



Imaging frontiers, contesting identities / edited by Steven G. Ellis and Lud'a Klusáková
(Frontiers and identities : thematic work group 5 ; 2)

305.8 (21.)

1. Identità 2. Multiculturalismo I. Ellis, Steven G. II. Klusáková, Lud'a

CIP a cura del Sistema bibliotecario dell'Università di Pisa



This volume is published thanks to the support of the Directorate General for Research of the European Commission, by the Sixth Framework Network of Excellence CLIOHRES.net under the contract CIT3-CT-2005-00164. The volume is solely the responsibility of the Network and the authors; the European Community cannot be held responsible for its contents or for any use which may be made of it.

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Photo Scala Archives, Florence

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Lungarno Pacinotti, 43

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www.edizioniplus.it - Section "Biblioteca"

Member of



Association of American
University Presses

ISBN 978-88-8492-466-7

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The Irish Paradigm in the 19th Century British Discourse on Bosnia-Herzegovina

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ABSTRACT

This chapter reveals a largely unknown connection between the ostensibly disparate territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ireland and Great Britain. It was not uncommon for late 19th-century Britons to draw parallels between politics and society in Ireland and Bosnia-Herzegovina – two countries on the ‘margins’ of Europe subject to imperial authority. This study discusses these parallels, and explores their political implications. In doing so it highlights the different kinds of relationships which Great Britain and its governments established with the European peripheries. Finally, this chapter challenges the thesis of Maria Todorova, contained in her pioneering study, *Imagining the Balkans* (1997). Todorova’s argument, that the Balkans were perceived as the nadir of Europe, is challenged by introducing an approach which emphasizes a ‘centre-periphery’ relationship for the study of cultural relations within Europe.

In questo capitolo si guarderà alla costruzione ottocentesca del discorso britannico sulla Bosnia-Erzegovina a partire dalla “questione irlandese”, punto nodale della politica britannica interna per alcuni decenni, nonché aspetto cruciale negli anni Settanta, proprio durante la riattivazione dell’interesse britannico, pubblico e politico, per la Questione d’Oriente.

Sono assai numerosi gli scritti britannici della seconda metà dell’Ottocento che tradiscono un atteggiamento di superiorità culturale sia nei confronti dell’Irlanda che della Bosnia-Erzegovina. Questo preciso modo di porsi colloca i due paesi, rispetto alla Gran Bretagna, in una condizione di ‘periferia’ culturale. Così, rispetto ad un ‘centro’ caratterizzato dai valori della ‘civiltà’, i due paesi situati ai confini europei sono connotati come essenzialmente barbari. In più, alcune forti somiglianze tra la Bosnia e l’Irlanda, da un punto di vista politico, economico, sociale e culturale, hanno fatto sì che diplomatici e viaggiatori britannici nell’Impero ottomano confrontassero anche di fatto queste due realtà. Parlando della Bosnia nel contesto ottomano, come si avrà modo di osservare, non era raro che i britannici ricorressero al paradigma irlandese.

Tuttavia, i soggetti britannici, pur confrontando le due realtà periferiche in base alle loro somiglianze reali, instauravano anche una scala gerarchica di valore. Quest’ultima non solo limitava le capacità della Bosnia-Erzegovina, se confrontata con l’Irlanda, a costituir-

si in uno stato autonomo, ma poneva anche i bosniaco-erzegovesi, nelle rappresentazioni letterarie ed iconografiche, in una posizione d'inferiorità rispetto agli irlandesi. Tale visione britannica era fortemente influenzata dalla posizione geo-politica di questi due paesi: mentre l'Irlanda si trovava nella zona d'influenza politica britannica e a breve distanza da Londra, la Bosnia non solo era distante in termini fisici, ma ruotava anche attorno alla 'dispotica e corrotta' Porta.

La prospettiva irlandese, da un lato, mette in luce le diverse forme del rapporto che la Gran Bretagna instaurava con le sue periferie europee; dall'altro, essa evidenzia un legame inaspettato tra la Bosnia, l'Irlanda e la Gran Bretagna. Infine, la nota tesi di Maria Todorova, secondo la quale i legami culturali all'interno dell'Europa sono regolati secondo l'asse Est-Ovest, sarà contestata a partire da un approccio che preferisce la relazione centro-periferia per lo studio dei rapporti culturali all'interno dell'Europa.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the construction of a 19th-century British discourse on Bosnia and Bosnians from the perspective of the Irish Question, the issue which lay at the core of British government policy in the 1870s¹. This was the period that, with the outbreak of the Bosnian and Bulgarian peasant revolts between 1875 and 1876, and the violent Turkish intervention against the *rayah* that followed, public opinion in Great Britain became interested in the regions of Turkey-in-Europe, and British politics became preoccupied with the Eastern Question.

There is a variety of English-language writing from the second half of the 19th century that suggests an attitude of cultural superiority towards both Ireland and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most of these writings place the two countries, when they are compared with England, in a condition of cultural periphery; the English 'core' is characterized by the values of civilization, while Ireland and Bosnia are seen as essentially barbarous and their populations as racially inferior². Moreover, an analogy between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Ireland emerged as certain British travellers and diplomats in the Ottoman Empire compared these two realities from economic, political, social and cultural perspectives. In fact, especially when talking about Bosnia within the Ottoman context, the British frequently made use of the Irish political paradigm.

Nevertheless, British travellers and diplomats, although comparing the two peripheric realities on the basis of this analogy, very often established a hierarchical scale of values. This scale not only saw the Bosnians, in comparison with the Irish, as less capable of establishing an autonomous state. It also, in literary and iconographic representations, placed the Bosnians and the Herzegovinians – both of Muslim and Christian religious backgrounds – in a position of cultural and racial inferiority. Such a point of view was strongly influenced by the geo-political position of these two countries: whereas Ireland was under British political influence and close to London, Bosnia-Herzegovina

was not only more distant from England, it also revolved around the 'despotic' and 'corrupted' Porte.

