 1992, pp. 56-162.

4   S. Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building, Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic*, Seattle - London 2001, p. 68.

5   "As established by our Constitution, Ankara is the administrative centre of the Republic of Turkey. To build in Ankara a government seat worthy of an advanced state, by outfitting it with the necessary infrastructure, sanitary and scientific dwellings, and other essentials of civilization is one of the most vital duties of our government as authorized and sanctioned by the Grand National Assembly." This text was translated by Zeynep Kezer from the Assembly Record [Zabıt Ceridesi] dated 25 February 1341/1925. Z. Kezer, *The Making of a National Capital, Ideology and Socio-Spatial Practices in Early Republican Ankara,* Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Berkeley 1992, p. 42.

6   The urban modernization project was introduced into the Ottoman Empire from the second half of the 19th century, in parallel to the developments in the West. In the second half of the 19th century, a few building regulations [*ebniye nizamnamesi*] were executed to solve the problems of the Ottoman cities. However, the planning attempts developing around these regulations mostly remained as local solutions, such as the re-planning of the conflagration areas, widening of the roads or planning of the immigrant quarters. In any case, the lack of organized institutions, the economic deficiencies, as well as the existing habits were the major constraints that made these planning attempts incremental. For a detailed evaluation of the urban planning practices in the late 19th and early 20th centuries European and Ottoman cities, see İ. Tekeli, *Türkiye'de Kent Planlamasının Tarihsel Kökleri* [Historical Roots of Urban Planning in Turkey], in T. Gök (ed.), *Türkiye'de İmar Planlaması* [Urban Planning in Turkey], Ankara 1980, pp. 8-112.

7   A. Cengizkan, *Ankara' nın İlk Planı, 1924-25 Lörcher Planı*, Ankara 2004, pp. 17-18, 158-159.

8   "[...] *Ankara şehri kendisine tabi olan bağ, bahçe, tarla ve otlakları içeride kalmak üzere tepelerden geçirilecek hududuyla bir şehremaneti teşkil eder. Bu hudut Cemiyet-i Umumiye-i Belediye tarafından tespit ve*

haritası tanzim edilir. Bu harita Dâhiliye Vekâletince tasdik olunduktan sonra kesinleşir [...]" M. Sarıoğlu, *Ankara-Bir Modernleşme Öyküsü,* Ankara 2001, p. 35.

9   Cengizkan, *Ankara' nın İlk Planı* cit., pp. 35-36, 158-159.

10   Tankut, *Bir Başkentin İmarı* cit., p. 54.

11   F. Yavuz, *Ankara'nın İmarı ve Şehirciliğimiz*, Ankara 1952, pp. 18-24. For further information on this large-scale expropriation, see also: Tankut, *Bir Başkentin İmarı* cit., pp. 53-54; Tekeli, *Türkiye'de Kent* cit., p. 55.

12   T.C. Ankara Şehremaneti, *Ankara Şehrinin Profesör M. Jausseley, Jansen ve Brix Tarafından Yapılan Plan ve Projelerine Ait İzahnameler*, Ankara 1929, p. 3.

13   For a comprehensive study on Lörcher and his plans for Ankara, see Cengizkan, *Ankara' nın İlk Planı* cit.

14   Tankut, *Bir Başkentin İmarı* cit., p. 66; Yavuz, *Ankara' nın İmarı* cit., p. 24; T.C. Ankara Şehremaneti, *Ankara Şehrinin* cit., p. 3.

15   Yavuz, *Ankara' nın İmarı* cit., pp. 25-26.

16   These were the 1924 *Şehremaneti* plan in 1/4000 scale and the 1924 and 1925 Lörcher plans in 1/2000 and 1/1000 scales, respectively. For further information, see: Cengizkan, *Ankara' nın İlk Planı* cit., pp. 105, 211; Tankut, *Bir Başkentin İmarı* cit., p. 67; T.C. Ankara Şehremaneti, *Ankara Şehrinin* cit., pp. 4-6.

17   According to Gönül Tankut, the projects were evaluated in three stages. The preliminary evaluation was made by a jury constituted by three persons, who were most probably the members of *İmar İdare Heyeti*. The jury in the second stage had 26 members from different occupations such as parliamentarians, architects and engineers. In the last stage, the projects were evaluated by a six-member commission and the winner was declared on 16 May 1929. Having heard from one of the jury members, Fehmi Yavuz suggested that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was personally involved with the evaluation of the projects and approved the Jansen plan as the winner. In his memoirs, Falih Rıfkı Atay, who was a jury member in all three stages as the director of *İmar İdare Heyeti*, also stated that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk personally examined all the plan proposals and declared the first place of Prof. Jansen's plan. F.R.Atay, *Çankaya: Atatürk Devri Hatıraları*, Ankara 1958, p.380; Tankut, *Bir Başkentin İmarı* cit., pp. 75-77; Yavuz, *Ankara' nın İmarı* cit., p. 37.

18   *Ibid*., pp. 38-42.

19   The western parts of this artery were planned as an industrial zone [*Industrie-Viertel*], while the eastern parts would be the education zone [*Hochschul-Viertel*]. The government quarter [*Regierungs-Viertel*] was positioned to the south of the citadel, between the educational and industrial zones. The residential areas in Jansen's plan were dispersed around the town in a way that the new officials of republican government would be located around the administrative quarter, while the workers would live to the northwest. H. Jansen, *Ankara İli İmar Planı*, Istanbul 1937, pp. 6-7.

20   The total area of these residential quarters in Jansen plan was foreseen as 1475 hectares for 271.000 inhabitants. Tankut, *Bir Başkentin İmarı* cit., pp. 79-82.

21   G. Tankut, *Ankara İmar Planı Uygulamasının 1929-1939 Arasındaki Dikkat Çeken Verileri* [The Significant Remarks during the implementation of Ankara's Development Plan between 1929-1939], in Y. Yavuz (ed.), *Tarih İçinde Ankara II*, Ankara 2001, p. 10.

22   Tankut, *Bir Başkentin İmarı* cit., Ch. 3 analyzes these actors in detail.

23   *Ibid*., pp. 159-161.

24   Yavuz, *Ankara' nın İmarı* cit., p. 65. For further information about the speculations on urban space, see: T. Şenyapılı, *Baraka'dan Gecekonduya. Ankara'da Kentsel Mekanın Dönüşümü: 1923-1960*, 2004, p. 111; S. Aydın, K. Emiroğlu, E.D. Özsoy, Ö. Türkoğlu (eds.), *Küçük Asya'nın Bin Yüzü: Ankara* 2005, pp. 393-396.

25 About the urban planning ideology in the early republican period, see also F.C. Bilsel, *Ideology and urbanism during the early republican period: two master plans for Izmir and scenarios of modernization*, in "METU Journal of Faculty of Architecture", 1997, 16, 1-2, pp. 13-30.

26 For the relationship between the nation building strategies of the Republican government and architectural discourse of the period, see Bozdoğan, *Modernism* cit.; E.A. Ergut, *Making a National Architecture: Architecture and the Nation-State in Early Republican Turkey*, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1999.

27 İ. Aslanoğlu, *Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Mimarlığı 1923-1938,* Ankara 2001, pp. 30-39, 115-137, 240-262; M.Sözen, M.Tapan, *50 Yılın Türk Mimarisi,* Istanbul 1973, pp. 99-165.

28 Aslanoğlu, *Erken Cumhuriyet* cit., pp. 194-196, 200-201; Bozdoğan, *Modernism* cit., pp. 87-97.

29 *Teşvik-i Sanayi Yasası* [Law for the Encouragement of Industry], which was passed in 1927, also gave the foreign architects and planners opportunity to work in Turkey. Aslanoğlu, *Erken Cumhuriyet* cit., p. 55.

30 According to Bozdoğan, there were more than 200 German, Austrian and Swiss academics who occupied important positions in the universities in Ankara and Istanbul. Some 40 of them were architects and planners who worked in Turkey as instructors, consultants, administrators and planners and played key roles in the making of Ankara and the construction of public buildings. Most of these architects and planners were refugees who opposed the National Socialist Regime in Germany and left their countries due to the oncoming World War. For further studies on these German-speaking architects and planners, see: Bozdoğan, *Modernism* cit., p. 71; E. Hirsch, *Anılarım: Kayzer Dönemi Weimar Cumhuriyeti Atatürk Ülkesi*, trans. F. Suphi, Ankara 2000; F. Neumark, *Boğaziçine Sığınanlar. Türkiye'ye İltica Eden Alman İlim, Siyaset ve Sanat Adamları, 1933*-1953, trans. Ş.A. Bahadır, Istanbul 1982; B. Nicolai, *Moderne und Exil: Deutschsprachige Architekten in der Türkei, 1925–1955*, Berlin 1998.

31 Bozdoğan identifies the architecture of the period as the *İnkılâp Mimarisi* [Architecture of Revolution] and gives a particular attention to the binary oppositions such as old/new, traditional/modern or progressive/reactionary while construing the period. Bozdoğan, *Modernism* cit., ch. 2.

32 İ. Aslanoğlu, *Ernst A. Egli: Mimar, Eğitimci, Kent Plancısı*, in "Mimarlık", 1984, pp. 11-12, 15-19.

33 B. Taut, *Mimari Bilgisi*, Istanbul 1938; Aslanoğlu, *Erken Cumhuriyet* cit., pp. 184-191.

34 Bozdoğan, *Modernism* cit., p. 75.

35 Aslanoğlu, *Erken Cumhuriyet* cit., pp. 122, 209-213; Y. Yavuz, *Ankara'da Mimari Biçim Endişeleri* [The Concerns of Architectural Form in Ankara], in "Mimarlık", 1973, 11-12, p. 29.

36 Aslanoğlu, *Erken Cumhuriyet* cit., pp. 126-127, 153-154.

37 *Ibid.*, pp. 128-136.

38 In the competition, the projects of the Austrian architect Clemens Holzmeister, the French Albert Laprade and the Hungarian Alois Mezara were given the first prize of the 14 projects. The implementation of Holzmeister's project as the new Grand National Assembly Building was decided by Atatürk himself. *Kamutay Müsabakası Programmeı Hülasası (1.Ödül: Clemens Holzmeister)* [The Summary of the Programme of Grand National Assembly Competition (1st Prize: Clemens Holzmeister), in "Arkitekt", 1938, 4, pp. 99-132; *Yeni Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Binası* [New Turkish Grand National Assembly Building], in "Arkitekt", 1948, 4, pp. 38-39.

39 Aslanoğlu, *Erken Cumhuriyet* cit., pp. 47-54, makes a general evaluation of Turkey's economic conditions between the years 1932 and 1938.

40 Aslanoğlu, *Erken Cumhuriyet* cit., pp. 251-262.

41 E.A. Ergut, *Building to Exhibit (for) the Nation: The Exhibition Building in Ankara*, in M.Ghandour, et al. (eds.), "Sites of Recovery, Architecture's (Inter)disciplinary Role. Proceedings. 4th International Other Connections Conference", Beirut, 25-28 October 1999, pp. 115-124.

42 P. Vietti-Violi, *Les installations sportives d'Ankara,* in "La Turquie Kémaliste", 1936, 13, p. 12; *Ankara Gençlik Parkı*, in "Nafıa İşleri Mecmuası", 1935, 3, pp. 35-37.

[43] Bozdoğan, *Modernism* cit., p. 79.

[44] E. Şevket, *Avrupa'nın En Modern İstasyonu Ankara Garı* [Ankara Station: The Most Modern Station of Europe], in "Yedigün", 1939, 325, p. 15.

[45] Sözen, Tapan, *50 Yılın Türk Mimarisi* cit., pp. 246-47 makes a general evaluation and lists the articles on the *Anıtkabir* Project competition.

[46] S.H. Eldem, *Milli Mimari Meselesi*, in "Arkitekt", 1939, 9-10, pp. 220-221.

[47] Bozdoğan, *Modernism* cit., p. 72.

[48] From the second half of the 1930s, neo-classical architecture became the official style in some western countries, particularly in Germany, and it was used to express the political ideology of their regimes. According to Albert Speer, neo-classicism, a style particular to that period, is not a characteristic style for totalitarian regimes. However, it cannot be denied that from the end of the 1930s, neoclassicism was the most favoured style for the design of public buildings, which were seen by these regimes as the propaganda media and symbols of their powers. A. Speer, *Inside the Third Reich,* New York 1970, p. 130.

[49] The architectural tendencies and discussions during the early years of Republic were propagated by several periodicals, among which "Arkitekt" (1935-1945), "Mimar" [Architect], (1931-1934), "Mimarlık" [Architecture], *(1948-1974)*, "La Turquie Kémaliste" (1930s) and the official newspaper of the state, "Hakimiyet-i Milliye" [National Sovereignty] were prominent ones. For some of the articles that had an impact on the Turkish architectural agenda during 1930s, see: *Yeni Mimari: Mimarlık Aleminde Yeni Bir Esas*, in "Hakimiyet-i Milliye", 2 January1930; Mimar Behçet ve Bedrettin, *Türk İnkılap Mimarisi*, in "Mimar", 1933, 9-10, pp. 265-266; Mimar Behçet ve Bedrettin, *Yeni ve Eski Mimarlık*, in "Mimar", 1934, 6, p. 175; B.Ünsal, *Zamanımız Mimarlığının Morfolojik Analizi,* in "Arkitekt", 1937, 7, p. 204.

[50] İ. Aslanoğlu, *1928-1946 Döneminde Ankara'da Yapılan Resmi Yapıların Mimarisinin Değerlendirilmesi* [Architectural Evaluation of the Official Buildings Built in Ankara in the Period 1928-1948], in A.T. Yavuz (ed.), in *Tarih İçinde Ankara* [Ankara in History], Ankara 2000, pp. 275-277; E.A. Ergut, *Searching for a National Architecture: The Architectural Discourse in Early Republican Turkey*, in "Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Working Paper Series", 2000-2001, 130, pp. 101-126. See also Eldem, *Milli Mimari* cit., pp. 220-221. S.H.Eldem, *Yerli Mimariye Doğru,* in "Arkitekt", 1940, 3, pp. 69-74; A. Mortaş, *Modern Türk Mimarisi*, in "Arkitekt", 1941, pp. 5-6, 116.

[51] Bozdoğan, *Modernism* cit., chapter 6 identifies the architectural attempts of this period as "Nationalizing the Modern". For "International National Style", see Nicolai, *Moderne und Exil* cit., pp. 161-196.

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Remodelling the Imperial Capital in the Early Republican Era: the Representation of History in Henri Prost's Planning of Istanbul[1]

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ABSTRACT

When the Ottoman Empire definitively ceased to exist with the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in October 1923, the imperial capital Istanbul was simultaneously deprived of its title. The determination of the founders of the Republic to break with the Ottoman past was effective in their decision to transfer the political capital from Istanbul to Ankara. It is even asserted by certain historians that Istanbul was intentionally neglected and deprived of public investments in the period that followed the foundation of the Republic. The present chapter focuses on the urban planning of Istanbul from mid 1930s to early 1950s. Here, the question of how the Republican authorities and the French planner Henri Prost, whom they finally addressed, approached the planning problem of Istanbul and its historical heritage in particular will be discussed.

