



Creating Links and Innovative Overviews for a New History Research Agenda
for the Citizens of a Growing Europe

CLIOHRES-ISHA READER

II

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Being a Historian Opportunities and Responsibilities Past and Present

*Compiled by
Sven Mörsdorf*

A CLIOHRES-ISHA Reader



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Preface

CLIOHRES is very happy to present *Being a Historian. Opportunities and Responsibilities, Past and Present*. This volume is the second CLIOHRES-ISHA virtual reader. It will be placed on internet and it will also be printed in a limited number of copies for use at the ISHA Seminar, held at the University of Marburg in January, 2010.

The chapters have been chosen by the organisers of the Seminar and are introduced by the President of the Marburg Section of ISHA, Sven Mörsdorf. They provide input for a discussion on the future of today's history students and the implications, ethical, political and occupational, of the role of historians in society.

The CLIOHRES Network is multicultural and transgenerational; it includes not only historians but also geographers, philosophers, sociologists, philologists, archaeologists and art historians; it uses national differences to highlight the variety of understandings of history that are produced and reproduced in our countries. The work of ISHA, and of CLIOHRES and its sister Networks shows clearly that citizens of European countries know very little about each other, and above all have ideas about the histories of other countries which are very different from those widely held in the countries themselves. Over the last twenty years we have addressed this situation producing a patrimony of information and new view points which we wish to share with ISHA.

A central objective of CLIOHRES, CLIOHWORLD and their sister Networks, past and present, is to ensure a close link between teaching and research. The most significant place where these two sides of the historian's activity meet is in the classrooms of universities and schools. We know that, in any field, learning and teaching cannot simply be a transfer of existing knowledge. History is perhaps the discipline that makes this clearest. What information should be transmitted? There is, never has been and, we can confidently say, there never will be a human being familiar with more than a very small part of the experience of human beings on this planet. Nonetheless, historical knowledge – what we call knowledge of the past – is one of the most important tools that humans use to define their place in the world and in society and to organise their dealings with others. But wherever we turn, we see that what is taught in History programmes may be seemingly complete, or even excessively detailed, but that it is actually very partial and even highly slanted, whether through ignorance, lack of awareness or for specific – ideological or cultural – purposes.

In essence, “being a historian” does not mean simply knowing a lot about history, although a rich patrimony of knowledge is very useful. Rather, the most important part of being or becoming a historian is acquiring what is (or should be) the historical mindset: open, critical, aware of how knowledge is created, used and manipulated – and at the same time ready to use the historian's tools (documents of every sort, written, oral, landscape-based, media-based – from the most traditional to the most innova-

tive) to attempt honestly to understand and describe the events and processes that have brought us to the present.

We have learned that most historians are unaware of the degree to which their view of the past, the choice of their research questions, what they think ‘everyone’ should know are the result of constraints, usually deriving from the structures in which they study and work: i.e. schools, universities, local bodies, each devoted to propagating a particular historiographical culture or group of cultures.

In such a situation, how can the mind be ‘open’? “Being” or “becoming” a historian means a long, risky and fascinating slog through the debris of human culture, including academic culture, in order to come to an awareness of how history is constructed and used. We hope that the chapters printed in this reader will provide some short cuts: perhaps seeing how and why some very selective views of history have been formed in specific contexts will alert the reader to the existence of similar phenomena in his or her own country or University.

Being a historian also means getting a job. In the *Introduction* to this reader, Sven Mörsdorf mentions that many who choose to study history will be forced to find occupational opportunities in other fields, not necessarily directly related to History. According to the surveys we have carried out in the Tuning Educational Structures in Europe project (www.unideusto.org/Tuning) and amongst the History doctoral candidates in CLIOHRES (www.cliohres.net) and CLIOHnet (www.clioh.net), we have seen that historians do find employment, but in line with Sven’s ‘quip’, many, about half, will find it in fields not directly related to history.

Nonetheless, there is great demand for the competences which history studies develop. For example, people trained as historians are able to write and speak effectively, to gather information from a variety of sources, to integrate it into a single coherent picture: normally historians are interested in people and society, and they often become journalists, writers, personnel managers, politicians and public employees. In this sense, then, finding and accepting other employment does not mean ‘betraying’ one’s historiographical vocation: rather it means being able, critically and open mindedly, to bring the ‘historical mindset’ to various sectors of society.

We hope that this reader will be useful, and wish all the participants in the Marburg seminar a very fruitful meeting.

Ann Katherine Isaacs

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The CLIOHRES Network of Excellence

CLIOHRES is a consortium of 45 universities and research institutions in 31 countries. Each institution is represented by two senior researchers and two doctoral students coming from various academic fields – primarily from history, but also from art history, archaeology, architecture, philology, political science, literary studies and geography. The 180 researchers in the network are divided into six “Thematic Work Groups”, each of which deals with a broadly defined research area – ‘States, Institutions and Legislation’, ‘Power and Culture’, ‘Religion and Philosophy’, ‘Work, Gender and Society’, ‘Frontiers and Identities’, and ‘Europe and the Wider World’. Furthermore, the Network as a whole addresses ‘transversal themes’ of general relevance. These include ‘Citizenship’, ‘Migration’, ‘Tolerance and Discrimination’, ‘Gender’ and ‘Identities’; one of these is targeted each year.

As a Network of Excellence, CLIOHRES is not an ordinary research project. It does not focus on a single research question or on a set of specific questions. Rather it is conceived as a forum where researchers representing various national and regional traditions can meet and elaborate their work in new ways thanks to structured interaction with their colleagues. The objective is not only to transcend the national boundaries that still largely define historical research agendas, opening new avenues for research, but also to use those very differences to become critically aware of how current research agendas have evolved. Thus, the goal is to examine basic and unquestioned attitudes about ourselves and others, which are rooted in the ways that the scientific community in each country looks at history. Historians create and cultivate selective views of the national or local past, which in turn underpin pervasive ideas about identities and stereotypes: national, religious, gender, political, etc. National historiographies today are still largely shaped by problems and preoccupations reflecting previous political and cultural contexts. CLIOHRES aims to create and promote a new structure and agenda for the community of historical research, redirecting its critical efforts along more fruitful lines.

The Network began its work in June 2005, thanks to a five-year contract with the European Commission through the Sixth Framework Programme of its Directorate General for Research, under Priority 7, dealing with “Citizenship”. Its activities aim to contribute to the development of innovative approaches to history as regards both the European Research Area and European Higher Education Area. The Network works for a closer connection between research and learning/teaching, holding that this is essential in order to ensure that European citizens possess the necessary information, conceptual tools and more in general the vital critical and self-critical abilities which they will need in the future.

All the thematic groups have worked from the start according to a common research plan, beginning in the first year with reconnaissance or mapping, of how the questions

perceived as important for the thematic area appear in the different national historiographies. During the second year they defined 'connecting' themes, which are relevant for research in a wider geographical and chronological context. The third phase has concentrated on comparing and reviewing sources and methodologies; the fourth has focussed on cross-fertilisation, that is on showing how problems identified in the previous phases can be developed in new contexts. During the last phase, the groups are defining new and relevant projects, in the broadest sense, for future research in the sector.

Each Thematic Work Group publishes one volume a year in order to share and discuss the results of their work with the broader academic community.

The volumes are not conceived as the final word on the issues that they deal with, but rather as work-in-progress. In addition to the six Thematic Work Group volumes, the Network publishes one common volume per year dealing with the transversal theme targeted. It also publishes abridged versions of the dissertations written by doctoral students who have participated in its work. Together the volumes already published form an invitation to discuss the results of the Network and the novel directions that are emerging from its work; they also constitute a unique patrimony of up-to-date studies on well-known and less well-known aspects of Europe and its history.

All publications are available in book form and on the www.cliohres.net website. They can be downloaded without charge. A list of publications to date can be found at the end of this volume.

Introduction

It is a well-known quip that, with a degree in history, one will most likely become a taxi driver after graduation. As with every good joke, it contains an element of truth. But if we look at a cross-section of society, and the labour market in particular, we will find trained historians in almost all fields of activity, including those more akin to their professional education. Regarding careers, however, most historians who do not pursue a vocation in teaching, research, or the like will find themselves forced to be inventive when it comes to hunting for a proper job.

Many students seem to be unaware of the opportunities their education has to offer, both in “classic” and more “uncommon” fields of employment. On the other hand, those who already know that they want to remain within the direct scope of their training and become professional historians themselves may feel the need to expand their understanding of the implications of their work and of its corresponding opportunities and risks.

These are the two main issues we want to address at the ISHA Weekend Seminar titled “Being a Historian: Opportunities and Responsibilities in Past and Present,” to be held January 28th – 31st, 2010, at Philipps-Universität Marburg. Despite its title, the conference will encompass two different points of view: historiographical and practical aspects of studying history – be it as a student or professional – and the application of one’s knowledge and skills in manifold occupations outside academia.

In four consecutive workshops we will follow lectures and take part in debates. In the first, we will examine the reasons which historians had (and have) to devote themselves to the study of the past. Then we will analyse how politics and ideologies influenced historians’ work, what challenges they had to face, and what we can learn from them about our opportunities and responsibilities today. In the third workshop we will shed some light on the practical application of one’s education in historical science to different fields of occupation, including teaching, tourism, and cultural heritage protection. Finally, the fourth workshop is meant to initiate a discussion among students and professors about the effects of the Bologna Process on the quality of European history programmes and especially international student mobility.

The twelve chapters of this reader have been taken from the vast collection of articles offered by the CLIOHRES Network of Excellence, among them a number of case studies which are directly related to the lectures to be held in the conference workshops. Varied and diverse as the Network’s publications are, it has still been impossible to find a suitable match for every theme we wanted to cover. Instead, the selection is an opportunity to read “around” the topics of the conference, to check their arguments against one’s own experience, and to thereby prepare more thoroughly for the workshop’s topics and discussions.

This is the second reader of its kind and a valuable and effective support to ISHA's work. On behalf of ISHA Marburg, the organisers of the Weekend Seminar, and ISHA International I want to thank the European History Networks and their members for supporting us from their scientific resources through the distribution of this reader. I would especially like to recognise the Coordinator's ongoing friendly assistance, without which we would not have been able to achieve nearly as much.

Sven Mörsdorf

Philipps-Universität Marburg

Whose History is History? Singularities and Dualities of the Public Debate on Belgian Colonialism

GEERT CASTRYCK
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In deze bijdrage wordt ingegaan op verantwoordelijkheden in het debat over de Belgische koloniale geschiedenis. Het gaat daarbij om de historische verantwoordelijkheden van koning Leopold II, het Belgische kolonialisme of de Belgen, maar vooral ook om de verantwoordelijkheden van historici.

*Naar aanleiding van enkele ophefmakende publieke manifestaties (boeken, films, tentoonstellingen) kende België de voorbije jaren een Congo-opstoot. Het begin ervan viel min of meer samen met de verschijning van de boeken van Adam Hochschild, *De geest van koning Leopold II en de plundering van de Congo* (1998), en van Ludo De Witte, *De moord op Lumumba* (1999). Deze brachten het duistere hart van het Belgische optreden in Centraal-Afrika onder het voetlicht. Er barstte een debat los in de academische wereld, in de media en in de politiek. De parlementaire onderzoekscommissie naar de moord op Lumumba (1999-2002) en de televisiedocumentaire door Peter Bate, *White King, Red Rubber, Black Death* (2004), vonden de meeste weerklank en lokten ook politieke reacties uit.*

*Het Koninklijk Museum voor Midden-Afrika te Tervuren wou met haar tentoonstelling *Het geheugen van Congo: de koloniale tijd* (2005) een genuanceerde en in tijd en ruimte gecontextualiseerde versie van de Belgische koloniale geschiedenis brengen, en zo het woedende debat modereren. Ze bereikten echter enkel dat het in alle hevigheid opflakkerde en niet minder gepolariseerd is dan tevoren.*

Het debat kent tegenstellingen tussen een generatie die door de koloniale mythologie is gevoed en een die nooit over de koloniale geschiedenis heeft gehoord, tussen een groep die het kolonialisme verdedigt en een groep die het verwerpelijk vindt, tussen Belgen die het debat voeren en Congolezen die uit het debat geweerd worden, tussen Vlaanderen en Franstalig België, en tussen historici en het brede publiek.

Twee dominante standpunten in het debat zijn dat de koloniale schandalen opgeklopt worden om België en het koningshuis te schaden, en dat Belgische historici de heikele thema's uit hun geschiedenis uit de weg gaan of toedekken. Deze twee benaderingen vallen opvallend samen met de Belgisch-Franstalige respectievelijk de Vlaamse teneur van het debat, en staan in feite in dialoog – of dovemansgesprek

Historici lijken veel te lang afwezig gebleven uit dit debat, maar bij nader toezien, blijken de versies die het publiek uiteindelijk wel hebben bereikt, vrijwel uitsluitend te putten uit het werk van Belgisch historisch onderzoek. Dit brengt mij tot de conclusie dat historici niet zozeer zijn tekort geschoten in het onderkennen en onderzoeken van delicate thema's, maar wel in het kenbaar maken van hun onderzoeksresultaten en in het opleiden van nieuwe onderzoekers. Deze vaststelling maakt het probleem niet minder acuut, maar impliceert integendeel dat het eigen is aan een actuele academische attitude en zich niet beperkt tot het domein van de koloniale of Afrikaanse geschiedenis.

INTRODUCTION

In February 2005, *The Memory of Congo: the Colonial Era*, a much debated exhibition on the colonial history of the Belgian Congo, opened at the Royal Museum for Central Africa in Tervuren (RMCA). The museum itself is part and parcel of this history and is without any doubt the single most important relic or witness to Belgian colonialism in the public sphere. Therefore, the exhibitor is implicitly and symbolically also the exhibited. This apparent ambiguity is at the same time a unique opportunity, and the current management of the museum is well aware of this. Already at the time of a previous exhibition in 2001, *ExItCongoMuseum*, the RMCA combined its double identity of exhibitor and exhibited with a modest touch of exhibitionism, in showing the historical layeredness, the social life and the moral implications of their own collection. This caused internal protest against any form of self-criticism, whereas external critics welcomed the initiative but thought it was too little, too late. In the 2005 exhibition, a less articulate reminder of this self reflection was exhibited, though stuck away in a corner and reduced to a display that stressed the prestigiousness of the collection rather than the contestation of how it had been acquired, decontextualised and recontextualised. This case is in a way a small-scale example of the colonial debate in Belgium. It is about the "other" but above all about the "self", it involves internal discordances and external interferences, it includes questions of layeredness and moral responsibilities, and it is an issue of struggle nicely put away in the corner of an old building.

In this contribution I shall analyse different ways in which colonial history is remembered and not remembered in Belgian public spheres. The public debates during the first years of this century surrounding the monograph by Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Central Africa* (1998), the television documentary by Peter Bate, *White King, Red Rubber, Black Death* (2004), and the exhibition by the RMCA, *The Memory of Congo: the Colonial Era* (2005), offer plenty of insights into the character of these remembrances and memories¹. These issues were almost exclusively debated by journalists, politicians, academics and (former) colonials, but over the years the debates became ever more public, both in style and in scope. On the reverse side of the debates, however, there are some remarkable instances of indifference and of difference that deserve closer attention. Especially the relative absence of Congolese in the debates, the superficial or lethargic attitude of 'the public', and the generational, (sub)national, (inter)national, ideological, and professional cleavages are

at least as revealing about the position of colonial history in the Belgian public spheres, as the actual debates on the surface.

WHITE KING, RED RUBBER, BLACK DEATH

In April 2004, a documentary by Peter Bate on the cruel history in King Leopold II's Congo Free State was broadcast by both the Flemish and the Belgian-francophone public television stations. This event was the culminating point of a controversy that started in 1999 after the sensation surrounding the Dutch and French translations of Hochschild's monograph. In both the book and the documentary, the story is told of how King Leopold II of the Belgians obtained the Congo as a personal possession and how he earned huge amounts of riches by the brutal exploitation of rubber and people. The Belgian support for and interest in the king's colonial endeavours were derisory, and initially he had difficulties in avoiding bankruptcy. However, after the invention of the rubber tyre and the automobile, and the discovery of natural latex in the Congolese rainforest, he organised a reckless rubber harvest in which he actually preferred derisory interest. The campaign was based on forced labour, harvest quotas, and excessive measures of punishment and terror, including chopping off hands, killing people, destroying plantations and villages... The cruel intimidations drove rubber harvesters deeper and deeper into the forest, exposing them to hardship, hunger, danger, and disease. Their relatives were weakened by lack of food and labour, which drove them to hunger and disease as well. In the end, the combination of murder and torture, death by starvation and disease, and the disruption of demographic reproduction caused a steep fall in the population figures... or rather a dramatic decline of the population, since actual figures are not available. Micro research in a few villages severely affected by the rubber terror has shown that in that area at least half of the population disappeared². It is difficult to extrapolate these figures to the Congo as a whole, but there is no doubt whatsoever as to the massive terror that took place under the personal responsibility of King Leopold II of the Belgians.

However, a debate between believers and disbelievers is raging around the figures, around the use of the words 'genocide' or 'holocaust', about the question if the king actually *knew* what was happening under his responsibility, and about the wider context of this horror. Adam Hochschild, and Peter Bate with him, adheres to estimates that the rubber terror caused a demographic deficit of 10 million people out of a total population of 20 million³. The RMCA on the occasion of their 2005 exhibition, accepted an approach that hypothesises a demographic regression of 20% for the whole of the Congo, due to a combination of epidemics, forced labour, mass migration, slave trade, and the Leopoldian terror. They refrain from using absolute figures, because it is impossible to know how many people lived in the Congo at the beginning of colonisation, and they accept implicitly that some regions were more heavily affected than this 20% average⁴. Hochschild also accepts that we will never know for sure, but nevertheless sticks to a regression of approximately 50% without making a distinction between

different regions within the Congo⁵. At the other end of the debate, we find a calculation by (former) colonials, who claim that the number of people involved in the rubber regime remained *bien en dessous des cent mille* [well under 100,000]⁶. Their calculation is completely implausible, since it ignores ‘collateral damage’ by hunger and disease, and since it naively believes that – later – laws were always in vigour and, moreover, effective. Nevertheless, their caricaturist stance is important, because they took sides with the RMCA, who in fact replied to the same statements. Hence, the defensive attitude at Tervuren is contaminated by a denial – which may have been the intention of some of them in the first place.

Anyway, whatever the estimate one follows or does not follow, the record remains horrific. Even if one believes the preposterous abstraction that less than 100,000 Congolese were involved in the rubber episode and that many of them died as a consequence, then this still is the single most deadly page in the history book of the Kingdom of the Belgians – at least, if it were in it – leaving both World Wars, including the mass murder of the Jews during the Second, far behind. As a matter of fact, this comparison with the genocide of the Jews is a strong emotional argument in the debate. Nobody really claims that what happened in Leopold II’s Congo Free State was genocide. There was no intention “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”⁷. The intention was to obtain riches and the execution was arbitrary and not aimed against a specific group⁸. Nevertheless, the number of casualties leads Adam Hochschild and others to comparisons with the Holocaust – with capital a ‘H’ – and to the use of the term *holocaust*, meaning massive destruction, but automatically alluding to the mass destruction of Jews in Europe. The subtitle of the French translation of *King Leopold’s Ghost*, even contains the word *holocauste* [holocaust]⁹. On the other side of the debate, people object to the use of the word “holocaust” or the suggestion of a genocide – or “genocidal scale” – in much the same way as they object to the claim that 10 million Congolese died. The francophone Belgian historian Jean-Luc Vellut, who is a renowned expert in the historiography and the political economy of the Belgian Congo, responded to Hochschild’s book by declaring to the British newspaper “The Guardian” that “to compare it [the violent history of Leopold II’s Congo] with the Holocaust or Auschwitz is an insult to the truth”¹⁰. At the time of the broadcast of Peter Bate’s documentary, the director of the Royal Museum for Central Africa, Guido Gryseels, reacted in similar fashion by questioning the accuracy of the ‘10 million’-estimate and by assigning the brutal practices in Leopold II’s Congo Free State – which neither he nor Vellut deny as such – to limited areas and a limited number of perpetrators¹¹. In other words, they accept that extreme violence did occur and even on a massive scale, but they refute the idea that this was part of a system instead of unacceptable and unaccepted excesses. They also contest that this brutality was more excessive in the Congo than in other colonies. In short, they play down the Belgian and royal responsibilities.

In the same message, Gryseels also claimed that there is no reason to believe that King Leopold II ordered the use of violence. This brings yet another element of discord to the fore: was Leopold II aware of what happened, could or should he have known, did

he care at all, and how far reaching was and is the royal and/or the Belgian responsibility? The historical record is quite clear that Leopold II ordered to harvest as much rubber as possible, and that he established a reward system that directly provoked all kind of abuses. He also was very well informed about all the proceedings in the Congo, and he did not pay much attention to the human cost. There is, however, no evidence that he ordered the actual killing of thousands or millions of people. Most certainly no one gave such an order, but he did cause it and was absolutely accountable. Of course, this does not turn the perpetrators in the field into innocent executors, but the final and paramount responsibility of the king of the Belgians is undeniable.

