Multiculturalism in Historical Perspective
CLIOHRES.net is a large-scale research project, supported by the European Commission through the Sixth Framework Programme of its Directorate General for Research as a “Network of Excellence” for European History. It includes 180 researchers (90 staff and 90 doctoral students) from 45 universities in 31 countries. Working together in six thematic work groups, their aim is to achieve greater understanding of both the histories and the representations of the past current in Europe today, highlighting both diversities and connections.

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Multiculturalism in Historical Perspective

Compiled by
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A CLIOHRES-ISHA Reader
Contents

Preface
Ann Katherine Isaacs ................................................................. pag. IX
The CLIOHRES Network of Excellence ........................................... » XI

Introduction
Francesco Malfatti ................................................................. » XIII

Workshop 1: Multiculturalism in metropolitan areas
From Islam to Christianity: Urban Changes in Portuguese Medieval Cities
Luisa Trindade ................................................................. » 1
Ubi bene ibi patria: Reading the City of Kiev through the Polish and Czech “Spatial Stories” of the First World War Period
Olena Betlii ................................................................. » 25
Reading the City. Urban History and Urban Studies.
Some Methodological Thoughts
Dobrochna Kalwa ................................................................. » 49

Workshop 2: The Nation State and the Minorities’ Homogenization
The Post-Apartheid Condition and Dilemmas of Imagining a Nation in South Africa
Vukale Khumalo ................................................................. » 65
Spanish and Basque Nationalism
Maria Jesús Cava Mesa ................................................................. » 77

Religious and Ethnic Diversity in the Second Half of the 20th Century:
War and Political Changes in the Territories of Former Yugoslavia
Matjaž Klemenčič ................................................................. » 101

Workshop 3: Empires and multiculturalism
Native Americans under the Castilian Crown: Resettlement Policy in 16th-Century Peru
Manfredi Merluzzi ................................................................. » 117

Turbans or Top Hats? Indenture, Indian Interpreters and Empire:
Natal 1880-1910
Prinisha Badassy ................................................................. » 127

The New Age of Imperialism: British and South African Perspective
Saul Dubow ................................................................. » 149
Workshop 4: The Concept of “Europe”: from the Greek Mythological Image to the EU
Tolerance and Non-discrimination Policies in the Multilingual European Union
Ina Druviete .................................................................................................................................................................. » 165
Austria's Neutrality and European Integration: a Conflict between International and National Spheres of Law
Andreas Gémes, Gudrun E. Ragosnig .................................................................................................................. » 175
Identity of Change as a Consequence of the Migration Experience
Olga Seweryn ........................................................................................................................................................... » 197

Workshop 5: Multiculturalism and Cultural Relativism
The Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of the Concept of Tolerance
Ana Cristina Araújo, Iwan Michelangelo D'Aprile, Bojan Borstner, Smiljana Gartner .......................................................... » 219
Language, Culture, Identity
Fabio Dei ................................................................................................................................................................ » 237
Frontiers and Identities: Approaches and Inspiration in Sociology
Olga Seweryn, Marta Smagacz .................................................................................................................................. » 249
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CLIOHRES is very happy to present *Multiculturalism in Historical Perspective*. The materials contained in this Reader are not new, although some of them have been published very recently. Rather, the format in which they appear and the reason for compiling them is completely novel.

*Multiculturalism in Historical Perspective* is the first CLIOHRES-ISHA virtual reader. It will be placed on internet and it will also be printed in a limited number of copies for use at the ISHA Autumn Seminar, 2009, held at the University of Pisa at the Departments of History and Philosophy from 14 to 17 September. The materials have been chosen by the organisers of the Seminar and compiled by the President of the Pisa Section of ISHA, Francesco Malfatti. They have been chosen from the more than 500 studies available in the CLIOHnet and CLIOHRES publications in order to constitute common readings for the participating students to prepare for the Seminar. They in no way exhaust the offer of research and teaching materials prepared by CLIOHRES, but they do show how those materials can be organised and used in new contexts, tailor-made to the needs of the users.

CLIOHRES is a Sixth Framework Network of Excellence dedicated to exploring how a new critical transnational approach to European history can be useful in building European citizenship. The Network unites 180 researchers, of which one half are senior researchers and one half are doctoral students. They come from 45 universities and 31 countries. Divided into six Thematic Working Groups, they are now in the final year of their five year project. Their work has yielded important insights, research results and indications for future research: They share their results with the academic community and the general public through what will be, at the end of the project in May 2010, more than 50 books (available both on-line, free of charge, from the www.cliohres.net site and in book form).

CLIOHRES is proud to be able to collaborate closely with ISHA. ISHA, the International Students of History Association, shares much of its basic philosophy with CLIOHRES, which it complements. Our belief in the necessity of linking teaching and research, and placing the student at the centre of the learning process, means promoting and listening to students. Motivated history students, students who know that “history matters”, are the ideal interlocutors for CLIOHRES. CLIOHRES is already unique in the very important place it gives to doctoral students: ISHA represents first and second cycle history students and we are very happy to be able to assist and support them and, in our turn, receive feed-back from them.

Our Networks are multicultural by definition, and use national differences to highlight the variety of understandings of history that are produced and reproduced in our coun-
tries. The work of ISHA, as of CLIOHRES and its sister Networks, shows clearly that even today citizens of European countries know very little about each other, and above all have ideas about the histories of other countries which are very different from those widely held in the countries themselves. Over the last twenty years we have addressed this situation producing a patrimony of information and new viewpoints which we are delighted to share with ISHA.

In a general way, multiculturalism means promoting or advocating the presence of different cultural components in a society or in a polity. However, for some this can be best done by ensuring the respect of equal individual rights; for others states or public bodies should intervene to correct injustices, when one group or another seems to be in difficulty. Delicate political and ethical problems are posed continually, in practice, in all of our countries, with regard to multiculturalism, and different political and intellectual forces identify with various policies of inclusion, exclusion, assimilation or respect for difference.

Multiculturalism is a slippery concept, often an equivocal term. It is used by the left and the right, by radicals and conservatives, liberals, racists and equalitarian promoters of human rights. Learning to place it in context, and to understand the political and cultural agendas of those who use it is a first objective of the ISHA Seminar and of this reader.

A second objective is to place synthetic up-to-date research results, treating a number of less well known periods and parts of Europe, in the hands of the students and future History teachers and researchers who are represented in ISHA, hoping that that their work on Multiculturalism can build on our results and carry them forward.

This is the first CLIOHRES-ISHA Reader. We hope that there will be many others.

Ann Katherine Isaacs
University of Pisa
CLIOHRES is a consortium of 45 universities and research institutions in 31 countries. Each institution is represented by two senior researchers and two doctoral students coming from various academic fields – primarily from history, but also from art history, archaeology, architecture, philology, philosophy, political science, sociology, literary studies and geography. The 180 researchers in the network are divided into six “Thematic Work Groups”, each of which deals with a broadly defined research area – ‘States, Institutions and Legislation’, ‘Power and Culture’, ‘Religion and Philosophy’, ‘Work, Gender and Society’, ‘Frontiers and Identities’, and ‘Europe and the Wider World’. Furthermore, the Network as a whole addresses ‘transversal themes’ of general relevance. These include ‘Citizenship’, ‘Migration’, ‘Discrimination and Tolerance’, ‘Gender’ and ‘Citizenship and Identities’; one of these is targeted each year. As a Network of Excellence, CLIOHRES is not an ordinary research project. It does not focus on a single research question or on a set of specific questions. Rather it is conceived as a forum where researchers representing various national and regional traditions can meet and elaborate their work in new ways thanks to structured interaction with their colleagues. The objective is not only to transcend the national boundaries that still largely define historical research agendas, opening new avenues for research, but also to use those very differences to become critically aware of how current research agendas have evolved. Thus, the goal is to examine basic and unquestioned attitudes about ourselves and others, which are rooted in the ways that the scientific community in each country looks at history.

Historians create and cultivate selective views of the national or local past, which in turn underpin pervasive ideas about identities and stereotypes: national, religious, gender, political, etc. National historiographies today are still largely shaped by problems and preoccupations reflecting previous political and cultural contexts. CLIOHRES aims to create and promote a new structure and agenda for the community of historical research, redirecting its critical efforts along more fruitful lines. The Network began its work in June 2005, thanks to a five-year contract with the European Commission through the Sixth Framework Programme of its Directorate General for Research, under Priority 7, dealing with “Citizenship”. Its activities aim to contribute to the development of innovative approaches to history as regards both the European Research Area and the European Higher Education Area. The Network works for a closer connection between research and learning/teaching, holding that this is essential in order to ensure that European citizens possess the necessary information, conceptual tools and more in general the vital critical and self-critical abilities which they will need in the future.

All the thematic groups have worked from the start according to a common research plan, beginning in the first year with reconnaissance or mapping, of how the questions
perceived as important for the thematic area appear in the different national historiographies. During the second year they defined ‘connecting’ themes, which are relevant for research in a wider geographical and chronological context. The third phase concentrated on comparing and reviewing sources and methodologies; the fourth focuses on ‘cross-fertilisation’, that is on showing how problems identified in the previous phases can be developed in new contexts. During the last phase, the groups will define new and relevant projects, in the broadest sense, for future research in the sector.

Each Thematic Work Group publishes one volume a year in order to share and discuss the results of their work with the broader academic community. The volumes are not conceived as the final word on the issues that they deal with, but rather as work-in-progress. In addition to the six Thematic Work Group volumes, the Network publishes one common volume per year dealing with the transversal theme targeted. It also publishes abridged versions of the dissertations written by doctoral students who have participated in its work. Together the volumes already published form an invitation to discuss the results of the Network and the novel directions that are emerging from its work; they also constitute a unique patrimony of up-to-date studies on well-known and less well-known aspects of Europe and its history.

All publications are available in book form and on the www.clioHres.net website. They can be downloaded without charge. A list of publications to date can be found at the end of this volume.
Introduction

Multiculturalism. A word we find on the lips of many, but a vague and ambiguous concept, used to describe the interactions among the many components of today’s societies and, perhaps, applicable to interactions in civilisations of the past as well. Multiculturalism is understood as a pressing necessity, as an unavoidable theme in the complex debate on the structures of our societies in our ever more globalised and open world.

To celebrate the twentieth anniversaries of ISHA, the International Students of History Association, and of the fall of the Berlin Wall -- which in the second half of 20th century, more than any other, represented the fracture, the demarcation line between two “opposing” and “conflicting” realities -- we thought it opportune to choose this theme for the first Conference organised by an Italian section of ISHA. Multiculturalism incarnates the spirit of our Association, which is proud to have among its members students from all over Europe and from other countries as well, and which promotes reciprocal understanding and tolerance among history students around the world. ISHA is a polyhedral laboratory in which the most varied facets, different points of view and multiple cultural approaches are present, although at the same time we try to maintain a critical view, free from the prejudices and limitations imposed by national or regional perspectives.

The aim of pursuing historiographical research in a more critical, but also a more widely shared, manner, and the recognition of the need to give it broader horizons brings ISHA very close to the principles that inspire the CLIOHRES Network of Excellence. Our desire to put these two contiguous realities, the world of research and teaching and that of the students of history, into contact has given rise to the idea of using the materials published by CLIOHRES as an efficacious tool to stimulate reflection and debate in the context of the international conferences organised by ISHA. The CLIOHRES publications are precious in themselves and also considering the broad geographical and thematic spectrum treated in the single volumes and chapters, and the possibility they give of having access to resources in a commonly known language, which elsewhere are often unavailable except in the languages of the single authors.

The selection of the fifteen chapters that compose this compilation from such a rich and varied offer has been very difficult: we have chosen them on the basis of their pertinence with respect to the five workshops planned for the Conference.

The various workshop themes have been chosen with an eye to analysing multiculturalism in a broad diachronic and spatial context. The chosen themes include the urban dimension from the poleis of the ancient world to the metropolises of the 21st century; and also the great overseas empires of the modern age, as well as the situation of other continents, including for example the Chinese imperial experience. Confrontation with and of various ethnic, religious and cultural entities had one of its most lively and often tragic phases during the formation of the nation states, but it still constitutes an
open question today as we attempt to define more or less inclusive frontiers for multi-national bodies such as the European Union.

Finally, at the Pisa Conference, we wished to include a theoretical reflexion on the concept itself of multiculturalism based on a philosophical and anthropological analysis.

On behalf of ISHA I thank the European History Networks and particularly the CLIOHRES Network of Excellence for having given us to opportunity to use their scientific findings and for arranging to print this Reader. Special thanks go to the Network’s Coordinator and the “Pisa team” for their active collaboration and support, and for the precious time they have dedicated to ISHA.

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From Islam to Christianity: Urban Changes in Medieval Portuguese Cities

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ABSTRACT

Focusing on the Islamic urban pattern in the actual Portuguese territory, the present study underlines the confrontation with the Christian urban model in the period post-Reconquista. Emphasizing both the complexity and variability of Muslim presence in Gharb al-Andalus and the Christian take over process, this chapter goes through two different situations: the appropriation and adaptation of the most important symbolic or strategic places – alcáçova and medina – where properties massively changed hands and the compulsory resettlement of the Muslim previous inhabitants in peripheral and closed quarters known as mourarias.

Under different pressures and obeying distinct necessities both situations suggest the eventual disappearance of the Islamic pattern, which recent archaeology proves to have existed especially from river Tejo to the south according to the social, political and military framework that from the very beginning, but in particular through the 11th to the 13th centuries, marked the southern territories.

Even though Portuguese archaeological investment in the urban medieval context is still rare – with the exception of Mértola, Silves Tavira or Lisbon – the most recent conclusions suggest an evident proximity to the evolution already studied in Spanish towns with similar historical processes such as Murcia, Valencia or Toledo, where, besides the final result, the transformation process can be followed step by step being therefore an important base for understanding the fossilization of the Islamic pattern in Portuguese territory.

Incidindo sobre a questão da matriz urbana islâmica no território actualmente português, a presente análise tem por objectivo aferir o resultado do confronto com o modelo cristão no período pós-reconquista. Destacando a complexidade e variabilidade do quadro de implantação do Islão no Gharb al-Andalus a par do processo de conquista cristã, a análise parte de duas realidades distintas: a apropriação e adaptação dos espaços nobres e estratégicos – Alcáçova e Medina – onde se verifica uma transferência maciça de propriedades e a
reinstalação em bairros próprios e de forma compulsiva dos contingentes muçulmanos que, embora submetidos, optavam por permanecer no reino.

Sujeitas a pressões e necessidades diferentes ambas as situações sugerem, no entanto, o desaparecimento da matriz islâmica que a arqueologia comprova ter existido sobretudo nas regiões a sul do Rio Tejo, de acordo com o quadro social, político ou estratégico-militar que desde o início, mas com especial incidência no decorrer dos séculos XI a XIII, marcou os territórios meridionais.

Se no primeiro caso as necessidades da população cristã levam, pelo menos numa primeira fase, à apropriação da esmagadora maioria de estruturas e edifícios singulares – circuitos defensivos, alcáçovas e mesquitas – ainda que genericamente adaptadas e transformadas, o tecido urbano residencial, inadequado e incompreendido pelos conquistadores cristãos, parece, invariavelmente, ser sujeito a uma de duas opções: o abandono puro e simples das estruturas existentes – reocupadas as áreas já em finais da Idade Média mas raramente recorrendo à sua reutilização ou a sua ocupação condicionada a um conjunto de transformações que inevitavelmente determinaram a desestruturação do modelo mediterrânico e consequente fossilização da matriz islâmica.

Pese embora as ainda raras, e por regra pontuais investigações arqueológicas – com exceção para os casos de Silves, Mértola, Tavira ou Lisboa – as conclusões apresentadas sugerem uma clara aproximação à evolução registada em várias cidades espanholas referentes ao mesmo período e a conjunturas muito similares, caso de Múrcia, Valência ou Toledo, onde para além do resultado final, todo o processo de transformação tem vindo a ser minuciosamente registado.

No segundo caso, correspondente às Mourarias, analisa-se em paralelo o conjunto de pressões decorrentes da Reconquista e reinstalação – com implicações evidentes na esfera social, demográfica ou regime de propriedade – e os traços materiais que a escassez documental ou os vestígios cadastrais remanescentes deixam, apesar de tudo, transparecer. Uma vez mais, os resultados sugerem uma ausência generalizada da que possa ser considerado matriz urbana islâmica revelando, pelo contrário, uma progressiva adaptação aos costumes cristãos e a consequente assimilação pela maioria à semelhança do que foi já comprovado para o quadro social.

The analysis of the medieval Portuguese city inevitably includes the confrontation between two different cultures and urban patterns: the Islamic, which dominated the territory for five centuries (711-1249), and the Christian which, from North to South and following the Reconquista progression, imposed a new socio-political organization with obvious repercussions for urban space.

Within this process, of all the urban sections, the alcáçova\(^1\) was the one which immediately changed hands due to its strategic location and symbolism. In contrast, in the Me-
subjugation took different forms. If the town capitulated without offering effective resistance, the previous inhabitants were allowed to keep, amongst other privileges, their properties. Differently – and in the most common situation in the Portuguese Reconquista – military conquest implied the expulsion of the defeated population from the city walls while their possessions were distributed amongst the conquerors, as Raul, the English crusader, described in relation to the fall of Lisbon. After being expelled from the inner cities, mudejares were compulsorily confined inside peripheral walled quarters called mourarias.

As a result, Portuguese medieval cities were forced into a significant set of adjustments, which, in a short time, resulted in a different urban pattern. These material changes, intimately connected and directly dependent on the discrimination/tolerance and ultimate integration/expulsion processes towards the Muslim minority, are the focus of the present analysis, particularly the way the Christian pattern was imposed over the Islamic, and how the Muslims, constrained by the strategies pursued for their resettling, eventually attempted to resist.

In order to understand the incompatibility of the two patterns, and the reason changes were unavoidable following the conquest, it is important to emphasize, in a necessarily brief way, the fundamental structure of an Islamic town.

Included in the Mediterranean model, the prevailing Islamic pattern was the result of a religious, juridical and social paradigm materialized through three decisive aspects: reduced state involvement in the urban setting, the supremacy of private initiative and the massive adoption of central courtyard houses within exclusively residential areas. Taken together, these factors forced the urban pattern to assume the most visible characteristics of an Islamic town: a dense and saturated fabric of close knit domestic structures mostly only accessed by a cul-de-sac or blind alley.

These characteristics, which marked the residential fabric, were the ones where changes, even if made slowly, were most visible after the Christian conquest, while individual equipment and buildings such as the alcáçova, mosque and defences, immediately consecrated, were promptly adopted as instruments of propaganda of the new Christianized city.

Contrary to the Christian town, the Islamic one was perceived exclusively as a pragmatic association of people joined together by convenience, so that any mystic origin or sacred aspiration was disregarded. State involvement in the urban setting was, therefore, in most cases, confined to individual buildings and structures of manifest religious-political symbolism or military interest, such as the alcáçova, the congregational mosque (aljama) and the city walls. Not recognizing it as a religious entity, the state left the major part of the town layout, and particularly the residential areas, almost entirely in the hands of private individuals.
While state interference in the global city layout was reduced to a minimum, private initiative was maximized by the equally absent conceptualization of the town as a juridical entity, which justified the non-existence of any political-administrative structure capable of imposing regulating mechanisms upon the community. Furthermore, unlimited individual action was supported and strengthened by the prevalence of the private property regime. In fact, within a very varied parcelling, where the shape and size depended exclusively on financial capability, each and every property-owner was able to freely dispose of, and use, his parcel. The progressive construction, according to needs, resulted in a dense fabric which eventually saturated the blocks completely. The only limit was the Qur'an prescription which preached the duty of practising good while rejecting evil. As Betran Abadia underlines, this meant the defence of private interests until they were shown to be damaging similar neighbour’s rights, a rule upheld by the market officer, known as sahib al-suq or muhtasib.

Finally, spontaneity was reinforced due to the prevailing domestic structure – the enclosed central courtyard house – which was adopted on a widespread level as a response to the extensive family social structure. Organized in patrilineal clans, lineage cohesion and solidarity depended on the practice of endogamic matrimonial alliances and secluded women. The typology of the Mediterranean house was an adequate answer to the principles of the Qur’an regarding the defence of the family honour because it preserved the sacredness of the harem by finding the cool and curtained space needed for the women’s privacy in the central courtyard.

When allied to non-invasive public management, this domestic typology had deep implications in the way residential areas extended and, therefore, also in the urban mesh. Ignoring the façade concept (as a result of maintaining privacy and hiding the owner’s wealth) and capturing all the required light and air through an open central patio, the Mediterranean house presented blind walls to the city. Houses belonging to members of the same clan, or related people (by origin or ethnicity), placed their walls touching the next one since the non-existence of windows did not imply any particular ambitus or space in between. As a consequence of this principle of adjoining wall-to-wall dwellings, houses expanded indefinitely while open space was reduced through progressive infilling. Blocks merged together into solidly built superblocks. The only restriction made was to ensure access, which was done through the adarves (durûb, sing. darb), narrow, dead-end streets that, in fact, were progressively and spontaneously shaped according to needs. They entered the heart of the residential quarters and served as access corridors for several doors, and they were the result of private initiative on private property. This explains why they were also considered private at the juridical level.

Summing up, the Islamic city acted in accordance with religious, juridical and social rules. The essence of the Islamic urban pattern and the core differences with the Chris-
ian model lay in the absence of a strong and active administration defending the public space, combined with full rights over private property structured in accordance with the central courtyard model.

**The Courtyard House as an Indicator**

If vestiges of *alcáçovas*, mosques and defences²³ scarcely survived on Portuguese territory, and were mostly reduced to a vague memory, the same cannot be said of the Islamic urban mesh which seems to have completely vanished – at least, on the surface. This is contrary to what happened in several Spanish towns, where it is still openly visible.

Two main explanations can be given for the Portuguese case:

- the Islamic character was tenuous in the first place, partly because the Muslims occupied the pre-existing urban network²⁴, and partly because they did not stay long in some regions;

- the changes were systematically eliminated by the subsequent Christian occupation.

Regarding the first aspect, it is worth emphasising that the Muslim occupation was far from being an homogeneous process. It depended, to a large extent, on three factors: the geographic, social and ideological origin of the invaders, their demographic weight and the time they controlled the region.

Coimbra illustrates a situation where the Islamic influence in shifting the previous urban pattern must have been weak. Essentially occupied by recently-Arabized, North African Berbers, numerically limited to a reduced military contingent and at least initially settled in *husun*, outside the urban nucleus, the city was, throughout the period of Islamic domination, one of the most important *moçarabe²⁵* centres, suggesting, therefore, significant cultural and material continuity. Under the domination of Islamic troops from 714 to 878 and again from 987 to 1064, it was only in the late 10th century, with the rise of *al-Mansur*, that Coimbra fell effectively under the centralised military and administrative control of Cordova. In accordance with this new role as a strategic military base for Muslim movements against the Christians, along with a forced Islamisation process, a massive investment was made in the construction of the defences. This also happened in the *alcáçova*, being completed in the first years of the 11th century, just a few decades away from the Christian take over²⁶. Considering the completely different construction and maturation times of architecture and urbanism, this interval, long enough to enforce isolated material marks on the territory, was insufficient to transform the pre-existing urban network in a permanent manner.

Setting aside the controversial thesis of a dichotomy between the deeply Islamised South in opposition to the North, which lacked such influence²⁷, the southern regions’ historical context was indubitably favourable for engraving a deeper Islamic urban pattern. To the Yemenite origin of the occupier²⁸, the owner of urban properties since the very
beginning, we must add the demographic influence of the continuous influx of Muslim contingents pushed out by the Christian advance, particularly during the 12th and 13th centuries. During this latter period, the Gharb was perceived to be of major strategic importance by the Islamic central authorities, and therefore the focus of attention and military investment. As Cristophe Picard underlines, the global Islamic feature of Gharb cities, where the madina, the qasaba and the mosque stand out, occurred from the 11th century onwards\(^{29}\), just a few decades before the Reconquista reached the river Tejo.

That is why the present approach concentrates on the southern region, whereas the perfect setting for the emergence of the Islamic city was previously defined. This is confirmed by archaeology. Silves\(^{30}\), Mértola\(^{31}\), Tavira and Lisbon\(^{32}\) are the most representative examples, where evidence of central courtyard houses – a potential indicator – is increasingly present.

In Mértola, a set of 30 houses matching the Mediterranean type, either in structure or materials, was discovered in an area transformed after the Christian conquest into a cemetery. In Silves, evidence brought to light proves the broad adoption of the central courtyard domestic structure throughout.

What archaeology reveals happened after the Christian conquest is of greatest significance to our purpose. In all cases we find one of two situations:

- An occupational gap between the second half of the 13th century and the end of the 15th century, matching the discarding of Islamic domestic structures and a new reestablishment, by the end of the Middle Ages, over the previous structures, while scarcely ever reusing them;

- The reuse of Islamic houses by covering and, hence, neutralizing the central courtyard.

In either circumstance, the result is similar: the eradication of typical Islamic houses.

All late-medieval written sources support this thesis, as do the occasional material sources that have survived where the traditional Mediterranean courtyard house is consistently absent\(^{33}\). In fact, it is now agreed that the advance of the northern conquerors was the cause of a progressive shift in the ancestral way of life demanded by the pressure of the new culture and social system\(^{34}\), and subsequently the new urban pattern. This new urban pattern can be recognized in the medieval plot, narrow and deep, where the façade systematically faces the street along with the implementation of the ever-present backyard.

If the abandonment of Islamic domestic structures is a perfectly clear process, the same cannot be said of the appropriation and progressive adaptation of former structures, especially of how the documented isolated and circumstantial changes, such as the covering of the courtyard, could eventual lead to the disappearance of the Islamic urban grid.

In this particular case, recent Spanish historiography, mostly concentrated on Murcia, Valencia and Toledo\(^{35}\) allows us to contextualise the, as yet, sparse Portuguese results.
Despite local examples, which differ case by case, there is a whole set of general aspects which can be explained through the differences between the Islamic and Christian urban models, and which are therefore also valid for the Portuguese territory.

On a broader and understandable scale, these latest pieces of research point out two essential and combined aspects: the abandonment or transformation of Islamic plots and the consequent assimilation/disappearance of a relevant part of the street system; that is, the typical *adarves* or dead end alleys.

In Spain, as in Portugal, the conquest of Muslim cities determined a massive transfer of property over a few decades. Dividing the city territory and keeping a part to themselves, Iberian kings rewarded those who participated in the conquest with lands and properties. Christian settlers, recruited from diverse origins, were also included. The redistribution of properties and the subjecting of the plots to different needs, caused a profound change in the urban pattern, albeit at differing speeds, eventually inducing the fossilization of the Muslim city.

A whole set of differences between the two cultural models explains their incapacity to share the same town layout. In fact, contrary to the Islamic social structure, the Christian one is based on a restricted family founded on the matrimonial cell. Furthermore, the active role of women discard the obsessive need for privacy, looking for, whenever possible, direct contact with the street (used as a natural extension of the house and social area). As a result, the central courtyard completely lost its meaning. The generalised trend of facing the street naturally obliged house owners to adopt narrow fronts, considered the most valuable and expensive space. The houses were therefore built as elongated rectangles in a compact row with sidewalls. In such a system the only possible extra source of lightning and ventilation was the small backyard. Since each and every house fronted the street, the *adarve* was no longer needed and was therefore assimilated within the plots, divided into small sections and used as a backyard for several bordering houses.

The shift in urban patterns was also encouraged by another significant aspect. Family plots were private property and built according to needs until saturation in the Islamic city, but in Christian towns, most of the land plots belonged to powerful and demanding owners (crown, church, nobility), and obeyed a very precise configuration, shape and size which was avidly ensured by the landlords. As a result, the Christian city often appeared as a rigid and long-standing mesh, where residential quarters were bordered by open and fluid streets protected from private initiative by active and interfering local authorities.

Finally, the Islamic city observed the principle of separation between different functional areas, keeping the residential quarters exclusive. The trade area was located near the mosque or throughout the one or two most important axes that crossed the urban space and connected the town gates. After the Christian conquer towns had to adapt
to a different model where artisans’ and merchants’ trade and living spaces were commonly found in the same building. The quiet, narrow and private accesses to the former residential areas were no longer suitable for the new functionally complex areas forcing the street grid to change.

This transformation process has been the focus of several pieces of research carried out in the past 20 years in various Spanish towns. Murcia is, in this context, a paradigmatic example, with archaeology increasingly proving the existence, partly adapted or simply abandoned, of the Islamic mesh below the medieval city\textsuperscript{39}. Step by step, the details of the changes, while adapting the old pattern to the Christian needs, is now, to a great extent, clear.

One example, matching Portuguese archaeological results, is enlightening. It is that of the reuse of Islamic houses by covering and, therefore, neutralizing the central courtyard, which, in spite the continuity of use, implies a profound and meaningful restructuring of the whole scheme. As already mentioned, besides social and religious needs, the courtyard was the pivot of the entire construction as it was the only real point of entry for air and light to the interior. By closing it, the new inhabitants were obliged to open the outer walls, fitting windows as an alternative to the key function of the central courtyard. The emergence of a façade, directly connected to the street, also had an impact on the street system, making the adarves obsolete.

What seemed to be a small adjustment introduced a sequence of meaningful changes, all of them contrary to Islamic logic.

If we consider the few archaeologically proven cases in Lisbon or Silves and extrapolate them to the larger scale that occurred in Spain, it is possible to understand how a whole urban system was put in danger following the Christian occupation, which found the central yard, and everything it stood for, incomprehensible. The process was not immediately widely adopted. It was dependent on the new occupiers, and nothing suggests it was part of a conscientious political strategy. In fact, it was the result of a sequence of individual actions especially focused on the architectural level.

Contrastingly, on the urban level, the Christian authorities seem to have taken a more active role, concentrating their efforts on the opening, regularisation and enlargement of the street grid, while facing a new set of demands. The street was not just a place for circulation. It was, by then, a place of encounter, work, trade and definitely one of the urban elements most capable of expressing power and wealth, either through the display of ornate façades, or as stage for religious processions and civil parades\textsuperscript{40}.

Once again, Spanish sources enlighten us about the process. Royal and communal decrees from Valencia, Murcia, Granada or Toledo attested to the necessity, during the 14th and 15th centuries, albeit slowly, of improving the street grid. These changes were noted in written documents, explicitly indicating the negative perception the Christian authorities had of the Islamic city. In 1393, the Council of Valencia blamed the Islamic origin of the city for its feature “estreta a meçquina, ab molts carrers estrets voltats e al-
Assimilation, Integration and Exclusion

tres deformitats” 41 [narrow and wretched with a multiplicity of intricate and tight alleys and other deformities]. The differences between the Islamic and Christian models are openly suggested in terms such as carrer mourisc [Moorish street], casa mourisca [Moorish house] and obra mourisca [Moorish work]. A document from 1322 refers to a house still Moorish42.

Francesc Eiximenis also expressed a similar opinion in 1383, while advising the Valencia authorities on how to rule public affairs, by stressing the urgent need to Christianize the town plan and cultural habits: Dotzenament, car com la ciutat sia encara quasi morisca, per la novitá de sa preso, per tal vos cové vetlar que es repare en murs, e en valls, e en carreres, e en places, en cases, e en armes, en guisa que per tot hi apareixca ésser lo crestía regiment e les crestianes maneres...”43.

Underneath an apparently continuous occupation, to which the reutilization of some equipment or buildings (usually called ‘urban mudejarism”44) contributes, there hides a deep fracture in which the Islamic pattern makes no sense to the new inhabitants. The Christian conquerors dismantled the Islamic city, the pace of change depending upon the city concerned.

This process, comprising the result of the appropriation and adaptation of an urban plan and equipment to a new cultural, social and political context, cannot be mistaken for the one designated as “mudejare urbanism”45 and used in relation to the neighbourhoods assigned to the defeated Moorish population. These mourarias, although built under Christian rule, could, theoretically, resist the conquerers’ model, thereby preserving the Islamic pattern in small areas of the town plan.

It is precisely this potential autonomy in setting up their quarters that we intend to assess.

**MOURARIAS [MOORISH QUARTERS]**

The advance of the Christian troops forced the retreat of the Islamic population. If the escape toward the southern regions, seeking refuge in territories still under Muslim control, or the definitive migration to North Africa were the most frequent options, an unknown number of Muslims chose to stay, although they were relocated in areas peripheral and allegedly inappropriate to the Christian majority, as assigned by the authorities46.

From what documentary sources reveal, the transfer did not affect all Muslims since some of them went on living in their former properties within what from that moment on was called and perceived as “Christendom”. Although the extension of this scattered presence was not quantified, it decreased significantly after 1361 when segregation laws were strongly pursued by King Pedro I47.

Although segregated, the Moorish presence was tolerated and even protected by the Iberian kings. Apart from representing an important income to the Crown as they were heavily taxed Muslim communities an extra urban and rural labour force48. For that
reason, they received charters where obligations and rights were clearly balanced. In return for high taxation, they were allowed to keep, to a certain extent, jurisdic-tional and religious autonomy, and thus their identity within the Christian society.

The Portuguese *mourarias* were mainly concentrated in the southern part of the country in towns such as Lisbon, Santarém, Elvas, Évora, Moura, Beja, Silves, Loulé, Tavira and Faro. In fact, the Moorish quarter of Leiria — known from a brief reference in a document dated 1303 is, up to now, the only one with a northern location.

Such geographic distribution of *mourarias* did not necessarily mean the absence of a Moorish population in the north. Proved to exist through documentary sources, their number was, however, far from sufficient to demand organized communities or the need for exclusive quarters.

In fact, the Moorish presence was neither homogeneous throughout the country, nor did it follow the same pattern of evolution. In the northern regions, where Muslims were taken as slaves by the Christian armies, their conversion, liberation and assimilation occurred in an extremely prompt way. Such processes are undoubtedly attested by the Royal Inquiries dated 1220 and 1256. From the first to the last, the number of references to Christian names followed by a Moorish surname doubled, thus denouncing Muslim origin. Moreover, four of these cases were identified as clerics in spite their Muslim background.

In the southern cities, taking the river Tejo as a borderline, the reality was completely different. Numerous, and considered free by law, *mouros forros* lived in officially authorized communities, being, therefore, able to preserve their identity.

The different Moorish circumstances relating to the northern and southern regions were acutely identified and summed up by Filomena Lopes de Barros through the expression “Moorish of the land” and “Land of Moorish”.

It is therefore not surprising that mudejar urbanism, as described above, can only be found in Portugal’s southern areas. But to what extent?

The question looks at the capability of resistance towards the pressures due to the conditions imposed by the conquerors with emphasis on the compulsory retreat from the *medinas* and subsequent lost of properties, the dispersion of families and clans caused by intensive mobility (slavery, escape, death), the marginalized resettlement, the new tenant conditions and, finally, the eventual interference of landlords in planning the area, plots and residences.

Would it have been possible after all the above-mentioned factors for the Islamic population to persist with the ancestral model? The answer to this question is not clear, although some aspects can be used as potential indicators.

The weakness of the Portuguese Moorish population can be indirectly assessed by the *mourarias’* dimension as well as their demographic evolution. Generally occupying a small
area – limited to a street in Évora and Silves – the largest one in the Kingdom, as expected located in Lisbon, did not exceed, at its origin, one hectare in area\(^54\). Even when taking into account those who settled in the immediate rural suburbs, the total population remained small. In fact, recent studies, based on the occupied area, estimate a total of less than 500 people living in the Lisbon Moorish quarter at the end of the 15th century\(^55\).

Regarding demographic evolution, Portuguese Moorish quarters experienced a broad depopulation process due to the initial exodus, progressive assimilation, damage inflicted by the plague and the constant escape throughout the 14th and 15th centuries. While the Moorish populations of Avis, Estremoz, Palmela, Almada, Leiria, Alenquer and Coimbra just disappeared over the course of the centuries, all the others, with the exception of Lisbon, corroborated the decline.

Written documentation of the 14th century explicitly mentions Moorish migration to North Africa as well as to neighbouring kingdoms such as Castile, Aragon, Andalusia and Granada, mostly caused by the excessive duties and services demanded by the local councils, even though they were against the Crown’s orders\(^56\).

Lisbon was once again the only exception, not because of the natural increase of the original inhabitants, but because it acted as a magnet to the Portuguese Moorish population as the documented migration movements towards the capital prove.

As significant as this demographic weakness was the capability to preserve the extended family, as seen above, one of the aspects which most strongly influenced the layout of residential areas.

In fact, the social structure of Portuguese mudejares is not yet completely clear. Along with the dispersion of family members and boundaries caused by the conquest, in the following centuries increased contact with the majority, and the progressive assimilation must have pressured the Islamic minority to adapt the Christian social model, based on the nuclear family. Even though polygamy was considered in the Ordenações Afonsinas\(^57\) [code of law], allowing the four legitimized wives permitted by the Qur’an, it was possible, as Maria José Tavares Ferro underlines, that “Christian monogamy lead to a prevalence of the western model whenever the matrimony proved to be fecund”\(^58\). This same opinion is shared by Maria Filomena Lopes de Barros who found in the marriage practice pursued by mudejares, during the 14th and 15th centuries, a significant sign of the increasing minority subjection to the common practices and general laws of the kingdom\(^59\).

Along the same line of thought, and equally essential to the characteristic Islamic town plan, was the full ownership of urban property and its resulting use without restriction. Contrary to this situation, even though mudejares’ private property is documented, the relocation of the minority occurred predominantly in rented properties, thus limiting their autonomy in organizing and freely using the space.

**Assimilation, Integration and Exclusion**
Examples can be found in the Moorish quarter of Santarém where several houses belonged to the church of S. Salvador, while in *Rua da Ramada* some of the buildings rented to Moorish people were property of the monastery of Chelas. In Évora, various institutions owned houses in the *mouraria* located in the S. Mamede suburb: the local council, the monastery of S. Domingos, the church of S. Tiago and the hospitals of Jerusalem and S. Bartolomeu. Also, the crown rented five houses near the *Porta Nova*, in a place called *Olarias*, probably named after the most common Moorish occupation, the manufacturing of clay pots. In Leiria, the only known document refers to a house owned by Domingos Moniz, an ecclesiastic from the Coimbra cathedral. In Silves, where the *mouraria* was limited to a single street, the Crown possessed seven houses and four plots, as claimed by the inquiry known as *Livro do Almoxarifado* in 1474. All these examples reveal the need to adapt to a predefined house structure and land partition. In the case of Silves, the king’s properties’ descriptions included in the *Livro do Almoxarifado* demonstrate that the central courtyard organization was not followed in the *mouraria*, at least, by the end of the 15th century.

To a great extent, the features of Portuguese *mourarias* are still an incognita. Along with the rare archaeological excavations carried out in medieval contexts, the elusive character of the written sources hardly allows much more than a register of the public equipment such as walls, mosque and baths, in most cases with a difficult location within the quarter. The houses’ structure and the inner street grid is almost always absent.

The Moorish quarter from Lisbon is an exception since its relevance justified a larger number of references. Located in the northern part of the town on the castle foothill, and enclosed by walls, the Moorish quarter included two mosques, a school, a prison, baths, a corral and butchery. In accordance with Islamic religious concepts, the cemetery, or almocavar, was located outdoors on the *Santa Maria da Graça* slope. During the course of the 15th century, the original quarter spread out to this area in response to the population growth. Both quarters, the original one and the later one, known as the *Arrabalde Novo* [New Suburb], covered an area of around five hectares, although part of it was occupied with cultivated farms and yards. Furthermore, the new extension was not exclusively taken up by Moors since the presence of Christian residents has been frequently detected.

Two streets, identified as *Direitas* (literally straight, but meaning direct), crossed the neighbourhood acting as structural main roads. Surprisingly, in both cases, they were dead-ends, a feature also detectable in the *Rua da Dentro* (inner street), or *Carniçaria*, that linked the two mentioned central streets. This has been frequently taken as an obvious Islamic characteristic. However, in this particular case, the interruption did not fulfil the same function as in the Muslim pattern. As already mentioned, dead-end
alleys did not occur randomly. They existed to give access to the interior of residential quarters, permitting the entrance to one or more private buildings. As such, they were simple passages, quiet and narrow, privately used and private property accepted by law. On the contrary, main streets (shari) commonly crossed the town in the straightest and widest manner, connecting two of the most important gates. Crowded and commercial by nature, they usually attracted public buildings and equipment towards them. Regarding circulation, they allowed, and compelled, outsiders to move across the city without entering the residential neighbourhoods. In the case of the Lisbon Moorish quarter, the three dead-end main paths must have had a different explanation, probably related to the topography, the reduced dimensions of the neighbourhood and its expansion toward the walls of the quarter.

The characteristics of the house structure are almost unknown. The study carried out by Luís Filipe Oliveira and Mário Viana identified three residential buildings with front-yards which, in our opinion, far from being a significant sample, do not match, in concept or function, the Mediterranean type.

Concerning the materials, the general formula used throughout medieval documentation is equivalent to the one used by the majority, systematically clustering a whole set of different elements such as stone, wood, tiles, lime and nails.

The way the evidence seems to point to a similar context within the Christianity framework is reinforced by other data. The public baths, located near the mosque, rented to a Christian since 1301 and used both by mudejares and Christians, were shut down by the end of the 14th century, while the building was adapted as a residence. The same occurred with the madraza [school], which was closed before the middle of the following century. The premature closure of these structures, equally essential to the Muslim way of life, seems to assert a progressive weakness of Islamic practices at the same time that Christian ones were assimilated.

The process was stressed by the close daily contact between the followers of the two creeds’ the followers of despite all the legal measures in use since D. Pedro’s reign, to a great extent, because of pressure by the church.

From the middle of the 14th century onward, laws attempting to confine the minority were increasingly triggered. In addition to prohibiting residences outside Moorish quarters and the limiting walls, there were penalties for Moorish people found outside the neighbourhood after sunset, and the interdiction of those quarters to Christian women. The restraining strategy was reinforced and expanded by D. João I by denying the ancestral Islamic use of a public call to prayer, imposing the use of Islamic clothes as an immediately recognizable sign and, finally, banning the use of Arab in legal acts.

Nevertheless, as Filomena Lopes de Barros highlights, daily proximity surpassed legal and physical barriers while sharing the same business areas (Santarém and Lisbon), living scattered amongst Christians (Coimbra, Évora, Campo-Maior, Olivença) and even
sharing the, at least theoretically, restricted Moorish quarters with Christian inhabitants (Lisbon, Elvas).

Cultural permeability stood out in the use of aljamia, an adaptation of the Islamic linguistic code to western characters, and in the enthusiasm for Moorish music, dances, traditional clothes and architectural decorations amongst the Christians. In fact, the Islamic minority gradually and naturally became diluted in the course of the 14th and 15th centuries.

The integration process was partially helped by a lack of hostility from the Christian majority towards the Muslims. Decreasing in number, socially discreet and economically dependent on agriculture or common manufactures, occupying peripheral and unattractive residential areas, the Moorish people, unlike the Jews, did not arouse the resentment of the majority, and therefore required less attention from the political power. This explains why legal decrees relating to the Jewish minority were much more profuse. In fact, in the 15th century, the code of law known as Livro das Leis e Posturas, while having five resolutions concerning both the Moors and Jews, had thirty-one exclusively applicable to the latter. Also, all the segregation measures explicitly assumed that those applying to Islamic people should follow those that had been decided for the Hebraic population, clearly implying the priority of controlling the Jews, who the Christian majority increasingly felt threatened by in a similar manner to that which happened in other Iberian Christian kingdoms.

Easily tolerated and accepted within the Christian society, the Moorish population, by nature more permeable than the Jewish community, was gradually integrated and eventually assimilated.

While using Spanish examples and concluding that the process for dealing with the Islamic pattern was similar, a question remains: why did the Islamic urban pattern completely vanish from the surface of Portuguese territory in contrast to what happened in the southeast regions of Iberia?

On the one hand, neither the dimension nor the significance of the Muslim towns in question are comparable. Even in Andaluzia Betica, where the mudejar population was forced to migrate after the mutiny of 1264 (the ones who stayed did not exceed 0.05% of the total population) thus suggesting a drastic change of the towns’ landscape, the towns’ dimensions associated with the problems facing the Christian repopulation process, close to what some authors consider a failure, resulted in a necessarily slow transformation of the urban pattern. As J. Abellán Pérez highlights, “el corte radical de la sociedad hispanomusulmana en esta region, su sustitución por otra nueva, que en ningún momento la iguaría en número, hace difícil pensar en transformaciones inmediatas...”. The most visible changes occurred through the rebuilding of mosques and the adaptation of the residential areas, whilst defences, perimeter and various equipment
necessarily prevailed. The slow rhythm of the process partly explains the permanence of the Islamic mark through the following centuries on towns such as Sevilla, Cordoba or Jérez de la Frontera.

On the other hand, Gharb towns, geographically peripheral from the political centres and lacking central administrative control for a long time, included throughout the period of Islamic domination, without any exceptions to the south, a significant percentage of moçarabes presence that necessarily balanced the Muslim cultural and material influence. To refer to just one example, in 1109, Lisbon was described by Norwegian crusaders as a town “half Christian, half pagan”.

But other important aspects can be added such as the different rhythms of the reconquista. While Coimbra was conquered in 1064, Lisbon and Santarém in 1147 and Évora in 1165, the Portuguese reconquista concluded in 1248-49 with the fall of Silves and Faro, to refer to just some of the most important Gharb urban centres. In the neighbouring Christian kingdoms, the same process occurred considerably later (Cordoba, 1236; Valencia, 1238; Murcia, 1243; Sevilla, 1248), only to be concluded by the end of the 15th century with the fall of Granada, the capital of the nazari kingdom.

Moreover, the Muslims were expelled from Portugal in 1496 along with the Jews. In “Spain”, this same process occurred separately since the Catholic Kings decree from 1492 only affected the Jewish community. While the mudejares’ compulsory conversion was ordered in 1502, it was only much later, in 1609-1614 during the reign of Felipe III, that the moriscos expulsion was decided. In addition, from 1500 to 1609, the minority evolution was not homogeneous from one region to another. In Castile, the moriscos, descendants from the mudejares, easily assimilated the Christians habits, while in oriental Andaluzia, on the contrary, they kept their beliefs and culture strongly alive. This explains the mutiny of 1568, refusing to accept the previous year’s royal decree by which they were forbidden to speak, read or write in Arabic, use Muslim names or dress according to tradition, measures perceived by the minority as a threat to their identity until then but almost untouched by the frequent laws imposing the Christian way of life.

Incomparably more numerous (according to Garzia de Cortázar, the expulsion decree affected approximately 300,000 people) with a much stronger cultural tradition, and expelled more than one hundred years later, “Spanish Muslims” engraved the urban space they left in an enduring way.

CONCLUSION

Trying to understand the confrontation and its consequences between two different urban models the present approach focuses on the urban changes originated by the Christian conquest of Islamic towns. Gathering all the available data from the still insufficient archaeological investment in the Portuguese territory and the scattered knowledge from medieval Moorish quarters, we must conclude that there was a pro-
gressive and inevitable eradication of the former Islamic pattern. The disappearance of the central courtyard house structure due to the conquerors' different culture has been unanimously accepted, but the same did not occur with the urban pattern still commonly mistaken with plain spontaneous urban mesh. We tried to prove that the Islamic pattern materialized within a coherent system where one element automatically affected another. Adapting the residential structures affected unavoidably the corresponding street grid. The contrary nature of the Islamic and Christian models explains why the Islamic model could not prevail after the Christian takeover.

Using recent Spanish approaches to similar historical contexts – which Murcia and Valencia best illustrate – allowed us to clarify, step by step, the shifting process of the Islamic pattern and, in a more radical way, its prompt discard.

Concerning the mourarias or Moorish quarters, all the available data point to a progressive adaptation of the Islamic population to the way of life of the majority thus contributing to the disappearance of the Muslim town in the Portuguese territory.

NOTES

1 From *qasaba*, the centre of political and administrative power, always strategically located.

2 From *Madinat*, signifying the area within the walls.


5 For details of these concepts, see this same volume, B. Borstner, S. Gartner, *The Conceptual Analysis of Assimilation and Integration*.


8 The Islamic town abides with the principle of functional separation with the trading areas set apart from the residential quarters.

9 After the Christian conquest, the *alcáceus* of Coimbra, Lisbon and Silves were reused and progressively transformed over the course of the following years. Mosques were sacred, and transformed into churches until financial resources were made available for a global renewal, which happened in Lisbon and Coimbra. In Mértola, however, the mosque remained almost unchanged until the 16th century.
Besides the pragmatic concept of *Umma* (community), the absence of a sacred constructed town prototype – the promised Paradise was in fact a garden, the garden of Genesis – justified the minimal state role in the global town layout. Actually the mosque was the only sacred building. Betran Abadia, *La forma de la ciudad* cit, p. 25.

11 A. Frey Sánchez, *El Jardín de Al-Andalus. Origen e consolidación de la Múrcia Islámica*, Murcia 2002, p. 76. An example of this limited interference can be found in the description of the foundation of Badajoz in 885, on the order of the emir Abd Allâh. Previous decisions had been made on the mosques, *alcazaba*, baths and ramparts. Town planning, however, was not mentioned. Castillo, Palazón, *El urbanismo islámico* cit., p. 84. On this subject, see also C. Mazzoli-Guintard, *Ciudades de al-Andalus. España y Portugal en la época musulmana (s. VIII-XV)*, Granada 2000, pp. 304-310.

12 The equalitarian theocracy, implying the omnipotence of the caliph, God’s single representative, justified the discarding of any other political-administrative structure such as a town council, which, while representing the citizens, could simultaneously impose regulating mechanisms on the community.


15 The perfect matrimonial alliance was the one which united direct cousins through father’s lineage. Guichard, *Al-Andalus* cit., p. 102.

16 Apart from being an appropriate space to carry on the daily activities and management of an extensive family, the courtyard or Mediterranean typology is, as its designation implies, the perfect response to the Mediterranean climate, largely in Islamic hands.

17 As Cláudio Torres underlines, “in the Islamic city the street belongs to men (…) in this male world each woman’s step is perfectly limited to the mosque’s paths, to the passage through *marabu*, where the devotion saint serves as confidant, the sporadic visit to the cemetery, where she worships her dead. Weekly and always at the same hours of the day, to avoid any promiscuity with the male users, she spends the afternoon in the public baths”. C. Torres, *O Garb-Al-Andaluz*, in J. Mattoso (ed.), *História de Portugal*, Lisbon, vol. I, 1992, p. 382.


21 This explains the later Portuguese use of the term *adarve* in reference to the upper path of a defensive structure allowing troop movements. In fact, as with the previous term, it means an access in the form of a tight corridor, partially between walls.

22 Castillo, Palazón, *El urbanismo islámico* cit., pp. 77-78.

23 Examples can be found in Coimbra, Lisboa, Silves, Mértola, Évora or Elvas.

24 Islamic *ex novo* foundations are not documented in the actual Portuguese territory.


27 Regarding this false dicothomy, see A. Alves, *Qalbi Arabi: o património árabo-islâmico em Portugal in Memórias Árabo-Islâmicas em Portugal*, Lisbon 1997, pp. 57-60.


34 Torres, Macias, *A islamização do Gharb al-Andalus* cit., p. 43.


38 Castillo, Palazón, *El urbanismo islámico* cit., p. 117.


44 Besides buildings such as mosques or baths, ramparts or hydraulic installations were also frequently reused during the following centuries, as happened with the Silves cistern, whose capacity and distribution mechanism was still valuable in the 17th century. F. Botão, *Silves capital de um reino medievo*, Silves 1992, p. 34.


46 In the second half of the 15th century, the council of Elvas, with the king’s approval, assigned a new location for the mudejar graveyard. The place is described as steep and stony, and therefore perceived as unsuitable for any Christian use. F. Correia, *Elvas na Idade Média*, Lisbon 1999, p. 345.


49 Published by P. Azevedo in *Do Areeiro à Mouraria. Topographia histórica de Lisboa* in *O Archeologo Português*, V, 1899-1900, pp. 212-224, 257-278. Added in the course of the following centuries, the rights and duties of the minority were codified in another text published in *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica, Leges et Consuetudines*, vol. I, Lichtenstein 1967, pp. 98-99.

50 In the case of Leiria, the Moorish contingent probably did not correspond to previous inhabitants, but to the slaves captured and brought to the north by Christian troops. S. Gomes, *A Mouraria de Leiria. Problemas sobre a presença moura no Centro do País*, in *Estudos Orientais. II. O legado cultural de Judeus e mouros*, Lisbon 1991, pp. 162-163.


67 Oliveira, Viana, *A Mouraria de Lisboa* cit., p.196. 68 *Ibid.*, p. 201 compare with Trindade, *A casa corrente* cit., p. 75. 69 Barros, *A comuna muçulmana* cit., p. 142. 70 Correia, *Elvas* cit., pp. 341-345. In this case – the attempt to move the Islamic graveyard to a different place – besides the church complaining about the proximity to the monastery of S. Domingos, other interests from the town council are evident, such as the will to convert a field to a cereal storage area or, 20 years later, the need to expand the town.
70 The extensive and transversal appropriation of Moorish dances and songs by Portuguese society as witnessed in popular festivities or in their involvement in the Corpus Christi procession was, within the royal court and higher nobility, part of a broader inclination to exotic themes resulting from contact with the Orient and North Africa and consciously used as a form of marking an "Iberian difference", particularly visible in the use of architectural motifs. P. Pereira, *A obra Silvestre e a esfera do rei*, Coimbra 1990, pp. 77-80.
72 As discussed in Rita Rios’ contribution to this same volume. R. Rios de la Llave, *The Discrimination Against the Jewish Population in Medieval Castile and León*.
73 In spite of the enormous disparity regarding the estimates of 10th century Cordova inhabitants– from 100,000 up to 1,000,000, and even if we accept the lowest data, the difference to Gharb al-Andalus
towns is still immense: in the middle of the 12th century, apart from Lisbon with probably 25,000 inhabitants, Coimbra and Santarém would have had around 4,000 or 5,000, while other the important cities Gharb, such as Elvas, Alcácer, Évora, Beja, Mértola, Silves and Faro, never exceeded 2,000 to 3,000. Guidoni, La Ville européenne cit., p. 65; Torres, Lisboa muçulmana, in Lisboa Subterrânea, Lisbon 1994, p.83. Following Christine Mazzoli-Guintard’s estimates of the walled towns’ dimensions, it is worth comparing the 11,31 ha in Lisbon with the 89,91 in Cordova, the 267 in Sevilha and even the 52,66 in Valencia. Mazzoli-Guintard, Ciudades de al-Andalus cit., p. 458.


Id., A Comuna muçulmana de Lisboa (séculos XIV e XV), Lisbon 1998.


Id., Santarém medieval, Lisbon 1980.


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Ubi bene ibi patria: Reading the City of Kiev through Polish and Czech “Spatial Stories” from the First World War Period

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ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on Kiev during the upheavals of the First World War period by analyzing Czech and Polish ‘spatial stories’ of the city. It examines the effect of the war on the everyday pursuits of pre-war Kievites of Czech and Polish origin and new arrivals to the city. The author ascertains whether and how their perception of Kiev was transformed during the war: from home into lost space. It is argued that Kiev played an important role in the development of the daily activities of Czechs and Poles and that, furthermore, both ethnic groups influenced the city by filling it with their own spatial practices, thereby formulating a unique identity for the city that bore special significance for its migrant communities.
датних конгресів, монастирі та університет відкрили свої терени для формування не своїх військових підрозділів (Чеської дружини). Це лише перша спроба прочитати Київ крізь просторові історії його мешканців, прояв спокуси затримати на довше блимання вогника, який у вигляді ностальгійних спогадів дозволяє нам відчути себе в постаті тих, чиї давно зниклі кроки оживляли Київ.

INTRODUCTION

You can meet in the streets of Prague a shabbily dressed man who is not even himself aware of his significance in the history of the great new era. He goes modestly on his way, without bothering anyone. Nor is he bothered by journalists asking for an interview. If you asked him his name he would answer you simply and unassumingly: ‘I am Švejk’¹.

That is how the prominent Czech writer Jaroslav Hašek pulled an anonymous inhabitant out of the embrace of the street, introduced him and forced us to follow his steps, to read his ‘spatial stories’, during the 500 pages of his book. Reading this novel, one actually does what Michel de Certeau wanted all of us to do—to understand the subject in space while reading his or her own spatial stories. I consider Švejk’s urban experience—‘the murmuring voice of societies’—to be a good way of demonstrating de Certeau’s technique, but what can we say about Hašek in this context?

A building on Volodymyrska Street in downtown Kiev bears a plaque with the inscription: “Jaroslav Hašek, a famous Czech writer, lived here during the World War I”. This is the only name that has been commemorated out of almost 50,000 Czech and Slovak people in Ukraine. A large part of this community marched through Kiev in the late winter of 1918 leaving the city for Prague via Vladivostok. However, my task here is not to write a story about Hašek, but rather to produce, or else find, de Certeau’s “science of singularity”²—a science of the relationship which linked the everyday pursuits of the inhabitants to the particular circumstances of World War I in Kiev. Thus, my intention is to show how culture—“a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which people communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life”³ (Clifford Geertz)—was consumed by ordinary Czech and Polish men far from their homeland, in their new Heimat—a Ukrainian metropolis. This kind of approach helps avoid the pitfalls of nationally oriented studies, which still prevail in Ukrainian, Czech and Polish historiographies. The authors of Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914-1919 demonstrated that the history of World War I can be better understood if one investigates its events through urban studies, paying attention to the metropolis as the “social formation at the juncture between the national state and civil society, as defined by collectivities of many kinds”⁴. Following their approach, this chapter will not focus on the urban level of waging war but rather on the urban activities of an under-researched collection of city-dwellers, namely minority ethnic groups. Specifically this study is concerned with the Czech and
Polish indigenous population and new arrivals, who together transformed Kiev into an immigrant city by 1917.

The specific questions I will ask below, in terms of the ‘science of singularity’ framework, are: How did the Czechs and Poles perceive Kiev? Where did they concentrate and how did they inhabit the city space? What did their daily routes look like? Where did they start and end? Which places bound these ethnic groups together through common memories? How much did the War influence the usual traditions of city life and reformulate urban identity? In this article I attempt to answer these questions by examining them in terms of the key formula – *Ubi bene ibi patria*. Research of this kind can reveal an interesting and rare phenomenon in urban history, when a city’s fate depended not on the indigenous population, but on the newcomers who came to the city as refugees, rather than permanent occupants.

**Kiev as Heimat**

Polish colonization of Ukrainian territory began several centuries before the start of Czech colonization. The former can be traced back to 1569, when Ukrainian lands became an integral part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The latter was mainly rooted in late 19th century Pan-Slavist sympathies. Nevertheless, one should not forget that the first Czech colonists appeared in Ukraine soon after the defeat of Czech rebels in the battle of *Bila hora* [White Mountain] in the first half of the 17th century. Despite this, before World War I both ethnic communities considered the land where they had settled as their motherland, their home, and a place of safety. They took root in these lands and filled them with their own memories and stories. “We were the citizens of this land, which owes everything to us”, Polish colonists in Ukraine used to say (a statement echoes the discourse of colonialism worldwide). The status of Czechs and Slovaks differed slightly; it may be summarized as follows: “in the harsh conditions of the Russian Empire, most of them had lost interest in their native country and its problems, becoming thoroughly Russified”. The best expression of the migrants’ identification with the Ukrainian lands was conveyed by the name which both the Polish and the Czech communities used to designate Ukraine: they called it *Rus*’ (referring to the medieval state Kievan Rus’) and its native population, *Rusyny* (Ruthenians). The Czech colonists probably adopted the name *Rus*’ from Poles9, who wanted to emphasize their own, rather than Russian, legacy and tradition in these lands10. But the question is how much these attitudes were preserved within the city walls. If Ukrainian lands were perceived as a homeland, what role did Kiev play for these ethnic groups?

There are many starting points from which to answer the questions mentioned above and, in this way, to read the Czech and Polish spatial stories of Kiev. If we give the floor to a flâneur, we can see that the description of a city naturally begins with an edge: “I see my city picturesquely situated on the right bank of the Dnieper... I see this city...”
immersed in the green beauty of the charmed parks that embellish the hills under the river bank..."11. As in this quotation, the Dnieper, which divides Kiev into two parts, was the line from which the Poles and the Czechs customarily drew their map of the city. But the river bank did not expose “an entire metropolis to view”12, as Lake Michigan in Chicago did in Kevin Lynch’s classic example of the edge, without which the city cannot be pictured13. Rather, it marked the developed part of the city and created a beautiful cityscape visible from the non-urbanized opposite bank of the river, where the first recreation districts began to appear at the turn of the 20th century. The river bank also had another function. It was the end of the usual path, which led a flâneur to the main cultural events that took place in the city and were organized in the numerous parks and districts along the Dnieper, for example, in the Kupetski Sady (Merchants’ Gardens) or in the trade area in Podil. One could enjoy concerts, dances, talks, singing, playing cards, and flirting there. It was the most romantic part of Kiev and an area that encouraged a feeling of belonging. This kind of spatial practice neglected all differences between city-dwellers. However, these differences surfaced immediately after leaving this area. They arose when visitors returned along the routes that had led them to the river bank. Thus, at this stage we come to another possible starting point in our attempt to read the urban space, which may be narrated as follows: “Let us take a tour from the edge in summer 1914” or “Were we to follow one of the residents along her typical route to the Dnieper, the experience would be something like this”14.

Fig. 1
View at Podil.
The task is not easy, however. Ordinary people of Czech and Polish origin left so little evidence of their city life that one may only guess at how their itineraries were organized. The sources that remain allow us to reflect on how urban space was occupied by communities in general, rather than how they articulated their social differences using the urban landscape. Indeed, in this case Kiev becomes fragmented into different parts, the histories of which can unfold “like stories held in reserve”\(^{15}\). To evoke these stories let us take a closer look at the city in general. By the beginning of World War I Kiev was one of the most pleasant cities in the Russian empire. Under the influence of the new industrial age, the city had expanded rapidly. New multistoried houses with apartments for rent were built everywhere; a regular water supply became standard across the city centre; new roads were paved; electric lights replaced the old gas lights along the streets; and tramlines connected the city centre with outlying areas. All this made Kiev increasingly attractive to businessmen, traders, and craftsmen. Also, by the end of the century it became an important educational centre. These changes caused an increase in the city’s population. Part of this population growth was made up of the two ethnic groups we are interested in. Between 1897 and 1914 the Polish population grew from 35,552 to 60,000 (the total population of the city on the eve of the War was 600,000)\(^{16}\). Kiev also became attractive to the Czechs. In 1909 the young Czech community comprised as many as 3,000-3,500 members\(^{17}\).

The industrial age finally defined the functions of the city districts. ‘Little Paris’, as people sometimes called Kiev at the time, received its newly restored and very wide street, Khreshchatyk, which became the main artery of the city. Its appearance was shaped by numerous hotels, stores, restaurants, cafes, and business offices. At the same time it was also the place for everyday strolling. It was beautiful, and attractive to those who had capital and wanted to start a new business in the city. So, taking into account that the Poles were the richest landlords in this part of the Russian Empire, it is not surprising that there were a large number of Polish landmarks on the Khreshchatyk. On this street one could find Marszak’s jeweler, Fruziński’s cafes and Idzikowski’s bookstore and library\(^{18}\). The latter was well known in the Russian Empire and in Europe for its rich collection of music literature. In another district one could find the musical instruments store which belonged to local ‘Czech king’, Jindřich Jindřišek. The intellectual district was also nearby, marked by St. Volodymyr University, the Second Gymnasium, the Opera House, and the City Theatre, all of which were located along Volodymyrska Street. Although these were places which let all inhabitants enjoy the same social relations with the city, the paths that led there were quite different. On the way to the Opera House Polish inhabitants could stop by Franciszek Gołąbek’s amazing Hotel François, which featured a nice restaurant with tasty deserts and famous poolrooms. In contrast, the Czech path to the opera went via the Praha hotel, which is the most famous hotel along the street. It belonged to Dr Václav Vondrák, one of the richest Volhynian Czechs and a deputy to the Volhynian local self-government body, the zemstvo. The hotel’s ad-
Fig. 2
Khreshchatyk.