At a period when the population of the city decreased, the main concern of planning in Istanbul was transforming the old Ottoman capital into a modern city. The setting of an effective transportation network and a number of public spaces designed for the representation of the Republican values illustrate this goal. Yet, at the same time, the way the architect-planner brought out the historical monuments of the ancient capital in his planning proposal, point to a renewed representation of history. Henri Prost's plan for the historical peninsula reclaimed the value of Istanbul as an urban geography dotted by the symbols of imperial power, both Byzantine and Ottoman. The modern setting of the Republican Istanbul was designed to highlight its "incomparable landscape" and the "glorious edifices" of the past. The way this approach was appropriated by the Republican authorities points to the ambivalent relation of the Republic with history.

29 Ekim 1923 tarihinde Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin ilan edilmesi ile Osmanlı İmparatorluğu son bulurken, İstanbul'un bin beşyüz yıldan fazla süren imparatorluk başkentliği de sona ermekteydi. Cumhuriyet'in kurucularının Osmanlı geçmişinden bağımsız yeni bir yönetim biçimini hedeflemeleri, başkentin İstanbul'dan Ankara'ya taşınması kararında etkili olan nedenlerden biriydi. Kimi tarihçilere göre, İstanbul bu nedenle Cumhuriyet'in ilk

yıllarında bilinçli bir biçimde ihmal edilmişti. Bu makale bu savı sorgularken, İstanbul'un Fransız şehirci-mimar Henri Prost tarafından 1936-1951 yılları arasında gerçekleştirilen planlama çalışmalarına ve özellikle İstanbul'un tarihi ve arkeolojik mirasının plancı tarafından nasıl ele alındığı sorunsalına odaklanmaktadır.

1930'lu yıllarda İstanbul henüz nüfus kaybetmekte olan bir kentti. Cumhuriyet yöneticilerinin diğer kentlerin olduğu gibi İstanbul'un da planlamasından beklentisi, kentin çağdaş şehircilik ilkelerine uygun olarak modernleştirilmesiydi. Bu amaçla 1932 yılında bir davetli şehircilik yarışması açılmış, ancak yarışma sonucunda seçilen Alman plancı Elgötz'ün planı uygulamaya konulmamıştı. Bunun yerine, 1936 yılında Fransız şehirci-mimar Henri Prost İstanbul'un planlamasını yönetmek üzere İç İşleri Bakanı ve İstanbul valisi tarafından davet edildi. O dönemde Prost Paris'in metropoliten planlamasını yürütmekteydi.

Henri Prost İstanbul'un planlamasının iki ana hedefini "kentin modernleştirilmesi" ve "eşsiz tarihi peyzajının korunması" olarak ortaya koymaktaydı. İstanbul'da kentin planlamasını yürüttüğü onbeş yıllık süre boyunca Bizans ve Osmanlı dönemlerine ait anıt yapıların belgelenmesi ve korunmaları için özel çaba harcadı. Tarihi Yarımada'nın planlamasında, tarihi anıtların kent görünümündeki etkisini ön plana çıkaran kentsel tasarım önerileri geliştirdi. Kentin yeniden tasarımında Bizans ve Osmanlı anıtlarının yan yana varoluşlarını vurgularken kentin kolektif belleğini yeniden inşa ediyordu. Ancak, Prost'un İstanbul planı tekil anıt yapıların korunmasına özel bir önem verirken, tarihi Osmanlı kentinin kentsel dokusuna karşı modernleşme adına son derece müdahaleci bir yaklaşım sergilemekteydi. Henri Prost'un İstanbul nazım planı yerel yetkililer tarafından, bekledikleri modern kent imgesini taşıdığı için büyük ölçüde olumlu karşılandı.

Fransız şehirci tarihi Istanbul'da kentsel arkeolojiyi planlama ile bütünleştirmeyi de amaçlamaktaydı. Bizans surlarının anıt olarak tescil edilmesi için çalıştı, Hipodrom – Ayasofya-Topkapı Sarayı'nı kapsayan alanda oluşturulmasını öngördüğü Arkeolojik Park önerisini geliştirdi. Prost'un bu önerileri Cumhuriyet yöneticilerince olanaklar ölçüsünde desteklendi. Arkeoloji araştırmalarına verdiği destekle Türkiye Cumhuriyet'i insanlığın ortak tarihinin mirasına sahip çıktığını göstermekteydi.

Prost tarihi İstanbul'u, "imparatorluklar başkenti"nin "muhteşem" anıtlarını ve "eşsiz" siluetini vurgulayan bir anlayışla yeniden düzenlenmekteydi. Bir başka deyişle, İstanbul'un Bizans ve Osmanlı İmparatorlukları'nın erk simgelerinin taçlandırdığı bir kentsel coğrafya olma niteliğini ön plana çıkarmaktaydı. Fransız şehircinin bu yaklaşımı, Cumhuriyet'in Osmanlı geçmişi ile arasına koymak istediği mesafe ile çelişiyor görünmekle birlikte, gerçekte bir yönüyle Cumhuriyet'in ulusun tarihindeki "parlak" dönemleri yücelten tarihyazımı anlayışından çok da uzak değildi.

THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION AND THE RELOCATION OF THE CAPITAL

The foundation of the Republic of Turkey on the 29 October 1923 marks the culmination of a political revolution which brought six hundred years of Ottoman sovereignty

to an end. The proclamation of Ankara as the capital of the new Nation-State dates to 13 October, i.e. two weeks before the foundation of the Republic. Not only the Ottoman dynasty but also Istanbul, which had been the imperial capital for nearly one thousand six hundred years since Constantine the Great, was being dethroned by this radical decision.

There were several reasons behind the relocation of the capital. First, it was a symbolic act having historic reasons: Following the defeat of the Ottomans at the end of the WWI, the Treaty of Sèvres signed with the Allied Forces anticipated the division of Turkey into zones to be occupied. Istanbul was occupied by the British, the French and the Italian troops; the Greek Army embarked in Izmir and occupied Western Anatolia. Local resistances which spontaneously started against the occupation were finally organised and united around the National Assembly held in Ankara under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal against the will of the Ottoman government. The Turkish War of Liberation was directed by the National Assembly from Ankara from 1919 to 1922 while Istanbul was under occupation. The same National Assembly would decide the abolishment of the Sultanate in November 1922 and proclaim the foundation of the Republic as the expression of the sovereignty of the Nation in October 1923. The declaration of Ankara, the headquarters of the revolution as the new capital symbolizes both the end of the Ottoman Empire and the birth of the Republic of Turkey. Practical reasons such as keeping distance from the conservative circles of the old capital that were loyal to the Ottoman rule were also effective in the new regime's decision of relocating the capital to Ankara. In short, it reveals the republicans' determination to break with the Ottoman imperial past with which Istanbul was strongly associated.

The relocation of the capital to Ankara, situated at the centre of the national territory, was part of a strategy for the overall development of the country[2]. The reform movement towards westernization generated from the Ottoman capital since the beginning of the 19th century could not infuse into the remote parts of the country. Istanbul, with its westernised elite, remained isolated from the rest. Ankara, located at the heart of Anatolia, was to become a motor for the progress and development of the whole country.

The period that followed the foundation of the Republic is marked by the implementation of a comprehensive programme of reforms, not only at institutional level but also in the social and cultural domains. The construction of Ankara as the capital city had both a symbolic and strategic importance for the modernity project of the Republic. The new capital was to be constructed as a city that symbolised the modernity of the Republic. It would constitute a model for other urban centres, with not only its physical constructions but also its social and cultural institutions and the modern way of life of its inhabitants[3].

However, how this model city was to be created was a considerable problem, especially when the overall economic condition of the country, the financial difficulties, the lack of experience and of technological means are considered.

When it comes to the old capital, historians seem to agree that Istanbul was intentionally neglected by the Republican government[4]. The reason for the negligence can be searched in the government's policy of canalizing all the public investments to the construction of its new capital simply in order to make the project of relocation real. The reluctance of certain Western countries to transfer their embassies from Istanbul to Ankara in the early years of the Republic testifies indeed the difficulty of the task.

TOWN PLANNING AS A TOOL TO CONSTRUCT THE "MODERN CITY" OF THE REPUBLIC

Town planning had emerged at the turn of the 20th century as a civic initiative animated by social reformist movements as the "new science of town building" in Western countries in search for healing the ills caused by the uncontrolled growth of cities due to industrialisation. In early Republican Turkey, it was perceived as a means of constructing modern cities that would represent the identity of the young Nation-State. It was seen as a technical/scientific knowledge for the creation of a physical urban environment, the setting of public spaces and equipment that would support the societal modernisation that was aimed at by the reform movement.

From the very beginning, the Republican authorities opted for a planned urban development in conformity with the modern principles of town building. European architects and planners, most of whom are renowned as distinguished experts in this field, were invited to develop plans for the Turkish cities. The preparation of the reconstruction plan for Izmir by the French planners Prost and Danger[5] and the first planning scheme for Ankara by the German planner Lörcher[6] date back to 1924-1925. The competition organized for the planning of Ankara in 1927, by an invitation made to three experts of urbanism from Germany and France, is generally highlighted as the beginning of the planning history in Turkey[7].

The first planning attempts of the Republic for Istanbul were, indeed, belated when compared to Ankara and Izmir. Yet, it is certain that planning the historical capital was a critical task, not less important than the construction of the new capital city. The Municipality of Istanbul organised a planning competition in 1932. Three renowned architect-planners were invited by the government to contribute with their planning proposals. These were Henri Prost, the chief planner of metropolitan Paris; Donate Alfred Agache, the planner of Buenos Aires, both French architect-urbanists, and a German planner Elgötz. Henri Prost, who declined the invitation, was replaced by Jacques Lambert. The jury, which was composed of Turkish officials, selected Elgötz's entry in the end, for being "more realistic" than others[8]. However, Elgötz's planning proposal was finally put aside and not implemented.

Interestingly enough, Henri Prost was invited a second time by the governor-mayor of Istanbul in 1936. The apparent object of this invitation was the preparation of a settlement plan for Yalova thermal station including the presidential residence and its

surroundings. Soon after his meeting with the governor-mayor Üstündağ, Henri Prost was delegated by the Minister of the Interior Ali Çetinkaya with the task of preparing a master plan for the city of Istanbul, and directing its urban development in collaboration with the *İmar Müdürlüğü* [the planning directorate] of the Municipality. Certain sources mention that he was directly invited by the president Atatürk for this task[9]. However, no written document has been found in the archives to verify this information. Yet, the fact that Prost was assigned to prepare the settlement plans of two presidential residences, Yalova followed by Florya, attests at least to the president's approval. Prost's contract will be regularly renewed after Atatürk's death.

The period between 1936 and 1951 during which Henri Prost directed the planning of Istanbul is critical in the history of Republican Turkey. The first two years of Prost's presence in Istanbul corresponds to the last years of Atatürk's presidency. From 1930 to 1950 the country was governed by the single party, i.e. the Republican People's Party founded by Atatürk. 1930s are characterised by the top-down implementation of reforms under single party regime for an overall institutional and societal modernisation in the country. The following years constitute a critical period due to the international conjuncture determined by the explosion of the Second World War. Turkey did not participate in the war, but she was highly affected by its economic consequences. Although it is a period of economic stagnation, Henri Prost worked as the chief planner of Istanbul in close collaboration in these years with a particularly active governor-mayor of the Republican People's Party, Dr. Lütfi Kırdar; who stayed at this post till the 1950 elections. The French planner would leave Istanbul a few months after the elections, i.e. after the Democrat Party came into power. Prost is the foreign architect who stayed longest as a planner of a major city in Turkey, and he mainly worked in harmony with the local authority under the single party regime. Once the political conjuncture changed, he preferred to leave in the face of the growing criticism especially coming from the professional circles in Istanbul.

The fifteen years of planning activity of Henri Prost in Istanbul covers a wide range of studies, including the Master Plan for the European side of Istanbul (1937), Master Plan of the Asian side (1939), the planning of the two coasts of the Bosporus (1936-1948) and numerous detailed urban design projects for plazas, squares, construction of new avenues, parks and promenades in the historic city.

Henri Prost, the "architect-urbanist"

Henri Prost was one of the leading figures of the generation of French architects that contributed to the creation of the new discipline, which they baptised as "*urbanisme*". We see him first among the graduates of the *École des Beaux-Arts* who won the *Prix de Rome* together with Tony Garnier, Léon Jausseley, Ernest Hébrard who all would become pioneering figures of the French urbanism[10].

Henri Prost's acquaintance with Turkey and the city of Istanbul dates back to 1904, when he first came to the capital of the Ottoman Empire to study the archaeological

vestiges of the Ancient Constantinopolis within the framework of the *Prix de Rome* programme. He stayed in Istanbul in 1904-1905 and 1906-1907 and returned to Paris with impressive drawings of Hagia Sophia and restitutions of the Imperial Palace of Constantine[11].


Fig. 1
Restitution drawing of the Imperial Palace of Constantine, the Hippodrome and Hagia Sophia by Henri Prost, 1911.
Source: Institut Français d'Architecture (IFA) / Académie d'Architecture (AA), Fonds Prost.

Prost's career as urbanist began with his winning entry for the extension of the city of Antwerp in 1902. He participated in the activities of the Sixth Section of the *Musée Social*, working on "Urban and Rural Hygiene"[12]. In 1913, he was invited by Marechal Lyautey, the military governor of the French protectorate in Morocco, to found the *Service des Plans* [the town planning office] under the French military government in this country. From 1914 to 1920 he realised a comprehensive planning work for several cities including Fez, Marrakesh, Meknes, Rabat and Casablanca[13]. Finally, starting in 1932, he directed the planning of the metropolitan area of Paris. The Plan *d'Aménagement de la Région Parisienne* would be approved in 1939[14], thus three years after he began to work on the planning of Istanbul. The objective of planning adopted by Prost is to direct the metropolitan development and to control the urban extension around Paris through constructing a system of motorways while preserving historical and natural sites.

Henri Prost was contacted by the Republican government of Turkey first in 1924 for the preparation of the reconstruction plan of Izmir, destroyed by the fire in 1922 at the end of the Greco-Turkish war[15]. Although he delegated this task to his colleague René Danger, he worked actively as consultant in the planning of Izmir. This plan, which was approved by the Municipality of Izmir in 1925, constitutes the first comprehensive plan – *plan d'ensemble* – prepared to direct the future development of a city in Turkey.

Istanbul in the 1930s

The relocation of the political capital to Ankara had immediate impacts on Istanbul. The population of the city decreased considerably – from around one-million inhabitants before WWI to 700.000 inhabitants in 1927[16]. The limited funds of the young Republic were canalised to the construction of the new capital city, and the old capital was neglected at least in the early years of the Republic.

The long period of wars, which had started with the Balkan Wars followed by the First World War and the occupation of the city, had destructive effects on Istanbul, economically, socially and physically. Fires, which had always been frequent in Istanbul devastated numerous neighbourhoods that remained as empty grounds within the historic city. Zeynep Çelik, who is the author of *Remaking Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the nineteenth century*, points out that the historic city confined within the Byzantine fortifications had already been "run-down and neglected" in the late 19th century, many neighbourhoods being left unrebuilt after the destruction of fires. She explains this situation with the shift of the building activity to the new districts to the north and the abandonment of the "grand old city to the working classes"[17].