If one is to understand why this issue is so very sensitive for some and sensational for others, one has to look at the context of all these statements and at 20th-century Belgian history, and Belgian colonial history in particular. The context of Hochschild's statements, for instance, is that of a human rights' activist. Therefore, the more gruesome and unique the abuses are, the more heroic its contesters. It is, undoubtedly, not a coincidence that the word "heroism" figures in the title of his book. However, with respect to the subject of this contribution it is more important to find out the motivations of those people who consistently try to adjust – not necessarily without good arguments, by the way – the number of victims, the radius of cruelty, the deliberateness of crime, and the role of the king. By reducing the extent of the accusations, they seem to believe they can tear down the pervasiveness and trustworthiness of the accusation as such. In so doing, they make it very tempting to draw comparisons with the Holocaust and its negationists... There is, however, a reason for all of this: just like every nation in the world, Belgium has been built on myths¹², and the civilising genius of Leopold II is one of them. The unifying force and fairy story appeal of the royal family as a whole is another one. In this respect, it is striking to notice that the above statements by Gryseels were pronounced on the occasion of a visit to the museum by the present king of the Belgians, Albert II. These myths are especially strong for people who identify with Belgian colonialism¹³. They consider Leopold II as their founding father and the myth of his civilising mission as their single most important – and, again, heroic – paradigm. Criticism of Leopold II is considered as criticism of their own life and work, of their sincere – though misguided – idealism, of their royal family, and of Belgium as a whole.

The debate may appear to be a struggle with external contesters, like the American journalist Adam Hochschild or the British director Peter Bate, but the real fear is internal. In fact, Adam Hochschild and Peter Bate add virtually nothing to the historiography on the Congo. As far as contents are concerned, all had already been written before. In a review of the Dutch translation of *King Leopold's Ghost*, the expert in Belgian foreign politics Rik Coolsaet wrote: *Wat nieuw is voor Hochschild is hier intussen al lang bekend. [...] de werkelijkheid achter het patriottische discours over het Belgisch kolonialisme [is] al lang doorprikt* [What is new to Hochschild is already known over here. (...) the reality behind the patriotic discourse on Belgian colonialism has already been exposed for a long time]¹⁴. In fact, the Belgian researchers Jules Marchal (under the pseudonym A.M.

Delathuy), Daniel Vangroenweghe, Jean Stengers, Jan Vansina and Jean-Luc Vellut had already uncovered many details in the 1980s. Hochschild, by the way, draws most of his information from Jules Marchal, but both he and Bate did add something to the historical debate: they made it public.

KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST

A remarkable aspect of the controversy following the publication of the Dutch and French translations of Hochschild's book was the anger and the shock. Although there was nothing new in this monograph – apart, maybe, from its eloquence – it was new to the readers, who were either baffled by it or furious. Apparently, Belgians did not know or did not want to know what historians – so they pretend – already knew for ages. The myths surrounding Leopold II were at stake. It was as if his ghost came to life, which is either horror or desecration, and in any case lese-majesty.

In fact, the publication of *King Leopold's Ghost* triggered two debates: one in academic circles about the accuracy of Hochschild's allegations, and one in the media and public spheres, in which academics participated as well, about the double shame – of what happened and of not knowing. At the time, however, scholars in African studies were more interested in what would come out of the research on the assassination of Congo's first Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, than in a book that only repeated what they already knew. The contrast between the public and academic reactions was so absolute that it became obvious that there is a serious problem in the communication of research results to the public. This problem is threefold: (1) the silent majority is basically not interested – and never was – in Congolese or colonial affairs, (2) African studies in Belgium are extremely minimal and the academic attitude in general attaches little importance to informing broader society, and (3) the political situation causes a preference for keeping history unknown. Moreover, these three aspects are closely intertwined.

Contrary to most nation-states, Belgium survived the past few decades by *not* constructing a national identity, by avoiding national history. Recently, *belgitude* is cultivated again, and, ironically, the absence of nationality is now praised as typically Belgian, hence as the national identity¹⁵. Nevertheless, the neglect of history has been a conscious policy for a long time, and in the 1970s the then Belgian government even seriously considered abolishing the teaching of history altogether. Since history historically is the science of the nation-state, history becomes useless or even embarrassing when the nation virtually collapses, or when several nations live side by side in an ambiguous mix of conflict and connivance as is the case in present-day Belgium. It has not always been like this. After World War I, Belgian nation-building was in a winning mood and the then Belgian colony was part of the propaganda. In 1908, after a fierce international and national campaign against the abuses in the Congo Free State, Leopold II handed over – or sold – his personal possession to the Belgian state, and from that moment onwards the Congo was a Belgian colony. Belgian propaganda and policy never drew a line between the two eras, but on the

contrary organised a collective amnesia on the pre-War scandals¹⁶. At the same time, and more than ever, king Leopold II was honoured as the genial founder of the Congo. Even on the day of Congolese independence, on June 30th 1960, the then Belgian king, Baudouin I, uttered a perfect summary of the Belgian colonial idea, including an extensive celebration of Leopold II. On that same day, a speech by Prime Minister Lumumba gave a completely opposite perspective, which condemned Belgian colonialism altogether. The Belgian king and his establishment were “scandalised”, quite as much as they had been at the beginning of the century because of the international human rights campaign against the Leopoldian abuses, and as they would be again at the beginning of the next century when Bate’s documentary was broadcasted.

Lumumba did not survive his appraisal of colonial history very long: within weeks he was dismissed as Prime Minister and by early 1961 he was murdered. What happened in these crucial months was the subject of the book written by Ludo De Witte, in which he established the responsibilities of some Belgian politicians, colonial administrators and the king. In the year of publication, 1999, the Belgian government, the first one without Christian Democrats since 1954, made the surprising decision to start a Parliamentary Commission to investigate the events of 1960-1961. Four Belgian historians, nicely picked from different language and ideological groups but excluding Congolese participation¹⁷, were allowed to do research using hitherto closed archives. Avoiding the reprimanding tone of De Witte, they pretty much came to the same conclusions, accepted by the Belgian parliament in February 2002.

Thus, between 1999 and 2002, both the beginning and the end of Belgian colonial history lost its mythical aura, and twice the Belgian establishment, including the equally mythical royalty, bore a dazzling responsibility. In a political context where Belgium as a whole and the monarchy in particular are often questioned, this entailed emotional reactions. (Former) colonials, understandably, felt as if their life and work was reduced to the temporal and moral extremes of colonialism, with which these men, who mostly worked in the Congo between 1930 and 1960, had little to do – at least in a direct way. Less understandably, they nevertheless felt as if these crimes concerned them personally. They – that is, (former) colonials who still today build their identity primarily on their former career – may have had good, even idealistic intentions in colonial times, maybe they even sincerely believed in the paternalistic and patriotic project, and they may have accepted the mythology around the founding father and royal protection, but it is surprising that they cannot or do not want to draw a distinction between their own job and the wrongs of predecessors and superiors. Apart from possible present political preferences, this is a consequence of two related facts. First, the Belgian colonial world view, on which (former) colonials had built their identity, was grounded in myths which had never been questioned before – except by Lumumba in 1960, but he was considered a ‘communist’ and hence not trustworthy by definition. Both an accepted ‘truth’ and the basis of their identity were now being questioned, and therefore this forcibly had to be false. A second fact is the genuine traumatic experience of many colonials when they fled the Congo in 1960, when they received an often hostile reception

upon arrival in Belgium, and when they perceived that their beloved Congo endured ever harder times or, put another way, that their work in the Congo was ruined. Their side of the story, so they feel, is neglected and has been ever since their forced return in 1960. This explains the enthusiasm of (former) colonials when their experiences find their way into monographs and oral history projects. It is definitely not a coincidence that such books and projects emerged together with the (anti)colonial controversies of the past few years¹⁸. There is, by the way, some ground for the feeling that their side of the story has been neglected, but then again, this is because the colonial story has been neglected altogether after 1960.

After Congolese independence, the Belgian expertise on Central-Africa – whether bi-ased or not – was largely dismantled. Research institutes were either abolished (Colonial University in Antwerp, Scientific Research Institute on Central Africa IRSAC-IWOCA, Afrika Insituut in Leuven...) or contained in politically harmless – at least so it seemed in pre-postmodernist times – fields like linguistics, geology, or agricultural sciences (Universiteit Gent, the scientific sections of the Royal Museum for Central Africa...). African history was still pretty much considered a *contradictio in terminis*¹⁹, and colonial history was hardly included in Belgian national history either. The colonial endeavour had never caused much zeal in Belgium, which explains both the rather hostile reception of former colonials and the rapid elimination of expertise. In short, there were no chairs in African or Belgian imperial history at Belgian universities and as a lasting consequence no Belgian historians were trained in this field for decades²⁰. There were, however, some Belgian historians who used to work at the IRSAC-IWOCA or who worked at the Congolese universities of Lovanium (Kinshasa) and Elisabethville (Lubumbashi), and some notable exceptions at Belgian universities who showed a certain interest in Belgian colonial history as a corollary of their research. Jan Vansina, Jean-Luc Vellut and Jean Stengers even built an international reputation as leading scholars in their fields, but within the Belgian context there seemed to be no popular interest in their findings. This problem, however, is not limited to colonial or African history.

The main gateway to bring the results of historical research to the public is schools, but since even the teachers did not take courses on African or colonial history at university, they were not in a position to integrate the latest research results in their own teaching. Schoolbooks continued to give the colonialist mythology on Belgian heroism, until Congo disappeared from history courses altogether²¹. The reason for this omission is partly that knowledge about the Congo and Belgian colonialism had no direct ‘use’ anymore, but it was also a consequence of internal political evolutions. Belgium, being a bi-national state, started to disintegrate at about the same time it lost its (African) colonies, and education was one of the first domains to be split. To say the least, stressing Belgian unity and pride is no longer an unquestioned priority in history courses. History, as I already mentioned before, was even considered completely superfluous and there were serious plans to proclaim the end of history 15 years before Fukuyama. As a result, there is a generational difference in Belgium concerning knowledge of colonial history: the youngest half of the population does not know colonial history because

they never learned about it at school, and the oldest half of the population... does not know colonial history because they only learned the colonialist propaganda.

D-BATE

The publications of Hochschild's and De Witte's monographs, the parliamentary commission to investigate the assassination of Lumumba, as well as the Rwandan genocide and the Central African World War, caused debates in academic circles, in the media and in politics. The documentary directed by Peter Bate on king Leopold's looting massacre in the Congo Free State put this part of the story into a mass format and, therefore, the day it was broadcasted can be considered D-Day in the Belgian public confrontation with (its own?) colonial past.

On the occasion of the broadcast Louis Michel, who was then Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs and who is now European Commissioner of Development and Humanitarian Aid, sent a communiqué after seeing *fragments* of the documentary (29/03/2004). In it, he wrote that he "normally would prefer to leave the debate to historians", but he meaningfully did not stick to his normal preferences this time. He stated that he was "shocked" and that it was a "partisan work giving a completely one-sided image of Leopold II and his era". He also mentioned that "all the positive contributions that are recognised by our Congolese partners" were omitted. Michel is clearly a member of the oldest half of the population. I, on the contrary, wonder what the positive contributions there could possibly have been during the period under scrutiny in the documentary (approximately 1895-1905). Again, we witness someone who is not able to draw a distinction between the utter looting at the early stage of colonialism, and the – more ambiguous – mix of exploitation, domination, infrastructural works, hospitals, schools... afterwards. It is symptomatic and revealing that a lot of people seem unprepared and incapable of distinguishing between Leopold II and Belgian colonialism as a whole – or between the royal family and Belgium as a whole.

This royal family also notified that it was "scandalised" by the documentary²², and the equally royal Museum for Central Africa criticised the documentary and linked their objections to the exhibition *The memory of Congo: the colonial era* that was then in preparation²³. Two years before, the same exhibition had already been announced as a reaction to Hochschild's book²⁴. When the exhibition finally opened in February 2005, as a component of the celebrations of the 175th anniversary of the Belgian state, the director of the RMCA all of a sudden claimed that it is not their duty to make political statements...²⁵. A fourth official Belgian protest against Bate's documentary was posted on the website of the Belgian embassy to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and is still online today²⁶.

The broadcast also evoked a heated media debate, and the difference between the Flemish and the Belgian-francophone debates was staggering. The francophone media shared the scandalised feeling of their king and minister. The broadcasting company created a

package deal consisting of a historical contextualisation of the documentary, then the documentary itself, and finally a debate about the documentary. The francophone press in Belgium overtly questioned the credibility of the historians who were interviewed in the documentary. With regard to the Congolese historian Elikia M'Bokolo, "La Libre Belgique" declared that he is not one of the experts on Belgian colonialism, and *parmi les autres intervenants, tous néerlandophones, figurent notamment le journaliste Marc Reynebeau ("Knack") ainsi qu'un missionnaire. Les spécialistes qui font le plus autorité sur notre passé africain, tels Ginette Kurgan (ULB) ou Jean-Luc Vellut (UCL), n'ont pas été rencontrés par l'équipe anglaise. On les entendra, en revanche, dans le débat qui suivra la diffusion* [among the other discussants, all of them Flemish speaking, are notably the journalist Marc Reynebeau ("Knack") as well as a missionary. The most renowned experts on our African past, like Ginette Kurgan (ULB) or Jean-Luc Vellut (UCL), were not contacted by the English team. We will hear them, in return, during the debate following the broadcast]²⁷. Another Brussels-based francophone newspaper, "Le Soir", was even more explicit in its paranoia and suggested that the fact that only Flemish historians took part in the documentary was part of a Flemish-nationalist plan to hit Leopold II and the royal family, and to undermine the Belgian union²⁸.

The Flemish press also questioned the credibility of the historians, but in quite the opposite way. The prevailing question was why Belgians did not know about this²⁹. Ironically, the journalist who was discarded by "La Libre Belgique", is the main proponent of the claim that Belgian historians failed to study the controversial aspects of colonial history. Already in January 2003 Marc Reynebeau, who is in fact a qualified historian, blamed Belgian historians for not paying attention³⁰, and he reiterates this charge unabatedly³¹. His statement is that all the controversial parts of Belgian colonial history have been studied by non-historians and/or non-Belgians, and this allegation has been picked up by others, either to demand that Belgian historians write their 'own' history³², or to minimize the credibility of the work by so-called "amateur-historians"³³. But is Reynebeau's statement correct? Without any doubt, it is at least partly true, but every half-truth is also a half lie. When we look at research by Belgian historians, we notice that a lot has been done already. The non-Belgian non-historians that Reynebeau seems to admire, draw almost all their facts from this research. However, it is a bitter reality that this research hardly reached the public: not through widely accessible and marketed books, not through education, not through the training of historians. Not only research, but also spreading the results is an academic responsibility, and in this respect Reynebeau and his adherents are right in blaming historians. In the remainder of this contribution, I shall give a short overview of the research that *has* been done by Belgian historians, and of the acute deficiencies that have to be remedied.

We already mentioned that after Congolese independence there was no chair in African history at any Belgian university. When, eventually, the Catholic University at Louvain-la-Neuve did establish an African chair, its consecutive holders, Louis Jadin and Jean-Luc Vellut, did an excellent job in making text editions, bibliographies, research guides, and the like³⁴. They thus enabled historical research by others, as is what one can expect from

the only chair available. Facilitating research and training researchers are, by the way, as important among the responsibilities of academic historians as conducting research properly. They conducted research, however, as well, and especially Vellut was prolific and influential with his work on the political economy of colonial Congo. He is not the kind of historian who looks for controversies, but he did not avoid contentious topics either. He did, amongst other things, write about violence in the Congo Free State³⁵, and Hochschild used Vellut's writings on colonial violence in his monograph.

When we take a closer look at Hochschild's *King Leopold's Ghost*, we notice that almost his entire work is based on research by Belgians, especially Jules Marchal, Daniel Vangroenweghe, Jan Vansina, and Jean Stengers. Stengers, professor at the *Université Libre de Bruxelles* [Free University Brussels], was an expert in, among other things, Belgian institutions and kings. He studied Leopold II's dealings with colonialism in general and with the Congo in particular; he furnished a wealth of information, but he believed he could and should avoid moral judgements³⁶.

Vansina is probably the world's most famous scholar in African history. He never hesitated to study controversial themes and to make controversial statements³⁷, but he is not always included in overviews of Belgian historians because he could not find an assignment at a Belgian university. According to Reynebeau, this is due to his controversial attitude³⁸. It is also amazing to see how many people consider Jan Vansina, who holds a Ph.D. in history and is professor emeritus of history and anthropology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, as anything but a historian: I have seen him labelled Africanist³⁹, ethnographer⁴⁰, anthropologist⁴¹, linguist⁴²... In the end, the Belgian historian Jan Vansina becomes a non-Belgian non-historian. One can wonder if this happens despite the fact that he does what one expects from a Belgian historian, or rather because what he does is not at all what one expects a Belgian historian to do.

Similar twists can be observed in the way Vangroenweghe is presented. He holds a Ph.D. in cultural anthropology and is guest professor in African history at Ghent University. He was the first Belgian scholar to study the Leopoldian rubber terror in depth⁴³. He is rarely considered a Belgian historian⁴⁴, but rather an anthropologist⁴⁵, non-historian⁴⁶, amateur-historian⁴⁷, teacher⁴⁸... Of course, Vangroenweghe *is* an anthropologist, but anthropology has its history. Throughout the colonial era African cultures and societies were the realm of anthropology. Anthropology and history share a colonial legacy of denying history to Africa, either by not including change and time in their research, or by not studying African cultures and societies altogether. When this "denial of coevalness" gradually lost – or loses – its allure, both disciplines became closely intertwined⁴⁹. Hence, it is not a coincidence that Vansina combines a chair in history and anthropology, and that the anthropologist Vangroenweghe lectures on African history.

Finally, Jules Marchal (under the pseudonym A.M. Delathuy), who has a degree in philology and made a diplomatic career, has less affinity with professional historiography than the other Belgian researchers of the history of the Congo Free State. As a consequence, he is often referred to as an "amateur-historian"⁵⁰. He was the most prolific

writer on Leopold's exploitation and the main source of information for Adam Hochschild⁵¹. In short, the allegation that Belgian historians avoid controversial topics is overstated, and that they avoid controversial statements is true for some but not for all.

However, there is some truth in the charge that historians do not live up to expectations. The main shortcoming, as far as their research attitude is concerned, lies in the assertion that what happened in the Congo under colonialism is African history and not Belgian history. The historians dealing with 19th- and 20th-century Belgian history, apart from Stengers, barely paid attention to what happened in the Belgian Congo. At the same time, and equally damaging, except in one Belgian University no historians of Africa were trained. It is distressing to notice that even the chair in African history at Louvain-la-Neuve was abolished when Vellut retired, and it is not yet clear if the recent establishment of African history at Ghent University will be enduring. However, the public debates of the past decade have prompted historians at least to realise that colonial history is part and parcel of Belgian, and not just of African history. Hence, colonial history is now better entrenched than the frail field of African history, which could turn out to be the drawback of recent evolutions.

Apart from the research situation, there remains a huge communication problem. Historians claim they already knew about Leopold's Congo, but they did not succeed or maybe did not even try to bring their findings to the public. The intermediate level of history teachers were not encouraged to utilise research findings either. Only recently are there clear signs of improvement, with reference material on the subject, seminars, and teaching ideas provided to history teachers. On the university front, however, the spur of the moment does not encourage communication with society at all, but rather forces scholars to climb up the ivory tower of global scholarship⁵². This is a huge societal problem, but alas not restricted to the field of African or colonial history.

CONCLUSION: THE MEMORIES OF CONGO

When the exhibition *The Memory of Congo: the Colonial Era* opened in February 2005, it caused a strong outburst of public debate, and it was at the same time a component of the festivities to celebrate the 175th anniversary of the Kingdom of the Belgians. This Belgian nationalist frame is in fact an age-old singularity of Belgian colonial history. It seems rather cynical to integrate colonial history in a celebration, and it is also ironic to view Belgian-nationalism at work in contrast to the accusations in the Belgian-franco-phone press one year before. All of this shows that colonial history has reached a stage at which it has become unavoidable in the Belgian public memories.