COMPARISONS BETWEEN IRELAND AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

In the 1870s it was neither exceptional nor unusual in both British diplomat reports and travellers' accounts to draw comparisons between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Ireland. The words of H.G. Elliot, British ambassador in Constantinople during the Eastern Crisis, can be taken as an example. In 1875 Elliot considered the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina "not unlike that of the landlords and tenants of Ireland"³. This same tendency can be discerned in the writings of travellers who visited Bosnia in the following years. William Miller, for example, a well-known 'authority' on Balkan affairs, in his *Travels and Politics in the Near East*, claimed that "The occupied territory, it must be remembered, is largely agricultural, and the Bosnian and the Hercegovinian peasants have an earth-hunger not less intense than that of the Irish farmer"⁴. Even J.P. Barry, one of the few Irishman who travelled to the Balkans, compared the strength of Herzegovina's peasants to that of his own fellow countrymen. He also reminded his readers of the insignificant size of the Irish potatoes – the failure of which had resulted in the Great Famine of 1845-9 – when compared to those cultivated in Herzegovina:

When I look upon these stalwart shepherds and husbandmen, and take in my hand some of their champion potatoes weighing nearly 2 kilos, I think of Sydney Smith's humorous definition of my own countrymen, and see its applicability here. If an Irishman of that time could be described as a 'six-foot machine for turning potatoes into human nature', the men of Herzegovina must be their first cousins on the strength of the same fare. The relationship, alas, does not extend to the tubers, for the 'praties' of old Ireland since the famine must close their eyes with shame in presence of the lusty giants turned out of their furrows by Balkan farmers⁵.

Both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Ireland were countries with a dominant agrarian character, but common social, religious and political aspects also prompted comparisons. In both countries social divisions coincided with religious ones, splitting a society that linguistically, and sometimes even ethnically, was unified. Protestant landlords found their mirror image in the Muslim *beys*⁶ and *agas*⁷, whereas the Catholic peasants of Ireland had their peers in the Christian *rayah* of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, the Irish ethnic background of some Protestant landlords, and the English language spoken by the vast majority of the Irish population, was reflected in the shared ethnic roots of the Bosnians – Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox – and in their use of one South Slavic language⁸.

Focusing on 19th century Bosnian and Irish history, one finds two other features that might equally have rendered possible the comparisons between Ireland and Bosnia drawn by British observers. First, both countries, throughout the 19th century, were frequently the theatre of ferocious and violent political struggles for administrative autonomy. Whereas the Bosnian Muslim *beys* and *agas* first, and later the Serb leaders as

well, claimed independence from the Porte, the Irish Home Rulers engaged in similar actions against London. Second, the peasants of both countries, through armed revolt, also showed strong determination to bring about reform – during the last years of the 18th century in Ireland and in the 1860s and 1870s in Bosnia.

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF AN IMAGINARY PROCESS

As a consequence of the conversion to Islam and of the imposition of the feudal military system, the native nobility in Bosnia represented both the landowning class and the political class⁹ during the period of Ottoman dominion:

The political situation was extremely favourable for the Muslims. The conversions had created a situation in which the political and economic power was held by a Muslim ruling class that was nevertheless of a predominantly local Slavic origin¹⁰.

In the first decades of the 19th century, these Muslim lords represented the major political problem for the crumbling Ottoman Empire. The lords sought formal acknowledgment of the administrative autonomy from the Porte that, in practice, had already existed for years. In the previous decades the local nobility established a rule of law, which, for example, denied the Turkish governor the right to spend any more than three days in Sarajevo, and forced him to settle in Travnik¹¹. The situation worsened in the 1830s as a wave of armed rebellions organized by the Bosnian lords, brought one of the rebels, Husejn-kapetan¹², to demand administrative autonomy and an end to the Ottoman reforms in Bosnia. The Grand Vizier crushed the Bosnian lords' rebellion in 1850-51, deploying Omer Pasha Latas, one of his most effective governors¹³.

By 1703, as a consequence of the plantations and land confiscations in the 16th and 17th centuries, the vast majority of Ireland's landlords were of English or Scottish descent. The accumulation of land and wealth in the hands of British Protestants, at the expense of the Gaelic Irish and Old English landowners, precluded Irish Catholics from holding political and economic positions. The new political and economic structure of the country also altered the social composition of the state. Land that previously had provided the basis for complex social and familial ties among the different social classes of Irish Catholics was, in the 18th and 19th centuries, an agent of socio-economic division. In most parts of Ireland the landlord Protestant class was linked to its Catholic tenantry by economic rather than social ties, yet was separated from them religiously and culturally. From the beginning of the 18th century, Ireland was marked by strong social and religious divisions.

But the Protestant landlords of Anglo-Irish ascendancy, who by the 1780s owned over 95 percent of all productive land, represented a problem for the British government. Due to their accumulation of wealth, they tended to be particularly protective of their own interests. In the 18th century, the Irish parliament not only guaranteed Protestants some economic and political freedoms from London, but also became the means through which they would and could claim an autonomous status for Ireland. In the

second half of the 18th century, Ireland was indeed proclaimed a separate kingdom, though still a possession of the British kingdom. This special status was suspended with the imposition of the Act of Union (1801) – and from that point onwards Irish Protestants became progressively marginalized within the British imperial governmental system, losing most of the rights acquired throughout the 17th century¹⁴. Claims for autonomy in both countries had their roots in the status of administrative quasi-autonomy that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Ireland had acquired in the previous centuries.

Furthermore, the peasants of both countries, through armed revolt, also demonstrated strong determination in claiming their rights. Indeed, in 19th-century Bosnia, the major tensions were provoked not by the lords' rebellions, but by the armed revolts of the 1850s onwards organized by the Christian peasants, both Orthodox and Catholic, who at that time represented more than half of the total population¹⁵. Ottoman reforms, introduced in 1839 and built upon in 1856, did not manage to improve the conditions of the Bosnian Christian peasants, who looked for support in neighbouring Serbia and Montenegro. In the revolt of 1875-78 armed support came from Serbia, where nationalists dreamed of a unified state of Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, under the leadership of the latter¹⁶.

In 19th-century Ireland major protests against the British administration were not organized by the Protestant landlords, but by the Irish peasant population of the Catholic faith. Whereas the Land Acts (1870-1909) progressively expropriated the Protestant landlords from their landholdings, weakening their residual authority derived from those properties, Catholic Ireland was strengthened thanks to Emancipation in 1829, and the Land Acts¹⁷. Although most peasant protests spread throughout Ireland in the 19th century, the first took place some decades earlier, at the end of the 18th century, when, following the example of the American and French revolutions, the Catholic population organized an armed revolt in order to express their political discontent and frustration.