In fact, the reconstruction of the old districts of Istanbul had been undertaken several times since mid 19th century by the Ottoman governments. The reorganisation of the urban space in conformity with the image of the contemporary European cities, by the opening of wide avenues, plazas and squares but especially by the regularization of the urban fabric according to the "rules of geometry"[18], was part of the Ottoman reform movement that started with the declaration of the *Tanzimat* [the reorganization movement] in 1839. The urban programme of the *Tanzimat* was put into implementation through a series of urban regulations, and a considerable number of reconstruction plans which were applied in the neighbourhoods destroyed by fires[19]. At the end of the century, the urban fabric of the historic peninsula (the old city confined within the Byzantine walls) was already transformed to a great extent, yet through the juxtaposition of piecemeal operations and not as a result of a total urban design project.

The early years of the Republic were characterised by an atmosphere of enthusiasm and an overall mobilisation for modernization, animated by the comprehensive reform programme of the Republic. In continuity with the Ottoman reform movement, the Republican reforms were, however, based on a criticism of the former as being incremental. As the overall reform programme, the urban programme of the Republic had to be more comprehensive and much more radical than that of the Ottoman reformers as well.

One can argue, however, that both institutional and societal modernisation had destructive effects on the historical city of Istanbul. Secularism was one of the keystones of the Republican modernisation programme that envisaged not only the secularisation of the state affairs, but of the whole societal sphere. Along with the secularisation of the national education, the religious schools (*medrese*s), centres of religious orders (*tekke*s and *zaviye*s) were closed down by law in 1925, and the properties of the religious

foundations (*vakıfs*) were taken under state control. The edifices belonging to these establishments, numerous in the historical city of Istanbul, were deserted and in time fell into decay.

People's aspiration for modern life styles resulted in a progressive desertion of the historical peninsula. Although individual building activities were observed in the old neighbourhoods, higher income groups were leaving the old city for the newly developing settlement areas on the north of the European side, or on the Asian coast of Marmara, as Henri Prost would later state in his reports. This process gained momentum in parallel with the development of means of public transportation – tramway and maritime transportation. In the speech he made at the *Institut de France* in 1947, Prost[20] explains this continuing mobility from the old city towards new settlement areas with the people's adoption of modern life-styles and the emancipation of women in particular. The emigration of higher income groups resulted in the continuous extension of the city towards its peripheries, in spite of the fact that the city's population was still decreasing in the 1930s.

While the urban area was being extended, the central business districts continued to develop within the historical peninsula as well as Galata – the old European quarter on the north of Golden Horn; the Grand Bazaar and its environs still served as the commercial centre *par excellence* for the entire city[21]. This resulted in an increase of everyday mobility, causing considerable problems in urban transportations.

Briefly, when Prost became head of the planning office, Istanbul was a city with a receding economy and population; but paradoxically, it was geographically extending, which in turn caused difficulties in the urban circulation system. The historical city of Istanbul confined within the Byzantine walls had been largely devastated by fires and partly abandoned by its inhabitants. The majority of the Ottoman public buildings – e.g. religious centres and school buildings, public baths and fountains – were falling into ruin.

Planning Istanbul: setting the infrastructure for a modern city

Within the revolutionary socio-political context of the 1930s in Turkey, the principal objective of planning the cities in general and in Istanbul in particular, was 'modernisation'. This was what the local authority expected to achieve by elaborating and implementing a comprehensive plan. What was meant by the modernisation of the city was also the arrangement of settlement areas conducive to modern life-styles and hygiene, and the creation of open public spaces that would contribute to the flourishing of a civic public realm. Henri Prost also defined the principal goal of the planning of Istanbul as the modernisation of the city. According to him, this was inevitable for a city in the process of a "complete social change"[22].

Prost completed his Master Plan (*plan directeur*) for the European side of Istanbul in 1937. The master plan consisted mainly of a transportation plan, supported by detailed

Fig. 2
Istanbul in 1940s.
Source: IFA / AA, Fonds Prost.

Fig. 3
Madrasa of Selimiye in ruins in 1940s.
Source: IFA / AA, Fonds Prost.

urban design proposals for strategic nodes of the plan. He proposed to reinforce the maritime transportation between the two sides of the Bosporus[23]. The urban circulation network that Prost studied in detail was organized around a spine that crossed the city from north to south connecting the newly developing settlement areas on the north to the old city[24]. This road, which started at Taksim Square – the Square of the Republic – on the north, went through the old quarters on the west of Pera, crossed the Golden Horn by Atatürk Bridge and continued directly following the valley between the two of the seven hills of the historic peninsula. It crossed the old city from north to south to end up at the proposed central station at Yenikapı[25]. A second connection, in the north-south direction, started again from Taksim Square, crossed Pera and Galata through tunnels and viaducts before passing the Golden Horn by the Galata Bridge[26]. On the historic peninsula, it continued through the central business district of Eminönü to reach Beyazıt Square where the University of Istanbul was to be located.

Fig. 4
The Master Plan of the European Side of Istanbul by Henri Prost (1936-1943).
Source: IFA / AA, Fonds Prost.

In addition to these two north-south arteries that would connect the northern districts to the central activity areas located in the old city, Prost proposed a new circulation network to be created within the historic city. Partly making partly use of the existing street network, the new circulation system necessitated the opening of several new avenues and streets within the historic urban fabric. These were listed as "operations to be realized in priority" in the program of Prost's master plan[27].

An urban design to glorify the historical townscape of Istanbul

In his conference at the *Institut de France* in 1947, Henri Prost clarifies his approach to the planning of Istanbul particularly vis-à-vis the planning of the historic city:

> The modernisation of Istanbul can be compared to a chirurgical operation of the most delicate nature. It is not about creating a New City on a virgin land, but directing an Ancient Capital, in the process of complete social change, towards a Future, through which the mechanism and probably the redistribution of wealth will transform the conditions of existence. This City lives with an incredible activity. To realize the main axes of circulation without harming the commercial and industrial development, without stopping the construction of new settlements is an imperious economic and social necessity; however to conserve and PROTECT the INCOMPARABLE LANDSCAPE, dominated by glorious EDIFICES, is another necessity as imperious as the former[28].

Prost's words summarize his attitude as a planner *vis-à-vis* the transformation of Istanbul: the objective of planning was to modernise the historical city, a goal which was mainly determined by the socio-political circumstances and the revolutionary atmosphere of the period in Turkey. Yet, for him, special attention had to be paid to the historical heritage of the city. In this perspective, he put forward a plan of urbanism which aimed to combine modernisation and conservation. As he expressed in these words, the protection of both the "incomparable" landscape and townscape of Istanbul was of primary importance – as important as the modernisation and economic development of the city.

Fig. 5
The silhouette of the Historical Peninsula from Sarayburnu.
Source: IFA / AA, Fonds Prost.

Yet, in the planning of the old city, Prost adopted a highly interventionist attitude towards the historic urban fabric. The reorganisation of the road network that he proposed for the historic peninsula reminds, in fact, of Napoléon III's and Baron Haussman's operations in 19th-century Paris. The grand avenues that crossed the historic city and multiple secondary roads transformed the introverted neighbourhoods of the old Ottoman city into an open structure.

One can argue that as fires had already destroyed large areas in the city, such operations were inevitable. In addition, the regularisation of the neighbourhoods destroyed by fire had become a tradition in Istanbul since mid 19th century, i.e. the beginning of the Ottoman reform movement[29]. However, the operations foreseen by Prost were not limited to the areas destroyed by fire, but brought forth an overall reorganisation of the urban fabric. Prost's plan was realising in a way an age-old project of modernisation in Istanbul[30] that had already been put into implementation through piecemeal operations in the late Ottoman period.

His observations on the societal change in 1930s Istanbul and particularly the determination of the Republican authorities who undertook a comprehensive socio-cultural revolution must have been influential in Prost's interventionist planning approach. The revolutionary political context, but also the dynamics of social change in the Turkey of the 1930s, forced the architect-planner to intervene radically on the urban historical fabric of Istanbul.

While adopting an interventionist attitude towards the urban fabric, Prost paid particular attention to the historical monuments of Istanbul. He listed numerous monuments that date from both Byzantine and Ottoman periods, and spent particular effort for their conservation. He collaborated with the Turkish Association of the Friends of Istanbul[31] as well as with the French, German and American institutes of archaeology. His call to the *Institut de France* for financial support for the conservation of archaeological vestiges of the city is worth mentioning in this context[32].

He put much emphasis on preserving a great number of Ottoman structures, which were out of use, by giving them new functions. He integrated these to pedestrian promenades, as "picturesque" monuments to be contemplated together with the monumental trees that complete the composition[33]. In Prost's plan of 1937, significant monuments of the city such as the grand mosques constituted the landmarks, on which perspective axes opened in conformity with the Beaux-Arts tradition.

Urban aesthetics was pivotal for Prost's planning, which reflects both a picturesque and classical understanding of urban design. While completely remodelling its urban fabric, Prost conceived the historical peninsula as a glorious landscape – "*l'incomparable paysage dominé par des edifices glorieux*" in his own words – to be preserved in its totality. It was the total effect of the townscape that was important for Prost. The historical silhouette of the peninsula would effectively be preserved by the building regulations and particularly by the height restrictions that were imposed by the planner.

Fig. 6
Urban Design Sketch for Eminönü Square, made by Jaubert, Prost's assistant in 1943.
Source: IFA / AA, Fonds Prost.

Urban archaeology and the representation of the three epochs of Istanbul

Revealing the memory of the ancient Constantinopolis buried under the Ottoman Istanbul was one of the goals of Prost's planning of the historical peninsula. Prost's interest in the Roman-Byzantine history of the city is obvious in his plan proposal and his reports. He attributed particular importance to archaeology as a means of bringing to light the memory of the past ages of the city. He combined "urban archaeology", which is a modern idea, with the modernisation of urban spaces.

Prost's particular interest in the East Roman vestiges of the city can be traced back to the studies that he had made in Istanbul as a young architect of the Prix de Rome. In his master plan of 1937, he proposed to create a park of archaeology on the eastern tip of the historic peninsula, at the site of the imperial palace of Constantine – the restitution of which he had worked on thirty years before. He continued to work for the realisation of this project until he left in 1951. The Park of Archaeology extends from

the Sultan Ahmet Mosque [the Blue Mosque] on the south, to Hagia Sophia on the north and the Byzantine maritime fortifications on the east by covering a large area. It includes the Acropolis of the Ancient Byzantion, the Hippodrome and the Imperial Palace of Constantine and his successors. This park, where archaeological excavations were to be held, would be an open-air museum open to public[34].

Fig. 7
Plan of the Park of Archeology (1936-1947).
Source: IFA / AA, Fonds Prost.

However, the area, which was divided into private properties, was covered by constructions that had to be expropriated for demolition, which was bringing an enormous burden to the city's administration.

In his conference at the *Institut de France*, Prost stresses that his proposal for the Archaeological Park was approved by Atatürk, who had ordered the transformation of Hagia Sophia into a museum[35]. The Grand Basilica of Constantinopolis, erected in the 7th century by Justinian, was converted into the Grand Mosque by Mehmet II when he conquered the city in 1453. The decision for the conversion of the edifice from the

Grand Mosque of the Ottoman imperial capital into a museum was certainly a powerful symbolic act. It was an expression of the determination of the Republic to break away from the Ottoman history by attacking one of its symbols of power. In his speech, Prost quotes Atatürk who declared that the edifice did not belong to one religion or another, but to all humanity[36]. The architect extends this idea to the history of Istanbul, stating that it belonged to all humanity, rather than to one nation or another. The question whether this idea was shared by the Republican authorities can hardly be answered. Yet, we know that a number of archaeological excavations were started in several places in Anatolia in the early years of the Republic. The Temple of Augustus in Ankara was cleared of the constructions that surround it and restored with the initiative of Atatürk in the 1930s on the occasion of the celebrations of the 2000th anniversary of Augustus[37]. The aim was to link the history of the Republic of Turkey to the universal history of humanity. Hence, Prost's proposal for creating an archaeological park at the heart of Istanbul was well received by the Republican authorities and by Atatürk in particular. Although the Park of Archaeology could not be realized in its integrity, parts of the Byzantine imperial palace were excavated and a new museum was built to display the mosaics of the palace *in situ*.

In Prost's plan, the Park of Archaeology was not the only reference to the East Roman history of the city. In his master plan of 1937, he proposed to rearrange the square – *At Meydanı* – in front of the Sultan Ahmet Mosque, which had been the hippodrome of

Fig. 8
Sultan Ahmet Mosque and the Square – *At Meydanı* – the Hippodrome of Ancient Constantinopolis.
Source: IFA / AA, Fonds Prost.

Byzantine Constantinopolis, into a plaza crowned with a grandiose monument dedicated to the Republic. Hence, three eras in the history of Istanbul – the Byzantine, Ottoman and Republican – could be symbolized at one place[38].

He proposed to remove the buildings dating from the late Ottoman period, which are located on the southern edge of the hippodrome, in order to open the perspective from the plaza onto the Marmara Sea, and to make this grandiose monument, located on top of the colossal retaining walls of the Byzantine hippodrome, visible from the sea.

Prost's proposal for Beyazıt Square was again founded on the same idea of simultaneous representation of the three epochs of the city[39]. This square where the Beyazıt Mosque – erected in the late 15th century – stands, and onto which the gate of the University of Istanbul opens, is located next to the Ancient Forum Tauri of the Byzantine city. Prost suggested enlarging the Beyazıt Square in the direction of the ancient forum, and reconstructing the triumphal arch that used to stand there, the remains of which certainly could be found, if excavations were made.

Fig. 9
The arrangement proposed for Beyazıt Square with the triumphal arch of the ancient Forum Tauri reconstituted, drawing by Aron Angel.
Source: A. Angel, *Henri Prost ve Istanbul'un ilk Nazım Planı*, "Mimarlık", n. 222, pp. 34-37.

Prost's proposals for the two main squares of the historical city, the description of which we found in his report of the master plan, were not implemented. The operation to restore the Forum Tauri by the enlargement of Beyazıt square necessitated the demolition of old Ottoman structures including the *Simkeş Han*. It provoked the reaction of a number of Turkish intellectuals including architects.

It is possible to observe that, in Prost's plan, the main arteries that cross the historical city from east to west follow the hypothetical trajectory of the main arteries of the Byzantine city. These radiated and branched off from the *Mese* – the first principal axis of the ancient city – towards the gates on the terrestrial walls on the west, following the crests of the seven hills of the city. In the 1950s, during the construction of these avenues, the Roman porticoes along these axes came to light. With the new arteries he proposed to open through the urban fabric, Prost referred to the remote history of Constantinopolis. He aimed at revealing the memory of the ancient city buried under the Ottoman Istanbul, while modernizing the urban infrastructure.