These memories, however, are full of dualities. Apart from the Belgian (sub)national duality, there is also a generational contrast, between those who studied colonial heroism and those who did not study colonial history at all. The current focus on cruelty entails a different effect on both groups. For the older generation, provided that they accept the historical record, this may be an adjustment of previous one-

sided ideas, for the younger generation this may create a new one-sidedness. Another contrast, between those who defend their personal colonial identity, and those who condemn colonialism, is aggravated by the focus on colonial crimes. As long as the former deny these crimes, no reasonable conversation is conceivable, but those who admit the criminal and oppressive foundations of (Belgian) colonialism, do have a point in asking consideration for their experiences and the presumed accomplishments of colonialism. They – and all of us – must be prepared, however, to discover the paternalistic, exploitative and oppressive singularities of both ‘their’ colonialism and ‘our’ capitalist world-system, both in the past and the present, both in Belgium and in the entire world. This brings us to a further duality: the one between Belgium and the Congo, between Belgians and Congolese. It is amazing how little Congolese (are allowed to) take part in the public debates about our common history. A blatant example of this duality was in the composition of the Parliamentary Commission to investigate the assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Belgian paternalism decided that no Congolese historian was able to be neutral in this matter... as if Belgians are. This clearly illustrates that Belgium still has not recognized the Congolese as equal partners.

A final duality is history itself. Whose history is history? Is it the history of professional historians with university assignments, or the history of so-called “amateur-historians”? Is it the history of sensational horror or the history of systems and structures? Is it history as researched or history as taught? Historians have urgent responsibilities, but these are not necessarily what the public or the media expect. Belgian – but also other – historians especially need to research how colonialism worked in every-day life, what mechanisms enabled excesses and control, and if this history is perhaps not past but still present. Belgian universities need to train historians in the field of African history, and need *not only* to research what the public asks or expects, but also what the public is not aware of or would prefer not to be confronted with. Moreover, historians in general have to address the public with their findings, especially when these are not concurrent with the mainstream of the day. Finally, the most urgent need of the moment is probably to oppose the hegemonic academic thought that scholars have to work for the benefit of their peers only, and not of society. The allegations against historians may be not completely accurate, but they are absolutely appropriate: if historians are not able to communicate their findings, they become meaningless. Accommodating to the current isolationist trend would hasten the end of history after all.

NOTES

- ¹ Another case in point was the debate following the publication of the monograph by L. De Witte, *De moord op Lumumba* [The assassination of Lumumba], Leuven 1999, a Belgian parliamentary research commission in 1999-2002, and a movie by R. Peck, *Lumumba*, 2001.
- ² D. Vangroenweghe, *Rood rubber: Leopold II en zijn Kongo*, Leuven 2004.
- ³ A. Hochschild, *De geest van koning Leopold II en de plundering van de Congo*, Amsterdam 1998.

- ⁴ The argumentation was exhibited on a bill board named *Genocide in the Congo?* in the section *Hierarchies* of the exhibition *Memory of Congo: the colonial era* at the RMCA in Tervuren. Also see: J.-L. Vellut, *Inleiding: Beelden van de koloniale tijd*, in *Het geheugen van Congo: de koloniale tijd*, Tervuren-Gent 2005, pp. 11-21; P. Marechal, *Kritische bedenkingen bij de controverses over Leopold II en Congo in de literatuur en de media*, in *Het geheugen van Congo: de koloniale tijd*, Tervuren-Gent 2005, pp. 43-49.
- ⁵ *De Congo-tentoonstelling in Tervuren liegt: Adam Hochschild over de strijd tegen de slavernij en hoe België met Congo omgaat*, "De Standaard", 1 October 2005.
- ⁶ *A un journaliste*, <http://www.urome.be/fr/journ.htm> [retrieved on 30 January 2006].
- ⁷ The definition of 'genocide' can be found in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, article 2, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm [retrieved on 30 January 2006].
- ⁸ One could argue that colonialism as a whole was based on racist grounds and hence that the brutal exploitation of the Congo was aimed against a racial group.
- ⁹ The title of the French translation is: *Les fantômes du roi Léopold II: Un holocauste oublié*, Paris 1998.
- ¹⁰ *Belgium exhumes its colonial demons: Historians vow to unearth truth about allegations of genocide in Congo*, "The Guardian", 13 July 2002.
- ¹¹ *Afrikamuseum wil hogere dotatie*, "De Standaard", 24 June 2004.
- ¹² E. Hobsbawm - T. Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge 1983; B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London 1983.
- ¹³ People who identify with Belgian colonialism are often former colonials, but not all former colonials continue to identify with colonialism. Some are really *former* colonials. When I write about '(former) colonials', I refer to the nostalgic ones who continue to identify with colonialism.
- ¹⁴ R. Coolsaet, *Adam Hochschild over het Congo van Leopold II: Een land waar de tien geboden niet gelden*, "De Standaard", 18 April 2000.
- ¹⁵ *Les petits Belges*, "De Morgen", 20 July 2005.
- ¹⁶ The 2005 exhibition of the RMCA mentioned the organised amnesia on the billboard '*Brutalities and acts of barbarism*' in the section *Transactions* of the exhibition *Memory of Congo: the colonial era* at the RMCA in Tervuren. Also scholars and journalist made reference to the Belgian amnesia in recent articles: A.T. Kongolo, *Colonial Memories in Belgian and Congolese Literature*, in C. Labio, *Belgian Memories*, "Yale French Studies", 102, 2002, pp. 79-93; M. Ewans, *Belgium and the Colonial Experience*, "Journal of Contemporary European Studies", 11, 2003, pp. 167-180; *Toen het nog onze Congo was: blank en zwart in Belgisch Congo*, "De Standaard", 2 June 2005.
- ¹⁷ It is remarkable that no Congolese historian was included. Jean Omasombo, the author of a biography of Patrice Lumumba, was a so-called ad hoc member but not a full member of the commission. He writes about his experience: *J'ai fait formellement partie de l'équipe avec le titre fort ambigu d'expert 'ad hoc' et/ou 'adjoint'. En ce qui me concerne [...] la raison de ce traitement particulier est qu'on estimait qu'en tant que congolais je ne pouvais être objectif. Ainsi bien qu' 'expert', il me sera fixé pour les quelques minutes que j'ai pu rencontrer les 'vrais experts' une 'méthodologie' faite surtout par des interdits: pas question de travailler avec le groupe et de 'toucher aux archives belges', ceci me dira-t-on afin de 'me protéger'! [...] Ce fut pour moi l'occasion de faire l'expérience d'être un Nègre, d'être perçu comme n'ayant pas de personnalité propre, par simple déterminisme biologique, représentant d'une région du monde et porte-parole de son opinion. J'ai pu vraiment ressentir combien était pesant le regard colonial encore bien présent dans les comportements* [I was officially part of the team with the ambiguous denomination of 'ad hoc' and/or 'deputy' expert. As far as I was concerned (...) the reason for this treatment was that they thought that I, as a Congolese, could not be neutral. Though I was 'expert', during the few moments I was permitted to meet the 'real experts' I was imposed a 'methodology' consisting above all of interdictions: I could not work with the group and I was not permitted to 'touch Belgian archives' in order to 'protect me', so

they said! (...) It was for me the occasion to feel being a Negro, being perceived as having no proper personality, because of biological determinism, representing a part of the world and being its spokesman. I really could feel how much the colonial view was still heavily present in the conduct], "Forum - Nieuwsbrief van de Belgische Vereniging van Afrikanisten / Bulletin de l'Association belge des africanistes", 22, 2002, pp. 11-12.

- ¹⁸ Another reason for the current revival of testimony efforts by (former) colonials is probably age. Books from the perspective of (former) colonials: P. Verlinden, *Weg uit Congo: het drama van de kolonialen*, Leuven 2002; UROME, *La colonisation belge: une grande aventure*, Bruxelles 2004; F. Ryon, *De laatste kolonialen: Vlamingen in de Congo 1950-1960*, Leuven 2005. Registration projects by (former) colonials: *Mémoires du Congo* (for Belgian francophone former colonials) and *Afrika Getuigenissen* (for Flemish former colonials). Two more scientific projects, including the registration of testimonies of (former) colonials, are conducted by SOMA-CEGES: *Het sociale geheugen van de Belgische koloniale / La mémoire sociale des coloniaux belges, 1945-1960*, and by the KULeuven under the auspices of the Flemish Government: *Afrika vertel(t)(d): de immateriële weerslag van het koloniale verleden in Vlaanderen*.
- ¹⁹ E. Said, *Orientalism*, Harmondsworth 1978; J. Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object*, New York 1983; J. Vansina, *Living with Africa: Reminiscences and Historiography*, Madison 1994.
- ²⁰ See, e.g., the reprimand by W. Blondeel, *De jongste Congo-opstoot: mag het ietsje meer zijn?*, "Forum - Nieuwsbrief van de Belgische Vereniging van Afrikanisten / Bulletin de l'Association belge des africanistes", 23, 2002, pp. 5-7.
- ²¹ In the programmes of the four main educational nets in Belgium (Catholic and community / Flemish and French), only the Flemish community net, the former state schools in Flanders, demands one hour in the entire school curriculum to be spent on *Het Belgische koloniale avontuur in Congo* [The Belgian colonial adventure in the Congo (italics by the author)] and another hour to deal with both the Balkan wars and colonial conflicts – combined. The other nets do not demand this one hour and a half, but then again, they do not incite these preposterous approaches and combinations either. To avoid misinterpretations, this does not mean that Congo is excluded from other nets in an absolute way, since the other nets only impose goals and allow their history teacher to choose their topics. But since the teachers are mostly not familiar with African or colonial history, the average will probably be not above the allotted time in the Flemish community schools.
- ²² *Un film sur Léopold II scandalise le Palais*, "Le Soir", 24 March 2004.
- ²³ *Afrikamuseum wil hogere dotatie*, "De Standaard", 24 June 2004.
- ²⁴ *Onderzoek naar koloniaal geweld in Congo*, "De Standaard", 15 July 2002.
- ²⁵ Interview: *Er wordt wat onzinnig verteld over Leopold II*, "De Standaard", 1 February 2005 [this interview was part of a supplement to the daily newspaper De Standaard, entirely dedicated to the exhibition].
- ²⁶ *Congo under King Leopold II*, <http://www.diplobel.org/uk/pages/news/newsletters/LeopoldII.pdf> [retrieved on 30 January 2006].
- ²⁷ Épinglé - *Ce qu'on verra ce soir*, "La Libre Belgique", 8 April 2004. At that time, Marc Reynebeau was no longer a journalist of "Knack" but of "De Standaard".
- ²⁸ *Un film sur Léopold II scandalise le Palais*, "Le Soir", 24 March 2004.
- ²⁹ *De blinde vlek Congo Vrijstaat: Waarom moet een Britse tv-maker België's duistere verleden uitspitten?*, "De Standaard", 1 April 2004.
- ³⁰ *Een detail van de geschiedenis: Schrijven over Congo's verleden: tussen polemieken en wetenschap*, "Knack", 29 January 2003.
- ³¹ *België vergeet zijn koloniale verleden*, "De Standaard", 30 March 2004; M. Reynebeau, *Het einde van de vriestijd*, "De Standaard", 7 February 2005.

- ³² K. Hemmerrechts, *Liefde voor het leven: het turbulente leven van een Belgische prinses*, "De Standaard der Letteren", 14 April 2005.
- ³³ Interview: *Er wordt wat onzin verteld over Leopold II*, "De Standaard", 1 February 2005.
- ³⁴ J.-L. Vellut, *Guide de l'étudiant en Histoire du Zaïre*, Kinshasa 1974; J.-L. Vellut - F. Loriaux - F. Morimont, *Bibliographie Historique du Zaïre à l'Époque Coloniale (1880-1960)*, Tervuren 1996.
- ³⁵ J.-L. Vellut, *La violence armée dans l'état indépendant du Congo: ténèbres et clarté dans l'histoire d'un état conquérant*, "Cultures et Développement", 16, 3-4, 1984, pp. 671-707; J.-L. Vellut - D. Vangroenweghe (eds.), *Le Rapport Casement*, Louvain-la-Neuve 1985.
- ³⁶ J. Stengers, *King Leopold's Imperialism*, in R. Owen - B. Sutcliffe (eds.), *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*, London 1972; J. Stengers, *Belgian Historiography since 1945*, in P.C. Emmer - H.L. Wesseling (eds.), *Reappraisals in Overseas History*, Leiden 1979; J. Stengers - J. Vansina, *King Leopold's Congo, 1886-1908*, in R. Oliver - G.N. Sanderson (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 6: From 1870 to 1905*, Cambridge 1985; J. Stengers, *Congo: Mythes et Réalités: 100 Ans d'Histoire*, Paris 1989. See also: J. Stengers, *Quelques réflexions sur le jugement moral en histoire*, "Académie Royale de Belgique - Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques", 58, 5, 1972 [1975], pp. 189-205.
- ³⁷ J. Vansina, *The Children of Woot: A History of the Kuba Peoples*, Madison 1978; Stengers et al., *King Leopold's* cit.; J. Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforest: Toward a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa*, Madison 1990.
- ³⁸ For a full account of Vansina's professional wanderings, see his memoirs: J. Vansina, *Living with Africa: Reminiscences and Historiography*, Madison 1994. In his memoirs, one can understand why I call him 'Flemish' rather than 'Belgian'.
- ³⁹ *Een detail van de geschiedenis: Schrijven over Congo's verleden: tussen polemieck en wetenschap*, "Knack", 29 January 2003; M. Reynebeau, *Het einde van de vriestijd*, "De Standaard", 7 February 2005; *De Congo-tentoonstelling in Tervuren liegt: Adam Hochschild over de strijd tegen de slavernij en hoe België met Congo omgaat*, "De Standaard", 1 October 2005.
- ⁴⁰ L. De Witte, *De rush naar Congo*, "De Standaard", 9 February 2005.
- ⁴¹ P. Verlinden, *Rwanda / Burundi: mensen - politiek - economie - cultuur*, Brussels 1996, p. 7.
- ⁴² Verlinden, *Rwanda* cit., p. 59.
- ⁴³ Vangroenweghe, *Rood* cit.; Vellut e.a., *Le Rapport* cit.; D. Vangroenweghe, *Voor rubber en ivoor: Leopold II en de ophanging van Stokes*, Leuven 2005.
- ⁴⁴ *Een Afrikaanse holocaust?*, "De Standaard", 1 February 2005.
- ⁴⁵ *Een detail van de geschiedenis: Schrijven over Congo's verleden: tussen polemieck en wetenschap*, "Knack", 29 January 2003; *Een Afrikaanse holocaust?*, "De Standaard", 1 February 2005.
- ⁴⁶ Marc Reynebeau, *Het einde van de vriestijd*, "De Standaard", 7 February 2005.
- ⁴⁷ Interview: „*Er wordt wat onzin verteld over Leopold II*“, "De Standaard", 1 February 2005.
- ⁴⁸ Ludo De Witte, *De rush naar Congo*, "De Standaard", 9 February 2005.
- ⁴⁹ Fabian, *Time* cit. Also see Said, *Orientalism* cit. and Vansina, *Living* cit.
- ⁵⁰ Interview: „*Er wordt wat onzin verteld over Leopold II*“, "De Standaard", 1 February 2005.
- ⁵¹ A.M. Delathuy, *E.D. Morel tegen Leopold II en de Kongostaat*, Berchem 1985; A.M. Delathuy, *De geheime documentatie van de Onderzoekscmissie in de Kongostaat*, Berchem 1988; A.M. Delathuy, *De Kongostaat van Leopold II, 1876-1900: het verloren paradys*, Antwerp 1989.
- ⁵² Jan Blommaert, *Kennis boven nostalgie*, "De Standaard", 11 February 2005.

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Regional History without a Region: the Peculiar Case of Post-1945 West German Historical Research into Former German Territories in the East

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ABSTRACT

This chapter focuses on the deep post-1945 break in German regional history devoted to the Reich's Eastern provinces and to those areas of Eastern Europe settled by ethnic Germans. Almost all institutions for regional history in that region vanished between autumn 1944 and spring 1945. The chapter reviews the attempts made to continue historical research into the lost German territories as a peculiar case of scholarship. The first organizations of *Ostforschung* [Eastern Research] were a deliberate continuation of like-minded institutions of the interwar period. From the late 1940s they were producing publications designed to tell the young about German cultural and economic achievements in the East. The Herder Institute functioned as an umbrella institution for a body of re-founded Historical Commissions which devoted themselves to the former German Eastern territories. The *Ostforscher* were more concerned with establishing a new institutional base than with clarifying their role during the Nazi years. A critical West German literature on *Ostforschung* developed only in the late 1960s. The policy of détente of the late 1960s and 1970s posed a threat to the institutional structure of *Ostforschung*. After Germany's reunification in 1990, there was a new interest in the history of the former German East. However, the process of abandoning the traditional Germanocentric perspective was irresistible. The abolition of the century-old German-Polish juxtaposition seems to allow a historiographical perspective free from political subtexts. The research agenda in the new millennium is the history of encounters, contacts and relations between peoples and cultures in the vast areas of Eastern and East-Central Europe.


Das Jahr der endgültigen Niederlage Hitler-Deutschlands 1945 bedeutete für die deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas einen zweifachen und deshalb umso radikaleren Bruch.

Zum einen wurden etwa 12 bis 14 Millionen Deutsche aus Osteuropa vertrieben; sie fanden nach einigen Anlaufschwierigkeiten in Westdeutschland, der DDR und in Österreich eine neue Heimat. Zum anderen bedeutete diese auf der Konferenz der alliierten Sieger in Potsdam im Sommer 1945 sanktionierte Vertreibung das definitive Aus für die reiche regionalgeschichtliche Forschung, die bis 1945 in den Ostprovinzen des Deutschen Reiches sowie in den von Deutschen besiedelten Regionen Ost- und Südosteuropas von Universitäten, Archiven und privaten Geschichtsvereinen betrieben worden war.

Diese diversifizierte Landschaft regionalgeschichtlicher Forschung für Ost- und Westpreußen, Pommern, Schlesien, das Baltikum, Böhmen und Mähren sowie Südosteuropa war im Sommer 1945 definitiv, wie es schien, untergegangen. Nur ganz wenige Quellen und Bibliotheken konnten aus jenen nun sowjetisch beherrschten Regionen nach Westen transferiert werden, so dass ein Wiederaufleben der Ostforschung auf beträchtliche, bis heute virulente Schwierigkeiten stieß. Dennoch gelang es der Ostforschung, sich binnen weniger Jahre in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland institutionell und personell neu zu konstituieren und für heutige Begriffe gewaltige Förderungssummen aus dem westdeutschen Steuertopf zu erhalten. Nur ganz wenige bis 1945 mit dem Thema Ostforschung befasste Wissenschaftler fielen wegen ihrer zu offenkundigen Affinität zum NS-Regime und dessen mörderischer Ostpolitik durch den Rost, den meisten schadete ihre Beitragstäterschaft kaum. Um 1950 war wiederum ein rudimentäres Netz der Ostforschung in der BRD etabliert; personell und thematisch-methodisch knüpfte es an die stark von der Volksgeschichte beeinflussten Konzepte der Zwischenkriegszeit an. Nach wie vor stand der deutsche kulturbringende Einfluss auf Osteuropa im Vordergrund. Diese Argumentation sollte unter den veränderten Rahmenbedingungen dazu dienen, mit historischen Argumenten den (west-)deutschen Anspruch auf die de jure noch nicht endgültig verlorenen Ostgebiete zu untermauern. Einen ganz ähnlichen Anspruch verfolgten die Landsmannschaften der Heimatvertriebenen, die mit den einschlägigen Forschungseinrichtungen eng kooperierten, wie überhaupt die erste Generation der Ostforscher nach 1945 selbst aus dem ehemals deutschen Osten stammte.

War so die teils nostalgischen Zielen dienende Revitalisierung der Ostforschung in den 1950er Jahren in der BRD weitgehend gelungen, so geriet diese Forschungsrichtung in den 1960er und noch mehr in den 70er Jahren im Zuge der sozialliberalen ‚Neuen Ostpolitik‘ in eine tiefe Krise. Revisionspolitische Argumente zur Untermauerung der deutschen Ansprüche auf die verlorenen, nun de facto abgeschriebenen Ostgebiete waren nicht länger gefragt. Hoch im Kurs standen vielmehr politik- und sozialwissenschaftliche, politisch unmittelbar verwertbare Analysen des sowjetischen Machtbereichs, welche die traditionelle Ostforschung kaum zu liefern vermochte.

In den 1970er Jahren brach sich zudem eine kritische Sicht auf die braunen Traditionen der Ostforschung Bahn, welche das Fach zeitweilig insgesamt in Zweifel zog. Die der Neuen Ostpolitik verpflichteten Bundesregierungen ließen das Fach evaluieren und damit zur Disposition stellen, es kam jedoch zu keinen Institutsschließungen. Erst in den 1990er



Map 10
The Oder-Neisse Line and Germany's postwar territorial losses.

Jahren machte sich eine von den Landsmannschaften unabhängige Disziplin bemerkbar, die Osteuropa nicht länger als einstige Projektionsfläche deutschen Einflusses, sondern als eigenständigen Forschungsgegenstand wahrnahm und die Rolle der slawischen Bevölkerung angemessen würdigte. Zugleich kam es zu einem teils touristisch, teils nostalgisch inspirierten Wiederaufleben der Suche nach den verbliebenen deutschen Spuren im Osten des Kontinents, die gegenwärtig freilich im Sinne eines gesamteuropäischen Erbes und als (konfliktreiche) Beziehungsgeschichte verstanden werden.