The political dominion of one social class with a common faith, requests for administrative autonomy from the central government, and growing peasant discontent expressed through organized revolts, considered along with an historical context that often sees the landowners and peasants united by the same language, if not by the same ethnicity, all constitute elements that justify a comparison of Bosnia and Ireland that can be observed in the writings of some British diplomats and travellers.

READING BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA THROUGH THE 'IRISH LENS'

Furthermore, these comparisons of Bosnia and Ireland by British travellers and diplomats can also be justified because some actual analogies were drawn between the two historical realities – very often followed by the establishment of a hierarchical order between them. The inferior position that Bosnia occupied on this scale was the consequence of the much better social, political and economic situation in 19th-century Ireland. In fact, the improvements to the conditions of Irish tenants, especially after the Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) Act, introduced by the government of William Gladstone in 1870, can be seen

as a significant moment of transition in Irish history. The approval of an act that not only regulated tenants' rights, but also established a new hierarchical order between the landowners and the tenants, was the result of a two-decade campaign that emerged from the Great Famine and represented the first in a series of acts promoted by Gladstone, which in the following years made a positive impact on the Irish rural economy:

[It] provided for compensation for disturbances of tenants evicted other than for non-payment of rent, and made provision for compensation for improvements in the case of a departing tenant. Its so-called 'Bright clauses' allowed tenants to purchase their holdings¹⁸.

In addition, the revival of the Home Rule movement took place in Ireland in the 1870s. During the 1820s the movement's demands for Irish autonomy included calls for the restoration of the Irish parliament and the repeal of anti-Catholic legislation. By the 1870s the movement had gone through a series of significant transformations. In 1874 it became a coherent political party; it also came under the influence of both Protestant Toryism and radical republican movements. Thus, events in the 1870s made the movement a pluralist phenomenon that, on the one hand, continued to represent the Catholic population's desires for national, religious and social emancipation, already evident in the 1820's, while for the Protestant population of Ireland, it represented the only way of protecting their largely secular interests¹⁹:

For almost half a century – from the early 1870s to the end of the Great War – Home Rule was both the single most important feature of Irish political life and major influence within British politics²⁰.

Against this Irish background, we can mention the condition of unaltered hardship of the Bosnian peasants as well as the absence of any kind of organized or structured political opposition in Bosnia. The minor armed rebellions of the Bosnian nobles in the 1850s, which claimed administrative autonomy for Bosnia, but originated in Bosnian protests against Ottoman reforms, were definitively suppressed in 1851 by the Vizer's mobilisation of Omer Pasha Latas. On the other hand, the well-known Ottoman Tanzimat reforms, promoted in Bosnia after Omer Pasha's repressive actions, failed to improve the Bosnian peasants' conditions of life. The unaltered social and economic situation of the Bosnian *rayah* led them, in the 1870s, to look for support from neighbouring Serbia and Montenegro.

Because of the revival of the Home Rule movement and the passing of the Land Acts, the British tendency of the 1870s to read and interpret Bosnian events through an 'Irish lens' was established. Indeed, British representations of the 'Bosnian Other' and of Bosnian politics, that in the decades of the Eastern Crisis originated around the image of the Irish and their political initiatives, took their definitive shape from the significantly better social and political conditions prevalent in Ireland. In their representations of Irish and Bosnian cultural and political life, British diplomats and travellers established a hierarchy, with Bosnia occupying the inferior position. The hierarchy was political, cultural and racial: denying Bosnians the ability to establish an

autonomous state, and focusing on the different stages of cultural evolution reached by the Bosnian and Irish populations. In order to create this Bosnian ‘Otherness’, the British efficiently adopted the pseudo-science of racial differentiation, which was used to classify many other ethnic groups in Europe – such as the Irish and the Jews – along racial lines.

An example of the British denial of the validity of political autonomy for Bosnia-Herzegovina, more resolute than that regarding Ireland, can be seen in the writings of Benjamin Disraeli. In July 1875, at the outbreak of the Bosnian revolt which provoked Russian suggestions of autonomy for Bosnia, Disraeli wrote that “autonomy for Ireland would be less absurd” than for Bosnia²¹. Having recently won the general election, Disraeli’s Conservative government became particularly hostile towards the Home Rulers’ requests, declining several of their bills. The ‘happy’ period of the agrarian reforms promulgated by Gladstone in 1870, had come to an end, until Gladstone revived the policy in 1880. In fact, Disraeli’s Conservative party engaged in a much more severe policy with regard to the regulation of the landowner-tenant relationship. Yet even though the British policies of this period were oriented towards the suppression of the privileges acquired for the Irish Home Rulers during the Gladstone period, Disraeli persisted in perceiving autonomy for Bosnia as much less probable than autonomy for Ireland.

A similar reaction, although of less political significance, is to be found in James Creagh’s travelogue of 1876. Creagh was an Irish-born British army officer, who, at a very young age, was sent by his father to England to continue his ‘anglicization’ as he was becoming “a wild Irishman”²². He was enlisted as a Captain in the First Royals, fought in the Crimean War, and later served in India. Creagh’s Bosnian visit was part of his journey through Hungary and the Balkans in the summer of 1875. On his return to England a year later he published, in two volumes, *Over the borders of Christendom and Eslamiab*. Creagh’s opinion on the version of ‘Home Rule’ in Bosnia is not very different from Disraeli’s: “Home Rule in Bosnia”, wrote Creagh, “would be attended with insurmountable difficulties, compared to which a similar form of government in Ireland would be harmonious and edifying”²³.

Both Disraeli and Creagh, in so arguing, were clearly under the influence of the contemporary Conservative political line, which, after 1874, opted for a policy of ‘non-intervention’ with regard to the Ottoman Empire. This policy was thought to protect British interests in the Near East by maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire²⁴. The main catalyst for this new approach was the fresh role that Russia assumed in Europe after its territorial successes against the Turks from the 1830s. According to this policy of non-intervention, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire would halt Russia’s territorial expansion into the Balkans; in India, British commercial supremacy, as well as economic and geopolitical influence, would be assured.

But we should not exclude the possible role that the changes in Irish society, such as the Land Acts and the political activity of Home Rulers in the 1870s, might have played in influencing both Creagh and Disraeli. On the other hand, they would have not been

alone. In 1876 Richard Monckton Miles, better known as Lord Houghton, argued against autonomy for Bosnia and Bulgaria, on the basis of an absence of a Home Rule movement or Tenant Rights in these two countries²⁵.