One of the consistent efforts of Prost in Istanbul was for the preservation of the Byzantine fortifications that surround the historical city. Besides labelling them as monuments, he defined, in his plan, a zone of *non-aedificandi* covering an area of 500 m. outside and 50 m. inside the terrestrial walls, in order to conserve the walls in their integrity, and also to emphasise their monumental total effect.

Fig. 10
Restoration of the Byzantine fortifications, the Topkapı Gate in 1940s.
Source: IFA / AA, Fonds Prost.

CONCLUSION

The expectation of the Republican authorities from the planning of Istanbul was the modernisation of the city in conformity with the contemporary principles of urbanism. The French architect-urbanist Henri Prost, whom they addressed, set the two principal goals of the task as the modernisation of the urban infrastructure and the conservation of the city's historical landscape. In his planning proposal, he put emphasis on the preservation and display of the monuments of the city from both the Byzantine and Ottoman periods. Hence, he attempted to reconstruct the collective memory of the city through the co-existence of these monuments in the cityscape. However, while he paid particular attention to the individual monuments and historical structures, he opted for a highly interventionist attitude towards the Ottoman urban fabric in the name of modernisation with the new circulation network that he superposed on the historical urban fabric in particular. Prost's master plan was received positively by the local authorities as it brought the modern urban image that they expected to achieve. Yet, especially certain operations that brought the demolition of certain Ottoman structures were confronted with the reaction of some circles of intellectuals.

Henri Prost redesigned the old city in a way to bring out its "glorious" monuments and silhouette, reminiscent of its imperial history. In other words, his plan for the historical peninsula reclaimed the value of Istanbul as an urban geography dotted by the symbols of imperial power, both Byzantine and Ottoman in the Republican era. Indeed, the emphasis put on the Ottoman imperial monuments within the cityscape of Istanbul corresponded to the glorification of the "brilliant" moments in the Nation's history in the Republican historiography. By supporting archaeological studies, the Republic of Turkey also claimed to be the inheritor of the common history of human civilisation.

NOTES

[1]   The present chapter is based on the research "Preparation of an Inventory on the Planning work of Henri Prost in Istanbul (1936-1951)" conducted by S. Yerasimos, C. Bilsel, İ. Akpınar, P. Pinon, within the framework of the Bosporus programme conjointly financed by the Turkish Institute of Science and Technology [TÜBİTAK] and EGIDE, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and on the archival research that I conducted at the *Institut Français d'Architecture* [IFA] with the financial support of the Turkish Academy of Sciences [TÜBA].

[2]   Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic, was highly inspired by Enlightenment thought. His conviction on the merits of the republic, founded on the idea of a nation-state, was nurtured by the political philosophy of Enlightenment: the idea of a nation mainly depended on the definition of the national territory, unitary and undividable; and the capital of the nation-state had to be ideally situated at the geometric centre of this territory. This ideal was justified by being at equal distance from the most farthest parts of the national territory, as well as the ease of governing the country. Ankara was located almost at the geometric centre of the national territory of Turkey, as finally defined by the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923.

[3]   İ. Tekeli, *Türkiye'de Cumhuriyet Döneminde Kentsel Gelişme ve Kent Planlaması*, in Y. Sey (ed.), *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, Istanbul 1998, pp. 4-11; G. Tankut, *Bir Başkentin İmarı, Ankara: 1929-1939*, Ankara 1990.

[4] Tekeli, *Türkiye'de*, cit.

[5] C. Bilsel, *Ideology and Urbanism during the Early Republican Period: Two Master Plans for Izmir and Scenarios of Modernization*, in "Journal of the Faculty of Architecture", 1996, 16, 1-2, pp. 13-30.

[6] A. Cengizkan, *Ankara'nın İlk Planı 1924-25 Lörcher Planı*, Ankara 2004

[7] Tankut, *Bir Başkentin* cit.

[8] İ. Tekeli, *Development of Urban Administration and Planning in the Formation of Istanbul Metropolitan Area*, in *Development of Istanbul Metropolitan Area and Low Cost Housing*, Istanbul 1992.

[9] Th. Leveau, *Istanbul*, in L'Académie d'Architecture, *L'Œuvre de Henri Prost, Architecture et Urbanisme*, Paris 1960, pp. 183-208.

[10] G. Wright, P. Rabinow, *L'Emergence d'un Urbanisme Moderne*, in J.-P. Epron (ed.), *Architecture une Anthologie,* Tome I: *La Culture Architecturale*, Liège 1992, pp. 163-164.

[11] L. Hautecœur, *Henri Prost à la Villa Medici*, in *L'Académie d'Architecture*, cit. pp. 11-30.

[12] J.-L. Cohen, *Henri Prost*, in J. P. Midant (ed.), *Dictionnaire de l'Architecture du XXe siècle*, Paris, 1996, p. 731.

[13] N. Toucheff, *Henri Prost (1874-1959). Anvers, Casablanca, Paris*, in J. Dethier, A. Guilheux (eds.), *La Ville, Art et Architecture en Europe, 1870-1993*, Paris 1994, pp. 172-173; J.-L. Cohen, M. Eleb, *Casablanca: Mythes et Figures d'une Aventure Urbaine*, Paris 1998.

[14] J.-P. Gaudin, *Desseins de Villes, 'Art Urbain' et Urbanisme, Anthologie*, Paris 1991, p. 169.

[15] Bilsel, *Ideology* cit.

[16] Z. Toprak, *Nüfus, Fetihten 1950'ye*, in *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 6, Istanbul, 1994, p. 110.

[17] Z. Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century*, Berkeley - Los Angeles - London 1993, p. 155.

[18] The term belongs to Mustafa Reşit Paşa, one of the leading figures of *Tanzimat* reforms, who had written a letter to the Sultan Abdülmecit from London where he had been the ambassador. In the letter, he was explaining the reasons of the necessity of reconstructing the Ottoman capital. He was dwelling upon different Western models of settlement, comparing the British to the French in particular.

[19] Z. Çelik, *Remaking* cit.; S. Yerasimos, *A propos des réformes urbaines de Tanzimat*, in P. Dumont, F. Georgeon (eds.), *Villes Ottomanes à la fin de l'Empire*, Paris 1992, pp. 17-32; S. Yerasimos, *Istanbul ou l'urbanisme par le feu*, in S. Yerasimos, F. Friès, "La Ville en Feu, µ Recherche Cahiers", 1993, 6-7, pp. 26-36.

[20] H. Prost, *Communication de Henri Prost, 17 Septembre 1947 à l'Institut de France*, in *Les Transformations d'Istanbul*, unpublished reports, 1947, pp. 15-16.

[21] *Ibid.,* pp. 16-17.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[23] H. Prost, *Mémoire Descriptif du Plan Directeur de la Rive Européenne d'Istanbul*, in *Les Transformations d'Istanbul, Plans Directeurs*, vol. 3, unpublished reports, 1937.

[24] *Ibid.*; Prost, *Communication* cit.

[25] *Ibid.,* pp. 21-25.

[26] Prost, *Mémoire* cit. pp. 12-13; Id., *Communication* cit. p. 21.

[27] Id., *Mémoire* cit. pp. 19-23.

[28] Id., *Communication* cit. p. 18 (Author's translation from French).

[29] Yerasimos, *Istanbul* cit.

[30] Z. Çelik, *Remaking* cit.; Yerasimos, *A propos* cit.

[31]   This association, which was founded by Ottoman intellectuals in 1911, was active until the 1940s.

[32]   Prost, *Communication*, cit. pp. 27-30.

[33]   *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

[34]   Prost, *Mémoire*, cit. p. 4;Prost, *Communication*, cit. pp. 28-29.

[35]   *Ibid.*, p. 29.

[36]   *Ibid.,* p. 29.

[37]   S. Güven, *Bir Roma Eyaletinin Evrim Sürecinde Galatia ve Ancyra*, in Y. Yavuz (ed.), *Tarih İçinde Ankara*, Ankara 2001, pp. 109-122.

[38]   H. Prost, *Mémoire*, cit. p. 5.

[39]   *Ibid.,* p. 5.

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Id., *Mémoire Descriptif du Plan Directeur de la Rive Européenne d'Istanbul*, in *Les Transformations d'Istanbul, Plans Directeurs*, vol. 3, unpublished reports, 1937.

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The Female Body as a Tool for the Identity Formation of the Turkish State during the Kemalist Modernization Project

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Abstracts

In this study we will examine how the female body, its physical appearance, and the exposure of women in the public sphere, were used for the development of the identity of the new Turkish state by the Kemalists. We will also examine the problems that resulted from this, since the state appeared to care more about its modernization project than about women's rights.

Σε αυτό το άρθρο θα εξετάσουμε με ποιο τρόπο το σώμα των γυναικών, η φυσική τους εμφάνιση και η έκθεση τους στην δημόσια σφαίρα, χρησιμοποιήθηκαν ως μέσο οικοδόμησης της ταυτότητας του νέου κράτους από τους Κεμαλιστές. Θα εξετάσουμε επίσης τα προβλήματα που δημιουργήθηκαν επειδή το κράτος παρουσιάστηκε να ενδιαφέρεται περισσότερο για το έργο της νεωτερικότητας παρά για τα δικαιώματα των γυναικών.

The Turkish Republic established in 1923 is a country in which a modernization project was undertaken in order for the newly established state to become a modern state based on western civilization. For the Turkish modernists, modernization, civilization and westernization were seen as one and the same, and modernization meant the adoption of western civilization[1]. According to Kızılyürek, Kemal Atatürk stated that "there is only one civilization, the western civilization, and Turkey must be a part of it"[2]. In addition, modernity was understood as a pragmatic rationality in administrative practices and diversions from the Islamic code[3]. Çarkoğlu and Toprak summarize this as follows: "For the founders of the Republic, Islam was a system of beliefs that should be confined to private life. It would not be allowed to organize and play a prominent role in public life"[4]. Therefore the modernization project was also a project of secularization.

As Alev Çınar writes, all modernization projects involve the creation of a particular sense of nationhood and the construction of a specific national identity defined around

Fig. 1
Sabiha Gökçen seated beside Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

ethnicity, race, religion, culture, civilization, language or some other similar primordial bond[5]. In addition, the marking of bodies and places as the particular and the different involves the construction of identities by inscribing various meanings to certain bodily features, among them the colour of one's skin, behaviour, or articles of clothing[6]. In this chapter we will examine how Kemalist modernism used the female body in the first years of its establishment in the framework of the construction of a new western and modern identity for the country.

According to Nilüfer Göle, the Kemalist modernization project was based on the following three points as regards the position of women in the framework of modernization: (1) the adoption of a new legislative system which would give women political

rights as citizens of the new Republic; (2) the natural appearance of women, according to which women should adopt western clothing and abandon the Islamic headscarf; and (3) the exposure of women to the public sphere through work and education[7].

The legal framework which gave many rights to the women of the Republic was established with the adoption of a new civil code which was based on the Swiss legal system. The introduction of new laws and institutions, based on European models, was part of the modernization project, most of which took place in the years 1924-1934. All the reforms adopted aimed not only to modernize and westernize the new state but also to change the position that Turkish women had in society, compared to the position they had in the past, during the Ottoman empire. One of the most important reforms adopted was the outlawing of polygamy and the abolition of Islamic courts in favour of secular institutions. This was a development that allowed the women of the Turkish Republic to have their marriage rights protected by the law. Women were also granted the right to vote, they were permitted and actually encouraged to study, to get involved in politics, and to work[8].

When the legal framework was established, it was thought to be the time for the natural appearance of women to be altered. Women were strongly encouraged to change the way they were dressed and to wear western dresses and hats. Women's modern appearance reflected the state's modernity. The transformation of women from Ottoman Islamic traditional clothing to a modern western appearance reflected the transformation of the new state from the Ottoman period to the Turkish Republic. However, there was no legislation to force women to appear in public in western clothing[9]. However, a law was introduced according to which men were forbidden to wear the traditional fez and were to wear western headgear instead[10].

The abandonment of the headscarf was equated with women's emancipation, and Kemal Atatürk himself personally encouraged women to appear in public uncovered[11]. He was seen on many occasions accompanied by women with modern dresses and without head covering. The abandonment of the traditional Islamic Ottoman clothing and headscarf was not an innovation carried out only by Kemalists, since the body is the space that modernism acts upon and where the parameters of the private and public sphere take place[12]. In this framework, the female body became not only the symbol of the nation, marking its own limitations, but comprised the space where the sphere of the private and public interacted[13].

In accordance with the new public morality, the standards of beauty were changed too. The Ottoman image of women's beauty – the fat odalisque with big breasts – was replaced with the skinny flat-chested woman[14]. The fatty odalisque was taken to represent the old Ottoman woman who was lazy and depended on men, while the new slim westernized woman represented the new Turkish woman who was active and not dependent on anyone but herself.

In this framework, the first beauty contest took place in Turkey in 1929. The announcement for the competition was published in the "Cumhuriyet" [Republic] newspaper as follows: "Who is the most beautiful woman in Turkey who is so beautiful so that she can participate in the international beauty contest? If all the citizens realise how important this issue is and consider it as their national duty, this competition will have amazing results"[15]. As Çınar writes, the paper considered the beauty contest to be a national issue and because of this perception it gave to the female body a national dimension[16]. The winner of the beauty competition was a young Turkish woman called Keriman Halis, whose attributes matched contemporary western standards. She participated in the world beauty contest in Belgium in 1932, occasioning major publicity not only in Turkey but also in the western press. Halis won the competition in Belgium and was pronounced the most beautiful woman in the world. According to Çınar, with Halis' victory the new state proved that it had imposed its own modernity, which was the west's modernity, in a way that it would have been considered at least scandalous in Ottoman times. The body of Keriman Halis, posing in a swimsuit in front of a European audience, was proof that Turkey itself was a modern state comparable with other European countries and even able to succeed in competition. It was also proof of the major exposure of women in the public sphere.

Women were actually exposed to the public sphere through work and education[17]. As indicated above, the Kemalist regime put into place the legal framework which allowed women to work and to be educated and therefore to become able to enter the public sphere. In the Turkish case the issue of the "public sphere" could be rather complicated. The theories of Jürgen Habermas regarding the "public sphere" can be taken into consideration in this aspect, since the public sphere includes a variety of meanings. It can be considered as an area where people can enter social life, an arena in social life where people can get together and freely discuss problems of the society, and an area of social life in which public opinion can be formed[18]. However, the approach of Nancy Fraser on the issue is perhaps closer to the Turkish example, since as she argues, the bourgeois public sphere is in fact constituted by a "number of significant exclusions" and that the bourgeois public sphere has discriminated against women and the lower social levels of society. According to Fraser, the public sphere is the arena that men, who are the dominant power base of the bourgeoisie, are coming to see themselves as a "universal class" and preparing to assert their fitness to govern[19]. In this framework, men prevent other social groups from demanding their rights in the public sphere. When the other groups – in our case women – are allowed to enter public sphere, this is done in order to safeguard the interests of men. It seems that this is the issue in the Turkish instance; the Kemalist regime exposed women in the public sphere for the regime's own interests.