INTRODUCTION


In 2008 a commercial (not a scientific!) publishing house located in the Polish capital of Warsaw published an updated street map of Poland together with an amazing appendix. The addition, printed in German, displays, in a literal translation, the 'historical borders of the Greater German Empire [sic!] and of the Free City of Danzig' as they existed in 1939; a further addition is an index of German and Polish topographic names in Poland. Apparently the map's aim is to facilitate the trip planning of German tourists making their way into Poland. Some 60 years ago, ethnic Germans who at that time lived in what is today Poland moved in the opposite direction, desperately fleeing westward from their home towns¹.

1945, the year of Germany's final defeat in World War II, marked a deep break in German regional history devoted to the Reich's Eastern provinces (mainly East and West Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia) and to those areas of Eastern and East-Central Europe like Bohemia, Moravia and the Baltic states settled (partly or exclusively) by ethnic Germans. Prior to 1945, this part of Europe had enjoyed a rich and diversified landscape of historical research conducted by German academic historians as well as by non-academic amateurs. Many of the institutions promoting this research – often private associations – looked back to their own history of 100 or more years.

Since 1945, specific ethnic German communities attached to certain regions of Eastern Europe have ceased to exist. These populations have now found themselves scattered over the whole of Germany, both over West Germany and East Germany (and partly also over Austria), and have there been integrated into local society. Recent accounts reckon that 12 to 14 million people, were expelled: 1,5 to 2 million of them died during their flight. In this arduous and painful process they felt doubly afflicted: by total defeat as did all Germans at that time and, in addition, by the loss of their homes. The contribution of these expellees to the reconstruction of Germany counts, undoubtedly, among their greatest achievements and is, consequently, highly appreciated. However, many had understandable difficulties in accepting their fate. This makes it all the more necessary, therefore, to recognize that in the long run they did not become an institutionalized source of instability and thirst for revenge in – for example – a Palestinian manner. The majority of the expellees sooner or later came to accept their new homes, familiarized themselves with their new environment and settled down².

Remembrance of their common past in the East was vivid for decades. Attempts made by the expellees to perpetuate memories of their lost home met with tremendous difficulties. National affirmation of the victorious nations included not only the physical removal of the Germans and their artefacts but also the removal of their historical presence through the establishment of a new – non-German – collective memory. As Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Yugoslavs and others struggled to create a new national present and future for their countries, they also sought to rewrite the past they had shared with the Germans of their respective areas. These accompanied the appropriation of shared and sometimes wholly German public cultural and historical spaces as well as a reinterpretation of the German role in the history of those regions. In the end, perhaps fittingly, physical evidence of a shared past could be found primarily in the language of headstone inscriptions and monuments which fell increasingly into disrepair³.

It is the aim of this chapter to review attempts made after 1945 to continue historical research into the lost German regions – a peculiar case of scholarship which deserves attention. The chapter will focus on Eastern Europe proper, i.e. Poland and the western parts of the USSR, mainly the Baltic area. Although regional history dealing with the Sudetenland and South-Eastern Europe followed a parallel path, these regions which had been a part of the Habsburg, not the German, Empire prior to 1918 are not dealt with here⁴.



Map 11
Germany's territorial changes from 1914 to 1990.

Initially, the victorious Allies had in 1946 prohibited any attempts by the expellees to organize themselves, but this ban was lifted in 1948 in the Western zones of occupation. The years 1947-49 are filled in Western Germany with the founding of *Landsmannschaften* [territorial associations] and other organisations associating German refugees and expellees⁵. Around 1950, the various local branches of the East Germans in the new Federal Republic of Germany fused into the *Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten* [Association of the Expellees and Disenfranchised]. In the same year they published a Charter which – surprisingly – claimed to be against revenge and retribution for what they had experienced by way of unjust treatment. Although, initially, there was a broad consensus in Western Germany that the forceful expulsion of Eastern Germans from their home provinces had been unjust and that, sooner or later, Germany should be restored to its 1937 borders, the Bonn government of Konrad Adenauer

(chancellor 1949-1963) pursued two somewhat contradictory targets concurrently: to integrate the refugees and also to support their political/revisionist claims. For this latter goal, history seemed of the utmost importance.

Surprisingly, unlike the heated debates of the interwar years, interactions after 1945 with Polish historiography had little importance for West German historians. Thus, the gap between the expanding Polish regional historiography and its West German counterpart widened as historians in the Federal Republic still held fast to the analysis of Eastern history exclusively as a part of a wider German history. By proceeding in that manner, they deliberately ignored or at least downplayed the fact that, while German settlement in that area dated from the Middle Ages, German state rule there was a more recent phenomenon. Prussia, the core of the German Empire founded in 1871, had for centuries been a tiny and weak duchy, more or less under the tutelage of the much more powerful Polish-Lithuanian state. It was not until the partitions of Poland between 1772 and 1795 that Prussia, alongside Austria and Russia, gained control of large territories in East Central Europe.

No significant contribution came from historians of the other German state, the German Democratic Republic (GDR): they could not deny that East Prussia, not to speak of Pomerania which was after 1945 divided between Poland and the GDR, had been German before the War and part of a wider German state. Any mention of this fact, even within a strictly scientific frame, would have posed an obvious threat to socialist solidarity with Poland and the USSR, and this precluded GDR historians from exploring this interpretation. They simply – with very few exceptions – did not choose to research issues connected to the former German provinces in the East. A large number of German expellees also settled in the GDR but for evident political reasons they were not allowed to form any associations similar to their West German counterparts. For the GDR, at least as far as its official position was concerned, the new border with Poland, the Oder-Neiße line, was a just ‘border of peace’⁶.

A few sentences must suffice to outline the position of the third German-speaking state, Austria. This country, incorporated into the Third Reich in March 1938, hosted a large number of refugees after 1945, mainly from the Sudetenland and South-east Europe. Primarily concerned with presenting itself as Hitler’s ‘first victim’ and with ending the Allied occupation (which happened only in 1955), Austria’s government and public had little reason to tackle the issue of expellees. The question of whether the Sudetenland should join the Austrian Republic had been intensively discussed – and settled once and for all – after World War I. A renewed dispute over this delicate matter was, in the Austrian view, the more undesirable as it seemed likely to compromise the country’s official position, which was to maintain the pre-war borders. Defending the southern frontier against Yugoslavian demands for a border revision, Vienna could not spark off or even participate in a general questioning of the 1919 territorial settlement. For these reasons, the climate for organizing associations of the expelled was much less favourable

in Austria than it was in West Germany. In the latter, there was no Soviet occupation force, as was there in Austria. As to the historians, Austrian scholars had traditionally done research on the history of the Habsburg Empire. For them, the German Reich's lost provinces were no matter of concern nor interest; this was and still is a region totally alien to them. However, one concession was made to the powerful West German neighbour: until the late 1970s, as this author remembers from his own experience as a pupil, official maps used in Austrian public schools displayed Germany's 1937 borders and described the Eastern part of the former Reich as being temporarily "under Polish administration".

THE VIEW FROM POLAND

Statements made even during World War II leave no doubt that in the framework of Polish historical thinking it was of the utmost importance to find historical justifications for Poland's new Western border. As soon as the Red Army had advanced into what were then still the Third Reich's Eastern provinces, Polish historical institutions were founded or their interwar predecessors were revived. At the end of 1944, for example, the *Instytut Zachodni* [Western Institute] was established at Poznań/Posen. It was given the task of coordinating all research dealing with Poland's new territories and was thereby expected to smooth their political integration into the Polish state⁷. Within a surprisingly short period, the Institute started to publish a series of books entitled "The Provinces of Old Poland" emphasizing the alleged Polish traditions of the newly-acquired regions. As far as former East and West Prussia are concerned, this overall endeavour was supported by the University of Toruń/Thorn, founded in January 1946. As is obvious, at this early date after the war Polish historiography – now focusing on what had hitherto been Germany's East – possessed a much broader institutional basis than its German counterpart. No wonder that a meeting under the programmatic title "First All-Polish Assembly of Historians of Pomerania and Prussia" took place as early as February 1947⁸. Surprisingly, the old German names for the regions concerned were still officially used. At that time, Polish historiography had not yet been streamlined according to Marxist doctrines. In asserting the Polish character of the new provinces, ideology was of little, if any, significance.

From the middle of the 1950s onward, however, the *Instytut Zachodni*, apart from continuing research into Poland's Western parts, focused on both German states, primarily targeting what Polish historians perceived as revisionist tendencies in the Federal Republic⁹. Political motives also played a role in the establishment in 1953 of the so-called "Working Department for the History of Pomerania" as a branch of the Polish Academy of Science: it was located in Poznań/Posen. From the 1950s these institutes also had to fulfil the task of fostering some idea of the history and culture of the new provinces among those Poles who had been resettled in those areas from former Eastern Poland, now part of the Soviet Union¹⁰.

Taking into account these political circumstances, it is no wonder that a more nuanced debate about issues of regional history failed to develop in Poland prior to the 1960s. Institutes of regional history were enlarged or new ones were founded, as was the case with the specific institutes in Toruń/Thorn and Olsztyn/Allenstein¹¹. As a rule, they all published scientific journals devoted to the regional history of the former German territories. From 1972 onwards, they also engaged in a surprisingly liberal dialogue with West German historians, the basis of which was a bilateral commission for the revision of school history books¹².

A NEW START FOR *OSTFORSCHUNG*?

With millions of ethnic German refugees and expellees from Eastern Europe looking for a new home mainly in the Federal Republic of Germany (and, to a lesser extent, in Austria), their integration into these states was of the utmost importance. Apart from practical tasks like finding housing and jobs for the migrants, there was some awareness of the need to preserve their cultural heritage which now, as it seemed, had lost its geographical basis. On the one hand, such measures of preservation aimed at allowing the expelled to maintain their specific 'tribal' identities as Eastern Prussians, Silesians, Pomeranians and so on so as to smooth their integration into their new home countries. In that respect there existed a powerful coalition comprising the expellees' associations, the *Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten*, and the Federal Ministry for the Expelled for which the displaced Eastern Germans provided a disproportionate number of high-ranking officials. Representing millions of voters, the expelled had a strong say in formulating West Germany's cultural policy.

On the other hand, a strong scientific desire to rescue as much as possible from a quickly shrinking cultural heritage can be observed. This led, for example, to the creation of a specific sub-discipline within *Volkskunde* [ethnology], which found clear expression in the title of its journal (launched in 1955), "Jahrbuch für Volkskunde der Heimatvertriebenen" [Yearbook for Ethnology of the Expelled]. In 1949, the re-founded West German umbrella association for *Volkskunde* stressed the need to conduct intensive research on the issue of the expelled as quickly as possible and in 1951 established a *Zentralstelle* [central agency] for the Ethnology of the Expelled. Its main task was to advise on the collection of all kinds of material as well as spiritual heritage of the Eastern Germans: artefacts, literature, dialects, folk music, clothing and so on¹³.

Between 1944 and 1949, however, almost no historical publications of German historians dealing with the former German East can be traced. It was not until 1949 that the book *Ostwärts der Oder-Neiße-Linie* [Eastwards of the Oder-Neiße line], edited by Peter-Heinz Seraphim, Reinhart Maurach and Gerhart Wittram, appeared¹⁴. Even more important was the well-known fact that all institutions for regional history in that region, based mainly on universities, archives and historical associations, had perished between autumn 1944 and spring 1945. In many cases, the historical sources and specialist

libraries were lost, too, as they could not be evacuated to the West. This break was only a small and, as it seems, less significant part of a much broader process, i.e. the flight and the expulsion of Eastern Germans to the West. Even less well-known is the fact that the lacuna in the German-dominated regional history of some areas of Eastern Europe had commenced earlier, namely following the ominous Hitler-Stalin Pact of August 1939, according to which ethnic Germans from the USSR and from those territories now within the Soviet sphere of influence were swiftly resettled to the Reich proper or to German-occupied parts of the now-defeated Poland. As far as the Baltic states (annexed by the USSR in spring 1940) were concerned, this resettlement of Germans, as it was euphemistically called, spelled the end of the *Herder-Institut* in Riga and the *Institut für Heimatforschung* [Institute for research into local history] at Tartu/Dorpat in Estonia, to name but a few. It further resulted in the loss or the dissolution of large libraries (like those in Riga, Tartu and Tallinn/Reval) and archival repositories¹⁵.

It took some time until the gap could, at least partly, be filled again. At the end of 1949, the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde* [German Society for East European Scholarship] was re-founded and commenced publishing the journal “Osteuropa” in 1951¹⁶. The Historical Commission for East and West Prussian Regional Research (originally founded in 1923) resumed its activities in 1950, without being able to regain its former importance¹⁷. In 1951 it was followed by the Historical Commission for Silesia (founded in 1921) and the *Osteuropa-Institut* at the Free University of (West-)Berlin. The latter published the annual publication “Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte” [Research on East European History] from 1954. The Munich-based *Osteuropa-Institut*, the successor to a similar institution in the Silesian capital of Breslau, came into existence in 1952; its yearbook was the “Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas (Neue Folge)” [Yearbooks for the History of Eastern Europe (New Series)], started in the same year. In 1956, the Historical Association for the Ermland (a part of East Prussia) was also re-founded and started to publish its traditional journal anew.

Professional historians, however, often chose another path for themselves. Among the historians of the erstwhile East Prussian Albertus-University of Königsberg – a city renamed Kaliningrad and since 1945 part of the USSR – only Erich Maschke continued to write about East and West Prussian history. He did so, of course, from his new residence in West Germany. Almost all of his former colleagues, however, selected new topics for their continuing careers in the Federal Republic of Germany (and, seldom, in the GDR). It was mainly the archivists who guaranteed continuity, supported by those few academics who prior to 1945 had been closely connected with the regional archives of Königsberg and Danzig/Gdansk (e.g. Erich Keyser and Walther Hubatsch)¹⁸.

1945, it should be clear, was therefore a break, but not a total one. As time passed, serious attempts were made to revive what had been *Ostforschung* [Eastern Research] before the end of the war¹⁹. The first significant step towards reorganizing *Ostforschung* was the 1946 foundation of the *Göttinger Arbeitskreis* [Göttingen Work Group], ini-

tially headed by Joachim Freiherr von Braun. The original *Arbeitskreis* comprised a group of historians, geographers and anthropologists including Max Hildebert Boehm, Gunther Ipsen, Walther Hubatsch, Werner Markert, Theodor Oberländer and Theodor Schieder who had fled from the University of Königsberg²⁰. As the rescued Königsberg city archive was later transferred to Göttingen, prevailed comparatively favourable conditions for re-establishing the Königsberg-style *Ostforschung*²¹. Since 1951, the *Arbeitskreis* was partially identical with the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Osteuropaforschung* [Study Group for East European Research], with Markert as its leading figure. When in 1953 Markert became a full professor at Tübingen University, the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft* moved with him. Loosely attached to Tübingen University, its funding came from the Federal Ministry of the Interior starting at 120,000 DM annually²².

By publishing popular as well as scientific accounts of Germany's lost provinces and by stressing revisionist aims, the *Arbeitskreis* was a deliberate continuation of like-minded institutions of the interwar period. It is not by chance that the establishment of the *Arbeitskreis* was prompted by the need to produce an expert report, entitled "The Significance and Indispensability of East Prussia for Germany". Ironically, the Western Allies had asked the nascent West German authorities for such a report in order to make use of it at the Moscow conference of foreign ministers in April 1947. It must be noted that at that time neither West nor East Germany (the Western and the Soviet zones of occupation, to be more precise) had a common border with what had been East Prussia up to 1945. For the historians assembled in the *Arbeitskreis*, however, the Allied demand provided a welcome opportunity to stress Germany's judicial claims to its Eastern territories which were now under Polish and Soviet administration. No wonder that the task of justifying such claims ranked prominently among the duties of the *Arbeitskreis*²³. In that regard, there were striking similarities to revisionist endeavours of the interwar years aimed at setting aside the 1919 Versailles Treaty²⁴. The Federal Ministry for Overall German Affairs supported the *Arbeitskreis* to the princely tune of 90,000 DM per year. The Foreign Ministry at Bonn frequently commissioned and funded publications which justified Germany's claims to its lost territories. This ministerial sponsorship, however, was cautiously concealed from the public²⁵.

From the late 1940s the *Arbeitskreis* produced publications designed to inform the young about German cultural and economic achievements in the East, which was described as an integral part of Europe. In addition, various information sheets targeted at the Press and interested individuals in both Americas were circulated. Interest in South America was particularly strong, since a separate Buenos Aires edition of this *Pressedienst der Heimatvertriebenen* [Press Service of the Expelled] was produced for sympathisers residing in Chile and Argentina. Hans Mortensen, Theodor Oberländer and Ernst Vollert were on the steering committee.

It was from this background that a marked proliferation of research institutes surfaced in the Federal Republic from the early 1950s onwards: the Johann Gottfried Herder

Institute in Marburg an der Lahn (founded 1950); the *Norddeutsche Akademie* in Lüneburg (1951); the *Osteuropa-Institut*; the *Südost-Institut* (both founded in Munich in 1952); and umbrella organisations like the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde* in Stuttgart (1948); the *Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft* in Munich (1953) and the *Ostkolleg der Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst* in Cologne (1957).

The activities of the *Ostforscher* had clearly established a new institutional base in the Federal Republic of Germany. Although the Western occupying authorities were not initially well-disposed to the activities of the work groups and even banned Götze von Selle's manuscript "Deutsches Geistesleben in Ostpreussen" [German spiritual life in East Prussia], this does not seem to have obstructed the work of this self-proclaimed community of the like-minded. There were also six chairs of East European history, two chairs in Kiel for *Ostkunde* and six specialist institutes attached to the universities of Giessen, Mainz, Münster, Munich, Tübingen and Wilhelmshaven as well as the *Osteuropa-Institut* at the Free University of Berlin (founded in 1951).

By the early 1950s the *Ostforscher* were congratulating themselves upon having survived the difficult times of the recent past. In 1953, the *Bundestag*, the West German Parliament, resolved to promote the study of East and South-east European affairs at all levels – not only history – in the West German educational system. The following year, a committee consisting of representatives from the cultural department of the Ministry of the Interior, the ministers of culture of the *Länder* and the rectors of the universities was formed to suggest ways of allocating funds²⁶.

The driving force behind the revival of *Ostforschung* in general and the creation of the Herder Institute and the Herder *Forschungsrat* [Research Council] in spring 1950 in particular was the historian Hermann Aubin (1885-1969)²⁷. The 1948 currency reform, and the imminent creation of federal authorities, provided a window of opportunity for the institutional revival of *Ostforschung*. The structures adopted were explicitly modelled upon those of the past: conferences of interested scholars, a central institutional apparatus and a journal, the "Zeitschrift für Ostforschung" (launched in 1952). Aubin, Erich Keyser and Johannes Papritz were prominent in the *Forschungsrat* which met half-yearly to coordinate research.

The name of the institute, as compared with its nominal tasks, was striking: many of the institute's leading figures stood in sharp contrast to Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) because of the latter's Slavophil attitudes and his criticism of medieval German *Ostkolonisation*²⁸. The Herder Institute functioned as an umbrella institution for a body of re-founded Historical Commissions which devoted themselves to the former German Eastern territories as well as to those ethnic Germans who had, prior to 1945, lived outside Germany's borders and were expelled from their homes in the wake of the Red Army's advance. In the middle of the 1950s, such Historical Commissions existed for Silesia, East and West Prussia, Pomerania, the Baltic region, the Sudetenland, and

others²⁹. From that time on, those interested in the topic within the Federal Republic might observe that, to name just one example, annual conferences of 'Baltic Historians' were held at Göttingen! Baltic history researched in the Federal Republic remained a domain of Baltic Germans. No wonder that key books published on the issue dealt with the German minority in the Baltic region; the main reference book was a biographical encyclopaedia of Baltic Germans³⁰.

COMMUNIST CRITICS

During the first decades of the postwar period, a critical perspective on the relationship between *Ostforschung* and Hitler's regime had been rather slow to develop. Following Germany's military defeat, the *Ostforscher* were more concerned with establishing a new institutional base in totally altered political circumstances than with clarifying their own role during the Nazi years. Ironically enough, when in the mid-1950s criticism did ensue, the source of this criticism enabled the *Ostforscher* to postpone self-reflection. Their critics from across the inner-German divide were, as it appeared to them, enemies of Western freedom and tools of GDR or Polish political interests. No wonder then that the substance of the criticism from the East went unanswered. True, both sides shared the view that a serious scientific dialogue with their counterparts was impossible, whether because, from the Western side, of their opponents' attachment to Marxism or because, from the other, of addiction to Nationalism or to Imperialism and Militarism³¹.