Fig. 3
View at St. Volodymyr University.
vertisements claimed: “You have not been to Kiev if you have not seen the city from the hotel’s roof”. The hotel was the main landmark for Czechs in Kiev.

If one continued the tour all the way to the beginning of the street, one would reach Podil, the oldest trading region, passing St. Volodymyr’s hill, on top of which a figure of St. Volodymyr holding a cross was erected in 1853. This was the district most closely connected with the Poles. Normally Podil, as is typical for trading areas, had a “multiplicity of contact points” (Sennett) between ethnic groups, but once a year the area was immersed in Polish subculture. Each February many Poles from Kiev and other regions of Ukraine left their homes or homesteads to participate in the most important annual Polish event in Kiev – the Kontraktovyi Yarmarok (Contract Fair). Participation in the event could lead to a successful business deal, a good marriage proposal or a nice job offer, and guaranteed general revelry in the carnival atmosphere of non-stop balls, cards, etc. The Poles penetrated into all parts of Kiev during the fair. Hotels were overcrowded and all nearby apartments were rented. The event helped unite the Polish community by bringing together Kievites of Polish origin and the Poles who lived in the provinces.

In contrast to the Poles, the Czech ethnic group in the city did not have any event which knitted their social lives together. However, there was an entire district in one of Kiev’s

Fig. 4
St. Volodymyr holding a cross.
suburbs which belonged to them. Officially, its name was Shulavka, but for the Czech inhabitants it was known as Česká Stromovka. The origins of the district are associated with the Prague born engineer Josef Křivánek, who came to Kiev as a technical assistant from the Czech plant “Broumovský a Sulec” in the early 1880s and, by 1888, became the director of Grether’s plant located in Shulavka. Within ten years, the plant, which was known as the “Kiev Grether-Křivánek Machine Works and Boiler Plant” became one of the most advanced and productive machine works in Ukraine. At the end of the 1880s, another Czech, Mr. Veský, founded another factory – “Vielwerth a Dědina” – which became the largest producer of seeding machines in the region. A lack of local engineers, qualified clerks and builders caused the owners to employ specialists from the Czech lands. Some of them became managers in the plants, some were workers, but regardless of their positions almost all of them dwelled in Shulavka. However, one has to remember in this context that there was another source of the growth of the Czech community in Kiev. The city became attractive to the first generation of Volhynian Czechs, who found better career opportunities in the metropolis at the beginning of the 20th century. Also, some Czechs moved to Kiev directly from Austro-Hungary for ideological reasons. These new arrivals lived in different parts of the city and some of their apartments soon became the centres of Czech intellectual life in Kiev.

What is of most interest to us is how the Poles and the Czechs constructed their urban communities through their own communication infrastructure in Kiev, or, in other words, how they inhabited the city through their own texts. On 1 February 1906 Włodzimierz Grocholski, the Vice President of the Kiev Agricultural Society, published the first edition of “Dziennik Kijowski” [Kiev Daily], which became the main media outlet of the Polish community in the city. Its motto was “the responsibility of each Pole is to care for Polish prosperity” and its political priorities were close to the national democratic ones. This periodical and the different Polish organizations, clubs, and charity societies, where the Poles regularly met, created a recognizable Polish culture in Kiev. It helped the Poles express their claim to the urban space of Kiev and use it to stage Polish cultural events. It also helped the Poles to read Kiev in the same way. The Czechs carried out similar practices in the city. On 17 October 1906 the first issue of the Czech newspaper “The Russian Czech” was published in Kiev by Dr. Vaclav Vondrák. Even though only a few issues were published, the role it played in Czech life was very significant. It united the Czechs and inspired them to establish closer connections through the newly founded organizations. The most successful Czech project in Kiev, however, was “Čechoslovak” – the official Czech and Slovak newspaper in the Russian Empire. It was published by Věnceslav Švihovský with the financial support of Czech businessmen.

The significance of these periodicals was remarkable. Both of them stressed the identity of Kiev for their readers, showing them clear signifiers of the city’s borders, landmarks, and the paths which connected them and structured city life. Through brief announce-
ments, advertisements, and news the periodicals told their readers where to shop and what to visit. They helped the inhabitants make their own daily journeys, penetrating into different districts, passing by different landmarks, becoming *flâneurs* for a while, with the purpose of reaching places which bore significance for their ethnic groups. There were very few places that were identified with only one community. However, the main landmarks for the Poles were the two Catholic cathedrals (the old one – St. Alexander’s Cathedral – in downtown Kiev, and the new one – the neo-gothic St. Nicholas’ Cathedral – several miles away from the centre). The Jan Amos Komenský Charity Educational Society in Kiev located in J. Jindřišek’s store in Khreshchatyk played the same role for the Czechs.

To sum up, by the beginning of World War I the Czech and Polish communities had very clear images of the metropolis. Both of them had their own infrastructure of communication, which included newspapers, stores, hotels, schools, industrial plants, and in this way they inhabited the space with their own spatial stories. As in other cities of the Russian Empire[^24], this infrastructure was established by public figures, landlords,
and factory owners. In so doing they organized the ordinary Czechs and Poles into new local communities in Kiev and helped them perceive Kiev as their Heimat.

**Kiev as a Rented Apartment**

The beginning of World War I was a turning point in the lives of the Czechs and Poles in the Russian Empire. The war became the dominant influence on the population. It was everywhere, involving each family and entering everyone’s life through news and, above all, via the declarations and orders issued by the new authorities. This was a moment when all non-Russian ethnic groups were reminded by officials of their origin and citizenship regardless of their loyalty towards the empire. Those who did not apply for Russian citizenship were regarded as enemies and the government ordered them to be arrested or moved to special places under police control. There were a lot of absurd situations, mostly in Czech families, in which a husband joined the Russian army as a Russian citizen and his wife, still having Austrian citizenship, was forced to leave their home. The problem of ethnicity shaped the new perception of the city dwellers. It distinguished and named outsiders. In Kiev the group that stood out was, above all, the Czech community because their native land was part of an enemy power – the Austro-Hungarian monarchy – and supplied soldiers to the army against which native Kievites had to fight. Similar situations occurred in Paris or in London, where a German waiter would suddenly become an outsider, or in Berlin, where the same would happen to British students.

In order to avoid mass resettlement and arrests, the Czechs had to demonstrate their loyalty to the Russian Empire. This was the first time that the Czechs were forced to change their perception of the city space because of an external influence. On 27 July 1914 they organized a meeting in downtown Kiev using the open space for their activities. Speeches were addressed to the authorities and proclaimed the willingness of the entire Czech community to apply for the Russian citizenship, as well as to establish an independent Czech state under the protection of Russia. Furthermore, the government ordered the creation of a Czech unit in the Russian army on 30 July. It was called *Druzhina* and located in Kiev under the control of the Kiev headquarters. The unit’s flag was blessed by the clergy during a solemn meeting on Sofiivska square in Kiev on 28 September in front of the 11th-century orthodox St. Sofia’s Cathedral and the monument to Bohdan Khmelnytsky, a Ukrainian hetman. Since the Middle Ages the square had been the usual place for holding great events. Thus, the meeting was not a unique or unusual use of the urban space. However, the spirit with which the Czech community used it was the first signifier of the wartime influence on the city life, when the decisive features of urban rhythms and customs were “a function of the decisions taken elsewhere.”
Fig. 6
St. Sofia’s Cathedral.

Fig. 7
St. Michael’s Monastery.

Religions, Ethnicities, Mentalities, Politics
While the square became recognized as the birthplace of the Czech *Druzhina*, the other sacred place for Orthodox Christians – St. Michael’s Monastery, located one mile away – opened its gates to the first volunteers to join the military unit. Soon enough the Czech volunteers were joined by Czech and Slovak prisoners of war and deserters from the Austrian army. They were transported from the front line to Kiev where they faced a difficult life.

These new arrivals reformulated urban identity. They designated new landmarks, drew new edges, and imbued new routes through the city with meaning. The Czech and Slovak captives were concentrated in the Darnytsia camp located in a suburb on the opposite side of the Dnieper. Thus, the significance of the river changed for the city’s inhabitants. It no longer linked the urbanized and highly industrialized area with the undeveloped but beautiful and romantic landscape. The river became a dividing line between the spatial practices used by completely different worlds, those of the prisoners of war and the city’s inhabitants, rather than the connection of different practices of the same world. Moving along the bridge from the right to the left bank of the Dnieper, the deserters left normal city life, still brimming with the usual daily activities of its inhabitants, and met the challenges of the war period in poorly made barracks where they lived the stressful lives of captives.

The appearance of these newcomers in Kiev forced the local Czech community to change its role. Meetings with civilian and military authorities, in order to negotiate the deserters’ destiny in Kiev, became one of the main activities of its leaders. These meetings were part of V. Vondrák’s and J. Jindřišek’s daily responsibilities as they tried to get the authorities to permit the captives to be drafted into the *Druzhina*.

The war also changed the infrastructure of communication. The Praha Hotel became the focal point of the Czech community in the city. A network of Czech organizations was also established in the Russian Empire. In August 1914 the Union of Czech Societies in Russia was founded on the initiative of the Komenský Charity Foundation; its first meeting was held in Moscow in 1915. Kiev was represented in this Union by the newly established Czech Committee for supporting war victims headed by Jiří Jindřišek. It was located on 43 Volodymyrska Street. The committee was responsible for providing former Austrian citizens with documents which confirmed their Slavic origin and allowed them to live in the Empire. Thus, most of the events which occurred within the Czech community during the War period took place on Volodymyrska Street. However, this does not mean that other ethnic groups perceived the street and nearby area to be a special Czech district. The Czech spirit was to a large extent concealed within the buildings that lined the street, for example, in the Praha Hotel or in the buildings of St. Michael’s Monastery, which functioned as a base for military formations.

Whereas the spatial practices of the indigenous Czech community in Kiev were influenced by two categories of countrymen, i.e., the former Austrian subjects (‘war victims’)
and the deserters, the spatial practices of the Polish ethnic group were defined not only by the ‘war victims’, but also by the ‘refugees’. The Regional Kiev Council of the Polish Society for Supporting War Victims was established in the city in 1915 and became a new landmark, imbued with special significance for all Polish newcomers. It represented different Polish organizations which helped refugees by providing them with housing, food, and employment. Many Poles were resettled to Kiev from Congress Poland in 1915 when the Russian army left the Western provinces of the Empire after being defeated by Austrian and German forces. One of the refugees, S. Wasilewski, noted that the appropriate word for such refugees was actually “resettlers”: “The mandatory evacuation organized by the authorities forced us to leave Sarny. So in September we found ourselves in the Italia Hotel on Proriznsa street in Kiev.”

One cannot say how many Poles found themselves in the Ukrainian metropolis during the War. However, it is obvious that Kiev became the only city in the Empire where the Polish community not only maintained its activities but also developed them. According to memoirs the city came to be dominated by Polish culture. It resembled February in pre-war Kiev, when Poles arrived to attend the Contract Fair. It could be also been described as a “rented apartment” (de Certeau). However, this time the opportunities were quite different from those which were offered by the Contracts Fair. Nobody could estimate for how long the city space would be borrowed by the new Polish transients. Many unknowns dictated new rules of urban usage. The growth of the Polish population resulted in the establishment of private and secondary schools, initiated by the clergy of St. Alexander’s Cathedral. Moreover, the refugees brought with them their newspapers, weekly periodicals, and other signifiers of their previous city life in Warsaw or in Galician towns, using which they started to influence life in Kiev. Finally, the Polish theatre was founded in Kiev in 1916. It united the Polish community within its walls, becoming a new element in the city’s communication infrastructure.

Similar changes occurred within the Czech community in Kiev in 1916. The influence of newcomers, such as the captives, on Czech urban rhythms significantly increased. There was no part of Czech life in the city which was not transformed by their arrival. They became city dwellers and, what is more, involved the pre-war Czech community in the creation of an entirely new project – an independent Czech state. They became members of the Club of Captive Co-Workers founded in 1916 and affiliated with the Union of Czechoslovak Societies in Rus’. The club represented the interests of its members, and provided housing and food. Furthermore, newcomers became members of the Czechoslovak Credit Society, which also opened on Khreshchatyk in 1916. They went back and forth between the campus of St. Volodymyr University, where their new military units were trained, and their camp in Darnysia. Not only did they settle the city, but they also articulated their existence there:
Dear professor, the historical commission under your presidency organizes lectures for 
pupils in the secondary schools in Kiev. These lectures aim at the development of better 
understanding of current events by way of learning the history of friendly states. With this 
in mind, we would like to ask you to include a lecture about the history of the Czechoslo-
vak people since the 16th century into the lecture cycle as well. We ask Pavlo Rodionovich 
Timoshok to deliver this lecture⁴⁰.

This letter was sent by the members of the Club, i.e., by former captives who later became 
responsible for the further development of the Czechoslovak military unit and the 
Czechoslovak life in Kiev. Their usual tactic was to find ‘friends of the Czechoslo-
vak people’ who could help them either with disseminating information about their 
movement or with better contacts with the authorities:

Dear Konstantin Pavlovich Belkovskii, we regard it as our duty to thank you for your efforts 
aimed at informing the readers of newspaper “Kievlanin” about our people. Your articles 
demonstrated your deep knowledge of the subject, but if necessary, we are ready to provide 
you with further information”⁴¹.

This letter was sent by Vladimir Chalupa, the head of the Club and a former deserter.

Despite all the changes within the Czech and Polish communities mentioned above, 
their perception of Kiev was not radically altered during the first years of the War. Rath-
er, it was supplemented by the new “underlying city form elements” (Kevin Lynch), 
such as a camp for captives in Darnytsia or the Polish theatre in downtown Kiev. At the 
same time, the significance of older landmarks for the private life of the ethnic groups 
only deepened. None of these changes transformed the Czech or Polish image of the 
city. Nevertheless, it was not the same city as it had been in June 1914. It was not a 
Heimat anymore. The uncertainties of wartime and the arrival of the new immigrants 
changed the attitude of the Czechs and Poles to the city. They began to believe that 
their well-being in Kiev was temporary. They began to lose their perception of them-
selves as natives of Kiev and instead began to see themselves as tenants or renters of the 
city space.

Kiev as a Lost City

If one wants to study how a city loses its identity, one could not find a better example, 
than Kiev in 1917-1918. First, the city changed its status, becoming the capital city 
of the Ukrainian state in January 1918 and, by virtue of this, developing new spatial 
practices. Secondly, the city was occupied by a foreign power and became involved in 
civil war and revolution. Finally, it lost its population whose actions had given the city 
its character and identity.

The first hints of the future catastrophe appeared at the beginning of 1917, when the 
February Revolution drastically altered life in the entire Russian Empire. The meaning 
of the event for Kiev was later depicted by Mikhail Bulgakov as follows:
But these were legendary times, times when a young, carefree generation lived in the gardens of the most beautiful city in our country. In their hearts they believed that all of life would pass in white light, quiet and peaceful, sunrises, sunsets, the Dnieper, the Khreshchatyk, sunny streets in summer, and in winter snow that was not cold or cruel, but thick and caressing... But things turned out quite differently. The legendary times were cut short and history began thunderously, abruptly. I can point out the exact moment it appeared – it was at 10:00 a.m. on March 2, 1917, when a telegram arrived in Kiev signed with two mysterious words, ‘Deputy Bublikov’.

This indicated a change of authority in the Empire.

There is no evidence that the change of regime influenced the spatial stories of the Czechs and Poles in Kiev. The transformation did not lead them to change their perception of the city, rather it was a signal prompting them to proclaim new goals and tasks which would lead to the independence of their own states. Kiev was uniquely well suited to the pursuit of these aims, as it was located far enough from the centres of the revolution to allow a degree of freedom and normality in the city. That is why the political activities of both ethnic groups came to be based in Kiev. The newly founded Polish executive committee in Rus’ (Polski Komitet Wykonawczy na Rusi) and the Section of the Czechoslovak National Council in Russia (Odbočka Česko-Slovenské Národní Rady v Rusku, or OCSNR) became the main representative organs of the respective ethnic communities in Kiev.

Despite the eventful beginning to the year, in November 1917 Kiev’s inhabitants continued their usual spatial practices throughout the city. However, the legendary shot fired by the cruiser Aurora, which signalled the beginning of the Bolshevik revolt in Petrograd on 25 October (7 November) 1917, annihilated all existing spatial practices.

The October Revolution directly affected Kiev. Newspapers wrote that the city, which had avoided the brunt of the war, faced the threat of domestic upheavals. In early November 1917 the first armed conflicts took place between the military units of the Provisional Government and the Bolsheviks in Kiev. Some Czechoslovak units were involved in the conflict. Being under the control of the Russian army headquarters (Stavka), they could not remain neutral when they received an order to help the Stavka in the clash in the Mariinski Park. The Czechoslovak leaders did not have any influence on them. They did not even know exactly what the status quo was. For example, they knew that the two Czechoslovak companies found themselves in the centre of the conflict on Mariinski Park. However, they did not know against whom those companies fought – the Bolsheviks or Ukrainians. To avoid further involvement of Czechoslovak soldiers in domestic conflicts in Kiev, the Presidium of the OCSNR proclaimed strong neutrality with respect to the political situation in the former Russian Empire. They agreed to remain observers of the events in the city, rather than participants. This neutrality, however, led to their transformation into city guards later on.
Unlike the Czechs, the Polish ethnic group changed neither their perception of the city nor the role they played in the city life. They participated in all meetings organized by the Ukrainian authorities and had representatives in the newly established Ukrainian government. However, they could not continue their previous activities at the same rate. Life during a time of conflict dictated its own set of rules.

This became evident when Tomáš Masaryk came to Kiev, fleeing from Moscow which had fallen to the revolutionaries. In order to read Kiev through Czech spatial stories at that time, we should follow Masaryk’s footsteps. He was neither an inhabitant, nor a refugee. Masaryk was a guest in the city, who visited his countrymen for his own political purposes. As a guest he became acquainted with all the places significant for the Czech community. He did not visit the Praha Hotel, probably because Dr Vondrák had lost his influence in the Czech community in April 1917 and did not support Masaryk’s policies. He did, however, go to the Hotel de France in Khreshchatyk and Ottokar Červený’s family apartment, which became a second home for many Czechs. He visited the Ukrainian authorities and established connections with the Polish community in Kiev. The results of his movement through the city were the relocation of the OCSNR regular meetings, which were then often organized in Červený’s apartment, and that some places came to have meaning for both Czechs and Poles. As a result of his activities an anti-Habsburg movement was established, based in a circus in Kiev. A meeting of the suppressed and divided peoples of Austro-Hungary, organized in cooperation with Polish leaders, took place there on 12 December 1917 and was attended by 4,000 participants. It was that “contact point” (Sennett) that allowed both ethnic groups to enter into the same relationship with the city.

At the same time Masaryk became a key figure and had a great influence on the future of the city. In early February 1918 Kiev was occupied by the Bolsheviks. Only 300 young Kiev students tried to stop the Bolsheviks’ offensive and were killed near Kruty on 30 January 1918, not far from the Ukrainian capital. Ukrainian politicians sent delegates to Tomáš Masaryk and tried to use the well-disciplined Czechoslovak military units in the struggle against Bolsheviks. However, Masaryk insisted on their neutrality and did not permit the involvement of the Czechs and Slovaks in “domestic Russian affairs”. Thus, the Czechs did not play the role of Roman geese. They did not attempt to save the city but it seems unlikely that they would have succeeded had they done so. The Bolshevik occupation of Kiev meant that the Czechs lost access to the city. This became evident when the Czech soldiers were forbidden to visit Kiev by the OCSNR. The reason was explained as follows: “They (Kievites) do not like us and there were occasions when our riflemen were beaten”. Those Czechs who remained in Kiev, in turn, said: “I command all Czechoslovakian troops who are at the moment located in Kiev City to refrain from walking on the streets. Only in the case of necessity should individuals be sent on official assignments.” Within less than a month the Ukrainian
authorities came back to Kiev, but with its new allies – the German and Austro-Hungarian forces.

The Czechoslovak legion and Czech political leaders left Kiev for Vladivostok at the beginning of March. The Czechs and Slovaks who remained in the city, mostly pre-war inhabitants but also former captives who did not share Masaryk’s vision, again became outsiders in the city. This time they were accused of being enemies of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. They had to keep silent and not to show any signs of their existence in the city until the end of the war. In contrast, there was no mass exodus of Poles from the city nor did they change their routes within the city space. However, they partly reoriented their activities towards Warsaw, now that they were able to return there, and towards its main representative – the Regency Council, a creature of Germany.

This was the fourth upheaval which Kiev was to face in this short period. Bulgakov wrote:

In that winter of 1918 the City lived a strange unnatural life which is unlikely ever to be repeated in the 20th century. Behind the stone walls every apartment was overfilled. Their normal inhabitants constantly squeezed themselves into less and less space, willy-nilly making way for new refugees crowding into the City, all of whom arrived across the arrow-like bridge from the direction of that enigmatic other city... 49.

Fig. 8
View of the bridge.
The city faced ten more upheavals. After the last one, in 1920, it was the Poles’ turn to leave Kiev for good. Despite the fact that they left Kiev at different times and under different circumstances, the departure of the Polish and Czech communities transformed the image of the city for good: “Gone with the wind! Kiev stopped being a flourishing, happy, and smiling city, as I remember it from my youth. People, these wonderful Poles with strong necks and wide gestures, that set the pace in the city, were killed or died”\(^{50}\).

**Conclusion**

There is a saying: “A city is more beautiful than a village, because it is rich with people’s history”. Kiev is a good illustration of this statement. Just like other cities, it was inhabited with the spatial stories of its occupants. Although wartime had a significant influence on the life of Kiev’s inhabitants, the city continued to model and construct their urban life. It consisted of different elements which made the activities of the Polish and Czech communities possible. They lived their lives through familiar paths, landmarks, and edges which were established in the pre-war period. The Polish and Czech newcomers did not reformulate the local urban identity that they encountered upon their arrival. They only enriched it with new recognizable signs and meanings. The unusual circumstances of war led to old places being used in new ways. The hotels were used for everyday negotiations and offices of new organizations, the circus was turned into a hall for huge meetings, and the university and the cathedrals became the base for military units or newly founded schools.

This chapter is the first attempt to read Kiev through the ‘spatial stories’ of the Czech and Polish communities in the city. I am aware that important questions, such as how the urban landscape was used by different social groups within these communities, whether use of the landscape unified or divided them and how the social hierarchy of these communities operated within the city, have not been elaborated in the text. Examination of these aspects, however, needs further research and, thus, will be the subject of future publications on the issue.

According to the material analyzed in this chapter one can perceive a change in the Czech and Polish relationship with the city. Before the war they identified closely with the city rooting their lives there. During and after the conflict they began to perceive the city as a rented space and thought of returning to their native lands. Finally, after the revolution, they were forced to leave. If we follow the spatial stories of the Czechs and Poles, we can read Kiev as a unique city filled with elusive, but beautiful spatial practices which tied fond memories to the urban space. Although the city’s diverse identity was lost, enough evidence remains to remind us of the footsteps of Czechs and Poles on Kiev’s streets:
I would like to remind you that Kiev, thanks to its unique inhabitants, differs very much from other Russian cities... It is like a bridge between the European West and real Russia. Different nationalities, Ukrainians, Russians, Poles, Jews, Germans, Czechs and others, meeting on that bridge, created a mixture there... Different national interests of the inhabitants defined Kiev’s image and gave it the character of an international city in which everybody found what they needed and what they liked... I came to Kiev only in 1909 as a Volhynian Czech who had heard about Kiev ten years earlier, and I was filled with endless respect for the metropolis of our South-Western country^51.

NOTES
1 J. Hašek, Osudy dobrého vojáka Švejka [The Good Soldier Švejk], Bratislava 2000 [first published 1921-1923], p. 5.
3 Quotation from A. Wierzbicka, Understanding Cultures through Their Key Words: English, Polish, German, and Japanese, New York - Oxford 1997, p. 21.
5 Where you feel good, there is your home (Lat.)
6 Here, the term “ethnic communities” is defined according to A. Smith and means a social network or series of networks formed by people who possessed specific cultural attributes (common name, history, culture, language, customs, traditions, religion etc.). By the end of the war the Czech and Polish groups start behaving more like national minorities, meeting one of the characteristics of a national minority suggested by Brubaker: “the demand for state recognition of this distinct ethnocultural nationality”. Deeper investigation of how the Poles and Czechs in the Ukrainian lands were transformed from ethnic members into legal citizens of their future independent states is not the aim of this chapter. The issue will be elaborated in the further research. See A. Smith, The Origins of Nations, in G. Eley, L. Suny, Becoming a Naitonal: A Reader, New York - Oxford 1996, pp. 109-110; R. Brubaker, Nationalism Re-framed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, Cambridge 1996, p. 60.
9 Masaryk, the first president of the Czechoslovak Republic, would later use the name Malorossia (Little Russia), adopting the Russian scheme, or Ukraine, depending on the political situation.
10 It is necessary to emphasize here that the words Poles and Czechs used for the territory they inhabited were quite unique to each group and, obviously, contrasted with official Russian imperial discourse. More widely used names for the Ukraine within the empire at that time were Малороссия (Malorossia, Little Russia) or Юго-Западный край (Yugo-Zapadnyi krai, South-Western Land); both names defined the region as an integral part of the Russian Empire. Concurrently, the name Ukraine began to be used in political vocabulary. Andreas Kappeler commented that “only during the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century did the terms ‘Ukraine’ and ‘Ukrainians’, which had been used since the middle ages for particular regions, gradually become the common self-designation of the emerging nation. ‘Ukraine’ has served as the official name of the region only since 1917”, A. Kappeler,


12 But it has this function in modern Kiev.


15 De Certeau, The Practice cit., p. 108.


18 Švihovský, Kijev a kijevští Češi cit., p. 157.

19 Quotation from Nicieja, ‘Polski Kijów’ cit., p. 854.

20 It is common knowledge that national democrats were the most powerful group within the Polish community across Ukraine, as well as in Polish student body at the St. Volodymyr University in Kiev in which young people founded the secret organization Polonia in 1901. Education was another sphere to which Polish public figures paid a lot of attention. In 1904 the society Oświata Narodowa na Rusi [National Education in Rus'] was established by Polish businessmen.

21 See the pioneering work on the issue: B. Pietrow-Ennker, G. Ulianova (eds.) Civic Identity and the Public Sphere in Late Imperial Russia, Moscow 2007.


24 Archív Ministerstva Zahraničních Věcí (AMZV), SA, Spolky 5, Český komitet v Moskvě, Telegramma. Petrograd 13 Bogumila Chermského spr. В., Znamenská 19 [Archives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, Siberian Archive, Associations, box 5, the Czech Committee in Moscow, Telegram Petrograd 13 to Bohumil Čermák spr. V., Znamenskaja 19].


27 The Dražba consisted of four companies. There were 1,012 soldiers in the unit at the beginning of October 777 of whom were of Czech origin. See F. Šteidler, Československé zahraniční vojsko [Czechoslovak army abroad], in Československá vlastivěda. Stát, Prague 1931, vol. V, p. 558; В. Драгомирецкий, Чехословаки cit., p. 18;
31 See Н. Ходорович, Пламенный патриот (Из воспоминаний о д-ре В. Вондраке) in “Прил.от В. Ходоровича” in “Прил.от В. Ходоровича” in “Прил.от В. Ходоровича” in “Прил.от В. Ходоровича” in “Прил.от В. Ходоровича” in "Прил.от В. Ходоровича", 1930, 10, 5, p. 5.
36 The Russian authorities issued the appropriate permission in October 1915. Statistical data shows that pupils mostly consisted of newcomers, e.g., there were 79 children from Congress Poland among 150 pupils in a school founded by St. Alexander’s Cathedral. See S. Sopicki, Omówienie pracy Jana Korneckiego ’Oświata Polska na Rusi w czasie wielkiej wojny światowej’ [The discussion on Jan Kornecki’s book “Polish education in Rus’ during World War I”], in Pamiętnik Kijowski, 1959, vol. I, p. 199.
37 At the same time Kiev became attractive to conspirators who established their own ‘subculture’ and had a completely different image of the city. A conspiracy network was initiated by the Polish Socialist party members in general and by Józef Piłsudski, the future head of the Polish state, in particular. Their goal was the establishment of an independent Polish Republic. In January 1915 a conspiratorial Polish military organization (POW – Polska organizacja wojskowa) opened a branch in Kiev. It depended on the Zhytomyr unit and was led by Józef Bromirski. By 1917 all the units of the organization in Ukraine were controlled by Kiev, which turned the city into a center of the Polish insurgent movement against the Russian empire. See M. Wrzosek, Polski czyn zbrojny podczas Pierwszej wojny światowej: 1914-1918 [The Polish military action during the World War I: 1914-1918], Warsaw 1990, p. 377.
38 AMZV, SA, Spolky, box 11, Stanovy spolupracovníků Svazu Česko-Slovenských spolků na Rusi. Kopie. Schváleno Svazem na schůzi [Statutes of the Club of Captive Co-Workers affiliated with the Union of Czechoslovak Societies in Rus’. Copy. Declared at the Union meeting on 26/X 1916, N. 726, 28/X 1916].
42 On 2-3 March, the first congress of Polish political parties was organized in Kiev. According to its decision the “committee of nine” was established. The committee was responsible for organization of Polish representation in Rus’. The delegates from more than 30 Polish organizations located in Ukraine participated in its first meeting on 6 March in Kiev. The Polish executive committee in Rus’ (Polski Komitet Wykonawczy, or PKW) was established by them. On 7 March J. Bartoszewicz, former editor of Dziennik Kijowski, was elected as its chair. Within the next three months 127 Polish Societies applied for participation in the Committee activities. See: Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie (AAN), Organizacje polskie w Rosji, sygn. 37, p. 24; H. Jabłoński, Polska autonomia narodowa na Ukrainie 1917-1918 [Polish national autonomy in Ukraine 1917-1918], Warsaw 1948, p. 36. At the same time in April Kiev became a host city for the 3rd congress of Union of the Czech and Slovak Societies in Russia. It was not only the most fruitful congress, but also the last one. 48 organizations and societies from...
the whole Russian Empire participated at the congress, among them: the Czech Committee for war victims support of J. Jindřišek, Jan Amos Komensky Society, Voluntary Fire Units in Krasyliv, Semydyby; the Czech Committee in Sumy; Society of Russian-Czech-Slovak economic cooperation in Kiev, the Czechoslovakian Society in Berdyichiv (factory 'Progress'); the Czechoslovak Credit Society; the Czech Society in Poltava etc: AMZV, Špolky, box. 13, České spolky zastoupení ve Svazu česko-slovenských spolků na Rusi [Czech association represented in the Union of Czech-Slovak associations in Russia].

At that moment both the Ukrainian military units and the Bolsheviks’ forces meant the same for the Czechs – as both were new political powers whose activities were directed against the Provisional Government: Vojenský historický archiv Vojenského ústředního archivu [VHA VUA - Military Historical Archive of the Central Military Archives, Prague, Czech Republic], OČSNR v Rusku – presidium [OCSNR in Russia - presidium], 1917-1918, box 6, sig. 2703. Presidium komisi. V Kyjevě 18.11.1917. Dopis I. Kudely [Presidium of the commission. Kiev 18 November 1917. Letter I. Kudely], p.3.

The Czechs were the only military force in Kiev, which was allowed to guard the most important urban objects by both the Ukrainian and the Bolshevik authorities. Thanks to them the dwellers had electricity and water despite military conflicts. Indeed, they were the only military authority which could guarantee safety for the electric station, spirituous fabric, water supply, warehouses. However, OCSNRR refused the Council of Landlords Society’s and rectors of Kiev Polytechnic appeals to delegate the legions to guard Kiev against looters: VHA VUA, První česko-slovenský střelecký pluk. Rozkazy [The First Czechoslovak rifle regiment. Orders], book 11. 1917-1918. Приказ по 1-му Чешско-Словацкому [The order to the 1st Czechoslovak rifle regiment]; VHA VUA, OČSNR v Rusku – presidium [OCSNR in Russia - presidium]. 1917-1918, box 6, sig. 4093. Protokol presidiální schůze konané 24.01.1918 [Minutes of the Presidium meeting held on 24 January 1918], sig. 29. Protokol presidiální schůze konané 25.01.1918 [Minutes of the Presidium meeting held on 25 January 1918].

46 AMZV, box 6, sig. 2703. Митинг угнетенных и расчлененных народов [The meeting of the oppressed and divided nations], p. 2.


50 Glinka, W cieniu [Glinka in the Shade], cit., p. 236.

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Reading the City. Methodological Considerations on Urban History and Urban Studies

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ABSTRACT

This chapter examines methodological concepts and theoretical implements used in urban studies and their impact on and development of historical research. Following a survey of debates on defining the city, the chapter presents three theoretical concepts that influenced the approach to the city in social science and opened up new prospects in urban history – the system of meanings, spatial terms of place, space, and borders, and the theory of liminality.

História miast nie jest wyłącznie domeną historyków, ale również przedstawicieli innych nauk społecznych – socjologii, antropologii, czy geografii humanistycznej. Ten zwrot ku historii jest przede wszystkim konsekwencją przyjęcia paradygmatu, który zakłada, że analiza fenomenu miasta wymaga spojrzenia z perspektywy międzykulturowej, jak i diachronicznej. Interdyscyplinarny wymiar historii miasta to również efekt braku większego zainteresowania nie tyle dziedziną, co teoriami i metodologicznymi koncepcjami stosowanymi przez badaczy miast, skutkiem czego wzajemna recepcja dorobku jest w dalszym ciągu utrudniona. Celem niniejszego tekstu jest prezentacja wybranych teorii z zakresu antropologii i socjologii i ich wykorzystania w badaniach nad historią miasta, która ma wskazać perspektywy dla dalszych badań, jakie powinny stać się udziałem także historyków.

Wśród kwestii tutaj analizowanych fundamentalne znaczenie ma ciągła debata antropologów i socjologów nad definicją miasta, dzięki której to dyskusji uwidacznia się zmienność zjawisk miejskich w czasie i przestrzeni. Szczególną pozycję zajmują koncepcje i terminy odnoszące się do przestrzeni, które są wykorzystywane do badania nie tylko fizykalnej struktury/planu miasta, ale także do badań zjawisk społecznych i kulturowych.

Teoretyczna refleksja nad pojęciem miasta doprowadziła do poszerzenia obszaru badań o nowe, istotne kwestie dotyczące kulturowego wymiaru „życia miejskiego” – praktyk codziennego, form komunikacji i porozumiewania się mieszkańców, znaczenia systemu znaków wpisanego w przestrzeń i praktyki, form reprezentacji i historii wizji miasta,
wreszcie, systemu wartości i pamięci zbiorowej. Istotnym elementem współczesnych badań nad miastem jest jego semiotyczny system wszechobecnych znaków wpisanych w każdy wymiar miasta – od organizacji przestrzeni, poprzez symbole, po system praktyk życia codziennego. W tym ujęciu miasto jest tekstem kulturowym, pozwalającym na odczytanie i analizę wielowymiarowego fenomenu miejskiego, również jego historii.

Urban history is no longer the exclusive domain of historical research, but also of other social sciences, such as anthropology, sociology, social and human geography, semiotics, as well as cultural studies exploring the past^1. This multidisciplinary interest in the history of cities has arisen due to two main factors. The first is connected with the comparative approach, both intercultural and diachronic, which is essential for urban studies. The quest for a universal definition of the city and models of urbanism has led social scientists to refer to knowledge of cities’ past – their origins, transformations, developments and degenerations – since “an understanding of the origins and function of cities in the past will lead to an understanding of contemporary urbanisation”^2. The second factor is intertwined directly with historiography. At the beginning of the 20th century, the dawn of urban studies, historians in general still adhered to a positivistic paradigm and mainly to political history; therefore they were hardly in a position to contribute to the development of urban studies, focused originally on the social and cultural aspects of the phenomenon of the city and “urbanism as a way of life”^3. Although social and cultural history developed in the following decades, thus enabling historians to join urban studies, the past of cities remains a field of research which historians share with other social scientists.

Historians exploring urban history increasingly refer to theoretical and methodological concepts of social sciences, though not to the extent that they should. The main aim of this text is to focus on two main questions: whether anthropological and social concepts are useful implements and can provide fruitful inspirations for historians? And where the limits of interdisciplinary borrowings occur? Special attention will be paid here to three theoretical concepts present in contemporary urban studies: the semiotic system of meanings, urban borders, and liminality.

Conceptualising the city

A crucial issue in urban studies is the definition of the city. Social scientists have problems in reaching any consensus in this matter as the disparate approaches of the disciplines are concomitant with different theoretical criteria determining research interests and concepts of the city.

The Chicago School sociologists, such as Robert E. Park, William I. Thomas, Florian Znaniecki, Ernest Burgess, and Louis Wirth, who in the early 20th century carried
out the first large-scale field research on urban society, referred directly to Chicago as the basis for their concepts of the city and the theory of urbanism. They undoubtedly followed the 19th-century European sociologists in perceiving the modern city, and urbanism in general, as a contemporary phenomenon arising from and integrally interwoven with the processes of modernisation, industrialisation and mass migration observed at that time. Strongly influenced by organicistic thinking, the sociologists from Chicago proposed to define the city “not only as a whole consisting of people, streets and buildings, but also as a ‘state of mind’, built up of traditions, customs, attitudes, and feelings, which were kept alive by these traditions”.

As a consequence of this integrative approach, the proposed model went beyond materialistic understanding of the city and urban space, though it remained extra-temporal and Western-centred. Similarly, the definition of urbanism proposed by Wirth was based on the terms of secularization, voluntary associations, segmented social roles, poorly defined norms, and an antithesis of rural community. Yet it did not take into consideration the historical and cultural diversification of cities and urban phenomena. Other sociologists, such as Georg Simmel, associated the city with emancipation from traditional forms of social domination, and an increase of an individual's autonomy and self-identity. For the author of the segmentation theory, the city meant nothing but freedom, obviously a conclusion derived from the identification of the term “urban” with modernization.

It is no wonder that the anthropologists who studied very different urban societies of Latin America or Africa (e.g. the Manchester School) expressed doubts concerning sociological concepts excluding the cities which were irrelevant for the patterns of contemporary Western urban agglomerations. Sociologists’ focusing on familiar “here and now” societies was concomitant with the dominating macro-level approach based on quantitative data – figures, statistics, and tables – ignoring an individual's experience. As a consequence of this perspective, as pointed out by Marc Blanchard, sociology constitutes an image of the city “as a reality of isolated facts and statistics” devoid of dwellers' emotions, thoughts and habits, and the dwellers themselves.

Anthropological reflection has been relevant in the development of urban studies. Focused on a human being rooted in culture, anthropologists put emphasis on an individual's experience and existence framed in urban culture. As culture is crucial for the anthropological approach, the city is defined as a cultural phenomenon combining space, time and social actors. Despite this difference, anthropologists retained some sociological criteria, such as transformation of social structure, fragmentation of social roles, and physical closeness of the dwellers. A good example of collaboration between anthropology and sociology is Ulf Hannerz’s proposal to analyse urban culture according to segmented social roles performed by city dwellers. There are mutual benefits between these two fields of social science, since sociologists doing micro-level research use anthropological implements for gathering and interpreting their data. Under the
influence of anthropology, sociologists use the following criteria to outline the conditions essential for the city to function: socially constructed centre, functional and prestigious diversification of architecture, diversity of social space, and functions going beyond local environment.

Reciprocal development of the theoretical debate on the city broadens the spectrum of urban phenomena and makes urban scientists take into consideration historical issues also, these concerned with city origins and long-term changes within the city. Social scientists in urban studies tend to use history as a source of specific examples and data which they can analyse and use to create theoretical models. For example, the model of three urban types (i.e., the trade city, the city of power, and the industrial city) refers to the city-founding functions influencing spatial organisation, social diversification, and professional structure of dwellers. In his research on preindustrial cities, Gideon Sjøberg worked on the theoretical assumption that different types of societies, i.e. a preliterate society, a ‘feudal’ society and an industrial/urban society, correspond to different type of settlement. Sjøberg distinguished three models of societies in order to substantiate his comparative analysis of cities existing in different historical epochs and cultural areas. This theoretical assumption blurs historical distinctions and ignores the range of diversification associated with the urban phenomena.

Such a use of history as the one mentioned above reveals sources of misunderstandings between a social scientist and a historian. The former perceives history as a collection of useful examples selected according to theoretical assumptions, even against the historical context. On the other hand, theoretical debates on urbanism were rather beyond the field of interest of historians usually dealing with cities as unique, isolated objects always falling outside ‘universal’ definitions. Instead of abstract theories, historians prefer to use general representations of the city derived from historical sources and based on physical, tangible or ‘visible’ elements. Historical reflection on urbanism takes on quite a different form:

To understand the city, it is necessary to see it in its physical shape – city walls, streets, squares and symbolic buildings. They make the city excluded from rural landscape, and emphasize explicitly its distinctness from the countryside. Dense and walled-in, urban territory enabled the cities to gain independence.

This attitude is reflected also by those historians who refer to legal or administrative decisions in order to define the notion of a city. This practice has some limitations as it marginalizes the significance of other factors bound up directly with dwellers. It also omits the liminal aspects of urban life, such as history of towns deprived of city charter, the 19th-century industrial cities with a status of a village or towns that had more in common with villages than with the cities of the time.

The distance between social and historical approaches to the past based on a distinction between interpretation and reconstruction has been decreasing. History has be-
come much more open to new paradigms from social sciences; therefore the mutual relations have been evolving into interdisciplinary collaboration. When in the 1970s and 1980s urban scientists became more interested in the mental sphere, imaginary and representative, as well as in the qualitative approach to investigation, micro-history turned out to be the relevant direction of research. Since then, history has shared with anthropology and urban sciences an approach emphasizing the importance of anthropocentric, and most of all, cultural perspectives in research on the existential experience of a city dweller. These include, among others, community relations, identity building, the system of meanings or memory sites. This leads, in turn, to a position where the central subject of urban history is not the city as such, but multidimensional civic life, which “is embedded in collective processes through which people living in the same urban space communicate, understand each other through familiar and distinctive signs, elaborate on the representations and visions of the city, cultivate certain values, appoint symbols of their affiliation and, simultaneously, preserve and adapt the memories of their experience.”

**System of Meanings**

The anthropological approach to the city provides relevant implements for exploring multi-faceted aspects of urban history. One of the interesting and promising issues seems to be the system of meanings composed of objects [significants] and meanings attached to them (signifiés). To explore the semiotic dimensions of the city means to treat it as a (cultural) text on urban society. Reading the city does not concern recognizing signs attached to buildings, monuments, spatial structure and urbanistic plans only, but embraces other aspects of urban life:

[Signs] are unconsciously repeated actions, characteristic of the habits understandable in our indigenous consciousness; other signs which constitute customs, are loaded with an axio-normative content. Such customs become norms enforced by social sanctions and group pressure. We read these signs and symbols of vernacularity in many cultural texts – in the landscape and architecture, in the profile of a church, in art, music and dance, in legends, local dialects and in the atmosphere prevailing at a Christmas Eve table.

The everyday life of city dwellers, norms determining social order and hierarchy, rituals, valorisation of spaces, conflicts, mobility and barriers – these all are elements of the system of meanings as well. The urban system of meanings is clear and obvious only to the dwellers, members of the cultural community; therefore reading the city requires interdisciplinary implements enabling researchers to decode messages inscribed directly and ‘between the lines’ rather than to interpret unfolded cultural/historical facts. In urban studies one might find all the variety of methods, for example a structuralistic net of dichotomous meanings, a thick description, an analysis of the city as a discourse or as a field for social play and rituals.
Sensitivity to tangible facts frees historians from the anthropological temptations of unfounded generalizations resulting from disregard to historical context. Anthropological tendencies to abstractive interpretation are criticized by anthropologists themselves. Clifford Geertz emphasizes the importance of taking into account a larger, I would here add, historical context in anthropological analyses of everyday life situations, rituals or other social events. In his opinion, both the lack of context and the preference for abstract models result in epistemological ambiguity, methodological vagueness and, in consequence, unverifiable generalizations. On this account, semiotics pays special attention to describe and analyse specific manifestations of the system of meanings, including activity of social groups and institutions, historical context of analysed events, and dynamics of semiotic changes.

Urban historians provided with anthropological and semiotic implements usually recognize the historical city as a microcosm depicting visions and world outlook of the peoples of that time. Such an approach was represented by Walter Benjamin, one of the thinkers who exerted an influence on contemporary humanities, including urban history. Benjamin had been analysing the semiotic dimension of the 19th-century city space, reflecting in his study the phenomena of modernisation, mass culture, ideology, social order and everyday life practices. In his work *The Arcade Project (Passagen-Werk)*, Benjamin explored the issue of structure, function and meanings of the Parisian Arcades as he reflected on the ambivalence of 19th-century modern society as a “landscape of consumption” and the egalitarian concepts encapsulated in the utopian phalanstere. According to Rollason, in Benjamin’s interpretation, Arcades are:

archetypal manifestations of the expanding market economy – creations of private enterprise and sources of profit, and most certainly not part of any public works project. The goods displayed are commodities – objects existing for profit above utility, manifestations of exchange value rather than use value: for Benjamin, they participate in the “fetishism of the commodity”, the mystificatory conversion of human-made products into objects of irrational worship which Marx classically analyzed and denounced in the first volume of *Capital*.

The textual nature of the city emerges very clearly when Benjamin analyses and combines coherent elements: architecture, works by Baudelaire or Marx, or Fourier. Through reading the city, Benjamin reveals mental changes of 19th-century society personified in his works by a *flâneur* who experiences the city in a very new way:

The streets become a dwelling for the *flâneur*; he is as much at home among the facades of houses as a citizen is in his four walls. To him the shiny, enamelled signs of businesses are at least as good a wall ornament as an oil painting to the bourgeois in his salon. The walls are the desk against which he presses his notebooks; newsstands are his libraries and the terraces of cafés are the balconies from which he looks down on his household after his work is done.
Benjamin was one of the very first researchers to consider the city as an *imago mundi*, a microcosm bound on other aspects of human existence and culture. Similarly, in his *Flesh and Stone*[^26], Richard Sennett put emphasis on the anthropological, or more precisely anthropocentric approach to urban history. Sennett starts with an assumption that the city space is a mirror reflecting historically determined conceptualizations of a human body; thus, in consequence, he focuses on history of human experiences of physical dimensions. One by one he explores the meaning of nakedness for an ancient Athenian, visual sensitivity of citizens in the ancient Rome, the medieval concept of a sinful human body antithetic to the soul, and the impact of medical discourse on the conceptualization of both “flesh and stone” in modern times.

Obviously inspired by Michel Foucault, Sennett’s reflection on the city concerns the history of discursive practices of power-knowledge that have been taking place on the levels of both dwellers’ bodies and inhabited urban space. In his interpretation, the city is an arena where diversified social actors are constantly competing for control over creation, reproduction and change of the system of meanings. On the one hand, the city authorities strive to make the city space and the social order logical, rational, controllable and transparent with the purpose of governing the city efficiently. On the other hand, internally diversified and split, city dwellers tend to mould the city space according to their particular needs and interests. As Jacek Purchla noticed in his research on the development of cities of the Hapsburg Monarchy in the 19th century, “the natural process of urban development was always attended by a fundamental conflict between form and function. The changeability of function – as a dynamic element – forced the form of the cities to be altered, leading to the complete replacement of the fabric.”[^27] However, such continuous rivalry and multifaceted tensions are the *sine qua non* of the existence and development of the city. When deprived of these, the city must die.

Anthropological interpretation based on the theories of either discourse or symbolic violence enables historians to bring new dimensions to their research and to expand their range of interests to include such issues as mechanisms of conflicts in urban society[^28], disputes over collective memory, or the relevance of historical reality to utopian visions of a perfect social order embodied in a perfect city. The last case is especially relevant to urban history because it arises out of the comparison of the two faces of the city defined either as an artificial, self-contained project submitting to planning and controlling or as a field of dwellers’ activity which is difficult to manage and falls beyond control. The first approach to the city corresponds to the history of utopia, while the second accounts for the history of everyday life, the history of customs or micro-history. Usually the two aspects are analysed separately as disparate and contradictory subjects, although they are complementary elements of the same city. Therefore when put together, they constitute a significant field of research opening up an insight into the history of civic life[^29].

[^26]: Benjamin 1967
[^27]: Purchla 1997
[^28]: Foucault 1977
[^29]: Purchla 1997
BETWEEN SPACE AND PLACE

Space features prominently in urban studies. However, this is not only the matter of architectural structure of urban space (streets, squares, buildings, monuments, districts). Spatial terms, such as space, place, location, boundaries, are used for exploring cultural or social identities, which Henri Tajfel defined as “an individual’s knowledge that he belongs to a certain group together with the emotional and value significance of this membership”, visible at different levels in the practice of social roles. Spatial terminology is also used to describe and interpret social phenomena of spatial sensitivity, processes of space construction, and dimensions of spatial practice “respectively as the realms of the perceived, the conceived, and the lived”. Nowadays social sciences, especially geography, deprive space of the exclusively physical and objective dimension in favour of an anthropocentric perspective emphasizing the cultural determinants of spatial sensitivity, space organisation, and their historical change as well. It is not without reason that one of Benjamin’s most relevant thoughts concerns the historical nature of human senses:

During long periods of history, the mode of human sense perception changes with humanity’s entire mode of existence. The manner in which human sense perception is organised, the medium in which it is accomplished, is determined not only by nature but by historical circumstances as well.

The relations between space and history are dialogical and reciprocal. Each epoch, as Henri Lefebvre notices, produces its own space, imposing then a communality of use. The main task of historians is to recognize the historical patterns of spatial sensitivity and its reflection in city forms and functions. In order to do that, historians assimilate an elaborate set of terms related to urban studies which reflect spatial dimensions.

Urban studies distinguish space from place according to dichotomy between the inner and the outer. Unlike space, place is different from an outer world, familiar and accustomed in order to guarantee psychological safety. Dwellers convert space into place by means of the production of meanings embodied in the city and by associating their concept of self with the newly acquired civic area. Social signification of space produces not only places but also more important social identities and imaginary representation of the civic society. In City Sketches, Benjamin analysed how motives of “the inside and outside” functioned and were used in culturally different cities (Naples, Marseille, and Moscow): this led him to the conclusion that only in bourgeois societies did separation of public and private spheres take place, while in proletarian cities or districts the two spaces were intermingled. Juxtaposed in social theories, private and public spaces, when explored empirically, co-exist, cross and merge with each other in manifold ways, depending on cultural background.

Borderlines between space and places resulting from everyday demarcation and signification are fluid and vague. What is sacral for some might be secular for others.
What is strange can be familiar. At the same time, clear and logical space is construed as uncontrollable and chaotic. These spatial paradoxes take place because of an incessant reinterpretation and modification of meanings organised according to different city dwellers’ horizons, needs and interests.

The model of public-private dichotomy is the concept used most often with reference to mainly modern cities (and societies). In the beginning, urban scientists used it to distinguish the urban culture from the rural one, assuming that private space is intrinsic to urbanism. Soon the model raised doubts because it did not take into account either the multiplicity of cultural forms of dwelling or the complexity of spatial organisation of the city. Nonetheless, the private/public model remains a significant implement for analysing urban phenomena. The distinction into public and private space is now used not to assign urban practices to two disparate spheres, but it also seems to be an intricate implement for the exploration other aspects of civic life and dwellers’ identity.

The model of the public/private-self corresponding to the social roles performed in the public/private order respectively applied to an analysis of the self-identity of dwellers led Peter Berger to conclusion about incompatibilities between the public self and the private self and significant for the process of self-identity. Urban space is not a simple sum of isolated spatial units, the public as well as the private ones, but it is a new quality deriving from coexistence, reciprocity and combination of diverse elements. In consequence, the city can be defined as “both a site of public culture and association at the same time as preserving and even intensifying the ‘closed world’ of the family and the private household”.

The combination of the two models mentioned above, i.e., the space/place model and the public/private model is an up-and-coming method of exploring urban history. It is necessary, however, not to assume a simple attribution of the space to the public and place to the private; therefore the main task should remain answering the question of how the motives of the inside/outside, the public/private are related to each other, and what results derive from that.

Liminality of Borders

Each dichotomy is concomitant with the question of the demarcation lines framing the spatial organisation of the city and separating juxtaposed areas. The concepts of borders and boundaries are very crucial for contemporary social sciences and urban studies. Borders, like space, concern a wide range of issues going beyond physical dimensions of the city, for they have not only spatial but also social, symbolic and institutional meanings. Borders in the sense of demarcation lines and zones take the forms of institutional actions (law, urbanizing policy), buildings and constructions (railways, cemeteries, streets, etc.), areas of deterioration or everyday customs. Spatial borders, especially those visible on a micro-level of social practices (zones of danger, work, private life,
leisure, etc.); designate areas of an individual’s mobility within the city and within the society; they concern the way of recognizing and experiencing both space and place.

Social scientists attach great importance to institutional and symbolic borders. Since they reflect a vast repertoire of factors determining urban phenomena, such as gender, religion, class, ethnicity, market mechanisms, policy planning, and law, borders are significant implements for research into social divisions, segmentation of roles or collective identity constructions. From the perspective of urban history, spatial concepts, however promising and worth introducing, tend to produce a rather static image of the city and civic life. To give proper weight to the dynamic character of historical processes, for instance that of border displacement (in every sense of the term), historians should pay attention to anthropological theories concerning the mechanisms of social and cultural transformation.

Here I would like to focus on Victor Turner’s theory of liminality, as it considers aspects regarding borders and the temporal nature of social or symbolic changes. The concept of liminality refers to Van Gennep’s theory of a “rite of passage” distinguishing three stages in the process of transition between social and cultural states: separation from ordinary social life, threshold between past and future modes, and re-aggregation, e.g. return to the society. For Turner, the crucial issue is the liminal phase with its reversal status because it reveals cultural patterns and a society in action.

According to Victor Turner, liminality is:

a state or process which is betwixt-and-between the normal, day-to-day cultural and social states and processes of getting and spending, preserving law and order, and registering structural status. Since liminal time is not controlled by the clock, it is a time of enchantment when anything might, even should, happen. Another way of putting it would be to say that the liminal in socio-cultural process is similar to the subjunctive mood in verbs – just as mundane socio-structural activities resemble the indicative mood. Liminality is full of potency and potentiality. It may also be full of experiment and play. There may be a play of ideas, a play of words, a play of symbols, a play of metaphors.

Liminality is relevant to rituals and carnivals corresponding to either rural cultures or premodern urban communities, for it is based on the relationship between ‘closed’ social structure and liminal rituals. In modern cities, liminal rituals were replaced by stage dramas reflecting social structure. Although Turner attributes liminality to rural rather than urban culture, he admits the presence of liminal rituals (for example, a carnival or a stage drama) in civic life also. The city in this context is a stage for intermittent rituals celebrated by dwellers using urban space according to their needs. Squares and streets play different roles and determine the dynamic and repertoire of social actions and level of participation. Carnivals, one of the most significant examples of liminal rituals, take place on the streets, which is concomitant with active participation of the dwellers – observers looking at a procession could and did interact, comment, and in some cases join the march. The celebrations of stage dramas (social theatre of meetings,
gatherings, etc.) take place on squares and open urban areas as well. However, unlike carnivals, stage dramas had a visible division of participants into actors (performers) and their audience. Richard Sennett, analysing scenarios of state celebration in Paris during the French Revolution, portrays the strict correlation between space and action. Turner regards stage dramas as an essential genre of cultures recognizing the category of “the individual”.

According to Turner, dramas involve actors, audience, producers, stagehands, often musicians and dancers, and, most of all, their plots and messages are communicated by various written and oral networks to a general public which varies in span and composition from society to society and epoch to epoch. It is a moot point whether plays derive from rituals - as carnivals clearly do - or whether they originated in the retelling of hunting and headhunting adventures, with pantomimic accompaniments. In either case they are liminal phenomena, with a good deal of reflexive commentary interwoven with the descriptive narrative.

The crucial aspects of liminal situations are subjectivity, temporality, symbolic reversal, subversive destruction of social distinctions, and escape classification. Liminality is a meta-language reflecting collective identity and the self-concept of a society. It is a way to react, re-work and transform stable social structures determining an individual life-course. If we accept Andrew Abbot’s suggestion to investigate relations between the boundaries and units of social structure in reversed order, for “boundaries come first, then entities,” a liminality approach enables historians to recognize factors determining acts of demarcating or displacing social or spatial boundaries, and to estimate their relevance for the history of the city.

Social scientists engaged in historical research use their own specific methodology, theoretical background and analytical tools with a set of key concepts broadening a spectrum of urban studies, such as city dwellers’ identity, the systems of symbolic meanings, socio-spatial organisation of the city, urban rituals, acculturation and segregation, to mention a few. Urban studies offer more than just theoretical proposals or interpretations of empirical/historical data. The impact of social sciences consists also in casting doubts on and expressing reservations about universal theories of urbanism, and creating new issues for research in that way. Despite the never-ending debate on conceptualizing the city and the vagueness of definitions, urban studies have been a sphere of relevant methodological exchange and research inspirations.

This text does not present exhaustively all the aspects of interdisciplinary tools used in urban studies. The few mentioned theoretical concepts might open up possibilities to broaden the range of research. Indeed, an interdisciplinary approach in history has already become a fact as more and more researchers include new methods in their field of interests and take into account theoretical reflections on urban studies.
Notes

3. The quotation refers to the title of the essay by Louis Wirth, published in 1939, which was a synthesis of the Chicago School’s achievements. See W. A. Schwab, *Urban Sociology*, cit., pp. 18–23.
9. E. Kaczyńska, *Pejzaż miejski z zaściankiem w tle*, Warsaw 1999, p. 120.
11. I leave aside the more general question of whether social scientists have an adequate understanding of the historical approach, which, in my opinion, they often do not.
13. Kaczyńska, *Pejzaż* cit., p. 120.
14. History of Polish cities provides examples for the two phenomena. In the 19th century, Sosnowiec was a village as defined by the applicable law, despite its dynamic industrial development and urbanisation. When granted a city charter in 1902, the village of Sosnowiec had over 60 thousand inhabitants. Russian authorities in the 19th century revoked city charters of a number of small towns in the partitions.
19. Dichotomous terms such as inner/outer, sacral/secular, local/stranger, centre/periphery are frequently used in urban studies, notwithstanding the ambivalence of structuralistic practices and the subjective nature of the distinctions.
20. Anthropologists focus their attention on social institutions perceived as places of creation of common meanings (for instance, a 19th-century salon, a coffee shop, a criminal gang, a religious community or a university). See Hannerz, *Exploring* cit., p. 325.

24 Rollason, The Passageways cit.
29 Here I would like to mention only one illustration of this approach. In the essay dedicated to spatial organisation of the city, Zygmunt Bauman refers to the case of Brasilia, the laboratory created from scratch according to the concept of a perfect modern city. As a result, the city dwellers excluded from the process of creating the system of meanings suffer from anonymity, monotony, emptiness and lack of any unexpectedness in public places. According to Bauman, Brasilia "was certainly (at least in its intention) a space perfectly transparent for those charged with the task of administration and those who articulated such tasks. Granted, it could be a perfectly structured place also for those among the residents who identified happiness with life free of problems, because it was free of choice and adventure. For all the rest it proved to be a space denuded from everything truly human – everything that fills life with meaning and makes it worth living". Bauman, Urban Space cit., p. 183.
31 Bélanger, Urban cit., p. 82.
32 Jędrzejczyk, Geografia cit., p. 207.
34 Parker, Urban Theory cit., p. 22.
37 Parker, Urban Theory cit., p. 16.
38 E. Przybył, Pałac Kultury i Nauki jako socjalistyczna sakralizacja przestrzeni, in Grębecka, J. Sadowski (eds.), Pałac Kultury cit., p. 89.
39 It is not without significance either that the city is an object of authorities' endeavours to achieve specific (political, ideological or social) goals by organizing and adapting the space often against the dwellers. See T. Pisula, Polis, utopia, inżynieria społeczna, in D. Jędrzejczyk (ed.), Humanistyczne oblicze miasta, Warsaw 2004, p. 36; Bauman, Urban Space cit.
41 Hannerz, Exploring cit., p. 259.
42 Parker, Urban Theory cit., p. 140.
This term derives from the concentric zone model developed by Ernest Burgess. The model, based on the research on Chicago in the 1920s, distinguishes five rings of space in the city: the central business district, the zone of transition, the zone of independent workers’ homes, the better residential zone, and the zone of commuters. The second zone is especially interesting, because it is inhabited by lower classes or groups of exclusion and it is directly adjacent to the central districts.


Sennett, *Flesh* cit., pp. 245-246.


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The Post-Apartheid Condition and the Dilemmas of Imagining a Nation in South Africa

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Abstract

For much of the late 19th and 20th centuries, South Africa was a land characterized by a heightened level of intolerance and discrimination. The formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 did not ease matters; instead, the union government put in place measures which sought to ensure that South Africans never shared the resources of the land equally. Indeed, the very foundation of the Union of South Africa was premised on intolerance of cultural diversity and increasing racial discourse. In this chapter I assume that the reader knows something of the history of South Africa in the past two centuries, and so, I focus on how South Africans, after the fall of Apartheid in 1994, have dealt with the remnants of intolerance and discrimination. The chapter specifically looks at the constraints that faced the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the debates that ensued after the life of the Commission.

Introduction

David Harvey, in his book entitled, The Condition of Postmodernity, suggests that the end of the 20th century was characterized by what he termed, “time-space compression”. For Harvey, “this has had a disorienting and disruptive impact upon political – economic practices, the balance of class power, as well as upon cultural and social life”. In this chapter I explore some aspects of the present discomfort, that is, how time and space, in the way Harvey uses them, influenced the proceedings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission [TRC] in South Africa. I look at how the present conceptions of time impose constraints and limitations on our ability to imagine our lives as individuals, groups and nations. I contend that by conceiving itself as an ephemeral structure the TRC undermined its long-term vision of nation building and reconciliation. This conception of time, in the light of its long-term objective, affected the outcome of its work.

The TRC had cut-off dates and an official time to end its work. These dates stimulated heated debates on exactly what was the appropriate day on the calendar to be consid-
ered. I argue that these debates were not just about political ‘point scoring’, but they were engaged with and mediated by time and space. Implicit in the debates was a full understanding that these seemingly neutral concepts, in this case the fixing of dates, are by no means innocent, that they carry with them power to shape people’s lives, and that these concepts are constructed through debates and negotiations.

One of the mechanisms that the TRC depended upon was the performances, theatre, drama and the poetics of the public hearings. This was particularly done through the print and electronic media. The hearings were broadcast in almost all eleven official languages, in part to speed up the process and reach as large an audience as was possible. For the TRC, the listeners and spectators were not just audiences; they were a nation that had joined the journey to the past.

This seems to be in contrast to Anthony Avani’s assertion that “the trouble with the past is that we have no direct dialogue with it”\(^7\). In attempting to “deal with the past”\(^8\), the expression that was used throughout the “life of the TRC”\(^9\), South Africans, those who journeyed to the past, were trying to negotiate and enter into dialogue with their past. Part of the dialogue with the past involved the digging of skulls and the reversal of power positions (that is, the face to face interaction between the perpetrator and victim\(^10\)), in the theatre and drama of the TRC public hearings, allowing South Africans to communicate in various ways with the past\(^11\). The conversations were intended to begin a search for the truth, which, as I show later, had to be abandoned and replaced by a reassuring sense of optimism – hope – in the face of rising unemployment and grinding poverty.