In any case women were allowed and encouraged under the new regime to be educated and to work. They started to study at universities together with men, even in fields which were previously forbidden for women, like medicine or law. Very soon the

Turkish press published hundreds of pictures with "the first Turkish woman lawyer", or "the first Turkish woman doctor", extolling the women pioneers who conquered fields which were considered to be strictly male-dominated in the past. In a book published in 1988 about the women of the Middle East there are numerous pictures of these first women pioneers[20]. What is important to note here is that many of the photographs come from official state publications intended to advertise the existence of these women and their achievements. Again, they were presented as the results of the modern Turkish state.

As if this were not enough, Turkish women had to conquer heights other women in Europe were not able to reach. As the first ever Turkish beauty won the world competition, Turkish women were granted the right to vote and enter the assembly in 1934, at a time when women in France and Switzerland, for instance, were not allowed the vote. In addition, Sabiha Gökçen, an ambitious young woman who was adopted by Atatürk, became the first female pilot and even studied at the military aviation school of Turkey[21]. Her case is interesting, because she was frequently used as an example for the position of Turkish women. She used to escort Atatürk at official balls wearing her military uniform, and Atatürk proudly introduced her, especially to foreign officials, as the first woman pilot in Turkey.

As the state introduced its numerous reforms in order to change the position of women, it simultaneously assisted the establishment of the feminist movement in Turkey. However, the feminist movement was established in order to help the modernization project. Durakbasa writes, "the first feminists in Turkey did not fight for their rights but put the women's issue in the service of the state and in the reflection of the modernization project of the new state"[22]. The Kemalist feminist acted as all the other feminist movements of the world which, according to Purvis and Weatherill[23], have a common concern which was "to make women visible where they had been hidden in the 'male' view of the past"[24]. As these authors argue, the feminist movements challenged the traditional ways in which women had been represented stereotypically as wives and mothers. "Kemalist feminism" sees women through this view, aiming though to serve Kemalism, which was a patriarchic ideology. "Kemalist feminism" challenged the Ottoman-era traditional role of the women of the Republic, but the way in which women were represented in the new Republic was limited within a male's view, that of Atatürk, who was the father of all the Turks, the father of the women, a patriarch.

Göle writes that women undertook the duty of spreading the idea the Kemalists had for Turkish civilization[25]. However, because the main reason for the reforms of the regime was to serve the modernization image of the state, the position of women did not change to a great extent. This is an issue studied in length in recent years by authors such as Göle, Arat and Çınar, who note that Turkish society remained patriarchal at its base. The legal framework for the protection of women existed, but at home the fathers and husbands remained the heads of the household. Even Sabiha Gökçen faced

her father's [Atatürk's] prohibition, when he asked her not to participate in a military operation in the Dersim region. When she insisted upon flying and fighting, Atatürk gave her his own pistol, telling her to use it in case she was imprisoned by the enemy, "to protect her honour" [i.e. her virginity] and his honour as well[26].

In general, women had to abandon their sexuality in order to be accepted by the Kemalist regime. Kemalist modernization was puritanical and accepted women as equal with men only if they abandoned their overt sexuality. The physical appearance of the modern Turkish woman was neutral and less feminine, in order for her exposure to the public sphere not to be scandalous for society[27]. Women were allowed to be free and were granted rights only insofar as this served the modernization project of the state.

Notes

1   See Ç. Keyder, *Whither the project of modernity? Turkey in the 1990s*, in S. Bozdoğan, R. Kasaba, *Rethinking modernity and national identity in Turkey*, Seattle - London 1997, p. 37.

2   N. Kızılyürek, *Kemalism*, Athens 2006, p. 14.

3   Ş. Mardin, *The Just and the unjust*, in "Daedalus" 1991, 116, pp. 113-129. Mardin notes that this actually started to take root in the Ottoman Empire from the 16th century.

4   A. Carkoğlu, B. Toprak, *Political Islam in Turkey*, Istanbul 2000, p. 15.

5   A. Çınar, *Modernity, Islam and Secularism in Turkey*, Minneapolis - London 2005, p. 5.

6   *Ibid.*, p. 41.

7   N. Göle, *The forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling*, Michigan 1996, p. 73.

8   There are many books on the issue of the reforms and legal changes. See E.J. Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, London - New York 1993; L. Bernand, *The emergence of Modern Turkey*, London - Oxford - New York 1961.

9   Although there were local laws for the change of women's clothing.

10   For the hat law see H. Poulton, *The Top Hat, the Grey Wolf and the Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*, New York 1997.

11   Göle, *The forbidden Modern* cit., p. 170. Atatürk thought that in the future covered women would be only seen in history books.

12   For the use of the female body in the modernization project in general, see T. Mayer (ed.), *Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing the Nation*, New York 2000.

13   C. Aktaş, *Kılık Kıyafet ve İktidar: 12 Mart' tan 12 Eylül' e, Nehir Yayınları*, Istanbul 1990, vol. 1, pp. 170-173.

14   For the change of beauty standards from the Ottoman period to the new Turkish Republic, see M. Taşçioğlu, *Türk Osmanlı Cemiyetinde Kadının Sosyal Durumu ve Kadın Kıyafetleri Akın Matbaası*, Ankara 1958.

15   Aktaş, *Kılık* cit., p. 51.

16   Çınar, *Modernity* cit., p. 171.

17   For the general policy followed by the Kemalist regime on the issue of education as a tool for the construction of the identity of the new Turkish citizen, see K. İsmail, *Türkiye de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi İletişim*, Istanbul 1999.

[18] On this issue see J. Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, Cambridge Mass. (English tran. 1989) (German original 1962), p. 30. Habermas describes the public sphere as a discursive space in which individuals and groups congregate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common judgment.

[19] N. Fraser, *Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy, Habermas and the Public Sphere*, Cambridge Mass. 1992, pp. 109-142.

[20] See S.G. Brown, *Images of Women: The Portrayal of Women in Photography of the Middle East, 1860-1950*, New York 1988, pp. 218-221.

[21] For the story of Sabiha Gökçen, see A.G. Altinay, *The Myth of the military nation: Gender and Education in Turkey*, New York 2004.

[22] A. Durakbasa, A. Ilyasoglu, *Formation of Gender Identities in Republican Turkey and Women's Narratives as Transmitters of 'History' of Modernization*, in "Journal of Social History", 2001, 35, 1, pp. 195-203, at p. 124.

[23] J. Purvis, A. Weatherill, *Playing the Gender History Game: A reply to Penelope J. Corfield*, in "Rethinking History", 1999, 3, 3, pp. 333-338.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 333.

[25] Göle, *Forbidden Modern* cit., p. 77.

[26] Altinay, *Myth* cit., p. 79. For this incident, see also Gökçen's autobiography: Sabiha Gökçen, *Atatürk'le bir ömür*, 2nd ed., prepared by Oktay Verel, Türk Hava Kurımı Yayınları, Istanbul 1982.

[27] See Durakbasa, Ilyasoğlu, *Formation* cit.

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Hagia Sophia 'Museum': A Humanist Project of the Turkish Republic

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Abstract

Hagia Sophia, which is one of the greatest monuments in the world, has an inspirational architectural and artistic quality, adapting to changing cultural and political contexts all through history and continuing its momentous existence until today. The monument witnessed significant periods of shifting political ideologies, cultural transformations, and during them has assumed overlapping meanings. It has constantly been used as a medium of propaganda to represent the power of the ruling authorities and to transmit the message they wanted to convey. Seen in this light, throughout its long history, Hagia Sophia represented the power of Christianity and Islam respectively under the ruling Byzantine and Ottoman empires. In the Turkish Republican period, the building has been subject to a new shift of meaning, representing the power of the new, modern, secular Republic and has been used as one of the means to convey its ideals. From being the Grand Mosque of the old capital, this imperial monument was converted into a museum during the early years of the Turkish Republic – another turning point in its history. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the conversion process and argues that the transformation of Hagia Sophia is in line with the 'modernisation' and 'secularisation' policies of the young Republic. In other words, it claims that the conversion of Hagia Sophia into a museum stood as one of the cornerstones of the broader Republican project grounded on the revolutionary pillars of 'secularism', 'modernity' and 'superiority of science'. It further states that since then Hagia Sophia has not belonged to one religion or nation but to all humanity, as it still does. In this framework, the chapter also considers the reflections of the conversion after the early years of the Republic until now, thus in the light of the recent political changes and debates, while Hagia Sophia still continues to be a museum today.

Mimarlık tarihindeki en çarpıcı ve önemli anıtlardan biri olan Ayasofya, tarih boyunca değişen kültürel ve politik bağlamlara ayak uydurabilmesine ve önemi yadsınamaz varlı-

ğını günümüze kadar sürdürebilmesine olanak veren mimari ve sanatsal niteliklere sahiptir. Yöneticilerin erklerini görünür kılmak ve dikkat çekmek istedikleri mesajı iletmek için bir propaganda aracı olarak yararlandıkları Ayasofya tarih boyunca değişen politik ideolojiler ve kültürel dönüşümlerin yaşandığı dönemlere tanıklık etmiştir. Bu bağlamda, uzun tarihi boyunca Bizans ve Osmanlı hakimiyetleri süresinde Hıristiyanlığın ve de devamında İslamın gücünü temsil eden Ayasofya, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kurulduktan sonra yeni, modern, ve laik Cumhuriyet'in gücünü temsil etmiş ve ideallerini gerçekleştirmekte yararlanılan bir simge olmuştur. Cumhuriyet'in erken yıllarında tarihi başkentin Ulu Camisi iken müzeye çevrilmesi, yapının tarihinde bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Bu çerçeveden bakıldığında bu çalışma Ayasofya'nın müzeye çevrilmesi sürecine yoğunlaşmakta ve bu dönüşümün genç Cumhuriyet'in 'modernleşme' ve 'laikleşme' politikalarının bir parçası olduğunu savunmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, Ayasofya'nın müzeye çevrilmesinin, Cumhuriyet'in üstüne inşa edildiği 'laiklik', 'modernite', ve 'bilimin üstünlüğü' gibi devrimci kavramsal temellerin üzerine kurulan daha büyük bir projenin parçası olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Bu çalışma, müzeye çevrilmesiyle birlikte Ayasofya'nın günümüzde de olduğu gibi, ne tek bir dine ne de tek bir millete, ancak tüm insanlığa ait olduğu fikri üzerinde durmaktadır. Son olarak bu çalışma, müzeye dönüşümün Cumhuriyet'in ilk yıllarından günümüze değin süregelen yankılarına güncel politik zeminleri ve tartışmaları da göz önüne alarak değinmektedir.

Representation of power through an imperial monument

The construction of the first Hagia Sophia was completed on 15 January 360 as the Great Church of Constantinople by Constantine II. A timber-roofed structure[1], it was burnt down in 404, during a riot occasioned by the banishment of Bishop John Chrysostom. A new church was constructed eleven years later, in 415, on the site of the first church[2]. On 14 January 532, the Byzantine Empire witnessed one of the bloodiest revolts in its history, the Nika Revolt, during which the second church was burnt down by the rebels. Procopius, Justinian's court historian, interprets the revolt and Hagia Sophia's destruction as a riot against not only the Empire but also God[3]. The construction of today's Hagia Sophia was started by Justinian the Great, 38 days after the fire, on the same site of the second church, and it was inaugurated on 27 December 537, after five years and ten months from the beginning of the construction. This was an extremely short construction time for a structure of such complexity and scale, in absolute and as compared to other contemporary structures. Kleinbauer claims that if Justinian's idea had simply been to restore the ruined Hagia Sophia, the church could have been completed in two years[4]. Kleinbauer, Swift and also Downey argue that the emperor's aim was radically different[5]. Justinian, who was known as the greatest builder of the Byzantine Empire, intended to reflect the imperial generosity and ideology through his grand cathedral. Kleinbauer explains this intention as follows:

> It [Hagia Sophia] had to represent a symbol of Justinian's own imperial authority, to glorify the emperor as the representative on earth of the divine power in heaven. And as an architectural enterprise it had to overwhelm the martyr shrines elsewhere in the capital and in all other cities, including Rome[6].

Swift and Downey point out the short lapse of time between the clearing of the site and the beginning of the construction and argue that Justinian himself already had had some plans prepared for his imperial cathedral. When the other building activities commissioned by Justinian in the Byzantine territories are considered, it can well be claimed that the construction of religious buildings as lavish symbols of Christianity was one of the main concerns of his building program[7]. In this way, Justinian aimed to establish unity in the Empire by using the power of Christianity to replace the former pagan traditions. Furthermore, the rebuilding of the greatest and the most imposing church in the capital, namely Hagia Sophia, was among his priorities. He wanted to confirm his divine authority through Hagia Sophia. From this point of view the great church represented not only the authority of the Emperor but also the superiority and the triumph of Christianity over paganism. Hagia Sophia became the seat of the Patriarch of Constantinople and later that of the Eastern Orthodox Church. When Constantinople was captured during the Fourth Crusade between 1204 and 1261, the Church transformed into a Roman Catholic Cathedral, representing the superiority of Catholic Rome over Orthodox Byzantium during those years. The recapture of the city by the Byzantines brought back the revival of the power of the Orthodox Church in Hagia Sophia, until the Orthodox ruling authorities were replaced by the Ottomans.

The edifice, which had represented the imperial power of the Byzantine ruling institution, was used as a powerful political symbol by the Ottomans. When Mehmed II took over Constantinople, he took a crucial step in fulfilling his forefather Beyazid I's imperial vision, which was to make the Ottoman State a world empire[8]. Making Constantinople the Ottoman capital was a strategic decision in the complex of Mehmed II's imperial policies[9]. In this perspective, the conversion of Hagia Sophia into the Grand Mosque of the new imperial capital was crucially significant for it also announced the triumph of Islam over Christianity and heralded the rise of Ottoman power worldwide. Hagia Sophia – "Ayasofya" – was the only Friday Mosque until the completion of Mahmud Paşa Mosque in 1462. A marble *mihrab, minbar* and also the first two minarets, which signified that the building was now a "Sultan mosque", were added. The bells, crosses and icons were removed and the mosaics were covered with stucco. Mehmet II established the first *medrese* of the capital, for the study of Muslim theology, within the precinct of Hagia Sophia. During the reign of Süleyman I and also his successors, the Islamic signs and emblems of conquest continued to accumulate not only inside the mosque but also in its immediate surroundings (Fig. 1-2). The royal tombs of the sultans; Selim II, Murad III, and Mehmed III were built in the garden of Hagia Sophia rather than in their own royal mosque complexes[10]. This preference indicates that the

Fig. 1
Hagia Sophia Museum from Sultan Ahmed Mosque.
Source: http://www.guzel-resimler.org/resim-cami-ve-dini-resimler-204-ayasofya-cami-3126.htm

sultans recognised Hagia Sophia's symbolic value. The appropriation of Hagia Sophia by the Ottoman dynasty was complemented through additions, restorations, replacement or removal of various of its architectural features over the centuries[11].