From the middle of the 1950s the *Ostforscher* were refracted through two mutually antagonistic literatures. Their own was compounded of nostalgia, and old animosities refashioned for a global Cold War setting. GDR critics on the other side of the Iron Curtain sought to represent the *Ostforscher* as ideological bedfellows of a demonic succession running from Wilhelmine Imperialism, via the Nazis, to the so-called military-clerical dictators in Bonn³². In GDR opinion, the *Ostforscher* simply researched whatever target of Imperialism and expansion came next.

It was inevitable that the *Ostforscher* should have become the specific target of assaults from GDR scholars. Case studies of particular prominent individuals like Aubin and Theodor Oberländer accompanied attempts to discredit specific research institutes as alleged centres of subversion and espionage³³. By studying this subject, Communist scholars and propagandists hoped to clarify what were for them the historical roots of contemporary West German *Ostpolitik* and to discover valuable analogies between past and present. Around 1960 they produced a study of institutions concerned with *Ostforschung* in the Federal Republic and posed the question as to why there was no longer a global *Westforschung* devoted to, let us say, Britain and France, or *Südforschung* covering Italy, Spain and Portugal. GDR historians noted correctly that the former pre-1945 *Westforschung* which had focused on the 'Germanic' heritage of Germany's West-

ern neighbours (Belgium, the Netherlands and France) had faded away in the foreign policy climate of the 1950s with the Federal Republic now involved in a process of full integration into the Western bloc. Unlike its Western counterpart, *Ostforschung* was still (or again) very active after 1945. The overt political objectives of GDR critics – and GDR historians made no secret of them – should not obscure the striking continuities in institutions and personnel between pre- and postwar *Ostforschung*.

THE COLD WAR CONTEXT

In 1952 Hermann Aubin and ‘the band of the unbroken’ issued a new journal entitled “*Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*”³⁴. The language and images were curiously familiar, simply worked into a Cold War context. With considerable monotony, Aubin repeated the same metaphors and notions of German cultural superiority, and had the same recourse to ‘blood’ as a causal agent, in numerous publications on the history of Silesia, a former part of Germany which Aubin used to describe as the exit gate for the teutonic being to the East³⁵. Aubin stressed the continuity of German settlement in Eastern Europe despite the Germanic migrations; the inability of the Slavs to form coherent states; the existence of a West/East cultural watershed and the historic mission of the Germans to civilise the sub-Germanic zone. He then built a bridge to the present: he urged the members of the Herder Institute to defend “what is under attack from abroad: the claim of Germandom on its Eastern territories”³⁶. Having assumed the role of a Cold War warrior, Aubin sallied forth in defence of freedom.

In 1952 Aubin’s colleague Keyser outlined the objectives of what he called the new German *Ostforschung*. Necessity and a sense of duty had impelled him and his like-minded colleagues to begin anew after the 1945 catastrophe. The German people were, according to Keyser, duty-bound to study some 700 years of German history in the East. The decisions made at the Allied summits of Yalta and Potsdam in 1945, Keyser argued, reflected an ignorance of German history. Narrow chauvinism was to be replaced by a sense of a European community to which the peoples of the East also belonged. This meant in practical terms that the Germans had brought Christianity, cultural improvement, political order and economic progress to the East, somehow, as he admitted, in collaboration with other nations. Keyser’s timid internationalising of traditional German chauvinism barely concealed the striking legacy from the past³⁷. A moderate change in terms – from Eastern Germany to East-Central Europe – meant little; Europe as a geographical and historical space was more or less explicitly confined to Germany and the peoples of the so-called ‘West’³⁸.

A Western community of interest, juxtaposed against an undefined (but surely now Communist) East, was apparent in much of the historical work produced by the *Ostforscher* during the 1950s³⁹. To anyone familiar with what the same men had written only a couple of years before, these efforts to revise the past in terms of a trans-national

community of interest are – to say the least – unconvincing. But these lines of interpretation were in full harmony with the views of the Federal authorities. The state of affairs at the time, i.e. the division of Europe and the loss of Germany's provinces in the East, according to the Federal German Minister for Overall German affairs, was not a German, not a Polish, not even a Russian, but rather a Bolshevik solution. Keyser, Aubin and the historians collaborating with them laboured to demonstrate that the historical German expansion eastwards was carried out on behalf of the nascent 'West'. All this was presented in a highly aggressive tone, which again proves that the almost hysterical reactions in the GDR and Poland to this type of statement had some basis in fact⁴⁰. No doubt, a curious intermingling of *völkisch* historiography and an ideology of Western culture is apparent in the writings of Aubin, Keyser and others.

RESEARCH INTERESTS OF THE 1950S

Aubin and his like-minded colleagues relied partly upon the pre-1945 understanding of *Volksgeschichte*, a discipline that can now be described as ethnology. Research into the German or Prussian state's institutions in the East, from the time of the Teutonic Knights to modernity, also had top priority⁴¹. From this perspective the main topics of interest for historiography of the East automatically followed: the history of the Duchy of Prussia and the Hohenzollern administration. During the 1950s and 1960s, some new surveys of, for example, East and West Prussian history were published, accompanied by the 1955 handbook "Die Ostgebiete des Deutschen Reiches" [The Eastern Regions of the German Empire]⁴². They followed old patterns of argument and more or less openly expressed revisionist claims. For decades, those publications of the early postwar period remained in wide circulation. Bruno Schumacher's "History of East and West Prussia", first published in 1937 (!), had seen no less than six, albeit revised, editions by 1987 and was reprinted for the last time in 2002⁴³.

Apart from those few surveys, the production of handbooks and maps stood in the foreground, e.g. the *Historisch-Geographischer Atlas* of the Prussian Lands which started to appear in 1968. There was, it is true, a long tradition of publishing valuable manuals like Eastern European maps, indexes of place names and so on which continues up to this day. Many of these endeavours were funded and supervised by the still existing *Kulturstiftung der Deutschen Vertriebenen* [Cultural Foundation of German Expellees]⁴⁴.

THE 1960S: A CRITICAL APPROACH SURFACES

Further examples of this type of writing would not promote a deeper understanding. Suffice to state that a critical West German literature on *Ostforschung* developed only in the late 1960s. Older criticism from Poland and the GDR, which could easily be brushed off through reference to its political purposes, was gradually accompanied by

a growing Western interest in the culpable involvement of intellectuals with the Nazi regime⁴⁵. Younger scholars discovered that beneath the fine mask of academic respectability lay a more sophisticated collusion in Nazi atrocities. In a lesser key, the advent of détente in the late 1960s seems to have triggered an internal crisis of confidence within the discipline, as the assumptions that had guaranteed *Ostforschung* generous funding in the decade after the war were called in question.

1970 ONWARD: DÉTENTE AND ‘NEW EASTERN POLICY’

In 1969 a new coalition government of Social Democrats (SPD) and Liberals (FPD) headed by Chancellor Willy Brandt (1913-1992, SPD) entered office in Bonn. Brandt’s main foreign policy aim was to ease tensions with the Communist countries and to achieve a détente – however fragile – with the entire Eastern bloc in general and better relations with the GDR and Poland in particular. To reach these goals, Brandt was prepared at least indirectly to abandon Germany’s claims to a future restitution of its former Eastern provinces. A quarter of a century after the end of World War II and with millions of East German refugees now fully integrated into the Federal Republic, such revisionist demands had become more and more anachronistic. Almost none – including those who explicitly stated the contrary – expected a restoration of Germany’s 1937 borders within the foreseeable future, if ever. Furthermore, during the Cold War, Poland had come to be seen in Western eyes as another Soviet victim and as a potential ally of the West. This new perspective automatically triggered a modified view of Germany’s past in the East. Within the framework of this *Neue Ostpolitik* [New Eastern Policy], the revisionist fixation on regional history written about the East was perceived as an imminent threat. In addition, the policy of détente of the late 1960s and 1970s also posed a threat to the entire institutional structure of *Ostforschung* as it had developed during the 1950s⁴⁶.

MODIFICATIONS OF *OSTFORSCHUNG*: THE YEARS OF PERMANENT CRISIS

Historiographically, *Ostforschung* exhibited, somewhat reluctantly, a willingness to adapt itself to the radically altered political situation. For example, from the middle of the 1970s the Historical Commission for East and West Prussian Regional Research engaged in a dialogue with its Polish colleagues, being the first to do so among the various commissions for Eastern Historical Research in the Federal Republic⁴⁷. This led inevitably to what was later described as a historiographical ‘Polonisation’ of former Eastern German territories. Klaus Zernack stated that without doubt this history had since 1945 been transformed into a domain of Poland’s historiography. He further objected that his colleagues in the Federal Republic had not even been capable of registering, not to mention studying, Polish publications on this common subject⁴⁸.

A conference held in 1974 debated the nature and future of the discipline, and the question of whether the term *Ostforschung* should be dropped in favour of *Osteuropaforschung*, Sovietology, *Osteuropakunde* or *Ostwissenschaft*⁴⁹. Behind this rather self-conscious semantic exercise lay concern about diminishing recruitment and budgetary stagnation. The founder generation – men like Aubin, Keyser and Papritz – had by then retired. Their 45- to 60-year-old successors, who had benefited from expansion from the late 1950s, were securely in place. Those whose training, and expectations, had been formed in the years of expansion had fewer opportunities when contraction ensued. Around 1980, 20 West German universities were concerned with historical research on Eastern Europe. This discipline was the primary concern of c.100 scholars, a third of whom had received their *Habilitation* during the 1970s. Another 100 scholars were reckoned as the reservoir of the next academic generation⁵⁰. Problems were further compounded by the fact that whereas many of the middle generation had been born outside the Federal Republic of Germany, their younger pupils had no immediate personal link with the countries and regions to be studied. It was not just a matter of what sort of torch was to be handed on but whether there would be anyone with an interest in receiving it!

The aforementioned 1974 conference also discussed the relationship between academic expertise, politics and the mass media. While scholars wished to be in close proximity to but not in the tow of politics, the politicians wanted accurate information on developments within the Communist states of Eastern Europe. That was why the subject received generous funding. Contacts between researchers and the bureaucracy had been formalised when in 1953 the Bonn-based Federal Ministry of the Interior established a committee for research on Eastern Europe consisting eventually of the heads of the eleven major research institutes, and representatives from the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign, and Inner-German Relations. In 1974 an Inter-Ministerial Study Group for *Osteuropaforschung*, with a permanent secretariat, was formed to coordinate the interests of government departments and the work of the research institutes.

As the generation directly involved in giving the subject its originally extreme Germano-centric impetus passed away, its successors had the difficult task of adapting to the new international and domestic political realities, while not jettisoning the entire legacy of the past. Personal loyalties and ties of academic patronage have not assisted the process of confronting the recent history of the discipline. Cosmetic changes – like altering the title of a journal – resolved nothing. When, from the late 1960s onward, modern approaches like ‘Social History’ developed in the Federal Republic, younger scholars attached to these methods focused on regions outside Germany’s traditional East. Asking new questions mainly connected to the Age of Industrialisation, they gave short shrift to the predominantly agrarian regions east of the Oder-Neiße line. Tellingly, as late as 1987, a collection of essays devoted to *Landesgeschichte heute* [regional history today] did not even mention research on the lost East⁵¹. It was only as late as 1992 that an article by Klaus

Zernack raised as a subject for discussion the historical term 'Eastern Germany' with its different meaning before and after 1945 and the relevance of this shift for regional history⁵². Around 1990, for younger and middle-aged people in the reunited Germany the term 'Eastern Germany' meant nothing but the vanishing GDR, not Pomerania, Silesia or Prussia.

By roughly 1970, all *Länder* or provinces of West Germany had been accorded a modern synthesis of their regional histories while at the same time – and up to 1992 – not a single modern account comparable to its Western counterparts had been published for Germany's East. Continuing problems with access to the sources and the failure of agencies like the Herder Institute to compensate for the loss of pre-1945 research institutions in the East can only partly explain this stagnation. Another reason was the still prevailing political function attached to Eastern regional history. As the continued task primarily was the maintenance of recollections and memories of Germany's former role in Eastern Europe, a shift towards a somehow outdated *Heimatgeschichte* was inevitable⁵³.

However, from the 1990s onward change has accelerated and will probably continue to accelerate – unless the subject becomes irrelevant – as the wider scholarly landscape becomes more internationalised. Even from the 1980s, in some areas of medieval history, for example, there have been genuine attempts to treat once sensitive issues in a broad, thematic and comparative way, by teams of scholars from East and West. Some of the most interesting work on towns, nobilities, estates or colonisation is the product of international conferences, organised by the *Konstanzer Arbeitskreis* [Konstanz Work Group], while Polish, West German, and Scandinavian medievalists meet regularly in Toruń/Thorn for the comparative study of military religious orders like the Teutonic Knights.

OSTFORSCHUNG SINCE GERMAN RE-UNIFICATION IN 1990

Following Germany's reunification in 1990, a new interest in the history of the German East has developed. For the first time, this revived interest has not been limited to the circles of former refugees and expellees or their *Landsmannschaften*. There was and still is a tourism focused on discovering the few remaining German traces in the East. New editions of tourist guides for those areas try to exploit this revived interest into the former German East⁵⁴. The museums of the *Landsmannschaften* have also been enlarged as, generally speaking, there is an increased media interest into Germany's erstwhile East.

A few years prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the prominent social historian, Werner Conze (1910-1986), started to schedule a series of books to be published under the umbrella title 'German History in Eastern Europe'. The title indicated that this endeavour was not to be limited to those areas which up to 1945 (or 1919 respectively) had formed a part of the Reich. On the contrary, the role of Germans in entire East and South-east of Europe was to be treated. The first volume to be published was that of Hartmut Boockmann (born 1934), "East and West Prussia", the first synthesis of this

region since Bruno Schumacher's book from the 1950s⁵⁵. Following the guidelines for the entire series, Boockmann wrote on German history in these regions, not a history of the regions proper. No wonder that his book concluded with the year 1945 as the author perceived the end of World War II to be the end of East and West Prussia. From 1945 onward, according to Boockmann, the history of Eastern Germany is the concern of those who now live to the west of the Oder-Neiße line and their successors.

Later parts of this series comprising ten huge and richly illustrated volumes more or less followed Boockmann's path⁵⁶. None of them openly supported revisionist claims. On the other hand, it can hardly be ignored that the overall purpose of Conze's idea was to preserve a collective memory of the German character of the lost territories. In that respect, the *Ostdeutsche Landsmannschaften*, which still harboured political resentment against a more scientific outlook on regional history as connected to their former home countries and resisted this ongoing process, could at least partly be satisfied⁵⁷.

Whatever the level of resistance, the process of abandoning the old Germano-centric perspective is irresistible. This is also mirrored in a quite new "Handbook of the History of East and West Prussia", edited during the 1990s by the Historical Commission for East and West Prussian Regional Research⁵⁸. Unlike the initial planning which was undertaken by the Commission, the project has prompted a modest cooperation between German and Polish historians. The ongoing abolition of the former German-Polish juxtaposition seems to allow a historiographical perspective more or less free from political implications⁵⁹.

Collectively, these developments reflect an increased specialisation within the various disciplines and regions hitherto subsumed under the term *Ostforschung*. Although there are still those who continue to plough the old Germano-centric furrow, this group now represents one school among many. Since the intellectually interesting developments occur elsewhere, stagnation ensues. Towards the end of the 1990s, one prominent scholar announced the end of *Ostforschung* as it had existed since roughly 1950 in its highly politicised fashion. With the expiry of the Cold War, the previous political function served by that research had lost any meaning. The author had observed some feelings of nostalgia which during the 1980s had found expression in the foundation of cultural centres devoted to the role of Germans in Eastern Europe. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, after 1990 mass emigration of the remaining Germans from Russia became possible and this nostalgia became increasingly obsolete⁶⁰.

RECENT EVENTS IN THE NEW MILLENIUM

In the new millennium new institutions dealing with *Ostforschung* have been founded. The primary focus of the work of the *Nordost-Institut* [North-east Institute], for example, is research on the culture and history of North-eastern and Eastern Europe as well as the various ways in which this area connects with German history, especially modern

and contemporary history. The *Nordost-Institut* began its work on 1 January 2002 with its main office in Lüneburg and a department in Göttingen. A specific foundation, which supports the *Nordost-Institut*, came into being in June 2001. Since March 2004 it has been associated with the University of Hamburg. The *Nordost-Institut* emerged from two previously independent institutions: the North German Cultural Institute (*Institut Norddeutsches Kulturwerk*) in Lüneburg and the Institute for the Study of Germany and Eastern Europe (*Institut für Deutschland- und Osteuropaforschung des Göttinger Arbeitskreises*) in Göttingen. The Institute cooperates on research and teaching with the University of Hamburg and other universities. It conducts research projects and hosts conferences, publishes scientific research in its annual journal, “Nordost-Archiv, Zeitschrift für Regionalgeschichte”, and in its series “Veröffentlichungen des Nordost-Instituts”, and hosts the library *Nordost-Bibliothek*, a special collection of literature on North-eastern European history. The *Nordost-Institut* is financed by Federal funds (the Office of the Federal Representative for Culture and Media) as well as by third parties. Topics covered include regional, national and state developments as well as their interpretation in the context of wider political, economic and cultural European issues. The regional focus of research on the history of the Germans and their Eastern neighbours and the societies of North-eastern and Eastern Europe is mainly in the historically Prussian provinces (East and West Prussia, Pomerania, Posen) and Poland as well as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, also in the Soviet Union and its successor states.

What has become obvious in recent years is the continuous and intensified process of coming to terms with the past. This was partly an intellectual endeavour resulting from the loss of Germany’s Eastern provinces. David Blackbourn has noticed a striking parallel between this process and the dissolution of the British and French colonial empires after 1945 which also released a decade-long, painful questioning of national identities⁶¹. Since the late 1950s, the political importance of issues like the Oder-Neiße line or the expulsion of ethnic Germans has decreased dramatically and has more and more been replaced by research into Eastern and East-Central Europe as a historical subject in its own right, no longer analyzed as a mere derivative of Germandom.

Gradually, the self-instrumentalisation of *Ostforschung* for political purposes has come to an end. This older view had focused on the German factor as the single decisive force in East European history. Furthermore, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the integration of the peoples living in Eastern Europe into the European Union, ‘Eastern Europe’ as the subject of the traditional version of *Ostforschung* has ceased to exist. What is now on the research agenda in the new millennium is so-called *Beziehungsgeschichte*, the history of encounters, contacts and relations between peoples and cultures in the vast areas of Eastern Europe. As the (fund-securing) slogan of today is cross-border cooperation within the European Union, reflecting Europe’s fading borders, institutions like the German Historical Institutes have sprung up in Warsaw and Moscow since the 1990s. Recently the Polish Academy of Science has also opened a Centre for Historical Research

in Berlin which in 2008 began to issue a yearbook. Not surprisingly, the content of the first volume deals mainly with German and Polish demographic losses during and after World War II. Another prominent aim of the new journal is to inform German scholars about historical research in Poland, access to which is still, even increasingly, hampered by a language barrier.

At the time of writing this chapter (autumn 2008), the *Deutsch-Polnisches Jugendwerk* [German-Polish Youth Association] is inviting a limited number of German and Polish youngsters to participate in a joint visit to “places of common culture and history in the Ermland and Masuria” in North-eastern Poland. One aim of this sponsored journey, as announced in the schedule for the trip, is to allow the participants to get to know the “German contribution” to the history of the aforementioned regions. Amazingly, one excursion is to be made to the remnants of Hitler’s 1941-1944 East Prussian headquarters, the *Wolfschanze* [Wolf’s Lair]⁶².

It appears to this author that in today’s Poland nearly all the taboos relating to the country’s German past have faded away. During the first years of the new millennium an increasing number of trans-national editions of sources, handbooks, learning material and surveys have been published. Polish historians today are no longer reluctant to acknowledge the German heritage in large parts of their country: they have also begun to use the Polish equivalent for ‘expulsion’ (*wypędzenia*) instead of the earlier euphemism ‘resettlement’ (*wysiedlenia*) when writing about the ethnic cleansing of the second half of the 1940s. One typical example of this fresh approach to history is a four-volume edition of documents describing the living conditions of Germans who stayed on to the east of the Oder-Neiße line between 1945 and 1950. As the title of this publication strikingly informs the reader, for the Germans their ‘home country has turned into an alien land for us’. Furthermore, a new atlas illustrating all flights, expulsions and resettlements which occurred in regard to Polish territory between 1939 and 1959 reinforces this recent historiographical trend⁶³.

The former history of East Germans in that part of Europe is now beginning to find an appropriate place within these new cross-border research programmes. And hopefully such perspectives may also act as a stimulus to overcoming the current crisis in ‘area studies’. Undoubtedly, hermetically sealed-off cultures of national memories do not accord with the standards of the 21st century.