**Contesting Spaces, 1986 – 1994**

The public protests that intensified in 1984 signalled a new contest for the control of space(s) in South Africa. These were nationwide protests against the hegemonic control of the State. They took place predominantly in small towns, cities and townships. Most of the public rallies and gatherings were organized by the United Democratic Front (UDF), Trade Unions affiliated with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and civic organizations including churches linked to the South African Council of Churches (SACC)\(^12\). However, these public marches were not the first in South African history\(^13\); nor did the organizers have a new political objective. But what distinguished these rolling mass actions from the previous protests was a clear intention from the general public to contest public spaces with the South African State. These demonstrations were met with a very determined force from the State security forces. And it soon responded by declaring a State of Emergency in June 1986, which was extended to 1990\(^14\). This gave the Security Forces “extraordinary powers of arrest, detention, censorship regulations and control of public assembly”\(^15\). The definition of public assembly included public gatherings, funeral gatherings and marches\(^16\). Reporting and talking publicly about the “unrest” was banned. Some newspapers like the “New Nation” and “Weekly Mail” were closed through the
State of Emergency regulations. The UDF was restricted from organizing its activities, and Cosatu was banned from taking part in political activities.

Seeing all the restrictions imposed on organizations to organize public meetings, the UDF and Cosatu formed a broad public based movement called Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). In late 1980s it was the MDM that organized rent and bus boycotts in the Townships, and consumer boycotts against white owned businesses. In 1989 the MDM organized a “defiance campaign against segregated facilities and restrictions on meetings”. As Pampalis writes:

from August, black patients were organized to present themselves for treatment at white hospitals; most were, in fact, given treatment. This was followed by similar challenges to the segregation of schools, transport, workplace facilities, beaches and other public amenities.

The period between 1986 and 1990 was a crucial period or an intense moment of contests for control of public spaces. It was in these spaces that the politics of South Africa in the late 1980s was staged and dramatized. The collapse of the system of Apartheid in 1990 signalled a ‘new’ beginning, and the freeing of spaces was a visible prediction of what has since been referred to as a new South Africa, a new space.

The unbanning of all political organizations opened a space(s) for negotiations to take place. These negotiations took place over a period of three years. Formal negotiations began in December 1991, when 228 delegates from nineteen political organizations gathered at the World Trade Center, Kempton Park, Johannesburg. The negotiations included participants from the homelands. The participants in these negotiations called themselves the Convention for a Democratic South Africa – [CODESA].

However, even this space was not yet free and was once seized by the Afrikaner Weerstandbewiging (AWB). This group of right-wing “neo-Nazi storm troopers attacked blacks caught in the building”. This attack, which was beamed across the country during prime time, and the clear understanding that the anti-apartheid movements had not won the struggle through arms led to a need for a compromise. It was this political compromise that has made the South African political situation very engaging, challenging, and at certain moments it has presented interesting dilemmas. It made this new space ready for refashioning. This moment also bequeathed constraints and limitations.


One of the points that were agreed upon during the negotiations for an interim constitution was, among others, a clause that would give amnesty to the perpetrators of gross human rights violations and restore dignity to the victims. It was this clause which paved the way for the all race elections, which took place from 26 - 29 April 1994. This is the clause that has sustained a highest level of debate both in South Africa and internationally to this day. It reads:
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross human rights violations, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge.

These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu [the African philosophy of humanism] but not for victimization.

In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. To this end, Parliament under this Constitution shall adopt a law determining a firm cut-off date which shall be a date after 8 October 1990 and before 6 December 1993 and providing for mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the law has been passed.

The first and second sections of the clause seek to deal with the experience, psychological and material effects the past has had on people’s lives. This clause also suggested a cut-off date that was later to be a point of serious debate.

In 1995, soon after the 1994 elections, the Justice Portfolio Committee was entrusted to draft the appropriate legislation. Its work entailed, inter alia; the fixing of cut-offs. Some political parties like the Freedom Front, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging [AWB] and the Democratic Party had their own views about the appropriate dates. For the AWB, any date before 6 December 1993 as a cut-off date would exclude its members from benefiting from the Amnesty process, and therefore it asked for the extension of the date to April 1994. And if the process was to be inclusive it had to accommodate the AWB’s concerns. In its submission to the Portfolio committee, the AWB, through its leader, stated:

[...] if the shifting of the date can bring peace – then you must shift the date with every day on the calendar. If justice rules ... I will talk peace ... because that is all that I am ... a simple farmer from Westransvaal who has come to you to put my case.

The statement not only suggests a link between the cut-off date and peace, it also introduces justice, and how these three terms have been intrinsically connected to the calendar system. The conventional meanings of justice in this process as I have highlighted before, were suspended in search of a nation. The new space was made ready for remaking.

The AWB’s concerns on the cut-off date were accepted. And the government changed the date from March 1993 to May 1994.

**HISTORICAL WINDOW**

It was not only the cut-off date that was debated, but also the span of time under consideration. The year 1960 was raised as a possibility. This was the year when the Sharp-
ville march took place. During this march a number of people were killed, which constituted one of the reasons put forward for the date.

The Democratic Party (DP), concerned with the length of time the Commission had to consider, proposed that the starting date should be 16 June 1976. The party reckoned:

This would not only shorten the Commission’s area of research by sixteen years but would have a symbolic resonance, because it ushered in the famous cycle of resistance and oppression.

For the Democratic Party to deal with “four decades, and to look not only at disappearances, as in Chile, but at other gross violations such as murder, kidnapping, torture and severe ill-treatment, was an impossible workload.”

The DP statement on the date is telling, as it shows that the process was not about establishing a full picture of what happened, but was symbolic, or a historical window and therefore it had to concentrate on the “famous cycle of resistance and oppression”. The phrasing, “famous cycle of resistance” begs some consideration. This idea was at the very core of the TRC. The TRC was designed to be a spectacle, which sought to capture public imagination through pictures, theatrical performances displayed in the ephemeral spaces created by the public hearings. This explains the urgency that characterized the process leading to the creation of the TRC.

**The Hour**

The debates on the TRC legislation were severely constrained by time, and the participants seized on the opportunity presented by the media to create an impression that there was “progress” in the debates. This media mania, perhaps, represents what Harvey calls the “mediatization of politics.” Krog writes:

One morning a note is sent to the media: Don’t leave too soon – promise to provide you with a row and an underhand ANC deal.

Just before the TRC was established the definition of time was clear, it was that of productive time, getting as many things done in as short a time as possible. The debate proceeded as though they were in competition. Simply put, this was a race against time. Time was the great concern of the Portfolio Committee members, as Krog writes:

De Lange is adamant. We still have eight draft bills to discuss. We argued this agenda last week for more than an hour. We have accepted it. I will allow no discussion. I am putting it to the vote. Read my lips: I am putting it to the vote. Whereupon the ANC outvotes the other parties by fifteen to seven.

The whole process of debating the legislation was later seen, not in its content, but in the amount of time spent on it.

The Justice Portfolio Committee spent six and half-hours on the Truth Commission Bill before any public submission was made. It listened for more than twenty hours to submis-
sions and it discussed, compiled and drafted the various clauses of the bill in 100 hours and 53 minutes. Many a time the civil servants turned up at the meeting with red eyes and wrinkled clothes, having worked through the night to prepare a new discussion document. In total, the Committee spent 127 hours and 30 minutes on the Truth Commission Bill.

Time, the present conception of time, has conditioned our lives, to the extent that it has become natural. The civil servant became impatient about the whole process. For her the process was taking too long. She could not take it any longer. Her views and feelings might have been a reflection of a sizable number of the civil servants who had to write the day to day proceedings of the TRC Bill debate. The civil servant stated:

[...] if I personally had to draft this legislation, it would have been a lean, simple law – completed weeks ago. But because this has to be a process, it is developing into a hell of a unique, but impossibly complex law.

The speed with which the debates were conducted invited vicious criticism. The bill itself was seen as a flawed piece of legislation. However, those who advanced this argument saw no alternative to the process. The Truth Commission Bill was signed into law on 19 July 1995. And soon after that the nominations for people who would comprise the Commission started, culminating in the seventeen members elected to form the Commission. The Commission was divided into three committees, the Committee on Human Rights Violations, Amnesty Committee and the Committee for Rehabilitation and Reparation.

At the heart of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, I suggest, was an attempt to imagine a nation. However, it had to be constructed out of the ashes of the old. This was attempted by travelling to the past, as the TRC put it, “to another country.” The public hearings were given a priority. These public hearings were intended to take the South African public back to specific spaces where certain events under the Commission’s mandate occurred.

The public stage, during the TRC hearings, was a space, or as the TRC puts it, a “forum for many voices that had previously been silenced.” One observer acutely noted:

The public TRC hearings provided spaces for singing where we could sing sad songs for some of the biggest tears in our mortal dress, where we could lament some of the scars in our body politic.

Here the two spaces, the old and new, were made to interact simultaneously, and yet the spaces were ephemeral.

THE DILEMNAS OF IMAGINING A NATION

The first public hearing took place in April 1996. The hearing was held at the East London City Hall, in the Eastern Cape. The venue was chosen for its historical resonance. As the report put it:
The choice of a centre in the Eastern Cape was no accident, but a deliberate decision to focus attention on an area which had borne the brunt of some of the heaviest repression by the security forces of the previous government, in direct response to some of the most militant resistance. The planning of the first public hearing is worth quoting in full, for not only does it provide backstage information on the reworking and construction of spaces, it also alludes to the most important aspect of the TRC, that is, a concerted effort to use the latest means of communication, so that it could get full publicity of the hearings. To ask why the TRC was so preoccupied with publicity would be to question, these days, the obvious. The report states:

The selected venue was the East London Hall in April, an imposing Victorian-style building in the centre of the city. Stringent security measures had to be put in place, and were provided and maintained by the South African Police Services (as at subsequent public hearings). Provision had to be made for the media. Food and accommodation had to be provided for deponents and for at least some of their families who attended to support them. Transport had to be arranged, entailing heavy costs and considerable logistical difficulties, and interpretation services had to be arranged for simultaneous translation into all the languages to be used. The placing of tables for the witnesses and for Commission members received careful attention – witnesses were to take pride of place and there was to be no suggestion of their being ‘in the dock’ as in a court. They were also always to be accompanied by a Commission ‘briefer’ and, if they chose, by a family member or other supporter. The deponents were brought together during the weekend before the hearings in order to prepare them.

The hall was packed to full capacity by people who came to join the journey to the past, the national and international media representatives “filled to overflowing the room”. This was the atmosphere in most of the TRC initial hearings. They drew large public attention and most of the hearings were broadcast on radio and television, and were covered by the latest electronic means of communication including the internet. Through this media attention, the TRC hoped that the vast South African landscape would be compressed into a single whole, and its inhabitants travel together to the past. As the TRC itself was later to claim that the “live radio and television broadcasts made the Commission so much a part of the South African landscape.”

Krog describes the back stage scene during the preparation of the items for the news headlines in the first hearing. She writes:

We pick out a sequence. We remove some pauses and edit it into a 20-second sound bite. We feed it to Johannesburg. We switched on a small transistor. The news comes through: “I was making tea in the police station. I heard a noise, I looked up ... There he fell ... Someone fell from the upper floor past the window ... I ran down ... It was my child ... my grandchild, but I raised him”.

We lift our fists triumphantly. We’ve done it! The voice of an ordinary cleaning women is the headline on the o’clock news.
The present became the past, and the past that was brought into the present was expected to inform the future. Jeremy Cronin has noted that the TRC was a bridge, designed to take people from the past to the future. All this was possible through the manipulation of time and space or—as Harvey puts it “through the annihilation of space through time.” One of the Commissioners acknowledged this in the TRC hearings in Durban:

“We commend the radio for ensuring that thousands, if not millions, especially of the so-called ordinary people, are being reached.”

Not only the nation was imagined, also the audience was imagined. They were expected to be watching and soul searching. However, it does not seem that the imagination was all that accurate as will become apparent below.

The venues the TRC chose had to be justified by invoking the past, as we have seen with the East London Town Hall. The choice of venue for the Durban hearings was also no accident, it had historical meanings. This venue in particular allowed the TRC to make some connections to the recent 20th-century failure of humanity to be human—the Holocaust. The TRC Commissioner explained:

“It seems in a different kind of way particularly appropriate that the venue should be a Jewish one, given their peculiar capacity to remember.”

To help the imagining, the individual testimonies were transformed into a shared story, in search of a nation. As one of the Commissioners stated in the victims’ public hearings in East London:

“The 27th of June 1985 is a day which will be indelibly printed in your minds and in your hearts and in the minds of many, many thousands and hundreds of thousands of people in South Africa. Many people within this hall and many of us sitting at this table knew your husbands well, had met them, we had worked with them and like you we heard with horror of the gruesome killing of those four, the Cradock Four.”

Their husbands were not heroes. They worked and mingled with the many, many thousands and hundreds of thousands of people in South Africa.

And also again in the Durban hearings similar words were uttered to demonstrate the public nature of the proceedings. In this case it was not only the South African public that was imagined, but the world as a whole:

“A particularly warm welcome to those who will be testifying, and to their families. Thank you for your generosity, and in this province particularly, your courage in coming forward and exposing your pain to the gaze of the world.”

However, there was another side to the TRC’s imaginings of a public glued to their television sets and listening to the victims’ stories. In the Northern Province while the hearing was taking place inside the hall people, the South African public, were going about their normal chores. Krog observed:
By late morning a cricket match commences on the field next to the hall. And it is clear that
more things change on this side of the Soutpansberg, the more they stay the same. While
the Commission listens to testimony of human rights violations, cheerful white families with
their Tupperware, their sunhats and their small-town familiarity spend the day picnicking on
the grass outside. Their children chase each other around the bakkies. Caught between the
field and the hall, we in the media sit listening to bitter crying and choked words, interspersed
with cheering and applause from an enthusiastic cricket crowd. The division carries through to
the policemen patrolling the showgrounds. The white policemen loll about, watching cricket,
while their black colleagues stand solemnly in the door-ways of the hall listening to the testi-
mony. My hands on the laptop keyboard are numb with contradiction.

METAPHORS ABOUT THE PAST

Besides the planned proceedings and eloquent speeches that were intended to draw pub-
lic attention to the process, I suggest here that it was also metaphors about the past and
the sight of exhumed bodies that kept some people’s emotions in the past. Metaphors are
in themselves empty, but it is in their emptiness that their potency lies. For this reason
everyone tries to search for meanings in these metaphors. The South African past, that is
– history as experience – has emerged as dark, brutal and as a beast. Perhaps, it was in try-
ing to condense and describe decades of human interaction in the shortest possible time,
that the TRC saw the South African past as bloody and the country itself as “soaked in
blood”\textsuperscript{54}. The TRC Commissioner once asserted that the present situation in South Afri-
can society “requires a huge regional ablution ceremony to get through the era of blood”\textsuperscript{55}. But depending on this kind of emotive language at times ignores crucial details. Perhaps
one has to remember, as Njabulo Ndebele has suggested, that “if today they sound like im-
aginary events it is because, as we shall recall, the horror of day-to-day life under apartheid
often outdid the efforts of the imagination to reduce it to metaphor”\textsuperscript{56}.

For these metaphors, powerful as they were, failed to stimulate the imagination. For
most people a brutal past, as it will be clear below, is better to be forgotten than kept in
people’s memories.

TIME TO MOVE ON

As I have demonstrated earlier in the chapter, the TRC from the start faced various
limitations, constraints and dilemmas. First the negotiators who drafted the TRC bill,
later the commissioners and the public at large, as I shall try to demonstrate below,
confronted similar challenges partly due to how they conceived time during the whole
process. The ephemerality of the TRC created a situation in the minds of the South
African public that it was something that would come and go. The process would come
to an \textit{end}. As one journalist who took part in the TRC hearings, put it with all good
intentions:

\textit{Maintaining Discriminations or Fostering Tolerance?}
The Truth Commission provided counselling and I was advised to stop. But I don’t want to. This is my history, and I want to be part of it – until the end.

Here lies one of the great dilemmas; a nation or the imagination of a nation that would come to an end. Nations are not ephemeral and imagining them can not be a piece-meal process. The journalist innocently shows the flaws and limits to imagination that riddled the negotiators of the TRC bill and the structure that came as a result of the debates.

The life span of the TRC was eighteen months, with the exception of the Amnesty Committee that continued with its work after 1998, but it does not enjoy same media coverage as was the case with victim hearings. In this space of time the TRC was expected to provide as full a picture as possible of the gross human rights violations. However, this proved impossible as the TRC later conceded that it had to complete an “enormous task in a limited time”. This is convincing in light of the period it had to consider and time made available to it. However, at the core of the debates around the time that was made available to the TRC lies a reality, that the TRC itself might threaten the fragile political, economic and human relations, and that it would disturb the quietness of a neo-natal space. Justifying its short life span, the TRC stated:

It would also have been counterproductive to devote years to hearing about events that, by their nature, arouse very strong feelings. It would have rocked the boat massively and for too long.

So rather than “devote years to hearing events that arouse strong feelings”, the whole process had to be a sign, to use a metaphor. Commentators on the TRC process just before it finished its work had started to complain about the length of time. And they felt it was “time to move on”. This sense of impatience which permeates through the fabric of South African society from the law-makers, public commentators, and no doubt to ordinary citizens is in line with Harvey’s concerns about the disruptive impact of the postmodern condition in every sphere of life. Such views are well captured in the following comment, “we should move forward as a country rather than continue to wallow in the past.” No doubt the metaphors that characterized the TRC public hearings made the period between 1996 and 1998, for some, a dark period.

Concluding Comments

At the core of the dilemmas was the tension between productive time and the imperatives of imagining a nation or, as Anderson suggests, that to imagine a nation requires a certain conception of time which is immemorial, an immemorial past. Faced with material and imaginative constraints the TRC put much emphasis on temporal spectacles and emotive language. As a result the process remained locked at the level of accusations and counter-accusations.
Nations are imagined through heroes, who live in a timeless space. However, for the TRC every South African was a victim. Jeremy Cronin has observed:

We are asked to recognize the little perpetrator in each of us, but we are nowhere asked to recognize the little freedom fighter, the collective self-emancipator that we all could be.\textsuperscript{67} 

Recognizing that things did not go as planned the Commission stated, “with its short life-span and limited mandate and resources, it was obviously impossible for the Commission to reconcile the nation”\textsuperscript{68}. I have suggested in this chapter that it was partly due to the conception of time that the TRC later found it hard to accomplish its objective of nation building and reconciliation. And this constraint of imagination was inherited from the negotiations and debates that gave birth to the TRC. As a result right from the start the imagining of a nation was meant to be ephemeral. But all was not lost, for the next 10 years (1998 - 2008) would see a politics of hope despite visible signs of rising inequality and crime\textsuperscript{69}.

\section*{Notes}

\textsuperscript{1} I have been inspired by a number of authors who have tried to think through the South African experience since 1994. The sub-title of this chapter is taken from Njabulo Ndebele, who is generally described as a prophet of the post-apartheid condition through his collection of essays entitled \textit{South African Literature and Culture: Rediscovery of the Ordinary}, Manchester 1994. And, more recently, his book entitled \textit{Fine Lines from the Box: Further Thoughts about our Country}, Johannesburg 2007. In one of his essays he writes, “at the time when Berlin walls of various kinds are falling, I am aware of a wall that is as formidable as ever. It is the wall of ignorance. At this time when the spirit of reconciliation is supposed to bring South Africans together, South Africans don’t know one another as a people”, p. 151.

\textsuperscript{2} D. Harvey, \textit{The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change}. Oxford 1990, p. 284. According to Harvey this moment is captured in the saying, “all that is solid melts into air”, p. 285.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 284.

\textsuperscript{4} This study is neither a critique of the noble objectives of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission nor an assessment of its monumental work. My partial metaphorical use of space in this paper is taken from Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hebert and Kenneth Thompson, who suggest that “places remain fixed; they are where we have roots. Yet space can be crossed in the twinkling of an eye – by jet, fax, or satellite”. S. Hall, D. Held, D. Hebert, K. Thompson, \textit{Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies}, Massachusetts 1996, p. 205. Here I think of the tension between a linear understanding of time as was used by the drafters of the TRC bill, in short, time as progress or productive time, and nonlinear time of “travelling to the past” that was later used by the TRC. This tension was never resolved throughout the life of the TRC. Since the dead were not transformed – this question of time was never resolved.

\textsuperscript{5} My understanding of a nation is taken from Benedict Anderson’s book, \textit{Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and Spread of Nationalism}, London 1991. According to Anderson, “a nation is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{6} In this chapter I refer to the TRC as an independent body, for once it was created it functioned as a semi-autonomous structure under the guidelines of the TRC Act proclaimed by the Government of National Unity on 16 June 1995.

8 The truth leaves deep scars, electronic "Mail & Guardian", 12 December 1997. See also the TRC final report, foreword by Chairperson, vol. 1, chapter 1, p. 4.


11 As Njabulo Ndebele has acutely observed that “only now has South Africa succeeded in becoming metaphor, in becoming a true subject of philosophy”, in S. Nuttal, C. Coetzee, Negotiating the past: The making of memory in South Africa, Cape Town 1998, p. 20.


13 Since the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 different kinds of protests have taken place in various corners of South Africa. These protests culminated in the 1956 women's demonstrations at the Union Buildings in Pretoria against pass laws, the Sharpville march in 1960, the Durban Workers strike in 1973 and the Soweto uprisings in 1976.


16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., p. 290.

18 Ibid., p. 295.

19 Ibid., p. 295.

20 From that time ordinary citizens could occupy the spaces that they had, hitherto, been prevented from occupying by law.


22 Homelands or Bantustans were enclaves within the Republic of South Africa that were created in the early 1970s to contain Africans’ aspirations to power. Then the process of imagining a nation was not only a reconciliation between races, it was also an attempt, I think, to get people from these eight Bantustans to imagine themselves as a nation.


24 Krog, Country of my Skull cit., p. 6.

25 Ibid., pp. 2-3.

26 E.M. Mgojo (Commissioner: KwaZulu / Natal and Free State), After the TRC: Can Reconciliation come to KwaZulu Natal? (Cry Beloved Country, Cry!), Breakfast Briefing, Friday, 7 November 1997 at 07h:15 at the Point Yacht Club on the Esplanade, Durban, South Africa.

27 Krog, Country of my Skull cit., p. 1

28 Ibid., p. 6.

29 The implication here is that a “nation” was progressing.

30 Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity cit., p. 288.

31 Krog, Country of My Skull cit., p. 6.
Maintaining Discriminations or Fostering Tolerance?
58 See Anderson, *Imagined Communities* cit., pp. 11 and 22 - 23.
59 TRC Final Report, Foreword by Chairperson, vol. 1, chapter 1, p. 1.
60 Ibid., p. 2.
63 Harvey, *Condition of Postmodernity* cit., p. 284.
64 Nyatsumba, *After the TRC* cit.
65 Anderson, *Imagined Communities* cit., p. 11.
66 Piers Pigou, one of the former TRC investigators said the Commission failed to do its work, and cited the under-resourced and poorly managed investigators. “Pigou also blamed a lack of direction plagued by organizational, managerial and bureaucratic problems, enormous efforts were inevitably wasted in attempts to get the investigative unit to operate as a unit and in a focused manner”, wrote David Beresford of the “Mail and Guardian”, electronic “Mail & Guardian”, *Truth Commission’s failed, says a former star investigator*, Johannesburg, South Africa, 28 April 1998, 1.
69 However, such issues must wait for another telling.

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BOOKS

Spanish and Basque Nationalisms

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ABSTRACT

The theme of national and regional cultures of 20th century states is particularly important for Spain. The keynote of Spanish political history in that century (and in the preceding one as well) was certainly – as a well-known specialist, J.P. Fusi Aizpurua, writes –, the dialectic of nationalisms, that is, the confrontation between a Spanish integral and unitary nationalism – already born in the 19th century – in response to the regional (“peripheral”) nationalisms, the Basque and the Catalan, principally.

We must remember nevertheless that at the beginning of the so-called Age of Nationalism, Spain was one of the oldest political units established in a region of Europe, immensely fragile and with shifting borders (Alvarez Junco J., 1996). A second opening consideration is necessary: we must also remember that nationalism and regionalism are not at all the same thing. On the contrary, the first characteristic which must be taken into account is the heterogeneity of those movements and the marked differences between them. According to this point of view, which has many supporters in Spanish historiography after the 1980s, there were sentiments of national identity or consciousness, tendencies towards a national interpretation during the 19th century, however there was no theory or movement which supported or exalted national values or ideas of ‘patria’ (fatherland). Nothing that carried the name “nacional” and aspired to creating a unitary or national model of a State.

On the other hand, there was no shortage of intellectual writings evoking a Spanish collective identity, which some authors have described as pre- or proto-national, but which Alvarez Junco prefers to term ethno-patriotic. A process, consequently, which was developing as Spanish nationalism was reinforced as different elements were integrated (education, broad military service, means of communication, and the development of the state itself) – a weak Spanish state, precarious, fragile and not very effective in the 19th and a part of the 20th centuries. Near the end of the period, the crisis of 1898 had a strategic influence on the question of nationalisms: a crisis of the national conscience, a need for regeneration, with the irruption of Catalan nationalism and the frustration of the colonial Army. Basque nationalism, the “roughest and hardest” according to Fusi, the most complex from my point of view, will be hence the other object of the chapter.
A premise such as this has the object of putting into high relief perhaps one of the most widespread ideas with the most numerous supporters in present day Spanish historiography on these themes. Its effort at breaking down myths is countered by some other points of view, principally among those of nationalist orientation, about which we will speak in due course.

El artículo trata de reunir las voces más representativas del estudio que sobre el nacionalismo español y vasco se han dejado escuchar en la historiografía española más reciente.

Desde el planteamiento genérico, la visión de los aspectos que sobre la cuestión se expresan, confirman – pese a divergencias interpretativas – los caracteres del nacionalismo español que desde el siglo XX se manifestaron evidentes. Muchos de estos rasgos apuntan hacia el complicado proceso de aprendizaje nacional que en España se vivió desde los primeros síntomas de la revolución liberal burguesa.

El escenario interpretado por unos y por otros, revela una situación multiforme y multicultural, en el que determinados sucesos, como el desastre del 1898: la pérdida de los últimos resquicios del Imperio Español, alcanzarían de lleno al complejo problema de la confirmación del Estado-Nación en este país.

Problemas de disfunción, retraso, ineficacia, incultura, etc, ponen en jaque la esencia de un tema resuelto en otros lugares de la geografía europea, que por el contrario, no dejaría de complicarse aún más dentro de la sociedad española. Hasta el estallido de la guerra civil de 1936 y después de ésta también, la consideración doctrinal de “lo nacional” viene adobada por opciones casi siempre enfrentadas. Las visiones contrapuestas de izquierda y derecha sobre el hecho nacional se fragmentan con el estallido de otros nacionalismos en el interior del país. Pero los nacionalismos y regionalismos adquirirán su propio ritmo y dinámica. De entre ellos, el nacionalismo vasco en particular revela un perfil de gran importancia y mayor aspereza.

La transición española y luego el establecimiento del modelo autonómico suponen procesos en los que el asentamiento ideológico de los nacionalismos ha ido acumulando caracteres de dificultad innegable. Agravados hasta hoy mismo con el impacto de diferentes lecturas en que ha desembocado el problema vasco hasta los finales del siglo XX.

Desde los postulados historiográficos, el caso vasco ofrece un balance investigador muy interesante, a diferencia de otros casos que también forman parte históricamente de la radiografía política del Estado español en su fase más contemporánea. A través de las distintas posturas y opciones interpretativas, se confirma la complejidad del diálogo político en España al encarar el problema, incluidas las actitudes no exentas de violencia que subsisten todavía, cuando se plantea la reivindicación nacionalista.
SPANISH NATIONALISM

Andrés de Blas, a representative of this historiographical tendency which spread in the 1990s, strengthened by the presence of Socialists in power, takes as his departure point – in a little book dedicated to the theme of Spanish nationalism – that Spain, in his opinion, constitutes a clear and complete example of a nation of a political territorial kind which is independent of the existence within it of other possible national realities of a cultural kind.

Various authors have characterised Spain even today as a national reality of a political kind; which means that the concept of the rising State is relevant theme. De Blas affirms that the claim of cultural nationalism, that there must be a “direct” correspondence between the cultural reality of a people and an ad hoc political organisation, lacks the idea of a political nation, the rise of which is to a great degree a consequence of the political organisation which was present previous to the national reality.

De Blas’ opinion is shared by others. Fusi holds that “nationalism is a relatively unnecessary factor in Spanish life in most of the last century” (that is, the 19th century). In this way, the Catalan nationalist temptation in the 19th century can be included in the category of reactions to a Spain anchored in the ancien régime. Vicens Vives, a master for a generation of Spanish historians, presented some years ago even Carlism as an armed movement of Spanish Catholicism, that is to say, as a movement which did not question the State.

Not even the defence of privileges (fueros) had this character, according to the liberal school, in spite of the discrepancies in this respect which the defenders of the Basque nationalist tradition pointed out. This is the origin of the idea that the liberal revolution threatened the defence of the Ancient Regime and from the final crisis of the Privileges of Basques and of Navarre arose, notwithstanding the various interpretations, keys issues to be fought for, some of which are still present, re-elaborated, in today’s situation.

The truth is that in modern times, liberal revolutions and the Age of Nationalism entered Spain with the Napoleonic army. The invasion was to cause the country enormous problems, but it certainly did not seem to threaten the Spanish state or the Spanish collective identity. On the contrary it can be argued that it was an excellent beginning from the point of view of a nation-building process, because the modern period was inaugurated by a conflict labelled as nothing less than a war of national independence. In fact, the nationalist interpretation of this war was an enormous simplification, not to say an outright falsification. Napoleon’s brother, Joseph Bonaparte, stated that Spanish territory (including the American empire) would remain united with the same boundaries as before. Therefore, the conflict of 1808 was in reality a great complex phenomenon, which can be understood by distinguishing a number of different levels or coinciding sub-conflicts which fed off each other.
By the middle of the 19th century not only history books attested to this interest in the construction of the national past. Romantic illustrations of school history books come from this period between 1850 and 1900. In 1882 Benito Perez Galdos began to publish his highly successful novelistic series of *Episodios nacionales*, which surveyed the 19th-century political upheavals, beginning with the war of Independence, where the protagonist was the Spanish people, portrayed as a suffering, innocent victim of evil rulers and the only possible hope for the country’s redemption. The premise of these liberal historians was that Spain embodied an essential national character that, since remote times, has survived wave after wave of invaders.

The shift of Spanish Nationalism towards Conservatism is also another patriotic canon reached during this century and the following one. The best summary of the National-Catholic position was expressed by Menéndez y Pelayo. But the competing visions of the national identity (the conservative and the liberal-progressive mythical versions of the national past) produced a kind of syncretic version, dominant in the history textbooks at the end of the century. During the 19th century the most significant role left to Spanish nationalism was the purely reactionary one unifying of all those opposed to liberal or social revolution and to Catalan and Basque autonomy.

What was the origin, then, of the peripheral nationalisms of a “disintegrating type”? The starting point was more than one hundred years ago, in 1898. It is necessary to look closely at what happened before the Civil War in order to understand the nationalist protest and not to oversimplify, confusing the issues.
The general conclusions to be drawn from these first remarks is that the processes of nationalisation of the masses, usually studied in relation to the new nation-states formed in the 19th century, such as Germany or Italy in Europe, or countries of mass immigration, such as Argentina or the United States, were also necessary for old traditional European monarchies if they were to survive as modern nation-states. Well-known failures were the Austro-Hungarian or the Ottoman Empires. Spain was a middle of the road case: an old traditional monarchy which survived but under political and economic circumstances which made its effort at nationalisation of the masses weak and insufficient. In the 20th century, conservative forces would finally make a determined effort to nationalise ... but too late.

Elites were attracted either by social revolution or by alternative nationalisms. This link between “Spanishness” and its lateness, united to military dictatorship, gave a bitter flavour to the idea and the symbols of Spain. As Alvarez Junco and I too believe, here lies the root of present day problems.

LIBERALISM AND NATION DURING THE 19TH CENTURY

A question about what happened requires nonetheless greater attention today: that is, the construction of the liberals’ project of a Nation-State.

The Spanish liberal revolution meant a political and ideological but not an administrative upheaval. Absolutism was overthrown, but the transformations of the State were produced under the blows of the military, economic and political conjuncture. The State was the result of a vast social process of national assimilation. Giving a structure to the nation meant in Spain as in other countries the growth and integration of markets, regions and cities: the creation of an obligatory national military service, the development of a unified education system, the expansion of modern means of mass communication. An immense process of social learning. This process was made more rapid by facts such as: the creation of the Madrid Stock Exchange (1831), of the Bank of Spain as the body which had the monopoly of monetary issue (1856), building the railroads (1848), creation of the Guardia Civil (1844), unification of Law, beginning with the Penal Code in 1848, the Organic Law on Judiciary Power (1870), the compilation of the Civil Code (1889), the system of secondary and higher education (1845 and 1857).

The administrative division into provinces in 1833 was another key moment for these aims. The Provincial Delegations were converted into directive bodies, whose character was different in different cases (in the Navarre-Basque case they had their own resources). In spite of the abolition of existing local privileges in 1839 and the transformation of Navarre from a kingdom into a province (1841), the four provinces lived until 1868 their “full privileged maturity” according to the conservative vision of the time. In any case the period was dominated by the localism of Spanish political and social life, since the administrative machinery of the central State in the 19th century was quite small in size.
Spanish liberalism, hence, took for granted the existence of the Spanish nation and of national awareness. But debate was inevitable and was translated into civil war, the civil war of the supporters and the enemies of liberalisms (Carlism), without it being reinforced culturally or ideologically by the Spanish citizens’ new identity.

In this process of building the liberals’ Nation-State, we can contrast two great projects which existed in 19th-century Spanish nationalism: the conservative and the democratic ones “of the lefts”. Both have been judged very differently by historiography, including the best known specialists in Spanish history up to the present day (R. Carr, P. Vilar, and others).

There are two positions in the most recent historiography (among other authors we may mention Borja de Riquer and Andrés de Blas) who are in disagreement on a point regarding the relative lateness of the impact of a Spanish nationalism, because for one of the two (the former) it is obvious that in all the parliamentary and political debates of the first half of the 19th century there can be found evident signs of projects of Spanish nationalism. The alternative version (that of Andrés de Blas) believes on the contrary that nationalism was a relatively unnecessary resource in the life of the majority of the Spanish population in the 19th century. As a consequence one can speak of delay in the formation of Spanish nationalism in an old Spain which was lacking a healthy policy of expansion and without important internal or external challenges which might have been able to awaken her, as would happen during the crisis of the end of the century. Juan Pablo Fusi is on a parallel position.

In the second half of the 19th century Riquer finds two pro-Spanish proposals which are markedly different, because they take off from diverging concepts of what is to be understood as the Spanish nation, the “nación española”. Moderate Liberals, then progressive, unionists and finally conservatives finished imposing politically and culturally Spanish nationalism of a conservative, Catholic and traditionalist character. Or, and it is the same thing, an ideological line which considers the Spanish nation to be the result of history, unchangeable and unquestionable.

The organicistic State which fixes the relationship between men and territory generates a political scenario which seems to be made of stainless steel, constructed in the most remote past and which the action of human beings cannot alter. A meta-historical oblivion places the nation as a natural reality, independent of human will and the contingencies of historical evolution. During the 20th century this conservative vision was imposed to the prejudice of the democratic idea of the new national consciousness. Its programme is based on the notion of nation as a project which, founded on the past, is built and organized thanks to the positive and patriotic action of the citizens. The nation of the Spanish lefts was basically the work of new social groups, new wills of citizens, the fruit of a collective aspiration towards a better future. A new entity joined together in step with the liberal and democratic institutions, institutions which were
created merely so that national sovereignty could be exercised. The nation of the left, of
the democrats and republicans, appeared as a project for a secularising and a civilizing
future with the clear will to integrate “the maximum of social groups”.

It is possible to single out notable internal differences within this left-wing Spanish
nationalism, or centralism, with other formulas and attitudes which co-existed: local
autonomism, federalism, and even Iberianism (that is, desiring to unite Spain and Por-
tugal). It is possible to hear different proposals, and in the end also as to the political and
administrative form of the State and its projection abroad. As to this last aspect, the pos-
sibility of forming a multi-national state was not discarded. These were proposals which
the left kept aside “in the political and cultural periphery” during the entire 19th and a
good part of the 20th century. They were considered subversive and destabilizing.

Obviously there were similar situations as well in other countries such as France, Ger-
many, Portugal and Italy. A process in which nation and nationality were joined. This
is proved by Massimo D’Azeglio’s famous phrase: “We have made Italy, now we must
make the Italians”.

1898

In contemplating the question of Spanish nationalism, we must inevitably take into
consideration the year 1898 and its significance in this respect. A first reflection: 1898
is the demonstration of the lack of synchronization and the dysfunctions due to the in-
sufficient awareness of four fundamental processes, according to Riquer’s interpretation
(1994): first, the discussion about the new unitary State (liberal territorial, juridical
and administrative centralisation); second the process of economic imbalance and the
social-cultural modernization of the different territories; third, the insufficient demo-
cratic political consensus and cultural prestige of the liberal regime, which Riquer at-
tributes to the pressure and the dominion of the moderates and the conservatives; and
finally, an insufficient nationalizing

action, carried out by the State, which implies a weak awareness of a Spanish identity.
This lack of capacity to incorporate or neutralize a good part of the middle classes pro-
duced the splitting of liberalism and brought the more radical sectors to an extra-parlia-
mentary and subversive stance. The lack of consensus implied the absence of reformist
policies which could have brought elements of social integration and nationalization.

The predominance of a conservative political military élite which had as its priority the
defence of the new capitalist property, the bourgeois order, the reconciliation with the
Catholic Church implied – this is Riquer’s thesis – that the task of building the Spanish
nation was not considered relevant. The difficulty in organizing the national territory
or the State because of the deficiencies of the policy of Public Works (endemic deficit
in infrastructures) is the other key to the problem discussed by a historiography which
since the end of the 80s has concentrated on denouncing the backwardness of the Span-
ish educational system and the deficiencies in the military service, deficiencies which made it impossible for the Army to nationalize its soldiers. The deficits contributed, then, to a weak policy of integration of the citizens, although they identified under the liberal system with political principles, institutions and symbols (the Crown, hymns, the flag), accepting even linguistic and cultural unification (as a sign of progress), taking on a common image of the past, of patriotic reference points (which had already become myths before Franco's time: 1808, Napoleon, Agustina de Aragón and others) and of a common destiny, the so-called “memories of Empire”.

The political élites took it upon themselves, as J.M. Jover points out, to make uniform and to centralize, but not to nationalize. The dynamics of continuity from the 18th century on subsisted and the élites showed themselves unable to accept the necessities of cultural, linguistic and administrative autonomy, which from the middle of the 19th century on already begin to be felt in some territorial communities.

The shock came with the beginning of the 20th century. On the basis of the limitations we have already mentioned, it will come as no surprise that Spanish nationalism of the 19th century was for “internal consumption”, and that it did not have irredentist aspirations. The absence of an external enemy from 1814 to 1898 made people look at the “other” and at themselves in an un-chauvinistic way. The patriotic stimuli of the colonial campaigns in Africa (1859-1860), the affair of the Carolinas in 1885 and so forth had limited results and not such as to produce extremism in public opinion. The War of Cuba, on the contrary, was seen as the work of “separatist insurgents”.

This gave way to a reflection on the impact caused by Spanish nationalism from 1868 to 1898. This was the first time that the Spanish national unity was questioned, was discussed. The loss of Cuba was also due to the rise of a nationalism alternative to Spanish nationalism, that is, which proposed to free itself from Spain with arms (although the intervention of the USA was denounced too). 1898 generated a dual effect, in the consciousness of Basque and Catalan nationalism. A national consciousness in crisis, because the problem was not what the regenerationists wanted to denounce, but rather the non-Spanish nationalists. This is the way the contemporaries saw it, the conservative school and the regenerationists of the generation of 1898 saw it. And soon the far right and the socialists too.

The problem was to be of Spanish nationalism, and not so much of Spain. Whether or not the political, social and psychological consequences of the “disaster” were grave, at the end of the century it became clear that there was an identity crisis, tightly linked to the political system built by the liberals. The historians closest to this political line pointed this out. Spain was a ruined Empire, conquered, a nation which was questioned, from within and before the alternative nationalisms had come to the fore.

Cánovas del Castillo, whose centenary was celebrated in 1998, made a special contribution to the demise of Spanish nationalism. He remained faithful to the historicistic
view which was the mark of doctrinaire liberalism. As a historian, he was sensitive to the provincialism and the limits of the process of nation building in Spain, and as a politician, he tried to solve the problem according to a unitary and centralising logic. But the regionalistic periphery was to make itself felt more and more. The task of defining those identities, respect to Spanish identity, was taken over by the most charismatic representatives of the time and then by those who continued in that role until the present (the most orthodox and at the same time the most heterodox nationalistic historiography).

The character of efficacy, of democratic modernization with which the alternative nationalisms proposed to mobilise the masses, the vocation of the modern party could already be felt, the idea of ideological pluralism also existed, in spite of the reductionist form of Catalanism and of the “Basquism” of the PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco [Basque Nationalist Party]).

Strangely, the Cuban disaster also had a very strong impact on a series of Italian sociologists of the South. It had an influence on Guglielmo Ferrero; and particularly on Giuseppe Sergi, anthropologist, professor in Bologna and Roma, who rendered tribute to the theme with an influential work, La decadenza delle nazioni latine (The Decadence of the Latin Nations), an apology of the Anglo-Saxon race, positivist, translated into Spanish in 1900. The colonial defeats of the Latin countries were many: Cavite, Santiago de Cuba, Fashoda, Adua (Italia, 1896); the ultimatum for Portugal (1890) were shared colonial frustrations. It is the inevitable trajectory of imperialisms (Jover, Pabon). It is the contrast of a consciousness of superiority and euphoria (Anglo-Saxon) respect to the Latin world. All the national historiographies contain different reflections on the subject. Dreyfus in France and the Abyssinian adventure, with which afterwards there was an attempt to make up for the defeat of 1896 and which raised the spirits of a generation of Italians, also were part of this process.

With the 20th century and following the scheme proposed by Borja de Riquer in the three days of debate on the Orígenes y formación de los nacionalismos en España (Origins and Formation of Nationalisms in Spain) we can distinguish four great currents of Spanish nationalism:

- Nationalism of a traditional character, conservative, ultra-Catholic and anti-democratic. Vehemently monarchical, diffident towards parliamentarism, refusing all non-unitary concepts of the State. To this current belong the Carlists, Menéndez Pelayo, Vázquez de Mella, Maitzú, “Acción Española” of the 1930s, and others.

- The unitary, anti-separatist nationalism, an aggressive defender of a strong levelling State with authoritarian, militarist and expansionist connotations, hostile to political parties and to liberal parliamentarism: Neither the monarchy nor Catholicism with their basic ideological traits, but the militarist character would be incarnated by the “africanistas” who, tending toward Fascistisation, were represented by Ledesma Ramos, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the group of the Spanish Falange, “La conquista del Estado” (The Conquest of the State) and other similar groups.
- A democratic liberal, civil, reformist, lay nationalism, linked to republicanism, which offered pragmatic solutions to the question of Basque and Catalan nationalism above all, and a political opportunity or opportunism to solve “the problem” in a valid, “civilised” way. This current went from Ortega y Gasset to Azaña and among others was identified with the main ideological principles of the Second Republic: “¡Viva España!” (Companys) and “¡Visca Catalunya!” (Azaña), 12 May 1932.

- A Jacobin nationalism of the workers’ left, political, deeply statist, which defended a form of strong, interventionist state, principal tool for the reform of Society, for whom ceding any state powers was dangerous. This current, represented by PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español [Spanish Workers’ Socialist Party]) and the PCE (Partido Comunista de España [Communist Party of Spain]), in the beginning of the Second Republic showed widely differing attitudes towards Catalan autonomy – accepted because led by the left – and Basque autonomy – conceived as a danger which was called a sort of “Vatican Gibraltar” (Indalecio Prieto).

These tendencies coexisted during the 20th century, they influenced each other, they competed, they hegemonised Spanish nationalism, in a very different situation than in the 19th century, because the context was different; there already was a much greater degree of effectiveness in the public services and in education, greater economic development and integration of the market and of the territorial articulation (telephone, mass periodicals, communications); because the democratic system (Second Republic), although questioned, imposed itself notwithstanding the fact that it rendered harsher the intranigency of sectors which took their own path until the system exploded – Civil War, and because Basque and Catalan nationalism were at the centre of the stage, they in their turn tended to hegemonise their respective territorial spaces politically and culturally.

Azaña, a politician more than a writer, was the leader most interested in reaching an agreement which would allow the full participation of the Catalan and Basque nationalists in the Republic. He wanted to “understand Spain” and he proposed the political pact to both. But the Spanish “rights” were various, “oscillating”, and ready to adopt different tactics when the time came to deal with the problem of the regional nationalisms. Opposed to republican reformism, they demonstrated that this was so in 1932, denouncing the privilege of the Catalan “Statute” (Estatuto de Cataluña).

Respect to the Basque case, the lefts adopted an ambiguous attitude which changed its route by 1931 (with the refusal of the Statute of Estella as clerical and anti-republican, although they accepted the following one in 1936). However, before that (1934) they had already started to change their opinion, when it became clear that the PNV had abandoned Arana’s integralism and had accepted the republic. Indalecio Prieto, the socialist from Bilbao, was the person that accelerated the process of approval of the Statute. It is even said that he was the one that drew it up in great haste.

1936 is the date, along with the other dramatic events, in which a deeply divided Spanish nationalism appears: “Spaniards! Speak the language of Empire!” was the exhortation of one side. The war created a deep slash within Spanish nationalism, a traumatic
process. Calvo Sotelo’s phrase sums up another view: “Better a red Spain than a broken Spain”. With 1936 Spanish nationalism was deeply divided.

**STAGGERING TOWARDS CIVIL WAR**

As García de Cortázar and G. Vesga state, “[...] the Restoration had begun its itinerary with the task still pending of defining a Spain which, overcoming the moderate liberal and the republican Spain (the experience of the First Republic), could block every threat of reform, to the benefit of the conservative bourgeoisie”.

The stimulus of a formula of Uniformisation in the political and administrative areas was clearly intended to put an end to the claims to separate historical privileges and laws on the part of the “Vascongadas y Navarra”, the Basque provinces and Navarre. In this task the Government of the restored monarchy received support from European law of the 19th century and from the members of the Basque bourgeoisie themselves and from their economic projects. With the Civil War, this turned into something worse.

These authors, in the same way as others who are not nationalist, affirm the highly erratic character of those who, without paying attention to Spanish diversity (of the different nations, the nationalist historiography has been saying for years), established a short-sighted centralism which suffocated the cultural heterogeneity under the slogan of avoiding breaking up the State, after having lived the cantonalista (separatist) experience.

The right wing manipulated Spanish national sentiment in order to sabotage the “revolutionary spirit” of a social character and did this again in 1936, when Catalan and Basque claims revived fears of secession. The widespread thesis, based on a critical vision which however is not in contrast with the unitary vision of the State, lucidly states: fruit of the political centralisation of the Regency governments, the industrial and rentier income of the middle classes, the peripheral nationalisms are born, that – and here not all contemporary authors are in agreement – “they drank from the same fountains as Spanish nationalism and maintained strong ideological links with it”. Sabino Arana inherited his existential pessimism and his fear for progress from Spanish nationalist tendencies, in contrast to the optimism of Catalan nationalism. This is debatable, but there is some truth in it.

The Spanish problem (which the generation of 1898 also lived during the Civil War), hides the crumbling of the concept of Spain which is very well defined and which survives until the 1950s: centralist, agrarian, priest-ridden, prone to follow bosses (caciques), militarist and closed to the artistic and scientific innovations of contemporary culture. And in spite of everything, provocatively elitist. The army, resource of the provocateur members of the oligarchy, was taken and converted into the corner stone of a newly coined Spanish nationalism, supported by the bureaucracy of Madrid, the great landed estates of the south, ecclesiastical traditionalism and the upper Basque bourgeoisie, which so greatly feared Socialism. This Spanish-ism of right wing patriots is as unenlightened as the reactionary tendencies of the 18th century (“Pan y Toros”, Bread and Bulls).
Andrés Sopeña, a popular writer, author of Florido Pensil, remembered the spectral argumentation of a History under the sway of a stale Spanish nationalism (1942-58) among the students of National-Catholic Spain: “We proclaimed that Spain has never been a backward country, that since the earliest times it had made such useful inventions as horseshoes, that it had taught to the less advanced people of the earth….” The height of the most absolute stupidity.

For this generation formed in the “national spirit”... The Spanish Empire was born again with its providential, historical mission: “Spain, a unity of destinies in the universal... [destiny]”.

FRANCO’S SPANISH NATIONALISM

In Franco’s time, folkloristic Spain, with its new version of “bread and bulls”, was alien at times intentionally to the organic change of the 19th century clichés of a social imagination which began to be outdated. This was demonstrated during the democratic transition as well.

It was an oppressive nationalism whose heritage would be ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna [Basque Country and Liberty]) terrorism in the Basque country, the loss of Spanish prestige, an accentuated militarism and an imperial rhetoric which exploited the old myths of the Spain of the Catholic Kings and the Habsburgs, and the reformulation of Spanishness (Hispanidad) in America as well, following Ramiro de Maeztu. All this made that Spain something unreal which died with Franco.

Because of this, among the victors in the war, the objective of the New Spain was national unity. To extirpate the nationalisms. During the Francoist period, there was an interesting process, which would deserve more attention than it has received until now from Spanish historiography. On one hand there were the pro-Spanish victors in the Civil War, the Ultraconservatives and the Falangists symbolised by the paraphernalia of the first Francoism, the yoke and the arrows, that is, the Empire towards God, all that which tries to legitimate ideologically a “new Spain”, the Spain of the years of “triumph”.

Exactly because of this oppressive attitude, it is very easy to understand how the historiography of the time saw itself forced, literally, to turn back before any possible reflection on what had happened during the period that was not in tune with the “official version”. With the 1970s on the contrary it was possible, even before the death of the dictator, to develop a scientific debate to try to get closer to reality through reading the works of for example Tuñón de Lara, Payne, Jover, and many more, which the new generations, installed today in the chairs of the Spanish Universities, wanted to discover.

On the other hand, the losing tendencies, the liberal and the left, under double pressure because their ideological character was grounds for a loss of prestige due to Francoist manipulation – which made Spanish nationalism something of its own – and for the
complexity of dealing from a position of inferiority with Francoism’s will to occupy the centre of the stage, were sensitive to the progressive civic and democratic prestige of the Catalan and Basque nationalisms. This perhaps contributed to the fact that the Spanish nationalist message was reflected ideologically diluted, incapable of renewal, also in order to differentiate itself from the Francoist form of Hispanism.

The transition, the pact of reform, although directed by the members of the apparatus of the last Francoist government, joined up with the pragmatism of the representatives...
of the left. Applying realism to the process of directing the transition, the Hispanist substratum was able to survive, but it agreed to look for equilibrium by changing into a “State of Autonomies”, in which, under a pseudo-federal appearance, Spanish national sovereignty persisted.

The nationalist project, although it was greatly renewed after the 1970s, showed a European vocation, although this meant running ahead of itself, and not a logical, coherent process of maturity, deeply accepted.

The transition showed that the Canovist Spain was dead too and the 8th article of the 1978 Constitution, as the 2nd, guaranteed “the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions that make it up and the solidarity among all of them”. Political freedom asked for by Basques and Catalans has to be guaranteed. Autonomy recognises a plurality of cultures, however the autonomistic proposals are interpreted in differing ways up to the present.

All the political events from 1982 to 1996 were such that – after the UCD governments (Unión de Centro Democrático [Union of the Democratic Centre]) – the PSOE presented itself as the party able to guarantee Spanish unity. The national effort has not been to stimulate the whole but to eliminate inequalities between the different autonomies. From 1996 to 1998 the right on the basis of their electoral success have shown a respectful attitude towards the autonomies but not particularly favourable to self-determination.

At present, if observed from the point of view of sociological, as well as historical and politological analysis, it appears that Spanish nationalism is receding in recent years. A Spain is emerging which is multiple, lively, not because of the identity given by militarism, but because of its democratic will, even if the radical and abertzal [indipendentist] parties consider it false. The notion of multicultural nation, culture without impositions and a new historical direction is being searched for, but the political consensus on it is still debated.

Juan J. Linz stated a few years ago that the history of Spanish nationalisms, of all of them, is the history of partially defeated hypotheses. Or better, “it is the history of shared defeats which have reciprocally defeated each other as a consequence of the impossibility of any one of them winning a total victory. Spanish nationalism globally will be defeated because it will not achieve the construction of a solid and fully accepted Nation-State”. For this reason some speak of the “partially frustrated construction of the Spanish nation”.

The nationalisms which are alternate to Spanish nationalism, according to Linz, also are partially defeated because none of them has achieve its final goal: neither their principal political objective (that is, to exercise political power in an exclusive form on their territory: “estado proprio”, “independentzia”); nor have they been able to exercise full sovereignty (through a self-determination plebiscite); nor have they been able
to achieve a complete cultural or linguistic nationalisation of their countries. It seems clear that the autonomistic solutions of 1978 (the Constitution), as happened in the 1930s, were more a fruit of “political pragmatism” than of “deep conviction”, which explains why, even today, this is an open and debated question.

It is good to remember what Azaña said: “A people on the march is a historical heritage corrected by reason”. However Renan said “The nation is an idea, apparently clear but which is prey to numerous dangerous misunderstandings”.

**Basque Nationalism**

Basque nationalism gained political importance with the arrival of the Second Republic. The PNV and the ANV received only 26.2% of the votes cast in 1931, 24.7% in 1936 and, with the triumph of the rightwing, 31.4% in 1933. This nationalism which participated politically with the Republic is not comparable to that which arose during the transition from Francoism to democracy (or at least so we believe).

In Catalanism a genuinely nationalist component coexists with another of a “regenerating” character, not always isolatable from attitudes similar to the rest of Spain. Demands for independence, although not absent, are not the essential features (recurring says de Blas) of the world view of Catalan nationalism yesterday and today.

What are the reasons for the weight of the nationalisms (particularly Basque) in the 20th century?

According to de Blas opacity and politicisation are two clear lines in the process of the construction of the nation and of the State among the Spanish. The Civil War, the dictatorship and the Spanish transition are characterised by the expansion of the peripheral nationalisms. Today the same happens with the exaggerated irredentism which gives rise to a basically undemocratic terrorist violence. Logically all these realities weigh on historiography as it attempts to interpret the keys of the phenomenon. It is not by chance that academic research, political journalism and writing for the general public offer innumerable examples, of very different value, which confirm something difficult to deny. As Xosé Nuñez says, historical research on Basque nationalism is probably what provides the best results, as well as proving capable of adopting new methodological approaches.

However, more than the historians to whom I will refer below, let us see an example of the controversial nature of the theme. A recent work, which received a national prize, is the debated work by Jon Juaristi: *El bucle melancólico. Historias de Nacionalistas vascos*. It summarises the thesis of a former ETA member who has confessed with an inconclusive vision showing the mythical nature of the archetypes of the political nationalism of the present Basque country. Juaristi, a very well known philologist and writer, attacks without compassion the palaeo-ontological view of the old “fuerismo”, that is the de-
fence of the old Basque law, reincarnated according to Juaristi in the present Secretary General of the PNV, Javier Arzallus.

According to Juaristi’s version (taking on purpose Arzallus’ ideas), “One thing is to be Basque, and another to be a Basque nationalist”. That is to say, the ethnic belonging and the nation are contrasted. Blood, surnames and language are the signs of identity of the Basque ethnic group, now and in the past. The genetic and cultural heritage, the ideal would be the complete Basque, who not only has the surname and the language, but also the national consciousness.

However, Basque reality, and not just because Jauristi says so, is much more complicated. In addition to Basques with Basque blood who know Euskera, there are Euskaldunberris without Basque names who are nationalists and others that are not, there are people unquestionably genetically Basque who do not know Euskera and also that are or are not nationalist, and nationalists and non-nationalists who do not know the language and do not have Basque surnames...That is to say, a chaotic situation. Thus the criterion for distinguishing the sides becomes more and more that between “us” and “them” (the outsiders).

Juaristi also insists on the Jesuit root of Arzallus’ nationalism and, exaggerating, says that he uses the Society of Jesus as a model for the party, just as Sabino Arana did, however substituting his teaching. Why? Because of the common reference to P. Larra-mendi, the primary source both of nationalism and of Carlism based on the fueros. The “grandchildren of wrath” as Patxo Unzueta called them (also of the first generation of etarras) crowded together in the 1960s asking to enter the terrorist organisation. Today some of them are part of the establishment.

Let us clarify some basic concepts about the contents of nationalism, before proceeding to see what historiography offers in this case. These are those formulated by the founder of the Basque Nationalist Party, Sabino Arana Goiri. Basque nationalism gives great importance to: language, as an element of differentiation; race – the biological and ethnic dimension. Racial purity, a method of defense against outside contamination and racial mixing; national character, the depositary of the reason for existence and the idiosyncrasies of peoples.

The result was a xenofobic and racist theory, according to which Basque nationality was defined by Race, Religion and Language, expressed in the formula Jaun Goikna eta Lagizarrak (God and ancient law). The Basque Nationalist Party was set up in 1894. Sabino Arana died in 1903.

The territorial base reaches positions which are maximalistic, irredentist, but also opportunist. The concept of Basque Country, extending to France, Spain and Navarre, includes territorial claims, in the first place the annexation of Navarre to the Spanish Basque Country (Iparralde, Iparretarrak). However the present autonomistic national-
ism defines itself as ‘possibilistic’ and represents an attempt at a political solution of the national problem. The plurinational character of the Spanish State is recognised too.

The solution found in a unitary context is a system of autonomy under a Statute of Autonomy. It has been valid since 1998. Aside from this line, there exists a regionalist position (for a long time the official position of the government and the central State bureaucracy, which only recognises regional particularism, and accepts a certain decentralisation). In the third place, there is the position of the leftwing Federalism. Independence is the most radical position. It proposes self-determination and wishes to reach the construction of an independent State (abertzale). Confederalism is an intermediate position, between independence and federalism, which however does not have very many defenders at present; nonetheless it was part of the electoral programme of certain political parties.

But returning to historiography…

Friedrich Wilhem von Humboldt wrote, on his return from a voyage to the Basque Country, in the spring of the year 1801, the following words⁷:

Basques are characterized by their language, organisation, physiognomy, and everything around, without excepting the aspect of their country, as a pure and separate race. Its peculiarity, deeply interwoven in it, is completely independent of external causes and causes determined by chance; it does not know, either near nor far, a brother race, except that which is in its small territory, between the mountains and the Ocean, solitary as an island. Thus, what is called the pure character of a people and from whence it arises can nowhere be better examined than in it.

Obviously German Romanticism conditioned Humboldt’s view in studying the Basques, but it is possible to affirm that, today too, something of this ethnographic Messianism subsists in the historical-political view of nationalism, with some touches of predestination.

Someone who understood well Basque society and did not agree with ETA, the anthropologist Julio Caro Baroja said more than 10 years ago that “Basque identity today is characterised by a conflictive situation which is stronger than ever before”. The polymorphism of Basque society is a fact however; even if cycles do not repeat themselves, problems do, and they become worse, as we today as citizens of the Basque Country know⁸.

Basque nationalism (“the roughest, the hardest, the most intractable” in the phrase of J.P. Fusi), is based on a culture which initially had a limited social perspective, and on false interpretations – “insecure and vulnerable” – of Basque history itself, because this history, linked to Castile, was presented as alien to the historical argumentation of Basque nationalism itself. Defined by Sabino Arana (1865-1903) as an ethnicistic and theocratic movement, race and religion are the defining elements of Basque nationality.
Its political aspirations are centred on the unification of the Spanish and the French Basque provinces in a sovereign confederation organised in agreement with the ancient laws and privileges and inspired by the directives of the Church. Even when it was legal and there was a regionalist wing in the movement, the orthodox “Sabinist” line prevailed. This was the case until 1936, because Basque nationalism lacked the Spanish dimension and always saw autonomy as its minimum and not its final aspiration. Just as today, however from an abertzale point of view, which is different and also divergent.

Historical criticism – Corcuera, Elorza, Tusell, Garmendia, etc. – distinguishes significant differences within Basque nationalism. Xose M. Nuñez Seixas in a work published in 1993 (Historiographical Approaches to Nationalism in Spain) concludes saying that in spite of the advances made in the 1980s in this field of investigation, Spanish nationalism has not reached in its historiographical treatment the maturity which, on the other hand, Basque nationalism and the history of regionalisms have reached. However many questions have been posed. For Fusi Spanish political nationalism emerges only during the 20th century. Borja de Riquer, in Nuñez’ view, wants to demonstrate that there are different aspects of the action of the State which are very widespread, hence the difficulty in identifying them as a subject for research. He hopes hence for a sort of consensus between the central and the peripheral historiographies. The study of Spanish patriotism (in the way shown by Raphael Samuels for the British case, 1989) is almost totally missing.

In contrast with these lacunas, research on Basque nationalism probably has given the most significant results, as we have already mentioned.

The historicistic legitimation of Basque historiography is not always polluted by spurious interests, rather the contrary: it is a well documented history. In fact, some authors speak of a School, which marks an itinerary in today’s research concentrated in the University of the Basque Country and, on a smaller scale, in the Universities of Deusto and Navarre.

Suming up some conclusions from Alvarez Junco, de Blas and myself, on the origins of nationalism, the most recent historiography has made available very interesting works, such as those of J.A. Solozabal, J.C. Larronde, A. Elorza, J.P. Fusi, J.M Castelles, J. Corcuera, J.L. de la Granja, among others. Of all of these, we will refer to J. Corcuera because he has been a pioneer in the study of the intellectual origins of the movement from the Carlist wars on and one of the first authors to discover “fuerista” pre-nationalism (that is, a pre-nationalism based on the defence of fueros or privileges) as such. This work signalled the arrival of historiography in the history of the Basque Country.

There are diverse studies published in the second half of the 1970s, and which contributed to the forging of a specific Basque explanatory model (M. Escudero and his sociological theory of the existence of two communities – nationalist and non-nationalist; Martin Blickhorn’s first analysis of the Basque nationalist question in Navarre; Joseph
Harrison and his articles about the industrial upper bourgeoisie and the Basque nationalist movement; Stanley Payne and his general history of Basque nationalism from its origin to ETA (60s) – tending to generalise in the worst way –, Fusi and his study about the Second Spanish Republic, and so forth). There are, in spite of all, many black holes in our knowledge. The attention paid to the Restoration years following Sabino Arana’s death in 1903 has been very scarce.

The period of the Second Republic was the next field of interest for historians, probably because of the need to seek the historical root of the disputes about Basque autonomy which characterised the end of the 1970s. The main focus was on the roots of Basque leftist nationalism, whose expression in the post-Francoist period were undoubtedly the abertzales parties: Herri Batasuna (United People) and Euskadiko Ezkerra (Left for Socialism) J.L. de la Granja and the study on ANV (Accion Nacionalista Vasca [Basque Nationist Action]) is one example.

With the 1980, new lines of research were followed, perceiving the movement as a global phenomenon. Consequently, some studies concentrated on specific aspects such as the nationalist workers trade-unions, the women’s organization (1922), the youth organisations of the party (the Turnverein or Mendigozales), the Basque cultural and scientific organizations, for example. The relationship between the Catholic Church and the Basque nationalist movement has received systematic and general studies. F. García de Cortazar (who presented his arguments from an often politicised anti-nationalist point of view) with an appreciable number of essays; the British F. Lennon; D. Unanue and Aizpuru from Navarre, and others. In that field the para-diplomatic relations between Basque nationalism and the Vatican are interesting too. This theme of research is possible only since there has been access to the Vatican’s Secret Archives in Rome.