Hagia Sophia witnessed another transformation in the mid 19th century, related to the Empire's attempts at 'westernisation', to cope with the rapidly developing process of modernisation in Europe since the 18th century. This process, which was initiated in the state organisation and continued with its effects in social life, was taken very seriously and increased in pace all through the 19th century. Abdülmecid is particularly known as a sultan who highly valued 'Western' and 'modern' ways of living prevalent in Europe during his reign. He had the *Tanzimat Fermanı* [Edict of Reforms] proclaimed in 1839, which declared that the Ottoman Empire would move towards being a westernising state and gave new rights to all the subjects – from then on the "citizens" – of the Empire and, particularly, increased the rights of the non-Muslim citizens. These reforms triggered changes in the social structure paralleled by spatial transformations. In this context, Hagia Sophia underwent considerable repair and restoration. The work

Fig. 2
The dome of Hagia Sophia Museum. Photograph by Katipoglu, 2010.

was commissioned by Abdülmecid and executed by the brothers Giuseppe and Gaspare Fossati, who were Swiss architects of Italian origin, between 1847 and 1849.

The Fossati brothers erected a scaffolding to preserve the structure during the consolidation of the cracks in the dome, the walls, columns, marble revetments, and stucco decoration[12]. During the works on the revetments and plaster, the previously covered mosaics were accidentally discovered. Having understood their historical significance, the Fossatis attracted the attention of Sultan Abdülmecid to this newly discovered decoration. Even though Abdülmecid had a limited budget reserved for the repair of Hagia Sophia, after he had seen the mosaics, he ordered to increase the budget[13]. Abdülmecid was so much impressed by the beauty of these and valued them to such an extent that he ordered their repair. It is reported that he said "*Elles sont belles, cachez-les pourtant puisque notre religion les défend: cachez-les bien, mais ne les détruisez pas; car qui sait ce qui peut arriver?*"[14]. Abdülmecid ordered to re-cover the mosaics with utmost care after they were repaired, yet he wanted some mosaics outside the prayer hall to remain visible[15]. However, it was impossible to leave any mosaics representing human figures uncovered in a mosque; the strict Islamic rules enforced by the state were not

open to any discussion[16]. After the restoration had been completed, for the inauguration ceremony on 13 July 1849, Abdülmecid issued a commemorative medal, on one side of which his *tuğra* [monogram] and on the other side an image of Hagia Sophia with the inscription "Date of Repair of Hagia Sophia". The medal was cast in Paris[17]. It can be argued that the gesture basically announced the value attributed by the Ottoman Empire to this universally significant monument, while at the same time emphasising that Hagia Sophia was still an Ottoman edifice, the Grand Mosque of Istanbul. In addition, an album of lithographs made from Gaspare Fossati's water colours was published after the restoration project and dedicated to Sultan Abdülmecid in 1852. However, the lithographs comprised the depictions of Hagia Sophia as perspective drawings of the inner and outer spaces and did not include any depictions of the mosaics. It was the Prussian Architect Salzenberg who published incomplete descriptions of some of the mosaics in the form of laconic texts and insensitive drawings which he prepared as the restoration was in progress[18]. Nonethless, the medal, the album, and Salzenberg's published work paved the way for Hagia Sophia to enter the scene of scholarly as well as broader international attention.

The edifice, in fact, was brought to the attention of the international public in the same period. An article entitled 'A Great Domed Church' was published in the "New York Times", on 20 August 1877:

> St. Sophia at Constantinople. A creation of Byzantine art – shaken by earthquakes and partly despoiled by Mohemmedan – the sacred edifice surmounted by a golden sun – rich mosaics restored to light – a building as solemnly impressive as it is overpoweringly beautiful.

> How soon the crescent over the minarets of St. Sophia will be replaced by the cross, or how soon the minarets themselves will be entirely swept away leaving the outlines of the church in their ancient condition, no seer has foretold. There is, however a belief of long standing – still of force, we are assured among the Greeks of Constantinople, and not altogether discredited by the Turks – to the effect that such a change one day shall take place, and that "Aya Sofia" shall at least be restored to Christianity. [...] For centuries the centre of Christianity in the Eastern World, the building has remained comparatively unchanged in spite of the new faith, which appropriated it, and which made it a centre of a very different character. Christendom has never completely lost sight of it. Christian emblems remain under the plaster of the walls, and this most marvellous creation will need no reconstruction, and but little refitting, to enable it once more to receive the throne of a Christian patriarch. Mosques, it would seem, no more exempt than cathedrals from the pains and penalties of restoration; and St. Sophia has been "restored". But in this case restoration had become an absolute necessity. The building was threatened with destruction, and was daily becoming more ruinous, when in 1847 the sultan Abdul Medjid placed it in the hands of an Italian architect Cavaliere Fossati, by whom the work needful for its preservation was carefully conducted. Roofs were made watertight, foundations were secured, and the superb mosaics which line the interior were, except in the case of Christian emblems, freed from the coats of plaster by which they had been overlaid for ages. In short, this seems to have been a true case of "restoration", unaccompanied by the "destruction" which too often goes hand

in hand with such doings. It was repair which was needed and which was supplied, not reconstruction. [...]"

Hence, the description of the edifice as "the great church", the emphasis put on its Christian character, and the author's wish for its re-conversion to a church are significant in displaying in what context Hagia Sophia had become a subject of discussion. Similar expectations culminated when the Ottoman capital Istanbul was occupied by the Allies in 1918 after the Ottoman Empire was defeated in World War I, until the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. An article in the "New York Times" published on 22 June 1919, under the headlines "Art Glories of Saint Sophia; Sealed Beauties of Saint Sophia at Constantinople May Be Revealed When Sultan's Capital Passes into Other Hands", begins with a quotation from W. R. Lethaby and H. Swainson:

> Sancta Sophia is the most interesting building on the world's surface. Like Karnak in Egypt, or the Athenian Parthenon, it is one of the four great pinnacles of architecture, but unlike them it is no ruin, nor does it belong to a past world of constructive ideas, although it precedes by seven hundred years the fourth culmination of the building art in Chartres, Amiens, or Bourges, and thus must ever stand as the supreme monument of the Christian cycle[19].

It is also in this article that the photographs of the mosaics documented in the works of Fossati and Salzenberg were published. By this means, the Christian character of the edifice was further emphasised, announced to a larger public, and thus demands to reveal the 'Christian monument' as a 'Christian shrine' were once more promoted.

As for scholarly attention, the works of the French Byzantinist Charles Diehl from the Sorbonne and the American Byzantinist Emerson Howland Swift from Columbia University can be listed among the pioneering studies[20]. Swift studied the church onsite before 1926 for his research on Hagia Sophia, published later in 1940, with the permission of the Turkish Government. Having established relations with the Turkish authorities, he encouraged the American Institute of Architects to cooperate with the Turkish Government to restore the monument[21]. Likewise, Charles Diehl, at a tea given for him while he was working as a visiting scholar at Harvard University, voiced "a hope that art lovers of this country and Europe might prevail upon the Turkish Government either to repair the mosque of Santa Sophia at Constantinople or to allow others to repair it"[22].

These intentions were positively received by the authorities of the young Turkish Republic founded in 29 October 1923. Eventually, Thomas Whittemore, the founder of the Byzantine Institute of America, conducted the first extensive survey and restoration work more than half a century after Fossati's restoration. It was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the President of the Turkish Republic, who gave permission to Whittemore to conduct advanced works on Hagia Sophia in 1931. This had certain repercussions in not only the national but also the international press. In the "New York Times" of 25 December 1932 the works of the Byzantine Institute led by Whittemore were announced with the caption "Mosaics Uncovered in Famous Mosque" and it was reported that "Byzantine

treasures long hidden in Saint Sophia stripped of plaster covering. Some Moslems object. Turkish Government, however, is cooperating in work with American Institute". Giving information about the progress of the work, the article at the same time evoked the 'modern' and 'secular' aspects of the new Republic in its closing sentence: "The more liberal views now taken by Turkey's rulers in all matters pertaining to religion will surely encourage others to help regardless of race or creed"[23]. A year later, the progress of the restoration was mentioned again, emphasising the cautious works of Whittemore and the close attention paid by the Turkish scientists and the President, Gazi Mustafa Kemal, who monitored progress. The article continued:

> In bringing to light the mosaics Mr. Whittemore is adding nothing to them and taking nothing away. He is treating the surface adornments as reverently as a connoisseur handles an old manuscript, seeking simply to preserve what is left. In his task he has had the constant support of the savants and rulers of the new Turkey. Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of Turkey is following the work with keen interest[24].

A HUMANIST PROJECT AT WORK: FROM MOSQUE TO MUSEUM

In June 1931, the Turkish Council of Ministers officially gave permission to the Byzantine Institute of America to uncover and restore the mosaics of Hagia Sophia[25]. In December 1931, the work began by uncovering the mosaics over the imperial gate in the inner narthex[26]. As also emphasised in Whittemore's Preliminary Reports which he regularly sent to the Institute, Atatürk was very interested in his work[27]. Officially invited to participate in the Turkish Historical Institute Congress in Ankara on July 1932, Whittemore was entertained during this visit by Atatürk and his adopted daughter Zehra Kemal at the president's farm near Ankara. In his report to the Institute, he describes this event as:

> The Ghazi's daughter took me about the kiosque and the gardens and at about half past five, the President of the Republic arrived and sent almost immediately for me. [...] It was very hot in the kiosque and he proposed that we moved out to the terrace. There at once the cameras began to work with some of the results that I sent you in the Hakimiyeti Milliye. The close-up shows me in the effort under his intense concentration to tell him something about Byzantine Art. [...] Then the conversation turned to how far Turkish builders had carried architecture beyond the Byzantines. With so many about us, it was not the time to look at the Photographs I had brought to show him but he assured me that there would be a moment before I left the city. After this conversation of twenty minutes or more during which others were waiting to be received he permitted me to retire...and a little later I returned to my hotel in his car[28].

The mosaics revealed provoked enthusiasm and increased the awareness about the historical significance of the building. Two years later, on 25 August 1934, Abidin Özmen, *Maarif Vekili* [Minister of Education], sent an official letter to Aziz Ogan, *İstanbul Âsâr-ı Atika Müzeleri Müdürü* [Director of the Museums of Antiquities in Istanbul] to start the arrangements to convert the mosque into a museum[29] (Fig. 3).

The letter raised particular issues that had to be considered by the directorate such as the organisation of exhibition spaces, the art works to be collected, and the budget for financial support, and also included the appointed staff responsible for carrying on the work. Minister Özmen sent an additional letter to the *Baş Vekâleti Celîle* [Prime Minis-


Fig. 3
The correspondence written by Abidin Özmen, *Maarif Vekili* [Minister of Education] in 25 August, 1934.
Source: S. Türkoğlu, *Ayasofya'nın Öyküsü*, İzmir 2002, p. 212.

try], asking for the ownership of Hagia Sophia to be transferred from the *Evkaf Umum Müdürlüğü* [General Directorate of Pious Foundations] to the *Maarif Vekâleti* [Ministry of Education] so as to make possible its change in status[30]. Finally, on 24 November 1934, the *Vekiller Heyeti* [Turkish Council of Ministers] declared the secularisation of the mosque, hence its conversion into a museum by official decree. In the decree, the rationale behind this decision was stated as:

> [...] Owing to its historical significance, the conversion of the Hagia Sophia Mosque in Istanbul – a unique architectural monument – into a museum will gratify the entire Eastern World and will cause humanity to gain a new institution of knowledge [...][31] (Fig. 4).

According to Özmen, this idea of conversion and the motives behind it were initially suggested by Atatürk himself in one of his usual dinner gatherings, in which state affairs were the main focus of discussion. According to the memories of Özmen as reported in the Hagia Sophia visitor's book, Atatürk explained his intention to convert Hagia Sophia into a museum with the following words:

> It will be reasonable to convert it [Hagia Sophia] into a museum, which will be open to the visits of all nations and religions rather than letting it belong to a single religion and a single group, and it will particularly be appropriate to collect the Byzantine works in this new museum [...][32] (Fig. 5).

In the final analysis, the conversion process of Hagia Sophia into a museum, which started with the survey and the restoration by Whittemore in cooperation with German archaeologists, Italian restorers and Turkish scholars in 1931, can be read as a milestone in a larger scale project. This larger scale project comprised the basic principles of the new Republic grounded on 'modernisation' and 'secularisation', which at the same time brought together humanist ideals with a special emphasis on the 'respect and praise of science and arts'. Accordingly, the conversion of Hagia Sophia from a Great Mosque into a museum was one of the steps taken to achieve the greater project of the Republic. Rather than highlighting one culture or religion over the other, the conversion promoted an equal stance towards all cultures and religions, which were embraced under the roof of science. In other words, neither a great church nor a great mosque, Hagia Sophia no longer represented the superiority of Christianity over Islam or Islam over Christianity. Instead, Hagia Sophia, as a 'museum' was to become one of the symbols that could substantiate the 'secular' and 'modern' discourse of the Republic. While it represented the value given to the cultural and historical heritage by the new Republic, it also highlighted that 'secularism' was not to be limited to state affairs but to be adopted in all aspects of society.

The opening of the Hagia Sophia Museum aroused considerable interest in both national and international spheres. In Turkish newspapers, the opening ceremony was announced with great enthusiasm. Likewise the museum attracted great curiosity among the public; the number of the visitors exceeded five hundred per day and increased day by day[33]. An article published in "Milliyet", dated 25 March 1935, states:

T.C.
BAŞVEKALET
Kararlar Müdürlüğü
Sayı: 2/1589

BAŞBAKANLIK
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

KARARNAME

    "Maarif Vekilliğinden yazılan 14/11/934 gün ve 94041 sayılı tezkerede: Eşsiz bir mimarlık sanat abidesi olan İstanbul'daki Ayasofya Camiinin tarihi vaziyeti itibariyle müzeye çevrilmesi bütün Şark alemini sevindireceği ve insanlığa yeni bir ilim müessesesi kazandıracağı cihetle bunun müzeye çevrilmesi, çevresindeki evkafa ait dükkanların yıktırılması ve diğerlerinin de evkafça istimlak edilmesi suretiyle güzelleştirilmesi ve tamiri ve daimi muhafızası masraflarına karşılık da evkafça bu sene ve gelecek seneler bütçelerinden muayyen bir para ayrılması hakkında bir karar ittihazı istenilmiş ve Evkaf Umum Müdürlüğünden yazılan 7/11/934 gün ve 153197/107 sayılı mütalanamede, bu camiin Bizanslardan kalma bir eser olması hasebiyle hiç bir vakfı olmadığı ve her ne kadar cami olduktan sonra Sultanlar ve Halk tarafından bazı gelirler bağışlanmışsa da bunlardan aşar olarak bağlanan sultan gelirlerinin kaldırılmış olduğu ve halk tarafından bağlanan gelirler ise kuran okumak ve buna benzer belli ve nerede olursa olsun yapılabilir dini emekler için olup müzeye çevrilmesi ve korunması için verilecek bir geliri bulunmadığı ve şimdiye kadar tamiri, gelirine bakmadan diğer vakıflarla bir arada yapılagelmekte olan bu bina cami olmaktan çıkınca artık buna da imkan kalmayacağı ve bütçelerinin bugünkü vaziyeti herhangi bir yardıma da yol bırakmamakta olduğu ve çevresindeki yapılardan evkafa ait olanları yıkmak ve kaldırmak elden gelirse de ötekine berikine ait olanların Evkafça satın alınmasına imkan bulunmadığı bildirilmiştir.