Another argument that might be presented as a valid cause for the formulation of these hierarchies is the change of the formal status of Ireland after the union of the kingdoms of Ireland and Great Britain in 1801. Even though the Act of Union did not fully guarantee Ireland the status of a decolonized country, it provoked serious difficulties for contemporaries and historians attempting to define Ireland's precise place in the British imperial system after 1801. It is also true that from then on, at least formally, Ireland ceased to be considered a 'Dominion', or dependent kingdom.

David Fitzpatrick argues that "the problem of specifying Ireland's place in the British Imperial system remains unresolved, partly because of continuing disagreement over the character and rationale of that system"²⁶. According to most scholars, the formal union of the two kingdoms, which allowed Ireland to have representation in both Houses of Parliament in London, was not accompanied by concomitant economic or administrative integration. For example, free trade between Ireland and Britain was enacted only in 1824, separate currencies persisted for another two years, and excise duties and taxation remained sharply at odds until 1853. On the administrative level, the situation also remained dramatically unaltered for years, and yet is somehow more complicated to define. Indeed, Fitzpatrick argues that after the Act of Union the administrative system in Ireland could be defined as a 'mess':

The administration, in short, was a mess, with limitless opportunities for misunderstanding and collision between the Chief Secretary and the Lord-Lieutenant, the civil and military authorities, or the Castle, the Irish office, and the Treasury. Despite reiterated demands for assimilating Irish and English laws and institutions, no government could bring itself to accept the full implications of the Union²⁷.

Despite the legislative Union, the Irish administration remained distinctively colonial in both form and function: on one hand, as in India after 1858, annexation was followed by direct rule under a lord lieutenant, or viceroy, whose powers remained ill-defined in the absence of a Parliament over which to preside²⁸; on the other, the hybrid Irish administration differed significantly from that of England or Scotland as the Irish government was remarkable in the extent to which centralization, uniformity, inspection and professionalism spread throughout the system before 1850²⁹:

In these respects, Ireland was not only exceptional within the United Kingdom but akin to a colony, efficiency in government being valued above the liberty of the subject and the sanctity of property³⁰.

Furthermore, there were also some visible signs of the imperial and colonial presence; in the form of the army, which suppressed riots, illegal assemblies, and rebellions against the so-called 'army of occupation'. On the other hand, the British presence trebled in Ireland in the period of 1841-1911, of which nearly half was concentrated in the vicinities of Dublin and Belfast. Finally, Anglicization was also pursued through education in the English language, as well as through renewed settlement.

These strong ambiguities discouraged scholars from defining Ireland's place in the 19th-century Empire, although recent publications are likely to provoke further debate from both Irish and imperial specialists³¹. The available studies highlight the difficulty of incorporating Ireland within any colonial model of general application. Notwithstanding comparisons drawn between Ireland's experience and that of the white settler colonies, few historians have detected the germ of dominion status within the shell of the Union³². However, several have noted Britain's enduring disposition to govern Ireland like a colony. The Union itself had been largely prompted by fear of French invasion, and Ireland's proximity to Britain conferred it with a strategic importance comparable with that of Gibraltar or Aden. Thereafter governments became gradually less preoccupied with Ireland's strategic role; and by the 1880s it was sometimes suggested that the Empire's strategic interests could be defended without military occupation of the western island³³.

Lastly, one can also perceive some scholarly controversies regarding the question of the presence of colonial qualities in Irish thought and imagination. According to some scholars, Edward Said's specification of "Ireland's colonial status, which it shares with a host of non-European regions: cultural dependence and antagonism together", is based upon a premise incapable of historical verification. Said assumes that "Irish people can never be English any more than Cambodians or Algerians can be French", citing confirmation in the record of Irish protest against the British government³⁴. As some scholars argued, the political expression of Irish attitudes towards the Empire was far more various and discordant than Said's view acknowledges. Ireland had its rebels; it had its 'mediators' and 'collaborators', or 'shoneens', its imperialists, and its self-confident metropolitans³⁵.

Thus, one historical certainty regarding the Irish status within the Empire was the parliamentary unity between England and Ireland due to the Act of Union of 1801. This formal shift, while controversial (especially when one considers the minimal changes on an administrative and economic level, and the continuity of the English view of Ireland as a colony), might have been a contribution to a qualitative difference in the British image of Bosnia and Ireland between 1875-1878.

Furthermore, the process of modernization of the institutions in Ireland promoted by the British parliament might have represented another starting point for assigning to this country its supremacy on the hierarchical ladder. In fact, the inferior status assigned to Bosnia could be linked to the truth that, in British eyes, the Bosnians still lived under unenlightened 'oriental despots', whereas Ireland had been brought onto the path of civility and progress, thanks to the enlightened reforms promoted in Ireland by the British institutions. The origins of this British attitude can be traced back to the 1840s, after 'humanitarianism' had become a vital component of Britain's national and imperial identity³⁶. This attitude was symptomatic of the imperial idea that maintained that by promoting humanitarian work in the colonized or quasi-colonized countries, the British would both protect their own insular interests and liberate the conquered populations from moral, religious and political darkness. There were also those who argued that possession of Empire, wealth and power, brought obligations, irrespective

of British interests, wherever opportunities existed to promote the welfare of less fortunate societies. Speaking in Parliament on the East India Bill in December 1783, Edmund Burke offered an eloquent statement of Britain's obligations as the possessor of power over other peoples:

all political power which is set over men, and [...] all privilege claimed [...] in exclusion of them, being wholly artificial, and [...] a derogation from the natural equality of mankind at large, ought to be some way or other exercised for their benefit. It is true with regard to every species of political domination, and every description of commercial privilege [...] then such rights or privileges, or whatever else you choose to call them, are all in the strictest sense a *trust*; and it is of the very essence of every trust to be rendered *accountable*; and even totally to *cease*, when it substantially varies from the purpose for which alone it could have a lawful existence³⁷.