During the last few years, many historians have been involved in studying the social basis of Basque nationalism and show a deep knowledge of the most recent trends in conducting the historical study of the movement. I. Estornes, A. Elorza, Ludger Mees, Santiago de Pablo, G. Jauregui (who thinks that Basque nationalism has managed to adapt itself to the modernization changes in the two more industrialised Basque provinces, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa).

There are still obscure periods that will be covered in the near future. Apart from the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera’s time, the theme of the Basque opposition to the Franco Regime has not received, surprisingly, much attention, as far as the foundation of ETA is concerned.

The contribution from Beltza and K. San Sebastian are very partial (studies about the Basque exile in America, mainly). The peculiarities of the period of clandestinity make necessary to have access to the files of the PNV archives, which so far remain closed.

The crucial period of the foundation of ETA has received much attention even before the most recent decades. Political and social sciences, anthropology and so forth offer
particular viewpoints. The reason is very simple: the fact that ETA has been a protagonist from the 1960s on and until the present. The origin of ETA, let us remember, was in 1951-52 (the Ekin group) with founders that early declared their activism, although one of them has said and written that they defined themselves by “daily communion”. Their first Assembly was held in the spring of 1962. However very soon there were nonetheless discrepancies (Eusko Tenebrosoen Alkartasuna). ETA and its revolutionary strategy have received much specific attention in Basque historiography. P. Ibarra contributed in significant way to analysing it. Francisco Letamendia in a prolix, detailed, but indirect research, gave us a history of Basque nationalism and ETA in the 1990s, disseminating an image which shows the degree of complexity of this formation and the changes in different directions that it has undergone until very recently.

Some important books have appeared during the last ten years dealing with specific aspects of the history of ETA (C. Clark, during the 1960s). For example, J. Sullivan and G. Jauregui have studied the first steps and revolutionary strategy of its military and political organization.

But the peculiarities of the Basque movement stimulates debate on endless topics of discussion. Let us show an example.

Fusi, as many non-nationalistic historians, states that a leftwing Basque movement could never crystallize (before 1936) as a “viable and popular alternative to the PNV”. But the majority of the authors closer to our times (Andrés de Blas, 1989) have analysed and refer to a “bad conscience” deriving from the relationship existing at the end of Franco’s regime. This atmosphere affected substantially the evolution of the Basque country and the role of the ETA. The action-repression-response on the part of the ETA was connected with the success of the terrorist organisation. The repression of a delegitimated dictatorship towards fighting democracy helped to give meaning to this aspect.

The contribution of ETA to the democratisation of Spain is a controversial question, more than doubtful. It is debatable whether the “armed struggle” was in itself a contribution towards weakening Francoism, although the death of Carrero Blanco was, if interpreted today in one way or the other, crucial and strategic, in my view. Secondly, because the ETA had no real weight until Franco’s death. The ETA has claimed to be a support to the development of Basque nationalism, although the official positions of the PNV constantly refuse its methods. The formation called “the table” of Ajuria Enea proves this.

Today nationalism as an ideology and as a movement is ambivalent, capable of building/destroying the State, able to ally itself with the process of liberal-democratic legitimisation of power, and of sabotaging this process through the defence of conservative and reactionary ideologies capable of freezing a social and economic modernisation which gives nationalism its direction in other parts of the world.
As to identity – says the ‘abertzale’ left – “autonomist and Basque”, expressed by a percentage of 15-20% another “new identity” with its own slogans, in support of ETA and the defence “of Basque sovereignty and of its territorial unity”, says one of the most representative historians of the ‘abertzale’ line, F. Letamendia (Historia del nacionalismo vasco y de ETA, 1994).

Because the proposal of HB (Herri Batasuna) at the end of the 1980s aspired to creating a government “of national reconstruction”... with PNV and EA (Eusko Alkartasuna [Basque Solidarity]) (April 1987), an axis of “progress” which does not recognise the Basque Lehendakari as President of the Basque people, but rather an “autonomistic Basque third force”

Many in Euskadi today want to affirm, with respect to the general confusion produced by the recent and less recent assassinations, that in spite of ETA the best capital which Euskadi has is its own people. Culturally and economically the paradigm represented by the Basque country is clear and very positive although normalisation is a difficult path to follow; however, metaphorically, as an historian, I wish to encourage a certain hopefulness and to say, paraphrasing Galileo, that the Basque County “notwithstanding all, moves” (E pur, si muove).

Notes

2 Napoleone Colajanni said: “every country shows us the causes of its momentary greatness or decadence, the germs of its renaissance or of its degeneration, which can be seen in its present organism [...] It will not be the first time that History contradicts the prophets”.
3 J. Companys was the first President of the Generalitat de Catalunya. Manuel Azaña was the President of the II Republic of Spain.
4 García de Cortázar F., Breve Historia de España, Madrid 1994, p. 47.
6 But the discussion on Franco ended with theoretical questions about the existence of a Spanish Nation. This circumstance became clear in the 1970s when the leftist forces took on programmatic proposals which considered possible the separation of Basque Country and Catalunya. In October 1974, the XIII Congress of the PSOE approved the right of self-determination of all the Spanish nationalities; and the strategic objective of the creation of a federal republic. Let us leave aside the propaganda of the PCE in the transition stage. This Party guaranteed the right of selfdetermination for Catalunya, Euskadi and Galicia. Furthermore, it fixed federalist aims as well.
8 The artist J. Oteiza, who also publishes attempts at interpretation of the Basque soul and was angered by not being in the Guggenheim (he was also the designer of another cultural space located in the historic building “The Alhóndiga”) said something rather prophetic: “But now we must ask ourselves what we are in order to know what is declining in us. We are a defeated people, in a slow decadence and we have precipitated ourselves in the critical and mortal situation of today. We are a man with a language and a style”. 
In 1959 Txillardegui named the formation. Jose Manu Aguirre, Benito del Vaile, Julen Madariaga y Álvarez Emparanza were some of the founding members.

The "up-dating" of the PNV was losing, little by little, its Sabinian roots – not forgetting them – in order to become a movement of affirmation of Euskaldun culture and the defence of a Christian con-
ception of life and society. As a popular interclassist party, with broad support in the cities and in the country and an important trade union base (Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos, Solidarity of Basque Workers, 1911) both in Vizcaya and in Guipúzcoa, this 'up-dating' confirmed the initial affirmation; although with reservations, the PNV fought with the Republic at the outbreak of the Civil War in July 1936.

Along with the “‘indipendentist’, racial, religious and anti-Spanish” nationalism of Arana, in 1898 a sector called "euskalleriaco" arose with a moderate and flexible character, favourable towards region-
alistic and autonomistic attitudes, which in 1915 controlled the direction of the party, changing its name, in a significant way, into Comunión Nacionalista Vasca [the Basque Nationalist Communion]. (This provoked the split-off in 1929 of the independentist wing which returned to the party in 1930 and split off again in 1933-34). In 1910 a contrast arose between the reformist left, lay and republican, around Francisco Ulacia – which did not have immediate success, soffocated by the party’s orthodox orientation, but which in 1930 was to develop into the Acción Nacionalista Vasca (Basque Nationalist Action), expression of a Basque nationalism, liberal, republican and non-confessional, which ended up by absorbing socialist and radical nationalist ideas. This progressive opening towards the left turned into a sliding in that direction. The ANV continued to be have a “testimonial” character, unable to furnish an answer to the rightist nationalist PNV and to the leftwing statalism of the socialists and the republicans.

Thus the MLNV (Movimento de Liberación Nacional Vasco [Basque National Liberation Movement]) interprets what both they and the Pact of Madrid has wanted to present as marginal, the HB project. Or, and it is the same thing, the KAS project (Coordination of Socialist Indipendentists), conjuncture analysis, since 1988 has insisted on victimistic themes. A year in which Arzallus was elected President of the Birkai Buru Bazar, taking the role of the highest internal office of the PNV.

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Religious and Ethnic Diversity in the Second Half of the 20th Century: War and Political Changes in the Territories of Former Yugoslavia

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Univerza v Mariboru

ABSTRACT

Former Yugoslavia was among the religiously and ethnically most diverse countries in the world. Relations among ethnic and religious groups also determined historical development in this region. This chapter deals with the history of relations among religious groups and the Communist state during the period after World War II and deals with the question of the relation of churches to the processes of democratisation at the crossroads of the 1990s and relations of individual religious groups towards the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the wars which followed. Inter-religious relations in former Yugoslavia were marked primarily by the relations among the Orthodox, Catholic and Islamic Religious Communities. The relations of Yugoslav communist authorities towards religious groups were marked by different degrees of “harshness”; furthermore relations were different in the various republics of former Yugoslavia.

The second part of the chapter deals with the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the relations of religious groups towards it. None of the religious groups wanted the bloody demise of Yugoslavia as in the end occurred. After the wars broke out, however, they defended their interests which were also the interests of individual nations.
INTRODUCTION

With respect to both religious affiliations and ethnicities/languages, the region of former Yugoslavia was one of the most heterogeneous in Europe. After World War II, more than 30 religious communities were registered. The largest among them were the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church and the Islamic religious community. The others, such as the Greek Catholic Church, the Russian Orthodox Church, the Old Catholic Church, Protestant and Evangelical Churches, were smaller and locally organized and run. The destiny of some religious communities was marked by World War II. During that period most of the Jews were destroyed by the Holocaust; some Evangelical religious communities lost many of their members when almost all Germans were compelled to leave Yugoslavia after World War II. Religious adherence went hand in hand with ethnicity; so, for example, most Serbo-Croatian-speaking Serbs were adherents of the Orthodox Church and most Croats were Catholics 1.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>B&amp;H</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
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<td>3,669</td>
<td>780</td>
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<td>449</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>998</td>
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<td>51</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>2,878</td>
<td>1,231</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
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<td>84.1</td>
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<td>546</td>
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<td>139</td>
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<td>89</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>575</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>139</td>
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<td>4,461</td>
<td>1,714</td>
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Table 1
Population of former Yugoslav republics and autonomous regions according to religion in 1953 (in thousands).
After World War II, communists under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito took over in Yugoslavia. The new authorities did not recognize leaders of the religious communities as partners: they forced their will upon them “from above”. There were many changes in the religious structure of the population. In the 1953 census, the Yugoslav State inquired for the last time about the religion of the population; in later censuses this question was not asked, in accordance with the policy of separation of Church and State. Still, according to the data for 1948 and 1953 the most numerous religious groups remained the Serbian Orthodox, the Catholic and the Islamic.

The geographical distribution of religious communities in the region of former Yugoslavia was very complicated due to historical circumstances. The most diverse were the populations of Vojvodina, Kosovo and Macedonia as can be seen from Table 1.

The first censuses of population in the newly established states showed fewer people who wanted to be counted as adherents of any religion; for example, in Slovenia, in the census of 2002, a little less than one-third of the population did not answer the question about religious affiliation!

**The Church in Yugoslavia after World War II**

After the Yugoslav communists came to power, they tried to compromise the Church among the people and force it to resign from public life. They supervised Church activities and tried to make Church leaders loyal citizens of the State. After the nationalization of most of the wealth of the Church (including some Church buildings), Yugoslav Communists expected that the Church would soon die. As to Church-State relations, this period was one of open hatred, political prosecution and even physical beatings of priests. In September 1945, the Catholic bishops reacted with a letter of protest against this situation, and they also raised their voices against atheism and against the new authorities in general. The answer of the authorities was a trial against the Bishop of Ljubljana, Gregorij Rožman. The Archbishop of Zagreb, Alojzije Stepinac, was another victim. The authorities arrested him in September 1946, put him on trial for cooperation with the Ustaše, the group that had led the Independent State of Croatia (a Nazi-Fascist puppet State), convicted him and sentenced him to sixteen years in prison. The Vatican protested, and the Pope sent a cardinal’s hat to the imprisoned Stepinac.

There were several reasons for such actions on the part of the authorities. In addition to wanting to retaliate for the real cooperation of the Church with the occupying forces during World War II, the Communists also feared that the Churches could threaten their new revolutionary authority. Also the Vatican’s criticism of the new authorities is worth mentioning. The Church did not die, in spite of the wishes and deeds of the Communist authorities. The Church could not be part of society any more, it could not be active socially and politically and did not have a large presence in society. It had churches full of believers, however; and there were many students of theology. Relations between the Church (especially Catholic) and the Yugoslav State became more difficult, espe-
cially at the end of the 1940s and at the beginning of the 1950s. In the second half of the
1950s, with general changes in Yugoslav society towards democratisation (the authorities
freed almost all priests from prison), relations between the authorities and the religious
hierarchies became better. This is true especially for the Orthodox Church, in spite of
the fact that Montenegrin Metropolitan Arsenije was sentenced to eleven years in prison
because he was against the establishment of State-sponsored societies of priests, which
the authorities had initiated in the whole State, among all priests and all denominations.
During this period the new Patriarch of the Orthodox Church did not conceal his wish
to cooperate with the Communists authorities. At the same time, relations between the
Communist authorities and the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia (which the Commu-
nists considered a very dangerous opponent of unity among South Slavic “nations”) be-
came less strained. In 1958 Slovene and Croatian bishops for the first time were allowed
to visit the Pope. In 1960, when Cardinal Stepinac died while interned in the parish
manor-house in Kraljevica, the authorities allowed a funeral appropriate for a cardinal to
be held. Later, in October 1960 at a meeting in Zagreb, the Catholic bishops issued a
memorandum in which they recounted all the problems that would have to be solved to
reestablish dialogue between the Catholic Church and the State. After the authorities
also showed readiness to begin a dialogue, relations between Yugoslavia and the Vatican
buttered. The pressure of the authorities towards the Islamic religious community also
softened. In the 1950s it was the harshest; at that time the Community had to bend to
modernization, since the authorities forbade women to wear veils.

The search for ways to appease both the State and the Church continued through the
1960s. Churches and their leaders continued to be kept under strict surveillance, but in
the eyes of party ideologues they no longer constituted the number one opponent. Af-
after the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) and ratification of the so-called Belgrade
Protocol between Yugoslavia and the Vatican, it was generally agreed that the State’s
domain was to take care of the economy and politics, while the spiritual life of citizens
remained the domain of the Church. For those fields where the interests of the two
sides clashed (charities, culture, education etc.), continuous negotiations took place.

The State and the party still used different means to try to hinder the operations of
religious communities and weaken their power within society. In order to weaken the
power and authority of the Serbian Orthodox Church, federal officials supported the
creation of a separate Macedonian Orthodox Church, which would be independent
from the Serbian Patriarch. As long as Aleksandar Ranković continued to be the Secre-
tary of the Interior, controlling the secret police and supporting a strong federal State
– and also protecting the Serbian Orthodox Church – Macedonians could not fulfil
their wishes, in spite of the fact that Yugoslav authorities supported “nation building”
of the Macedonian “nation.” Soon after, in 1966, Ranković was ousted because he had
directed the secret services to interfere with leadership of the country (he even bugged
Tito’s bedroom). The Macedonian Orthodox Church then became an independent
Autonomous Church (1967).
In spite of strained relations between religious communities and the State during the 1970s, the leaderships of the former discussed openly what should be written in the new Constitution of Yugoslavia, adopted in 1974. The Catholic Church was especially active, trying to convince the authorities that the Constitution should forbid the expression of hatred towards religion. The Church also tried to define, with the greatest precision possible, an article in the Constitution that proclaimed religion to be a matter regarding man’s free will and a private affair.

The Role of Churches and Religious Leaders in the Democratization of Yugoslav Society in the 1980s and 1990s

The search for a compromise that would satisfy both the State and Church authorities continued and strengthened in the 1980s. In Slovenia both political and Communist leaders adopted quite a liberal attitude towards religion. The leadership of the other Yugoslav republics and the federal authorities criticized Slovenes vigorously for this, while democratically oriented people welcomed the Slovene authorities’ view. When Alojzij Šuštar became Archbishop of Ljubljana in 1980, the Catholic Church changed its method of communication with the authorities. In a friendly way, Archbishop Šuštar told the authorities the basic points of his requests: cessation of unequal treatment of believers in society, access of the Church to public media, the right of the people to celebrate and observe religious holidays, the right of the Church to be active in charitable activities, and the right of priests to have access to people in hospitals and homes for the aged. His demands also included consolidation of the social status of priests, so that they got healthcare and pensions provided by the State, etc. During this decade, the Slovene leadership and the leadership of the Slovene Catholic Church spent time discussing ways to realize the demands of the Church and not worsen the relations of Slovenia with the federal authorities and the other republics. Problems in relations between the Slovene leadership and the Catholic Church hierarchy continued through the 1980s and into the beginning of the 1990s, when the Church placed the dialogue with the authorities first on its agenda. The Catholic Church in Slovenia also played a significant role in the support of the emerging political opposition but did not cease its dialogue with the Communist authorities.

The situation of the Church in Croatia at the beginning of the 1980s was much worse; the authorities introduced quite a harsh Communist regime after defeat of the so-called “Croatian Spring” at the beginning of the 1970s. As an answer to repression, the Croatian people’s interest in the Catholic Church increased, although at the beginning of the 1980s this was more a way of showing national identity than a demonstration of the religiosity of the Croatian people. As part of this response, however, we must note the great echo in the Croatian public of visions of the Virgin Mary that occurred in Medjugorje (in Bosnia and Herzegovina) from 1981 onwards. The Communist authorities at first forbade visiting Medjugorje and holding religious processions there.
After a while, the visions of the Virgin Mary became famous in Europe and in the USA and became a factor in tourist revenues (six to ten thousand tourists visited Medjugorje daily), and the authorities gave in.

In spite of this, Communist authorities worried very much about the strengthening of religious feelings among the Croats. In 1984 they even cancelled the visit of Pope John Paul II, who was scheduled to come on the occasion of the 1300th anniversary of the Croats' becoming Christians. Although the Pope did not come, the celebration on September 9, 1984, in Marija Bistrica, the most important pilgrimage Church in Croatia, attracted so many people that the demonstration became political. During the mass, the Archbishop of Zagreb, Cardinal Franjo Kuharić, demanded that the authorities grant more religious freedom and tried to create an alliance with the Serbian Orthodox Church on this common ground (a representative of Patriarch German of the Serbian Orthodox Church was also present). The alliance between the Catholic Church and the Serb Orthodox Church was not accomplished, however, since the Orthodox Church (in Croatia as well as in Serbia) became the main messenger of Serb nationalism in the next years.

Succumbing to ongoing pressure by the Communist authorities at the beginning of the 1990s, the Catholic Church in Croatia openly supported a process of democratisation and the introduction of multiparty democracy in the State. It also supported the creation of the Croatian Democratic Union and Croatian independence. The Croatian Catholic Church, in accordance with the Vatican Council's views, demanded that war be avoided (de bello vitando). Misunderstandings should be solved politically and peacefully; it condemned violence and war unconditionally.

A similar position was adopted by the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not surprisingly since the majority of the Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina were Croats. It is interesting to note that during this time, as the Yugoslav crisis deepened, members of the Catholic and Islamic communities became allies. This was based primarily on the fact that both religious communities opposed the ideology and institutions of the Communist regime, which was then under Serb domination. There were quite a few other reasons for alliance between Bosnian Catholics and Bosnian Muslims. Bosnian Muslims were already open to Western European cultural and civil values. Bosnian Muslim society never developed a fundamentalist wing, which demanded that all social and political life should be based on and should follow the patterns of the Koran. The Yugoslav authorities helped to prevent the spreading of Islamic fundamentalism in Bosnia, when, in 1968, they recognized the Bosnian Muslims as the sixth constitutive nation of Yugoslavia. The fact that most of the Muslim priests (imams) had not attended Arabic medreses (religious schools) and had not had any conservative theological education contributed to the fact that, instead of fundamentalism, a pro-European attitude and cultural-civil alliance with the Catholics prevailed among Bosnian Muslims. Once the Yugoslav crisis deepened, representatives of the Muslim faith (together with Catho-
The Role of Religious and Ethnic Diversity

Religion, Politics and Gender

The Serbian Orthodox Church, which even during the Yugoslav socialist period proclaimed itself the only defender of Serbdom, worked in the opposite direction. Since it was excluded from public life until the end of the 1980s, its comments did not have any effect. The situation changed at the end of the 1980s, once the then president of the Serb Communists, Slobodan Milošević, openly spoke about how Serbs outside Serbia were threatened. The Serb Orthodox Church was happy to embrace Milošević’s idea that “Serbia which will be great, or will not exist” 2, and advocated Milošević’s great Serbian policy.

This orientation of the Serbian Orthodox Church is not surprising; since in the traditions and historical memory of the Serb Orthodox Church, the myth of a hero, who would conquer new regions, was very much present. Even before Milošević, the Serb Orthodox Church spoke widely about Serb military tradition. In the publications of the Serb Orthodox Church, the Battle of Kosovo polje (1389), the Balkan Wars and the First and Second World Wars were always present. The main explanation for that is contained in the 1989 Predlog srpskog crkvenonacionalnog programa (Proposal of Serb Church for a National Program). Here among other things, they find written:

Serbs are a nation of State builders. They built their State over many centuries, they adored and respected its nation as their own house, and therefore they defended it vigorously. This nation shall do that today as well, if only there is a goal behind this ... 3.

This demonstrates that the Serbian Orthodox Church already in 1989 expected a military struggle in Yugoslavia, especially since Milošević’s great Serbian nationalism day by day became more and more unacceptable to other Yugoslav nations. Later events showed that they were not mistaken. The building of the Serb Orthodox Cathedral in Belgrade, for which funds were gathered from Serbs all over the world, showed that Serb nationalism and the Serbian Orthodox Church were unified in their interests.

The Macedonian Orthodox Church identified with the policies of the Macedonian State in the 1990s and decided to support Macedonian politicians who, after Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, decided on Macedonian independence too.

The Role of the Church during the Yugoslav Crisis of the 1990s

The Yugoslav crisis began to become evident in 1991, when Croatia and Slovenia declared independence while the Yugoslav army tried by force to convince them to stay in Yugoslavia. The period of bloody wars began, which in the course of events encompassed most of the regions of Yugoslavia. The refugee crisis and ethnic cleansing also produced a complete change in the ethnic, religious and language structures of quite a few regions.

In Slovenia both the Catholic and Protestant Churches supported the Slovenian path towards independence at the beginning of the 1990s. At the same time they opted for
peaceful solution of open questions; and played an important role in international recognition of Slovenia. The Vatican was among the first States in the world to recognize Slovenia (and Croatia).

The Catholic Church in Croatia preached peace and fought against violence even after 1990, when Croatia already had to cope with the armed rebellion of some of the Croatian Serbs. At one of his sermons in Sisak, Cardinal Kuharić said that the Bible emphasizes four principles on which to build interhuman relations: truth, justice, freedom and love. These principles exclude hatred, which is the “... source of violence and the reason for crimes against human beings” ⁴. In January 1991, the Commission Justitia et Pax (Justice and Peace), which convincingly was against the widening animosity and use of force, also asked all the decision makers in former Yugoslavia to reach a peaceful agreement⁵.

Once Croatia had to fight the open aggression of the Yugoslav People’s Army, aided by Serbian and Montenegrin paramilitary forces, the Catholic Church also started to defend the theory of a “just war” (de bello iusto). According to this theory, the victim has the right to defend itself against aggression and the right also to re-establish peace with force. In this circumstance, the Croatian Catholic Church, as a defender of national interests, also started to advocate for the right of just defence against war and aggression instead of unconditional peace and non-violence. At the same time, in accordance with its basic mission, the Church continued to defend values of peace, love and coexistence. In October 1991, Cardinal Kuharić said that defence of the homeland, freedom, rule of law and peace are the moral right and duty of each citizen, but it has to be limited to the confines of moral values and should not overstep self defence or become a matter of revenge⁶.

In addition to supporting just war, the Catholic bishops of Croatia spoke about the urgency of reconciliation between the Croat Catholic and Serb Orthodox peoples at a meeting in Zagreb on 15 and 16 January 1992. In a special report for the public, they emphasized that “... in military encounters the attackers and the defenders died, so that both deserved peace and reconciliation” ⁷. Cardinal Kuharić also emphasized that the Catholic Church fought for the principle “that Orthodox believers have the absolute right ... to their religion, to their freedom and that their bishops and priests have the right to pastoral activities. The Bible should help them to accept coexistence with Croats ... and to accept Croatia ... as their Homeland”⁸.

This was the position of representatives of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Croatia. But what were the deeds of ordinary priests in Croatia? This question has not been fully researched yet, but it would appear that they committed quite a few murders and violent acts against members of the Serb minority in Croatia.

The war continued in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fights that began in the autumn of 1991 continued on the Serb-Croat ethnic border in Croatia and after March 1992 they also continued in ethnically and religiously mixed Bosnia and Herzegovina. In spring 1993 it looked as if Serbs and Croats would really divide Bosnia and Herzegovina. That goal was also the object of a political agreement between Croatian Presi-
dent Franjo Tudjman and Serb President Slobodan Milošević. It is interesting to note that the Catholic hierarchy distanced itself from the agreement to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia. The leaders of the Croats in Bosnia, who at that time formed the para-State Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna, tried to convince Archbishop Vinko Puljić to move from Sarajevo, which was then under Serbian siege, to Mostar. This move would have meant Puljić’s support of the policy of secession of Herzeg-Bosna from Bosnia and Herzegovina and its annexation to Croatia. Archbishop Puljić stayed in Sarajevo however. He was rewarded by Pope John Paul II, who later sent him a Cardinal’s hat.

The Serb Orthodox Church remained a vehicle of Milošević’s great Serbian policy. A member of the leadership of the Serb Orthodox Church, Vladika Nikanor, among others, stated that “where Serbian blood is shed and where Serbian bones feel there must be Serbian land, who thinks otherwise is on the side of the enemy …” 9.

The Serb Orthodox Church – like Milošević and the Serb Bosnian leader Radovan Karadžić – did not discriminate between a war for self defence and one of aggression. On the theory of international conspiracy against the Serbs, an Orthodox theologian, Božidar Mijać, wrote, among other things:

All the world turned against the Serbian people in the former Yugoslavia … On the basis of this the question arises: is it possible that everyone in the world are wrong, and only the Serbs, one small nation, are right?...Obviously, a problem arises here which demands clarification from the point of view of the Church and theology ... From this point of view ... it is possible that one small nation is, at a certain historical moment, the bearer of divine truth and justice against those who are attacking this nation10.

Serbian Patriarch Pavle also tried to find excuses for the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to him, Serbia and the Serbian nation had to defend themselves because the war was forced upon them. Therefore this war was in accordance with the teaching of the Christian Church, which in general is against war, while at the same time it does not forbid war if there is no other way to reach a just solution 11.

The result of war and this logic was the war in Bosnia, which brought ethnic cleansing and ruin to Bosnia. The solution was the Dayton Agreement, which meant the defeat of the idea to of establishing a Great Serbian State on the ruins of Yugoslavia.

Milošević stayed in power in Serbia after the Dayton Agreement was signed. Soon it became clear that Milošević would try to claim Kosovo for the Serbs, which demographically was no longer in Serbian hands, since the Serb minority represented only 10 percent of the population in 1991. (For the Serbs Kosovo was the cradle of the Serb State and their Holy Land: in 1389, in the battle of Kosovo polje, the Serbian army lost to the Turks).

Milošević did not enjoy the support of the Serbian Orthodox Church in dealing with Kosovo anymore. The Serb Orthodox Church allied itself with those opposition parties that were defending traditional values and also demanded reinstatement of the mon-
archy in Serbia and the return of the Kardjordjević dynasty to the Serbian throne. The Serbian Orthodox Church also demanded changes in the relations between Church and State that would help the Serb nation to recover from the spiritual and moral chaos caused by the Milošević regime. Therefore Vladika Artemije demanded a political solution to the Kosovo problem and demanded that “... no ethnic cleansing or any other type of crime be permitted against the non-Serbian population of Kosovo...”

Slobodan Milošević’s regime started another war in Kosovo, first against the “Kosovo Liberation Army” and in 1999 also against NATO. After the defeat of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the failure of Milošević’s policy to keep Kosovo, Milošević had to accept the NATO peace plan and withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Kosovo. The Serb Orthodox Church then demanded the resignation of Slobodan Milošević. After that, many Serb non-governmental and civil society organizations demanded that the Serb Orthodox Church call for a “Church-National Assembly” to save Serbia. The Serb Orthodox Church later helped to unify the opposition, which in the September 2000 elections brought them to power and to the final democratisation of Serbian society in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

This did not mean the end of war in the region of former Yugoslavia, however. In February 2001, armed fights occurred between Albanian insurgents and the Macedonian army in Macedonia after the Macedonian authorities did not want to recognize Albanians as a constitutive nation of the Republic of Macedonia. The Ohrid Agreement ended the battles in August 2001. The consequences of interethnic war in Macedonia are still not completely resolved, but the Macedonian Orthodox Church unreservedly supports the Macedonian leadership. The Macedonian Church is still an independent autonomous Church, in spite of the fact that it voted for its return under the Serbian Orthodox Church with the name “Autonomous Ohrid Archiepiskopie”. The authorities in Macedonia were unhappy with decisions of the synod of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. This action of Serbian Church is seen as a hegemonic move by Belgrade. One has to note that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and Greek Orthodox Church also play a role in the future “games” in Macedonia. The Bulgarian State and Church accept the existence of the Macedonian State, but not that of the Macedonian language and nation. They consider the Macedonian language to be a dialect of the Bulgarian language. The Greek Orthodox Church does not accept the independence of the Macedonian Orthodox Church; it considers Macedonia still to be under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Patriarch.

The Serb Orthodox Church is also fighting the independence of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. The jurisdiction of the Serb Orthodox Church in Montenegro is based on the remnant of Serb occupation forces from 1918 still in Montenegro. Montenegrin nationalists fight for the independence of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. In 1993 a committee was formed to establish an independent Montenegrin Orthodox Church. This committee proclaimed a Serb Orthodox priest from Canada, Antonije Ambamović, as leader of the independent Montenegrin Orthodox Church. The inde-
pendence of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church was not confirmed, and the vladika [leader] of this Church had to leave the country. This did not mean the end of the fight for an independent Montenegrin Orthodox Church, however, because of different options for the future of Montenegro: i.e. independence of Montenegro is still an option for the future.

**CONCLUSION: WERE THE WARS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA RELIGIOUS WARS?**

Many scholars interested in the territories of former Yugoslavia tried to define wars in the territories of former Yugoslavia as religious wars. The American theoretician Samuel P. Huntington in his paradigmatic vision foresees that the main form of global fights in the 21st century will be “encounters of civilizations” (similarly, looking globally at the 19th century, one sees ethnic fights primarily and in the 20th century, ideological battles)\(^{13}\). As proof of his thesis he considers the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where religion is one of the main factors of national and cultural differences (Croats are Roman Catholics, Serbs are Orthodox, Bosniaks are Muslims). If differences in religion should become elements of global struggles between cultures, it would mean that future global battles would actually become religious wars.

The wars in the territory of the former Yugoslavia did not occur because of religious hatred. They did not occur because of the need to spread Catholicism, Islam or Orthodoxy. There was, however, a real threat that this war could become a religious war, especially after the Bosnian government accepted the help of Islamic countries when it was disappointed with the policies of Western Europe and the USA. There were some mujahedin among those who fought on the side of the Bosniaks in the war of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but they did not play an important enough role to be able to define this war as a religious war. Religion and religious communities did not cause the Yugoslav wars and they could not prevent them. Indeed, the role of religious hierarchies in making peace was very limited, in spite of their influence in the societies that emerged on the ruins of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\(^{14}\).
INTRODUCTION

With respect to both religious affiliations and ethnicities/languages, the region of former Yugoslavia was one of the most heterogeneous in Europe. After World War II, more than 30 religious communities were registered. The largest among them were the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church and the Islamic religious community. The others, such as the Greek Catholic Church, the Russian Orthodox Church, the Old Catholic Church, Protestant and Evangelical Churches, were smaller and locally organized and run. The destiny of some religious communities was marked by World War II. During that period most of the Jews were destroyed by the Holocaust; some Evangelical religious communities lost many of their members when almost all Germans were compelled to leave Yugoslavia after World War II. Religious adherence went hand in hand with ethnicity; so, Table 1.

<table>
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<th>Total</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>B&amp;H</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
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<td>Orthodox</td>
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<td>3,669</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>565</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>1,231</td>
<td>609</td>
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<td>73.5</td>
<td>84.1</td>
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<td>145</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>139</td>
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<td>89</td>
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<td>499</td>
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<td>13.1</td>
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<td>9.5</td>
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<td>16,930</td>
<td>4,461</td>
<td>1,714</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>3,914</td>
<td>1,463</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Role of Religious and Ethnic Diversity

Religion, Politics and Gender

NOTES

3 Z. Milošević, Politika i teologija [Politics and Theology], Niš 1994, pp. 40–44.
4 Švi su gradjani držni slušati zakonitu vlast [All the citizens have to obey legal authorities], “Glas Koncila”, 1990, n. 34, 26 August 1990, pp. 1–3.
7 Slogan u trećem oboru [With unity into general reconstruction], “Glas koncila”, 1992, n. 4, 26 January 1992, p. 3.
8 Važnije je ponežanje u Boga negoli u ljude [It is more important to believe in God then in the people], “Glas Koncila”, 1992, n. 50, 13 December 1992, p. 3.
12 Lakićević, Archipelag Balkan cit., p. 188.
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SOURCE

Izjava komisije »Justitia et pac« BKJ

Za miran dogovor među narodima

Komisija Justitia et pac BKJ na sjednici održanoj 22. siječnja 1991. godine u Zagrebu razmatrala je ugroženost mira u svijetu s posebnim osvrtom na Jugoslaviju.
Nema sumnje da je izbijanje rata u Perzijskom zaljevu teško pogodilo cijelo čovječanstvo. Polaženi od stanovišta pape Ivana Pija II., koje se o tome posljednjih dana izrazio u više navrata i od zabrinutosti naših biskupa izražena u Sarajevu 19. siječnja o.g. Komisija podupire diplomatske napore pojedinih država i međunarodnih tijela koja se trude oko prekida sukoba i oko pravednog rješenja njegovih uzroka mimim putem.
Komisija osuđuje nasilje, povredu ljudskih, građanskih i narodnih prava koja su se dogodila posljednjih dana u približnim zemljama a usmjereni su protiv demokratski izabranih vlasti i rješavanja nastalih problema mimim putem. Podupiremo zahtjeve tamošnje Crkve o prestanku sovjetske vojne intervencije da bi se stvorili uvjeti za život naroda u demokraciji i poštovanju prava svih građana.
Ovo utjecanje nasilju nasuprot nadama u novi demokratski međunarodni sustav, zaprijetilo je već i razvoju demokratskih procesa u Jugoslaviji.
Prešlogodišnji slobodni izbori u pojedinim republicama Jugoslavije znači i ostvarenje znanemeralih ljudskih prava kao i put nacionalnog oslobađenja naroda. Sada se taj demokratski razvoj u nekim sredinama ugrožava unutarnjim pritiscima, prijetnjama i
zastrašivajem. Upomo se želi zadržati stari sustav, čak i upotrebom Jugoslavenske narodne armije protiv legitimnih vlasti izabranih na slobodnim demokratskim izborima, posebice u Hrvatskoj i Sloveniji. Čini se da je model takvih namjera nasilje koje se već dugo provode na Kosovu.

Iz toga se vidi da u višenacionalnim zeljama koje su bile pod komunističkom vlašću, još nije prestala opasnost ugroženosti, ne samo osobnih građanskih nego i narodnih prava. Bez prava naroda, koja uključuju i pravo na osamostaljenje, nema niti ostvarenja ostalih prava. Čini nam se da potpora demokratskih snaga u svijetu, koja je usmjeren na ostvarenje individualnih građanskih prava, ne vodi uvijek dovoljno računa o narodnim pravima, te stoga ne vidi cjelovitost povijesnog procesa koje je na djelu u našim prostorima. Prijetnja ovim procesima može zakočiti razvoj demokratizacije u Europi koji se je u prošlog godini s toliko nadu počeo odvijati.

Komisija odlučno odbacuje sve metode sile i zastrašivanja i stvara sada zalaže za mimi dogovor među narodima, kako u Sovjetskom savezu, tako i u Jugoslaviji.


Predsednik komisije Justitia et Pax BKJ
Dr. Srečko Badurina, biskup

**Statement of the “Justitia et Pax” Commission of the Catholic Bishop’s Conference of Yugoslavia**

The “Justitia and Pax” Commission of the Catholic Bishops Conference of Yugoslavia discussed at its meeting of 22 January 1991 the dangers for peace in the world with emphasis on Yugoslavia.

There is no doubt that the start of the war in Persian Gulf has a dangerous impact for all mankind. Starting from the standpoint of the Pope John Paul II who during recent days has issued statements and of worries our bishops expressed in Sarajevo on 19 January of this year the Commission supports diplomatic efforts of individual states and international organizations with the aim of interrupting the fighting and finding a just solution of the reasons of the dispute in a peaceful way. The Commission condemns the violence as well as the violations of human, civil and ethnic (national) rights which occurred in recent days in the Baltic States and which were directed against the democratically elected authorities and we support attempts to find solutions in a peaceful way. We support the demands of the Church in the Baltic States to stop the Soviet armed intervention and to enable the nations to live in democracy and to respect the rights of all their citizens. This influence of violence in spite of the hopes for a new international democratic system already threatens the development of democratic processes in Yugoslavia. The free elections which have taken place in some Yugoslav republics also mean the fulfilment of neglected human rights as well as a way to set nations free. This democratic development is now endangered in some segments of society by internal pressure and threats. The old system tries to sustain itself even by the (mis-)use of the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army against the free democratically elected govern-
ments, especially in Croatia and Slovenia. It appears that Kosovo, where measures of this kind have been practiced for a long time, may serve as a model. From this one can ascertain that in multiethnic states which were under communist rule the danger has not ceased to exist, not only with regard to human civil rights but also as regards ethnic (national) rights. Without the fulfilment of national rights which include also the right of secession and independence, the other rights cannot come to fulfilment either. It appears that the support of the democratic forces in the world which support primarily the fulfilment of individual civil rights and rights of a citizen does not always take national (ethnic) rights into account sufficiently and therefore to clarify the complexity of historic process which is taking place in our region. Endangering these processes can be harmful to the processes of democratisation in Europe which brought so much hope in the last year.

The Commission is against all the methods using force and threats and is truly in favour of peaceful agreements among nations in the Soviet Union as well as in Yugoslavia.

Zagreb 22 January, 1991

President of the “Justitia et Pax Commission” of the Yugoslav Bishops’ Conference
Dr. Srečko Badurina, Bishop
Native Americans under the Castilian Crown: Resettlement Policy in 16th Century Peru

Manfredi Merluzzi
University of Rome III

Abstract

The debate about the “nature” of the American Indians extended for several decades after the discovery and conquest of America. During that period various questions were posed. Were the Indians human beings like Europeans? Should they be considered “natural slaves”, using the category from Aristotle, or subjects of the Crown? Could they be converted to Christianity? Were they predisposed to receive European culture? These questions had important economic and political implications. After an intensive debate and some experiments, the Crown had to face the problem once and for all in order to establish its own political strategy regarding the indigenous American peoples. Diverse factors of a theological, philosophical and economic nature contributed to the recognition that Native Americans were, in fact, human beings for all intents and purposes, and so had the potential to learn the European cultural model (considered more advanced and therefore more complex) and receive the Christian doctrine.

However, the dynamics of the Conquista in the following decades brought about an incredible demographic collapse of the indigenous populations. This led the Crown to introduce concrete policies for the protection of the natives, who represented not only million of souls to be saved through conversion to Christianity, but also the main factor in the appropriation of resources in the new Indian settlements. For this purpose American society was considered divided into two different parts: the “Republica de los españoles” and the “Republica de los indios”. It was considered that, to guarantee their survival, it was essential to separate the indigenous populations from the Spanish as much as possible. However, such a division did not prevent the local labour force from being used for the profit of the Spanish settlers. In the Peruvian viceroyalty it was felt that a segregation model was too dispersed, and that it constituted an obstacle, both to the conversion of the indigenous populations and to their promotion to “better” cultural levels, as well as to their productive capacity. Between 1565 and 1575 around one million natives were forced to resettle in the so-called “reducciones”.
This chapter analyses the different voices (authors of treatises, religious people, rulers) who discussed the possibilities and methodologies for resettling the indigenous populations, attempting to determine if, in their view, these measures could be considered protectionist or discriminatory and if the real project was a true integration of the native American into the European social model. What was the reasoning of contemporaries?

Il dibattito sulla “natura” degli indiani americani si protrasse per diversi decenni dopo la scoperta e la conquista dell'America, nel corso dei quali ci si chiese se gli indios fossero esseri umani come gli europei oppure no; se essi dovessero essere considerati “schiavi naturali”, usando una categorizzazione tratta da Aristotele, o se dovessero essere considerati sudditi della Corona a tutti gli effetti; ci si chiedeva se essi potessero o meno essere convertiti al cristianesimo; se essi fossero o meno predisposti ad accogliere la cultura europea. La questione comportava importanti implicazioni di carattere politico ed economico. Dopo un animato dibattito ed alcuni tentativi sperimentali, la Corona dovette affrontare definitivamente tale problema per poter stabilire la propria linea di azione politica nei confronti degli indigeni americani. Diversi fattori di carattere teologico, filosofico, ed economico intervennero nel riconoscere che i nativi americani erano esseri umani a tutti gli effetti, che essi erano potenzialmente capaci di apprendere il modello culturale europeo (considerato più evoluto e quindi più complesso) e che potevano ricevere la dottrina cristiana.

Tuttavia, le dinamiche della conquista e dei decenni successivi avevano condotto ad un incredibile collasso demografico delle popolazioni indigene, fattore che spinse la Corona a determinare concrete politiche di tutela dei nativi, i quali rappresentavano non soltanto milioni di anime da salvare attraverso la conversione al cristianesimo, ma anche il principale fattore di sfruttamento delle risorse dei nuovi insediamenti nelle Indie. Si pensò, a tal fine, di dividere la società americana in due diversi ambiti: la “República de los españoles” e la “República de los indios”. Si pensava che per garantire la loro sopravvivenza fosse indispensabile che gli indigeni fossero il più possibile separati dagli spagnoli. Tale divisione non impediva, però, che la forza lavoro indigena fosse sfruttata a proprio vantaggio dai coloni spagnoli. Nel vicereame peruviano si ritenne che il modello insediativo degli indigeni era troppo disperso e che ciò avrebbe ostacolato sia la loro conversione che la loro promozione a superiori livelli culturali, oltre che la loro capacità produttiva. Tra il 1565 e il 1575, circa un milione di nativi venne obbligato a trasferirsi in nuovi insediamenti, chiamati “reducciones”.

In questo studio, attraverso l’analisi di alcune voci (trattatisti, religiosi, governanti) che discussero della opportunità e del miglior modo di condurre tale trasferimento di popolazioni indigene, si vuole indagare se nella loro ottica possano essere considerate misure protezionistiche o discriminatorie; se in tal modo si progettasce una vera integrazione dei
Ethnic and Linguistic Discrimination and Tolerance

The first impact of the “new humanity”

In the 16th century, categories such as “tolerance” or “discrimination” had a different meaning from what they have today. As has been pointed out elsewhere, our “modern” concept of tolerance was essentially defined by John Locke in his *Epistola de Tolerantia* written in 1685 (published 1689) and by Voltaire in the *Traité sur la Tolérance* (1763). In the 16th century, ideas of tolerance and discrimination were quite different, and this study shows how policies, which would seem highly discriminatory today, appeared then to be wise state policy that took into account the safety and the freedom of the target population.

Such was the case of the American Indians following the Spanish conquest, during the colonial age, especially in the second half of the 16th century. The Castilian Crown was very sensitive to the safety of the Native Americans, whose numbers were sharply declining, but their concern was motivated by considerations that were very different from our own idea of tolerance and integration. Indeed, the notion of discrimination did not really enter the discussion. From the Crown’s point of view, the construction of new separate urban communities for the American Indians was not discrimination but rather a way of protecting and safeguarding their interests. To understand this better, we have to focus on the years immediately following the Spanish conquest of America.

The discovery of the New World had a deep impact on European culture and brought many new questions and issues onto the political and philosophical agenda (these have been explored by a number of historians, although they have not yet been completely clarified). In particular, the encounter with the indigenous population and the various consequences resulting from it were important aspects that had to be dealt with in the complex process of defining a new society that was to be made up of Europeans – mostly Castilian subjects – and American natives (though black African slaves should also be taken in account, as they had begun to appear in some parts of the Americas by the 16th and 17th centuries). The Spaniards had a clear idea of the position to be occupied by the American Indians in the society they were planning to build in their transatlantic dominions. Their ideas reflected the *ancien régime* division into estates, and the society they were going to construct was modelled on European paradigms, that is to say, based on political theories that perceived society as structured like a body, with specific functions assigned to different parts, although it was not as strict division as in the medieval distinction between *bellatores*, *oratores*, *laboratores*. The first step to creating a New World society that could include the natives was to define what, in fact, the natives were.
The debate on the nature of Indian people

The debate on the nature of the Native American Indians went on for several decades after the discovery and conquest of America. The existence of a people that were radically different from Europeans, whose presence was not recorded in the Holy Scriptures or in classical Greek and Latin texts, provoked a real intellectual challenge for the mental schema of 15th- and 16th-century Europeans. There were many questions and doubts as to the “nature” and “condition” of the Native Americans. Were they human beings, like Europeans? Were they “natural slaves” in the Aristotelian sense? Had the Crown the right to subjugate them? And in that case, could they be subjects of the Castilian Crown like everyone else? Could they be Christianized? Could they be “civilized”? The issue was not at all clear in the first decades after the discovery of the New World. The importance of these theological and political debates is indicated by the fact that, in 1532, the supreme Christian authority, Pope Paul III, intervened, declaring that the American Indians must be considered human beings and could not be deprived of their freedom in order to be Christianized. But the papal intervention did not put an end to the debate about the nature of the Indians, as we can see from the famous Valladolid Controversy of 1550-51 between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, who had very different views on the subject.

Bartolomé de Las Casas was the most famous and active member of the group that considered the Indians not only to be human beings with intellectual capacities, but also, to some extent, civilized. His writings and efforts in support of native rights have been studied by many historians, and were particularly influential in Peru, as has been pointed out by Isacio Pérez Fernández. Las Casas’s *Brevíssima relación de la destrucción de las Indias*, published in Seville, inspired crown policy on many issues, such as in the Royal Cédula of 20 December 1553. Having spent a long time in the New World (he had been appointed Bishop of Chiapas), Las Casas had first-hand knowledge of the Indians and was convinced that they could be considered subjects of the Crown, that they had a spontaneous inclination towards religion and could be fully Christianized without the need for violence.

Sepúlveda, a well-known humanist who had had Italian Renaissance education, conversely, was completely opposed to Las Casas’s point of view. He argued, using Aristotelian theories, that the Indians were inferior human beings and that their “natural” condition was to be “slaves” of the “rational”, more civilized and advanced Spanish peoples.

These different positions are clearly laid out and explained by Anthony Pagden in *The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology*; there is no need, therefore, to enter into further details on the matter, beyond pointing out some of the more important political and economic consequences of the debate. Once the conquest was completed, the Castilian Crown had to decide upon a policy...
Native Americans under the Castilian Crown Resettlement Policy in 16th Century Peru

with regard to their American indigenous subjects, and many different factors were brought to bear on the issue – moral, philosophical, and economical. The final decision involved recognition of their human “nature”, their ability to learn and live in society, their potential to be Christianized and to live in an advanced cultured and complex society, as the Spaniards believed that their own was. For the purpose of rights, they were perceived as comparable to the “uncultured” peasant subjects of Castile.

Nevertheless, the dynamics of conquest and the post-conquest situation led to a rapid decline in the American Indian population\textsuperscript{10}. The reasons for this collapse, which has attracted great historiographical interest in past decades, were very complex, and involved anthropological, cultural and biological factors in addition to war and exploitation. Naturally, they were poorly understood by contemporary Spanish observers\textsuperscript{11}. According to Alfred Crosby, author of an interesting analysis of the so-called “Columbian exchange” in 1492, most native deaths were caused by biological factors linked to diseases that were inadvertently transmitted by the Europeans in the New World\textsuperscript{12}. Nathan Wachtel, on the other hand, attributes the demographic decline to the cultural and anthropological consequences of “conquest shock”, which “destructured” the Indians’ worldview, leaving their lives effectively meaningless\textsuperscript{13}.

Obviously, contemporary observers were not aware of the biological factors, nor could they easily understand the cultural impact of the conquest on the natives. But Las Casas was not the only one who worried about the Indians’ condition and their cruel exploitation. Royal officers, such as Polo Ondegardo\textsuperscript{14}, Juan de Matienzo\textsuperscript{15} and Hernando de Santillán\textsuperscript{16} wrote memoranda on the situation, and political writings addressed to the Crown, in an attempt to improve the natives’ situation, reasoning about the conditions they were living under and the exploitation they were suffering at the hands of the Spaniards. The huge volume of documents addressed to the King testifies to the fact that part of Spanish colonial society was concerned not only with the demographic collapse of the native population, but also with the need to improve their condition and respect at least some of their cultural habits.

In the 1560s, there was a very lively debate in Peru about the measures needed to counter the dramatic demographic collapse, and many writers, most of them religious people, put forward a number of suggestions for policies to prevent the complete extinction of the natives\textsuperscript{17}.

**The Political Consequences**

So, once the Conquest was complete, the Castilian authorities had to decide upon a policy with regard to their American Indian subjects, and many different factors (moral, philosophical, and economic) were taken into account in this choice. The final decision recognised the Indians’ human nature, their ability to learn and live in a society, and their potential to be Christianized, and for the purpose of rights, they were consid-
The Indian Policy was central to any future development in Peru, because the Native Americans constituted the bulk of the available labour force in the colony. Moreover, their conversion to Christianity had been the main ideological justification for the Spanish Conquest. Juan de Solorzano y Pereira, the most important legal and political author in 17th-century Spanish America, explained that American Indians had been given by God to the Castilian kings to be “instructed” in Christianity and “introduced to political life” and “civilized”, and that the Spanish had to do this peacefully. He urged these goals to be pursued without violence or imposition, but only through “amor, suavidad, tolerancia y perseverancia” (“love, gentleness, tolerance and perseverance”), regardless of the Spaniards’ own interests in exploiting them. These notions he apparently borrowed from the theories of Saints Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.

The Crown was therefore forced to devise concrete policies to protect the Indians, who represented not only millions of souls to be saved through baptism and Christianization, but also the main source of labour for the development of the colonial economy. At first, the Indian labour force was organised into a system called encomienda, where they served the Spanish in their houses and fields, and were employed in mining, pearl fishing and in other unhealthy activities (e.g. as carriers). Many Spaniards, including Las Casas, observed that it was dangerous for the Indians to live alongside the Europeans as they were exposed to violence and oppression, despite being protected by the royal legislation. Therefore, the new society was conceived as two separate political orders: the Spanish Republic and the Indian Republic. It was decided that the Indians should live apart from the Spaniards in order to protect them.

Obviously, the separation would not affect Indian labour (which was forced labour, of course) because this was essential for the exploitation of New World resources. But it was also clear to the Crown officials that the demographic collapse had to be stopped and that the Indians required some form of protection against the Spanish colonizers, and perhaps even some exemptions from excessive taxation. The Crown also needed to gain more control over the viceroyalty so as to acquire a bigger share of the Peruvian resources and have more influence over the Christianizing efforts.

As early as 1503, when Spanish domination was restricted to the Antilles and the Caribbean, many Spanish political writers wrote about the convenience of grouping the Indians into ordered settlements – villages or small towns. There were, however, some isolated voices, such as Polo Ondegardo, who suggested that the Crown would benefit if the Indians were allowed to maintain their traditional social and economic structures – an assessment based on an observation of the Incas’ system of rule (their antigua orden) and its great effectiveness on all levels, from production to legal and fiscal aspects.
He wrote to the king explaining that the Crown should have maintained the “Indian system”, since it was well-adapted to Andean conditions and was very efficient and developed. The differences between Native American society and culture in the Caribbean and within the Aztec Confederation, or Inca Empire, were substantial.

Unfortunately, most of the Incas’ social, political and economic order had been destroyed during the conquest and in the decade immediately after it. Only scattered communities or individuals now remained in the large areas of the former Inca Empire, and these were easily forced by the Spanish to work in their encomiendas or mines. It would also have been impossible to have retained the Incas’ social and political structures because these were intricately bound up with their religion, which of course was completely unacceptable from the Spanish Crown’s point of view. Indeed, many writers have pointed out that the local Indian chiefs, or ‘caciques’, were actually the most tyrannical exploiters of their people after the fall of the Inca Empire.

The only way that the Spanish Government could prevent this kind of exploitation was to gain more control over the land and the Indian communities, and in order to do that, they studied measures that had been used by the Incas. During their rule, the Incas used to transplant whole villages, small communities (ayllus), and even ethnic groups to different parts of their empire. However, this was done for quite different reasons. They resettled (called mitimaes) people in order to remove rebellious groups, or for economic reasons, to give villages more productive environments. There were also resettlements for cultural reasons, to help the people of the region acquire the Inca language, craft skills, or to partake in the economic and political structure; the creation of mitimaes enclaves in different geographic locations would also have ensured the exchange of products between the different regions under Incan control. A further reason for resettlement was to prevent overpopulation and lack of resources in some areas.

In the first decades after the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire, there were many problems requiring urgent attention (civil war amongst the Spaniards, revolts against measures passed by the king, Indian revolts etc.), so it was difficult to proceed with the Indian resettlement programme. Charles V had ordered the Audiencia of Lima in 1549 with the intention of finally getting the resettlement under way, but without success. The viceroys, the Marquis of Cañete (1556-1560) and the Count of Nieva (1561-1564), also tried to “reducir los indios a pueblos” [resettle the Indians into villages], but encountered great opposition from the Spanish encomenderos, who were worried about losing their Indian workforce. It was Lope García de Castro, Governor and President of the Audiencia of Lima (1564-1569), who took the first real steps in this direction. In 1565, he received detailed instructions from the king to resettle the Indians, on the grounds that this would be beneficial to them, would facilitate instruction in the Catholic faith, and would prevent them from being “scattered” around the wilderness, living “like animals” and “worshipping idols”.

Ethnic and Linguistic Discrimination and Tolerance
The Indians were used to living and working in kinship-based communities (*ayllus*) amongst close relatives, and with a certain amount of common land. The *encomienda* system was very damaging to those communities, because the allocation of Indians to *encomiendas* did not take into account the *ayllus*. Many Indians were forced to move far away to work for the Spaniards, sometimes travelling for weeks, even months, to reach their final destination, and as a result, their communities broke up. Their fields could not be worked because the men were far away, and so production declined.

Of course, these measures were underpinned by theoretical notions concerning the benefits of Europeanization, i.e. that the Indians’ souls would be saved by the Catholic faith; ostensibly, European culture was more developed and civilized, and the core of civilization was to be found in the *politia*, a concept that involved urban living in accordance with laws and the political order. For most authors “Christian” and “civlized” were considered synonymous – which is why José de Acosta had such problems with China, which seemed to be a quite developed society but did not espouse the true faith. Their approach to history was providential, which meant that the highest level of civilization could only be reached after conversion to Christianity.

**The reducciones of Viceroy Francisco de Toledo**

In the Viceroyalty of Peru, it was decided that the existing territorial arrangement, according to which Indian communities were scattered across vast areas of inaccessible terrain, was not conducive to the Christianization, education and civilization of the natives, or to effective social control and supply of labour. Thus, Governor García de Castro issued a number of Laws (*Ordenanzas*) and Instructions (*Instrucciones*) with the view to launch a massive Indian resettlement programme. Although the results were only partial, the Crown nevertheless insisted that this should remain the objective.

The situation changed with Castro’s successor, Viceroy Francisco de Toledo (1569-1581). He was given detailed instructions by the king concerning the Indian resettlement, which was deemed to be central for their Evangelization and cultural and economic development. The *Real Cédula* of 28 December 1568 explained that the *reducciones* would be the best way of ensuring “la conservación, doctrina, gobierno y policía de los naturales” [the protection, indoctrination, regulation and control of the natives]. Resettlement would greatly facilitate conversion to Christianity, since the natives’ villages were scattered about the mountains and forests, often with great distances between them, and were not easily accessible by the *curas* (religious people sent to convert and educate them). Moreover, with the current situation it was also difficult to get an idea of population figures for the purposes of taxation; many natives would avoid contact with the Crown Officer sent to count them by disappearing into the mountains or forests. Consequently, in the years between 1565 and 1575, around a million Native
Native Americans under the Castilian Crown Resettlement Policy in 16th Century Peru

Americans from the Andes were forced to abandon their villages to be resettled in new communities, called reducciones.

These new Indian settlements brought together members from several different ayllu, which allowed the authorities to gain better control of the Indians’ morality (the Europeans had been scandalized by many Indian sexual habits, such as incest and homosexuality, as well as by their continuing attachment to pagan cults or “idolatry”, even after formal conversion to Christianity). Towns were laid out in the form of grids, with standardized housing, all with windows, doors and water supply. There were public buildings, such as a church, police station and jail, and symbols of crown and faith were also well represented in the main square. They were modelled upon the Castilian town, and the basic concept was that of “civil coexistence”, or politia, considered the best way of bringing civilization to the natives.

Some aspects of the Incas’ system were maintained, but the effects were completely different from those desired by Polo Ondegardo. In fact, the Spanish measures entirely changed the meaning of those practices, which had gained their significance from their insertion into a highly reciprocal religious and social context. The best example of this was the maintenance of the Inca system of forced labour, known as mita.

Viceroy Toledo, who implemented the “mita system” extensively during his administration, explained to the king in a letter of 8 February 1570 that his predecessors’ achievements had been inadequate and needed to be completed. For him, Indian resettlement would greatly help the reorganization and management of forced labour for the state. Thus, this was carried out on a large scale. A pilot attempt was organized at the beginning of 1570 involving two villages located very close to the capital Lima and the former Inca capital Cuzco; the Indians concerned were transferred to areas called Santiago and Belén. Subsequently, a number of lay and clerical inspectors were sent around all 14 provinces of the country to complete the task, and the encomenderos were forced to cooperate with the crown’s officers, and to reside in their encomienda mansions for the time necessary to help the inspectors to gather the Indians into the new planned reducciones. The scale of the operation was immense: in the Condesuyo province alone, 16,000 Indians from 445 villages were resettled into 48 reducciones by the two inspectors sent there, Luis Mexía (a cleric) and Herrera (a judge). The new urban centres were placed close to the former Incan royal roads, to ensure better communication.

The resettlement policy gave the Crown better control of the Indian workforce, which was to be used in the silver mines of Peru, and was essential for the general reassessment of the whole viceroyship of Viceroy Francisco de Toledo in the years between 1569 and 1581. He justified his measures to the Crown on the grounds that the natives had been subjected to despotism from local chiefs and that Spain was helping them by introducing them to a “free” and more “civilised” lifestyle. He also pointed out that the laws for
Indian taxation established in a royal Cédula in 1553 had not been applied and that the conversion of the natives had been inefficient and superficial\(^3\). In order to establish a new political order, a key strategy was to build a new relationship between the local Indian élite (kurakas) and the Castilian Crown, replacing the former "post-Incan alliance" between encomenderos and kurakas. During Toledo’s administration, the Crown did a great deal to cement this strategic alliance by transforming the kurakas into officers of the Crown. They were allowed to maintain their former social status, or even improve it, receiving public positions and salaries\(^4\). The resettlement policy undertaken in those years had a deep impact upon the subsequent American Indian population, and profoundly changed the way in which they related to their communities and to the Andean world and space around them. Later, the Jesuit Order would adopt a variant of this model and transform this system into a key element of their own programmes in Spanish America\(^5\). But that is another chapter of this history.
NOTES\(^6\)


\(^6\) I. Pérez Fernández, Bartolomé de las Casas en Perú, Cuzco 1988.

\(^7\) Ibid., pp. 30-33.

\(^8\) M. Mahn-Lot, Bartolomé de Las Casas et le droit des Indiens, Paris 1982.

\(^9\) Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man cit.


17 The Peruvian historian Lohmann Villena analyzed this mood in his introduction to “Gobierno del Perú”, written in 1567 by the judge Juan de Matienzo, probably the most interesting of these political writings.


19 Polo Ondegardo, *Relación acerca del linaje de los Incas* cit.


32 AGI, Lima 29, Letter by Toledo to the King, 8 February 1570.


34 Zimmerman, *Francisco de Toledo* cit., p. 121.

35 L. Ulloa, *Documentos del virrey Toledo. Encomiendas y situaciones que su Excelencia ha hecho y proveído desde que entró en la tierra hasta ay veinte y ocho días de mes de febrero deste año de setenta y dos*, in "Re-


38 “Os mandamos y mucho encargamos que tengáis muy especial cuidado de la conversión y cristiandad de dichos indios que sean bien adoctrinados y enseñados en las cosas de nuestra fe católica y ley evangélica y que para esto os informéis si hay ministros suficientes que les enseñen la doctrina y los bauticen y administren los otros sacramentos de la santa madre iglesia de que tuvieran habilidad y suficiencia para recibirlos”, in Hanke, *Los Virreyes Españoles* cit., I, p. 80.

39 AGI, Lima 28 A, n. 55, see *Títulos que ahora se dan a los caciques que se proveen por el virrey*, Cuzco, 25 gennaio 1572. See also, Stern, *Perú’s Indian People* cit., pp. 92-94.


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Native Americans under the Castilian Crown Resettlement Policy in 16th Century Peru


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Turbans or Top Hats? Indenture, Indian Interpreters and Empire: Natal, 1880-1910

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Abstract
This chapter is concerned with an historical examination of Indian interpreters in the British Colony of Natal during the period, 1880 to 1910. These civil servants were intermediaries between the Colonial State and the wider Indian population, who apart from the “Indentureds”, included storekeepers, traders, politicians, railway workers, constables, court messengers, teachers and domestic servants. As members of an Indian elite and the Natal Civil Service, they were pioneering figures in overcoming the shackles of indenture but at the same time they were active agents in the perpetuation of colonial oppression, and hegemonic imperialist ideas. Theirs was an ambiguous and liminal position, existing between worlds, as Occidentals and Orientals.

That your memorialists beg most respectfully to state that the Supreme Court of Natal at Pietermaritzburg has no Indian Interpreter, and when cases have to be heard, the interpreter at the resident magistrate’s court at Verulam has to be sent for, thus causing a delay, which is unnecessary, of all Indian cases that may come before the court at Verulam during his absence, and that the Indian interpreters at the resident magistrate’s court at Durban and other places have not a thorough knowledge of Tamil, Telugu, and Hindustani, and the Indian languages commonly used in the Colony, causing a misunderstanding between the bench and other suitors, thereby preventing justice being properly meted out to your memorialists, as British Indian Subjects, consequently entailing great loss, injury and inconvenience to them. Your memorialists therefore earnestly pray that your Excellency may be pleased to ask the Colonial Government to be so good as to have competent interpreters in all Natal courts.

On 14 July 1884, fourteen years after indentured Indians had arrived in the Colony of Natal, a petition headed by a certain Mr M.A. Doorasamy Pillay was sent to the Viceroy of India complaining about the level of interpreting in the Colony. Mr Pillay had arrived in the Colony of Natal in 1883 as a deck passenger aboard the Coldstream and on arriving, applied to register as a legal practitioner. He claimed to speak Tamil, Telugu, Sanskrit, English, Hindustani and French but was unsuccessful in his application for a post as an interpreter in Durban and Pietermaritzburg. He then moved to
Ladysmith where he initiated this petition among the residents of Klip River. It was not long after that he moved out of the Colony to Kimberley where he began a business as a legal adviser. He placed an advertisement in the “Diamond Fields Advertiser”, stating,

[...] the undersigned begs to inform the public that they may seek for legal advise free from the difficulty they have to undergo in explaining the elements or circumstances of their case or cases to any of the legal members unacquainted with their Indian dialects i.e. Madrasie, Telvogoo [sic], Hindustanie and Sanscrit [sic] as well as French through illiterate interpreters ... to avoid inconvenience, misunderstandings, confusion and risks that may naturally occur. Signed M. Doorasamy Pillay³.