NOTES

¹ *Autokarte Polen 1:750,000 – zuzüglich: Historische Grenzen des Großdeutschen Reiches und der Freien Stadt Danzig (1939), deutsche Ortsnamen, Verzeichnis der deutschen und polnischen Ortsnamen, aktuelles Straßennetz*, Warsaw 2008; Recent accounts of this topic are *Flucht und Vertreibung. Europa zwischen 1939 und 1948*, with Introduction by A. Surminski, Hamburg 2004; P. Ahonen, *After the Expulsion. West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945-1990*, Oxford 2003; M. Kittel, H. Möller, J. Pešek, O. Tuma (eds.), *Deutschsprachige Minderheiten 1945. Ein europäischer Vergleich*, Munich 2006.

- ² Cf. J. Křen, *Changes in identity: Germans in Bohemia and Moravia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries*, in M. Teich (ed.), *Bohemia in History*, Cambridge 1998, pp. 324-343.
- ³ For the Czech case see N.M. Wingfield, *The Politics of Memory: Constructing National Identity in the Czech Lands, 1945 to 1948*, in "East European Politics and Societies", 2000, 14, pp. 246-267. For German reactions see E. Mühle, *The European East on the Mental Map of German Ostforschung*, in E. Mühle (ed.), *Germany and the European East in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford - New York 2003, pp. 107-130.
- ⁴ For these areas see M. Beer, G. Seewann (eds.), *Südostforschung im Schatten des Dritten Reiches. Institutionen-Inhalte-Personen*, Munich 2004; H.H. Hahn (ed.), *Hundert Jahre sudetendeutsche Geschichte. Eine völkische Bewegung in drei Staaten*, Frankfurt am Main - Berlin - Bern - Bruxelles - New York - Oxford - Vienna 2007; S. Albrecht, J. Malír, R. Melville (eds.), *Die "sudetendeutsche Geschichtsschreibung" 1918-1960. Zur Vorgeschichte und Gründung der Historischen Kommission der Sudetenländer*, Munich 2008; C. Brenner, K. E. Franzen, P. Haslinger, R. Luft (eds.), *Geschichtsschreibung zu den böhmischen Ländern im 20. Jahrhundert. Wissenschaftstraditionen-Institutionen-Diskurse*, Munich 2006; S. Salzborn, *Geteilte Erinnerung. Die deutsch-tschechischen Beziehungen und die sudetendeutsche Vergangenheit*, Frankfurt am Main 2008.
- ⁵ P. Ahonen, *Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik. The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era*, in "Central European History", 1998, 31, pp. 31-63; M. Stickler, "Ostdeutsch heißt Gesamtdeutsch". *Organisation, Selbstverständnis und heimatpolitische Zielsetzungen der deutschen Vertriebenenverbände 1949-1972*, Düsseldorf 2004. For the Sudeten German example see A. Šnejdárk, *The Beginnings of Sudeten German Organizations in Western Germany after 1945*, in "Historica", 1964, 8, pp. 235-252; E. Glassheim, *National Mythologies and Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of Czechoslovak Germans in 1945*, in "Central European History", 2000, 33, pp. 463-486.
- ⁶ J. Hackmann, *Ostpreußen und Westpreußen in deutscher und polnischer Sicht. Landeshistorie als beziehungs-geschichtliches Problem*, Wiesbaden 1996, pp. 320-322, footnote 281 for further references; A. Fischer, *Forschung und Lehre zur Geschichte Osteuropas in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone bzw. der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (1945-1990)*, in E. Oberländer (ed.), *Geschichte Osteuropas. Zur Entwicklung einer historischen Disziplin in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz 1945-1990*, Stuttgart 1992, pp. 304-341, p. 312.
- ⁷ Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., pp. 258-259; J. M. Piskorski, "Deutsche Ostforschung" und "polnische Westforschung", in "Berliner Jahrbuch für osteuropäische Geschichte", 1996, 1, pp. 379-390; J. Hackmann, *Strukturen und Institutionen der polnischen Westforschung (1918-1960)*, in "Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung", 2001, 50/2, pp. 230-255.
- ⁸ Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., p. 267.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 276.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 279.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 285.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, p. 343; J.-D. Gauger, *Deutsche und Polen im Unterricht. Eine Untersuchung aktueller Lehrpläne, Richtlinien und Schulbücher für Geschichte*, Schwalbach 2008; K. Hartmann, M. Ruchniewicz, *Geschichte verstehen – Zukunft gestalten. Die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen in den Jahren 1933-1949. Ergänzende Unterrichtsmaterialien für das Fach Geschichte*, Dresden 2007.
- ¹³ For details see the introductory remarks in the first issue of the "Jahrbuch für Volkskunde der Heimatvertriebenen", 1955, 1.
- ¹⁴ C. R. Unger, *Ostforschung in Westdeutschland. Die Erforschung des europäischen Ostens und die deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 1945-1975*, Stuttgart 2007, p. 158; Cf. D. J. Allen, *The Oder-Neisse-Line. The*

- United States, Poland, and Germany in the Cold War*, Westport - London 2003; J.-D. Kühne, *Zu Veränderungsmöglichkeiten der Oder-Neiße-Linie nach 1945*, Baden-Baden 2008.
- ¹⁵ M. Hellmann, *Zur Lage der historischen Erforschung des östlichen Europa in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, in "Jahrbuch der historischen Forschung 1979", pp. 13-38, p. 20. See also H. Lemberg, P. Nitsche, E. Oberländer (eds.), *Osteuropa in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Festschrift für Günther Stökl zum 60. Geburtstag*, Cologne 1977.
- ¹⁶ C.R. Unger, "Objektiv, aber nicht neutral". *Zur Entwicklung der Ostforschung nach 1945*, in "Osteuropa", 2005, 55/12, pp. 113-131, 114-115.
- ¹⁷ E. Keyser, *Die Historische Kommission für ost- und westpreußische Landesforschung*, in "Zeitschrift für Ostforschung", 1952, 1, pp. 525-529; <http://www1.uni-hamburg.de/Landesforschung/hiko.htm>. The journal published by the Commission is entitled "Preußenland".
- ¹⁸ Cf. H. Lehmann, J. van Horn Melton (eds.), *Paths of Continuity. Central European Historiography from the 1930s to the 1950s*, Cambridge 1994; M. Salewski, J. Schröder (eds.), *Dienst für die Geschichte. Gedenkschrift für Walthar Hubatsch*, Göttingen 1985; M. Burleigh, *Albert Brackmann (1871-1952), Ostforscher. The Years of Retirement*, in "Journal of Contemporary History", 1988, 23, pp. 573-587; J. Hackmann, *Königsberg in der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945*, in "Nordost-Archiv", 1994, Neue Folge 3, pp. 469-493.
- ¹⁹ Basic for this issue is E. Mühle, *Institutionelle Grundlegung und wissenschaftliche Programmatik der westdeutschen Beschäftigung mit "deutscher Geschichte" im östlichen Mitteleuropa (1945-1959)*, in J. Kłoczowski (ed.), *Erfahrungen der Vergangenheit. Deutsche in Ostmitteleuropa in der Historiographie nach 1945*, Lublin - Marburg an der Lahn 2000, pp. 25-64; B. Schalhorn, *Anfänge der deutschlandpolitischen Forschungs- und Bildungsarbeit in den fünfziger Jahren: Die Ost-Akademie Lüneburg*, in "Deutsche Studien", 1987, 25, pp. 318-328; S. Conrad, *Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Nation. Geschichtsschreibung in Westdeutschland und Japan, 1945-1960*, Göttingen 1999.
- ²⁰ On Oberländer's fascinating career see P.-C. Wachs, *Der Fall Theodor Oberländer (1905-1998). Ein Lehrstück deutscher Geschichte*, Frankfurt am Main - New York 2000. Theodor Oberländer is not to be mixed up with the younger historian Erwin Oberländer. A general account of the *Arbeitskreis* is H.G. Marzian, *Der Göttinger Arbeitskreis*, in H. Neubach, H.-L. Abmeier (eds.), *Für unser Schlesien. Festschrift für Herbert Hupka*, Munich - Vienna 1985, pp. 142-152; J. von Braun, *Fünf Jahre Arbeit für den deutschen Osten. Der Göttinger Arbeitskreis. Tätigkeitsbericht zu seinem fünfjährigen Bestehen*, in "Jahrbuch der Albertus-Universität zu Königsberg", 1952, 2, pp. 208-251; M. Hagen, *Göttingen als "Fenster zum Osten" nach 1945*, in H. Boockmann, H. Wellenreuther (eds.), *Geschichtswissenschaft in Göttingen. Eine Vorlesungsreihe*, Göttingen 1987, pp. 321-343.
- ²¹ Unger, *Ostforschung* cit., pp. 130-131.
- ²² *Ibid.*, p. 147. For the overall issue of federal funds for *Ostforschung* see A. Buchholz, *Koordination und Ressortbezug in der bundesgeförderten Osteuropaforschung*, in "Osteuropa", 1980, 30, pp. 688-704. At the time of the introduction of the Euro in 2002, 2 DM equalled 1 Euro. At the beginning of the 1950s, 120,000 DM was a tremendous amount of money.
- ²³ Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., pp. 306-307.
- ²⁴ Cf. W. Oberkrome, "Grenzkampf" und "Heimatdienst". *Geschichtswissenschaft und Revisionsbegehren*, in "Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte", 1996, 25, pp. 187-204.
- ²⁵ Unger, *Ostforschung* cit., p. 131.
- ²⁶ M. Burleigh, *Germany turns eastwards. A study of Ostforschung in the Third Reich*, Cambridge - New York - Port Chester - Melbourne - Sydney 1988, pp. 313-314. For a list of all West German chairs dedicated to Eastern Europe including a brief survey of their research activities see Oberländer, *Geschichte* cit.

- ²⁷ See E. Mühle, *Für Volk und deutschen Osten. Der Historiker Hermann Aubin und die deutsche Ostforschung*, Düsseldorf 2005.
- ²⁸ Unger, *Ostforschung* cit., p. 155.
- ²⁹ Hellmann, *Lage* cit., pp. 22-23; Unger, *Ostforschung* cit., pp. 132-133.
- ³⁰ A. Martiny, *Osteuropäische Geschichte und Zeitgeschichte*, in "Osteuropa", 1980, 30, pp. 705-724, 712-713; W. Lenz (ed.), *Deutschbaltisches biographisches Lexikon 1710-1960*, Cologne - Vienna 1970.
- ³¹ Hackmann, *Ostpommern* cit., p. 341; Cf. W. Borodziej, "Ostforschung" aus der Sicht der polnischen Geschichtsschreibung, in "Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung", 1997, 46, pp. 405-426; H. Olszewski, *Die deutsche Historiographie über Polen aus polnischer Sicht*, in D. Dahlmann (ed.), *Hundert Jahre Osteuropäische Geschichte. Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft*, Stuttgart 2005, pp. 281-292.
- ³² Burleigh, *Germany* cit., pp. 300-301; S. Kreuzberger, J. Unser, *Osteuropaforschung als politisches Instrument im Kalten Krieg. Die Abteilung für Geschichte der imperialistischen Ostforschung in der DDR (1960 bis 1968)*, in "Osteuropa", 1998, 48, pp. 849-867; C. Kleßmann, *DDR-Historiker und "imperialistische Ostforschung". Ein Kapitel deutsch-deutscher Wissenschaftsgeschichte im Kalten Krieg*, in "Deutschland-Archiv", 2002, 35, pp. 13-31.
- ³³ Burleigh, *Germany* cit., p. 309.
- ³⁴ The phrase "band of the unbroken" comes from the foreword to this new "Zeitschrift für Ostforschung", 1952, 1, p. 1.
- ³⁵ Burleigh, *Germany* cit., p. 305; Mühle, *Volk* cit., passim.
- ³⁶ Quoted after E. Mühle, *Ostforschung. Beobachtungen zu Aufstieg und Niedergang eines geschichtswissenschaftlichen Paradigmas*, in "Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung", 1997, 46, pp. 317-350, at 339. For the publications of the Herder Institute see *Fünfunddreißig Jahre Forschung über Ostmitteleuropa. Veröffentlichungen der Mitglieder des J.G.-Herder-Forschungsrates 1950-1984*, Marburg 1985.
- ³⁷ E. Keyser, *Der Johann Gottfried Herder-Forschungsrat und das Johann Gottfried Herder-Institut*, in "Zeitschrift für Ostforschung", 1952, 2, pp. 101-106, at 102; H. Weczerka, *Johann Gottfried Herder-Forschungsrat*, in Oberländer, *Geschichte* cit., pp. 256-275.
- ³⁸ Hackmann, *Ostpommern* cit., p. 310.
- ³⁹ Burleigh, *Germany* cit., pp. 314-315.
- ⁴⁰ K. Pagel (ed.), *The German East*, Berlin 1954, pp. 7-8.
- ⁴¹ Hackmann, *Ostpommern* cit., p. 313.
- ⁴² G. Rhode, *Die Ostgebiete des Deutschen Reiches. Ein Taschenbuch*, Würzburg 1955; Unger, *Ostforschung* cit., p. 136.
- ⁴³ B. Schumacher, *Geschichte Ost- und Westpreussens*, Würzburg 1957; Hackmann, *Ostpommern* cit., p. 318.
- ⁴⁴ Cf. for example R. Täubrich (ed.), *Archive in Ostpreußen vor und nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg unter Einschuß des Memellandes und des Soldaugebietes*, Bonn 1990. For the foundation see <http://www.kulturstiftung-der-deutschen-vertriebenen.de>.
- ⁴⁵ A recent survey is E. Mühle, *Ostforschung und Nationalsozialismus. Kritische Bemerkungen zur aktuellen Forschungsdiskussion*, in "Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung", 2001, 50, pp. 256-275. Still valid on this topic is Burleigh, *Germany* cit.
- ⁴⁶ T. Kleindienst, *Zerreißprobe. Entspannungspolitik und Osteuropaforschung*, in "Osteuropa", 2005, 55/12, pp. 149-162.
- ⁴⁷ Hackmann, *Ostpommern* cit., p. 346.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 330-331.

- ⁴⁹ H. König, *Ostforschung – Bilanz und Ausblick. Bericht und Gedanken zu einer erweiterten Redaktionskonferenz*, in "Osteuropa", 1975, 25, p. 787.
- ⁵⁰ Martiny, *Geschichte* cit., passim.
- ⁵¹ C.-H. Hauptmeyer (ed.), *Landesgeschichte heute*, Göttingen 1987.
- ⁵² K. Zernack, *Der historische Begriff "Ostdeutschland" und die deutsche Landesgeschichte*, in "Nordost-Archiv", 1992, Neue Folge 1, pp. 157-173.
- ⁵³ Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., p. 329.
- ⁵⁴ A fascinating account of early post-war travels to the border regions is Y. Komska, *Border Looking: The Cold War Visuality of the Sudeten German Expellees and its Afterlife*, in "German Life and Letters", 2004, 57, pp. 401-426. A more recent example is M. Antoni, *Dehio-Handbuch der Kunstdenkmäler West- und Ostpreußen. Die ehemaligen Provinzen West- und Ostpreußen (Deutschordensland Preußen) mit Bütower und Lauenburger Land*, Munich - Berlin 1993.
- ⁵⁵ H. Boockmann, *Ostpreussen und Westpreussen*, Berlin 1992.
- ⁵⁶ G. von Pistoohlkors, *Baltische Länder*, Berlin 1994; N. Conrads, *Schlesien*, Berlin 1994; F. Prinz, *Böhmen und Mähren*, Berlin 1995; G. Schödl, *Land an der Donau*, Berlin 1995; J. Rogall, *Land der großen Ströme. Von Polen nach Litauen*, Berlin 1996; G. Stricker, *Russland*, Berlin 1997; A. Suppan, *Zwischen Adria und Karawanken*, Berlin 1998; I. Röskau-Rydel, *Galizien*, Berlin 1999; W. Buchholz, *Pommern*, Berlin 1999.
- ⁵⁷ Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., pp. 338-339.
- ⁵⁸ E. Opgenoorth (ed.), *Handbuch der Geschichte Ost- und Westpreußens. Teil 2: Von der Teilung bis zum Schwedisch-Polnischen Krieg 1466-1655. Vom schwedisch-polnischen Krieg bis zur Reformzeit*, 2 vols., Lüneburg 1994 and 1996; *Teil 3: Von der Reformzeit bis zum Vertrag von Versailles, 1807-1918*, Lüneburg 1998; *Teil 4: Vom Vertrag von Versailles bis zum Ende des zweiten Weltkrieges, 1918-1945*, Lüneburg 1997.
- ⁵⁹ Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., pp. 339-340.
- ⁶⁰ J. Baberowski, *Das Ende der Osteuropäischen Geschichte. Bemerkungen zur Lage einer geschichtswissenschaftlichen Disziplin*, in "Osteuropa", 1998, 48, pp. 784-799. See also Mühle, *Ostforschung* cit., passim.
- ⁶¹ D. Blackburn, *Das Kaiserreich transnational. Eine Skizze*, in S. Conrad, J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt 1871-1914*, Göttingen 2004, pp. 302-324, at 324. Cf. S. Creuzberger, J. Mannteufel, A. Steininger, J. Unser (eds.), *Wohin steuert die Osteuropaforschung?*, Cologne 2000.
- ⁶² <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/termine/id=10007>.
- ⁶³ W. Borodziej, H. Lemberg (eds.), *"Nasza ojczyzna stała się dla nas obcym państwem ..."* Niemcy w Polsce 1945-1950. *Wybór dokumentów*, 4 vols., Warsaw 2000-2001; there is also a German version: *"Unsere Heimat ist uns ein fremdes Land geworden..." Die Deutschen östlich von Oder und Neiß 1945-1950. Dokumente aus polnischen Archiven*, 4 vols., Marburg an der Lahn 2000-2003; G. Hryciuk, W. Sienkiewicz (eds.), *Wysiedlenia, wypędzenia i ucieczki 1939-1959. Polacy, Żydzi, Niemcy, Ukraińcy. Atlas ziem Polski*, Warsaw 2008.

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Transformations of Regional History in the Polish “Western Territories” since 1945: Legitimization, Nationalization, Regionalization

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ABSTRACT


The present chapter analyses developments in Polish historiography in the regions which were incorporated into the Polish state after the Second World War (Outer Pomerania, Silesia, parts of East Prussia, and others). The “historical character” of these territories had, since the 19th century, been disputed by Germans and Poles. After 1945 the central task of Polish historical work there was to legitimate the new territorial changes, to prove that the lands concerned had always been Polish. In the 1950s and 1960s, large syntheses of their past began to be conceptually prepared, discussed and later also published, accompanied by a rapid development of monographic research. Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, the previous orientation towards Polonity and Polishness in the past receded into the background, and the formation of a new Polish regional history or *Landesgeschichte* took place. Since the 1990s, such features as the ‘European’ or ‘multicultural’ character of the territories have been emphasised.

Príspevek sa zabyvá formováním a vývojem polské historiografie na tzv. “znovuzískaných zemích” od roku 1945, tj. na těch dříve německých územích, která se v důsledku druhé světové války stala součástí polského státu (Slezsko, Kladsko, části Lužice, Lubušsko, Zadní Pomořany, Pomoří, Varmie, Mazursko). Předmětem zájmu jsou jak cíle a úkoly historiografie v souvislosti s politickými a teritoriálními změnami, tak i základní rysy vývoje metodologie, konceptualizací, tematických preferencí a institucionálních podmínek. Pozornost je přitom věnována nejen samotné historiografii, ale částečně také politické legitimizaci prostřednictvím dějin, historické popularizaci, veřejnému a kulturnímu traktování historie, historické paměti a politice paměti. Základní rys dlouhodobého vývoje v perspektivě padesáti let po druhé světové válce je spatřován v cestě od politické a historické legitimizace připojení jmenovaných zemí k Polsku přes postupné etablování národně orientovaných regionálních a zemských dějin Pomořan, Slezska atd. až po multikulturalizaci a europeizaci historického dědictví v 90. letech 20. sto-

letí. Přitom jsou rozlišeny čtyři základní fáze. V první, bezprostředně na konci druhé světové války a v nejbližích poválečných měsících, byly položeny institucionální základy polské historické práce a cíleně připraveny první stručné publikace o polském charakteru minulosti těchto zemí, regionů a měst. Od konce 40. let lze sledovat orientaci na plánovanou historiografickou práci formou monografií, přičemž vůdčí ideou a hlavně centrální tematickou orientaci stále představovalo zapojení sledovaných oblastí do kontextu (celo)polských národních a státních dějin. Polský charakter minulosti a polonita jako předmět studia a východisko zůstávaly nadále markantními, i když ne vždy a za všech okolností zcela dominujícími rysy. Zároveň byly zahájeny přípravné práce a konceptualizace budoucích rozsáhlých syntéz dějin zemí a měst, doprovázené institucionálním rozvojem. Od konce 60. do 80. let pak lze pozorovat částečný ústup primárně národní a zejména legitimizační perspektivy, a to jak v souvislosti s monografickými studii, tak i v kontextu dlouhodobé realizace obsáhlých syntézních záměrů (dějiny Pomořan, Gdaňsku aj.). Do popředí tak silněji vstoupila dříve přehlížená témata německé kultury apod., zároveň však se posilovala orientace na dějiny daného regionu bez prioritního použití národně dějinné perspektivy. Dějiny těchto regionů se tak do určité míry začaly osvobozovat od národního narativu, takže lze nejpozději pro 80. léta mluvit o formování pomořanských, pomořských či slzeských zemských dějin jako oboru. Od 90. let pak v souvislosti s novými politickými, společenskými a kulturními jevy nastal zejména v oblasti politické a intelektuální reflexe dějin, ale i v samotné historiografii obrat k hodnotám multi-kulturality a evropanství, jež pak byly nacházeny také v minulosti regionů a měst jako jejich určující motivy. Zvláště markantním způsobem se tento trend projevil v Gdaňsku, ve Varmii a Mazursku, částečně ale i ve Štětíně, Slezsku, Vratislavi a jinde.