In the mid-19th century, the apparent failure of humanitarian expectations reinforced a pessimistic view of 'non-European' capacity and racial hierarchy. Its persistence in Ireland, on the other hand, which this comparison with Bosnia from the 1870s would suggest, is not to be considered as a residual effect of the events of the 1840s, but rather a result of the different type of formal relations that England established with her colonies in the 19th century. Indeed, the changes in the political conditions in Ireland, which British administrators considered to be a result of the Act of Union of 1801, were numbered among the reasons that made modernization a continuing process within Ireland. Finally, this constancy in modernization can possibly be seen as a reason for the elevated perception of this region by the British, and its higher position within the imaginative hierarchical scale established by the Empire's diplomats, politicians and travellers to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This different perspective is suggested by two iconographical sources, published in the British satirical magazine *Punch* between 1878 and 1882. (See Fig. 1)

The end of the Eastern crisis, which began with the Bosnian revolt in 1875, was formalised three years later at the Congress of Berlin. It was decided that Bosnia-Herzegovina, while still in theory under Ottoman dominion, would be occupied and administrated by Austria-Hungary. The Bosnians and Herzegovinians did not hesitate to express their discontent regarding the Great Powers' decisions and, by organizing protests in the big cities and by resisting militarily, to try to prevent the Austrians from immediate occupation³⁸. Liberal Europe followed these events with apprehension, whereas the English satirical magazine, *Punch*, commented with its usual cynicism. On 31 August 1878, the British middle-class could follow the new crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina leafing through the pages of this magazine. But this image, besides accusing the Great Powers of throwing this country once again into turmoil by focusing on the allegorical representation of Austria as an insensitive policeman ready to answer with force, is also illustrative of Victorian British attitudes to the people of the Balkans. Certain features in this representation of two children, "Bozzy" and "Herzy", betrays the significance that the Bosnians and the Herzegovinians assumed in British popular imagination in the years of the Eastern crisis. Indeed, the nature



Fig. 1

A nice time of it; or the new constable and the naughty boys.

Source: "Punch, or the London Charivari", 31 August 1878, p. 86.

of these images drew upon principles of 'white racism' that, in the second half of the 19th century, was also focused on the Irish.

In the last decades of the 19th century, a small but dedicated group of social science pseudo-scholars set out to uncover the minute differences that distinguished the 'races' of Britain. This pseudo-research proceeded by measuring the "Index of Nigrescence" – the amount of residual melanin in the skin, hair and eyes – in the peoples of Britain and Ireland³⁹. The conclusion was that the Irish belonged to an inferior race. Though the Irish were defined as a non-coloured population, 'coloured' being a category that facilitated racism towards the peoples of Asia and Africa after similar pseudo-scientific analysis, after the 1860s it was widely thought that certain cultural and physical features marked the Irish, baptized as "Celtic Calibans"⁴⁰, as an inferior race. An English traveller to Ireland in 1783 declared: "Shoes and stockings are seldom worn by these beings who seem to form a different race from the rest of mankind"⁴¹. Besides focusing on Irish culture, which often included mention of the 'barbarism' of the Irish accents, British racism towards Ireland often alluded to the aspects of Irish physiognomy. The Irish were, in fact, often characterized as having animal, particularly simian, or infantile features, resembling either children, or monkeys and apes⁴².

Thus, the racial inferiority of people from Bosnia-Herzegovina is expressed in *Punch* by adopting some very similar cultural features that were also used to mark the ‘Irish race’ of ‘Celtic Calibans’. “Bozy” and “Herzy” are seen as two naive children, bare-foot and wearing rags; in order to defend themselves from the Austrians, they use old knives and stones. The image is an iconographical transcription of the analogies that existed in the British representations of these two populations, a sign of the cultural basis that enables the direct comparison which is the central concern of this article.

Yet, while these ‘white racist’ representations of the Irish continued throughout the 19th century, in the decades of social and political change, they underwent slight modification. Although this transformation of the British view might appear not particularly significant, it may reflect an evolution in the Anglo-Irish relations of the last years, which improved the lot of the Irish. Such an attitude is again exemplified in *Punch*. In an illustration from 18 February 1882, an Irishman called “Master Paddy”, in contrast to the simple ‘Paddies’ of the previous years, wears a cloth composed of two pieces while in his hand he carries a farmer’s cap (See Fig. 2). The hat is made ridiculous by a falling twig, his shoes are untied and his clothes ill-fitting; but “Master Paddy” is without doubt in much better condition than his brothers from the travellers’ account that we cited above and who, like

the Bosnians and the Herzegovinians in the 1870s, appeared in the British iconographical representations as half naked, bare-foot and armed only with stones. On the contrary, “Paddy” is a figure who highlights the new status that the Irish acquired within British society, after the modernization of Irish institutions began in the 1870s. Although elements of ‘white racism’ persist – infantile features, primitive weaponry and the wearing of rags – betraying the continuity of the British tradition to represent the Irish as inferior, this image of the Irish is also a testimony of a shift in British collective representation. The image emphasizes, in all its tragic irony, evidence of British racist attitudes – that the English perceived the Irish as slightly superior to the Bosnians. This image confirms the thesis of this chapter with regards to the ‘hierachization’ of the two countries’ representation by the British.



Fig. 2

Essence of parliament.

Source: “Punch, or the London Charivari”, 18 February 1882, p. 75.

Captain James Creagh (whom we mentioned while discussing the British attitudes towards autonomy for Ireland and Bosnia-Herzegovina) represents another example of the negative perception of the Bosnians when compared to the Irish⁴³. Writing in his autobiography many years after his journey to the Balkans, Creagh mentions the reasons for his visit to the frontier provinces of European Turkey in 1875. Lines that at first appearance seem to suggest the innocent curiosity of a traveller for “the costumes, the suggestive dances, the dominant and subject populations in the dominions of both the Sultan and the Emperor”⁴⁴, are in stark contrast to what the textual analysis of Creagh’s earlier travelogue *Over the borders of Christendom and Eslamiah* reveals.

Creagh relates the Irish to the Bosnians on the grounds of their common experience as two subjugated populations⁴⁵. Both are perceived as barbarous and underdeveloped peoples, essentially different from the English and the Turks, who embody the values of ‘civility’. Having set up his discourse according to the specific coordinates of ‘civility’ and ‘barbarity’, Creagh assumes extremely critical attitudes towards the Westerners who describe the Turks in their roles as ‘tyrants’ and ‘oppressors’. The best example of this is represented by a passage of Creagh’s travelogue in which he reports on the troubles in Bosnia-Herzegovina through the paradigm of an event that took place at the port of Shannon:

Every misfortune is attributed to the Turks, and we hear so often that they are tyrants and oppressors, that people generally believe they are so. The Home Rulers are not ashamed to declare that the English Government drove the ships out of the Shannon; and as there are people silly enough to accept that trumpety statement as a matter of fact, it is not surprising that less enlightened dreamers should impute their own ignorance, incivility, and want of enterprise to any cause except to that of the levity and barbarism from which it all arises⁴⁶.