The petition as well as the advertisement aptly illustrates the dilemma experienced by Indians in the Colony in terms of language, bureaucracy and justice; and situates their experience within the milieu of the system of indenture, diaspora and Empire. By 1911, there were approximately 152,184 indentured Indians in Natal, but only an estimated 26 Indian interpreters and clerks in the Colony⁶.

The aim of this chapter is to examine the problematic role of Indian interpreters and translation in the Colony of Natal during the years 1880 to 1910, in relation to indenture and the British empire. In 1860 the Colony was mainly occupied by Indian indentured workers, as well as Africans and European settlers. To facilitate communication between the colonialists and the indentureds, interpreters were employed in the Natal Civil Service. Considering the important part played by interpreters in facilitating contact, communication, cultural exchange, social upliftment, conflict resolution as well as disseminating imperial ideology in the colonial period, there have been surprisingly few individual or collective historical biographies of these influential individuals. Many of the historians writing on Indian history in Natal with particular reference to the Indian elite, nationalism and eventual emancipation from indenture have extolled the virtues and trumpeted the accomplishments of a few men like Gandhi and Polak to the exclusion of many other voices and characters. This study aims to provide an examination of Indian interpreters in the Colony, and attempts to understand their various personalities, talents and skills, limitations and most importantly investigate their “petty bourgeois”⁷ status and role in the rise of Indian nationalism in Natal as well as their place in the broader continuum of Empire.

However, for historians writing in a colonial context, there is no straightforward method or formula to aid the historian with presenting a thorough account of events. Unlike writing about 18th-century England, for instance, where historians have at their disposal personal diaries, letters, travellers’ accounts, newspapers, and magazines, “no such simple solution exists for the historian of the colonies, where problems of class, colour and literacy combine to place diaries, memoirs and letters of employers and servants at a premium”⁸. Since this study relies heavily on archival and newspaper material housed in a colonial archive and makes use of court records, personal testimonies, depositions and petitions it is necessary to provide a commentary on the implications of this for his-
torical research. These letters, petitions, depositions and testimonies have the potential to open up social histories that have otherwise been neglected, and “are a valid avenue through which the ‘representative reality’ may be attained”\textsuperscript{9}. There have been numerous studies on the historical use of court cases, testimonies, and depositions and letters in the production of histories, some of which have interrogated the methodologies used in the process of historical reconstruction. Some have praised their usage, while others have dismissed the importance of these, particularly in colonial settings where subjects could not speak English. The problematics of translation and interpretation have become a highly contested site of struggles over representation and truth as a result\textsuperscript{10}. Therefore, these petitions and letters as well as depositions, despite problems – such as the unreliability of interpretation – provide exciting and dynamic insights into colonial life. In these personal testaments individuals ultimately provide a commentary about their personal experiences in relation to the private and broader public life of the colony and the metropole as well as the people and the places in the cultural, economic, political and social setting of Colonial Natal.

Furthermore, taking into account the process whereby these testimonies and depositions present in the archives were produced and preserved, they are nonetheless a representative sample and it remains the challenge of the historian “to understand the context and conventions of these ‘stories from the archives’ before including them in historical narratives”\textsuperscript{11}. Archival records are themselves marked by silences, bias and incompleteness, but as Hugh Trevor-Roper says, the historian should be \textit{amphibious}, in that s/he should be able to penetrate the surface and at the same time be able to live above this surface as well\textsuperscript{12}. The purpose of history is not just to paint in flat colours: black, blue, red, but also to show the hues, shades and mottles of the past.

There has been very little examination of these interpreters and the role they played as conduits between the Colonial Government and the Indian population. For the most part the broader literature on interpreters and interpretation depicts them either as victims, “weathercocks buffeted by the shifting political winds in one or both cultures,” and docile subjects or as heroes, master mediators, intercultural brokers and “special servants”\textsuperscript{13}. While there is some truth to both of these views, neither characterization does justice to the colourful lives, complex roles, opportunistic careers and contradictions embodied by these interpreters. In examining the culturally ambiguous characters that served as interpreters in the Natal Civil Service, it is not possible to construct a single composite portrait that would sufficiently represent the diversity of their motives, choices, and life experiences. They were from the upper echelons of society and before entering the Civil Service underwent a process of acculturation/transculturation as they acquired the English language. Although the linguistic skills of these ‘middlemen’ may have made them more sensitive to the cultural values of both parties, it is important to remember that these extraordinary individuals acting as mediators were ordinary men in pursuit of their own self-interest. Collectively, however, their individual actions
and “personal dramas influenced, changed, and sometimes even dictated the course of
colonial development”14. Unlike the indentured Indians, these interpreters were not
mere “units of labour” that could be replaced with comparative ease, and Natal’s colo-
nial government was deeply dependent upon them. The same can be said for African
men who were also employed as interpreters by the Natal Civil Service. While the state
generally preferred to employ white settlers in this capacity, who were referred to by the
state as “Kafir Interpreters,” there were still a substantial number of Africans who served
as interpreters. As interpolators, these men, like Indian interpreters found themselves
cought between worlds and constantly struggled to determine and define their roles in
their social and political spaces15.

The problem of language, literacy, and communication caused immediate difficulties
for the establishment and settlement of the Indians of servitude in Natal. For instance
when the first indentured labourers arrived in South Africa, Davarum, a 30-year-old
male emigrant from Madras, had placed his thumbprint to a document he could neither
read nor understand. The document stated, “We the adult male emigrants, do hereby
agree to serve the employer to whom we may respectively be allotted by the Natal gov-
ernment under the Natal Act No. 14 of 1859 and we all understand the terms under
which we are engaged…”16 This raised considerable problems for communication and
dissemination of information to indentured Indians by officials who could not speak
the Indian language. Consequently, the urgent need for interpreters and translators
increased. As this chapter will show, the problems surrounding illiteracy and English
become evident as many of the depositions given in court, apart from being translated
into English by these interpreters, had to be transcribed by them as well. Moreover, the
Indians were heavily dependent on interpreters since they had no other official means
whereby their complaints and depositions could be recorded.

By 1909 there were approximately 26 interpreters in the Magistrate’s Court, Supreme
Court and Protector of Immigrants Office. Of these some, like Henry Louis Paul, Che-
livum Stephen, David Vinden, R. Moodaly, Anthony Peters, A. Ruffe, Frank Ward,
and J.S. Joshua were particularly more well-known. And as intermediaries and spokes-
persons of the Indian people they often came into serious conflict with the Natal gov-
ernment and with the Indian ‘community’ as well. They were attracted to the prestige
and kudos bestowed on them by the English language, culture and society but were
not zealous advocates of the colonial government. Despite this, colonial administrators
such as magistrates recognized the importance of winning the favour of these linguis-
tic and cultural mediators and ensured that even when complaints were made against
them, it was almost always the interpreter who was awarded the benefit of the doubt
over the indentured Indian. The interpreters facilitated interlocution but through this
process became culturally disoriented and found themselves caught in the trappings
of English middle class way of life. Some interpreters developed a confused and di-
vided sense of allegiance as a result of the immersion experience, in that they would don
three-piece suits, pocket watches, and carry cane sticks. And yet, ironically it is evident that they also possessed an ardent sense of Indian nationalism and were responsible for spearheading and forging a nationalist movement. Despite their compromised position within the civil service it would have been very surprising if these interpreters had not seen the injustice of indenture and colonial society around them.

Studying these bilingual members of the Indian intelligentsia provides invaluable information on the lives led by the elite in comparison to those of the working class. The Pietermaritzburg Archives house abundant sources that relate not only to Indian interpreters, but traders, court messengers, police officials, constables and postmasters. They were certainly members of a bourgeoisie in Natal, but they were much more than that and hardly deserving of being dismissively labelled as “elitist”. They were journalists writing for newspapers such as the “African Chronicle” and “Indian Opinion” (L.M. Naidoo, S.P. Pillay and Suchitt Maharaj, who was also a member of the Examinations Board). They were not only members of the Natal Indian Congress, but also the Durban Indian Society, the Natal Indian Patriotic Society, and the Natal Indian Teachers Association. They belonged to and formed various sporting clubs and for these and other reasons they may be understood and interpreted as possessing a genuine concern for the Indian public. But then how do we square this with the numerous complaints by Indians about their incompetency as interpreters and their incomplete knowledge of the languages, as well as the accusations of extortion, bribery and assault made against them?

A study of these interpreters is fundamental in understanding the relationship between Empire, represented by the colonial state, and the Indian “community”. These Indian interpreters were located in the interstices of the socio-political crosscurrents of the European coloniser and the colonised Indian. The identity of these interpreters was constructed around the politics of difference and separation from both the Indian and British populations, but this designation is itself ambivalent and contradictory. Thus, the politicisation of their position in the Natal Civil Service and public view stems from their bilingualism being used by the colonial government in maintaining and legitimising their power. This chapter is both a social history and a narrative history that seeks to recover these individuals from a position of belonging both to the Empire and the colonised nation.

After the first period of indenture was over and Indians were allowed to return to India, re-indenture or settle in Natal, complaints and protests against the interpreters began to increase and evolve into a contentious issue. A possible reason for this was that an increasing number of Indians were no longer simply “units of labour” and “subjects” but were interacting with the Government as “citizens” of the Colony, and so this called for a more open and considerate bureaucracy. One of the reasons for advancing this argument is that the official records of the Natal Government show that these complaints and grievances against interpreters begin after 1870 and become more frequent and
serious in the 1880s. While translation has played and plays a key role in the development of world cultures, translators and interpreters have also been especially crucial as active agents in the perpetuation of colonial oppression, and hegemonic imperialist ideas of ‘Indianness’. Apart from being members of the imperial Natal Civil Service, these interpreters were also members of an Anglicised Indian elite.

In *Translation and Empire* Douglas Robinson looks at the micro-politics of translators and translation within an empire. Robinson understands colonialism as the internalisation of authority that is achieved through interpellation and subjectivism, in that colonial subjects are led to believe in the hegemonic ideas of the colonial powers, and begin to see themselves in terms of (and conform to) these stereotypes. He says,

English is today the *lingua franca* because of a century and a half of British political, economic, military, and cultural world dominance. That language of the imperial centre was disseminated to the peripheries of the empire as the language of power, culture and knowledge, and was not only spoken by more people than the indigenous languages of the peripheries, but carried with it an unconscious power-charge, an almost universal sense that those who spoke and wrote in this language would have known more and controlled more than those who didn’t.

Much of this is exhibited by these Indian interpreters. He further elaborates that “language was the perfect instrument of the empire,” since it was this aspect that served as the ideal conduit between the colonizers and the colonized. Language, translation and interpretation have always been, as Robinson states, “an indispensable channel of imperial conquest and occupation.” He says “not only must the imperial conquerors find some effective way of communicating with their new subjects; they must also develop new ways of subjecting them, converting them into docile or ‘cooperative’ subjects,” and one of the ways of doing this was through interpreters. When looking at interpreters in the colony of Natal, it is evident that they were far from docile and while they did possess a significant loyalty to the Crown, what emerges from the sources, is that it was an ambivalent loyalty.

Robinson argues that one of the most important bureaucratic processes of the colony was the selection of these interpreters who would act as mediators between the imperial centre and periphery. Considerable debate surrounded the question of whether it was better to employ members of the “Imperial race” who had learnt indigenous languages and whose loyalty would be guaranteed, or whether it would be a more viable option to have subordinated “subjects” learn the *Albion* tongue, in which case faithfulness would have to be controlled and sustained. As William Jones, founder of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, said, “It was found highly dangerous to employ the natives as interpreters, upon whose fidelity they could not depend.” Nevertheless, if this were the adopted option, then the colony would have to prevent the augmentation of what Robinson refers to as “counterproductive loyalties to the conquered peoples.” Unlike in India, where the British decided that it was a better option for them to learn the Indian and Persian lan-
Commentaries in Natal, quite the opposite occurred. Here, Indians and Eurasians were chosen as interpreters and one of the consequences of this was that the colonial government grew extremely dependent on these ‘Indian’ Indian interpreters.

From commissions held between 1860 and 1890, it is possible to fashion an understanding of the problems associated with Indian interpreters in general. There were three significant commissions that investigated the grievances of Indians in Natal, namely the Shire Commission of 1862, the Coolie Commission of 1872 and the Wragg Commission of 1885-1887. The Shire Commission appears to contain one of the first complaints against interpreters by indentured Indians. After several unsuccessful attempts at finding redress against their master in the local and Durban courts, workers from the sugar farm of Mr. Henry Shire, presented a petition to the Natal government. The “Coolies” of Melkhout Kraal, on the Umslanga [sic], in the Victoria County believed they had reason to complain of ill treatment and flogging. In addition to this they complained of the insufficiency and bad quality of their food and also of having been compelled to work for twelve to fourteen hours a day as opposed to the mandatory nine-hour day. They had to summon Mr. Shire to the Magistrate’s Court but due to the increased ill treatment they received they could not endure any longer. They decided to go to Durban because they were convinced that the Coolie interpreter of the Victoria County spoke their language “imperfectly”, which meant that the magistrate could not understand their complaints and act appropriately. They believed that by going to Durban, they would perhaps find a more proficient interpreter, who would help them in satisfying their complaints and in getting transferred to “another and better” service. However, on making their complaint in Durban they were told that that particular magistracy had no jurisdiction over Mr. Shire or the Victorian County and were thereafter sent to prison for 14 days for not having passes. They were then imprisoned for another 14 days and seven days after that. These labourers spent a total of 35 days in prison and this was a result of the scarcity of competent and knowledgeable interpreters at the various magistracies. In 1862, there were roughly five interpreters in the different magistracies as Table 1 shows, and the interpreter of the Victoria County was most probably C.H. Harley.

Table 1
List of Indian Interpreters in the Colony of Natal for the year 1862.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magistracies</th>
<th>Name of Indian Interpreter</th>
<th>Date of Appointment</th>
<th>Salary (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pietermaritzburg</td>
<td>J. Francis</td>
<td>29 Mar 1862</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>Daniel</td>
<td>16 Jul 1863</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inanda</td>
<td>C.H. Harley</td>
<td>16 Jul 1863</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tugela</td>
<td>E.R. Flood</td>
<td>9 Dec 1863</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Umkomanzi</td>
<td>Moonesaumy</td>
<td>2 May 1861</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is further evidence of the lack of confidence in interpreters in the Report of Coolie Commission of 1872. On 6 July 1872, H.C. Shepstone, the then Coolie immigration agent, stated that he wished to draw the attention of the Commission to the “anomalous and unpleasant position of the Coolie agent, when visiting estates when complaints are made”. Further “the Coolies regard him as their protector and think that any complaints made to him must be righted at once, whereas the Coolie agent has no power whatever and can only recommend them to go to the magistrate, which they are averse to do, as they have no confidence in the interpreters”[29]. The Commission was of the opinion that to counteract this problem and to “secure the perfect and effectual supervision” of the immigrants, an active and efficient officer should be appointed, whose position should be devoted to that of care taker of the Indians[30]. The absence of this would be most “undesirable on all consideration of humanity”. Rangasamy, a “coolie” as the report calls him, stated

In the magistrate’s Court there are no proper interpreters: they won’t take our depositions properly before the magistrate. In this way:- if we say, “My wife was ill-treated,” he renders it, “My wife was kicked,” in consequence of this interpretation, the magistrates get angry, and say we are liars. I would ask that Colonel Lloyd would speak our language to the magistrate, and then let the interpreter render it in English, and he could then judge. We don’t blame the magistrate, the fault is the interpreter’s. From the sentence the magistrate does not understand. Masters don’t appreciate a good man; they always think us low[31].

In response to statements and interviews such as these the Commission recommended that the officer appointed should have had some experience in India, or among the Coolies and most importantly some knowledge of the Indian languages, implying then that he had to be British or European. He should also be at least qualified to act as the head of an important department. His duties would also involve inquiring into and settling petty disputes between masters and Coolies and among the Coolies themselves. This, they hoped, would relieve Resident Magistrates of a large number of what were seen as trivial but still “difficult and troublesome matters,” and would “ensure a more accurate interpretation that the Coolie Agent would have not been able to fulfil[32]. In this way matters would be disposed of immediately, and the lack of confidence in the integrity of the interpreters could be restored. But the lack of faith in interpreters seemed to be universal among the Coolies, especially with regard to the Madrasee interpreter at Durban.

In 1885-1887, the Indian Immigrants [Wragg] Commission enquired into the situation of Indians in Natal and reported on the complaints made about Indian interpreters in Natal. Many of the Magistrates “felt uncomfortable and uneasy with the levels of interpretation and when deciding Indian cases burdened with a conflict of interest”[33]. There were some cases where the interpreters attached to the Resident Magistrates’ courts were familiar with one or more dialects of the north which included Hindi, Urdu, Bengali, Panjabi, Kashmiri, Gujarati, and Marathi[34] but was often unacquainted
with Tamil which was the language spoken by the majority of Indians from Madras and Southern India. As a result, when there were witnesses from both Northern and Southern India, the interpretation became “broken, disjointed and unreliable”.

Table 2
List of Indian Interpreters in the Colony of Natal for the year 1886.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magistries</th>
<th>Name of Indian Interpreter</th>
<th>Date of Appointment</th>
<th>Salary (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pietermaritzburg</td>
<td>S. Samon</td>
<td>1 Apr 1882</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lions River</td>
<td>E. James</td>
<td>12 Feb 1886</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>E. Subhan</td>
<td>9 May 1875</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umlazi</td>
<td>C. Stephen</td>
<td>6 Mar 1875</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inanda</td>
<td>J. Lennon</td>
<td>13 Sep 1884</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Tugela</td>
<td>M.J. Williams</td>
<td>10 Aug 1877</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umvoti</td>
<td>H. Sing</td>
<td>1 Sep 1881</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandra - Supreme Court</td>
<td>H.J.G. Ince</td>
<td>19 Feb 1883</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the table it is evident that by 1886, along with C. Stephen, the longest serving interpreter was E. Subhan. While Stephen received the highest paid salary, Subhan received the lowest. E. James, who was appointed that same year, received a higher salary than Subhan. Moreover, Subhan’s pay was clearly not calculated according to the amount of work he did, because he was interpreting at the Durban magistracy, which would have been inundated with Indians wishing to seek redress. One of the possible reasons for this could be that both Stephen and James were Eurasians while Subhan, as the name suggests, was Indian. Such was the nature of the Colonial Government that inevitably the quality or quantity of work did not matter but rather race.

The report also stated that in one instance at a Circuit Court, the interpreter was well versed in Hindustani but the witness was Tamil speaking. He apparently had a “rudimentary acquaintance” but half an hour into the case, the judge discovered that the interpreter was intimidating the witness to force him to state that he preferred to give his evidence in Hindi rather than in Tamil. In other instances where the interpreters had a very inadequate knowledge of English, they conveyed the grievances and complaints of Indians in “Pidgin English”, which was “absurd in its sound and ludicrous in aspect when recorded”. Furthermore the report stated that in the Supreme Court there was no proficient interpreter in Tamil and so [that] language became dependent upon chance interpretation and interpreters were difficult to obtain. The report also asserted that in 1886 the Legislative Council struck the item “200 pounds for Tamil Interpreter to the Supreme Court,” out of the supply bill and that failure to reinstate
this amount would result in difficulties and miscarriages in Tamil cases of the gravest nature. It then went on to recommend that the only feasible approach to this problem was to employ two interpreters at every Court, for the Northern and Southern dialects respectively, which would save the hassle of waiting for interpreters and putting cases on hold due to the absence of a Government interpreter. There was evidently a lack of Tamil interpreters and one of the ways the report sought to redress this problem was by inaugurating a system through the Indian Immigrant School Board where some of the teachers were educated in the Tamil and English languages. Thereafter candidates for appointments as interpreters were to be examined by a competent Board of Examiners and an annual salary of £200 was to be made available for a Tamil interpreter to the Supreme Court.

While these interpreters were crucial to the perpetuation of the colonial system, some of them also did their best to ameliorate the situation of Indians. They were not just interpreters. Their interactions and daily lives as interlocutors between state and subject offer a comprehensive study of Indian life in Natal at the turn of the 20th century because it is not just a history from below or a history from the top down. It is from the middle, where one culture interacts with another. “It is a fertile space, and disquieting, because, if fully explored it proves to a sphere (or zone) in which one both abandons and assumes associations.”

Interpreters in the Colony of Natal belonged to the most professional strata of society. They dressed in English clothing, spoke the English language and lived an English lifestyle. As in Natal, English in India has meant a familiarity with British administration and education. Acquiring an English education appealed primarily to the “learned classes,” Brahmins and lower caste officials who had used the language and education to escape their caste, status and poverty. English education had created a middle class in India and allowed for the formation of a class of interpreters who acted as mediators between the British and Indians. The decision to teach English in India, which took the form of Anglicism was to facilitate easier administration as an alternative to requiring the British to learn the Indian dialects. However, there were numerous European scholars who were inclined to the preservation of the Indian languages, such as Sir William Jones who founded The Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1784 to facilitate research into Indian culture and its relationship with European languages. In 1820 when Mountstuart Elphinstone established the Bombay Native Education Society, Indians could for the first time in the history of British rule receive “a systematic inculcation of the literature, languages, science and philosophy of Europe.” And it was in 1829 that Lord Bentinck pronounced the intent of the British Government to make English the official language of commerce and administration throughout India. Thomas Macaulay, an English Whig lawyer, politician, essayist, poet and popular historian, joined Bentinck and advocated English education for the upper and middle urban classes. On 2 February 1835, he presented his famous “Minute on Indian Education” to the Brit-
ish Supreme Council of India, in which he stated “We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect.” However, the long term consequences of the Macaulayite education system was never for the good of the people since it was implemented as a system of the Empire to create an educated elite that would serve and perpetuate British rule. One of the problems of this education system was that it had created an elite that was not only small in comparison to the rest of the Indian population but that was also cut off from the overwhelmingly poor masses. A similar trend is discernable in Colonial Natal, in that being able to speak English was an advantage and a means of progress and alleviation, even though this progress was in itself marked by ambiguity and remained limited.

In *The Command of Language and the Language of Command*, Bernard S. Cohn looks at how language became a crucially important tool of the British in India. In the 17th century, British officials undertook the task of learning “Persian” which they saw as a “functional language” and which could be used as a “pragmatic vehicle of communication with Indian officials and rulers.” The members of the Natal Civil Service were in some ways a reflection of the Indians in the Indian Civil Service. Both these groups saw their elite position as a means of upward social mobility, and manipulated the system to their advantage. Interpretation was a form of knowledge and since “power is knowledge,” it is quite evident that these interpreters believed they possessed a sense of power. And this is something which interpreters fervently tried to sustain and use as a point of leverage even if this power was tainted and obscured by colonialism and the “ambiguities of dependence.” Cohn says that in India, knowledge allowed civil service members to be converted into “instruments of colonial rule.”

On 1 June 1908, a group of petitioners claiming to represent the Indian community of the City and Borough of Pietermaritzburg sent a letter concerning Mr. A.H. Peters, who was at the time an interpreter and clerk at the Pietermaritzburg Magistrate. In 1897, Peters began his career as an interpreter at the Inanda Magistrate. By 1902, he moved to the Durban Magistracy, and stayed there until 1906, when he was transferred to the Pietermaritzburg Magistrate’s Court and acted as interpreter and clerk until the formation of Union. Very little is known about Peters but he shares certain important characteristics with most of the other interpreters in the Colony, such as an ambiguous social status and the experience of white colonial antagonism.

A petition signed by E. Naicker and others, suggests that we can place Peters in the same category as other interpreters with regards to provoking complaints from Indians, especially in terms of extorting money and unfair representation. The petition stated:

1. That by the abuse of his official position he had become most unpopular amongst the Indians in the metropolis.
2. That he interests himself too deeply in cases prior to their being brought before the Court; and has, in many case, actually precognised [sic] witnesses and suggested evidence so as to ensure success to one or other of the parties concerned.

3. That he often acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner by refusing to take the depositions of many a poor and ignorant Indian, who call at his office for the purpose of lodging complaints, unless he is paid for taking them.

4. That his conduct and language towards Indian women and girls are often indecent and insulting, and cannot be tolerated by any honourable and self-respecting people.

That your petitioners are certain that the truth of the above assertions cannot be denied, as it is of public knowledge. That your petitioners therefore feel that this state of affairs cannot be allowed to continue without its resulting in some substantial injustice and harm to the community to which your petitioners belong. That your petitioners have purposely left out of consideration Mr. Peters' previous character and conduct whilst he was in the Court at Durban, as they presume that it is known to the Colonial Office. That your petitioners are averse to suggesting the extreme course of dismissing Mr. Peters from office, which is the only remedy that is any way proportioned to the nature of evil, but would humbly pray for his transfer to a Country Magistracy as a punishment for his misconduct. That your petitioners are convinced that the continuance of Mr. Peters in his present position will be detrimental to the interests of justice, injurious to the public, and discredited to the Government, and they therefore venture to hope that their prayer will be granted.

The petitioners portray Peters as a dishonest and unsavoury character, stating that he should be dismissed from the Civil Service, and if that is not possible that he be transferred to a country magistracy. Even though 30 Indians signed this petition, the Chief Magistrate responded by proposing that the only course of action was to subpoena the petitioners to be examined on an informal charge against the accused of indecency. But, this did not happen and was not likely to because of the favouritism afforded to interpreters by individual magistrates and the authorities as a whole.

Despite the racism of colonialism they endured on the trains and streets of the Colony and which was reflected in their wages, the Indian interpreters still persevered in their professions. Whether it was an interest in scholarship or finance, an urban sensibility, a desire to travel, or a quest for status, Indian candidates embodied the unique combination of energy and struggle that fuelled nationalism in the 20th century. And even though belonging to the Natal Civil Service was an undoubtedly treacherous path, especially with regards to hostility from the Indian people, interpreters were able to satisfy their responsibilities and duties as interpreters in the Courts to the best of their ability.

For instance, Chelivum Stephen, mentioned earlier, who first entered the Natal Civil Service in 1895, was called on to act as a Tamil interpreter in a high profile murder cases in 1907. In May in Pietermaritzburg, Vellappa Gounden was charged with “wrongfully, unlawfully and wickedly inciting, soliciting, encouraging, endeavouring and persuading” Sheik Ramthumiah to kill and murder Elizabeth MacDonald and Jessie Francis.
Sheik Ramthumiah lived and worked at 118 Loop Street as a domestic servant to Mrs. MacDonald and had been in her employ for about a year and a half. Jessie Francis was also a domestic servant in the household, but appears to have been on much better terms with Mrs. MacDonald. Vellappa Gounden lived next door, at 106 Loop Street and he was a domestic servant to Elizabeth J. Mary Behrens. Stephen was called upon to translate a text and give evidence in court to show whether any connection could be established between the murder and a story book written in Tamil that Vellappa allegedly used to incite Ramthumiah to commit the murders. The story book, which was used as prime evidence, was translated by Stephen, and Stephen found that the book was about wars and did not contain any specific information that would incite someone to commit murder. Not only did he give evidence in court but he also influenced the verdict that was reached. Stephen acted not simply as an interpreter in the narrow sense of the term, but as a translator – with the associated meanings of bridging the chasm created by language and cultural difference within the space of colonialism. As a translator, he engaged in the process of representation and thereby exercised considerable power.

However, in keeping with their ambiguous and liminal position, in December 1907, a letter of complaint was sent to the High Court General by Narayanasamy and others petitioning against Stephens and what they called his “disrespect for the community”. On Friday 27 December 1907, Narayanasamy and his fellow petitioners went to the Verulam Court for a case when Stephen told them that they would have to pay him £1 before their complaints were entertained. Even though they paid him, he also received £1/10 from the opposite parties in the case. They lost the case but wished to inform the court that their interpreter was a “swindler”. Another letter, written three days later, by a fellow interpreter and clerk at the Richmond Magistracy, Abdool Khadir Siab, validated what Narayanasamy said by protesting against Stephen’s behaviour towards women. Apparently on 28 December at about 5 o’clock, during the absence of the Magistrate, a Calcutta woman named Illachia was passing through the Court premises when she was “dragged into [Stephen’s] office” and “forced to cohabit” with him⁴⁹. On 2 January 1908, another letter of complaint was sent to the Minister of Justice, this time headed by R.M. Jack. On behalf of several Indians he desired to inform the Ministry that Stephen extorted money from Indians for cases. The letter stated that if Indians wanted Stephen to interpret in any case, they would have to pay him 1 or 2 pounds of “fowels and eggs”⁵⁰. Then only would he take notice and bring the matter to the attention of the Magistrate. The letter also said: “If you are woman or young girl then he will take her to his officer and do her bad, then he will take the case. If not he won’t take notice. And all the poor people are in great trouble, because if we have got any case there is no one to hear it”⁵¹.

Since there is very little biographical information on Stephen, it is through letters such as these that we attempt to formulate a sense of his character and identity. The accuracy of this method however, depends entirely on the veracity of complaints and letters
sent to the Colonial Secretary. L. Mason, the Protector of Indian Immigrants stated that “the Indian has brought to Natal his love of litigation and a portion of his skill in fabricating false cases”\(^52\). With this in mind then it is becomes difficult to ascertain whether these complaints were valid or not, or bred purely out of jealousy and personal vendetta. If the complaints were true, given the popular consensus on interpreters amongst ordinary Indians, then this letter is evidence of Stephen wielding the power of his interpretership and privileged ability to speak the language of the Empire to fleece the Indian community.

In a similar vein, on 1 May 1891, the Colonial Secretary received a letter from M. Sinappen regarding the supposed incompetency of a certain Henry Louis Paul\(^53\). Paul was born in Madras, a Roman Catholic British-Indian, and arrived in the Colony in 1879, and from 1889 until his retirement worked as the interpreter at the Durban Magistrates’ Court. The letter states:

I am a storekeeper residing in Durban, West Street, West End, and have been in the colony for more than 12 years. I have had transaction and have to the present day with a number of countrymen. Amongst these transactions one was with a man named Sigamoney. For a number of years this man has dealt with me. Last year there was an amount of over £25 due to me by this same Indian. It happened that about the latter part of last year the Indian interpreter of the resident magistrate court Durban, H.L. Paul became a tenant of the said Sigamoney. It happened also that about the same time I asked the said Sigamoney to settle my account (in the usual course of business). On making this demand I received the enclosed letter from H.L. Paul interpreter and tenant of the said Sigamoney. I refused to accede to the order of the said H.L. Paul. Business matter having occupied my time, I did not take any legal action in the matter until lately, about the early part of this year I instructed Mr. Binns of the firm Mr. W.S. Shepstone to issue summons against the said Sigamoney. The summons was issued and on the first hearing the case was adjourned. After this I add occasion to summon another Indian Sivasamy also for a debt due to my firm. When this came before the magistrate I was directed to produce my books. I produced the books. The books were written in Tamil. The interpreter H.L. Paul cannot either read or write Tamil, or any Indian dialect, in fact. The Tamil he uses towards us when interpreting corresponds to pigeon English of the Chinese or the kitchen kaffir of Natal. According to his own account he is not an Indian but an Eurasian, and therefore cannot possibly speak a language which is not his mother tongue, to us Indians. During the case of myself versus Sivasamy the interpreter displayed great hostility to me, and my then, solicitor. Mr. Coakes had to ask the magistrate for protection for his client. The magistrate then and there reprimanded the interpreter. Ever since then I have been reluctant to sue any of my debtors, as the risk of my being misrepresented in court is so great. My case against Sigamoney has not come on yet, but when it does I do not expect to receive that justice, that I would receive if another interpreter other then H.L. Paul was engaged. Besides the magistrate is not aware of these facts and more especially of the fact that his interpreter does not either read or write Tamil and the plausibility of the interpreter induces the magistrate to thoroughly confide in him. I beg most respectfully that the government will kindly in justice to me and other Tamil storekeepers in Durban cause an enquiry to be made into the circumstances here represented. I
beg that in any even Mr. C Stephen or some other qualified interpreter will be allowed to interpret in case where Tamil Indian cases in which accounts are concerned.

PS. The said Sigamoney is a constable in the employ of the Umlazi magistrate court, Durban. I beg further to state that since the foregoing was written my case against Sigamoney has come and dismissed. Fearing that I would be again insulted I did not attend at the hearing. I may as well state that at the instance of H.L. Paul, a man named Ruthusamy was called to translate the items in my account at the said hearing. This man has once been in prison and only the other day was tried before Captain Lucas for fraud and extortion but was acquitted.

Signed.

But, like most interpreters in the Colony there were often other aspects of their lives that made them virtuous and honourable, and it is only through rigorous and thorough sifting through of historical sources, primary and secondary, that a more balanced picture of their lives emerges. Most of the evidence present in the colonial archives depicts Paul as fractious, incompetent and arrogant. Yet, there is another side to Paul that makes him an “unsung hero”, and community conscious. He was the founder and president of many different sports clubs such as Natal Indian Football Association, United XI Cricket Club, Greyville Sporting Association, Indian Benevolent Society and the United Sports Association, which became the Durban Indian Sports Ground Association (Currie’s Fountain). Apart from that he was also responsible for the formation of various different soccer clubs in the 1880s and 1890s. He was also instrumental in the development of cricket and cycling among the Indians. When his son was refused entry into a “European Boys’ ” private high school he lobbied for an Indian Higher Grade school. In 1903, he was also active in Sandailu’s Christy Minstrel Band in Overport and between the years 1911 and 1914 he established and became the first president of the Natal Indian Educational Association. However, these other facets of Paul were found outside the colonial archive and therefore from this it can be argued that it is the job of the historian to use imaginative construction with a variety of sources to recreate an objective historical narrative.

In Siting Translation Tejaswini Niranjana argues that the problematics of translation and interpretation become a site for raising questions on representation, power and historicity. She shows how this site is responsible for perpetuating inequitable relations and that translation can be used as an instrument for appropriating, controlling and assimilating the oriental “other”. While the question of translation and interpretation is itself complex and layered, individual interpreters and translators are just as, if not more, multifaceted and complicated. Indian interpreters continued to play a crucial role in interracial communications throughout the “Westering” and modernizing experience and most importantly in maintaining and preserving the idea of Empire. They were not merely interpreters in the traditional sense of the term. The word “interpreter” at the turn of the 20th century in Colonial Natal, meant more than “translator”,
it was considered a title of special honour. This study attempted to understand the type of people these linguistic conduits were and why their peculiarities and experiences and not necessarily their interpreting skills, make them similar to us. Most importantly though, it was to bring to light their “silenced voices and excluded histories” 58.

It is important to point out that the interpreters fulfilled many different roles and partly because of their critical function in the Colony of Natal, they were just as likely to be maligned and misjudged, as to be afforded recognition. The biased and somewhat distorted view of these interpreters that has been left behind in the archive is an important obstacle to drawing historical conclusions. Much of the research for this study was carried out at the Pietermaritzburg Archives and one of the main reasons that the interpreters have a presence in this archive is because of the complaints and grievances of the Indian “community” that they attracted. Thus this chapter has provided an insight into the interpreters based on the material available at the archives, and that material at times provides a slightly skewed perspective on their lives as a result. Moreover, this study has adopted a narrative approach, since it is necessary to understand the context within which these interpreters existed before problematizing their position and character.

The title of this chapter, “Turbans or Top Hats?” is an metaphor used to describe their liminal status as descendents of India and subjects of the British Empire. Their confused and divided sense of allegiance was the primary cause of their ambiguous existence. They aspired to British ideals and way of life like many other “petty bourgeois” colonial men, but they were also responsible for inventing an idealised version of ‘Indianness’ within the British Empire. British education and cultural colonization propagated the English world, lifestyle and culture, as a world of discipline, success, achievement and progress. As a result, Indians and other colonized peoples believed their own culture, customs and traditions, religion, lifestyle and race to be inferior to that of the Empire and endeavoured to identify themselves with ‘Britishness’. These interpreters became mimic men who imitated and reflected the colonizer’s life style, values, and views. The problem with this was that they suffered from disillusion, dislocation and a loss of identity as a result. The cultural paradoxes exhibited by these interpreters make them prototypical colonial characters, who were caught between two worlds.

These “special servants” existed as mercurial entities in the Colony of Natal, restless in their beginnings and ends 59. They were members of an educated and disconnected elite, but they were also pioneers of a nascent nationalist movement. While these individuals were attracted to an English culture and lifestyle, it was the potential that their positions offered that served as a portal of opportunities in terms of upward social mobility. Their desire to use their talents and perseverance in the face of British racism, were exceptional qualities that this professional class possessed, which helped them assume a vested position in the hierarchy of colonial society. While this study has had to contend with the biased and tainted view of these interpreters that the archive produced, in the
broadest context it is evident that their identity was nonetheless a mixture of assurance,
egotism, and despair. More than an insight into Colonial Natal and Empire, this ar-
ticle has highlighted individual experiences, and revealed the powerful feelings of fear
and desire, expectancy, impatience, arrogance, and pomposity that came with being
an Indian interpreter in the Natal Civil Service. Theirs was an ambiguous and liminal
position, existing between worlds, as “citizens of the proudest Empire of the world and
descendents of [one of] the oldest civilisation of the globe”\(^{60}\).

**NOTES**

1 Please note that sections of this chapter have been previously published in an article entitled *A Di-
bolical Conspiracy: The Life and World of Henry Louis Paul* in the "Journal of Natal and Zulu History",
2003, 21, pp. 41-76, and these sections have been reprinted here with the kind permission of the editors
of that "Journal". Also note that this chapter is part of a larger study entitled *Turbans and Top Hats: In-

2 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, South Africa (hereafter, PAR), Government House (hereafter,
G.H.), 318, 1883-6, *Petition submitted by the traders and shopkeepers from Mauritius and other colonies*, in S. Bhana, B. Pachai (eds), *A Documentary History of Indian South Africans*, Cape Town 1984, p. 10.

3 I use the term “indentured” here to distinguish between Indian slaves who had first arrived in the Cape
Colony in 1760 and Indians who arrived in Natal a century later. According to F.R. Bradlow and M.
Cairns in *The Early Cape Muslims: a study of their mosques, genealogy and origin*, Cape Town 1978, and
E.S. Reddy, an anti-apartheid activist for the United Nations Organisation and member of the Council
of Trustees of the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, people from India were
sold into slavery in the Cape Colony and by the early 19th century the number of slaves from India
was 1,195 and comprised 36.4 per cent of the total number of slaves (3,283). By this time there were
only 875 African slaves. Found at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/solidarity/indiasa3.html,
accessed on 29 June 2002. Y.S. Meer et al., in *Documents of Indentured Labour 1851-1917*, Durban
1980, on citing A.J. Böeseken, reiterate this point by stating that during the 18th and 19th centuries,
over 50 per cent of the slaves in the Cape were either from Bengal or Southern India. See also Bradlow,

4 Bhana, Pachai (eds.), *Documentary History* cit., p.10.


6 Bhana, Brain, *Setting Down Roots* cit., p. 15.

7 The phrase “petty bourgeois” is used in this article in a Marxist sense to “designate the strata between
the bourgeoisie and the working class”. The phrase is used simply to situate these interpreters as part of
the middle class, and not necessarily with any negative connotations or attributes. See T. Bottomore, *A

8 C. van Onselen, *The Witches of Suburbia: Domestic Service on the Witwatersrand, 1890-1914*, in "Stud-
p. 2.


PAR, Colonial Secretary Office (CSO), 1166/1887/5255, All the Indians in Durban prefer certain complaints against an Indian interpreter named Suban, and one John in the protector’s office, 1887; PAR, CSO, 1273/1890/5763, S. Chimiken and Co. and Others, Indian Merchants. Complaint of incapacity of the Indian Interpreter in the Magistrates Court, Newcastle, 1890; PAR, CSO, 1298/1891/2972, M. Sinappen and Company. Complaint of the incompetency of HL Paul, the Indian Interpreter, Durban Division, 1891; PAR, CSO, 2602/C91/1909, Complaints against Moodley, Indian Interpreter, Umlazi Court, 1909; PAR, PMG (Post Master General), 26/GP0161/1891, D. Vinden, Indian Postmaster and Interpreter, Ladysmith committed for trial on a charge of obtaining money under false pretences, 1891.


Empire here is used to refer to the structure of a colonial society and because Robinson refers to different empires in his study, he does not refer to a specific colony or empire. He examines three key texts: T. Niranjana’s *Siting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism and the Colonial Context*, Berkeley 1992, V. Rafael’s *Contracting Colonialism: Translations and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society Under Early Spanish Rule*, Durham, NC 1993 and E. Chefitz’s *The Poetics of Imperialism: Translation and Colonization from the “Tempest” to “Tarzan”*, Philadelphia 1997. and situates his argument at the centre of this triangle.

By hailing a person as a colonial subject, the colonial power makes that person subject to colonial power.


26 Robinson, *Translation and Empire* cit., p. 11.


28 Information for Table 1 was sourced from the Natal Government Blue Books, 1862. More importantly though, Moonesaumy, who was the first appointed interpreter, received a salary that was lower than the rest and Harley who was the interpreter in the Victoria County was paid £100, which would show how unfair the Natal Civil Service was.


32 Coolie Commission report cit., p. 128.


36 Information for Table 2 was sourced from the Natal Government Blue Books, 1886.

37 Wragg Commission report cit., pp. 284-286. The report also comments on the lack of interpreters in gaol and other areas of administration and the inconvenience caused thereof. It gives the example of Kurampillei who suffered from severe heart disease. Owing to the fact that there was no interpreter on the prison staff, he could not inform the officials of his sickness and had to continue with "arduous labour". On the morning of the 30 September the guard found him in a "dying condition" but before the doctor arrived, Kurampillei died. See also R. Mesthrie, *New Lights from Old Languages: Indian languages and the experience of Indentureship in South Africa*, in S. Bhana (ed.), *Essays on Indentured Indians in Natal*, Leeds 1990, pp. 189-208.

38 In *Voices from Indenture: experiences of the Indian immigrants in the British Empire*, M. Carter states that in Mauritius, the courts were only allowed to employ one interpreter who had to be proficient in both Tamil and Hindi. See M. Carter, *Voices from Indenture: experiences of the Indian immigrants in the British Empire* London - New York 1996, p. 8.


41 The promotion of English language and other aspects of colonial modernity, such as dress, appearance, life style, education and bureaucracy.


side the subcontinent and with *Mississippi Masala* it aptly illustrates the experienced by Indians émigrés as a result of Idi Amin’s expulsion of Indians from Uganda.


45 Cohn, *Command of Language* cit., p. 278.


47 Cohn, *Command of Language* cit., p. 283.

48 PAR, CSO, 2600/C46/1908, Description E. Naiker and others forwards a petition regarding Mr. AH Peters, Indian Interpreter, City Court, 1908.

49 PAR RSC 1/1/95/19/1907, Supreme Court Criminal Cases, Rex versus Vellappa Gounden, “Charged with inciting to commit the crime of murder, 1907”.


51 PAR, CSO, 2600/C4/1908, R.M. Jack Verulam. With reference to the Court at Verulam. Allegations against Mr. Stephens the Interpreter, 1908.

52 *Ibid*.


54 There are some documents where Henry Louis Paul’s name is spelt as Henry Lewis Paul. Both versions however refer to the same man, but Louis appears to be correct, as this is how he signed his name.

55 PAR, CSO, 1298/1891/2972, M Sinappen and Company complain of the incompetency of HL Paul, the Indian Interpreter, Durban Division, 1891.


58 In focusing specifically on the works of Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida and Paul de Man, Niranjana is positioning herself against those who see translation as a neutral act.


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The New Age of Imperialism: British and South African Perspectives

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Abstract

We are constantly reminded that we live in an age of global empire and that the United States is the 21st century’s new imperium. Several well-known commentators, not only those associated with the neo-conservative movement, have welcomed this on the grounds that the United States is best placed to spread ideas of freedom and democracy. Parallels with the British empire abound. This chapter tests such ideas and draws parallels between the invasion of Iraq and the South African war of 1899-1902 in order to do so. It also examines the concept of imperialism and suggests that the hegemony of American empire, like its British counterpart a century ago, is rather more vulnerable to forces of resistance and fragmentation than might seem apparent.

The topic of “Empire” is back with us. After a period of relative abeyance, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have forced the issue to the surface – along with new interest in globalisation – and the word appears constantly in editorial columns, books and in public debate. George W. Bush’s first term as president was seen by many as marking the triumph of a new form of American imperialism whose ascendancy since the Second World War has been traced in relation to the demise of the British colonial empire and, on some accounts, to the evisceration of the Soviet empire. Those who denounce American imperialism as the embodiment of global oppression and injustice are angrier and more vocal than ever. But there are others who seek to defend American hegemony, arguing from a variety of positions that the spread of Western institutions and cultural values is essential for the maintenance of international order and civilised values. Neo-conservatives, like the signatories to the Project for the New American Century have been especially enamoured of this position. In less hawkish tones, writers ranging from the British diplomat Robert Cooper to Michael Ignatieff and Niall Ferguson argue in favour of what they term a “liberal” empire, an empire designed to secure humanitarian objectives and to provide the forces of globalisation with political ballast.
Ignatieff and Ferguson, both prominent public intellectuals, are of particular interest because they are also historians. And yet, historians are distinctly in the minority when it comes to discussing the contemporary nature of imperialism. Academic historians guard their patches jealously and are disinclined to draw analogies and parallels between the present and the past; historians habitually shy away from slick generalisations, and tend to disdain decontextualised grand theories, preferring to deal in the currency of probing questions and analytical distinctions. This is a respectable position to adopt but we cannot then complain when others cannibalise the past in order to lay claim to the present. And there is no shortage of prophetic theorists who do so: take, for example, an influential tome on the subject by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, published by Harvard in 2000. They choose to characterise empire – spelt with a capital E of course – as “a decentered and deterritorialising apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command”.

Seemingly, the power of this new empire is limitless.

Whether we are in fact in the midst of a new age of imperialism, dominated by the hyper-power of America, is still very much an open question. The debacle of the Iraq aftermath and the political demise of neo-conservatives like Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz may signal a significant shift away from American global interventionism, but, as Zhou Enlai once remarked when asked about the consequences of the French Revolution, it is too early to say. Not so long ago a great deal of attention was devoted to the ideas of the historian Paul Kennedy who warned of the dangers of American “imperial overstretch”, suggesting that America was in “relative decline” as a consequence of its vast military expenditure. This was in the mid-1980s when the Cold War was nearing its climax and when the rise of Japanese economic power seemed inexorable.

Re-reading Kennedy’s projections about how the start of the 21st century might look provides an object lesson in the dangers of predicting future trends. Yet, Kennedy may still be right about the fragility of American global power: the similarities he detects between America’s vulnerability at the turn of the 20th century and the British empire’s weaknesses in 1900 may not be altogether wide of the mark. Kennedy’s final, prospective chapter is also a salutary reminder of the important role of historical contingency. Had Al Gore been declared the winner of the 2000 American election by the Supreme Court, would America be in Iraq and, if not, would charges of imperialism be levelled so readily? And if September 11th had not occurred, might George Bush have reverted to policies of imperious isolationism rather than imperial interventionism?

One further reason to resist pronouncements about American imperialism is that we are living at a time of palpable uncertainty, where reason is not at a premium, and where the broadcast media are quicker to pronounce than to reflect. The ideological vacuum caused in large measure by the implosion of eastern European communism offered wonderful opportunities to provide catch-phrases with which to characterise our age.
Francis Fukuyama’s triumphalist announcement of the dawn of a New Order, is a prime example. But the end of communism did not augur either the end of history or the end of ideology. Nor, despite appearances, does it portend its alarmist ideological counterpart, Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilisations”.

The demise of the Soviet Union, which was wholly unanticipated by the strategists who were paid to foresee such things, ought probably to have entailed the winding up of the realist school of international relations. Instead, the mantra of globalisation arrived as a saviour, not only for the right, which readily embraced the idea of minimal states and unbounded markets, but also for those on the left who feared the unrestrained spread of multi-national capitalism. It did not take long, however, for the theoretical limitations and empirical weaknesses of the globalisation model to become apparent. 9/11 posed a particular challenge because it entailed an unprecedented tightening up of national borders and a powerful restatement of national sovereignty. It also focussed attention on the Molloch of Globalisation, the Imperial Republic of the United States (whose response to terrorist attack serves as a reminder that global pretensions and rampant nationalism can all too easily coexist). The inadequacies of globalisation as an explanatory model have therefore encouraged a more scaled down version of the thesis, in particular, the notion that 21st century America is replicating 19th century Britain as an imperial power.

In the not too distant future we may look back on such attempts to define the epoch as symptoms of a more general millenial anxiety, heightened by the breakdown of a bipolar world, propelled by the revolution in information technology, and fuelled by a fracturing of belief in binary logic and enlightenment (of which post-modernism is both cause and symptom). Fear, and often irrational fear, seems to be a defining feature of the current age – yet we lack even the most rudimentary capacity to gauge or calibrate collective danger: Was human life more or less threatened in the cold war world of mutually assured nuclear destruction than it is now in the shadow of the twin towers; Can we comprehend the threat of global climate change? Did we really believe on the eve of the millenium that Y2K would threaten civilisation as we knew it?

Happily, the sense of radical uncertainty that pervades the post-modern millennium has been good to the guild of history. In Britain, so-called “telly-dons” like Simon Schama, David Starkey, and Niall Ferguson have succeeded in restoring a breach between popular and academic history by virtue of their skilful reassertion of narrative order. Evocations of Britain’s wartime role – and its empire – have the capacity to offer comforting views of the past, often laced with nostalgia. In the hands of Niall Ferguson, Britain’s mostly benevolent empire provides moral absolution for the past together with instructive lessons for the future. For Ferguson, and others like him, the problem with America is not that it is an imperial power but that it is not imperial enough. The shrewd formulation of Slavoj Žižek is closer to the mark: in his view the problem “is not
that the US is a new global empire, but that it isn’t one, though it pretends to be. In fact
the US continues to act as a nation state, ruthlessly pursuing its own interests”.

Our analysis of empire depends to a large extent upon what we mean by it. The great
commonwealth historian Keith Hancock argued that “imperialism” is a word “so arro-
gantly and capriciously used that it has become a positive hindrance to thought” – and
advised scholars against its use. But we cannot banish a word simply because we do not
like it; it is more helpful instead to consider how changing meanings and uses of the
term may be indicative of broad shifts in historical understanding.

In Britain, the idea of empire once meant simply the United Kingdom. Imperialism
was frowned upon, not only because it was a disagreeable abstract noun – and a con-
cept at that – but because of its association with strutting continental dictatorships,
a contempt for liberty, and a lust for military glory. In the mid-19th century, Britons
despised the regime of Louis Bonaparte, which was said to exemplify the evils of im-
perialism. It was therefore “entirely possible for patriotic, freedom-loving Englishmen
to love the British empire while simultaneously hating imperialism – and praying that
it might never cross the Channel to threaten their homeland.”

As the so-called sec-
ond and third British empires developed, a distinction was drawn between the white
dominions of Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand (where forms of re-
sponsible self-government were envisaged from as early as the 1830s and 40s) and the
dependent empire (eg. India and Africa) where liberty and self-government were seen
as distant possibilities at best.

The word “imperialism” began to be used more widely during the late 1870s when it
came to serve as a slogan against the British prime minister Disraeli. But it was only in
1878, when the term “jingo” was coined as part of a wave of fierce patriotic sentiment
prompted by the Russian advance towards Constantinople, that imperialism came to
be adopted as a term of approbation. And yet the view that Britain was not by na-
ture or tradition an imperial power persisted. It was partly in order to challenge this
happy state of national denial that the Oxford historian John Robert Seeley famously
declared in 1883, at the height of the scramble for Africa, that the British seemed to
have “conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind”. Seeley wished
to remind his contemporaries that empire was a serious reality and that the ideal of a
“Greater Britain”, a term originally proposed by Charles Dilke, ought to be pursued vig-
orously. Seeley also wanted to show that empire embodied progress and moral purpose:
in particular it marked the victory of liberty and free institutions over despotism and
backwardness.

In 1878 Gladstone denounced the Tories for having “drunk deeply of the intoxicating
beverage of [what he called] the new Imperialism”\textsuperscript{10}. Increasingly, however, imperialism was adopted as a badge of honour. Liberals like Rosebery, who had previously de-
nounced imperialism as a version of oriental despotism, now embraced the idea of an
ethically-based imperial mission. By the late 1890s many liberals had become proud imperialists. Thus, in just 20 years “the word had changed” from a term of “abuse” to something approaching a “national gospel”. Its reversion to a term of moral revulsion was mainly a result of the Boer War which reopened party divisions, this time on the question of imperialism’s relationship to capitalism.

Imperialism, understood in its secondary, economic sense, was probably first used in 1898, in the United States, during the Spanish-American War which led to America’s annexation of the Philippine Islands – and, indeed, Guantánamo Bay. Norman Etherington has shown how the Bostonian editor of a weekly newspaper, the “United States Investor”, “announced his sudden conversion to the cause of ‘imperialism’”, while observing that the word was “new to [the] political vocabulary”. Like most of the financial press, the “Investor” had favoured peace up to this point, on the familiar grounds that war was bad for commerce. Saving “oppressed Cubans from the atrocious rule of the senile Spanish empire did not seem to be a principle worth fighting for”. During the course of the Spanish war, the editor changed his mind, and in an article headlined “The Benefit of the War to Commercial and Financial Interest – How the Thing Will Work”, argued that war served to stimulate business by opening up new fields for investment, trade and government contracts. A lengthy discussion ensued in which arguments outlining the economic advantages of imperialism were frankly admitted.

Just a year later, in 1899, the outbreak of hostilities in South Africa offered fresh opportunities to debate the merits of imperialism. One of the leading opponents of the war was J.A. Hobson, a radical liberal journalist and economist, who published *Imperialism: A Study* in 1902. Hobson blamed the Boer or South African War on the machinations of a clique of financiers and politicians who were seeking to gain control of the fabulous gold riches of the Transvaal. Abetted by a kept press and by means of clever appeals to jingoistic nationalism, this clique – in which Jews were said to be especially prominent – had been able to persuade the nation that the war was being fought in the interests of all Britons, whereas in fact the war benefited the class and institutional interests of only a tiny minority. Hobson’s economic analysis of capitalist imperialism was taken seriously. It was refined by Marxist theoreticians like Bukharin, Kautsky and Luxemburg, but most importantly by Lenin, who linked imperialism with the development of monopoly capitalism. For Lenin, it was the monopoly phase of capitalism that had made the First World War inevitable. Because imperialism was the “highest stage of capitalism” – the title of his famous 1916 wartime tract – it also signalled the imminent collapse of the capitalist system.

This brief exegesis of the word “imperialism” resonates strongly with contemporary discussions. Not only is it evident that terms like “liberal imperialism”, the “new imperialism” and “capitalist imperialism” were all debated at length a century ago, it is also striking that the principal protagonists of these discussions were journalists, politicians and historians – and that Britain and the United States were in the forefront of their
thoughts. Just as the Victorians referred back to the Roman Empire for guidance – Gibbon’s *Decline and Fall*, written at the time of the American Revolution, was a common reference point – so our more reflective commentators today look back to the British empire. Some see the current situation as a re-enactment of the hubris of Suez. Others, with longer memory spans, look back for guidance to the British conquest of Egypt and the Sudan in the 1880s, or, indeed, the occupation of Iraq after the First World War.

At least as compelling an historical example is provided by the Anglo-Boer (or South African) War of 1899-1902, which, for many historians, marks the culmination of Britain’s 19th-century pretensions to global dominance and therefore stands as a key “test of empire”. On the vexed question of its causation most historians would agree that the desire to control the Transvaal’s gold is a vital if not a sufficient explanation of the war. But there can be little doubt that had this remote and mostly poor part of the African interior *not* been rich in gold, the British empire would probably have passed up the opportunity to fight what turned out to be its costliest war since the defeat of Napoleon. The case of Iraq may be explained similarly. Control of Middle Eastern oilfields is by no means the sole, or even the determining reason for these conflicts, but without the presence of oil it is very doubtful that Saddam Hussein would have been considered worth waging a war against by one Bush, let alone two.\(^15\)

If the underlying structural reasons for the Boer and Iraq wars can be compared so, too, can their leading protagonists. The Boer war was provoked by a small tightly-knit group of politicians – men like Rhodes, Milner and Chamberlain – who were every inch the neo-cons of their day. Driven by a conviction that the British empire needed to renew itself in order to survive, these conservatives (in the case of Milner and Chamberlain, Liberal Unionists aligned with the Tories on account of their hostility to home rule for Ireland) were more than visceral reactionaries. They were calculating modernisers, and often conservative idealists, who relished the opportunity to reform the British nation and put it to the test. Their belief in Anglo-Saxon racial destiny may sound anachronistic today; but their promise that the British were destined to bring good government, economic progress and sound institutions to the rest of the world, sounds very familiar.

As a result of the actions of these 19th century neo-cons, Britain became committed to a war that involved nearly half a million imperial troops and which went on far longer than anticipated: the capture of Pretoria, far from ending the conflict, prompted the Boers to enter a prolonged phase of guerilla struggle. The horrors that this involved, which included farm-burnings and concentration camps, were the Abu Ghraibs and Guantánamo Bays of their day; such behaviour aroused widespread international condemnation and led to an admission by the Liberal Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman, that Britain had resorted to “methods of barbarism”.

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The Boer war deeply divided contemporary opinion. Within Britain pacifists, liberals, non-conformists and anti-capitalists took the moral high ground. They clashed with flag-waving patriots and jingoes who rushed to demonise the Boers. President Kruger, leader of the Transvaal Republic, was widely portrayed as a corrupt and tyrannical feudal potentate who had shamelessly denied British residents of the Transvaal their citizenship rights, so reducing them to the status of “helots”. The anti-war movement was rich in passionate anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist rhetoric. The likes of contemporary radicals like George Galloway, Tony Benn and John Pilger sound almost tepid by comparison with their radical forebears a century ago.

Just as today, the liberal left of a century ago was left divided and confused by events. Supporters of the Boer war included many reluctant imperialists, Fabians and socialists amongst them, whose generalised opposition to the manipulations of financiers and plutocrats came to be outweighed by a belief that Kruger had to go in the name of progress and civilisation. In the view of the Fabian intellectual Sidney Webb, for example, the Boer war was wholly unjust and yet wholly necessary. Bernard Shaw took a similar position and wrote Fabianism and the Empire to explain why. By contrast, trade-union aligned Labour MPs like Keir Hardie remained resolutely anti-imperial. 

A century on, these fierce debates resonate strongly in the British left’s condemnation of Tony Blair. They are reminiscent in many ways of the conflicts between 19th-century Liberal Imperialists of the Rosebery variety and opponents of imperialism, like Harcourt, who located themselves firmly in the anti-imperialist tradition of Cobden and Gladstone. While many protestant churches opposed the war, millenarian-minded Christians and evangelicals were quick to see the conflict as an “instrument of God’s judgement, in which Britain was [cast as] the Almighty’s agent”. Religious fundamentalism was evident here too.

For a conflict fought in a distant part of the world, the South African war aroused a huge international outcry. The era of telegraph despatches and mass journalism fed a hunger for news, heroes and scoops. The relief of the sieges of Ladysmith and Mafeking was accompanied by public orgies of patriotic rejoicing, which resulted in the entry into the English language of the verb “to maffick”. Some two hundred journalists, Winston Churchill, George Steevens, Leo Amery, Flora Shaw and Arthur Conan Doyle, among them, followed the action or embedded themselves with the troops. In Donal Lowry’s opinion, international views of the war were conditioned by the fact that “the British Empire had come to represent the highest stage of capitalist modernity” in what he calls the “first age of ‘globalisation’”. Contemporaries saw the conflict “as a struggle between two conflicting global ideologies: British imperialism and capitalism [on one side] versus anti-imperialism and nationalism [on the other]”. 

The war drew Canadians, New Zealanders and Australians in on the side of the British, though it was as much for their own developing sense of nationhood and self-esteem as
for the glory of the empire that representatives from the dominions were fighting. Beyond the empire, international pacifists and humanitarians found common cause with romantic nationalists, who idolised the Boers as noble savages or instinctive republicans. Volunteer detachments including French, Russian, German, Irish, Italian, Dutch, Scandinavians and Americans, fought on the side of the Boers. Irish republicans identified particularly closely with Boer fellow victims of British imperialism: one of these pro-Boer fighters was Major John MacBride of the Transvaal Irish Brigade. He went on to marry another passionate Boer sympathiser, Maud Gonne, ending up as a republican martyr in the 1916 Easter Rising\[19\].

John and Maud’s son, the Nobel prize-winner, anti-colonialist – and anti-apartheid activist – Sean MacBride, slowly broke with family tradition, left the IRA and emerged as a leading figure in the international anti-apartheid movement, though as late as 1954 he presented an ex-Boer rifle with Kruger’s profile carved on the stock to the South African High Commissioner to London\[20\]. Such was the curious bond between Irish and Boer republicanism. In 1986, there was a further twist to the MacBride story: Robert John MacBride, a “coloured” member of the ANC’s military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, was arrested and put on death row in South Africa for his role in the bombing of a Durban pub. By strange irony, Robert John turned out to be a direct descendant of John MacBride\[21\].

This compressed account of the three-generational story of the MacBrides serves as a reminder that anti-imperialism is an unstable and inconsistent ideology. Many high-minded pro-Boers ignored the trampling of African rights – which was in many ways the most important consequence of the post-war settlement. They only gradually woke up to this fact after the Second World War when Afrikaners became, all too conveniently for a forgetful British liberal conscience, the much mythologised white tribe of Africa. Attitudes to American imperialism betray similar inconsistencies and lie at the heart of American fury with pusillanimous Europe – France in particular. We should recall that the United States’ reluctance to enter the Second World War was strongly conditioned by its anti-colonial self-image and its disinclination to defend the British and French empires. Decolonisation and Vietnam changed all that. But the change in the imperial guard means that we might consider whether some of the more sanctimonious anti-American sentiments of today ought to be understood in terms of European discomfort at its diminished role in a post-colonial world.

Historical comparisons are never perfect and parallels can only be indicative. But, staying with the South African example, we may push the analogy one stage further in order to contrast the aftermath of British involvement in South Africa with the current situation in Iraq. Most historians would accept that Britain’s phase of hyper-imperialism came to a fairly abrupt end after the South African War. Almost a half century was to elapse before the independence of India set in motion a much wider process of decolonisation, yet the beginnings of the doubt and retreat that began this process can
be traced back to the bruising experience of the South African War. Only time will tell whether Iraq and Afghanistan mark the high point of American global influence, or the start of a new phase in America’s worldwide projection of power.22

One thing we can be relatively sure of is that Britain handled the reconstruction of South Africa rather better than the US coalition has managed in Iraq. Just eight years after the treaty that ended the conflict, South Africa became a self-governing (but effectively independent) unitary state under the leadership of two ex-Boer War generals, Botha and Smuts. For some historians this proved that Britain won the war only to lose the peace. This conclusion is oversimplified. Although Britain lost direct control of the country after 1910, vital economic and strategic interests were secured eg., British use of the naval base at Simonstown and significant holdings in the mining and industrial sector. In both world wars South Africa fought on the side of the empire, notwithstanding massive opposition from hard-line Afrikaner republicans. Jan Smuts duly became a stalwart of the Commonwealth, perhaps its most lionised figure. He helped to inspire the Covenant of the League of Nations and had a hand in the making of the United Nations too. One of Smuts’ great adversaries in South Africa was Mahatma Gandhi, who volunteered as a stretcher bearer for the British during the South African War and began his early experiments in passive resistance while opposing the South African government’s moves to restrict Indian land ownership in the Transvaal.