One of the most important territorial changes after the Second World War was the ‘Westward Shift’ of Poland. For the loss of its pre-war eastern territories, partly or predominantly Ukrainian, Belorussian or Lithuanian, to the Soviet Union, in the post-war settlement Poland was compensated with western territory. Predominantly German-speaking regions in south-eastern Prussia (Masuria, Warmia), Danzig/Gdańsk, eastern Pomerania, the Lebus Country (Lebuser Land, *ziemia lubuska*), Silesia, parts of Lusatia and the Glatz Country (Glatzer Land, *ziemia kłodzka*) in the south became Polish. These regions were formally transferred to Poland by the 1945 Treaty of Potsdam¹, and have gained acceptance both internally and by the international community as integral parts of the Polish state. As recently as 1990, in the context of German reunification, the Federal Republic of Germany formally acknowledged the post-war Polish-German frontiers, along the rivers Neisse (Nysa Łużycka) and Oder (Odra), from Zittau to Wisłoujście. Thus international recognition of the “Western Territories” as Polish has been asserted definitively.

The incorporation of the new western territories was accompanied by large-scale population change, amid a drive by the state to impose a Polish identity on the areas. Many of



Map 9

Poland's 'Shift to the West' after 1945.

The continuous black line marks the post-World War II boundaries; the eastern and western boundaries between World War I and II are marked with dotted lines.

From: R. Fuhrmann, *Polen: Handbuch. Geschichte, Politik, Wirtschaft*, Hannover 1990, p. 183.

the indigenous, predominantly German-speaking inhabitants, had fled or been killed in the last months of the war: most, however, were transferred to Germany in the months and years after the war. At the same time, “repatriations” of Soviet and Polish citizens took place, with Poles from the east of the country – now ceded to the Soviet Union – re-settled in former German-speaking western regions, along with a sizeable contingent of Poles from central Poland. In the western areas, new local societies were gradually formed. A long-term process of re-socialising peoples of various languages and dialects, origins, cultures and traditions, confessions and outlooks took place – often tense and complicated by shifts in the state’s ideological, social and religious agendas².

Germans and Poles were not the only national groups affected by post-war political and demographic changes. A large group of Ukrainians was violently transferred and

settled in northern Poland as a result of the so-called Action Vistula in 1946, an attempt to forestall nationalist resistance in south-eastern Ukraine. However, acquiring western territory proved easier than imposing a uniform sense of Polish identity. There remained a heterogeneous contingent of native inhabitants that to this day remain difficult to define in ethnic or even national terms. The autochthonous population included some Germans who had not (yet) been ejected, Poles, and other Slavs with a less developed sense of Polish identity – referring to themselves as Warmians, Masurians, Kashubians, Slovincs, Silesians, or even *Wasserpolaks* (in Upper Silesia, an initially negative designation). These groups were either forced to move to Germany, or were subjected to so-called “repolonization”³. This latter policy was based on the idea that large parts of the population in these regions were Germanized Slavs who had lost their Polish consciousness, adopted German or Polish dialects as a result of centuries of ‘foreign’ rule – but still had the potential to reawaken their Polish identity. It was not always successful; and as a result migration from Poland continued in the 1950s to the 1970s. Thus, for several decades, an exodus of ethnically-specific and ambiguous groups took place, which resulted in the extinction of groups like the Warmians, Masurians and Slovincs from northern Poland. Only the Kashubians succeeded in defending their ethnic identity and redeveloping it to embrace both ethnic and territorial aspects, particularly after 1956. The survival and new identification trends among the two groups of German-speaking and Polish-speaking Silesians, especially in the Opole region, remained evident as late as the 1980s and 1990s⁴.

PRE-HISTORY: NATIONALIZATION OF HISTORY SINCE THE 19TH CENTURY

The Polish-German struggle over the ‘historical’ character of Poland’s post-war western acquisitions was almost as old as the process of nationalization which took place in these regions from the 19th century. It was more pronounced in those regions with significant contingents of both Germans and Poles, and where there was a vigorous Polish elite: above all in Greater Poland (*Wielkopolska*), with its centre in Poznań, and in Western Prussia with Gdańsk, Toruń and other cities, and gradually also in Silesia or later Masuria, but rather less in Outer Pomerania, Lebus or Glatz Country. Disputes on the structure of the population and the cultural character of the lands were accompanied by attempts to prove the corresponding “historical character” of regions and cities. This tendency deepened significantly in the inter-war period. During the Versailles Conference, which was to settle the Polish-German frontier, both sides advanced historical arguments in support of their competing demands. Professional Polish and German historians, geographers and sociologists issued brief statements in English or French in order to achieve this. Scholarly disputes continued in the 1920s and 1930s⁵. Institutions were founded with the task of proving Polish territorial claims. The most important of these were the Silesian Institute at Katowice (*Instytut Śląski*, founded 1934) and the Baltic Institute at

Toruń (Instytut Bałtycki, founded 1925, opened 1927; from 1931 also in Gdynia), the task of which was to document the Polishness of the relevant regions.

Popular societies – similar to the groups which sought to mobilise support in the West for Poland in 1944–45 – were also active in the inter-war period. As early as 1921 and 1922, as the Polish and German states competed for Upper Silesia, the Union for the Defence of the Western Borderlands (*Związek Obrony Kresów Zachodnich*) was founded. It called for the legitimization of the Polish western borders as well as the “repolonization” of the borderlands’ population. Renamed the Polish Western Union in 1934, branches of the society sprang up across the country. On the eve of the Second World War, the Union boasted 45,000 members.

In academia, so-called “Western Studies” became an important part of inter-war Polish national scholarship – its preoccupation with asserting the Polish character of disputed territory made it an official school of thought in science and politics after the foundation of the Polish Republic. It was not a regional perspective: Western Studies was supposed to reinforce the interests and claims of the greater Polish state and nation. Toruń historians were severely criticised at the Polish Historians’ Congress in Warsaw in 1930 because of their regional and local interests⁶. Polish Western Studies, formulated in the 1920s and 1930s, was to be influential in the period after 1945.

HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATIONS AFTER 1945

After the Second World War the Polish state needed to legitimize her western annexations. Generally, both natural and positivist modes of argumentation have been used to cast the annexations as a just and logical historical development. The annexations have commonly been presented not as the incorporation of German territory, but as a re-incorporation of “old Polish lands”. Given this line of argument it was necessary to confront the un-Polish ethnic character of many of the inhabitants of these historic “old Polish lands”. It was argued that Pomerania or Lower Silesia had been Slavic or explicitly Polish in the past, but that this Slavic character had been considerably weakened due to medieval German colonization. According to this interpretation, the presence of a German-speaking majority in these regions was attributable also to the Germanizing policy of the Prussian monarchy, along with colonization and oppression of the native Poles. Thus, a partial or dominant German ethnic character could be explained as an illegitimate, unnatural state which did nothing to alter natural Polish territorial claims. The Germans were to be regarded as colonists, foreigners, immigrants or as Germanized Slavs, denuded of their Polish identity. Even if they spoke a Slavic dialect, they were not aware of their Polishness and regarded their speech not as Polish (as it was regarded from the point of view of the Polish national elites). The policy of re-polonization of Kashubians, Silesians, Masurians and others was therefore legitimized.

The idea that the new Western regions were rightfully subject to Polish nationalizing efforts was signified by their official designation in Polish politics – the “Recovered Lands” (ziemie odzyskane). A ministry was even established for the integration of the new regions, with Władysław Gomułka as its administrator. Several societies and institutions addressed the Polonism of the Recovered Lands. The above-mentioned Western Union experienced a renaissance after 1944, becoming a mass organisation with over 100,000 members. Its post-war scope was broader: the society concerned itself with the national verification of the “autochthonous” population. Besides this, propagandist activities even concerned some problems beyond the Polish frontiers: the Union supported the idea of the incorporation of the Upper-Silesian Region Zaolzie⁷ from Czechoslovakia into Poland; it also encouraged the secessionist movement among the Sorbs in German Lusatia. In 1951, the Polish Western Union was integrated into the Sea League (*Liga Morska*).

Between 1957 and 1971, the activities of the Polish Western Union were continued by the newly established *Towarzystwo Rozwoju Ziem Zachodnich* (TRZZ) [Society for the Development of the Western Countries]. The TRZZ was concerned not only with sustaining Polish claims to the western lands, but also with the further integration of the regions into the Polish state and society. This meant – besides administrative and economic activities – that it also attempted to shape identity by informing both the new inhabitants and Poles from the “central” parts of the state about the Polish heritage of the western territories. It was hoped that this would help to consolidate the territory, and to encourage those new arrivals from the former eastern part of Poland to take an active role in the repolonization of this ancient Polish territory. Their removal to the west was not to be seen as the loss of their country. This “internal” facet of Polish propaganda concerning the Western Territories has been little studied by historians, and would bear further research in the future.

To recapitulate, historical arguments played a crucial role in the legitimization of post-war Polish territorial expansion: the Polish population was a minority in large parts of the regions concerned, and in many cases it was indifferent to the nationalist perspective of the Polish state. History could be used to explain away these obstacles. In particular, a so-called “Piast” notion of Polish statehood could be mobilised, whereby historians concentrated on the rule of the Polish Piast dynasty. For particular periods during the middle ages, the western territories had been under Piast rule. In the case of Silesia, even after the region had been lost by Poland, it had remained under the rule of Piast branches⁸. In some cases – Pomerania, for instance – there had been other ruling dynasties of Slavic origin. Therefore, it was possible to depict the era from the later middle ages to 1945 as an interlude of foreign rule in an otherwise continuous narrative of Polish identity in the western regions⁹. In the context of the late 1940s, the Piast idea offered two other political advantages for the Polish communist authorities. First, it diverted public attention from territorial losses in the east towards gains in the west,

and thus was most convenient in the context of Polish-Soviet relations. Second, it constituted an alternative to the so-called Jagiellonian idea of Polish statehood, based on the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and represented by the inter-war (“bourgeois”) political state establishment.

Use of the Piast idea can be seen as early as the arrival of Polish troops and administrators in the new territories. In March 1945, reporting on the capture of Kolberg (Kolobrzeg) in Outer Pomerania by the Polish army, the “Polish Film Journal” (“Polska Kronika Filmowa”) stated:

The Germans lost the war. They lost the country they had considered their own for centuries. Strengthened by the friendship of the U.S.S.R. and the alliance with the Red Army, the Democratic Poland returns to the territories of the Bolesławs [Polish Dukes and Kings of the Piast Dynasty]. This land, paid for with the blood of the best sons of the nation [...], no force can take from us.

And in a report about Breslau/Wrocław in the same year:

After six centuries of German rule, Wrocław, the old capital of the Silesian Piast Dynasty has returned to the Fatherland. [...] We shall destroy the signs of German rule in Silesia. We shall rebuild the Polish Wrocław. [...] Wrocław is a Polish city again! The German penetration of Silesia is definitively over!¹⁰

Thus, the Polish occupation of Pomerania and Silesia was painted as a form of historical redress, a re-establishment of normality and justice by claiming a continuity between the middle ages and the present day. (Interestingly, even Bohemian sovereignty over Silesia was regarded as part of “German penetration”).

Polish historiography responded to the challenges presented by westward expansion. First, historians began to place the “regained” territory on the national historiographical agenda. As early as 1946, historical accounts of, for instance, Gdańsk, Wrocław, Masuria and Western Prussia emerged in the form of booklets and short monographs¹¹. Some authors were connected to the towns and regions concerned, others came from other parts of Poland. In certain areas – such as Gdańsk and parts of Western and Eastern Prussia – there was a strong tradition of Polish historiography since the inter-war period or even the 19th century. Other parts, like Outer Pomerania (in German, *Hinterpommern*), the Lebus-Country or the Glatz/Kłodzko-Country, had a far less developed place in Polish historiography. These early works dealt not only with the Polish history of specific places, but explored their historical connections with Poland, the Polish language and literature. The purpose was to impress upon locals – and Poles in general – their Polish character, and to incorporate the new territories into the Polish national consciousness. The later 1940s can thus be regarded as the first stage of Polish historiography in the new territories. These initial efforts presented the lands as genuinely Polish.

THE ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL HISTORICAL RESEARCH IN THE RECOVERED LANDS (1950s)

From the later 1940s, but especially after 1950, the second historiographical stage began, characterized by wider and more programmatic approaches both to the academic and popular treatment of the history of the regions. New museums, institutions and journals were founded. New research took place and numerous monographs were published. Efforts were made by historians to formulate a cohesive approach to writing the history of the new territory, and scholars planned large-scale works of synthesis on the history of certain regions¹².

The establishment and re-establishment of local and regional museums was a characteristic development of this period. In larger cities like Wrocław, Gdańsk and Szczecin/Stettin, as well as in towns like Brzeg and Kłodzko, existing museums could be taken over or rebuilt after 1945: in other areas new museums had to be founded. In addition, special institutions were set up for various reasons dealing with research, teaching and the popularization of history. These bodies were relatively well financed by the state, which viewed them as representing national interests in the territories. Perhaps a typical example is the Research Centre in Olsztyn/Allenstein, competent for the part of the former East Prussia which became Polish in 1945. Its predecessor, the Masurian Institute, was founded by the Polish underground in 1943 and moved to Olsztyn just after the war. There it was transformed into an Olsztyn branch of the Poznań Western Institute, but soon subordinated to the Polish Historical Society. The new institute was organized in 1961. It was eventually named after Wojciech Kętrzyński (1838-1918), born Adalbert von Winkler, a historian from eastern Prussia, who identified himself as a Pole and polonized his name. He became an enthusiastic representative of Polish historical perspectives. The institute at Olsztyn undertook wide-ranging activities in research and in public interaction¹³. Fellows of the institute took part in public and educational activities in the context of a cultural “repolonization” of the regions. The first head of the institute, Emilia Sukertowa-Biedrawina (1887-1970), described the beginnings and the development of the institute’s work very impressively in her memoirs, emphasizing the national relevance of the institute’s tasks¹⁴.

In political terms the most important institute was probably the fore-mentioned Western Institute of Poznań (*Institut Zachodni*). This institute was founded in Warsaw in 1944 and moved to Poznań a year later as a central scientific authority dealing with Polish-German relations and the new western territories. Although it was an interdisciplinary institution, historiography played a prominent role in it¹⁵. However, during the period of the Stalinization of Polish science in the first half of the 1950s, even the Western Institute faced severe criticism for the nationalist orientation of its publications. A rapid reduction of its resources followed, as Polish historiography in general became more centralized¹⁶.

After the foundation of the Polish Academy of Sciences (*Polska Akademia Nauk*, PAN) – which was an important, but not fully successful step towards the centralization of science in the Stalinist period, according to the Soviet model – Gerard Labuda established a Pomeranian History Research Institute (*Zakład Historii Pomorza*) as the Poznań branch of the Historical Institute of the Academy in 1953. This organization played a most important role in evaluating Pomeranian and Southern Baltic historiography, subject, since the 1950s, to opposing national and regional approaches¹⁷. In 1955, a branch of the Poznań establishment was founded in Gdańsk by Edmund Cieślak (1922-2007) with the task of preparing a large-scale synthesis of the history of Gdańsk¹⁸.

This period is also notable for the proliferation of scientific journals dedicated to the study of the Recovered Lands. The "Przegląd Zachodni" (Western Overview) in Polish (since 1945, initially published monthly), the "Polish Western Affairs" in English (since 1960), as well as the "La Pologne et les Affaires Occidentales" in French (1965-1981) represented the official Polish line with regard to "Western ideas" as well as Polish-German relations. The "Zapiski Historyczne" [Historical Notices] originally "Zapiski Towarzystwa Historycznego w Toruniu" [Notices of the Historical Society of Toruń], was renewed in 1945 in Toruń. It was devoted to the Baltic region history, including the Polish territories. New reviews dealt with the history of cities and regions, for example the Silesian historical review "Sobótka" since 1946, and the "Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie" [Masurian-Warmian Communications] published in Olsztyn since 1961.

The relevance of the Recovered Lands in the greater historiographical context is also highlighted by the series of important conferences and events devoted to the subject. Already from July to October 1948, the large propagandistic exhibition of the Recovered Lands, "Wystawa Ziem Odzyskanych", took place at Wrocław in order to document the successful repolonization in the western and northern "ancient Polish lands"; but the exhibition was dominated by a rather present-centred perspective on the new development¹⁹. In the same year the first post-war Congress of Polish Historians took place in Wrocław – the choice of venue was a powerful demonstration of the importance of the city within the new Poland and its normalized status as centre of science in Poland. The first session of the Congress dealt with the history of the Recovered Lands. In 1947 the Scientific Society of Toruń organized the "First Polish Meeting of the Historians of Pomerania and Prussia", where a future research agenda was discussed (ideas included the Baltic Slavs as a factor of regional unity in the history of the "new Polish North")²⁰. A "Pomeranian Conference" took place in Gdańsk in late October 1954. On the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the "recovering of Pomerania by Poland"²¹, the conference had to implement Marxist historical materialism in the historiographical research of the North. The present Polish *raison d'état* remained one of the major problems of such meetings then as well as in the years following (for example at the International Conference of Pomeranian Studies at Szczecin in September 1960, organized by the Polish Ethnographical Society (*Polskie Towarzystwo Ludoznawcze*) and well attended

also by historians). The 550th anniversary of the battle at Tannenberg/Grunwald that year – interpreted as a famous victory of the Poles over the Germans – provided an ideal opportunity for the state to encourage Polish identity in the northern regions²².

The activities of museums and local and regional societies were directly connected to the popularization and propagation by the state of Polish identity. There was a drive to research and communicate a historic Polish national movement in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Even in regions where the national movement enjoyed little success, its local representatives became symbols of the eternal struggle for the Polish interest. This was certainly the case in Masuria, where the large majority of the Slavic-speaking people had opted to be in Germany in the referendum after the First World War, identifying themselves as Prussians or – later and regardless of their speech – Germans in the 1920s and 1930s²³. State policy at a regional level, however, ignored this. In the official version, the Polish national movement was a central aspect of Masurian history. This was reflected by the polonization of place names. Several Masurian towns were named after the representatives of the Polish national movement there, despite the relative obscurity of the men commemorated. Rastenburg (Rastembork in Polish) was renamed Kętrzyn, after Wojciech Kętrzyński; Mehlsack became Pieniężno, after Seweryn Pienięzny Jr. (1890-1940), the publisher of the Polish newspaper “Gazeta Olsztyńska”, who died in a concentration camp; Wartenburg in Warmia became Barczewo, after the priest and historian Walenty Barczewski (1856-1928)²⁴. The roots of Polishness were sought for in the folk culture of the regions²⁵. Folk music was of primary importance here. Folk groups came to represent the old Polish culture in the territories and in the wider national context. This concentration corresponded neatly with the communist myth of people and folk culture. Perhaps the most popular example of this trend was the state ensemble of music and dance, *Śląsk*, founded in 1953 in Katowice with the task of cultivating Silesian folk culture²⁶.

During this period the first substantial monographs, methodological conceptualizations and syntheses emerged. In the late 1940s a series of official scientific and statistical monographs on the new western territories was published by the Western Institute of Poznań, entitled *Ziemia Staropolski* [The Lands of Ancient Poland]²⁷. Unsurprisingly, the Polish dimension of the regions, cities and towns was central, and there was an attempt made to relate the local to the broader “national” narrative by stressing past connections with Poland. The centralist (in the national and state sense) perspective dominated the vision of the regional past, resulting in concepts which included “Poland at the Baltic”, and “a city [Gdańsk] true to the [Polish-Lithuanian] Commonwealth”²⁸. An abundance of monographs and surveys on the history of Silesia, Pomerania, Masuria and Warmia, of Wrocław, Gdańsk, Szczecin, Elbląg and many more²⁹ appeared, especially in the 1960s, which sought to establish their place in the Polish grand narrative.

Historians made no bones about the one-sided nature of their endeavours. Zygmunt Wojciechowski (1900-1955)³⁰, the first director of the Western Institute of Poznań, wrote in the first volume of *The Lands of Ancient Poland*:

We do not attempt to write a so-called objective history on this place. Our task is to present the Polish history of those lands and to project the present-day Polish reality of them onto the historic background. Such a consideration of the problem is imposed not only by present-day demands, but also by our conviction that the Polish past of those lands is the most important one³¹.