The passage – besides forging an image of ‘barbaric Otherness’, through assigning to the population of Bosnia the attributes of ignorance, incivility and want of enterprise – imputes that the Irish Home Rulers share common characteristics with the Bosnians. By relating the Irish and the Bosnians to each other, Creagh also establishes a hierarchical scale of values between them, and clearly states the superiority of the first: the definition “less enlightened dreamers” condemns the Bosnians to a status of inferiority when compared to the Irish. The adjective “enlightened” reveals the core of Creagh’s political thought: the negative delineation of the Bosnians in comparison to the Irish derives from the fact that the former are perceived as the descendents of a despotic political system, whereas the latter are the subjects of a powerful Empire that can boast upholding institutions based on the principles of Enlightenment.

Paradoxically for Creagh, the Turkish despotic system in Bosnia does not preclude the moral superiority of the Turks with respect to the peoples they subjugate. Indeed, he perceived despotism as necessary to combat the local population tendency to rebellion:

God knows the Turkish Government is not the most enlightened administration in Europe; but it has fearful difficulties to contend with, and its despotic and paternal rule certainly prevents the Bosniacs from tearing each other to pieces⁴⁷.

Creagh thus justifies the Turkish despotic regime when it is directed towards a population that, like the Bosnians, suffers from never having been in contact with the principles of Enlightenment:

A constitutional form of government given to the provinces of European Turkey would be as useless to them as a knee buckle to a Highlander. For many years to come they must be governed despotically; but the offices of a despotism ought to have great powers, exercised under a wholesome inspection, in order to prevent their being disgraced by caprices of cruelty or corruption. Otherwise, the terror of summary and equal justice being unfelt, the ignorant peasants, constantly stirred up by unprincipled agitators, ascribe leniency, or even delay, which they think is hesitation, to fear; and object, like the misguided people of Herzegovina, last summer, to pay the taxes⁴⁸.

Creagh's discourse on Bosnia and its population is clearly informed by the current political context; it is also a direct consequence of the cultural formation of the traveller as well as of his Irish origins. He formulates the image of the Bosnians, and of the Irish, from the viewpoint of his vision of the Eastern Question and the question of Ireland. As a descendant of an Irish Protestant family of landowners, he sided with the political opponents of the Home Rule movement. Although Home Rule's origins were strongly influenced by the Protestant Irish, in the 1870s, under the influence of the militant and extremist fringes of the Young Irelanders and the Fenians, the movement was transforming into an almost solely Catholic party. His conservative political attitudes, and his adhesion to Disraeli's political line, indicated his inclination towards the protection of the interests of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, it was these two different political attitudes that led James Creagh to assume negative sentiments towards both the Irish Home Rulers and the 'Bosnian home rulers' of every ethnicity.

CONCLUSION

A largely unobserved, triangular, relationship exists, uniting Bosnia, Ireland and England. Through comparisons, hierarchizations, ironic illustrations and other remarks, Ireland and Bosnia, at least in the eyes of some 19th-century British observers, were often perceived in a similar manner. Nevertheless, this unexpected relationship affected more than the literary field. Indeed, some comparisons between the two countries made by British politicians shows that the Irish Question might have influenced certain decisions by British politicians regarding the Eastern Question, specifically in relation to the Bosnian crisis of 1875. The most interesting example of this is to be found in a series of diplomats' correspondence published by the *Slavic Review* in 1924-25 under the title of *Russo-British Relations during the Eastern Crisis*. These documents not only offer a precious testimony of Russo-British relations during the 1870s, but also provide details of the correspondence between Russian diplomats in England and Russian politicians. Their views of the British political scene during the years of the Eastern Crisis represent an inestimable source of information for students of Russo-British diplomatic correspondence. According to one such document of 14 October 1875, Count P.A. Shuvalov – the Russian ambassador to London – confessed that Lord Derby and Dis-

raeli were not in favour of an autonomous state for Bosnia-Herzegovina⁴⁹. In another diplomatic document, dated 13 January 1876, Shuvalov reported to the Russian prime minister, Gorchakov, that Disraeli's nervousness towards the reform programme of the insurgents in 1875, in which land reform figured prominently, was partly due its effect on the Irish agrarian campaign⁵⁰. The veracity of the second document's statement can also be trusted on the grounds of certain events that occurred effectively during the 1870s Eastern Crisis: whereas Russia played the principal role during the first two international attempts, in 1875 and again in 1876, in attempting to resolve the Bosnian crisis, their failure was mostly due to British policy⁵¹.

According to historians' reconstructions of those events, it seems that this second document refers to the Andrassy Note – the first serious attempt by the Great Powers to restore the peace in Bosnia⁵². The document, elaborated in Vienna by the foreign minister of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and by the Russian ambassador to Austria, was issued on 30 December 1875. It required the Porte to grant the two rebellious provinces religious liberty, to abolish tax-farming and to help the peasants of the area to buy land from their lords and thus reduce agrarian discontent. The Andrassy Note, as we can see, clearly focused on the regulation of the land in Bosnia, a clause that, in the minds of Disraeli and Lord Derby, resembled similar requests from Irish tenants, which the government was not willing to concede.

The attempt to solve the Bosnian crisis by the Andrassy Note failed. Among the various causes is the weakness of the Porte – above all its financial weakness – to enforce reforms in the rebellious provinces in the face of opposition of many of its own officials. Nor can we neglect the contradictory role played by Great Britain during the period of negotiations. Whereas proposals were readily accepted by the other Great Powers, the British government agreed to them only hesitantly, and refused to demand their acceptance in writing by the Porte. This British action seemed to have encouraged the Turkish government to pretend to modify the Note and, second, to execute its requests. In light of these events, Britain can be seen as indirectly responsible for the failure of this attempt to end the Bosnian crisis at its outbreak – and the question of Ireland can be seen as one of the motives for such political decisions.