    Bu iş İcra vekilleri heyetince 24/11/934 te görüşülerek, camiin çevresindeki Evkafa ait binaların Evkaf Umum Müdürlüğünce yıktırılarak temizlettirilmesi ve diğer binaların istimlak, yıkma ve binanın tamir ve muhafazası masrafları da Marif Vekilliğince verilmek suretiyle Ayasofya camiinin müzeye çevrilmesi tasvip ve kabul olunmuştur.

24/11/934

REİSİCUMHUR

K. Atatürk

Bş. V.   Ad. V.   M.M. V.   Da. V.

Ha.V. V.   Ma. V.   Mf. V.   Na. V.

İk. V.   S. I. M. V.   G. İ. V.   Zr. V.

Fig. 4
The decree signed in 24 November 1934, by the *Vekiller Heyeti* [Turkish Council of Ministers] and President Kemal Atatürk. Source: S. Türkoğlu, *Ayasofya'nın Öyküsü*, İzmir 2002, p. 213.

Fig. 5
Abidin Özmen's note in the visitor's book of Hagia Sophia.
Source: S. Türkoğlu, Ayasofya'nın Öyküsü, İzmir 2002, p. 214.

> The conversion of Hagia Sophia to a museum, socially speaking, is a very significant event, not only in our history but also in the history of all humanity. There are other examples where a shrine is assigned for another programme in history. However, all those examples – as far as we can remember – were converted after battles amongst nations. Whereas Hagia Sophia is converted from a shrine into a museum of science[34] [knowledge, wisdom] almost in one day in complete quietness. The way such a significant event took place proves how far people have progressed in thought. Since we are aware that our great revolution has generated deep changes in our thoughts, we have considered the conversion of Hagia Sophia into a science museum as a natural outcome and we have expected that [...] scholars in Europe would pay attention to this event. Besides, it is not possible for a scholar not to appreciate the establishment of a museum in Hagia Sophia. Even though Hagia Sophia was once built as a shrine, the name of the great building has dedicated it to Holy Wisdom. In these times, the only 'wisdom' that can be recognised as 'holy' can be found in 'science'. [...][35]

As it can be seen clearly in this article, the journalists of the new Republic were passionate supporters of the revolutionary pillars such as "secularism", "modernity" and "superiority of science", on which the Republic was founded. Here, the conversion of Hagia Sophia into a museum stood as a symbolic act which was part and parcel of a greater project now that Hagia Sophia did not belong to one religion or nation but to all humanity.

In the international arena, news of the opening of Hagia Sophia Museum together with the archaeological excavations of other remains of the Byzantine heritage in Istanbul was received with great interest. In an article by Kernick in the "New York Times" of 10 February 1935, this was announced with the title "Rebuilding of Istanbul; Kemal Seeking to Modernize the City and also to Restore Byzantium's Glories". The article states:

> In conjunction with her rich and glorious past, I would wish that the Istanbul of tomorrow should bear the imprint of Mustapha Kemal, who is the living symbol of the Turkish Revolution. Here, as in Rome, the problem is threefold. There is the ancient city, there is the modern city, and there is the city of the future. In any comprehensive plan of reconstruction all three must be treated with respect. These words appear in the preface of a report prepared, on behalf of the İstanbul Municipality, by an expert of world-wide repute. The adoption of his plans and his recommendations would alter the whole face of Istanbul but, in the process, the glory of Byzantium would be revealed and this former capital of Turkey would, more than ever, be acknowledged as the City Beautiful. Kemal is now beginning to teach his people that there are things handed by the ages into their keeping which are worthy of respect, that there is room for reverence and discrimination in any survey of past history.

> [...] Istanbul has known greatness and it has known decadence; across its face written the history of Europe, and the end of the book has not yet been reached. To Kemal has been given the opportunity of restoring some of the ancient lines to legibility – as well as writing a new chapter[36].

This article touches upon how the 'modern' and 'secular' Turkish Republic treated its cultural and historical heritage, emphasising that it promoted its past regardless of religion. It also contemplates the bigger picture, in which the treatment of each part of

the architectural heritage is undertaken within an urban project comprising them all. In this respect, the article provides clues about the urban project to be executed in order to modernise the city.

In 1936, the French urban planner Henri Prost was invited to Turkey to transform Istanbul into a modern city[37]. The master plan for Istanbul prepared by Prost bears some similarities with the "City Beautiful" planning approach[38]. In addition to that, Prost's proposal drew attention to the city's "incomparable landscape" and the "glorious edifices" of the past[39]. Bilsel states that Prost suggested to rearrange the surroundings of Hagia Sophia as a "park of archaeology" which would be an open-air museum where at the same time archaeological excavations were to take place[40]. She further continues:

> In his conference at the *Institut de France*, Prost stresses that his proposal for the Archaeo-
> logical Park was approved by Atatürk, who had ordered the transformation of Hagia Sophia
> into a museum. [...] The decision for the conversion of the edifice from the Grand Mosque
> of the Ottoman imperial capital into a museum was certainly a powerful symbolic act. It
> was an expression of the determination of the Republic to break away from the Ottoman
> history by attacking one of its symbols of power. In his speech, Prost quotes Atatürk who
> declared that the edifice did not belong to one religion or another, but to all humanity[41].

Prost worked as the chief planner of Istanbul and his implementations around Hagia Sophia continued until 1950 when the Democrat Party came into power after the multi-party regime was established in the country. It was then that the political circumstances in Turkey started to change, a fact which had its impact both in the social and in the cultural spheres. While Turkish architects and planners replaced Prost, the future history of Hagia Sophia Museum was to witness fervent debates regarding its conversion.

Afterwards

Even in the 1930s, right before the edifice was converted, objections against Hagia Sophia's becoming a museum were pronounced by small conservative groups which were not powerful during the early years of the Republic. For instance, during Whittemore's ongoing restoration work, some marginal groups were reported as protesting:

> [...] Although the Turkish Government was giving its full support and the work was receiv-
> ing the full cooperation of Turkish archaeologists, much gossip has been spread in Istanbul
> regarding the undertaking. Some of the most fanatical Moslem elements objected on reli-
> gious grounds, maintaining that it was contrary to Mohammedan religion, and even insinu-
> ating that Mr. Whittemore's objects was to spread Christian propaganda in Turkey[...][42].

Besides these conservative Muslim groups, who were against Hagia Sophia's becoming a museum and supported its re-conversion into a mosque, there were also certain Christian groups who wanted its re-conversion from a museum, in this case, back into an Orthodox church. In 1952, a Greek newspaper named "Akropolis" announced its support for re-conversion, provoking immediate repercussions in the Turkish press[43].

Rejecting such nostalgic tendencies focusing on the religious status of the edifice, the article published in "Milliyet" among others, advocated Hagia Sophia's becoming a museum[44]. However, while it was converted into a museum, the religious symbolism of Hagia Sophia gradually came to loom large. Both political and social movements, which have supported the rise of religion in the subsequent decades, resulted in highlighting either the Christian or the Islamic significance of Hagia Sophia. For instance, during his visit to Istanbul in 1967, Pope Paul VI kneeled down and prayed in Hagia Sophia Museum (Fig. 6)[45]. The Pope's symbolic gesture led to protests by the conservative Muslim groups in Turkey. The day after, the members of the *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği* [National Turkish Student Association], who were the young representatives of the national-conservative wing in Turkey, succeeded in avoiding the control of the guards and manifested against Pope's praying by praying as a group (performing the Muslim *namaz*) (Fig. 7) [46]. Even though the conversion of Hagia Sophia into a museum had put an end to religious exercises and worship, such events, connected to the rise of the religiously oriented political movements, made use of the meanings attributed to the edifice as a means of political propaganda[47]. Hence, in 1980 the Turkish government led by the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel declared the decision to transform a part of the imperial gallery of Hagia Sophia into a Muslim prayer hall. This act was interpreted in the "New York Times", in an article titled "Sacred and Secular: Turkish Dilemma" with the following words:

> Part of the widely venerated Byzantine monument Hagia Sophia is now open to Moslems for prayers, but neither Islamic fundamentalists nor modern secularists are very happy about it. [...] Some Turkish intellectuals, on the other hand, assert that the Government's decision to reserve a section of Hagia Sophia for prayers violates the secular principles of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey. [...] The last month Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel's Government announced its decision to set aside part of Hagia Sophia known as the Imperial Gallery as an Islamic sanctuary. The move brought criticism from Atatürk's disciples, who saw it is a dangerous concession to the fundamentalists and after the restoration of religious courses in the schools, a further step in the Islamic revival. Several Istanbul scholars warned in the press that what appeared to be symbolic gesture was in fact a deviation from Ataturk's revolution. A prominent writer, Ugur Mumcu, criticized the Government indirectly in his column in the leftist newspaper Cumhuriyet, questioning whether Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamic party, was a greater enemy of Atatürk than the men in office and whether Mr. Erbakan could do anything more startling and unnecessary than making a mosque at Hagia Sophia. "As a man believing in Atatürk's ideals, I consider Hagia Sophia is part of the universal culture", Doğan Kuban, professor of architectural history at Istanbul Technical University, said in a recent interview. "The controversy over Hagia Sofia is part of the conflict between secularists and non-secularists ever since the days of Ataturk. Now the Government, by opening the sultan's gallery, has given a little to the anti-secular camp, but this doesn't change the status of Hagia Sophia"[48].

The 'sacred' versus 'secular' conflict around Hagia Sophia Museum has continued until today. At the present, the edifice functions as a museum and all religious exercises and

Fig. 6
Pope Paul VI kneeled and prayed in Hagia Sophia during his visit to Istanbul in 1967.
Source: "Milliyet", 26 July 1967.

worship are prohibited. However, particularly among politicians, Hagia Sophia's being a 'museum' is still a controversial issue. The edifice has been used as a propagandistic symbol not only by the governmental authorities but also by the opposing parties to at-

Fig. 7
The members of the *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği* [National Turkish Student Association] protested against the Pope's praying by performing the *namaz* as a group. Source: "Milliyet", 27 July 1967.

tract further supporters and followers. Seen in this light, Hagia Sophia's recent history as a political symbol awaits to be narrated in another study.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the use of the symbolic power of Hagia Sophia within changing political contexts during the long history of the monument, with particular emphasis on its conversion into a museum in the Republican period. It is shown that the monument has continued its momentous existence through the millennia until today, being adapted to drastic political and cultural changes, as new values and meanings have been continuously attributed to it. It is claimed that the edifice has maintained its symbolic power and has continued to be used for the purpose of political propaganda throughout its long history. Hagia Sophia was initially constructed as the Great Orthodox Church under the Eastern Roman Empire, representing the power both of Christianity and of imperial authority. When Byzantine rule was replaced with the Ottoman Empire, Hagia Sophia was converted into the Grand Mosque of the capital as a political act representing both the power of Islam and Ottoman imperial rule. In

the Turkish Republican period, the building has been subject to a new shift of meaning that has represented the power of the new secular Republic and has been used as one of the symbolic means to convey its ideals. It was converted from the Grand Mosque of Istanbul into a museum in line with the 'modernisation' and 'secularisation' policies of the young Republic. This chapter examines the conversion of Hagia Sophia into a museum showing how it constituted a powerful symbolic act of the greater Republican project grounded on revolutionary pillars such as "secularism", "modernity" and "superiority of science".

Notes

1   T.F. Mathews, *The Early Churches of Constantinople*, London 1980, p. 11.

2   H. Kahler, *Hagia Sophia*, trans. E. Childs, New York 1967, p. 14.

3   Procopius, *Procopius*, trans. H.B. Dewing, Cambridge 2002, p. 11.

4   W.E. Kleinbauer, *Saint Sophia at Constantinople*, New Hampshire 1999, p. 18.

5   *Ibid.*; G. Downey, *Justinian as a Builder*, in "The Art Bulletin", December 1950, pp. 262-266; E.H. Swift, *Hagia Sophia*, New York 1940.

6   Kleinbauer, *Saint Sophia* cit., p. 17.

7   *Ibid.*, p. 16; Downey, *Justinian* cit.

8   H. Inalcık, *The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 1300-1600*, New York - Washington 1973, pp. 23-30.

9   S. Vryonis, *Byzantine Constantinople and Ottoman Istanbul: Evolution in a Millennial Imperial Iconography*, in I. Bierman, D. Preziosi, R. Abouelhaj (eds.), *The Ottoman City and Its Parts: Urban Structure and Social Order*, New York 1991, pp. 13-52.

10   The royal mosque complexes of Selim II and Murat III were founded in Edirne and Manisa respectively. However, these sultans were entombed in the Ottoman capital as was the tradition until the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, the choice of Hagia Sophia's garden for the location of the tombs is worthy of attention.

11   For further information on the Ottoman Hagia Sophia, see G. Necipoğlu, *The Life of an Imperial Monument: Hagia Sophia after Byzantium*, in R. Mark, A.S. Çakmak (eds.), *Hagia Sophia from the Age of Justinian to the Present*, New York 1992, pp. 195-225.

12   N.B. Teteriatnikov, *Mosaics of Hagia Sophia, Istanbul: The Fossati Restoration and the Work of the Byzantine Institute*, Washington 1998, p. 3.

13   S. Türkoğlu, *Ayasofya'nın Öyküsü*, İzmir 2002, p. 167. See also R.E. Koçu, *İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, Istanbul 1958, p. 1460.

14   [They are beautiful; hide them yet because our religion forbids them: hide them well, but do not destroy them, for who knows what can happen?], cited in C. Mango, *Materials for the study of the mosaics of St. Sophia at Istanbul*, Washington 1962, p. 140.

15   *Ibid.*, p. 14

16   Before undertaking the restoration, Abdülmecid even sent the most conservatives imams to Mecca for pilgrimage to avoid any obstacles they could have caused. See Mango, *Materials* cit., pp. 12-14, 135.

17   Necipoğlu, *The Life of an Imperial* cit., p. 224.

18   Mango, *Materials* cit., p. 4.

19 W.R. Lethaby, H. Swainson, *The Church of Sancta Sophia, Constantinople: A study of Byzantine Building*, London - New York 1894, p. ii.

20 Ch. Diehl, in J.B. Bury (ed.), *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 4, Cambridge 1927, pp. 752-53.

21 "New York Times", 29 November 1926.

22 "New York Times", 15 March 1927.

23 "New York Times", 25 December 1932.

24 "New York Times", 20 November 1933.

25 Koçu, *İstanbul* cit., p. 1456.

26 R.S. Nelson, *Hagia Sophia, 1850-1950,* Chicago 2004, p. 176.

27 Whittemore's reports to the Byzantine Institute, cited in Nelson, *Hagia Sophia* cit., p. 179.

28 Whittemore to Gano, letter dated 19 July 1932, Dumbarton Oaks Archive, cited in Nelson, *Hagia Sophia* cit., pp. 179-180.