Though the trajectories of their lives could not be more different, Smuts and Gandhi went on to play key roles as post-colonial nation-builders and both leaders enjoyed high regard as symbols of world freedom. Smuts’ claim to be a champion of freedom was, to say the least, narrowly based, and even Gandhi’s avatar has been tarnished. Yet, in different ways and in different circumstances Smuts and Gandhi both won their reputations through opposing imperialism and then coming to terms with it, in such a way that they helped to lay the foundations of a post imperial world. It is unlikely that the Karzais and Allawis, lacking popular legitimacy and hastily shuttled into government by a nervous occupying power, will be remembered as anything other than American stooges. They have proved incapable of releasing America from its imperial entanglements. And this continues to be a source of great instability.

Broadening this discussion from the South African case study, historians of empire and commonwealth would cite several structural differences between Britain and America in their capacity as imperial powers. The first, and most striking, is that Britain was predominantly successful as a colonial occupying power. Britain’s informal empire, that is to say, its economic sphere of influence, stretched well beyond those parts of the map coloured in red: Latin America and parts of China in particular. But it is Britain’s accumulated record in colonial governance that distinguishes it most acutely from America’s limited experience of direct rule. The United States’ global reach is most forcefully expressed in terms of economic, military and cultural influence and only to a very limited extent through formal territorial acquisition.
The standard distinction between imperialism and colonialism, alluded to here, is often lost in contemporary discussions. Direct foreign rule is very different from diffuse notions of hegemony or influence. These qualitatively different forms of domination provoke qualitatively different responses. Britain’s colonial empire, it should be remembered, developed over centuries. As a small island on the north-western fringes of Europe, it could only spread incrementally through forging alliances with indigenous elites and powers. It is astonishing to consider that British India was governed by a tiny cadre of approximately 1,000 professional administrators attached to the Indian Civil Service. Kenya, in 1947, was administered by fewer than 200 colonial officers.

Underlying the “thin white line” of colonial administration was the system of Indirect Rule. This version of the “light touch” was a form of administration whereby power was diffused through local intermediaries and functionaries. It was status-based and strongly hierarchical. The time-honoured practice of Divide and Rule meant that competing subject groups generally neutralised each other, while the army or police ensured that the balance of power was maintained in favour of colonial authority – the so-called pax Britannica.

Historians of empire rightly lay stress on the importance of collaboration with indigenous peoples. The word has an intriguing double-meaning since collaboration can imply cooperation as well as complicity. Either way, the fact of mutual dependence meant that Britain’s subject peoples often enjoyed considerable autonomy. Studies of the so-called dependent empire in Africa and India have devoted a great deal of attention to the complex forms of social and historical agency that determined the real lived relations of colonisers and colonised. Domination was seldom complete, hegemony had constantly to be achieved. The subaltern was neither silent nor passive. Another way of putting this is that the British empire, though relatively weak, was resilient, because it mostly recognised the limits of its power. Indeed, if success is measured by longevity and endurance, the most successful empires may be said to be characterised by the possession of decisive rather than absolute power.

This paradox does not seem to be sufficiently appreciated by those who either romanticise the British empire or seek to shape a putative American empire in the image of its British forerunner. Both Niall Ferguson’s claim that America should wake up to its imperial responsibilities by learning from the British, and Robert Nye’s suggestion that America should adopt techniques of “soft power” based on gentle persuasion, sit uneasily with the fact that America is a superpower which currently dominates the world as no nation-state ever has before; moreover, the United States seems more comfortable with being a super- than a supra-national state. Unless the United States seeks to become a colonial empire, which is extremely doubtful, there are few compelling reasons for it to exercise power through subtle forms of hegemony, and probably not enough time to do so in any case, before its outright economic and military supremacy is challenged by countries like China. One might add that another vital ingredient for
colonial-style empires has gone: the existence of intricate pre-modern social hierarchies with their supporting cultural tissue of deference and paternalism. These structures allowed the British to imagine their empire as a vast feudal estate and facilitated colonial officers’ interaction with, and understanding of, parallel local elites. Plainly, such relations no longer pertain in an age where global democratic consumerism and nationalist assertion have expunged forever the mystique of power and position that David Cannadine refers to as “ornamentalism”.

No mainstream British historian has done more to foreground the question of empire in recent years than Niall Ferguson. His study of the British empire has not been well received by experts in the field. But, whatever one concludes about his overly sympathetic and often nostalgic interpretation of Britain’s apparently liberal empire, Ferguson has rendered an important service by restoring the topic to a central position in British and European history, not least in his view of the world wars as imperial conflagrations. Indeed, if one dispenses with the introduction and conclusion to Ferguson’s provocatively titled *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* – whose calculated iconoclasm is often at odds with the evidence he adduces – we are left with nothing less than a compelling and mostly sensible reading of key works in imperial and commonwealth history.

Hopefully, this is indicative of a reconnection between the spheres of (domestic) British and imperial historiography. For much of the 20th century, and certainly in the post-war era, the imperial and British historians had little to say to each other. The experience of decolonisation in the 1950s and 60s, and the sense of national failure that attended it, had the effect of reinforcing traditions of historical “little Englands”, a term which came to prominence during the Boer war and which carries with it the idea that empire is an excrescence, an aberration, or merely an embarrassment in the long sweep of English history. Interestingly, “Little Englandism” enjoys both a left and a right wing pedigree: its left-wing strain can be traced from the laissez faire and pacifist doctrines of Cobden and Bright, through J.A. Hobson, John Morley and Goldwin Smith, and also in the writings of A.J.P. Taylor who regarded the empire as being of little consequence to Britain’s domestic story. Such insular reflexes are also apparent in a great deal of cultural and social history or “history from below”, not least in attempts to argue that ordinary people cared little for empire in their daily lives.

For the political right the idea of the English (or British) as an “island race”, fortuitously separated from Europe and naturally superior to it, has had obvious appeal. (“Minding Britain’s Business” was a popular slogan of the British Union of Fascists during the 1930s). Inter-war appeasement drew on similar assumptions. In Max Beloff’s view, “The British were not an imperially-minded people; they lacked both a theory of empire and the will to engender and implement one.” End of story.
Fortunately, this is not the end of the story. In 1975 the New Zealand-born intellectual historian J.G.A. Pocock wrote a powerful manifesto in which he criticised A.J.P. Taylor’s wilful insularity, arguing instead that British history should be written in terms of the “intercultural” story of “conflict and crossbreeding between societies differently based”\(^3\). Since then groundbreaking works have been published by leading historians including Linda Colley, David Cannadine, Norman Davies and Catherine Hall\(^3\). To this list one should add the names of a younger generation of historians amongst whom we should number Andrew Thompson, Stuart Ward, Alan Lester and Zoë Laidlaw. One of the important messages of these writers is that British identity cannot be understood by reference to the United Kingdom alone\(^3\). Britons made themselves both in relation to Europe and in the context of their imperial experience. One of the functions of empire was to provide a broad stage for the expression and performance of Britishness, and within that notions of Irishness, Scottishness – as well as that most understated but persistent of nationalisms, Englishness. This was well understood by late-19th-century commentators like J.A. Froude and Anthony Trollope who toured the empire in order to promote and to reflect upon the meaning of British national identity. Rudyard Kipling famously put this in terms of a rhetorical question: “What should they know of England who only England know?”

In the field of social history, the work of John Mackenzie and the Manchester University Press series that he inspired, deserve special mention. Mackenzie’s original collection on popular imperialism has been followed by studies on imperial propaganda, on literature and theatre, soldiering, masculinity, gender, travel, medicine, science, hunting and conservation. Linking these diverse contributions is the simple but surely incontestible claim that imperialism “had as significant an effect on the dominant as on the subordinate societies”\(^3\).

The latest British-based scholarship seeks to cast the imperial experience in global terms, stressing empire – or empires – as fields of interaction, of mutual influences, of complex networks and circuits. Christopher Bayly’s major intervention into global history, *The Birth of the Modern World: Global Connections and Comparisons* (2004), is an outstanding example. John Darwin’s *After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire* (2007) is another major study. Bayly encourages us to transcend the limits of national history and to adopt a multi-centric view of world historical change, one that does not assume the rise of western dominance and is ever alert to challenges to such dominance. His work begins in the era of the French revolution and ends in 1914, but it speaks eloquently to our moment: it poses radical questions about cherished Western presumptions and adds analytical sophistication as well as time-depth to contemporary concerns with globalisation, modernity, religion and imperialism. There are few better demonstrations of how the study of history, rooted in context but expansive, global and international in scope, can serve as a guide to our understanding of the present\(^3\).
A conspicuous weakness of metropolitan-based theories of globalisation is the tendency to view the non-European world in homogenous, totalising terms – which is ironical given the professed identification of anti-globalists with the mute victims of imperialism. Sadly, quite a lot of the literature inspired by Edward Said’s orientalist thesis, and a great deal of writing on globalisation, unwittingly reproduce these totalising tendencies, seemingly oblivious to what should be self-evident: that only a grounded historical, anthropological, and literary engagement with extra-European societies can explain and understand their particularity. There are simply no short-cuts. As Anthony Hopkins puts it, if globalisation is to be more than a reprise of “the rise of the West – and the fall of the rest” only a truly global history of globalisation will suffice.

This point underlines the need to understand global (and imperial) history at multiple societal levels. One of the weaknesses of Niall Ferguson’s “anglobalisation” approach is that it is mainly concerned with the outward spread of ideas, institutions, and financial systems from the towering heights of imperial policy and practice. The top-down approach means that there is far too little attention to zones of interaction at multiple levels and at different scales. The successes of British imperialism until mid-way through the 20th century, such as they were, had much to do with its appreciation of the power of what were termed “traditional societies” and, indeed, the capacity of the colonial state to manipulate such knowledge. This was an intrinsic assumption of the cultural relativism that underwrote indirect rule with its accompanying slogans of the Dual Mandate and the White Man’s Burden.

Ferguson ends his most recent book on American imperialism, Colossus: The price of America’s Empire, with wistful quotes from Kipling’s White Man’s Burden (though he covers himself by saying that such archaic language may not be appropriate for the building of the 21st-century liberal American empire that he so heartily endorses). He charges American policy-makers, who “lack the imperial cast of mind”, with a failure to see their project through and advises that note should be taken of British precedents. But Ferguson seems wilfully ignorant of the fact that indirect rule, which formed the basis of its empire in Africa and India, dissolved as a direct consequence of the very capitalist market relations that he so fulsomely welcomes. Nor does he recognise that industrialisation, urbanisation and market-based modernity created the conditions within which modern mass nationalism could flourish. Ferguson fails to appreciate this because his view of empire remains entirely metro-centric and top-down: it is a perspective that allows him to avoid any consideration of the internal dynamics of what he and others so glibly dismiss as the third world’s “failed states”.

The British colonial office made similar miscalculations in the post-war era. So certain and, indeed, dependent was the British empire on the otherness of the other, that it was confounded when modern nationalists wrong-footed their masters by speaking back in the language of universal rights and freedoms. Paradoxically, American imperialism in its neo-conservative guise is vulnerable for precisely the opposite reason: it inhabits
a manichean world of good and bad, one that takes no account of the history, culture, language or values of those it seeks so eagerly to convert to individual freedom and collective democracy. It is captive to Iraqi and Afghan leaders who cynically parrot its mantras but blind to, and hastily dismissive of those who do not. Iraq provides a paradigm example of this self-deceiving cultural and historical tunnel vision. For this reason as well as a host of others, the neo-conservative vision of America’s global destiny is manifestly bound to end in failure even more rapidly than its earlier, British model.

NOTES
1 My thanks to Mary Harris and Donal Lowry for their comments on this text.
2 Why we Still Need Empires in “The Observer”, 7 April 2002; or see the journalism of Christopher Hitchens, collected in A Long Short War: The Postponed Liberation of Iraq, New York 2003.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., p. 221.
13 Etherington, Theories cit., p. 7.
15 Cf. T. Benn, “The Guardian”, 22 September 2004: “The real reason for the invasion was to topple Saddam, seize the oil and establish permanent US bases to dominate the region. And we know that Tony Blair privately shared these objectives, and used the weapons issue to persuade parliament and public”.
19 D. Lowry, “The Boers were the beginning of the end”? The wider impact of the South African War, in Id. (ed.), The South African War Reappraised Manchester 2000, pp. 212-3.
20 Ibid., p. 239. Lowry, personal communication, points out that MacBride Jr wanted to commemorate the Irish Transvaal Brigade with a monument in Johannesburg in 1948. By the 1950s the IRA and the broader republican movement had ‘forgotten’ its pro-Boer past.
Europe and its Empires

21 E. Boehmer, in *Bloodlines*, Cape Town 2000, has told this remarkable story in novelistic form. One of her characters repeats as a refrain: “we carry our cocked-up history inside us.”


24 True, 19th-century nationalism and new imperialism were closely associated. But the “greater Britain” propounded by imperialists like Seeley was to a considerable extent intended to be trans-national.


26 Ferguson, *Empire* cit.


32 Note, however, that leading imperial and commonwealth historians like Peter Marshall and Shula Marks have themselves made similar points.

33 For a good statement of the new approach to Britishness and the “British World” as an integrated concept, see the special issue of the “Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History” 31, 2 (2003) edited by Carl Bridge and Kent Federowich.

34 General statement in “Studies in Imperialism” series.

35 Such work, one hopes, will help to counter a growing provincialism in British public life, from which universities are sadly not immune. As Martin Jacques has noted, it is paradoxical that while globalisation has “made the world interdependent to an extent never imagined in the past”, post-imperial Britain seems to be becoming “deeply parochial” and self-absorbed. Martin Jacques, *Our problem with abroad*, “The Guardian” 21 August 2004.


**Bibliography**


Tolerance and Non-discrimination Policies in the Multilingual European Union

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Abstract
Since 2007, there are 27 member states in the European Union, and 23 official languages co-exist as the official languages of this unprecedented supra-national formation. If the other languages spoken within the EU borders – regional, minority, immigrant ones – are added, there are about 200 different idioms represented in the European language landscape. The project of European integration will be successful only if Europe’s linguistic diversity is preserved and promoted. Many cultural achievements of Europe are closely linked to the achievements of specific languages and intellectual traditions. If these languages were no longer used, this would mean a serious depletion and loss of Europe’s cultural diversity. European citizens will support the idea of an integrated Europe only if their own linguistic and cultural heritage, present and future, is part of it. Most European languages function in language contact situations, and in addition to people’s mother tongues, other languages also have direct impact on the life of every citizen. Multilingualism refers to both person’s ability to communicate in more than one language (individual multilingualism or plurilingualism) and the co-existence of different language communities in one geographic area (societal multilingualism). Multilingualism has been officially proclaimed an integral part of the present and future development of Europe. However, the mechanisms for full-fledged protection of languages under processes of European integration and multilingualism need further elaboration. Over the past two decades the protection of language rights has been increasingly associated with fundamental human rights thus creating the concept of linguistic human rights. Non-discriminatory language practices in the EU are still being developed. The basic principles have often been discussed – how the general EU documents should be improved in order to reflect economic and ethnodemographic diversity of the member states and ensure linguistic human rights for all citizens. This study analyses the sociolinguistic situation in the European Union against the background of the EU language policies. In order to demonstrate the impact of coordination of EU and national language policy the Latvian case has been chosen.
Ina Druviête

INTRODUCTION
During the second half of the 20th century, two contradictory tendencies took place. One was the intensification of the globalization of all aspects of human life and the second was the continuing affirmation of special human identities. These developments are clearly visible in two major areas: 1) the development of ethnic and national identities, and 2) the evolution of identities based on particular ideologies and religions. A great number of factors can challenge language as the backbone of identity: supranational corporations, free flow of goods, services and working-force, migration, international mass media etc. There is one more identity which is not mentioned very often among other identities – the identity of economic well-being. It has a direct impact on language. People who identify themselves with a particular language, which does not...
enjoy high economic value, are forced to use a language with higher economic value, at least in some spheres. However, the trends of globalization and linguistic imperialism have brought forth a counter phenomenon. The number of organizations and movements protecting local identity is growing dramatically despite the logic of the market. In this confusion of global networks and local identities language plays a critical role. Language is the last bastion of resistance and self-control, not just a tool of entrepreneurship. The preservation of the linguistic identity of a particular territory is the only way to ensure the protection of linguistic diversity in the world.

Over the past two decades the protection of language rights has increasingly been associated with fundamental human rights thus creating the concept of linguistic human rights. At an individual level language rights, imply the right of every person “to identify positively with their mother tongue, and to have that identification respected by others”\(^1\). At the collective level it means the right of peoples to maintain their ethnolinguistic identity and alterity. These and other more specific standards are directed against the assimilation of communities using languages with less market value and against so-called linguicism – ideologies, structures, and practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate, regulate, and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (both material and immaterial) between groups which are defined on the basis of language.

**Principles of Non-discriminatory Language Practices**

Aiming at realising a space of freedom, liberty and justice in Europe, the Union’s objectives like democracy and solidarity, equality and non-discrimination, efficiency and good administration, safeguarding cultural identities and protecting smaller linguistic communities have also to be recognised in language use between people (communication) in their daily fields of activities and to be guaranteed in a constitutional framework of the European Union.

Non-discriminatory language practices in the EU are still being developed. The basic principles have often been discussed (e.g. during European Parliament Hearing “Effects and Consequences of Linguistic Discrimination” on 2-3 July 2007). The eight main principles were proposed already in 2003\(^2\):

1. Everybody is free in the choice of the language for communication with others, “*but in the communication with public services and authorities, everyone has to conform with the legal and linguistic provisions that are applied at the place concerned*” (*territorial principle*).
2. In the private sphere, everybody has the right to communicate in the language of his/her choice, *but*, those standing for election to public office should master communication in the local language(s) and recognise the legal and linguistic provisions of the place concerned (*principle of integration*).
3. In the field of private activities, everyone can organise his/her communication in the language of his/her preference, *but*, in dealing with public authorities, everyone’s lan-
guage use (communication) has to be in conformity with the legal and linguistic provisions in force at the place concerned (principle of local self-government).

4. In the internal organization of one’s own business, everyone is free to determine the language of communication, but, in applying for a job, everyone has to meet the professional requirements including the necessary linguistic qualification for communication required for the activity concerned by the employing firm, association or institution (principle of professional qualification).

5. Communication within public services and administration in Member States depends on the legal and constitutional framework of the country concerned (principle of subsidiarity).

6. Communication of the Institutions of the European Union should be non-discriminatory, rational and efficient; therefore, as general guideline it can be said that external communication towards the citizen and within the framework of a political mandate has to cover all official languages of the Union, while internal communication needs a common means of communication; as long as such a working language consists of a national language, discrimination in communication persists (distinction between external ‘citizen’ communication and internal ‘professional’ communication).

7. As long as discrimination in the internal communication of the institutions of the Union does exist, the competent bodies at the Union level and the education authorities in the Member States should undertake research in the field of a non-discriminatory system such as a universal language model (planned language), its conditions, capacities and limits, to support feasibility studies and to facilitate language experiments with view to ultimately resolving the remaining discrimination in internal and inter-ethnic communication (principle of equality and non-discrimination).

8. Finally, it is in the responsibility of the competent authorities in the Member States and of the competent bodies at the European level to co-ordinate best practices in this field, to organise the necessary language instruction in schools, to offer and guarantee diversity in language learning, and, finally, to safeguard the cultural and linguistic identities within this multilingual Union (principle of diversity in unity).

MULTILINGUALISM, LANGUAGE ACQUISITION, PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

The years 2000/2001 have become a symbolic watershed between past and present, and the ongoing processes of globalization and technological revolution urge humankind to find new models for interaction between economy and personality development. In this early part of the 21st century we find ourselves re-evaluating language policies in both EU and its member states – how they respond to the changing world. The Lisbon goals may be implemented only by developed personalities having multiple intelligences (not only intellectual, but also emotional, aesthetic, moral and spiritual qualities) and high order cognitive skills. The key competences are necessary prerequisites to guarantee conditions favourable to the individual’s personal fulfilment, active citizenship and social, cultural and professional integration. In “Recommendation of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 18 December 2006 in key competences for lifelong learning (2006/962/EC), these competences are defined as a combination of knowledge, skills and attitudes appropriate to the context. Key competences are those which all individuals need for personal fulfilment and development, active citizenship, social inclusion and employment.

The Reference Framework sets out eight key competences:

1) Communication in the mother tongue
2) Communication in foreign languages
3) Mathematical competence and basic competences in science and technology
4) Digital competence
5) Learning to learn
6) Social and civic competences
7) Sense of initiative and entrepreneurship and
8) Cultural awareness and expression

At least four of these core competences involve language and linguistic identity dimensions which are necessary to protect and to promote the humanistic values shared by our societies. The task of the European educational systems is to form linguistic personalities able to communicate in their mother tongue (“to express and interpret concepts, thoughts, feelings, facts and opinions in both oral and written form [listening, speaking, reading and writing], and to interact linguistically in an appropriate and creative way in a full range of societal and cultural contexts; in education and training, work, home and leisure”) and in foreign languages, “according to one’s wants or needs. Communication in foreign languages also calls for skills such as mediation and intercultural understanding. An individual’s level of proficiency will vary between the four dimensions (listening, speaking, reading and writing) and between the different languages, and according to that individual’s social and cultural background environment, needs and/or interests”. In other words, the recommendations ask the educational systems to develop multilingualism and a harmonious balance between globalization, internationalization and European integration, on the one hand, and cultural and linguistic identity, and sovereignty of the member states, on the other hand.

The protection and preservation of the diversity of languages was first mentioned as a conceptual goal in the “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”. Respect for the diversity of the Union’s languages is a founding principle of the European Union. The European motto “United in diversity” includes a strategic approach which has to be incorporated to detail in legislative acts and programmes, e.g. Guide for the Development of Language Education policies in Europe (2002), the strategic plan Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity: An Action Plan 2004-2006 adopted in July 2003, A New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism (COM(2005)596 final). The EU Commissioner responsible for multilingual issues identified languages as an integral part
of lifelong learning enabling an effective intercultural dialogue. However, the mechanisms for robust protection of languages under processes of European integration and multilingualism need further elaboration. Robert Phillipson clearly indicates this point in a recent study of European language policies: “One of the paradoxes of language policy in the EU institutions is that languages are often regarded as purely practical, technical matters, while at the same time they are fundamental to personal, group and national identity and national interests.”

Language, or linguistic identity, occupies a special place in the complex structure of multiple identities. In order to describe this type of identity several questions have to be answered. Is linguistic identity identical or separate from ethnic identity? Are there significant differences among ethnic groups? What is the role of supranational organizations? New EU countries must be taken into account, giving rise to new needs in terms of specialised communication that makes speakers of not so widespread languages unsure of their future prospects. Europe has built its cultural identity on two instruments: Latin and the Christian religion. Is English as *lingua franca* becoming a new linguistic identity element?

Certain criticisms have been directed towards an overly general approach to languages that ignores their sociolinguistic differences (“ideal state” and “ideal language learner” concepts, which remind one of N. Chomsky’s “ideal speaker-listener” hypothesis). Are there grounds for such criticism, and how should the general documents be improved in order to reflect economic and ethno-demographic diversity of the member-states? Let us analyse the sociolinguistic situation in the European Union against the background of the EU language policies.

**LINGUISTIC IDENTITY IN THE EU**

According to one of the possible classifications the languages spoken in the EU can be divided as follows:

1. Official and working languages (23 since 2007, including the former “Treaty language”, Irish)
2. Language with special status in the programmes (Luxembourgish)
3. Regional and minority languages: 45 ‘less used languages’ in the old member states, and an unknown number in new member states
4. Non-territorial languages (Yiddish, Romani)
5. Diaspora languages of refugees and labour migrants

According to Robert Phillipson, in “principle, what happens to languages in each member state is exclusively their own concern … However, it would be naive to assume that each EU state is a linguistic island, and that EU policies do not impact on all European languages.” It is estimated that between 60 and 80 percent of national legislation in Eu-
Tolerance and Non-discrimination Policies in the Multilingual European Union

Europe has been harmonized with the EU and it is necessary to develop both dimensions: centralized EU activities and activities in the member states.

The actual positions of these languages depend on several factors, for instance:

1. Number of speakers (including second language speakers)
2. Development of economy in the country
3. Market for goods and services in the language
4. Regional status, traditional use and learning in neighbouring countries
5. Linguistic development (standardization, terminology, software etc.)

Most of the new member states’ languages have considerably fewer speakers than the old member states’ languages. The power of the most-spoken languages (English, French, German, Spanish and Italian) in the EU has been strengthened by great numbers of speakers worldwide and by developed traditions of teaching and learning these languages as second languages.

Of the new languages, only Polish, Romanian, Czech and Hungarian are more or less quantitatively competitive as concerns first language speakers. None of the newcomers’ languages have developed traditions of teaching as a foreign language abroad, as has been demonstrated in Eurobarometer surveys. The fact that only five ‘major’ languages have been chosen for creation of a “European Survey on Language Competence” as a means to collect the data necessary to construct a European level indicator tends to deepen the gap between the ‘widely taught’ and ‘less widely taught’ EU official languages. We also have to pay attention to the fact that several member states may share a common official language (therefore there are 27 member states, but only 23 official languages) and that not all the inhabitants of the respective states are native or even second-language speakers of the official language. The percentage of minorities also varies considerably among EU member states (e.g., it is 5 percent in Austria, Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Poland, while it is more than 40 percent in Estonia and Latvia). Thus, the inappropriate application of Western European minority language rights standards to post-imperial language situations in Eastern Europe has caused serious problems for some new member states’ languages. “Small languages may find that to avoid being overwhelmed by outside intervention,” argues Uldis Ozolins, “they need to have an articulated defence based upon a thorough appreciation of their own linguistic situation.”

The main factors influencing perception of linguistic identity are the existence of supranational political and economic formations, the distribution of international mass media, an ideology which evaluates languages from the point of view of market economy, youth culture and sport, extensive foreign language teaching, humanitarian aid, especially in post-communist countries, and asymmetrical supranational cooperation. Most of these elements are present in the “new” member states whose languages mostly belong to so-called “less widely used” ones.
Taking into account all these aspects we could state that the small official languages of the EU form a special group which are insufficiently protected by market forces (as so-called international languages) or by international declarations, charters or conventions (as minority languages). This means that it is appropriate to raise the issue of their future prospects. Will the respective communities be able to continue to use their language in the most significant sociolinguistic functions and to transmit it to the next generation under new circumstances? What is the role of the national governments, EU institutions and market forces in language maintenance or shift? In order to demonstrate the impact of coordination (or lack of coordination) of EU and national language policy the Latvian case has been chosen.

Language situation and language policy in Latvia: a case study

Two interlinked processes are taking place now: the integration of society in Latvia (linguistic integration against the background of the Latvian language skills) and integration of Latvia into the European Union (involving individual plurilingualism). Therefore the language planning strategy proceeds from the following principles: 1) an official language is both the symbol of the state and an instrument for integration of society: learning and using the Latvian language is one of the main factors which ensures the stability of a multilingual state; 2) ensuring all inhabitants of Latvia the possibility to study and to use the Latvian language in order to promote the integration of the society; 3) supporting the learning and use of the minority languages in Latvia; 4) ensuring the possibility to study foreign languages in order to stimulate readiness for communication in a foreign language and integration into European structures.

Education in national minority languages is a precondition for maintaining the cultural identity of national minorities in Latvia. The Latvian government provides education in eight national minority languages, even where only a small number of children are seeking instruction in a certain language. State financed secondary education in Latvia is available in these eight national minority languages: Russian, Polish, Hebrew, Ukrainian, Estonian, Lithuanian, Roma and Belarussian. Courses in state financed universities are conducted in Latvian, while a number of private educational institutions have language(s) of instruction other than Latvian. In the 2006-7 school year, 727 schools use Latvian as the sole language of instruction, 148 schools use Russian (implementing a bilingual education programme), and in 92 schools the language of instruction is both Latvian and Russian (bilingual education programme; these are schools where there are both Latvian and national minority classes). In four schools instruction is given in Polish, at one in Ukrainian, and at one in Belarussian. In one Estonian and in one Lithuanian school some subjects are taught in the national minority language. In two schools Roma is taught as an optional subject.

The Government urges minority organizations to be socially active and to promote linguistic tolerance and understanding as essential elements for a future conflict-free
development of the country. Realistic evaluation of the history and the present position of languages in Latvia would allow one to make the prognosis on the future perspectives in connection with objective ethno-demographic, economic, political processes in the country, Europe and the world.

**EU LANGUAGE POLICY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS**

There is an urgent need for a more definite language policy in the European Union, taking into account sociolinguistic realities in the Union: different economic (market) value of the official languages, historically established unofficial linguistic hierarchies, competition among the ‘major’ languages and different position of languages among identity elements. Language, or linguistic identity, occupies a special place in the complex structure of multiple identities. In order to describe this type of identity several questions have to be answered. Is linguistic identity identical or separate from the ethnic identity? Are there significant differences among ethnic groups? What is the role of supranational organisations, including the EU? What will the effects of the expansion of the European Union be on EU language policy? And, above all, what will be the long-term effects of language and language policy on European citizens’ future? Is English as *lingua franca* becoming a new linguistic identity element? The role of widespread bilingualism and multilingualism must be studied.

It is important to pay more attention to the language dimension of the European identity. More cooperation among sociolinguists, politicians, teachers, representatives of NGOs, journalists, etc., would be welcomed. It is also necessary to develop the principle of mutual responsibility: any restriction of the rights, for instance, of Latvian, would mean the precedent for restriction of Finnish, Lithuanian, Slovene and other smaller official languages. The task of educational systems is not only to teach languages, but also to debunk common myths (excessive costs of EU language services, the benefits of one or few EU languages, harmful effect of bilingualism etc.). The common citizenship of the Union, the freedom to move and to settle within the territory of the Union, the right of every EU citizen to participate, among others, at the place of their main residence in municipal elections and the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality require a non-ambiguous formulation of communication rights and duties of the different actors in the European Union.

By 2010, Europe should be the world leader in terms of the quality of its education and training systems thanks to fundamental transformation of education and training throughout Europe. This process of change will be carried out in each country according to national contexts and traditions and will be driven forward by cooperation between Member States at European level. The philosophical guidelines of the European Union language policy towards multilingualism and language protection are evident – languages are an asset, the backbone of the national and European identity. The Eu-
European Union is by definition a multicultural, multilingual and multinational Community of people. Non-discriminatory communication between citizens of different mother tongues is a crucial element of peaceful living together and of long-term political cohesion of the Union.

NOTES
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Austria’s Neutrality and European Integration: A Conflict between International and National Spheres of Law

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ABSTRACT

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the concept of international law enjoyed a period of unprecedented prestige and cast its net to include aspects of international trade, environment, disarmament, and human rights issues. While the jurisdiction of international law had been mostly confined to the European continent before World War I, a substantial step in the direction of universality took place under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) during the process of decolonisation. Parallel to this universalisation, prominent developments also pointed towards an increasingly regionalised world system, above all in Western Europe.

With the burgeoning of international law, and its continuous expansion beyond the strictly political sphere, confrontation with domestic sovereignty became inevitable. The key question in such cases was the relation and the hierarchy between these two categories of law. What if they contradicted each other? Should international law override the national one? Numerous examples of this conflict have arisen since 1945 and ample theoretical concepts have been elaborated regarding these issues. This conundrum was (and is) especially acute within the context of European integration where, since 1957, a unique supra-national legal system has operated alongside those of the different member states. And, in certain instances, the former has overridden the latter.

This chapter focuses on just such a case. Austrian neutrality, and its ambivalent role in the fast-paced process of European integration, perfectly demonstrates the contingencies and intricacies of the relationship between international and national law. We will show how an evolutionary process of international and supranational law-making affected the domestic legal order in Austria and analyse how Austria’s political system tried to reconcile the requirements of neutrality with the advance of European integration. After some indispensable theoretical reflections on the relationship between international and national law and the concept of neutrality as a security policy for
small states, the history of Austrian neutrality will be outlined. We will explain how Austria, a small Central European country fully integrated into the European Union, has attempted to maintain its neutrality since the end of the Cold War. By way of an example, the reason why Austria has been reluctant fully to engage in the building of a common security policy for the European Union will be examined. We will then analyse how Austrian neutrality has been undermined and dismantled de facto as a consequence of its participation in the process of European integration. Finally, in order to explain the ambivalent stance of Austrian governments towards deeper integration in the field of European security policy, we will analyse neutrality as a domestic political phenomenon.


In verschiedenen Teilen der Welt haben Regionalismen diesen Prozess noch vertieft. Besonders signifikant war und ist diese Entwicklung in Westeuropa durch die europäische Integration. Die Entwicklung in Europa bis hin zur heutigen Europäischen Union hat auch dem Problem der konkurrierenden Rechtsordnungen, nämlich der nationalen und der internationalen, eine neue Bedeutung gegeben. Schließlich hat der Integrationsprozess ein (teilweise) supranationales Rechtswerk geschaffen, welches direkt in die nationalen Rechtsordnungen einwirkt und diese auch teilweise aufhebt.

Theoretical Observations

International and national law

Most legal historians agree that the era of international law began with the establishment of the modern state system following the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Its modern corpus was developed beginning in the middle of the 19th century and built upon theoretical reflections by scholars of the classic period of international law such as Jean Bodin (1530-1596) and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). The first World War and the creation in its aftermath of the League of Nations and other international bodies such as the International Labour Organization accelerated the process of international cooperation and law-making. Together they laid the foundation for the United Nations, which was established under the UN Charter in 1945. The UN codified new standards of international law, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, and under its aegis new international norms and organisations were created.

This trend has been deepened and widened through attempts at regional integration, best epitomized by the integration process in Europe. Today’s European Union is the only example to date of a fully-fledged, supra-national legal framework, in which sovereign nations have pooled part of their sovereignty within a system of courts and political institutions. It therefore constitutes a new legal order, a system sui generis. In short, since 1945, international law has developed as a distinct legal system with wholly new methods of law-making. Moreover, it has defined its own subjects and defined their rights and obligations.

The proper relation and hierarchy between international and domestic jurisdictions has been the subject of much controversy. This is due to the fact that international law today is not only confined to regulating relations between states. It also encompasses matters of social concern such as health, education, and economic policy. The underlying question is whether international law and national law (or to use the terminus technicus, municipal law) are considered to be one integral legal system or two distinct bodies. On this question scholars have traditionally been divided into two schools, the monistic and the dualistic. Monists have a unitary vision and see international and national law as integral parts of the same system. They therefore see transformation of international rules into national ones as unnecessary. In the event of conflict, most monists would contend that international law should prevail. This theory, which was propounded into a fully-fledged doctrine after the First World War by the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), argues that international law is at the top of the pyramid and can validate and/or invalidate all domestic legislation.

In contrast, dualists see national law and international law as independent of one another. International law regulates the relations between sovereign states, while domestic law regulates affairs internal to the state. Accordingly, dualists hold that the two systems are mutually exclusive and cannot impinge upon one another. For international
Andreas Gémes, Gudrun E. Ragossnig

directives to become binding on domestic authorities and individuals they must first be transformed into national law. In their view, international rules cannot alter or repeal national legislation and national laws cannot influence international rules. Thus, on this reading, no conflict can arise between international and domestic legal systems. Although recent scholarship has challenged the relevance of this separation between monism and dualism all introductory texts relating to international law still maintain the distinction. The two competing theories, among others, do not purport to offer any general explanation concerning the relationship between municipal and international law. Rather, they reflect different convictions about how the relationship between municipal and international law should be structured. They are thus not positive, but are merely normative in character.

Notwithstanding these theoretical reflections, the manner in which international law has been absorbed in practice by individual nation-states has always been a purely domestic matter. There exists no universal, uniform practice which stipulates how states should incorporate international law into their domestic legal systems. Determining the way in which international law becomes part of domestic law is left to the state’s discretion. Considering the scope of international law in our times this is a crucial question. Until the mid-20th century international law was concerned mainly with the conduct of sovereign states and the relations between states. At the beginning of the 21st century international law permeates and conditions national legal orders. Its rules are applied and enforced by national authorities, and on occasion it takes precedence over national law. This is especially true for the member states of today’s European Union. The law of the European Union is a special case and has received an enormous amount of scholarly attention. EU laws have a direct effect on the legal systems of member states and override national laws in many areas. This is especially true within the supranational first EU “pillar” (the “Common Market”). In contrast, the areas of common foreign policy and judicial cooperation (the second and third “pillars”) belong to the domain of more conventional intergovernmental cooperation. Given that the old categories of monism and dualism no longer suffice fully to explain the reality of a partly supranational EU, a number of alternative theories have been elaborated to clarify the distinction between European and national law. In any case, the superiority of European Community Law over national law has been supported on many occasions by the European Court of Justice and is generally accepted throughout the European Union.

Neutralité as security for small states in the past and present

Austria’s law on neutrality also exemplified the interconnections between international and municipal law. Before turning to the intricacies of Austrian neutrality, however, it is necessary to discuss the exact meaning of this concept. Ever since its first appearance at the end of the 14th century the concept of neutrality has denoted the non-partici-
pation of a territory or state in war between two or more other territories or states. It took another six centuries for this practice to be formalised. The Hague Treaties of 1907 codified the rights and duties of neutral powers in the case of war at land or sea. According to these agreements a neutral state could not take sides in armed conflict or support belligerent states by delivering weapons or allowing the passage through its territory of men and/or material. In addition, a neutral state had actively to protect its territory against any aggression. In return, the territory of a neutral state had to be respected by the belligerent powers.

With the further development of international law the concept of neutrality became more complex and fragmented. For example, alongside military and armed neutrality the idea of “moral” and “economic” neutrality appeared. “Permanent” neutrality, which is of special importance for the Austrian case, means that even in times of peace a neutral position has to be maintained. This is in contrast to “temporary” neutrality which is only applicable during the time of a specific armed conflict. A permanently neutral state has to avoid peacetime treaties and agreements that would make its neutrality in war impossible, and consequently ought not conclude military alliances that may, for example, allow foreign military bases to be established in its territory. It should be noted that the peacetime duties of a permanently neutral state have not been codified. They are part of customary international law and have thus remained a matter of political and scholarly debate. In time of war, the rules of temporary neutrality apply also to permanent neutrals.

Here it is important to mention the idea of “neutralism”. Also known as non-alignment, this concept entered the dictionary of international relations after World War II, and implied a non-binding impartiality between the two blocks in the context of the Cold War. While neither the US nor the Soviet Union cherished the concept of neutrality after 1945 – world and imperial politics never harmonised with the idea of impartiality – the so-called “balance of terror” in the mid-1950s created a new range of manoeuvre for neutrals. To the surprise of the Western camp it was the Soviet Union which revived the concept with the famous “Stalin note” of March 1952 and by accepting Austrian neutrality in 1955.

Neutrality is especially attractive for small states since they have a precarious position in international relations and security policy. Small states traditionally have two options for their security: imposed or voluntary neutrality, or regional alliances with neighbouring and/or stronger states. In post-war Europe, the possibility of European integration can be added as a third option, since small states have been able effectively to guard and secure their independence and economic prosperity thanks to the European Union.

While the concept of neutrality has always been controversial, since the end of the Cold War it has come under especially heavy attack. Different political theories, such
as those expounded by the so-called realist\textsuperscript{13} or the interdependence\textsuperscript{14} schools, stress the fact that neutrality has become redundant as a security strategy for small states. According to the realists, the concept of neutrality requires a balance of power in a bipolar or multi-polar international order. The neutral state practices a policy of non-interference between the opposing blocks. Since the bipolar world was replaced by a unipolar international system after the end of the Cold War, realists argue that the structural characteristics necessary for neutrality have disappeared. Classical neutrality is thus obsolete in their eyes\textsuperscript{15}.

The interdependence model also reaches the conclusion that neutrality is redundant. It suggests that close economic and political integration generates security and makes wars between the engaged countries unlikely. The higher the degree of economic and political integration, the higher the degree of security. According to this model, neutrality not only loses its legitimacy but it might also constitute an obstacle to integration for small countries and thus diminish their security\textsuperscript{16}. Thus many scholars argue that without a continuing and active participation in European integration there is a danger of increased political marginalisation and thus of lesser scope for action on the part of small states\textsuperscript{17}. They moreover stress that integration according to the European model is the best security strategy for small and thus vulnerable states.

These theoretical reflections on the security options for small states show that – at least among scholars – neutrality, a security policy with a long tradition, is nowadays an outdated concept. We can now turn to the case of Austrian neutrality and its implications for Austria’s participation in European integration, above all in the field of security policies. It should be noted that we are dealing here with the second pillar of the EU, that is, an area of intergovernmental and not supranational cooperation.

**AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY: HISTORY AND CURRENT ASPECTS**

Austria has a special status amongst the neutral countries of the European Union in that its neutrality – in contrast to that of Finland, Sweden, Malta or Cyprus – is not only a political strategy but forms part of national law. While the latter is also true in Ireland and Switzerland, Austria goes one step further by having its neutrality written into the Constitution.

Austria’s neutrality: a product of the Cold War

Following World War II, Austria was occupied by the four Allied powers: Great Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union. The negotiations for an Austrian State Treaty, which had been dragging on since 1947, reached a break-through only when the Soviet Union invited an Austrian delegation to Moscow in March 1955. As part of the so-called Moscow Memorandum, Austria promised to “practice in perpetuity a
neutrality of the type maintained by Switzerland” in return for a promise by the Allied powers to respect the “inviolability and integrity of Austrian territory”\(^{18}\). That Austria would not become part of the Western alliance was thus one of the conditions set by the Soviet Union for the signing of a peace agreement and the withdrawal of its troops from Austrian territory. The Austrian State Treaty was signed in the Belvedere Castle in Vienna on 15 May 1955. All occupying forces then departed and Austria became a free and sovereign country within the borders of 1938\(^{19}\). The price of the departure of Soviet troops, however, amounted to burdensome payments for the so-called “German property” in Austria which had been taken over by the Soviet occupation force\(^{20}\). On 26 October – and as promised in the Moscow Memorandum – the Austrian parliament passed the federal constitutional law on permanent neutrality\(^{21}\). Austria pledged not to become part of any military alliance or to allow military bases on its territory and to defend its neutrality with all possible means\(^{22}\). Austrian neutrality was thus based on municipal law and not on international law. This means that while no international treaty was signed, the international community was informed by “notification” and most states consequently recognized Austria’s neutrality.

Curiously, by maintaining a strictly literal interpretation of its obligations not to join any military alliance, the Austrian government was able to join the United Nations in 1955 and the Council of Europe in 1956. It even considered joining the European Coal and Steel Community\(^{23}\). However, Austrian politicians soon became more cautious in their interpretation of neutrality. This was partly a reaction to the unsuccessful uprisings in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) which prompted the Soviet Union to review its relations with its Eastern European neighbours in general. In this context Austrian neutrality was placed under a spotlight due to vociferous complaints from within the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries\(^{24}\).

Two further developments suggested that Austria’s government had started to view neutrality somewhat differently from its articulation in the neutrality law. Firstly, it accepted that neutrality had certain economic implications. For example, Austria recognised that membership in the European Community (EC; founded by the Treaty of Rome in 1957) was incompatible with Austrian neutrality since the EC perceived itself as a political as well as an economic community\(^{25}\). However, Austrian membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), an exclusively economically-oriented supranational organisation, was thought not to impinge on Austrian neutrality and Austria became a founding member in 1960. The EFTA was nevertheless not a goal per se for Austria as it still sought rapprochement with the EC, first via multilateral association along with Switzerland and Sweden in the years 1961-1963, and then via bilateral association in the years 1963-67. Although the Soviet Union officially opposed Austrian negotiations with the EC, in the end it was the Italian government which successfully blocked them in 1967 because of the South Tyrol conflict\(^{26}\).
Secondly, the Austrian government interpreted its legal obligations arising from neutrality more widely. The notification of the international community regarding Austria’s neutrality back in 1955 was believed to have established a quasi-treaty relationship between Austria and the states involved. Experts in international law consequently debated – often in rather emotional tones – the possibility of a unilateral renunciation by either side. The Austrian government finally adopted the view that the Federal Constitutional Law on Austrian Neutrality was a quasi-international treaty.

The broad interpretation of Austrian neutrality that prevailed in the 1970s was closely linked to the Austrian Socialist Bruno Kreisky, who served as Chancellor from 1970 to 1983. He believed that Austrian neutrality should not only be applied to the military sphere but ought to be interpreted more extensively. According to this interpretation neutrality did not only involve exercising restraint in questions of international politics. On the contrary, Kreisky used Austria’s neutral status in the international community to develop the so-called “active neutrality policy”. This meant Austria’s taking on an active role in international organisations, including devising initiatives to reduce international tensions, affirming a commitment to human rights, offering Austria as a base for international organisations, and using its active neutrality as a “balancing mediator” in the context of East-West and North-South conflicts. Directed by Kreisky, neutrality grew to be a central factor in the forging of a new Austrian identity after 1945 and almost attained the status of national ideology. The myth was created that only thanks to neutrality could Austria enjoy freedom and economic prosperity.

De facto dismantling of Austrian neutrality in the European integration process

As we have seen, by forcing neutrality on Austria the Cold War environment determined that it could not seek membership in the EC in the 1960s. Instead, it had to content itself with a more limited role as a member of the EFTA. With the end of the Cold War, however, the international order changed to such an extent that other security options – such as integration in the European Community – became feasible. Given the radically changed international context at the end of the 1980s both Washington and Moscow lost interest in Austrian neutrality. Austria’s application for European Community membership in July 1989 was, therefore, received without much protest.

Austrian politicians argued that neutrality did not constitute an obstacle to membership. The Socialist-led government of the time judged full participation in the EU (including the common foreign and security policy) to be compatible with an interpretation of neutrality reduced to the military core elements. The government felt comfortable with the European security policy of the time because of the ambiguity of the valid treaty provisions and the intergovernmental character of the decision-making process.
In public, the government chose to wink at the ambiguities which derived from this *de facto* situation. Austria subsequently joined the European Union (as the EC has been called since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992) in the year 1995 after a referendum in which 66.58 percent of Austrian voters declared themselves in favour of accession. Thanks to the massive propaganda campaign and the deliberate avoidance of the neutrality issue the Austrians were, as historian Michael Gehler has claimed, less convinced and more persuaded into voting for joining the Union. Anyhow, the Austrian accession treaty did not contain any special reference to neutrality. Moreover, Austria bound itself to accept the whole *acquis communautaire* and all obligations emanating from the common foreign and security policy.

Also during the 1990s Austria’s foreign and security elites sought a rapprochement with the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO while maintaining the nation’s neutrality. In retrospect, this seems like an attempt to square the circle. Neutrality was publicly scorned by opinion leaders and influential figures, while scholarly research into newly-available Cold War archives questioned its effectiveness. The practical erosion of Austrian neutrality started with the first Gulf War of 1990/91 when the so-called Verdross Doctrine – named after the Austrian international legal scholar Alfred Verdross – was abandoned. This had stipulated the priority of neutrality over UN obligations. Furthermore, as a consequence of its accession to the EU, Austria was forced to adapt its security and defence policies even though Austrian politicians had long claimed that EU-membership and neutrality were compatible. After all, the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” (CFSP) and “European Security and Defence Policy” (ESDP) was already established in the Maastricht Treaty. This was achieved with the introduction of a new article into Austria’s Federal Constitution (Article 23f) which stated that Austria would participate in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, including potential economic embargoes. In addition, Austria became an observer in the WEU and accepted an offer in 1995 to become a member of the NATO Partnership for Peace.

Ever since their accession into the EU, Austria and its neutral partners, Sweden and Finland, have been primarily concerned with preventing the CFSP and the ESDP from advancing in the direction of a common defence arrangement in which they are unable to participate because of their commitment to neutrality. However, the CFSP was further defined and broadened in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. During the negotiation process Austria supported the so-called Swedish-Finnish Initiative which endorsed two key ideas. The first was to limit the CFSP by preventing a mutual assistance clause. The second was to convert the original WEU Petersberg Missions into tasks of the European Union. The neutral states wanted to emphasize the peacekeeping aspects of EU security cooperation in order to prevent a drift towards a military alliance based on mutual defence guarantees. In 1997, during the European summit in Amsterdam, the Petersberg tasks were effectively incorporated into the treaty. Both the WEU and the
EU were empowered to enforce the Petersberg tasks, but with the transfer of the most important WEU assets to the EU in 1999 this distinction is mostly artificial. Austria had to react to this new development with the amendment of the recently-introduced Art. 23f of the Federal Constitution to permit Austrian participation in the CFSP. In spite of Austrian neutrality, its participation in all Petersberg tasks, including “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” now became legally possible.

Despite the best intentions of the Austrian government to maintain its neutrality in the context of EU membership, the Treaty of Amsterdam and the so-called Petersberg Clause were the first major steps towards the *de facto* dismantling of Austrian neutrality. As we have seen, the Europeanization process represented *ipso facto* a material derogation of neutrality because Austrian troops could now legally be involved in peacemaking tasks.

Paradigm change from neutrality to solidarity

At the turn of the millennium the major political parties in Austria advocated limited participation in the ESDP, even though neutrality remained Austria’s official position and was supported by large sectors of the Austrian population. This ambiguity led to an awkwardness in Austria’s relations with its EU partners. This became particularly obvious on the occasion of the Kosovo war when overflights by allied planes (including those of Austria’s EU partners) were not allowed since the NATO operation had not been authorized by the United Nations Security Council. By contrast, overflights by American planes in support of US operations in Afghanistan were permitted since the Security Council had provided legal cover for the campaign. Austria was derisively labelled a “free rider” by other NATO members.

Despite this apparent contradiction no formal declaration indicated Austria’s preparedness to surrender its neutral position in the period from 1995 to 2000. The first Austrian government openly to question neutrality was the coalition government of the People’s Party (ÖVP) and the Freedom Party (FPÖ) which had been formed in February 2000. The Minister of Defence, Herbert Scheibner, declared Austria to be non-aligned but no longer neutral, while Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated that Austria had said farewell to neutrality. These words were corroborated by deeds when the Austrian government appointed a commission of experts to elaborate a new “Security and Defence Doctrine” in 2001. In this document the Austrian government acknowledged the European framework to be of primary importance for Austrian security policy and asserted its intention to participate with military personnel in all areas of the ESDP. Furthermore, the document stated clearly that “Austria has – by its unconditional participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU – substantially modified its status of permanent neutrality. Thus, in an international
context, Austria no longer corresponds with the status of a neutral state but with one of a non-aligned or non-committed state.”

In fact, Austria developed what the Austrian legal scholar Waldemar Hummer called a “solidarity doctrine”, which required Austria to “act in solidarity within the EU and neutrally outside of it”. According to this interpretation, two separate areas of legal obligations existed for Austria: on the one hand, an “area of solidarity” within the EU which remained unaffected by neutrality, and on the other, the area of public international law outside the EU where neutrality prevailed. Even Hummer called this a legal salto mortale (death-defying leap) and questioned whether the international community would accept Austria’s double status.

The new Austrian Security and Defence Doctrine of 2001 clearly showed how difficult it was (and still is) to reconcile membership in the EU with the status of neutrality. The Europeanisation process of the Austrian security and defence sector not only meant the dismantling of neutrality but also pushed the Austrian government to distance itself from neutrality and to adopt a new non-aligned stance in its foreign policy. However, the government’s rhetoric in the international arena was quite different from the rhetoric it employed domestically. Since neutrality had come to be conceived as part of Austria’s national identity since 1955, it is not surprising that it enjoyed high levels of support in Austrian society. In fact, its popularity is the main reason why Austrian governments have not yet wholly abandoned it altogether. As will be shown in the next section, the importance of neutrality for the domestic political agenda explains the apparent ambivalence of the Austrian government.

Neutrality as a domestic political issue

Since the early 1990s the commitment to neutrality has faced significant and politically motivated pressure from certain circles in Austrian politics. However, recent opinion polls show that two thirds of Austrians favour neutrality because they perceive it as part of Austrian identity. This has not happened by accident. In 1955, Austrian politicians had to convince themselves and the public of the importance of neutrality and since then every schoolchild has learned the same lesson. Furthermore, the belief that neutrality and European integration were compatible was kept alive when Austria joined the EU in 1995. The main reason, however, why supporters of neutrality can continue to maintain a high level of confidence is because the neutrality clause in the Austrian Constitution can only be overturned by an amendment which would require a 2/3 majority in the Austrian National Assembly. Since one of the two largest parties still favours the concept of neutrality such a majority is not in sight.

Today, Austria’s major political parties hold opposing views on the issues of neutrality and participation in European security and defence policy. On the one hand the conservative Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) exhibits a very open-minded approach to
the common defence policy of the EU. It has flirted with the idea of WEU/NATO-membership and even considered this option to be compatible with neutrality. On the other hand the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) opposes any move which might gainsay neutrality. It is thus hostile to WEU/NATO-membership and has often cleverly used the popularity of neutrality for electoral purposes\(^{49}\). The Green party and the right-wing Freedom Party (FPÖ)\(^{50}\) both vehemently support neutrality.

There is no better example of the impasse between the two major parties than the so-called “report on options”. In 1996 the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition, led by the Socialist Viktor Klima, commissioned a report outlining Austria’s choices in the face of deepening European security policy. During its preparation it became clear that the ÖVP sought NATO membership while the SPÖ vehemently opposed this idea. The negotiations led to a dead end, the coalition could not find common ground, and the report came to nothing. The Austrian public was left confused by statements from high-ranking politicians, such as the ÖVP defence minister, that Austrian neutrality was compatible with NATO membership\(^{51}\). The position of the two parties has changed little since then. The general election of 2006 resulted once again in a coalition between SPÖ and ÖVP, with the latter being the junior party. Repealing the Law on Neutrality is currently out of the question and the steps taken in that direction by the previous ÖVP-FPÖ government have been more or less invalidated.

There is another factor which makes the continuance of neutrality desirable for certain circles in Austria. Neutrality has been the justification for very low defence expenditures\(^{52}\). Austria is one of the few member states which spend less than EUR 5 billion on defence. It moreover has fewer than 50,000 active military personnel\(^{53}\). The pressure on Austria to increase its defence budget would be significantly increased if it aspired to further integration in European security\(^{54}\). In the domestic political arena this is a very sensitive issue. This was highlighted in the summer of 2002 when the then ÖVP-FPÖ government placed an order for Eurofighter Typhoon airplanes to upgrade the Austrian air force. After having promised to cancel the entire deal during the election campaign, the new minister of defence (SPÖ) finally struck a deal with Eurofighter Ltd. and reduced the order from 18 to 15 aircraft\(^{55}\). The whole debate over the Eurofighter once again revealed that Austria had not overcome its ambivalence concerning neutrality as a legacy of the past and its commitment to European integration.

The mutual assistance clause in the constitutional treaty

Given the domestic importance of neutrality the ambivalent stance of the present Austrian government towards integration in the field of EDSP appears less puzzling. Yet despite these reservations Austria recently agreed to commitments which violate its neutrality law\(^{56}\). The adoption of the Austrian Security and Defence Doctrine of 2001 was particularly important because of the foreseen changes with regard to the reformed
European foreign policy in the EU Constitutional Treaty that would have made a number of alterations in the existing treaties. While the proposed European Constitution was abandoned due to negative votes in referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, a similar so-called Reform Treaty was agreed upon in 2007. The mere fact that the Austrian government signed and ratified the Treaty in 2004 justifies a closer analysis of the provisions.

Austria favoured a European Union Constitution because it feared that without it alternative military alliances outside of the European framework might be created. This was certainly not in the interest of Austria because such alliances would surely have been determined by the national interests of the major EU states and Austria would have lost influence. Even if accepting the proposed EU Constitutional Treaty would lead to deeper integration for Austria, this seemed preferable as it would at least take place within the framework of the European Union.

The proposed EU Constitutional Treaty foresaw different forms of cooperation between member states in the field of European defence. One of them was to establish closer cooperation on mutual defence for those member states willing to do so. This clause made it possible for the EU to evolve into a system of collective defence, a kind of military pact. As we have seen, the status of a permanent neutral state is incompatible with full membership in a military pact and so this development was not supported by the neutrals. Indeed, as a result of pressure from the non-aligned and neutral states in the European Union, the final version of the proposed EU Constitutional Treaty included the so-called “Irish Clause”. This stated that the Constitutional Treaty “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States”, and can be attributed to the long-standing Irish demand to maintain its “military neutrality” within the EU. Thus, there exists no obligation for mutual assistance if the defence and security policy of a neutral country prevents this. Austrian politicians deduced that neutrality was not affected by the CFSP and ESDP and that in the event of a collision with the EU its laws of neutrality would prevail.

However, as the Austrian scholar Hummer has pointed out, by signing the Constitution Austria has violated international neutrality laws. In his view the Constitutional Treaty has legal implications for Austrian neutrality which are easily overlooked. Despite the Irish clause, neutrality law is violated when Austria supports resolutions concerning the CFSP and ESDP which are in conflict with its obligations to neutrality. Secondary law in the CFSP pillar of the EU – where unanimity still prevails – needs the consent of the permanent neutral member states. Thus, according to Hummer, by the mere fact of participating in the voting, neutrals contradict neutrality law.
CONCLUSION

This chapter has sought to provide an example of how the international system set up after World War II, characterised by the expansion of international law, has affected the sphere of domestic legislation. The European Union is without doubt a fascinating and unique case. It has served as a model for many other attempts at regional integration, but so far the supranational approach has not been emulated. Laws of the (partly) supranational EU, which can have a direct impact on the member states and can take precedence over national laws, have transgressed the traditional monist or dualist approaches. There is thus ample reason to call the EU a system *sui generis*.

The question of Austrian neutrality was chosen as a case study because the domestic dimension of that country’s neutrality has created several problematic issues with regards to participation in European integration since the end of the Cold War. The scholarly debate over whether the law on Austrian neutrality should be considered part of international law also demonstrates the limitations of traditional distinctions between municipal and international law. Since its accession to the European Union in 1995, Austria’s security and defence sector has undergone tremendous change. Today, Austrian neutrality is practically obsolete. From 1997 to 2002 Austria cooperated with 5,000 participants in the framework of the “Partnership for Peace”, a NATO project aimed at creating trust between NATO and other states in Europe and the former Soviet Union. In the same period more than 120,000 international soldiers and more than 42,000 military vehicles have crossed Austria’s borders. Furthermore, more than 91,000 foreign military airplanes have overflown Austrian territory in this period. From an international perspective, Austria’s neutrality clearly exists merely on paper. This has happened as a consequence of Austria’s participation in the process of European integration and its desire to keep pace with the advance of the common European security policy. However, the concept of neutrality still holds a great deal of sway over the Austrian population and therefore has important implications for domestic politics. Since neutrality is part of Austria’s constitution and can only be altered by a 2/3 majority a broad consensus would be needed to do so. Given the conflicting views on the issue between the two major political parties, no such consensus is in sight.

This chapter has argued that Austria has not entirely abandoned its neutrality and has participated only with substantial reservations in the common European security policy. This stance, and the ongoing insistence upon its special status, has led to strains between Austria and several NATO member states. The solution of these issues will not become easier as future developments in the CFSP and in any reformed EU constitutional treaty will most likely further violate neutrality law. Austrian political elites have always avoided the implications of Austria’s participation in European integration with regards to its neutrality. As long as the Austrian government does not initiate a serious public debate on this issue, and leading political parties do not abandon their rhetori-
cal hypocrisy, the dilemmas arising from Austria’s ambivalent stance towards neutrality and CFSP will persist. This is all the more problematic as participation in all fields of the European integration process has been deemed necessary by a succession of Austrian governments that regard Austria as a key member of the European Union. Ironically, Austria’s continued adherence to the principle of neutrality constitutes an obstacle to its own desire for deeper integration in the European Union.

NOTES

1 International treaties have a long history, but it is widely accepted that ancient examples, such as that between the two Mesopotamian city states Lagash and Umma in 3100 BC, are not part of international law as they were not concluded by equal and sovereign states in the modern sense.

2 The term “municipal law” is used to denote the national, domestic, or internal law of a sovereign state. It includes not only law at the national level, but also at the provincial, territorial, regional and/or local levels.


6 The origin of the term is the Latin ne uter, which translates as neither of the two.


8 Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed out of a sense of legal obligation, so much so that it becomes custom. As such, it is not necessary for a country to sign a treaty for customary international law to apply. Customary international law must be derived from a clear consensus among states, as exhibited both by widespread conduct and a discernible sense of obligation.

9 Historically the “neutralist” states tilted towards the Soviet Union and the concept was thus scorned at by the West. See M. Gehler, Finis Neutralität? Historische und politische Aspekte im europäischen Vergleich: Irland, Finnland, Schweden, Schweiz und Österreich, Bonn 2001, pp. 3-5.


12 A combination of the two, namely a political alliance of officially neutral states as in the case of the Baltic League 1934-40, is also possible.

13 Realism encompasses a variety of theories and approaches, all of which share the belief that states are primarily motivated by the desire for military and economic power or security, rather than ideals or ethics. This term is often synonymous with power politics. See for example H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948, and K. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York 1959.

14 The interdependence theory stipulates that the current international system is characterised by growing interdependence, mutual responsibility, and dependency on others. The role of non-state actors such
as international institutions and widespread acceptance of a number of operating principles in the international system are stressed. See for example R. O. Keohane, J. S. Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Cambridge 1971.


18 K. Vöcelka, *Geschichte Österreichs. Kultur – Gesellschaft – Politik*, Munich 2002, p. 325. Austrian neutrality was attractive to Soviet leaders since it interrupted the NATO communication lines between West Germany and Italy and created another neutral buffer-state in Central Europe. Plus, it kept Austria out of NATO and prevented another Anschluss.


21 The Austrian Government waited until the last soldier of the occupation forces had left its territory in order to avoid the image of an imposed neutrality.

22 Bundesverfassungsgesetz über die Neutralität Österreichs, 26.10.1955. Contrary to common belief, Austrian neutrality is thus not part of the State Treaty.


30 Gehler, *Finis Neutralität* cit., p. 27.

It is questionable if the majority of the Austrian population would have voted yes faced with the choice between EU or neutrality. M. Gehler, *Der lange Weg nach Europa. Österreich vom Ende der Monarchie bis zur EU*, Innsbruck etc. 2002, p. 316.


The Western European Union (WEU) is a European defence and security organization, established on the basis of the Treaty of Brussels of 1948 with the accession of West Germany and Italy in 1954. Certain WEU-functions such as crisis-management now fall under the EU.

Gehler, *Finis Neutralität* cit., p. 28.

Luif, *Permanent Neutrality* cit., p. 143.


The Petersberg tasks, which were first formulated by the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992 during a summit in the Hotel Petersberg near Bonn, are a list of military and security priorities. They cover a great range of possible military missions, ranging from the most simple to the most robust military intervention. They are formulated as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and finally tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

Ferreira-Pereira, *Militarily Non-Allied States* cit., p. 27.

Luif, *Permanent Neutrality* cit., p. 143.


Ferreira-Pereira, *Militarily Non-Allied States* cit., p. 27.

Liebhart, *Transformation and Semantic Change* cit., p. 44.


Frank, *Möglichkeiten und Grenzen* cit., p. 35.

Ferreira-Pereira, *Militarily Non-Allied States* cit., p. 28.

Note that the FPÖ split in 2005 into two camps, when the former leaders established a new party, the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ), which today holds a (slightly) more positive attitude towards European integration. The FPÖ continues to exist but has shifted even more to the right. It opposes EU integration in general and claims to “defend” Austrian neutrality.


Boyer, *Defence Posture* cit., p. 4.
Andreas Gémes, Gudrun E. Ragossnig

54 Luif, Permanent Neutrality cit., p. 152.
55 Die Presse, 29.6.2007.
56 Frank, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen cit., p. 35
57 Ibid., p. 19.
58 Art.I-41 (7): “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have toward it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.” Stadlhofer, Weiterentwicklung der GASP cit., p. 107.
59 This means that the neutral state will be collectively defended by the other members of the military pact in the event of military aggression against its territory, but it does not have to participate in a collective retaliation in the case of a military assault against any other pact member.
60 Hummer, New EU cit., p. 63.
61 Ibid., p. 69.