Apart from these political effects, this study also takes into account other research, which assesses and analyses collective representations, mental maps and the construction of a 'cultural identity of Europe'. An important contribution to this field is Maria Todorova's *Imagining the Balkans*, which argues that a negative image of the Balkans was deeply rooted in different levels of Western society, dividing Europe into two opposing poles; the Balkans represented the land of 'in-betweeness' within Europe and the Orient, but always conceived of as 'the negative Self' of Europe, its Eastern Other⁵³. This chapter, with its comparative approach, confirms the validity of certain critiques of Todorova's study, which claim that in order to better understand the complex network of cultural relations within Europe, the opposition in the term 'East-West' applied by Todorova needs to be integrated into a 'centre-periphery' scale of relations⁵⁴. By doing so, this chapter substituted a diametric 'opposition' with a 'graduation'. On the basis of a 'centre-periphery' approach, it emerges that

at least for the British observers of both Ireland and Bosnia there is no strict opposition between a 'Europe' and a 'non-Europe', and that cultural relations within Europe rather follow a gradual scale that descends from the 'centre' to the 'periphery'. The position on this scale is obviously also influenced by the cultural relationship between East and West, but similarly South-North and, as we have seen, quasi-colony or non-colony.

The British perception of Ireland as a periphery at shorter distance from 'civilised' Britain; while the Balkans, or at least Bosnia, which in geographical terms represent their heart, is not solely the 'negative Other' within Europe, as Todorova suggested, but rather one of its more peripheral lands. The fact that the Bosnians were compared to the Irish, and Bosnia to Ireland, also informs us, in terms of a mental map discussion, of the existence of different discursive strategies that in the 19th century the British adopted for defining Bosnia as a European country in both cultural and political terms. So, even though it was a country that in many ways was perceived as the Orient, it was an Orient that orbited within the European cultural space. This final point is also demonstrated by the fact that the British, during the Eastern Crisis (1875-1878), in order to define Bosnia and the Bosnians within a political and cultural context, frequently compared the country and its natives to Ireland and the Irish.

NOTES

- ¹ In the 19th century, the Irish Question represented a complex set of political, economic and social issues which culminated in the foundation of the Home Rule movement. This movement was founded thanks to the initiative of Daniel O'Connell – a Catholic lawyer and land-owner – and was oriented towards the politics of 'emancipation' of Catholics from religious discrimination. Home Rule mainly expressed the political and social aspirations of Catholic Ireland: 'for some, it was an extension of the Irish land question; for others, town-dwellers, it promised liberation from the economic restraints imposed by the old regime'. A. Jackson, *Home Rule (An Irish History)*, London 2003, p. 2.
- ² There are numerous studies on this topic in relation to Ireland. See for example: J. Leerssen, *Remembrance and Imagination: patterns in the Historical and Literary Representation of Ireland in the 19th Century*, Cork 1996; N. McCaw (ed.), *Writing Irishness in 19th-Century British Culture*, Aldershot 2004; D. Kiberd, *Inventing Ireland: The Literature of the Modern Nation*, London 1996. Less has been written on the topic in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina; see for example O. Hadžiselimović, *At the Gates of the East*, Columbia - New York 2001.
- ³ Sir H.G. Elliot, *Some Relations and other Diplomatic Experiences*, London 1922, p. 214, quoted in M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (A Study in International Relations)*, New York 1966, p. 178.
- ⁴ W. Miller, *Travels and Politics in the Near East*, London 1898, p.105.
- ⁵ J.P. Barry, *At the Gates of the East: a Book of Travel among Historic Wonderlands*, London - New York - Bombay 1906, pp. 236-37.
- ⁶ *Beg* or *bey* means lord or landowner, belonging to the higher of the two categories of landowner existing in 'Ottoman' Bosnia.
- ⁷ *Aga* is a landowning lord, belonging to the lower of the two categories of landowners. The original meaning, however, is lord or senior janissary officer.
- ⁸ For introductions to the religious, ethnic and social compositions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Ireland in the 19th century, see N. Malcolm, *Bosnia (A Short History)*, London 1994 and S.J. Connolly (ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Irish History*, Oxford 2004 [1998].

- ⁹ On the process of the 'islamicization' of Bosnia-Herzegovina see: chapter five in Malcolm, *Bosnia* cit., pp. 51-70, M. Hadžijahić, *Porijeklo bosanskih muslimana*, Sarajevo 1990 and S. Džaja, *Konfessionalität und Nationalität Bosniens und der Herzegowina: voremanzipatorische Phase 1463-1804*, Munich 1984. In writing this paragraph the following titles were useful: Malcolm, *Bosnia* cit., R. Mantran (ed.), *Histoire de l'empire ottoman*, Paris 1989; M. Pinson (ed.), *The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Cambridge (MA) 1996; P.F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1351-1804*, Seattle - London 1973.
- ¹⁰ B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans (18th and 19th Centuries)*, Cambridge 1983, p. 89.
- ¹¹ In this sense the action of Siliktar Ali-pasha is highly paradigmatic. Having arrived in Sarajevo as governor of Bosnia and determined to curb Bosnian independence, he announced that he was not going to spend just those three days there, as allowed by custom, but would alternate between Sarajevo and Travnik at six-month intervals. This provoked a violent reaction by the local noblemen. Ali-pasha was forced to engage his troops in order to establish his will. See chapter ten, *Resistance and Reform*, in Malcolm, *Bosnia* cit., pp. 119-35.
- ¹² Originally, a *kapetan* was a military administrator in a frontier zone. In Bosnian history it signified an administrator of a territorial division, whose office was hereditary with wide-ranging powers.
- ¹³ Omer Pasha Latas was a Slav from the Lika region, who had served as a sergeant in the Austrian army on the *Militärgrenze*. He succeeded with surprising speed at the task that the Grand Vizier had set for him in 1850-1. Having crushed the rebellion of 1850-1 and sent the *agas* and *begs* into exile in Anatolia, he succeeded in imposing the sultan's will on Bosnia. *Pasha* or *paša* is a general term for a territorial governor. See G. Šljivo, *Omer-Paša Latas u Bosni i Hercegovini 1850-1852*, Sarajevo 1977.
- ¹⁴ See: Jackson, *Home rule* cit., Connolly (ed.), *The Oxford Companion* cit., A. O'Day, *Irish Home Rule*, Manchester - New York 1998.
- ¹⁵ According to Justin McCarthy's studies, Bosnia and Herzegovina had, in 1870, a population of: 694,000 Muslims, 534,000 Orthodox Christians and 208,000 Catholics. See J. McCarthy, *Ottoman Bosnia*, in M. Pinson (ed.), *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Cambridge (MA) 1993, p. 81.
- ¹⁶ M. Ekmečić, *Ustanak u Bosni 1875-1878*, Sarajevo 1873.
- ¹⁷ Jackson, *Home rule* cit.
- ¹⁸ Connolly (ed.), *The Oxford Companion* cit., p. 309.
- ¹⁹ The historiography of Home Rule is vast; for an introduction see Jackson, *Home rule* cit.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- ²¹ This passage is quoted in R.W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question*, London 1935, p. 22.
- ²² J. Creagh, *Sparks from Camp Fires*, London 1901, p. 25.
- ²³ Id., *Over the Borders of Christendom and Eslamiah*, vol. 2, London 1876, p. 136.
- ²⁴ As far as Benjamin Disraeli's policy of non-intervention after his re-election as prime minister in 1874 is concerned, see: J. Howes Gleason, *The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain*, New York 1972 and J. Snyder, *Myths of Empire. Domestic Politics and Intentional Ambition*, Ithaca - New York - London 1991.
- ²⁵ T. Wemyss Reid, *The Life, Letters, and Friendships of Richard Monckton Miles, First Lord Houghton (1890)*, London 1890, vol. 2, p. 341.
- ²⁶ D. Fitzpatrick, *Ireland and the Empire*, in A. Porter (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire. The 19th Century*, Oxford 1999, p. 501.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 496.
- ²⁸ See A.J. Ward, *The Irish Constitutional Tradition: Responsible Government and Modern Ireland, 1782-1992*, Washington 1994.