29 Summarized by the authors, the original is as follows: "*Ayasofya Camii'nin esaslı bir müze haline getirilmesi istenilmektedir. Bu büyük abidenin Bizans ve Osmanlı dönemine ait eski ve kıymetli eserleri sinesinde toplayarak bütün azametiyle kendisini göstermesi muvafık görülmektedir. İçine konacak eserler bugün mevcut eserler olacak ve müze bu şekilde az zamanda teessüs edilebilecektir. Bu işin yapılması için ilk iş olarak:1. Caminin müze haline getirilmesi için hali aslını bozamamak üzere iç ve dışında neler yapılmalıdır, 2.Nakledilecek eserler nelerdir, 3. Bu iki iş için ne kadar paraya ihtiyaç vardır ve müfredatı nedir? hususlarının tayini icap etmektedir. Bu cihetlerin İstanbul Müzeleri müdürü Aziz Beyin riyasetinde Evkaf Müdürü Niyazi, Eski Eserler Koruma Encümeni asasından Eftaleddin, mimar Kemal, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Müdürü Tahsin, ve [could not read] Beylerden müteşekkil bir komisyon teşkil edilmiştir. Vilayetçe Belediyede büyük ve bu işlere vakıf bir zatın komisyona gönderilmesi muvafıktır. Komisyon yukarıdaki üç noktayı derhal tespit edecektir. Vekâlet Müzeler müdürü Hamit Zübeyr Bey bu işi İstanbul'da bulunduğu müddet doğrudan doğruya takip edecektir. Ankara Etnografya Müzesi Müdürü Osman Ferit Bey İstanbul'da kaldığı çağda komisyonda çalışacaktır. Istanbul Vilayetine, Umum Evkaf Müdürlüğüne, İstanbul Müzeler Müdürlüğü'ne, yazılmıştır*".

30 Koçu, *İstanbul* cit., p. 1457.

31 Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "*[...] Eşsiz bir mimarlık sanat abidesi olan İstanbul'daki Ayasofya Camii'nin tarihi vaziyeti itibariyle müzeye çevrilmesi bütün Şark alemini sevindireceği ve insanlığa yeni bir ilim müessesesi kazandıracağı cihetle bunun müzeye çevrilemesi [...]*". Cited in S. Türkoğlu, *Ayasofya'nın Öyküsü* [The Story of Hagia Sophia], Izmir 2002, p. 213.

32 Translated by the authors, the original is as follows*: "Bir dine ve bir sınıfa mâl olarak kalmaktansa bütün akvâm ve edyânın ziyaretine açık olarak bir müze haline getirilmesinin uygun ve bilhassa bu yeni müzede Bizans eserlerinin toplanması muvafık olacağı [...]"*, in Türkoğlu, *Ayasofya'nın Öyküsü* cit., p. 214.

33 "Cumhuriyet", 1-2 November 1935. "Akşam", 7 November 1935. "*[...] İlk gün 480'i yerli, 28'i Alman ve Amerikalı seyyahlar olmak üzere, 790 kişi müzeyi ziyaret etmiştir. Havaların soğuk ve yağmurlu olmasına rağmen, o zamandan beri ziyaretçi adedi günden güne iki yüzden aşağı düşmüyor. [...]*" November 19, 1935: "*[...] Ayasofya Müzesinin ziyaretçileri gün geçtikçe artmaktadır. Son Cuma günü müzeyi gezenler beş yüz kişiden fazladır. Diğer günlerde de ziyaretçi sayısı yüzden aşağı inmemektedir. [...]*".

34 Here the word 'science' does not refer to 'natural science', it means 'knowledge' or 'wisdom'.

35 Translated by the authors, the original is as follows: "*Ayasofyanın müze haline gelmesi yalnız bizim tarihimizde değil, bütün insanlık tarihinde sosyal bakımdan pek mühim bir hadisedir. Bir ibadet yerinin başka bir işe tahsis edilmesinin tarihte başka misalleri de vardır. Fakat o misallerin hepsi –hatırlayabildiğimize gore- milletler arasında muharebelerden, [...] sonra olmuştur. Halbuki Ayasofya'nın tam sakinlik içinde, hemen bir günde gibi, bir ibadet yerinden bir ilim müzesi haline geçti. Bu kadar mühim bir hadisenin bu suretle vaki olması insanların fikren nekadar çok ilerlemiş olduklarını gösterir. Biz, büyük inkılâbımızın*"

fikirlerimizde pek derin değişme husule getirmiş olduğunu bildiğimiz için, Ayasofya'nın bir ilim müzesi olması nı pek tabi bulmakla beraber, Avrupa'daki ilim adamlarının bu hadiseye dikkat edeceklerini, [...] *sanıyorduk.* [...] *Zaten herhangi bir ilim adamının Ayasofya'da bir müze kurulmasını takdir etmemesine imkan yoktur. Ayasofya vaktile bir ibadet yeri olarak yapılmış olmakla beraber, o büyük yapıya takılmış olan isim onu (Mukaddes hikmet) e tahsis etmişti. Bu zamanda insanlar için mukaddes tanınabilecek tek bir hikmet te ancak ilimde bulunur"*, in "Milliyet", 25 March 1935.

[36] "New York Times", 10 February 1935.

[37] For further information on how Prost undertook the planning of Istanbul, see C. Bilsel, *Remodelling the Imperial Capital in the Early Republican Era: the Representation of History in Henri Prost's Planning of Istanbul*, in J. Osmond, A. Cimdiņa (eds.), *Power and Culture: Identity, Ideology, Representation*, Pisa 2007, pp. 95-115.

[38] P. Akpınar, *İstanbul'u yeniden inşaa etmek, 1937 Henri Prost Planı*, in E. Altan-Ergut, B. İmamoğlu (eds.), *Cumhuriyetin Mekanları, Zamanları, İnsanları*, Ankara 2009, p. 109.

[39] Bilsel, *Remodelling* cit., p. 95.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 108; see also note 34 in p. 114.

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 108-109.

[42] "New York Times", 25 December 1932.

[43] The issue of the Greek newspaper, "Akropolis", could not consulted by the authors. The information about the mentioned article was gathered from the Turkish newspaper, "Milliyet". See "Milliyet", 14 July 1952, 19 July 1952.

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] The Turkish newspaper "Milliyet" announced the visit of Pope Paul VI in the banner headlines. With the stand first it was stated that "Pope kneeled and prayed during his visit in Hagia Sophia". "Milliyet", 26 July 1967.

[46] The Turkish newspaper "Milliyet" announced the protest with the headline "When the Pope prayed..." and "Namaz was performed in Hagia Sophia". The caption under the photograph of the group performing *namaz* states: "The youths who went to the museum, with in their hands the portrait of the Conqueror that they would send to Pope after the press conference, went beyond the railings despite the efforts of the guards". "Milliyet", 27 July 1967.

[47] See the news published, which announced another performance of *namaz* by the *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği* [National Turkish Student Association] members as a group in 1976 in "Milliyet", 8 May 1976. A more interesting piece of news informed that Hagia Sophia 'museum' was closed to visits on the anniversary of the conquest of İstanbul on 29 May 1976. "Milliyet", 29 May 1976.

[48] "New York Times", 31 August 1980.

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Cânâ Bilsel

After graduation from the Department of Architecture at Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Cânâ Bilsel received her DEA in Sociology and Urban Geography at the Université de Paris X - Nanterre and a DEA at the Ecole d'Architecture de Paris-Belleville. She obtained her Ph.D degree at the Université de Paris X - Nanterre in 1996. She has published several articles on urban history, urbanism and public space, and recently collaborated in the book, *Smyrne 1830-1930: De la fortune à l'oubli*, edited by M. C. Smyrnelis (Paris, Éditions Autrement 2006). She is currently teaching architecture and urban design as associate professor at the Department of Architecture of Middle East Technical University.

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Elena Brambilla is professor of Modern History at the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy of the University of Milan. Her research interests were initially on the history of universities and the liberal professions, subsequently she has moved on to the history of medicine and science on the one hand, and on the other to church-state relations and the development of ecclesiastical courts. Among her publications: *La medicina nel settecento: dal monopolio dogmatico alla professione scientifica* [Medicine in the 18th Century: from monopoly of dogma to scientific profession] in F. Della Peruta (ed.), *Storia d'Italia*, *Annali*, 7, *Malattia e medicina* [Illness and medicine], Turin 1983; *Alle origini del Sant'Uffizio. Penitenza, confessione e giustizia spirituale dal Medioevo al XVI sceolo* [Penitence, confession and spiritual justice from the Middle Ages to the 16th century], Bologna 2000.

Emanuel Buttigieg

Emanuel Buttigieg is the holder of a first class honours degree in history from the University of Malta. His academic interests are now focussed on a PhD about status and gender in the history of the Order of St. John in the 16th and 17th centuries.

Çağla Caner

Çağla Caner graduated from the Middle East Technical University and has worked as a research assistant in the Department of Architecture in the same university. Her doctoral thesis is on The Architectural and Urban History of Western Anatolian Towns

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Gábor Demeter

Gábor Demeter was born in Debrecen, Hungary, in 1980, and educated at the University of Debrecen, where he is assistant lecturer in Physical Geography and Geoinformatics. In 2007 he completed a doctoral dissertation on diplomacy in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. His other research interests are economic history, historical geography, and the question of ethnicity and nationality in the historical Hungary. His publications include a study of migration and assimilation in North-East Hungary, 1715-1992 (2007) and an article on Bulgarian attempts to avoid isolation on the eve of the Second Balkan War. He has co-edited, with V. Árvay and E. Bodnár, a study of the Balkans and the Eastern Question in the Policy of the Great Powers (2005) and, with E. Bodnár, he has compiled a volume on Nation and State in the 19th and 20th centuries (2006).

Ivan Ilchev

Ivan Ilchev is professor of modern history of the Balkans in the History Faculty of Sofia University, Bulgaria. Currently he is Rector of that Universty. He has written books on diplomatic history, history of ideas, history of everyday life and biographies.

Kenan İnan

Born in 1961, Kenan İnan studied at the Department of Middle Eastern Studies of the University of Manchester, England. There he received the degrees of MA and PhD. He is Professor of Early Modern History at the Karadeniz Technical University of Trabzon, Turkey. His research interests centre on Ottoman historiography and 17th-century Ottoman court records of the city of Trabzon. He is currently the Dean of the Faculty of Science and Letters.

Ceren Katipoğlu

Ceren Katipoğlu is Research Assistant at the Architecture Department of the Middle East Technical University in Ankara since 2004. She took her bachelor degree in Architecture in 2003 and her Master of Art degree in 2007. She is a PhD student in the Architectural History Graduate Program at the Middle East Technical University. Her doctoral thesis is on provincial Ottoman mosque architecture in the 19th

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Darina Martykánová

Darina Martykánová graduated in Turkish Studies and the History and Culture of Islamic Countries from the Charles University, Prague, and is now a PhD student at the Department of Modern History of the Universidad Autónoma of Madrid. Her thesis is a comparative study of Spanish and Ottoman engineers in the 19th century and focuses on the discourses of progress and modernization and their interplay with the construction of professional identities. She has published works on Spanish as well as Ottoman history.

Alexandre Massé

Alexandre Massé obtained a diploma of *professeur certifié* of history and geography, and is preparing a doctorate in contemporary history at the University of Toulouse II-Le Mirail focused on the role of French consuls in the east of Greece during the first half of the 19th century. His main research interests are representations and their political and economic consequences, the birth of the idea of a civilizing mission and the place of France in the East. He has already published an article in the *Cahier de la maison de la recherche en sciences humains* (2007) and in the joint publication run by J. Ulbert (2010) on consular functions in the 19th century.

Iakovos Michailidis

Iakovos Michailidis is an Assistant Professor in Contemporary and Modern History at the Department of History & Archaeology Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece. His research interests focus on population movements in South East Europe, the position of minorities and the intervention of the Great Powers. Among his recent publications are *The War of Statistics: Slav-Speaking Emigrants and Refugees from Greece (1912-1930)* and *Greek – Yugoslav Relations (1944-1949) (in two volumes).*

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Markéta P. Rubešová

Markéta P. Rubešová received her MA degree in General History and Hebrew Studies at Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic in 2007, with a thesis entitled 'The Ottoman State and Society as Reflected in Rabbinic Literature of the 16th - 18th Centuries'. She is currently a doctoral student at Charles University, Prague. Her research interests include Jewish history under Christianity and under Islam in a comparative perspective, the individual and society in the historical process, Jewish emancipation and 'assimilation', especially the question of continuity and change in the sphere of the individual and collective identities.

Hana Sobotková

Hana Sobotkavá received her MA degree in Comparative History from Charles University in Prague, as also a MA degree in Latin American Studies there, and a DEA in Oriental Studies from INALCO in Paris. She was a visiting student at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich, Germany. In 2005-6, she worked at the Czech Liaison Office for Research and Development (CZELO) in Brussels. As a PhD candidate at Charles University in Prague, she is currently researching topics related to the perception of the Balkans in Europe, and in general she is interested in discussion and research pertaining to Orientalism in European culture in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Constantia Soteriou

Constantia Soteriou is a doctoral student at the University of Cyprus, at the Department of Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies. Her research interests and the theme of her dissertation are the Islamic political movement in Turkey, the establishment of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) and the women's movement in Turkey.

Dimitrios Stamatopoulos

Dimitrios Stamatopoulos received his Ph.D. from the Aristotelion University of Thessaloniki in 1998. In 2001, he was a visiting fellow at Princeton University. Since 2000, he has taught history at the University of Macedonia, in the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies. He was appointed lecturer in Balkan and Late Ottoman history in the same department in 2003. His book, *Reform and Secularization: Towards a Re-synthesis of the History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the 19th Century* (Alexandria, Athens, 2003), deals with the influence of the Tanzimat reforms on internal political relations as well as on the functioning of the institution of the Patriarchate. His current interests focus on the relationship between religion and politics in the Balkans and more specifically on the process of secularization and the rise of civil society.

Sinem Türkoğlu Önge

Sinem Türkoğlu Önge received her B.Arch degree in Architecture and M.A. degree in History of Architecture from the Middle East Technical University, Department of Architecture. Her main research interests are the architectural and urban history of the 19th and early 20th century Ottoman and Turkish cities. She is currently pursuing her Ph.D. at the same university, on the transformation of urban space in Ankara in the early Republican period. She is working as an expert-architect in the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Turkey.

Pelin Yoncacı

Pelin Yoncacı graduated from the Middle East Technical University. She has participated in various projects about social and urban transformations in Istanbul in the 1920s, and in Ankara at the end of the 1990s. She is currently a PhD student in the School of Architecture and Urban Design at the University of California Los Angeles. Her research interests are the spatial experience of streets; museum/architecture studies; architectural history and the material culture of the Roman Empire, particularly in Asia Minor; the integration of archaeological, textual and visual evidence and the use of information technology in the architectural documentation of ancient urban sites.

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9. *Guidelines and References Points for Learning and Teaching in the Areas of History of European Integration and of the European Union, World and Global History, e-Learning and Digitisation in History, Developing EU-Turkey Dialogue, Regional and Transnational History* (CLIOHWORLD Guide 1), Pisa 2011, second revised edition, Pisa 2011.

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