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The Austrian declaration of neutrality was a constitutional act of the Austrian parliament enacted on 26 October 1955. Formally, the declaration was promulgated voluntarily by the Republic of Austria but politically it was a prerequisite for the departure of the Allied occupation troops which was a consequence of the Austrian State Treaty of 15 May 1955. The document was published in the Federal Law Gazette.

Bundesverfassungsgesetz vom 26. Oktober 1955 über die Neutralität Österreichs

Artikel I.

(1) Zum Zwecke der dauernden Behauptung seiner Unabhängigkeit nach außen und zum Zwecke der Unverletzlichkeit seines Gebietes erklärt Österreich aus freien Stücken seine immerwährende Neutralität. Österreich wird diese mit allen ihm zu Gebote stehenden Mitteln aufrechterhalten und verteidigen.

(2) Österreich wird zur Sicherung dieser Zwecke in aller Zukunft keinen militärischen Bündnissen beitreten und die Errichtung militärischer Stützpunkte fremder Staaten auf seinem Gebiet nicht zulassen.

Artikel II.

Mit der Vollziehung dieses Bundesverfassungsgesetzes ist die Bundesregierung betraut.

Constitutional Law on the Neutrality of Austria of October 26, 1955

Article I.

(1) For the purpose of the permanent maintenance of her external independence and for the purpose of the inviolability of her territory, Austria, of her own free will, declares herewith her permanent neutrality which she is resolved to maintain and defend with all the means at her disposal.

(2) In order to secure these purposes, Austria will never in the future accede to any military alliances nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign States on her territory.

Article II.

The Federal Government is authorized to enact appropriate legislation.

From: Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich, Nr. 211/1955
Identity Change as a Consequence of the Migration Experience

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Abstract
This chapter focuses on concepts and methodological tools which have been developed in the fields of Sociology and Social Psychology for the analysis of the processes and strategies of adaptation by migrants as a key connecting issue for frontiers and identity studies. These tools may be used also by historians and other social scientists. Migration can be a critical experience in which points of reference disappear and identity is challenged. The groups on the move renegotiate their identity in new territorial, social and cultural conditions. They choose different identity strategies that depend on various factors, both internal and external. The issue of identity negotiation in a new cultural context is related to the acculturation strategies chosen by migrants.

The author deals mainly with terms related to identity, particularly ethnic identity, the process of acculturation, eventual culture shock, and intercultural competence.

In the field of frontiers and identity studies one of principal themes at the intersection with most of the crucial discourses of contemporary history and sociology is migra-
tion studies. Sociology deals with them of course mostly in ‘the present tense’, but its concepts and discussions may also be inspiring to historians. The act of crossing physical borders – migration – is also an act of crossing mental borders and constitutes a challenge for the integrity of identity. Although theoretical concepts concerning issues surrounding the adaptation of migrants to the new environment which have been developed in the fields of sociology and social psychology are based on studies of the phenomenon of contemporary migrations, they may also be of particular assistance in constructing analytical tools for strictly historical studies.

Contemporary migrants constitute a far more diversified group in comparison, for example, to the migrants of the beginning of the 20th century. Differences include their origin, race identification and gender. Also different are the socio-economic and cultural conditions in their countries of origin, as well as their social status in the receiving countries. One of the effects of international migrations is that the migrants ‘take’ with them the national boundaries of their countries, and bring them as a part of their consciousness to the ‘new land’. This way, in the new context, ethnic groups create not only the usual diasporas but “nations beyond the homeland”.

To understand the cultural diversity of modern societies, it is important to study how individuals in ethnic groups identify themselves, and the factors that contribute to one’s ethnic identity. Studies of ethnicity help the larger society better understand ethnic group members’ situations and feelings, and encourage respect for and understanding of cultures different from the mainstream. On the other hand, these studies may help ethnic minority group members, especially the children who sit astride cultures, to learn and experience the positive aspects of their ethnic identities and cultural origins. Moreover, studying how migrants identify themselves is important to understanding the process of their adaptation in host societies. These identities, especially group identities, also have a significant impact on host societies.

In this essay, I shall present several possible models of identification strategies that migrants may choose in the new environment. These strategies are ideal types, frameworks that can be used to analyse different case studies. Although the material presented below is based on the research from the second half of the 20th century, I hope that it may be a helpful tool for analysis of migrants in different periods. Migration has always been a source of dramatic change, so the mechanisms that influence identity changes, described in the following pages, may be valid for migrants in the 16th century as well as in the 21st century.

**Migration as a Ritual of Passage and Identity Crisis**

As we said, migration is a very complex process: starting from factors influencing or enforcing the decision to migrate, to the way the process develops up to the point of arrival at the destination where migrants have to face a new reality and find ways to adapt. Migration brings change, at the macro level of societies in their entirety, at the micro level of family and at the personal level.
To successfully manage the change, particularly in situations of cultural immersion, it is necessary to address a sequence of issues: pre-departure preparation, transition adjustments, personal and social relations, cultural and social interaction rules, and conflict resolution and intercultural effectiveness skills. Groups on the move are forced to renegotiate their identity in different territorial, social and cultural conditions. In this essay, I shall concentrate on the influence of migration on shifts in identification and acculturation strategies undertaken by migrants.

Identity may be described as a series of representations that are created within an individual’s personality with regard to the biological entity, to roles performed (gender, social status, social position, etcetera), to the presence in or absence from the determinant social contexts (nation, ethnic group, religion) and with regard to the way other people interpret our behaviour as evidence of who and what we are. Collective identity and individual identity only come into being through interaction, the process by which analogues are produced and reproduced.

An individual’s identity contains a set of relations, representations and images which one has of oneself, and which others give one, that determine the capacity of recognising oneself and being recognised. Our identity must be validated (or invalidated) by those with whom we have a relationship. It is never unilateral.

Social scientists believe that identity is a dynamic feature of social life. That is, it is something that is constantly evolving and changing. However, primary identities – self-hood, humanness, gender and sometimes kinship and ethnicity – rooted in our earliest process of socialisation are more solid, more resistant to change in later life than other identities. Transformations of identity are an immanent part of each biography; nevertheless, an individual tends to minimize this process and establishes strategies for gaining a sense of personal continuity. The change is usually continual. Life experiences gradually cause individuals to change their self-definition. Changes can be marked by turning points constituted by critical incidents. These moments in a biography enable individuals to see the change, and force them to explore and validate new aspects of their self. Migration may be a factor generating many critical incidents, and may have a huge impact on identity change; it may be a source of stress that brings a positive change, but it may also result in an identity crisis.

Two types of change over time need to be considered:

– Changes occur among generations, as indicated by immigrants and their children and grandchildren (the majority of research focuses on this).

– Changes occur during the lifetimes of immigrants and their descendants as they adapt to new situations and balance the demands and expectations of an old and new culture (important acculturation factor: age on arrival, length of stay).

The process of migration may be seen as a passage from “one life to another”. The model proposed by the anthropologist Arnold Van Gennep, which explains the ritual of passage, seems very useful in the description of the stages in the migration process. The
model consists of 3 steps: a pre-liminal phase (separation), a liminal phase (transition), and a post-liminal phase (re-incorporation). This model was further developed by Victor Turner in his conception of social change\textsuperscript{5}. Turner noted that in liminality – the transitional state between two phases – individuals were “betwixt and between”: they did not belong to the society that they had previously been part of, and they had not yet been reincorporated into another society. This model can be applied to many social situations in which individuals change their place in the structure and space. Migration is also such a change.

In the first stage, separation from the former position in the social structure takes place as well as, in the case of migration, a separation from norms and symbols of the society of origin. Here, the decision to migrate is made and a preparatory procedure commences. It is important to analyse this stage as the pre-departure life conditions of migrants, the reasons for migration, the context of decision taking (for example, the push and pull factors, existence of a migrants’ network, cultural distance between the sending and receiving country), may be decisive for the migrants’ life in the future.

The second, ‘liminal’ stage starts when the migration is already in process and the old social structure and system of reference of migrants fall to pieces. An individual is deprived of a large part of the context on which his or her identification was based. At this stage, migrants do not belong to any social structure; they are between two worlds – the old one left in the country of origin and the new one where they have just arrived. The liminal state is characterized by ambiguity, openness, and indeterminacy. One’s sense of identity dissolves to some extent, bringing about disorientation. It is a period of transition, during which one’s normal limits of thought, self-understanding, and behaviour are relaxed, opening the way to something new. For a migrant, it is a period of searching for a new identification, a place within the new social structure. This requires adaptation in personality functioning to achieve emotional comfort; a change in reference groups and social identity to achieve a sense of belonging, acquiring new cultural knowledge, skills, attitudes, and perceptions; and adopting new culturally defined roles to permit functional integration\textsuperscript{6}. It is the time of identification shift. Entering the liminal phase may be a source of shock and stress. The end of the liminal stage cannot be easily defined. It is a process at the end of which migrants pass into the third stage – the stage of aggregation. However, for some of them “the liminal stage ends only with their death”\textsuperscript{7}. The final stage of incorporation (aggregation) refers to finding a place in the structure of a new society and remodelling one’s identity. The length of the liminal stage and the passage into the final one is conditioned by various factors, such as: the individual’s own cultural background and social capital, age or level of education, the reasons for migration (voluntary or forced), cultural and social distance between the receiving society and the migrant’s society of origin, the size and strength of the ethnic group in the host country, the new environment, and also psychological factors as they contribute to identity flexibility.
“Being abroad makes you aware of your own culture”

The experience of migration, finding yourself in a new cultural and social context, activates the process of self reflection. As research shows, while living abroad individuals start to think more about their roots, cultural identity and aspects which are connected to it: language, eating habits, mentality and social behaviour. Cultural or ethnic identity normally become stronger while abroad. Through this personal experience of living abroad and being a foreigner, the personal identity shifts towards social identity (where ‘personal identity’ differentiates the unique self from all the other selves – thinking of oneself as a unique individual – and social identity is understood as thinking of oneself as a group member, it is the internalisation of some often stereotypical, collective identification) (Social Identity Theory by Tajfel and Turner).

For many new immigrants, the confrontation with the complexity and diversity of a new culture reinforces their tendency to remain with what is known and familiar. If the change of the context is too extreme, causing feelings of insecurity or even anxiety, the homeland’s value system and its criteria are maintained or even reinforced. In order not to weaken one’s own identity and borders, this can result in a movement towards stabilizing the indigenous social identity, because this promises a kind of protection for the self that could be in danger in an unfamiliar context. The more unfamiliar and negative the foreign culture is evaluated, the closer the migrants tend to feel to their own cultural background, and the more they start referring to its system of criteria and values.

Robert Zajonc used the frustration-aggression hypothesis to argue that there are intrinsic psychological processes that lead acculturating minority individuals to adopt aggressive and critical attitudes toward the dominant culture. First, “that a stranger must conform to many norms of the host culture is perhaps self-evident if only to mention things like language, laws, taxes”. Host culture conformity involves the psychodynamics of a superego control of behaviour, but the stranger’s superego was formed within a different cultural context. Thus, efforts towards host culture conformity lead to the frustration of trying to fit first-culture psychodynamics into contact culture norms, threatening the deeper layers of the superego. Strangers are exempt from fully conforming to host culture norms, and thus have license to digress from those norms. This attitude of aggression leads to a rationalisation against conformity, and the stranger regresses to the original psychodynamics of first-culture behaviour.

In cultures with more similar structures, identity seems to be questioned and actualised with regard to the new information and experiences. As Barth argues, identity change occurs only when interaction must be maintained, when disengagement is not a practical option. Most immigrants intend to maintain their ethnic identification, but to what extent they do so may depend on the cultural distance between them and the hosting society. Increasing cultural difference leads ethnic group members to stay involved with the people and culture that they know. However, the enhanced in-group identification might be activated by rejection from the dominant group members, which is caused by the cultural difference of the immigrant group.
CULTURE SHOCK: FROM MARGINALISATION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERCULTURAL IDENTITY

The experience of migration into another culture and what follows, may cause a culture shock. The term was introduced by anthropologist K. Oberg. He argued that culture shock is a pathology, a form of crisis caused by coming into contact with an entirely different social environment, such as a foreign country. Cultural shock was initially conceptualised as a consequence of strain and anxiety resulting from contact with a new culture and the feelings of loss, confusion, and impotence resulting from the absence of accustomed cultural cues and social rules. Taft reviewed a range of definitions of cultural shock and provided a summary: “a feeling of impotence from the inability to deal with the environment because of unfamiliarity with cognitive aspects and role-playing skills.” Although the clinical model of cultural shock as a psychological and cognitive reaction has been dominant, the implications of cultural shock are more extensive.

Cultural shock derives from both the challenge of new cultural surroundings and from the loss of a familiar cultural environment. Cultural shock stress responses cause both psychological and physiological reactions. Psychological reactions include physiological, emotional, interpersonal, cognitive, and social components, as well as effects resulting from changes in socio-cultural relations, cognitive fatigue, role stress, and identity loss.

Apart from stress reactions caused by exposure to a new environment and cognitive fatigue, as well as general personal shock, a factor that influences the identity crisis to the greatest extent is the role shock. Roles central to one’s identity may be lost in the new culture. Changes in social roles and interpersonal relations affect well-being and the self-concept, resulting in a “role shock.” One’s identity is maintained in part by social roles that contribute to well-being through structuring social interaction. In the new cultural setting, the former roles are largely eliminated and replaced with unfamiliar roles and expectations. This leads to the role shock resulting from an ambiguity about one’s social position, the loss of normal social relations and roles, and new roles inconsistent with the previous self-concept. For instance, relations of dependency may no longer be supported, or on the contrary, a previously independent person may have to accept a dependent relationship with an authority figure.

Schumann argues that anxiety and disorientation experienced when encountering a foreign culture arise because behaviours and coping mechanisms from the first culture do not work well in the new context. “This situation can cause disorientation, stress, anxiety and fear [and ] the learner, in attempting to find the cause of his disorientation, may reject himself, his own culture, the organization for which he is working and the people of the host country.” An assumption can be made that acculturative stress causes marginality, rather than the idea that marginality causes stress. However, as we will see later in this article, culture shock may lead to completely different reactions.

Adaptation to an unfamiliar culture, and getting through the liminal phase, is a subject of investigation of intercultural communication studies. The educational, or so-called develop-
Identity Change as a Consequence of the Migration Experience

Concepts, Methods and Approaches

ment, model of culture shock interpretation represented by Adler\(^9\) (which describes culture shock as an educational process), as well as the integrative communication theory of cross-cultural adaptation developed by Kim\(^20\) (that sees adaptation as a dialectic process of the “stress adaptation growth” dynamic that gradually leads to greater functional fitness and psychological health in confrontation with the host environment), state that as a result of intercultural encounters, the individual grows to become a multicultural person.

Kim argues that a person is an open system: a system that is in continuous interaction with its environment through output and input. He/she interacts actively with his/her environment, mostly through means of communications, that is, the encoding and decoding of messages exchanged with his/her environment. The individuals absorb their culture from their environment – first from their family, later from their social relationships, and the social environment, in particular the media, politics, and their professional life. Every person possesses an internal meaning structure: composed of artefacts and products, values and norms, and basic assumptions. The internal meaning structure is inherently logical in and of itself and is interconnected; it is, in that state, in equilibrium. The person aims to maintain this equilibrium: he/she is homeostatic. If the environment of the person changes, the equilibrium is disturbed. Any change in the equilibrium causes stress. If the stress reaches a certain level, the person will aim to restore the equilibrium. In order to regain the equilibrium, the internal meaning structure must be modified to accommodate the changed environment.

Once the ‘cultural consciousness’ is confronted with cultural otherness, the human is forced into some form of reflective process, the cultural assumptions and premises are called into question: the Kim’s “Stress-Adaptation-Growth” process\(^21\).

In a direct intercultural encounter, the individual inevitably experiences difficulties in communicating: due to other cultural premises and assumptions of the other party. Whether or not the communication takes the active form of direct conversation or the form of a limited feedback conversation or exposure, the ‘otherness’ projected by the other party will inevitably evoke some reflection on the person’s own cultural premises and assumptions. The degree of heterogeneity of the ‘other’, and the context and feedback of the communication, are of course a determining factor in the need for such a reflective process: if the heterogeneity is high, and the context low, the impact of such an encounter will only call for a very limited amount of reflection. If the context is high, and diversity equally high, then the reflection process has to be more in-depth, it is challenged more significantly.

Once such cultural ‘otherness’ is perceived, and the individual is confronted with the need for some kind of adaptation to accommodate the ‘other’, the internal meaning system is disturbed. The individual reacts with discomfort and uncertainty: the internal equilibrium is pushed into disequilibrium. Confronted with a significantly large change in the cultural environment, a large-scale adaptation and growth takes place.

The culture shock, the generic intercultural stress, is a result of such an intercultural encounter. It requires that the individual adapt his or her behaviour at least temporarily.
to regain equilibrium and to cope with the situation. This requires the suspension of certain behaviour, and possibly norms and values and basic assumptions, and the accommodation of new behaviour and an adaptation of different norms, values and basic assumptions to accommodate those new ways. This may, initially, meet with conscious or unconscious resistance of the individual to adapt. This causes additional stress. The adaptation, the accommodation of the new ways of thinking, perceiving and acting can result, according to Kim, in “temporary personality disintegration, or even ‘breakdown’ in some extreme cases”. Intercultural stress is therefore viewed as internal resistance of the human organism against its own cultural evolution.

What results from the process of disintegration and adaptation, of stress and growth, is a cyclic process in which the internal meaning structure is continuously moving forward. At the starting point, the individual experiences stress, the internal meaning structure is disturbed. It acquires the energy for adaptation to overcome the stress experience. Through a continuous stress-adaptation-growth process, the individual learns to ‘function’ in the new environment: his internal meaning structure is expanded to accommodate the new environment, and the individual is able to experience what is beyond the borders of his previous cultural consciousness.

Resulting from intercultural encounters, from the stress, growth, and adaptation, is a new ‘cultural conditioning’ of the individual: the individual grows to become a multicultural person.

The identity of man is based, not on ‘belongingness’ which implies either owning or being owned by culture, but on a style of self-consciousness that is capable of negotiating ever new formations of reality. In this sense multicultural man is a radical departure from the kinds of identities found in both traditional and mass societies. He is neither totally part of nor totally apart from his culture; he lives, instead, on the boundary.

Equal to becoming an ‘intercultural’ person, intercultural encounters and the stress-adaptation-growth process lead to a learning progress in the individual, resulting in a broadened understanding “of human conditions and cultural differences and a view of things that are larger than any one cultural perspective”. This way of viewing things will of course, in turn, influence the ability to react flexibly in an intercultural encounter: the intercultural person will have the flexibility to adapt to the situation, and creatively manage any intercultural stress and possible conflict:

At this stage, one achieves the maximum capacity to communicate with individuals who are significantly different in cultural backgrounds, and are able to make deliberate choices of actions in specific situations rather than simply being dictated by the normative courses of action in a given culture.

Successful cross-cultural adaptation means that one becomes bicultural, integrating one’s original identity with a new identity created in the new culture. Personal changes can be achieved by cognitive flexibility (openness to new ideas, beliefs, and experiences, and the ability to accept these new conditions) and behavioural flexibility (the
ability to change behaviour as required by the culture). However, emotional changes require more than knowledge, empathy, and understanding. One needs to simulate new behaviours and to express affective aspects (emotions, feelings) expected in the culture.

Development of intercultural identity is to a certain extent equal to cross cultural competence on an individual level. Cross, Bazron, Dennis and Isaacs described cross-cultural competence in terms of behaviours, attitudes, and policies that are congruent, converge, and result in effectiveness in cross-cultural situations. In their definition, the notion of cross-cultural competence can be applied to individuals, agencies, and systems. Cross-cultural competence can be defined as “the ability to think, feel, and act in ways that acknowledge, respect, and build upon ethnic, [socio]cultural, and linguistic diversity.” This definition assumes that all individuals and groups are diverse and does not imply that one group is normative. It also acknowledges that socio-cultural factors often play as great, or greater, a role in people’s shared or unshared experience as their ethnicity, language, or culture. Various authors discussed the process of developing cross-cultural competence. They agree that there are three critical elements, including 1) self-awareness, 2) knowledge of information specific to each culture, and 3) skills that enable the individual to engage in successful interactions.

**IDENTITY STRATEGIES**

Different studies of the process of migrants’ identity reinvention describe identity strategies that are chosen by migrants. The strategies consider the reinforcement of identity of origin, marginalisation, development of intercultural identity, and identity change.

So far, described strategies were presented for the first generation migrants and their possible reactions to the new cultural environment.

As we could see, not all the individuals that find themselves in a context of another culture develop intercultural identity. As it was described before, the clash with a structurally different culture may lead to withdrawal and rejection both of the culture of origin and of the host culture. However, a marginalisation strategy is not negative as long as it does not become a permanent state. Another reaction to the new situation may be a reinforcement of the original ethnic identity that is rediscovered in the alien context. It may be a reaction to an alien culture with the scope of protection of self, or may be forced by external conditions as reception by the host society. A change of identity can also take place. In this case, we face assimilation to the culture of the hosting country and its identity offer. This quotation characterises this process well:

A striking example of the ’milestone’ is found in the autobiographies of many immigrants to America who later visited their native lands, only then realizing how little affinity they had retained, how identified they had become with America and Americans. Any return home, insofar as you have really left it, will signalize some sort of movement in identity.
Identity can be viewed as having two functions: ontological and pragmatic\textsuperscript{28}. Ontological function is the constructing of our ideal or desired self, while pragmatic function is the utilitarian reality of who a person can actually be. During the acculturation in intercultural contact settings, individuals attempt to achieve a coherent sense of who they are by balancing the ideal with the realistic constraints of living in a society that is substantially prejudiced against them. Individuals choose different identity strategies in order to achieve coherence. Ting-Toomey examined the perspective of identity negotiation that she defined as the “coordination between interactants concerning salient identity issues, and the process of engaging in responsive identity confirmation and positive identity enhancement”\textsuperscript{29}. According to her study of Asian Indian immigrant women in the United States, Hegde found that these immigrant women devoted tremendous effort to “balancing multiple, often contradictory, ways of being both in interethnic and intraethnic contexts”. Those women needed to negotiate “between subjective experience and external representations faced in the practices of their daily lives”\textsuperscript{30}.

The four identity strategies presented above, using the example of the first generation migrants, can also be applied to the second and third generation of migrants, and becomes especially visible when these are confronted. Migrant parents often offer their children a contradictive model in which to relate – especially when parents keep a strong ethnic identity in opposition to the new country. Studies of ethnic minority children development indicate that these children often struggle between two or more sets of cultural realities\textsuperscript{31}. One the one hand, there is a country of origin, which has been left behind but which one would like to return to and where relatives still live – there is the culture of origin. On the other hand, there is a host country with its identity offer, with institutions of the host society that influence the socialisation of the child. There is no doubt that immigrant children live in a bicultural environment\textsuperscript{32}. Children usually acquire ethnic identity in the course of family activities, such as the language the family members speak, religions and holiday celebrations, and food customs\textsuperscript{33}. On the other hand, Park’s analysis of the dual cultural process of ethnic children’s socialization is still applicable\textsuperscript{34}. Park’s argument suggests that the lifelong process of forming one’s ethnic identity is intricate. It requires more effort for parents to, for example, communicate their Chinese heritage to their children than to communicate the mainstream culture, because their children tend to resist the former.

A child may experience identity conflict, a division of personality resulting from the contemporary membership in groups that have different, or even contradictory, goals and interests, but request identification, loyalty and involvement from their members. A migrant child is confused by this double identity offered to him, and tries to find a solution for oneself. However, a child of an immigrant family might be encouraged to acculturate both the dominant and the ancestral culture, either of which may be considered ‘foreign’; but in fact, they are both integral parts of the child’s development.

The models of identifications – as it was said before – may be fourfold. One of them is development of intercultural identity or double identity, which is most likely to occur when the parents have managed to insert themselves well in the new society and do not
refuse the culture of the host country. The true bicultural person has dual membership and little difficulty in moving freely in either group, but still retains membership in group A when he is participating in group B, and vice versa. Recent studies show that for children, “growing up bicultural and bilingual is a trying process, even in the best of circumstances”\textsuperscript{35}. Hegde argues that because of traveling between cultures, one’s ethnic identity needs to be constantly defined and redefined, and to be “negotiated between the self and the external world”\textsuperscript{36}. It is important to remember that in our relations with our significant others we draw upon identifications of similarity and difference, and in the process, generate group identities. Ethnic and other identities are a fluid, situation-dependent and perpetual subject and object of negotiation. It is not enough to send the message of identity, the message must be accepted by significant others before an identity can be said to be ‘taken on’. If a migrant child receives positive ‘feedback’ on his or her dual ethnic identification and has significant others in both ‘worlds’, it is more likely to develop an intercultural identity.

Reinforcement of ethnic identity can be described as cultural resistance, and is characterized by closing oneself within the own group, making reference only to the identity and culture of origin, which can be expressed in many ways, from language, to food, and style of dress. The turn towards the ethnic identity may be a reaction to the negative feedback from the hosting society. In the labelling process, people are identified as X and come to identify themselves as X. It is a cumulative labelling process over time, in which the label has a consequence for the individual. The ‘otherness’ defined by the host group is always of concern to migrant children. If the identification with the host society is not rewarding, cannot be confirmed by significant others, and is a source of frustration, the migrant children may turn to their ethnic identity. The reinforcement of ethnic identity may also be a counter reaction to parents, who as first generation migrants, struggle to adapt to the hosting society often abandoning to a great extent their ethnic identity in order to perform better in the new reality. However, their struggles may not be successful – the host society may block their efforts for integration in various ways. This situation is negatively evaluated by their children, parents may lose their position of significant others and role models. Migrant children who find dual identity strategy unpleasant, or too difficult to develop, turn towards the ethnic identity where they hope to find comfort and acceptance. However, the poor performance of parents in the hosting society is not a discriminating factor for choosing this strategy. The turn towards ethnic identification may also result from the identity crisis of adolescents, who – in search for an answer to the question “who am I?” – find the answer in their parent culture of origin, and may be abandoned by them to a certain extent.

Although many ethnic minority children are used to integrating their own ethnic culture and the host culture, they often complain that the situation of being caught between two cultures makes them feel marginal. The feeling of ‘otherness’ may lead, as mentioned before, to reinforcement of ethnic identity but may also lead to marginalisation both from the culture of origin and the new culture. A child cannot choose between them, does not have a sense of belonging to either of them. We could say that
one finds himself or herself in the liminal state. If such a state persists in time, it may cause serious modifications to identity: self divided, fragile, the sense of being alien in all situations. However, marginalisation is not negative as long as it does not become a permanent state.

Another strategy is change of identity. In this case, we face assimilation to the culture of the hosting country and its identity offer. The identity building process is based on the new culture and on the rejection of the culture of origin. It is built in opposition to the parents, who in this case identify themselves rather with their ethnic group. A complete abandon of ethnic identity of origin is rare. Research done in the United States has generally shown that the use of an ethnic or national label (for example, African) dominates in the first generation, and the use of a compound or bicultural label (Afro–American) becomes more common in the second generation. The change is substantial from the first to second generation, but little thereafter. The reasons for the persistence of ethnic labels beyond the third generation may be unrelated to acculturation. Members of immigrant groups who are visually identifiable are likely to be ethnically labelled by others or by themselves, regardless of their degree of acculturation. Also, the decline in strength and valence of ethnic identity (how strongly and positively individuals feel about their group membership) from the first to the second generation is followed by a levelling off, or much slower decline, in later generations. On the other hand – measures assessing cultural knowledge, practices, behaviours and language proficiency are in continuous decline. This tendency can be explained by ethnic loyalty – desire for cultural preservation.

The exclusive use of generation does not allow examination of behaviour or attitude changes that may provide the explanation for changes in ethnic identity. Ethnic identity does not necessarily diminish with greater orientation toward the host culture; it can remain strong without interfering with participation in the larger society. Changes in ethnic identity over time are accompanied by changes in identity relative to the dominant or host culture, so group identity of immigrants can be thought of as two dimensional: identification with their own ethnic group and identification as a member of the larger society. Having a strong sense of both identities (identifications) defines bicultural identity, which can take many different forms: blended, alternating or multicultural.

What is the key to the personal psychological comfort after migration? An attempt to answer this question may be found in the Eriksonian framework that rests upon a distinction between the psychological sense of continuity, the ego identity (sometimes called “the self” proper); the personal peculiarities which separate one person from another, known as personal identities; and the social roles that an actor might play, their social identities. In some readings of Erikson, the development of a strong ego identity, along with the proper integration into a stable society and culture, lead to a stronger sense of identity in general. Accordingly, a deficiency in any of these factors may increase the chance of an identity crisis or confusion.
Sociologists believe that identity is a dynamic feature of social life. The importance of identity flexibility in achieving effectiveness in intercultural situations has been underlined by many authors. Collier and Thomas, as well as Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, focus on identity negotiation as a key to intercultural communication competence. Kim in his adaptation theory goes further, and argues that an individual’s identity may evolve from monocultural to intercultural. “Through extensive and cumulative intercultural communication experience, the process of psychological evolution is theorized to unfold in the direction of a more ‘individuated’ (vs. categorical) and ‘universalised’ (vs. provincial) self – other orientation.” Research studies have provided evidence for intercultural identity transformation.

The development of intercultural identity depends on many factors. What may help in achieving this identity is coping with the stress of the liminal phase. It is a difficult task, but there are several ways that help to fight cultural shock and to adapt to the new environment. Taft suggested that managing cultural shock and immersion into another society is a special case of human adaptation that should be addressed in the context of socialisation, re-socialisation, and individual group relations.

Although some aspects of cultural shock adaptation vary as a function of the individuals’ characteristics, their intents and needs, and the cultural and social contexts of adaptation, others are universal. The universal features of cultural shock require adjustments based on an awareness of cultural shock. The use of skills for resolving crises, and the acceptance that some personal change and behavioural adjustment is necessary, is fundamental to cultural shock resolution and adaptation. This is not to say that an individual must assimilate, but one must accommodate (acculturate), understanding the local culture and the means of adapting effectively. Adaptation requires suspending at least some culturally based reactions (practicing cultural relativism) to become more tolerant of the local culture. This does not mean that one must give up one’s identity, values, or culture. Many individuals may effectively manage cultural shock without making major changes in their personality or former lifestyle. The challenge is to do so in a new cultural environment that does not provide the accustomed supports.

There are several aspects that help fight cultural shock and aid in adaptation. First of all, pre-departure preparation – before the liminal phase starts, one can prepare for the situation that one is going to meet by collecting information about the place one is going to and if possible by undergoing an intercultural training. One needs to be realistic about the necessary changes, as well as aware of the problems inevitably encountered in living in a foreign country. The knowledge about “what awaits us” among migrants may vary: it depends on their migration history and experience, cultural distance, existence of migration network that may provide the essential information, but also on the migration and integration politics of both the sending and the receiving country. Successful adjustment also depends on the availability of transition resources necessary for comfortable adaptation in the new culture. The needs of physical well being, food,
and security must be effectively met if one is to meet work requirements and address subsequent needs for social relations, self-esteem, and personal development. The day-to-day basics are crucial, though often difficult to achieve. That is why housing policy, availability of services, and work are all important parts of integration policies in many countries. *Personal and social relations* are crucial in managing cultural shock, which requires that one maintain or re-establish a network of primary relations, family, or friends who provide positive interpersonal relations for self-esteem and for meeting personal and emotional needs. Participation in the daily life of the host culture is essential for cultural adjustment and adaptation as well, providing the opportunity to learn social behaviour patterns by observation, practice, and questioning.

**Acculturation and identity strategies**

As we can see, changes in ethnic identification are closely related to the issue of acculturation. Change is central to understanding of both ethnic identity and acculturation. Acculturation and ethnic identity can be conceptualised in terms of at least two dimensions:

1) retention of or identification with the ethnic, or original, culture;
2) adaptation to or identification with the dominant, host or ‘new’ culture;
3) additional dimensions are possible such as identification with a third culture or multiple cultures.

“Acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups”43. Traditional conceptualisations of acculturation take a one dimensional approach, stating that individuals must lose cultural characteristics to gain characteristics from other cultural groups for cultural and social adaptation. Contemporary conceptualisations take a multidimensional approach that places both cultures on different continuums, indicating an individual’s ability to maintain his or her culture of origin while adopting characteristics from other groups considered appropriate for cultural adaptation44.

The multidimensional acculturation model proposed by Berry seems very useful for describing different strategies that migrants adopt – strategies of acculturation that are directly linked to their identity strategies. Berry45 conceptualizes the processes of acculturation on two levels: the population level (ecological, cultural, social, and institutional) and the individual level (the behaviors and traits of persons). The population level can be defined as the communication that takes place at the societal level between an ethnic group and the larger society, regarding social structure, economic transactions, and political organization. This dialogue creates social and cultural contexts that ethnic individuals use to identify themselves and to function as a member in society, for example, being aware of cultural change in his/her ethnic group and the relationship between the ethnic group and the larger society. At the individual level, both intra–
and inter-group communication occurs, through which an ethnic individual’s behavior, identity, values, and attitudes are formed, practiced, and reformed, in other words, one goes through acculturation-individual change.

In the model, four acculturation attitudes are identified according to whether or not the choices made are of the minority or of the larger society. According to Berry, acculturation attitudes of the ethno-cultural groups depend on whether the immigrant wants to maintain or reject his or her cultural identity and characteristics and maintain or reject relationships with other groups in the host society. Preference for loss of heritage culture, in favour of relationships with other groups, is considered ‘assimilation’ if chosen by a minority group and being a “melting pot” if decided by the larger society. Preference for maintenance of heritage culture and identity but for minimal relationships with other groups is “separation” if chosen by a minority group and “segregation” if decided by the larger society. Preference for maintenance of heritage culture and identity while still desiring relationships with other groups is “integration” if chosen by a minority group and “multiculturalism” if decided by the larger society. Preference for loss of heritage culture and for minimal relationships with other groups is “marginalization” if chosen by a minority group and “exclusion” if decided by the larger society.

Integration is the most preferred strategy of the majority of immigrants, meaning most immigrants want to maintain their ethnic or cultural identity regardless of whether they intend to take on the beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours of the host culture. However, integration strategy can be followed freely and be successful only if the conditions in the hosting society are favourable: when they offer an open and inclusive orientation toward cultural diversity.

Integration strategy, as well as separation strategy, are in a sense collective, as they may be followed only when other members of one’s ethno-cultural group share the wish to maintain the group’s cultural heritage. Assimilation is a more individualistic strategy that can, however, be blocked by negative response from the hosting society. The experience of prejudice and discrimination may stop an individual from choosing an assimilation strategy in order to avoid the stress of rejection. In this case, marginalization may occur.

Different factors influence the choice of an acculturation strategy, and they are similar to those that influence identity strategies. It may be a big cultural difference that pushes an individual towards one’s own group, and therefore leads to choosing a separation or integration attitude. Also, the freedom to migrate may play a significant role: immigrants who migrated of their own choice will probably seek greater participation in the host society, and will tend to choose assimilation or integration strategies, while, for example, forced migrants as refugees will be inclined to avoid participation, tending to separate.

Those whose appearance makes them distinct from the dominant group will not be attracted to an assimilation strategy that does not promise success. They might be discouraged by the experience of discrimination and racism or simply by labelling that
results in the fact that an individual, while becoming a competent participant in the majority culture, will always be identified as a member of the minority culture.

Another factor that is not irrelevant to acculturation attitudes is the size of the minority group and its vitality. The bigger and more active it is, the better the chance for cultural maintenance. Some aspects of globalisation have played a significant role here. Metaphoric reduction of the distance, which is possible to a large extent, owing to cheaper, commonly available and efficient transport systems (for example, jet airplanes transport passengers and cargo across any distance on the planet within twenty-four hours) contributed to accelerated population movement – this movement assures the ethnic groups’ constant ‘refreshment’ in the form of new waves of migrants. ‘Mass culture’, as well as the rapid development of communication technologies (telephone and computer networks effect instantaneous interpersonal communication between points all over the earth), make the cultural distance shorter, which helps maintain contacts with the home country and therefore maintain a vital migrant community. However, these two aspects of globalisation – easy spatial and interpersonal communication – enable individuals to maintain strong ethnic identification also in cases when the ethnic group in the hosting country is not strongly developed or does not meet the needs of the individual. Wong used “diaspora and imagined communities” to illustrate the complexities and dynamics in the process of ethnic identity formation. Diasporas can be defined as:

expatriate minority communities’ (1) that are dispersed from an original ‘centre’ to at least two ‘peripheral’ places; (2) that maintain a ‘memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland’; (3) that ‘believe they are not – and perhaps cannot be – fully accepted by their host country’; (4) that see the ancestral home as a place of eventual return, when the time is right; (5) that are committed to the maintenance or restoration of this homeland; and (6) whose consciousness and solidarity as a group are ‘importantly defined’ by this continuing relationship with the homeland.

We have to remember, though, that diasporas are not always oriented to their roots in a specific place. They more frequently re-create a culture in new diverse locations. In her studies on diasporas and ethnic identity formation, Wong emphasized that one’s ethnic identity and perceptions of one’s own ethnic culture may change through his/her life span “as new immigrants arrive, new generations are born, new alliances are formed, old alliances are broken,” and as special events and other concerns arise in the world.

Last but not least, what influences the choice of acculturation strategy is the national policy of the hosting country, which may encourage one or the other strategy, whereas the positive or negative experience of daily interactions with members of the host society may reinforce certain preferences. As it was said before, integration strategy can be successful only if the policy of the hosting country will allow it to be so. But identity can be spoilt; identification – particularly within institutions – can be heavily biased in favour of its external moment. Identification is often a matter of imposition and resistance, claim and counterclaim, rather than a consensual process of mutuality and negotiation.
Individuals belong to many different categories, and thus potentially have a repertoire of many different identities to draw upon. Every individual is exclusively placed in the social structure and is thus unique. The only thing that the migrants may have in common with one another is that they are migrants. Beyond that, they have a growing plurality of faiths, languages, and cultural backgrounds, as well as differing gender, age, and immigration statuses. We need to remember that it is impossible to create a “standard” identity change model or acculturation measure that could be applied to each case, as there are many unique features of each situation, and each case must be studied separately – and both individual and group aspects of the phenomena need be taken into consideration. As Barth argues, identifications are to be found and negotiated at the boundaries (of groups). Individual motivations to adopt certain self-categorizations and avoid others feed into this apparently mechanical process via the individual’s ability to subjectively redefine the context, or negotiate behaviourally a new context for all to see, in an attempt to select a different subjective frame of reference. The ethnic identity perceived by individual members in a group is not homogeneous. Those who study ethnic identity need to keep in mind that the “nature of identity experienced by many people whose lives crisscross multiple sets of boundaries” is multifaceted and evolving. One’s ethnic identity may vary corresponding to individual and situational variations. Even though individuals may share the same nominal identity (virtual), the practice of this identity may be different, have different consequences for their lives, and may be performed differently. The name can remain the same, but what it means in everyday life to have that name can change dramatically.

Notes


Ethnic identity is a dynamic, multidimensional construct that refers to one’s identity or sense of self as a member of an ethnic group. Ethnic identity is not a fixed categorization, but rather is a fluid and dynamic understanding of self and ethnic background. Ethnic identity is constructed and modified as individuals become aware of differences among ethnic groups and attempt to understand the meaning of their ethnicity within the larger setting. It is subject to change along various dimensions: over time or across generations in a new culture, in different contexts, and with age and development.


34 Park, in his Chinese-American community studies, argues that: "Children seem to take over intuitively and without resistance just those elements of a foreign culture which an adult alien finds most difficult to understand and assimilate. Children do not inherit the cultural complexes of their parents, and when children of immigrants grow up in the country of their adoption they inevitably take over all the accents, the inflections, the local cultural idioms of the native population. This is true of the Chinese in America, even though they are reared – as most of them are – in a ghetto. Most of the native sons among the Chinese in California are outrageously American in their manners and in their sentiments. It is only in later life, if at all, that they revert to the ancestral tradition and acquire a secondary racial loyalty". R.E. Park, Culture and cultural trends, in E.C. Hughes, C.S. Johnson, J. Masuoka, R. Redfield, L. Wirth (eds.), The collected papers of Robert E. Park, vols. 1-3: vol. 1, Human communities: Race and culture, Glencoe, IL 1925, p. 26.


Barth argued that cultural leaders choose for themselves acculturation options that have different consequences for their community: “(i) they may attempt to pass and become incorporated in the pre-established industrial society and cultural group; (ii) they may accept a ‘minority’ status, accommodate to and seek to reduce their minority disabilities by encapsulating all cultural differentiae in sectors of non-articulation, while participating in the larger system of the industrialized group in the other sectors of activity; (iii) they may choose to emphasize ethnic identity, using it to develop new positions and patterns to organize activities in those sectors formerly not found in their society” (F. Barth, *Ethnic groups and boundaries: the social organisation of cultural difference*, Oslo - Universitetsforlaget 1969, p. 33).


Wong (Lau), *Migration across generations: Whose identity is authentic?* cit., p. 133.


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The Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of the Concept of Tolerance

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Abstract

Concepts in general are not ahistorical or metahistorical phenomena and this is especially true of the highly normative notion of tolerance. This chapter explores the concept of tolerance in relation to the individual, groups in general and some monotheistic religious groups in particular, and looks at the historical dimensions of the concept from the 17th century until 19th century (with the stress on Forst’s four historical-systematic types of tolerance and on some other crucial positions in the Enlightenment period).

Konceptov, predvsem normativnih konceptov, kot je toleranca, ne bi smeli dojemati kot ne-zgodovinskih ali meta-zgodovinskih. To je razlog, da smo se v članku najprej lotili konceptualne analize, kjer smo raziskali relacije, ki se vzpostavijo v odnosu do tolerance, in sicer med konceptom toleranca in med posameznikom, med skupinami na splošno in med nekaterimi monoteistično religioznimi skupinami. Drugi del članka je sestavljen iz zgodovinske analize, kjer smo predstavili zgodovinsko dimenzijo tega koncepta od 17. do 19. stoletja, s poudarkom na štirih Forstovih zgodovinsko-sistematičnih tipih tolerance in na nekaterih odločilnih točkah v obdobju razsvetljenstva.

**INTRODUCTION**

On UNESCO’s 50th anniversary on 16 November 1995, its Member States adopted a *Declaration of Principles on Tolerance*. This asserts that tolerance is neither indulgence nor indifference, but rather, represents respect for and appreciation of the rich variety of world cultures, predicated upon an unconditional acceptance of universal human rights. Within the international community, only tolerance can ensure the survival of mixed communities in every region of the globe. Considering the fact that we are now in “an age marked by the globalization of the economy and by rapidly increasing mobility, communication, integration and interdependence, large-scale migrations and displacement of populations, urbanization and changing social patterns [...]”, values and important intellectual categories are “more essential than ever before”. One of these categories is “tolerance”. Nowadays virtually everyone feels confident that they understand what the word “tolerance” means. But is it really as clear as that? There are many contexts in which we speak of a person or an institution as being tolerant: parents tolerate certain behaviour in their children; a friend tolerates the weaknesses of another; a monarch tolerates different sexual practices; a church tolerates a possibility of heresy; a state tolerates a minority religion; a society tolerates deviant behaviour. Thus for any analysis of the motives and reasons for toleration, the relevant contexts need to be taken into account and we have to be very cautious about how we interpret the concept itself.

This chapter begins with a section in which Bojan Borstner and Smiljana Gartner describe the bases of the concept of toleration, concentrating firstly on the individual level, secondly, on groups in general and, thirdly, on some monotheistic religious groups. In the second section, Iwan D’Aprile and Ana Cristina Araújo present the historical dimension of this concept from the 17th century until the 19th century.

**SECTION A: THE BASES OF THE CONCEPT OF TOLERATION**

When we judge a group of people or an individual, we usually do so on the basis of their identity, or at least some parts of it. So, toleration is closely connected to the notion of identity, either individual or collective (ethno-cultural). Since John Locke, civil libertarians have argued that tolerance presupposes the value of the individual, his or her au-
tonomy, and freedom of choice. It also recognizes that a tolerant society is more likely to be creative and innovative, for it is open to new discoveries of truth and insights, thus expanding the repertoire of human experience. A tolerant society is more likely to engender mutual trust and cooperation, and tends towards peace; for, insofar as we are willing to learn from others, we are more able to negotiate and compromise on our differences. In a tolerant society, there is apt to be less cruelty, hypocrisy and duplicity, less dogmatism, hatred, and fanaticism. In short, the principle of tolerance contributes to the common good and to a more humane society, and is justified on pragmatic, consequential, and utilitarian grounds.

However, this is a very optimistic and idealised principle. For, if we analyse some of the basic ideas presented by civil libertarians, it becomes clear that this enthusiasm is not always justifiable. Therefore, in this section of the chapter, we will examine the issues of: (i) tolerance and the individual, i.e. characteristics an agent needs to have to be considered tolerant towards another agent’s beliefs or practice, and how this will affect her subsequent conduct; and (ii) tolerance and groups, with particular attention to religious groups. Considering the fact that religious belief is one of the most important parts of individual and group identity, the third part of this section looks specifically at (iii) the relation between monotheistic religious groups and tolerance.

**Tolerance and the Individual**

The term ‘toleration’ is derived from the Latin word *tolerare* which means to put up with, countenance or suffer, and generally refers to the conditional acceptance of or non-interference with beliefs, actions or practices that one considers to be wrong but which should not be prohibited or constrained. From this general description of tolerance, two points arise. First, in thinking about toleration, the unavoidable starting point has to be an awareness of someone else’s practice or belief; and second, the perception that those beliefs or practices are wrong. For if we consider them to be correct, we would naturally not only permit them but also encourage them. The concept of tolerance is interesting because it implies that we judge someone else’s beliefs and practice to be incorrect but nevertheless we permit them; indeed, most dictionaries characterize ‘tolerance’ as the act of permitting, or the capacity to endure those beliefs or practices that differ from or conflict with one’s own.

From this several issues emerge. First, tolerance should not be confused with relativism, pluralism, or scepticism, which, for different reasons, exclude judgments about another person’s thoughts, values, or actions as being wrong, faulty or harmful. Tolerance, conversely, requires a negative judgment. Second, there is the issue of permissiveness. Do we permit a certain act or opinion because we do not care? Permissiveness should be understood as a central quality of tolerance and it may imply an attitude of not caring. However, if tolerance were exhausted by ‘permissiveness’, its antithesis, intolerance,
would involve the strict enforcement of norms or adherence to practices. We can take the following example: A police officer tries to enforce the speed limit. He is very strict, i.e. he allows not a single person to get away with exceeding the speed limits. It would be strange to claim that, because he enforces the speed laws strictly, he is not tolerant. Therefore, tolerance cannot be restricted to permissiveness. In other words, one must be capable of intolerance in order to be responsibly tolerant. From this we get the second condition: i.e. if P believes that, what R does – X – is right (or at least not incorrect according to P’s standards) then there would be nothing for P to tolerate. That is to say, when we tolerate something, we deliberately refrain from negating that thing, because only with a negative judgment is there the option of tolerating another’s beliefs or practices.

Tolerance is a concept of the moral order. It implies a moral judgment on error and the consequent adoption of a moral attitude, based on charity towards the good faith of those who err. As tolerance does not imply lack of caring, we can extract the third condition: it is not enough for someone just to know that something is an incorrect practice, one must also have a desire to criticize (prevent) it. However, if criticism or prevention is not possible, then it makes no sense to say that P tolerates R’s actions. If it is not within one’s ability to prevent (criticize) someone else’s alleged wrongdoing, then there is no case of tolerance. And if P does something to prevent R’s wrongdoing, then that wrongdoing has not been tolerated. In that case, P would be intolerant toward R’s wrongdoing.

It is, however, wrong to conclude from this that a tolerant person needs to be in a position to effectively prohibit or interfere with the tolerated practices. From the first condition to the last, we can conclude that when we tolerate something we deliberately refrain from negating that thing. This implies volition. So, one can only speak of toleration where it is practised voluntarily and is not compelled, for otherwise one would speak of simply ‘suffering’ or ‘enduring’ certain things that one rejects but against which one is powerless to act. This is the last condition of describing a tolerant person.

To sum up, we have introduced six conditions, all of which have to be fulfilled if we want to talk about tolerance. They are as follows:

1. Person P is aware of person’s R belief or practice.
2. P judges R’s belief or practice to be wrong, faulty, or harmful.
3. P sincerely desires to criticize or to change R’s belief or practice.
4. P has the ability and opportunity to criticize or change R’s belief or practice.
5. P withholds criticism of R’s belief or practice, or refrains from attempting to change R’s belief or practice, because P attaches a value to the idea that R has the right to think and behave, in this situation, however she wishes. This restraint is called tolerance (T).
6. T is practised voluntarily.

From these six conditions, we get two possible conducts from P, i.e. from the person that is tolerant towards R’s beliefs or practices. The first is passive tolerance; the second active tolerance.

Passive tolerance implies:

(i) a refusal to interfere with someone or something you do not like or are neutral towards;

(ii) the affirmation that whatever it is that one tolerates, this practice or belief ought to be allowed continue to exist.

Therefore,

(iii) if this kind of toleration is accepted, we get passive tolerance (PT).

To rephrase, passive tolerance means that we neither interfere with nor support the practice or attitude that is tolerated. An example of this is when I tolerate the fact that you are a racist (refer to (i)), I will do nothing (according to PT) if this would put you under threat (refer to (ii)). If I do something for you (a long list of possible actions), then I am not just PT but A(active)T. That is to say, actively tolerant, i.e. what is being tolerated is actively protected or supported.

TOLERANCE AND GROUPS

According to Locke the principle of tolerance contributes to the common good and to a more humane society, and is justified on pragmatic, consequential, and utilitarian grounds. Arguments for the so-called ‘millet system’, which is based on the model of group rights, respond to the question: who is entitled to be tolerated? A well-known example comes from the Ottoman Empire, where the Turks, who were Muslims, allowed religious minorities (Jews and Christians) not only to practise their own religion for almost five centuries, but also to have freedom to govern their own communities’ internal matters with their own legal systems, laws and courts. However, there were also many restrictions and special rules regulating relations between non-Muslim communities and Muslims. Non-Muslims could not proselytize; they were required to wear distinctive dress to be easily recognized in everyday life; there were curbs on intermarriage, and they had to pay special taxes.

A similar system was established in medieval Spain, as has been shown by Rios. One of the characteristics of medieval Spain was the so-called convivencia (peaceful co-existence) between Christians, Jews and Muslims. Different religious groups lived together, but each group led its own way of life independent of the politically dominant one. In the case of Jews under Christian rule, they were not only a significant source of income for the monarchy, but also a force to be taken into account during the colonisation of
the lands conquered from Muslims. This was why the Jewish population was tolerated in the different Christian kingdoms of medieval Spain, although with some differences. Co-existence did not imply equal rights. As Luisa Trindade explains, Jews were tolerated in the Christian kingdoms of the medieval Iberian Peninsula, but they did not have the same rights as the Christian population, as is shown by the discriminatory laws of the Spanish ecclesiastical councils and legal codes. Was this the very beginning of the liberal comprehension of tolerance as a concept? Before answering this question, we have to examine the characteristics of the concept in liberal societies.

All societies, whether occupying a majority or minority position, seek legal recognition for their ethno-cultural (collective) identities and practices. These demands are often described, by both defenders and critics, in terms of ‘group rights’. Defenders typically describe group rights as a supplement to individual rights, and hence as enriching and extending traditional liberal principles to deal with new challenges. Critics, on the other hand, tend to assume that group rights entail a restriction of individual rights, and hence threaten basic liberal democratic principles.

Let us now consider a situation in which a cultural minority simply wants to be left alone to run its own community in accordance with its traditional non-liberal norms. If this minority does not want to impose its values on others, should it not be allowed to organize its society according to its culture and within the general ambit of the law, as in the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, even if this involves limiting the liberty of its own members? If we look back to previous Jewish communities, all were recognized as millets (self-governing units) and allowed to impose restrictive religious laws on their own members. This was a group-based form of toleration, which did not recognize any principle of individual freedom of conscience.

So when liberals extended the principle of religious tolerance to other areas of life, they were extending an individual freedom-based notion of tolerance. This is why a genuinely liberal conception of tolerance will deny the legitimacy of internal restrictions that limit the right of individuals within the group to revise their conceptions of the good. For example, liberalism uses legal means to oppose a religious minority’s attempts to prohibit apostasy and conversion or to prevent their children from learning about other ways of life. For similar reasons, they do not exclude religious groups with strong beliefs that may demand strict conformity and allegiance from their members, but they could not endorse the formation of a theocracy, for some people lack such intensity of religious belief.

From the previous examples we may conclude that the most important part of ethnocultural identity is religion. The question arising from these cases and from the liberal understanding of tolerance is whether the state is entitled to talk about tolerance towards different religious groups or not. Locke, in principle, advises the magistrate to avoid the use of force whenever possible, but he nevertheless acknowledges that there are cases where it will be necessary to use it. It is clear that here Locke is on a slippery
slop, because he no longer has a clear-cut procedure to determine what should be tolerated and what not. Even worse, he explicitly says: “Those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of God. Promises, covenants and oaths, which are the bonds of civil society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, denies all”⁶. According to Locke, atheists are not restricted by the bonds of civil society, and therefore are destructive to the needs and interests of the state. Since they do not believe in a providential God and belong to no recognized form of worship, and do not seek to save their souls, by definition they are not entitled to the same procedure as theists (primarily Christians). Atheists, since they neither accept nor participate in this fantastic and supernatural work of our salvation are entirely excluded from the community.

TOLERANCE AND MONOTHEISTIC RELIGIONS

As described in the previous section, Muslims, Christians and Jews used a group-based form of toleration – toleration based on social cohesion and collective (ethno-cultural) identity. The remaining question is: are monotheistic religions intrinsically able to be tolerant towards each other or to any other religious group? Locke’s answer would be in the affirmative. But considering the fact that: (i) there are different monotheistic religions, which are based on constitutive, redemptive, revealed truth(s); and (ii) religious beliefs in the frame of a Religion – being a matter of revelation – cannot attach any value to other religions’ beliefs. Because other beliefs could not have any intrinsic religious value, we can conclude that (iii) toleration of other(s’) monotheistic religions (believers) is not possible. Following the analysis undertaken in Margalit’s work, we can say that the very basis of this paradox is the background assumption that a revelation itself is propositional and it is possible to know/get its message only if one already (truly) believes that revealed truths are constitutive of redemption (salvation) through religion⁷. Religions themselves acquire their intrinsic value by providing frameworks for redemption/salvation. This is common to all the three monotheistic religious traditions and there is no dispute between them on this matter.

The problem arises, however, when different revealed truths, which form the constitutive ingredients of different religions, contradict each other. The unique source of those truths is always revelation and therefore it is not possible for someone else’s incompatible proposition to be assessed as true from the standpoint of Christian (C) revealed truth. This leads to a more general conclusion that is necessarily exclusionist, because a religion, which is based on revealed truths, cannot value other religions that contradict those truths. That is to say, as revelation and revealed truths are constitutive ingredients of each of the three monotheistic religions, it is not possible for both (all) sides to be right. Most obviously, if Allah exists, then the Cs and Js (Jews) are mistaken no matter how sincere, well-meaning, and thoughtful they were. If Jehovah exists, then the Ms

Accepting, Tolerating, Discriminating – the Concepts of Discrimination and Tolerance
and Cs are mistaken. The same procedure can be applied to the other propositions about which there is disagreement. Not only do these religions believe different things, their beliefs are incompatible.

It seems that, contrary to Locke, true believers cannot be tolerant, at least not in the case of religious beliefs. Indeed, anyone who is committed to a belief or practice cannot tolerate dissenting beliefs or practices. But what about tolerance as the capacity to endure those beliefs or practices that differ from one’s own? It is commonly accepted that religion is essentially connected with a belief, which is an inner, personal and somehow irrational feeling. If you ask a believer why she believes or where she found proof of God’s existence, the answer would be that the believer does not need a proof, and would not be perturbed by your question. Reason is powerless in the face of true faith. Here we are confronted with the first paradox related to the issue of religious tolerance. The total acceptance of a different religion cannot be considered as a case of tolerance, as it would lead to the negation of the other’s beliefs. If tolerance involves enduring conflicting beliefs or practices, then tolerance is not possible, for conflicting beliefs or practices can never be judged to have the same status or value as one’s own. If tolerance involves permitting differing beliefs or practices, then tolerance is not possible, for as long as another’s beliefs or practices are inoffensive or non-challenging, and are such that there is no disagreement, then there is no possible cause to prompt the action, attitude, disposition, or character of tolerance. What, then, passes for tolerance? What are people really doing when they mistakenly assume that they are tolerating another’s beliefs or practices? We will present four cases in which representatives of different religions are included. We use C for Christian, M for Muslim and J for Jew. They go as follows:

First case: C judges that it would be foolish and non-productive either to try to show M how mistaken she is or to try to convert M into believing or acting as C does. This decision is based on the awareness that M is likely to be as deeply committed to her religious beliefs or practices as C is. As C would not change her beliefs and practices, she realizes that M would not do so either. C concludes, therefore, that it would be foolish to try to change M’s thoughts and behaviour. This interpretation seems very reasonable. However, it leads to the situation in which C, who firmly believes that eternal salvation and damnation hang on embracing this particular religion, would have to sit back calmly as M went to hell.

Second case: C just does not care about how others judge her beliefs or practices, for she does not consider the judgments of others (M or J) to have any relevance to the quality of her beliefs or practices. C thinks that the only person who is authorized to evaluate those beliefs or practices is the (Christian) God himself, and she extends this same thesis to others. Therefore, C does not criticize others, simply because she thinks that other beliefs or practices have no impact on her beliefs and practices. Such an attitude could lead to a society made up of isolated groups (millet system) where only the
right (proper) membership has value and the idea of God preserving a certain moral order in society may be seen as a positive social effect of religion. Unfortunately, that idea in reality often excludes the idea of freedom from human consideration, because it is limited only to my (our) group (community), and, although individuals are formally free, they are not free and are inferior in their relation to God and the imposed ‘heavenly order’.

Third case: C judges that the harm or wrong done by M’s thinking or behaviour is less serious than the harm or wrong that would result from changing or trying to change M’s beliefs or practices. Perhaps, in this situation, we can recall the words of the just and wise inquisitor in Shaw’s *Saint Joan*: “If you hate cruelty, remember that nothing is so cruel in its consequences as the toleration of heresy”. Therefore, it is not so easy to use the notion of religious tolerance, because even in this case, someone who really is a believer of certain religion cannot remain truly indifferent in the face of beliefs she believes to be wrong, feeling that the mistake should be corrected. This, as a necessary part of the religious attitude, leads to the slippery slope of proselytism. This possible consequence shows once more that religious tolerance does not usually preclude proselytising (though, less laudably, it often involves a ban on proselytising by those who are tolerated).

Fourth case: C disagrees with M, but respects (tolerates) her opinion. Does it mean that C is respecting something that is false (wrong, offensive)? Of course C does not mean to imply here that disagreeing with M entails despising M: C can think that M’s beliefs are false and still respect M. But however honest M is, however carefully M has thought about the matter at issue, however honourably she has conducted the argument, if C disagrees with M’s opinion then C thinks that it is wrong, that M’s belief is false. If C does not think that it is wrong then C does not disagree with it. Nevertheless, we have here the case where an important distinction is involved. On the one hand, there is an evaluation of C’s or M’s truth claims and, on the other, there are different persons (C and M in our case). We should not make a faulty inference that statements regarding how we should treat those with whom we disagree follow directly from claims (we should stress that such claims are purely epistemological) about the truths or falsehoods they hold. In the situation where people hold false beliefs, just holding false belief does not allow us to mistreat them or imply that we should give them special (privileged) treatment if they make true claims. But it is usually the case that it is difficult to respect someone if we disagree with all, or even most, of their opinions. There is surely some connection between the sum of what we believe and the sort of people we are.

We started out with the question of whether there could be a kind of toleration in the case of revealed truths that are constitutive ingredients of all three monotheistic religions, and our answer has been No. Perhaps it is possible to find a more tolerant way out, but the price that true believers would have to pay is (too) high. Imagine the situation where we have two propositions: (i) Allah exists; (ii) our shared evidence supports (i). Believers
from M accept both propositions as true propositions. The Cs and Js deny both (i) and (ii). All of them have their (own) evidence that includes not only the original arguments (revealed truths) themselves and their own reactions to them, but also the fact that other believers assess the evidence differently. What should Ms say in the dispute? “We all share our evidence. After careful examination of the evidence which we all have it seems that we are entitled to accept both (i) and (ii) as true. However, for Cs and Js both of them seem false. We are right and they are wrong.” Js (or Cs) will, of course, have comparable beliefs on the other side of the issue. It is difficult to see why one of them is better justified with respect to (ii) than the other. What is clear is that both propositions (truths) are necessarily connected, and it is not possible for one of the parties justifiably to believe only (i) and not (ii). It is therefore obvious that Ms, Cs, and Js do believe or do not believe justifiably (i) and (ii) and there is no room for tolerance. If they wish to be tolerant, then they have to suspend their own judgments about (revealed) truth that is an unavoidable constituent of their religion. What does it mean? First, it means that some of M’s (J’s, or C’s) beliefs are not justified, which is the first step to scepticism and/or heresy. Second, it implies some kind of humility based on the Socratic assumption of (sometimes) not knowing what the truth is in the cases where it could be possible that evidence is shared.

Nevertheless, the principle of tolerance that we try to defend in the previous case could be described as a cover for a kind of moral cowardice, because it encourages educators not to deal with people as whole people. If the goal of religion is the development of a particular kind of a person, and if tolerance involves respecting people as they are, then succeeding in our religious goals requires being intolerant of certain ways of thinking, valuing, and acting. As *bildung* (religious formation) is impossible without change, so change is irresponsible without a goal. To mould a particular kind of person is to discourage the maintenance or development of certain other types of persons. Therefore, formational intolerance is as necessary as it is unavoidable.

**SECTION B: THE HISTORICAL DIMENSION OF THE CONCEPT OF TOLERANCE**

All the complex meanings, ambivalences, paradoxes and limitations of our concept of tolerance as described above result from historical processes in which these meanings have been developed as answers to specific situations of conflict. Just as concepts in general are not ahistorical or metahistorical phenomena, this is especially true for the highly normative concept of tolerance, a fact that has been pointed out above all by Michael Walzer in his classical study *On Toleration* (1997).

The experience of the European religious civil wars of the 16th and 17th centuries proved to be crucial for the development of the modern concept of tolerance. The conceptions of tolerance that developed in the European Enlightenment from late 17th to 18th centuries were an attempt to find a response to those situations. And despite postmodern criticism of the Enlightenment, they are not at all anachronistic; on the
contrary, they are still as relevant as ever to contemporary discussions. Moreover, the Enlightenment position on tolerance is not monolithic, but rather it includes various attitudes, reflecting the complexity of the problem. This plurality of opinion is also present in the self-criticism and self-reflection of the early Enlightenment conceptions of the late 18th century. According to Rainer Forst’s comprehensive study, Toleranz im Konflikt. Geschichte, Gehalt und Gegenwart eines umstrittenen Begriffs [Tolerance in Conflict. History, Content, and Presence of a Controversial Concept] (2003), at least four of these historical-systematic types, or ‘conceptions’ (as Forst calls them), of tolerance can be derived through historical analysis. They also imply different grades of anerkennung (growing respect and acceptance). In what follows, the four conceptions are briefly presented and discussed. Thereafter, Ana Cristina Araújo will characterize some crucial positions in the Enlightenment period in more detail.