- ²⁹ See also O. MacDonagh, *Ireland*, New Jersey 1968, p. 31.
- ³⁰ Fitzpatrick, *Ireland and the Empire* cit., p. 496.
- ³¹ C.A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830*, London - New York 1989 and K. Jeffery (ed.), *An Irish Empire? Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire*, Cambridge 1996.
- ³² T. Garvin, *The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics*, Dublin 1981 and P. O'Farrell, *England and Ireland since 1800*, Oxford 1975.
- ³³ O. MacDonagh, *Introduction*, in W.E. Vaughan (ed.), *A New History of Ireland*, Vols 5 and 6, Oxford 1989, 1996, pp. liii-liv.
- ³⁴ E.W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, London 1993, pp. 266, 275.
- ³⁵ Fitzpatrick, *Ireland and the Empire* cit., p. 504.
- ³⁶ See A. Porter, *Trusteeship, Anti-Slavery, and Humanitarianism*, in A. Porter (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire* cit., pp. 198-222; J. Cell, *The Imperial Conscience*, in P. Marsh (ed.), *The Conscience of the Victorian State*, Syracuse 1979, pp. 173-213.
- ³⁷ *The Speeches of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke*, Vol. 5, *India: Madras and Bengal, 1774-1785* in P.J. Marshall (ed.), Oxford 1981, p. 385.
- ³⁸ See for example D. Mandić, *Povijest okupacije Bosne i Hercegovine (1878)*, Zagreb 1910.
- ³⁹ J. Beddoe, *The Races of Britain: A Contribution to the Anthropology of Western Europe*, Bristol 1885.
- ⁴⁰ This word derives from the Anglo-Saxon belief that the Irish belonged to the Celt race. See L.P. Curtis, *Anglo-Saxons and Celts: A Study of Anti-Irish Prejudice in Victorian England*, Bridgeport 1968 pp. 17-36.
- ⁴¹ P. Luckombe, *A Tour Through Ireland: Wherein the Present State of That Kingdom is Considered*, London 1783, p. 19.
- ⁴² See R. Kearney (ed.), *The Irish Mind*, Dublin 1985; Curtis, *Anglo-Saxons and Celts* cit.; Id., *Apes and Angels: The Irishman in Victorian Caricature*, Newton Abbot 1971; R.N. Lebow, *White Britain and Black Ireland: The Influence of Stereotypes on Colonial Policy*, Philadelphia 1976; T.W. Hodgson Crossland, *The Wild Irishman*, London 1905.
- ⁴³ James Creagh interpreted many aspects of the Bosnian reality using the paradigms typical of Anglo-Irish relations. For example, Creagh considered the peasants' tensions of 1875 to be a big danger for Bosnia and predicted that, should a revolt occur, its consequences would be worse than the disorder in Belfast: "A feast, a procession, a word, or a song may at any moment set the province in a blaze which would throw even the riots of Belfast into the shade". Creagh, *Over the Borders of Christendom and Eslamiab* cit. p. 125. Similarly, when tackling the question of Christian rights in Bosnia, Creagh recalls the Irish political background when he states that "the Turks and the Christians are on footing of equality [...] the remembrance of ancient persecutions still inspires those deadly hatreds, like the passions of Ribbon-men and Orangemen in the north of Ireland, are ever ready to break out with a violence all the more astonishing because the causes that might justify it have long been removed." *Ibid*, pp. 124-25.
- ⁴⁴ Quoted in the opening chapter entitled *The Travelers' Tales: Bosnia and Herzegovina in British Eyes*, in Hadžiselimović, *At the Gates of the East* cit.
- ⁴⁵ In his autobiography, Creagh describes the Irish outside the Bosnian context by using language that was commonly used by the English. He observes, for instance, the Irish custom of not wearing shoes: "After the Great Revolution, English recruiting sergeants took the place of French, and formerly, though not of late years, fine, handsome, and good humoured lads [i.e. Irish], who had never wore shoes or stockings, nor eaten other food than potatoes and milk, were always ready to accept the shilling, and follow the drum." See Creagh, *Sparks from Camp Fires* cit., p. 4.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 125.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p. 136.

- ⁴⁹ Quoted in R.W. Seton-Watson, *The Role of Bosnia in International Politics*, The Raleigh Lecture on History, 29 October, Humphrey Milford Amen House 193, pp. 16-17.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁵¹ Anderson, *The Eastern Question* cit., pp. 178-88.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*
- ⁵³ M. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, New York – Oxford 1997; L.Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*, Stanford 1994.
- ⁵⁴ F.B. Schenk, *Mental Maps. Die Konstruktion von geographischen Räumen in Europa seit der Aufklärung*, in "Geschichte und Gesellschaft", 2002, 28, pp. 493-514; S. Petrungraro, *L'est europeo, o a l'est dell'Europa*, in "Novecento", 2004, 10, pp. 77-86.

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