**Type 1: The Permission Conception (Erlaubniskonzeption) of Tolerance (T1)**

The permission conception of tolerance is the minimal basic form of tolerance. Tolerance here means only that an authority (a king, a government, a majority) permits a minority to adhere to its confession as long as the legitimacy of the dominant authority is not called into question. This form of tolerance is seen as merely a kind of grace dispensed by a governor to a minority that is seen to be neither equal nor valuable. Often this minority pays for the tolerance with different forms of discrimination, higher taxes, and the withholding of many of the rights enjoyed by the majority. Tolerance here is a relationship which is highly hierarchical, asymmetrical and non-reciprocal.

Historically, the permission conception manifested itself in the various Edicts of Tolerance, starting with the Edict of Nantes, issued by the French King Henry IV (1598), followed by the Edict of Potsdam (two weeks after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV in 1685) and the Toleranzpatent of the Austrian Monarch Joseph II at the end of the 18th century (1781). The very narrow permission conception is often equated with tolerance in general, especially by critics of the concept of tolerance. But historically, the permission conception can be seen as a specific form belonging to the period of so-called Enlightened Absolutism, and it is widely criticized in the more republican conceptions of the later Enlightenment. Nonetheless, Forst points out that the permission conception is still relevant as a minimal claim on the part of repressed minorities.

**Type 2: The Co-existence Conception of Tolerance (T2)**

In the co-existence conception, as in the permission conception, tolerance is seen mainly as a means of avoiding conflict (rather than as a value in itself). It thus has a pragmatic, not a normative character. Conflicting groups and parties arrive at (or are
compelled to achieve) a modicum of sociability by tolerating each other for the purpose of security. In contrast to the permission conception, these conflicting groups have a more or less equal status, so that tolerance is not an asymmetric relation between majority and minority or ruler and subjects.

In the history of the concept, different subtypes of the co-existence conception can be distinguished. For example, Thomas Hobbes in the *Leviathan* developed a form where a religiously neutral sovereign guarantees the coexistence of religions by a monopoly of force. The element that holds together this fragile relationship is the fear of further civil war. Following Hobbes, Spinoza pointed out in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* that the main purpose of the state is to diminish the fear of its inhabitants. Spinoza’s version, which is built on the model of a multicultural and multireligious market city, such as 17th-century Amsterdam, transcends the mere co-existence conception, moving towards a conception where multiculturalism and pluralism count as values in themselves.

**Type 3: The Respect Conception of Tolerance (T3)**

A form of tolerance which is qualitatively different from those discussed above is the respect conception of tolerance. Here the different members of a society respect each other as autonomous individuals. Tolerance is a relationship that is reciprocal and non-hierarchical on the level of the individual, and based on equal rights at state level. In the terminology of Borstner and Gartner, the respect conception may be perceived as a form of positive tolerance, whereas the permission conception is a merely negative form. To distinguish the respect conception of tolerance from other forms of respect (where nothing has to be tolerated because the counterpart is totally esteemed), here the other person is respected, while his habits, values, or religious beliefs are only tolerated. It is significant that religious beliefs do not have to be given up to be an equal member of society.

Historically, the respect conception only became possible with the emergence of constitutional states, like those established during the course of the American and French Revolutions. For example, Jewish inhabitants of France were only accorded equal civil rights, independent of their religious affiliation, in 1792, with the French constitution; before this, they had been subjected to the permission conception in the Edicts of Tolerance. As one can see in the revolutionary debates, Enlightenment authors all over Europe were among the sharpest critics of the absolutist permission conception. Like postmodern critics of tolerance, they understood the absolutist conception as tolerance in general. For example, Thomas Paine points out in his *Rights of Man* (1791), that one form of tolerance (the T1 type) is always related to despotism: “Toleration is not the opposite of intolerance but the counterfeit of it. Both are despotisms: the one assumes to itself the right of withholding liberty of conscience, the other of granting it.” With the same intent, Rabaut de Saint-Etienne argued in the French national assembly against tolerance (T1) as a discriminating concept: “The word intolerance is banned
forever; nobody will ever use this barbaric term again. But I do not want tolerance instead of it. In this concept inheres the idea of pity, which is degrading to human beings. I claim freedom instead of tolerance which has to be for everybody the same.” In the German countries, Kant and Goethe, for example, criticized tolerance (T1) with a similar intent. Kant called tolerance (T1) an arrogant, haughty (hochmütiges) concept, and Goethe proposed to exchange tolerance for the concept of respect (Anerkennung).

**Type 4: The Esteem Conception [Wertschätzungskonzeption] of Tolerance (T4)**

Forst distinguishes a fourth type of tolerance which he calls the esteem conception, found especially in contemporary debates on multicultural societies. In this case, cultural differences are not only respected, but are seen as valuable and even desirable for society. In this conception, plurality is esteemed as a basic value, in addition to equality, as in the respect conception. Of course it is questionable how far the esteem conception may still be considered as tolerance, for which a situation of conflict is significant. But nonetheless, there were aspects of the Enlightenment debates which led towards an esteem conception. Mirabeau in France and Moses Mendelssohn in Germany (Spinoza has already been mentioned) claimed that pluralism and egalitarianism can only go hand in hand. For them, the enlightened concepts of unity of reason and equality of rights lead directly to the insight that plurality is one of the highest values in a society. Mirabeau, for example, argued in the French National Assembly that the purpose of the new state should not be to replace the “cult of the King” with the “cult of the majority”, claiming that, for many fields of life, the opinion of the majority could not be decisive. Mendelssohn, for his part, emphasized that supposed universality can often mean mere discrimination – as he learned in his own experiences with the Christian majority and its demands for conversion [Taufforderung]. For Mendelssohn, plurality seems to be the “purpose of providence”.

**The Importance of a Comparative Historical Analysis**

Forst’s typology is useful as an instrument for clarifying what is understood by “tolerance”. But it must not be forgotten that it is still an abstraction and must always be contextualized within a conceptual framework of related concepts (such as equality, justice, pluralism, or democracy). Specific historical uses of the concept cannot be properly understood without these related concepts or theories, or (more importantly) without the specific situations of power. Different perspectives in any conflict situation need to be compared, rather than merely taking for granted the self-descriptions of the historical actors. Moreover, the concept may be used by a particular author in different ways; for example, it may change from a respect conception to a discriminating permission conception, as in Voltaire (see below).
TOLERANCE AND ITS TENSIONS

In the late 17th century, the starting point for much of this discourse had been the civic status of different groups of believers in society and the individual’s duty to engage with religion. Locke’s theory of toleration clearly emphasizes these concerns. In his *Letter on Toleration* (*Epistola de Tolerantia*, 1689), he presents an open liberal position on matters of faith, not unlike that held by the Cambridge Platonists and Dutch Remonstrants with whom he had mingled during his time in exile in the Netherlands. Having had a bitter experience of exclusion himself, he sought to reformulate the matter of religious coexistence in English society by introducing new arguments.

Without dismissing the importance of revelation (which he believed to be crucial if the faithful were to cultivate their hopes of eternal salvation), Locke saw the state-recognized churches as the guardians of civil peace, thus rejecting the traditional view that there would be conflict between religious groups and sects within a politically-organized society. Consequently, he argued that the State did not have the right to impose a religious faith, and that the Church (defined as *societas spontanea* (a spontaneous society), in opposition to political society, which is by nature contractual) must not, under any circumstances, persecute or wage war against the followers of other faiths. In philosophical terms, Locke distinguished the contractual origins of civil society from the pursuit of the common good in a peaceful organized state, in which law would acquire a sacred character. For him, the same law which safeguarded freedom of individual conscience should also protect the theological aspirations of religious groups that were united by common beliefs and particular forms of public worship.

But, for Locke, religion, in its various manifestations, and the state were distinct and autonomous institutions. Therefore, any attempt to equate one with the other would constitute a threat to civil peace, inevitably upsetting the fragile balance of toleration. In theoretical terms, the idea that the state should guarantee religious freedom and religions should recognize and comply with political laws was not always interpreted as a sign of state independence and neutrality. For example, the famous *Letter on Toleration* is weakened by its association with an intricate argument about how the state should refuse to tolerate atheism and certain religious views such as Catholicism.

For Locke, toleration was sanctioned by the veracity of revelation, while the written proof of the existence of God was the basis of all moral conduct. His concept of toleration involves a kind of a ‘privilege’ or ‘immunity’ from Anglican forms of worship and can only explicitly apply to particular groups who subscribe to an organized religion. Locke’s concept of tolerance is, therefore, highly restrictive. Like John Milton and Andrew Marvell, he excluded papists (that is, Catholics) for reasons that were political rather than theological. Catholicism was not only perceived as a threat to civil order (after all, its followers swore obedience to a foreign sovereign, who could dispense them from oaths of allegiance, depose rulers, and threaten “the conservation of civil society”),
it also undermined the very grounds for tolerance by failing to distinguish between political and religious powers.

But there was also another important restriction on the principle of tolerance as conceived by Locke, which has to do with the exclusion of atheists from civil society. “Those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of God. Promises, covenants and oaths, which are the bonds of civil society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, denies all”12.

Thus, for this English philosopher, there can be no morality or civil commitment without faith. According to this logic, the whole raison d'être of tolerance (i.e. freedom of conscience) is displaced in the interests of public order and the cementing of moral ties necessary for political life.

TOLERANCE AND JUSTICE

After Locke, the theory of tolerance continued to link the defence of individual freedom with the need to safeguard civil peace. This topic, recurrent in Voltaire's writings, is also present in another form in Rousseau's concept of civil religion, which was also based on a belief in the existence of God and in the immortality of the soul, and therefore averse to atheism. Rousseau thought belief to be a private issue, though it could be manifested publically, but on the political plane, his emphasis upon the sacred nature of the social contract required a minimal religious framework. That was why he thought that atheists should be banned from the city. In the mid-18th century, citizenship status also guaranteed victims of religious persecution a defence before the tribunal of public opinion. This explains why the attitudes of French philosophers on religious toleration, especially towards Protestants, were so controversial13. We have only to remember the famous legal case of Jean Calas, during which Voltaire issued a general statement about the need for justice and tolerance in his famous Traité sur la tolérance, à l'occasion de la mort de Jean Calas (1763).

Voltaire originally developed his concept of tolerance in the debates around religious conflicts in France. With his Traité sur la tolérance, he courageously took side with the family of the Protestant merchant Jean Calas, who was sentenced to death in 1762 in Toulouse after having been falsely accused of killing his son who had wanted to convert to Catholicism. Voltaire not only brought this legal scandal to the attention of the public, but also collected money for the family so it could afford to bring action against the officials responsible. Like in the similar cases of the Sirven and La Barre families, Voltaire played the role of an engaged and enlightened intellectual14. His conception of toleration is one which is based not on the mercy of the powerful but on the general human right for justice and freedom of spirit and religion – hence it can be seen as a respect conception (T3).
Some years later Voltaire also spoke up for the rights of a religious minority: the so-called ‘Dissidents’ (that is, the Russian Orthodox minority in Poland) to whom the Russian tsar Catherine II had given the same rights as the Catholic majority (see Voltaire 1768). This legal act entailed the founding of the ‘Confederation of Bar’ in 1768 by Catholic Polish noblemen who perceived Catherine’s law to be a hostile imperialistic act and called for it to be resisted; this proved the starting point for the Russian-Polish war, ending in the first Division of Poland of 1772. Voltaire was in correspondence with both powers involved in the division, the Russian tsar and the Prussian king. In Voltaire’s view, there were clear frontiers in this war: on the one side, the enlightened rulers Frederick and Catherine, who defended values like reason and toleration; on the other, all the powers that represented the dark Middle Ages, such as the Catholic Confederation and their partners, the Ottoman Sultan and the pope in Rome. In his first letter on this topic, on 15 November 1768, Voltaire expressed his hope that Catherine would force the Poles to be tolerant. One can see here how Voltaire’s respect conception of tolerance (T3) shifts into a mere permission conception (T1) in another situation, or, in the perspective of the Polish opposition, into an imperial and discriminating conception.

This is just one example which shows the importance of a thorough comparative and multi-perspective interpretation of concepts within specific situations in European history.

**Equality and Difference**

A different concept of tolerance is found in Pierre Bayle’s 1682 work *Pensées divers écrites à un docteur de Sorbonne, à l’occasion de la comête qui parut au mois de décembre de 1680* [Thoughts on the Comet]. He argued astutely that immorality could be generated in even the most devout societies if they were undermined by vice and crime, and that therefore “l’athéisme ne conduit pas nécessairement à la corruption des mœurs” [atheism does not necessarily lead to the corruption of habits]. Although he was a Protestant, he defended atheists, believing that “on peut avoir une idée d’honnêteté, sans croire qu’il y ait un Dieu” [it is possible to have an idea of honesty without believing there is a God]. Thus, he raised the moral sphere to an autonomous stance for judging truth, radically separating it from religion. The assumption of the virtuous atheist was more important for the state than faith and submission to religion. By valuing atheism in this way, he claimed not only that religion was useless for civil concord, but that it was actually dangerous, since it introduced divisive elements.

Therefore, unlike Locke, Rousseau and Voltaire, Pierre Bayle concluded that a society could survive without religion, as the roots of its morality lay in each individual conscience. The emphasis upon the moral autonomy of the individual conscience, together with the strengthening of the principle of freedom of worship, meant that the issue of tolerance gradually shifted from the theological to the civil domain. In this entire proc-
The Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of the Concept of Tolerance

ess, the secularization of the state favoured a lay notion of tolerance, while at the same
time the affirmation of political neutrality in religious matters promoted individualism
and subjectivism in this domain. An important instance of this change in perspective,
and one that was decisive for the development of modernity was the _Tractatus Theolog-
ico-Politicus_ (1670) of Baruch Spinoza (a descendant of Portuguese-Jewish emigrants
to the Low Countries, who was expelled from the Jewish community of Amsterdam on
account of his unconventional ideas).

Spinoza takes his own religious experience as a starting point for a philosophical argu-
ment in support of a State with no connections to any religion, in a society in which
individual freedom is the prime condition for tolerance and justice. Loyal to the maxim
_Finis ergo reipublica revera libertas est_, Spinoza's main arguments as regards freedom of
thought are based on the idea of _libertas philosophandi_. Everyone should have free-
dom to express her beliefs and to think for herself, without external constraints; in-
deed, the right to freedom of individual thought, belief and expression is a great benefit
to society. As he asserts:

> If no man, then, can give up his freedom to judge and think as he pleases, and everyone is by
absolute natural right the master of his own thoughts it follows that utter failure will attend
any attempt in a commonwealth to force men to speak only as prescribed by the sovereign
despite their different and opposing opinions.

Before setting out his philosophical ideal for state religion, Spinoza denies that faith and
religion contain any inherent truth, and demonstrates that religion is not the only way of
practising goodness and charity. Amidst the various anti-heresy laws that existed all over
Europe in the 17th century, Spinoza realized that state intervention to ban beliefs ulti-
mately intensified doctrinal disputes. Therefore, he argued, truth could only be grasped on
an individual basis and could not be expressed by faith alone or in the form of theological
d doctrine. It is for this reason that freedom of thought and speech, and not freedom of con-
science and worship, is the true core of toleration in Spinoza's philosophy.

Hence, Spinoza's philosophical position represents a more radical Enlightenment cur-
cent, offering a weapon with which to oppose the dominant power and an alternative to
the prevailing theological and ecclesiastical authorities. Following Spinoza, the moral
dimension attributed to the role of individual freedom of thought was enhanced; in-
deed, it became inconceivable that religious practice could be meaningful, or interrel-
gious coexistence possible, without such freedom. Consequently, modernity, strongly
influenced by these Enlightenment trends, has been rife with tension between individu-
alism (whether religious, agnostic or atheist) and universal values in philosophy. With
the promotion of a reflexive awareness of one's individual freedom, tolerance has been
raised to the condition of a historic possibility of the autonomy of society, while at the
same time leading to a profound understanding of the importance of religious dialogue
in the world. As Gotthold Ephraim Lessing clearly perceived in _Nathan der Weise_ (Nath-
an the Wise), 1779, there is a common core to all the religions of the book that goes be-

Accepting, Tolerating, Discriminating – the Concepts of Discrimination and Tolerance
Beyond mere orthodoxy. True judgment does not involve deciding which of the three rings (symbols of the three monotheistic religions) represents the truth; rather it lies in telling your quarrelling sons to put an end to the conflict that separates them. In this parable, Lessing stresses the need for dialogue and mutual respect between the three religions, by showing how they all have a common heritage based upon a message of love. He thus manages to give concrete expression to the Enlightenment dreams of universal brotherhood, without making universalism into a simple abstraction or intangible goal.

From a broader perspective, we could say that, while Spinoza’s philosophy is framed by a model of tolerance that recognises the dignity and freedom of all individuals, in Lessing’s vision, the most important thing is to ensure equal rights for all communities (whether religious or not, we may add). This dual understanding of the problem, developed within the Aufklärung movement, is present in the connection, proposed by Michael Walzer, between individual identity and the common identity matrix of a community, so as to make the practice of tolerance effective. According to Walzer, the author of the most modern and referenced treaty on tolerance: we should value the extraordinary personal liberty that we enjoy as strangers and possible strangers in contemporary ‘transitional’ societies. But we need at the same time to shape the regimes of toleration in ways that fortify the different groups and perhaps even encourage individuals to identify strongly with one or more of them.

This position clearly reflects the persistence of this philosophical issue, which has shaped the modern debate on tolerance and its “enduring tension between individual and group, citizen and member.” Classified by some authors into types or historical categories this debate, loaded as it is with ambiguities, has been inscribed into history in an attempt to make sense of the present-day context of multiculturalism.

Conclusion

In terms of conceptual analysis and conceptual history, we have tried to show the importance of a thorough comparative and multi-perspective interpretation of concepts within specific situations in European history. Several conclusions have been reached, as regards: (A) the basic concept of toleration for the individual; (B) the concept as it affects social groups, with the stress on religious groups; and (C) the historical dimension of this concept.

(A): Conclusions as regards the basic concept of toleration for the individual:

a. Tolerance should not be confused with relativism, pluralism or scepticism. Unlike tolerance, each of these positions excludes (for different reasons) the dimension of judgement of another’s thought, value, or action as being wrong, flawed or harmful.

b. Permissiveness should not be understood as a central aspect of tolerance, for it may imply a stance of not caring.
c. When we tolerate something, we deliberately refrain from negating that thing, because only with a negative judgment is there the option of tolerating another person’s beliefs or practices.

d. One can only speak of toleration when it is practised voluntarily; for in situations of compulsion, when one is powerless to act, certain things that are rejected are simply ‘suffered’ or ‘endured’.

Hence:

e. Passive tolerance marks a refusal to interfere with someone or something you do not like or are neutral towards.

f. Active tolerance involves actively protecting or supporting that which is being tolerated.

(B): Conclusions as regards the basic concept of toleration for social groups, with the stress on religious groups:

g. When liberals extended the principle of religious tolerance to other areas of life, they were extending an individual freedom-based notion of tolerance.

h. Locke’s famous *Letter on Toleration* is weakened by its associations with an intricate argument about how the state should refuse to tolerate atheism and certain religious views such as Catholicism. His concept of tolerance is, therefore, highly restrictive. Like Milton and Marvell, he excluded papists, that is, Catholics, for reasons that were political rather than theological. According to this logic, the whole *raison d’être* of tolerance (i.e. freedom of conscience) is shifted onto the conservation of public order and the cementing of moral ties necessary for political life.

i. Muslims, Christians and Jews practised a group-based form of toleration, grounded on social cohesion and collective (ethno-cultural) identity.

j. A religion that is based on revealed truths cannot value other religions that contradict those truths. Therefore, contrary to Locke’s assertions, true believers cannot be tolerant, at least as regards their religious beliefs. In fact, anyone who is committed to a belief or practice cannot tolerate dissenting beliefs or practices.

k. It may be possible to find a more tolerant way out, but the price that true believers would have to pay would be (too) high.

The typology that has been analysed and defended here is useful for clarifying what is understood by ‘tolerance’. But it must not be forgotten that it is still an abstraction and must always be contextualized. One has to be aware that the concept may be used in different ways by a single author (such as the shift from a respect conception to a discriminating permission conception in the writings of Voltaire).

(C) Conclusions concerning the historical dimension of this concept from the 17th to the 19th centuries:
l. *Erlaubniskonzeption* (the permission conception) of tolerance is based upon a highly hierarchical, asymmetrical and non-reciprocal relationship. Historically, it is manifested by the various Edicts of Tolerance, starting with the Edict of Nantes issued by the French King Henry IV (1598); the Edict of Potsdam (two weeks after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV in 1685), and the *Toleranzpatent* of the Austrian Monarch Joseph II at the end of the 18th century (1781).

m. In the co-existence conception of tolerance, as in the permission conception, tolerance is seen mainly as a means of avoiding conflicts, rather than as a value in itself. It thus has a pragmatic, not a normative character. For example Thomas Hobbes in his “Leviathan” developed a form where a religiously neutral sovereign guarantees the coexistence of religions by a monopoly of force. Like Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza espouses the co-existence conception in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (1670). Spinoza’s conception, which is built on the model of a multicultural and multireligious market city such as 17th-century Amsterdam, transcends the mere co-existence conception and moves towards a conception where multiculturalism and pluralism count as values in themselves.

n. Where the different members of a society respect each other as autonomous individuals, we can talk about the respect conception of tolerance. This is a reciprocal and non-hierarchical relationship on the level of individuals and grounded in the notion of equal rights on the level of the state. In the terminology of Borstner and Gartner, one can define the respect conception as a form of active tolerance, whereas the permission conception is a merely passive form. Historically, the respect conception only became possible with the establishment of constitutional states, during the course of the American or French Revolution.

o. In the esteem conception (*Wertschätzungskonzeption*) of tolerance, cultural differences are not only respected but are seen as valuable and even desirable. In this conception, plurality is esteemed as a basic value, in addition to valuing equality like in the respect conception. Mirabeau in France and Moses Mendelssohn in Germany (Spinoza has already been mentioned) claimed that pluralism and egalitarianism could only go hand in hand. For them the enlightened concepts of the unity of reason and the equality of rights lead directly to the insight of plurality as one of the highest values in a society.
NOTES


2 Ibid.


8 We thank editor for pointing on the problem that in our case of three monotheistic religions there is a possibility of following interpretation: all different believers Ms, Js, Cs do consider that there is something – a/the Ultimate Reality – God that is always, properly, named according to their own framework. Therefore, it seems that we have three different names for a/the same ultimate Reality – for the same, one, ontological item. In a chapter called “Jews, Christians, Muslims: Do We All Worship the Same God?”, the philosopher John Hick has the plausibility of the claim that all religions worship the same God and merely refer to him by different names. Noting that the difficulty with this position is that the various descriptions must be compatible, Hick comes to the conclusion that “it does not seem sufficient simply to say that the same identical God is being named and described differently. The differences between these describable divine personalities go too deep for that to be plausible.” J. Hick, Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religion. New Haven 1993, p. 153.

9 G.B. Shaw, Saint Joan, London 1924, p. 77. One can find different interpretations of the idea in Shaw’s play. One is that what is meant in the inquisitor’s case is the following: the goal of religion is the salvation of human souls. I am a true believer, and I do believe in the goal. However, at the same time, I am tolerant towards heretics. Because, they are heretics, they will be lost. This is the Cruelty (with the worst possible of all consequences) which is meant by the Inquisitor. Therefore, from the point of view of the Inquisitor, all the cruelties which have been inflicted on heretics in the procedures against them are nothing in comparison to the Cruelty. In the endgame view, what is at the stake is the salvation of souls and all things which support this final goal are somehow justified in this sense. Another interpretation is that if the authorities tolerated heresy then the people would take matters into their hands and be much crueler. So in this sense to tolerate heresy is very cruel. In the present text we follow to the first interpretation.


15 Voltaire and Catherine, Correspondence, in W.F. Reddaway (ed.), Documents of Catherine the Great. The Correspondence with Voltaire and the Instruction of 1767, New York 1971, p. 20.

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Language, Culture, Identity

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Abstract
Questo testo intende presentare in forma sintetica e divulgativa alcuni aspetti del rapporto tra linguaggio e contesti socio-culturali. Il pensiero antropologico novecentesco ha sottolineato l’esistenza di una relazione biunivoca fra linguaggio e cultura. Da un lato, la cultura influenza e determina gli usi linguistici: è questo il campo di riflessione della disciplina comunemente detta “sociolinguistica”. Dall’altro lato, è il linguaggio che influenza e plasma la cultura stessa: siamo qui nell’ambito di riflessioni accomunabili sotto l’etichetta di “relativismo linguistico”. Il nostro modo di pensare le relazioni fra linguaggio e identità etnica o culturale è ancora oggi influenzato da una forte eredità romantica: l’idea del linguaggio come espressione di uno “spirito del popolo” che definisce in modo compatto ed esclusivo l’identità di un gruppo sociale e di un territorio. Questo modello, che influenza a fondo anche il pensiero antropologico, rivela i suoi limiti nella parte finale del XX secolo, mostrandosi incapace di comprendere i fenomeni della globalizzazione. La critica delle concezioni essenzialiste dell’identità porta a mettere a fuoco una molteplicità di livelli di identità linguistica nelle società contemporanee, i cui intrecci complessi e conflittuali sono talvolta definiti attraverso la nozione di eteroglossia.

Culture influences language
It can easily be understood how linguistic uses may vary according to the natural environment, economic systems, types of social relationships and what could be called the world pictures of different cultures. Lexicon, grammar rules, and codes and rules of linguistic communication are all entirely formed by these elements, that is to say, by the anthropological features of the speakers’ community.

As regards the lexicon, a traditional anthropological example, albeit a very controversial one, is that concerning the numerous words to describe ‘snow’ used in the languages of peoples living in cold countries (such as the Aivilik, Igloolik and Inuit, commonly called Eskimo). Snow is referred to by different words according to its type (freshly-fallen, icy, packing snow etc.), its position or its use. Its importance, not so much in the natural environment itself as in its cultural transactions, seems to impose a greater
lexical differentiation than ours (which in its turn is bijective related to a perceptive differentiation). I have called it a controversial example because its introduction by traditional anthropologists such as Franz Boas and Benjamin Whorf, has recently been criticised in that it was based on an insufficient understanding of Eskimo grammar, in particular on the ethnographer’s inability to differentiate between ‘words’ and ‘roots’ 1. Nevertheless, the idea that vocabulary reflects the prevalent cultural interests of a human community is perceptive and difficult to contradict. On the contrary, the ways in which culture affects grammar are not so clear. Some of the hypotheses that have been put forward seem rather generalized and obvious. For example, the idea that nomadic tribes use syntactical structures that emphasise movement, or the connection between the introduction of private property and structures based on the verb ‘to have’ (in societies that have not institutionalised property the use of the transitive verb to indicate possession – “I have got something” – would be replaced by expressions such as “something is to me”2).

In any case, accepting the cultural variability of the language, the problem that anthropology raises regards the degree of this variability, whether language depends partly on the context of a specific culture or whether on the other hand it is also linked to universal type cognitive structures that do not vary according to the context. How far, then, are linguistic differences simply variations of a universal meta-language? And, on the other hand, how far does it a matter of differences that are somewhat incommensurable? This problem has been extremely thoroughly examined in the field of cross-cultural semantics. What happens when we have to translate a language that is deeply rooted in a culture that is anthropologically very different from our own? Let us examine the apparently very simple case of descriptive words for what could be called natural phenomena. According to a realist conception that sees the meaning of a word in the object that it indicates, it is precisely reference to the object that ensures translatability. For example, it is sufficient to identify how a certain language expresses the concept of ‘tree’, ‘to walk’, ‘to eat’ etc. and that is all we need do. What we are thinking of here is translation as a simple transposition of the meaning itself from one linguistic code to another, no matter how different, rather like a cryptic puzzle where, having found the key, an absolute equivalence can be established between the hidden message and the decoded one.

But things change if we think of meaning as being determined by linguistic uses that are always cultural uses. What can be more universally human for example than ‘to eat’? Yet in this regard many cultures use a variety of words that may leave us perplexed. Let us take the example of Indonesia. In his classic work on Java, Clifford Geertz records no fewer than five different ways of asking the simple question “Are you going to eat rice and cassava now?” according to whether the interlocutor is a close friend of the speaker, just an acquaintance of the same social class, or of a higher social class. The same word that means ‘to eat’ changes (mangan between close friends, neda within the same social
Even more complex is the case of Bali, as summarised by the anthropologist Mark Hobart:

Balinese has several lexical levels with ranked words for the same object or act. Words for ingesting include miunan, marayunan, ngajengang, madaar, ngamah, ngaloklok, neda and nysèksèk. The first two are used of high priests and Brahmans, or when inferior address princes. Ngajengang is used for most other high castes. Madaar is used with strangers, where status is unclear, for politeness, by some ambitious people about themselves, but also of the sick. Ngamah is used of lower castes and, by them, for people they know well. It may also be used loosely of animals. Different animals are distinguished by their way of feeding. So ngaloklok is said of beasts which gulp, like dogs and pigs (neda is used of dogs owned by high castes); nysèksèk describes how a chicken picks at the ground, and how people pick out items from a collection. There are many others.

Faced with this account it would be tempting to ask, “But is there no single, more general word that corresponds with our concept of the natural mechanism of eating, common to people and animals and in particular to all social classes of people, from which all other words derive as special cases?” Yet there is nothing in the ethnographical report to suggest the existence of a similar meta-linguistic entity, of a ‘natural and general eating’; only our ethnocentrism leads us to make this supposition. Perhaps we should accept the fact that in Balinese culture and language the meaning of ‘to eat’ has never fully coincided with the meaning we give the word. However, neither is it so remote as to hinder us from understanding it: a translation is possible even though it will never be an exact equivalence. I must also emphasise that this translation and understanding is possible not by trying to throw away our own linguistic categories, but by departing from them and putting them into play. The “opacity” of ethnocentrism is inevitable, but it must be faced critically, triggering a process at the end of which our categories will probably come closer to the others, by changing themselves.

In any case, these anthropological observations support the linguistic principle of indexicality, according to which the meaning of words or expressions is always determined by the specific, concrete context of the social transactions in which the linguistic practices take place. A similar principle is the basis of the cross-cultural study of language that the anthropologist Alessandro Duranti makes coincide with the discipline of ethno-pragmatics which is defined as follows: “The ethnography-grounded study of linguistic uses, throwing light on the ways in which linguistic communication and social interaction constitute each other”.

**Language Influences Culture**

The foregoing discussion leads us to the second aspect of the culture-language relationship. An important anthropological tradition of thought holds that this relationship is a bijective one. While on the one hand culture shapes languages, on the other hand it is also formed by them. That is to say that linguistic differences are the basis of im-
portant peculiarities of cultures and the world visions that support them. This view, usually called linguistic relativism, completely turns its back on both semantic realism and cognitive universalism mentioned earlier, in order to argue: a) that linguistic uses determine perceptive and cognitive structures and not vice versa, and b) that such linguistic uses and relative semantic systems are basically incommensurable. A fundamental difference in the identification of meanings on the cross-cultural level follows from this: the inextricable relationship of language, thought and culture suggests considering each language as being associated with a specific distinct world vision.

At about the middle of the 20th century the anthropologists Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf, both devoted to the study of Indoeuropean languages such as those of the Amerindian groups, expressed their views on a similar principle of linguistic relativism. Sapir clearly sets out the philosophical premises of this viewpoint, writing that

... the real world is to a large extent built up on the language habits of the group. We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached.

In turn Whorf emphasises that our way of looking at the world, including the natural world, does not depend on things themselves which, so to speak, impose their real meaning on us, but rests on the contrary on an agreement or social solidarity that is deeply entrenched in our commonest (and usually unconscious) linguistic models:

We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way -- an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language. The agreement is, of course, an implicit and un-stated one, but its words are absolutely obligatory; we cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data which the agreement decrees.

Obviously this view cannot be understood in a deterministic sense: we cannot argue that cultural models (including cognitive and perceptive aspects) depend almost automatically on grammars that are reciprocally inmeasurable. We can, for example, consider the relation that exists between how a society makes a conceptual difference between man and woman and the precise distinction a grammar makes between masculine and feminine genders. But we certainly cannot think that a completely dichotomic view of the genders (that is a different thing – it must be remembered – from the biological difference between the sexes) is simply the ‘product’ of a grammatical classification. Deterministic relativism cannot be supported for numerous reasons, that basically consists of two principles: a) the impossible task of precisely separating thought, culture and language prevents us from establishing causal univocal relationships between any one of these areas and the others; b) it is never possible to distinguish independent cultural entities and linguistic communities that are clearly separate and even more difficult to make them correspond in a peculiar and distinctive way.
Further, Sapir and Whorf were a long way off from upholding the linguistic determinism that is often attributed to them. It is true that their theories are tinged with tones of relativism according to the preponderant spirit of North American anthropology of the day, however they were mainly concerned with exposing the culturally active role of language. The two scholars opposed the positivist tendency to consider language as a neutral mediator in the relationships between a thought and a reality that exist prior to and independently from it. From this point of view their ideas are still very pertinent today, in addition to being backed up by the most important results of the 20th century philosophy of language, and end up by becoming fused with that idea of ethnopragnamics that we have seen in the quotation from Duranti above. It is important to note how this approach, as opposed to semantic realism, does not necessarily result in cultural relativism. Indeed, it implies neither a) the idea of a variety of incommensurable, distinct, united cultural-linguistic entities; on the contrary (as we shall see in the following sections) it emphasises the phenomena of intermixture, hybridism, multiple belonging, nor b) the impossibility of determining universal characteristics of cultural and linguistic processes, in particular on the cognitive level.

Indeed, important anthropological traditions have examined this latter point in depth. A very well known example is that from cross-cultural studies on the perception and naming of colours by Brent Berlin and Paul Kay. The question these authors considered is the following. Human cultures and languages recognise and name colours in extremely different ways. The number of primary colours that are identified varies (from two to eleven) as do ways of establishing divisions between the scales on the colour spectrum. So, are these variations arbitrary and solely dependent on local contexts, or is it possible to see a coherent perceptive and cognitive model underlying them? Berlin and Kay, working comparatively on ninety-eight languages (twenty using direct analysis and seventy-eight using previously edited statements), claimed that it was possible to identify some common characteristics in the development of the semantic area relating to colours. The differences are anything but incoherent and are arranged according to a rather precise pattern. First and foremost “each of the words for primary colours in all the languages could be referred to one of eleven colours of reference”\(^9\). In other words, a universal method of perception is imposed on language that tends to break the colour spectrum down into established perceptive units. It is therefore the latter that establish the meaning of words for colour. Secondly, a precise evolutional progression exists in the development and differentiation of colour words. In not such ‘rich’ languages it starts with a basic differentiation between just two fundamental colours, black and white (or light/dark) and then proceeds to further divisions according to a regular order. When a third word is introduced it will almost invariably be red, followed by green and yellow, and then in the sequence blue, brown, purple, pink, orange and grey\(^10\). Berlin and Kay present their research as a reply to linguistic relativism and the “Sapir-Whorf theories”. Conversely their theories have been heavily criticised by supporters of
radical contextualism (on the basis that the methods of research and linguistic surveys used somehow presuppose the results). However, universalist theories are perfectly legitimate: they must be proved case by case and are not in themselves incompatible with a view that establishes meaning mainly in the practices of social action.

**Language and Identity**

Whether linguistic practices are based on universal cognitive structures or not, anthropology and the social sciences are deeply concerned with their rich variety for a further reason: language and communication (verbal and non-verbal) are the main criteria used to describe (or maybe construct, as shall be seen) the differences between human groups. Indeed, it is by referring to linguistic diversities, over and above other cultural elements, that the members of a community identify themselves and are identified by others. In other words, language is a powerful instrument of identity and belonging.

There are numerous levels of identification that are conveyed by means of language:

- firstly, the national level and (obviously distinct from the former) the ethnic and/or regional one, that for historical reasons play a significant role and on which we will dwell shortly;

- rank or social class: one only has to think for example of how often we speak sarcastically about those who ‘do not speak properly’, or who use special dialects, registers or expressions that are thought of as being ‘unsophisticated’. It is a demarcative instrument as regards the ‘lowest’ of our social rankings. In addition, the expressions we use when speaking to others always reflect the status relationship between ‘them’ and ‘us’; close, friendly relations or formal reserve, respect and deference require different forms of exchange. In Italian, for example, these status rules affect the choice to use the informal ‘tu’ or the formal ‘Lei’, surname or first name, dialect or official language, formal or informal registers in public verbal communication. (On the other hand it is interesting to note that in different contexts rules of propriety may change even towards the same person, and, moreover, that these rules may be interpreted and used to express subtle feelings of defiance or sarcasm etc.);

- level of sexual identity or gender. In all societies the ‘proper’ way for women to speak is different from that for men, a difference that sometimes goes so far as to the methodical use of a special vocabulary and of different syntactical structures. If this may seem strange, just think about phenomena that are very familiar to us. In European societies it is usually inappropriate for a woman to use expressions that are too ‘strong’ and direct, or to use pronunciation that is the characteristic of dialect or slang. In English for example the socio-linguist Robin Lakoff observed the particularly feminine way of replying to questions with ascending rather than descending inflections (as is usually the case in emphatic forms of reply), adding in their turn a question tag – as in the example of the utterance “they caught the robber last week, didn’t they?”11;

- the level of generation. What is particularly relevant here is the phenomenon of languages of juvenile groups and subcultures that are characterised by the common use of neologisms, of special phonetics and spelling, and more generally of codes that are extremely different from official ones. The sharing of these linguistic codes (together with those regarding cultural
consumption and trends) is a strong cohesive group element which often not only identifies youngsters from adults but one particular generation, even after the passage of many years;

- the level of professional identity. The identifying cohesive element here is the sharing of technical and special languages, of jargon that is not familiar to the community at large. One only has to think, for example, of the jargon used by computer programmers, but also, albeit in a more subtle way, by university students where professional characteristics blend with those of generation and often of social class, giving rise to very interesting combinations.

However all these forms of social use of linguistic differences are of lesser importance, at least as is usually thought, in comparison with the level of national or ethnic belonging. This perception has something in common with what could be called the persisting Romantic heritage of the major countries and cultural traditions of Europe. I am referring to the fundamental idea – that has characterised the entire process of European nation-building in the modern age – of ‘natural languages’ being the basis of as many natural identities. Romantic culture perceived natural languages, especially in their folkloristic and traditional expressions, as the most immediate expression of Volkgeist, that authentic national spirit that is meant to establish the forms and political unity of human societies. The equation nation-homeland-language is the foundation of modern nationalist ideology, and forms an image of citizen that, while on the one hand is the abstract subject of rights according to the Enlightenment, on the other is deeply rooted in an ethnic belonging that has its essential element in language (sometimes together with religion and specific ‘traditions’).

Historiography tells us that these roots of national unity are not so very ancient, on the contrary they have often been recently regenerated or even ‘invented’. They are a consequence rather than a cause of the development of national unity. As far as Italy is concerned it is sufficient to recall that at the time of the Unification the national language was based on an important literary tradition that had adopted the model of Italian in Tuscan dialect. At the level of spoken language, however, the country was divided into numerous very diverse dialects, so much so that the ‘language question’ was one of the main concerns of the Post-Unification ruling classes. Indeed, it was only resolved by mass television broadcasting in the 1960’s onwards. In European countries with an older history of unity it was also political unity that produced linguistic unity (with pronounced normative results on the spoken language) rather than vice versa.

Although ‘invented’, the Romantic model – nation/homeland/language – is strongly rooted in western and European culture and politics, deeply influencing our way of thinking of ourselves as a community (to use the famous words of Benedict Anderson). Apart from anything else, this model has profoundly affected colonial politics by playing the role of normative standard imposed on the cultural and political level over subject nations – who where in themselves very far from it. It has been well demonstrated, for example, by African colonial history marked by an acculturative strategy of forced subdivisions and aggregations that has sometimes had devastating results, while
it is true that some of the ethnic strife which disrupts the continent today are one of its probable direct consequences.

Anthropology itself has been deeply influenced by this nationalist ideology. The discipline has taken for granted that cohesive, well-defined cultural-linguistic spheres were the natural condition of all humankind, even though among primitive peoples we speak of ‘tribes’ rather than of ‘nations’. This divisionist obsession, as Clifford Geertz called it (1999), lies at the basis of the same debates on cultural and linguistic relativism. Relativism combines an anti-realist epistemology with an essentialist and divisionist conception of languages and cultures. This latter component is its weak point, the source of difficulties and paradoxes which one encounters (that on the other hand have by some been used to suggest a return to unsupportable forms of epistemological and semantic realism).

**FROM MONO-LINGUISM TO HETEROGLOSSIA**

In an essay first published in 1985, the anthropologist James Clifford wrote:

An intellectual historian of the year 2010 [...] may even look back on the first two-thirds of our century and observe that this was a time when Western intellectuals were preoccupied with grounds of meaning and identity they called “culture” and “language”. I think we are seeing signs that the privilege given to natural languages and, as it were, natural cultures, is dissolving. These objects and epistemological grounds are now appearing as constructs, achieved fictions, containing and domesticating heteroglossia.12.

Twenty years later the year 2010 is not very far off and Clifford’s prospect can be clearly seen. In the last twenty years social disciplines have criticised “essentialist” and “reified” uses of concepts of culture and cultural or ethnic identity, revealing their “fictional” nature (that is, showing the rhetorical and political processes that mould them). Developments in the process of cultural, communicative and economic globalisation have simultaneously made the ‘nation-language-homeland’ model even less conceivable. World market growth, the long flows of migrants and diasporas, the gradual weakening of the political strength of the traditional Nation-State, the increasing use of mass-media broadcasting and the Internet – all this seems to finally bring the illusions of the Romantic heritage to an end. Once again Clifford expresses this point very cogently:

In a world with too many voices speaking all at once, a world where syncretism and parodic invention are becoming the rule, not the exception, an urban, multinational world of institutional transience – where American clothes made in Korea are worn by young people in Russia, where everyone’s “roots” are in some degree cut – in such a world it becomes increasingly difficult to attach human identity and meaning to a coherent “culture” or “language”13.

If traditional anthropology was obsessed with questions of the authenticity and incommensurability between cultural and linguistic traditions, modern anthropology
focuses its attention on ‘heteroglossia’. This word was coined by Mikhail Bachtin (see table 1) when analysing literary texts and means “the simultaneous use of different types of discourse or other signs, the tension that is created between them and the conflicting relationship that revolve within a text” 14. But in modern social sciences the idea is removed from the field of pure textual analysis to describe the interaction between ‘voices’ and discourses that in many parts of the world inextricably intertwine in everyday communication. Hidden within essentialist ideology for two centuries, heteroglossia seems to break out and come to the fore once again in the age of globalisation.

This in no way means that linguistic behaviours cease to be important elements of assertions of identity and to be interpreted and made use of in this way by social actors. However, “identity” should not be understood in the essentialist sense but in a processual sense: an incessant structure in which the actors, from various social levels, behave strategically using the cultural and linguistic ‘raw material’ that is available to them. In globalised society, languages, together with religion, are the main instruments used to construct and represent an identity for themselves and for others. But, as has been said, this occurs on a variety of levels that in daily use may change continually. The example of a citizen that speaks one single language, that identifies him or her as a member of one single community or nation, is increasingly unlikely. In Europe, that is in the cradle of the Nation-States, the ideal model partly holds fast but here too it is undermined by phenomena that make the language question very much more complex. The following levels of linguistic identity and competence for example must be taken into account:

- an international community that communicates in English or other lingua francas;
- official national languages (in many cases beyond Europe, distinct from the idioms actually spoken; further, in ex-colonial c akers of neighbouring regions, and great importance is given to them when guessing where the speaker originates from;
- local dialects, often spoken at the same time as the official language in more familiar, less formal contexts;
- bilingualism or multilingualism that occur near the borders of countries, or that are produced from ’mixed’ marriages, long periods of education abroad, or from other cultural or educational experiences;
- mixed languages or communication that are produced in the field of migrant communities or diasporas or in the sector of tourism or other phenomena of cultural mixing.

All these elements are added to and interconnected with the factors of linguistic differentiation that have already been mentioned that regard social rank, gender, age category etc., going to make up a very complex and dynamic picture. We could not be further from the idea of those closed and isolated languages that are so exclusive as to cause methods of thinking that cannot be measured – the great obsession of classical anthropology, which lies at the very heart of the ambiguous problem of linguistic relativism.
At this point however the re-examination of the traditional model of relationships between language, culture and identity still lacks one dimension, what can be generally called politics. When we talk about actors and social groups that freely and creatively formulate strategies of identifying structures, and are able to move confidently in a context of heteroglossia, it should not be thought that all this occurs in a sort of political vacuum – like an innocent game between competitors who all start from the same level. On the contrary, the starting points of the “game” are precisely the great, dramatic inequalities in the distribution of resources (economic and cultural) and of power that characterise modern life, in international relations as in those within individual societies. The formulation of the differences arises from this very fundamental asymmetry of relationships. This means that all politics of difference take place in the confrontation between two aspects that cannot be separated, like the two faces of a coin. In other words, difference, in linguistics too, on the one hand asserts itself as a marker of belonging, often at least implicitly regarded as being exclusive and superior. On the other hand, it is emphasised as a stigma that marks the ‘others’, the bearers of a lower status. Starting off with the Greeks who called foreigners with no knowledge of Greek ‘barbarians’, the construction of downgrading markers according to linguistic use is a simple widespread cultural mechanism. As has already been said, one only has to think of how common jokes and witticisms are in modern societies about ‘how others speak’ – the lower classes, urban dwelling peasants, immigrants and so forth. Sarcasm that is anything but innocent, and which should be understood in the light of what Pierre Bourdieu called strategies of distinction.

If therefore linguistic peculiarity has never been a cognitive prison, neither has it always been a purely free choice. For those belonging to the lower classes, identity is often not a choice but an imposition. But while linguistic use reflects a lower class, it may at the same time represent an element of ‘rebellion’ against the rules of the dominant classes. In other words, what begins as a stigma, may end up by being proudly asserted in the area of oppositional strategies (or ‘tactics’ of popular culture where anti-hegemonic resistance is implicit and occasional, as those described by Michel de Certeau 15). A case that has been often studied in this area is, for example, Afro-American English and its relations with the official language of the United States; but also the relations between Italian and its various dialects or regional varieties has very interesting complex aspects, and is extremely full of connotations with a political meaning.

Finally, if there is a common feature to the great complexities of linguistic and cultural relations in modern Europe and the world, it consists in the constant tension between universal codes of communication and local or vernacular forms of speech (and of life). Long considered a fundamentally human rule, mono-linguism today definitely seems to be an exception.
NOTES
1 L. Martin, Eskimo words for snow: A case study in the genesis and decay of an anthropological example, "American Anthropologist", 88, 2, 1986, [p./pp.].
6 E. Sapir, Culture, Language and Personality, (ed. D.G. Mandelbaum), Berkeley 1958, [p./pp.].
10 Loc. cit.
13 Loc. cit.
15 See M. De Certeau, L'invention au quotidien, I, L'art de faire, Paris 1990, [p./pp.].

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Mikhail Bakhtin and Heteroglossia

Bakhtin’s views anticipated the analytical school of linguistic philosophy, and emphasized the vitality of language. Speech and writing come with the viewpoints and intentions of their authors preserved in the multi-layered nature of language, and heteroglossia is therefore an effective argument against some of the more extreme views of Postmodernism.

Whereas the Russian formalists drew their inspiration from Saussure, seeing language as a system of signs, Bakhtin took a sociological line similar to that later developed in Austin’s speech acts. The spoken word is primary, and words in conversation are oriented towards future words – they stimulate and anticipated replies, structuring themselves to do so. Many genres (e.g. epics, tragedy, lyrics) overlook or even suppress this natural feature of language to present a unified world-view. But the novel accepts, and indeed makes use, of many voices, weaving them into a narrative with direct speech, represented speech, and what Bakhtin called doubly-orientated speech. Four categories make up the latter: stylization (a borrowed style), parody, skaz (oral narration) and dialogue (a hidden shaping of the author’s voice).

Bakhtin stressed the multi-layered nature of language, which he called heteroglossia. Not only are there social dialects, jargons, turns of phrase characteristic of the various professions, industries, commerce, of passing fashions, etc., but also socio-ideological contradictions carried forward from various periods and levels in the past. Language is not a neutral medium that can be simply appropriated by a speaker, but something that comes to us populated with the intentions of others. Every word tastes of the contexts in which it has lived its socially-charged life.

Bakhtin’s concepts go further than Derrida’s notion of ‘trace’, or Foucault’s archaeology of political usage. Words are living entities, things that are constantly being employed and partly taken over, carrying opinions, assertions, beliefs, information, emotions and intentions of others, which we partially accept and modify. All speech is dialogic, has an internal polemic, and this is most fully exploited by the novel, particularly the modern novel.

Frontiers and Identity: Approaches and Inspirations in Sociology

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The significance of national borders has been called into question by the corrosive consequence of accelerated globalisation. Many commentators have assumed that intensified worldwide inter-connections and time-space compression entail a decline in state capacities and an increased permeability of their borders. It is argued that trans-national flows of capital, commodities, information and people have undermined the ability of states to regulate activities within and across their borders. In short, a ‘de-territorialised’, ‘borderless’ world is invoked which, it is claimed, fundamentally transforms economic, political and cultural realities.

Not only the physical borders but also imaginary ones change. According to Zygmunt Bauman’s thesis we have moved from a solid to a fluid phase of modernity, in which nothing keeps its shape and social forms are constantly changing at great speed, radically transforming the experience of being human⁴. Inevitably, the undermining of fa-
miliar institutions, an aspect of modernity that has certainly been intensified in recent years, has had important consequences for people’s sense of identity. Bauman suggests that the enduring identities once associated with work, nationality or class have given way to looser and more provisional identities and conceptions of community, that are subject to constant change and renegotiation. Identity is flexible, complex and open to different fields of reference. People in search of identity draw new lines and invent frontiers. Many social scientists argue for the continuing relevance of national borders – as demarcating *de jure* sovereignty, as regulators of movement, as markers of citizenship rights, and as instruments to classify populations and the reproduction of identities. They claim that borders have been reconfigured rather than uniformly eroded, that their permeability is highly differentiated, and that this permeability reflects and reinforces the power relations of uneven globalisation.

As we can see in post-modern discourse, both identity and frontiers are constantly changing, “fluid” and self-reproducing. However, this post modern introduction to the concept of frontier and identity is only a pretext for presenting a general overview of sociological approaches regarding these two concepts.

‘Frontier’ seen by sociologists

There is no sociological theory or definition of a frontier. Frontier as such is not a direct object of interest to a sociologist. It can however be read and interpreted according to sociological paradigm.

Until the end of the last century we could observe a double paradigmatic shift in sociology – the so-called “two sociologies”.

The first approach focuses on the ‘social organism’, social wholes and systems. It is a ‘hard’ approach that analyses and offers a holistic and systemic image of society. The ontological and epistemological consequence of this approach is a quantitative, hard analysis of all the elements of the social world. It provides us with more statistical, physical, demographic data. The methodological consequence of Sociology 1 is that the object is studied from the outside.

In this paradigm ‘frontier’, ‘border’ is defined as an objective ‘being’ whose indicators could be: visible lines between two or more areas; natural frontiers (rivers, mountains etc.) or artificial frontiers (political, administrative). The stress is put on the economical, political, structural aspect of the frontiers. This approach corresponds to the ‘old meaning’ of border, which is:

– between social wholes (nations, states, ethnic groups etc.);
– territorial;
– historical.

The second approach, Sociology 2, focuses on the human individuals and their actions. It proposes ‘soft’, constantly moving images of society; changing patterns of human actions and interactions. There are two directions in which this approach develops:
a) the socio-psychological direction which points to motivations, reasons, attitudes, intentions;

b) the centralist direction – focused on values, symbols, rules etc.

The ontological and epistemological consequence of this approach is a ‘soft’, qualitative analysis that depicts the social reality as a social construct (created by social actions). The methodological consequences are that the object is studied from the inside. As we will see later, most identity theories are part of this approach.

Looking at the ‘frontier’, ‘border’ from this point of view we will see them more as a subjective “being”, depending on the individual’s and group’s definitions, which are based on their subjective experiences. Frontiers can be invisible – the stress is on the symbolic, cultural, internal perception of the line ‘between’ something that is ‘mine, ours’ (known) and ‘his/hers/their’ (unknown, different). Soft variables like language, customs, lifestyles (values and norms) define the distinction between ‘a friend’ and ‘a stranger’. This approach corresponds to a ‘new meaning’ of the border, which is:

- non-territorial (without a specific territory or just a symbolic territory);
- historical;
- symbolic, psychological.

E.g.: intellectual, social, economical elites (professionals, metropolitan elites etc.).

The third approach visible in contemporary sociology are theories of ‘social becoming’, which recognize the ‘duality’ of structure and culture. On the one hand, culture provides a pool of resources for action to draw from: the values to set its goals, the norms to specify the meanings, the symbols and the codes to express its cognitive content, the frames to order its components, the rituals to provide it with continuity and sequence and so fourth.

On the other hand, action is at the same time creatively shaping and reshaping culture, which is not a God-given constant, but must rather be seen as an accumulated product or preserved sediment of earlier individual and collective actions. This approach enters within the frame of ‘late modernity’, which Bauman refers to as fluid phase of modernity. In brief it is characterised by:

- the dialectic relationship between globalisation-localisation (in the individual and collective life);
- separation of time and space;
- abstract and expert systems.

The consequences of the above mentioned phenomena are:

- individual reflexivity (reflexive project of the self) – as the base for self-identity;
- institutional reflexivity;
- risk culture (we must think about the future in the criteria of the risk);
- mediated experience of the human being;
- disembedding.
In this perspective the ‘frontier’ or ‘border’ is constantly created, shaped and reshaped by the actors (individuals and groups) in the existing cultural, political, economical context. There is a dialectic relationship between structural conditions and the new social needs, aspirations, aims.

In late modernity we face the diminishing importance of the ‘old, well-defined borders’. Disembedding of individuals and social groups causes the need to define new borders. The process is based on the reinvention of borders in territorial and symbolic meaning. E.g.: borders of: Euroregions, ghetto (of immigrants, the members of new middle class, bohemia), ‘private fatherland’ (city, village, neighbourhood).

The same issue of ‘social becoming’ refers to the post-modern concept of identity. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the social and cultural acceleration, ideological pluralism, the constant bombarding of images and information that characterise contemporary context do not help build the psychological or social identity of an individual. Culture, social and territorial belonging are put under question. As we grapple with the insecurity and uncertainty of liquid modernity, Bauman argues that our socio-political, cultural, professional, religious and sexual identities are undergoing a process of continuing transformation. Identities the world over have become more precarious than ever: we live in an era of constant change and disposability – whether it is last season’s outfit, car or even partner and as a result our identities have become transient and deeply elusive. In a world of rapid global change where national borders are increasingly eroded, our identities are in a state of continuous flux. Identity – a notion that by its very nature is elusive and ambivalent – has become a key concept for understanding the changing nature of social life and personal experience in our contemporary, liquid modern age. In the following section we will concentrate on how sociology defines and describes identity.

IDENTITY THEORIES AND CONCEPTS

Identity is a very modern subject, which comes into light with the process of social differentiation and the growing distance between an individual and his or her recognition in the society they belong to. This is a relational concept, a process which takes place as a consequence of an exchange between the individuals in the course of social interactions and is not, therefore, an immediate attribute of an individual (subject).

Identity may be described as a series of representations that are created within an individual’s personality with regard to biological entity, to roles performed (gender, social status, social position, etc.), to his/her presence or absence in the determinant social contexts (nation, ethnic group, religion) and with regard to the way other people interpret one’s behaviour as the evidence of who and what one is. Identity of an individual contains a set of relations, representations and images which an individual has of oneself, which others give him, that determine the capacity of recognising oneself and being recognised. Sociologists believe that identity is a dynamic feature of social
life. That is, it is something that is constantly evolving and changing. For some people of course, identity can change rapidly and dramatically, but our identities evolve slowly and imperceptibly in most cases.

The notion of ‘identity’ in sociology and social psychology refers mainly to the sphere of auto definition of a social actor – an individual or a group. We could describe it as a set of representations, judgements and opinions one has about oneself. We are all products of our social environment. However, this simple statement hides a multitude of controversies and interpretations over the precise relationship between us as individuals and the social groups to which we belong. This perhaps illustrates the tension between thinking, conscious individuals and the society we live in.

Self recognition and self-consciousness have always been a subject of reflection for theologists, philosophers, artists and later psychologists and psychiatrists. Since the creation of sociology it has become an important issue for sociologists too, even though the fathers of sociology did not use the term “identity”. Early thought dedicated to auto perception of a social subject assumed that the influence of the way of self-perception on the direction and forms of interactions should be taken under consideration in the analysis of a social subject’s actions. J.M. Baldwin was the first to formulate the idea about the influence of “an other” on the auto-definition of a subject. Charles H. Cooley developed this idea by introducing a conception of “looking-glass self”: the theory that we use others’ behaviour towards us as a kind of mirror in which an image of the person we are is reflected. He used this conception to describe the mechanism of the creation of images and judgement of a social actor about himself.

George H. Mead underlined its continuous character by creating the basis of modern research on interactions. Mead argued that although we are all conscious, thinking, individuals, the way we choose to behave is influenced by the social context of that behaviour. Mead argued that our behaviour as individuals is influenced by two aspects of our self-awareness: an “I” aspect based around one’s opinion of oneself as a whole; a “Me” aspect which consists of an awareness of how other people expect us to behave at any given moment and any given, specific situation. The “I” and the “Me” are parallel parts of what Mead called “The Self”. Self-consciousness is something that is constructed and developed socially; indeed, it is a process that involves an “I” aspect and a “Me” aspect which cannot be separated from each other. Mead introduces the concept of a “significant other”. These significant others are more influential in shaping our personality than people whose behaviour and opinions we care little about.

Erving Goffman used a theatrical metaphor to illustrate his ideas about personality, self-development and social identity. In basic terms, the social world is represented as a play in which the various members of society adopt certain roles and speak certain lines. Unlike a play, however, the lines we speak are created by us, not for us. Goffman argued that there are three basic variants of identity: social identity, personal identity and ego-identity. Robert E. Park also proposed the idea of self-conception connected with the repertoire of social roles one performs.
However, the one who introduced the term “identity” to social sciences was Erik Erikson – a socio-psychologist, a psychotherapist. He analysed identity in a biographical dimension, using the concept of a life cycle. He was the first to recognize three basic components of the identity building process: the capacity of one’s organism, one’s aspirations and chances, and the social roles and prototype carriers offered by a society.

We must remember the dual origin of the concept of identity: sociological and socio-psychological, which is reflected in numerous theories of identity that exist in the field. Options are only numerous in the field of sociology. For example, at one extreme are Interactionist sociologists – represented by Mead, Goffman, or Cooley – who emphasize the creative aspects of human individuality (people shape society according to their image). At the other extreme, we have Structuralist sociologists who argue that we are the product of society (society shapes people in its own image).

In structural sociology, the focus is placed more firmly on the way society, in all its forms, shapes the behaviour of individuals. Although Structuralists differ in the emphasis they place on structural forces and the ability of individuals to shape their own lives, there is a general agreement that what really matters in terms of individual and group self-awareness and development is the way these structural forces effectively seem to make people behave in certain more or less predictable ways. In addition, Structuralists tend to place a great deal of emphasis on the socialization process as the means through which societies shape the beliefs, perceptions, and behaviour of their members. In many respects, therefore, socialization is viewed as a powerful guiding force in terms of the way people are. Functionalist writers argue that it is only by learning cultural rules that social interaction becomes possible. Cultural rules, therefore, provide a structure for people’s behaviour, effectively channelling behaviour in some ways but not others. We experience structural pressure whenever we adopt a particular role, since by taking on a role we take on certain norms, express certain values and have a particular status in society.

It is important to mention Social Identity Theory. Social identity is different from personal identity, which is derived from personal characteristics and individual relationships. Tajfel and Turner, among others, have taken great interest in what happens to an individual’s self-perception when becoming a member of a group. They argue that on assignment to a group, people appear to automatically think of that group as being better for them than any alternative out-group. This is because they are motivated to keep a positive self-image. This self-image has two component parts: personal identity and social identity (the number of social identities one person may have has no theoretical limit). Any action or cognition that elevates the social identity will therefore also tend to elevate the self-image. Social Identity Theory asserts that group membership creates ingroup/self-categorization and enhancement in ways that favour the in-group at the expense of the out-group. Turner and Tajfel’s examples (minimal group studies) showed that the mere act of individuals categorizing themselves as group members was sufficient to lead them to display in-group favoritism. After being categorized in a group membership, individuals seek to achieve positive self-esteem by positively differentiat-
ing their in-group from a comparison with the out-group on some valued dimension. This quest for positive distinctiveness means that people’s sense of who they are is defined in terms of ‘we’ rather than ‘I’.

Related to the idea of group identity is the concept of ethnic identity, first introduced by A. Epstein. He defined it as a sense of belonging to a group which has biological and social foundation, is bounded with hereditary, historical, cultural links of community. Usually the subject discovers its own ethnic identity in the state of social transformation, when its own culture is at risk of cultural erosion – for example in the context of migration, when its own identity is put under question in face of another identity offer.

Ethnic identity can be based on geography, nationality, ancestry, family, culture and sub-culture, religion, language, race or any combination of these. It is the amalgam of conceptual and behavioural characteristics that are found in a group of people that set it apart from any other. Central to this notion is collective consciousness of common ancestry. Each ethnic group may have different ideas about the characteristics that make up its identity. Even sub-groups may emphasise differing sets of characteristics, which are functions of complex factors, some of which are quite dynamic. For example, language within an integral, monolithic and stable group is regarded as a static definer of ethnic identity, whereas within a minority under threat of linguistic assimilation, language becomes an emotive and dynamic factor which affects and influences people in different ways. Ethnic identity in a child is formed by the collection of conceptual and emotional input from parents, family, school, peers, the media, cultural organs, etc. Apart from physical appearance and bodily functions affected by the genes, none of the factors that shape one’s identity is inherited. The environment determines linguistic affiliation, values system, sense of belonging and other learned ethnic identity determinants.

**Borderland: crossing frontiers and identities**

Borderland can be seen by neighbouring groups as entrenchment (protection against the other), bridge-head (the territory obtained as a step for further expansion) or a bridge (passage to the mutual exchange of material and spiritual values). The sociological notion of borderland is connected with social ecology developed in the first decades of the 20th century by the Chicago School and is still being studied, with the analysis concentrated on the relations between the territory and community that lives there. As Sadowski argues, the object of the analysis of the sociology of borderland is:

- borderland as a space, a territory lying along the border or far from the centre (special aspect);
- borderland as identified in the space socio-cultural contact between two or more nations or ethnic groups (socio-cultural aspect);
- borderland as a place shaping a new man and his culture (personality – cultural aspect).
It seems important to mention borderland while talking about frontiers and identity, especially noting that we observe a renaissance of the subject of borderland. Authors argue that borderland has lost its traditional characteristics of a space, where competitive forces and cultures met. The character of borderland changes in accordance with the changing character of borders. There are more and more spaces of contamination than domination of culture, spaces of passage rather than rivalry and confrontation of centres. It is always more difficult to identify borderland as well as the differences and cultural divisions that take place there. As we mentioned earlier, old frontiers vanish but we create new ones where there were no borders at all. Along with new borders, new borderlands are born. It is important to study them, analyse them and interpret them – along with old borderlands, also changing under the influence of the vast set of factors and processes called globalisation.

In this chapter we have tried to present a general theoretical map of sociological concepts of identity and frontier. The approaches presented here are in our opinion crucial for a good start for a debate on frontiers and identities. It is important – especially in a multi-disciplinary discourse – to specify the theoretical frame and the definitions that we use in the debate. The scope of this volume is mapping. We hope to have unfolded the conceptual map of identities and frontier with this sociological chapter and that it will be useful in further readings and discussions.

Notes

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