In terms of new historiographical concepts and methodologies, the case of Pomerania and the Baltic area is of particular importance. In the immediate post-war period Karol Górski (1903-1988), Gerard Labuda (born 1916) and Marian Biskup (perhaps the most prominent representative of northern Polish historiography), developed a general historiographical concept of the so-called "Greater Pomerania", a well-defined and coherent historical region in the southern Baltic, including Pomerania and East Prussia. In the 1950s and 1960s, this concept was subject to further elaboration and application, particularly by Gerard Labuda³². Thus was constructed a historically-united northern territory which was not only incorporated into the Polish state but also extended (according to the designation "Pomerania") into the German Democratic Republic (Western Pomerania) and the Soviet Union (the Kaliningrad region, and parts of Lithuania). The most important aspect of this concept was the fact that while Polonity remained an important perspective, it was not central: historians tended instead to conceptualize Pomeranian history in terms of its regional specificity, and not primarily as a part of the Polish state or its national history. At the same time, Polish historians regarded rather critically the older Polish and German tradition of specific local history (*Heimatgeschichte*) and postulated – not only under Marxist influence – a more holistic regional historical approach which would focus attention more on general historical problems. One could say that the concepts of Labuda marked a decisive turn toward a Polish *Landesgeschichte* and regional history.

As in the inter-war period, tendencies towards an autonomous, specific conception of these regions as having discrete histories were regarded with hostility by a part of the academic establishment, which condemned such practitioners as particularist or even separatist. A prominent example of this was the Kashubian movement in Northern Poland, suffering under the pressure of the central authorities especially before 1956, but also between the 1960s and 1980s³³. Any attempt at conceptualizing Kashubian history was confronted by these problems, as Kashubian activists aroused the interest of the Polish state police³⁴. Only in the late 1950s and the 1960s did relatively open and critical public discussions on regionalism become possible in the Polish press. Leading spokesmen of the Kashubian movement (such as Lech Bądkowski, Tadeusz Bolduan) spearheaded new regional approaches, looking beyond the mainstream preoccupation with folk culture³⁵. But even if regionalism attained more respectability from the late

1950s, it still needed to remain within and contribute to the national culture. Nevertheless, for some scholars, historical argumentation continued to emphasize specific regional characteristics.

TOWARDS A POLISH “LANDESGESCHICHTE”?

The late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s represent the third period of regional history in the Western territories. In this period the historical legitimization of the post-war acquisitions lost its dominant role, though it remained important. *Détente* both in the general international scene and in Polish-German relations, in the context of the new West-German *Ostpolitik*, as well as the long-term integration of the Western territories into the Polish state, made it possible to consider them as integrated and ‘normal’ parts of Poland. Nevertheless, the Federal Republic of Germany refrained from acknowledging unambiguously Polish claims to the Western Territories, referring to the regions as “territories under Polish administration” in official discourse. Moreover, it was still considered necessary to enter into polemical debate with revisionists as well as German expatriates. An increasingly important consideration, however, was the “interior” propaganda of the Communist authorities: the modernization and improvements in the Western Territories since 1945 were to be presented not only as a Polish achievement, but as an achievement of the socialist political and economic system.

Unlike other communist countries of Eastern Europe such as Czechoslovakia or the GDR, in Poland science – including history – gained a fair measure of methodological autonomy from the late 1950s³⁶. The national perspective continued to dominate the historical narrative, more so than in some neighbouring countries. On the other hand, the official Marxist perspective ceased to be an obligatory methodology even at the official level after October 1956, and the state and Party authorities did not dare to impose it again. The 1960s to the 1980s saw the establishment of new academic and educational institutions in the Western Territories. Since the inter-war period only two Polish academic institutions had paid attention to the problems of the Western Territories – the Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań and the Pedagogical Academy in Katowice. Immediately after the war, the University of Wrocław had been taken over by the Polish state, while the University of Lwów had been ceded to the Soviet Union. Around the same time the Nicholas Copernicus University of Toruń and the Pedagogical Academy of Gdańsk were founded, followed by the Pedagogical Academy at Wrocław in 1950, which was moved to Opole four years later. Further institutes of higher education were not established until the late 1960s, among them pedagogical academies at Olsztyn, Bydgoszcz, Szczecin, Słupsk (all 1969) and Zielona Góra (1971); but universities remained at the forefront of historical research. As late as 1968 the University of Silesia at Katowice was founded, followed by the University of Gdańsk (1970) and the University of Szczecin only in 1984.

Political circumstances and institutional development went hand-in-hand with new tendencies in historiographical research and production. Regional history's time had come, and there was an outpouring of works on the histories of regions and cities – works which had been discussed and planned for decades. Small towns and modern-day administrative units were addressed; but the most important and extensive works of synthesis were devoted to larger territories, including Silesia, Pomerania, Western Prussia, Masuria and Warmia³⁷. The first major works were published on Silesia and Gdańsk, and in the 1990s were themselves subject to revisions with new conceptual ideas³⁸.

There is strong continuity of the persons involved in the historiography of northern Poland, with many of the historians who had set the agenda in the post-war period were still active in the 1980s and even in some cases in the 1990s, such as Marian Biskup (born 1922) and Gerard Labuda. The older generation of historians was not swept away: indeed they took part in conceptual and methodological innovation. The most important of these innovations – at least in the context of the history of the Western Territories – was regionalization and partial denationalization. Those tendencies were expressed in two ways. First, the regional perspective came to rival the primacy of the national. Although the role and place of those regions within Polish national history still remained prominent, it had ceased by the 1970s and 1980s to be the central point of historical reflection. While issues such as contacts between Wrocław and Poland from the 14th to the 20th centuries, attitudes of the East Prussian elite towards Poland in the 17th century, and "Polish Gdańsk" were still studied, they were no longer essential. Already at the Congress of Polish Historians at Wrocław in 1948, Stanisław Zajązkowski (1890-1977), who specialised in the Teutonic Order in medieval Prussia, had argued against projecting present-day territorial realities onto the history of "Recovered Lands"³⁹. But it was not until decades later that this idea was widely adopted. In the 1970s and 1980s monographs on Silesia, Prussia or Pomerania (but much less Warmia and Masuria) focused on the "internal" phenomena and processes in those lands, without a primary contextualization within Polish history or as a regional part of the national past.

Perhaps the best example of the boom in regional history is the multi-volume *Historia Pomorza* [History of Pomerania], edited by Gerard Labuda, and still in progress⁴⁰. Based on the concept of Greater Pomerania (discussed above), an extended synthesis of the history of that region was first discussed in the 1960s, and today seems to be the most rigorously prepared and self-critical work of synthesis devoted to a region in Polish post-war historiography⁴¹. However, the concept of regionalization of Pomeranian history could only partly be realized in the volumes published since the late 1960s. Whereas some chapters regarded Pomerania and related territories (such as Outer Pomerania, Eastern Prussia, and so on) as autonomous historical subjects, other sections reflected the former Polono-centrism. Nevertheless, the *History of Pomerania* and the

concept itself have continued to influence Polish regional historiography, particularly – but not only – in the North, up to the present day⁴².

The second, interrelated, expression of the autonomization of regional history was the increased attention to the German aspects of the history of the Recovered Lands, and on past relations between Germany and the territories. While these problems had never been entirely overlooked, they were emphasised much less than Polish national themes. The first signs of this development came as early as immediately after the war, from Jan Rutkowski (1886-1949), a leading historian in Poznań and one of the most important organizers of Polish historiography in the Western Territories since 1945. Rutkowski urged that his fellow Polish historians should not neglect or deny the presence and importance of German culture in those lands, and so avoid repeating the faults of their German counterparts⁴³. Confronting issues such as the German-speaking urban elites, and relations between German cultural centres became, by the 1980s, well established as topics of inquiry in Polish historiography. Moreover, such topics and problems have increasingly become regarded not in terms of those regions and “Germany”, but as an integral part of their past. In this sense, we may describe the recent trend as the formation of a Silesian, Pomeranian, Masurian *Landesgeschichte* in Polish historiography⁴⁴.

In terms of changing concepts of ethnic and minority groups in the western regions, the Kashubians represent a special case. Since the beginning of the Kashubian movement, the history of the group has been important to Kashubian intellectuals interested in reflecting on senses of identity, especially during the 20th century; but it was not until the 1980s that the Polish medievalist Gerard Labuda adopted a more sophisticated approach, considering the history of the ethnic group from a national, state and regional perspective⁴⁵. The newly-founded Kashubian institute at Gdańsk (1996) continues this work, although it veers towards topics such the Kashubian movement and Kashubian literature.

AFTER THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION

All these trends continued in the 1990s under the new political, cultural and ideological circumstances⁴⁶. While the national perspective remains predominant in the public domain, there has nonetheless been an acceleration of the shift away from the national lens over the past twenty years. Alongside these trends, the historiography of the Recovered Lands has also been subject to the programmatic application of ‘European’ and ‘multicultural’ perspectives. The most prominent example of this is undoubtedly Gdańsk. The city – whose ‘national character’ in the past and present has been the subject of Polish-German dispute since the 19th century – was gradually recast as a theatre of Polish-German co-existence, and even as a city with great multicultural and European traditions. Thus, a new image of the city could be forged, important, amongst other things, for tourism. Polish-German contact and European integration in the general Baltic region could be legitimated through references to the past. Historians and

intellectuals as well as local and state representatives took part in this new appraisal of historical culture in Gdańsk, which culminated in the city's millennium in 1997⁴⁷. The cultural 'melting pot' became a very popular metaphor in the 1990s. Even the leading Polish medievalist and former Polish education minister Henryk Samsonowicz⁴⁸ used the character of the bishop of Prague and martyr St Adalbert (died 997) – whose *Vita* (by Johannes Canaparius) mentioned the city for the first time 1000 years ago – to point out the European dimension of the city's history. By emphasizing the pilgrimage of Adalbert from Bohemia via Rome, France, Germany and Poland to old Prussia, Samsonowicz accentuated the international dimension of the patron saint. A German author, Reinhold Lehmann, wrote expressively: "Adalbert was completely European. How else could a Bohemian have become a Polish patron saint? Should a lobbyist for Polish access to the EU be sought for, this profile would suit him perfectly"⁴⁹. Focus on the international and multicultural history of Gdańsk was not confined to the millennial celebrations: historians continue to explore these aspects and today they are prominent topics in both academic and popular historical production⁵⁰.

A similar tendency can also be observed in former Outer Pomerania, with Szczecin as its centre⁵¹, or in Silesia and Wrocław⁵², where German-Polish cooperation or even trilateral German-Polish-Czech cooperation has become very fashionable among historians. In Warmia and Masuria, younger scholars have since the 1990s begun to emphasise the "multicultural roots" of the regional tradition. Such a form of consciousness was certainly conditioned by the fact that its propagators were the second or third generation of Polish post-war settlers in the region. Therefore they had a sense of Masurian and Warmian identity, but were also keenly aware of pre-war society and culture in the regions. Such notions as border, multiculturalism, and cultural transfer have become fashionable watchwords in the new perception of Warmian-Masurian traditions. It was little wonder that one of the most prominent speakers of this cultural and intellectual movement, the historian Robert Traba, depicted Masuria as a "landscape of a thousand borders"⁵³. Moreover, the "repolonization" policy of the early post-war period as well as the myth of the "Recovered Lands" has been considered rather critically.

We are aware of the cultural and multi-ethnic past [of the region]. Representing Polish identity, we discover the local Prussian, German, native heritage at the same time, in order to show – remembering the tragedies of the 20th century – that we strive for a democratic Fatherland and appreciate the good of other nations.

So stated, in 1991, the first volume of the review "Borussia" which was connected with this cultural movement in Masuria⁵⁴. Warmia and Masuria's diversity in ethnicity, religion, language and culture has been embraced by recent intellectual movements as a positive aspect regional identity, even if the new tendency has yet to percolate completely among the general public⁵⁵.

The re-orientation of historical reflection towards regions and cities has been directly connected with general political demands for state decentralization. An ideological

support has been provided by the identity policy of the so-called *mała Ojczyzna* [small Fatherlands], something akin to the German *Heimat*, but which is completely absent from the vocabulary of other neighbouring political languages, such as Czech and Slovak. Since the 1990s the *mała Ojczyzna* has become a significant political concept, legitimizing regional and political identities within – though seldom against – the national state.

CONCLUSIONS

As we have seen, Polish historiography and historical reflection on the “Recovered Lands” underwent a continuous and significant alteration. From the inter-war focus on the Polish character of the regions, historiography after 1945 was concerned with legitimizing the recent territorial changes: history had a national “social mission”. From the 1950s, while the national perspective remained important, historians’ concepts and publications became more sophisticated and coordinated. This trend was amplified in the following two decades, as historians increasingly concerned themselves with ‘internal’ and specific aspects of regional and local history. In these decades the *Landesgeschichte* in the Western and Northern territories incorporated in 1945 came into existence. As a continuation of that development, but at the same time as the result of the political and cultural change of 1989, the 1990s saw a concentration on multiculturalism, internationalism and Europeanism, without a complete abandonment of the national perspective.

Although in some respects the recent trends in the historiography of the “Recovered Lands” bears comparison with other European examples, it may be argued that the shift towards *Landesgeschichte* and the post-1989 developments are almost unique in a Polish context – at least in terms of intensity. However, similar trends are observable in regions like the former Galicia. Clearly, today the historiography of the “Recovered Lands” no longer has to fulfil a prescribed task on behalf of the state; but recent developments are no less a product of contemporary concerns as well as the specific heritage of these regions.

NOTES

- ¹ On the territorial incorporations, see for example E. Kaszuba, *Dzieje Śląska po 1945 roku* [History of Silesia after 1945], in M. Czaplinski, E. Kaszuba, G. Wąs, R. Żerelik (eds.), *Historia Śląska*, Wrocław 2002, pp. 423-462; P. Madajczyk, *Przyłączenie Śląska Opolskiego do Polski, 1945-1948* [Annexation of the Opole Silesia into Poland, 1945-1948], Warsaw 1996; J. Hackmann (ed.), *Stettin/Szczecin, 1945-1946: Dokumente – Erinnerungen/Dokumenty – wspomnienia*, Rostock 1994; K. Kozłowski, *Pierwsze dziesięć lat władzy politycznej na Pomorzu Zachodnim, 1945-1955* [The First Ten Years of Political Rule in the Outer Pomerania, 1945-1955], Warsaw 1994.
- ² See a paradigmatical monography by M. Wagner, *“Wir waren alle Fremde”: Die Neuformierung dörflicher Gesellschaft in Masuren seit 1945*, Münster 2001; C. Osękowski, *Spoleczeństwo Polski zachodniej i północnej w latach, 1945-1956: Procesy integracji i dezintegracji* [The Society of Western and Northern Poland: Integrative and Desintegrative Processes], Zielona Góra 1994; E. Kaszuba, *Między propagandą a rzeczywistością: Polska ludność Wrocławia w latach, 1945-1947* [Between Propaganda and Reality: the Polish population of Wrocław from 1945 to 1947], Wrocław 1997.
- ³ See J. Misztal, *Weryfikacja narodowościowa na Ziemiach Odzyskanych* [National Verification in the Recovered Lands], Warszawa 1990; J. Misztal, *Weryfikacja narodowościowa na Śląsku Opolskim* [National Verification in the Opole Silesia], Opole 1984; L. Belzyt, *Zum Verfahren der nationalen Verifikation in den Gebieten des ehemaligen Ostpreußen, 1945-1950*, in “Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands” 1990, 39, pp. 247-269; L. Belzyt, *Między Polską a Niemcami: Weryfikacja narodowościowa i jej następstwa na Warmii, Mazurach i Powiślu w latach, 1945-1960* [Between Poland and Germany: National Verification and its Results in Warmia, Masuria and the Vistule region], Toruń 1998, pp. 63-73, 142-154.
- ⁴ D. Berlińska, *Mniejszość niemiecka na Śląsku Opolskim w poszukiwaniu tożsamości* [The German Minority in Opole Silesia in Search of Identity], Opole 1999.
- ⁵ As examples for Pomerania, Gdańsk and Western Prussia: S. Askenazy, *Gdańsk a Polska*, Warsaw 1918 (2nd ed. 1923, revised ed. 1997; German version: *Danzig und Polen*, Warschau 1919, 2nd ed., 1930); J. Fürst, *Der Widersinn des polnischen Korridors: Ethnographisch, geschichtlich und wirtschaftlich dargestellt*, Berlin 1926; J. Kaufmann, *Das Verhältnis der Deutschen, Polen und Kaschuben in Westpreußen und Danzig*, Danzig 1919; E. Keyser, *Die Bedeutung der Deutschen und Slawen für Westpreußen*, Danzig 1919; W. Recke, *Die polnische Frage als Problem der europäischen Politik*, Berlin 1927; W. Sobieski, *Walka o Pomorze* [The Struggle for Pomerania], Poznań 1928; W. Recke, *Der Kampf um Pommerellen: Krit. Bericht über das Buch von W. Sobieski*, Danzig 1936; F. Znaniecki, *Socjologia walki o Pomorze* [The Sociology of the Struggle for Pomerania], Toruń 1935; E. Keyser (ed.), *Der Kampf um die Weichsel: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des polnischen Korridors*, Stuttgart - Berlin - Leipzig 1926; A. Zelle, *100 Korridorthesen. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Polen*, Berlin 1933.
- ⁶ M. Niedzielska, *Toruń jako ośrodek nauki historycznej* [Toruń as a Centre of the Historical Science], in A. Tomczak (ed.), *Dzieje historiografii Pomorza Gdańskiego i Prus Wschodnich, 1920-1939 (1944)* [History of the Historiography of Eastern Pomerania and Eastern Prussia, 1920-1939 (1944)], Toruń 1922, p. 9.
- ⁷ Zaolzie was a former part of Austrian Silesia in the Region of Cieszyn (Czech Těšín, German Teschen) on the right bank of the river Olza (Olše), which became Czechoslovakian after 1919. According to the census of 1910, a large part of the population was Polish-speaking. A short conflict between Poland and Czechoslovakia took place in the region of Cieszyn in January 1919. At the end, the Allies negotiated the Czech-Polish frontier on the Olza, which favoured rather Czech interests and gave rise to a relatively large Polish minority in Czechoslovakia as well as to long-term political tensions between the two states in the inter-war period. In October 1938, shortly after the Treaty of Munich and encouraged by Germany, Poland annexed the region and attempted to maintain it even after the war. At the same time (1945-1946), the Czechoslovak authorities claimed rights to parts of Lower Silesia and the Kłodzko-Country. As late

- as 1958 both sides signed a new treaty in Warsaw, which regulated definitively these salient problems and acknowledged the frontier from the inter-war period. See, for example, M.K. Kamiński, *Konflikt polsko-czeski, 1918-1921* [The Polish-Czech conflict, 1918-1921], Warsaw 2001; S. Zahradnik, M. Ryczkowski, *Korzenie Zaolzia* [The Roots of Zaolze], Warsaw 1992; D. Gawrecki, *Politické a národnostní poměry na Těšínském Slezsku, 1918-1938* [Political and Ethnic Relations in Teschen-Silesia, 1918-1938], Český Těšín 1999.
- ⁸ However, that was absolutely not true for the region of Glatz/Kłodzko. This part of medieval Bohemia and pre-modern Silesia always remained – except for two or three years under Bolesław I around 1000 – outside the territory of Poland or the Piast Duchies in Silesia.
- ⁹ See, for example, M. Řezník, *Das Königliche Preußen in den deutsch-polnischen Auseinandersetzungen um den "Historischen Charakter" Pommerellens in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts*, in D. Willoweit, H. Lemberg (eds.), *Reiche und Territorien in Ostmitteleuropa: Historische Beziehungen und politische Herrschaftslegitimation*, Munich 2006, pp. 311-328.
- ¹⁰ Quoted after the DVD edition *Ziemie odzyskane* [Recovered Lands] in the series "Propaganda PRL-u" [Propaganda in the Peoples' Republic of Poland], published by Wytwornia Filmów Dokumentalnych i Fabularnych (WFDiF), G. Ryby. Quoted after original subtitles in this edition.
- ¹¹ E. Sukertowa-Biedrawina, *Polskość Mazurów i Warmiaków* [The Polishness of Masurians and Warmians], Olsztyn 1946; J. Mitkowski, *Pomorze Zachodnie w stosunku do Polski* [Farther Pomerania in Its Relation to Poland], Poznań 1946; K. Górski, *Polityczna rola Warmii w Rzeczypospolitej* [The Political Role of Warmia in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth], in "Przegląd Zachodni", 1949, 7/8, pp. 1-23; M. Pelczar, *Polski Gdańsk* [Polish Gdańsk], Gdańsk 1947; A. Wielopolski, *Elbag, dzieje i przyszłość* [Elbląg, Past and Future], Gdańsk - Bydgoszcz - Szczecin 1946; K. Piwarski, *Dzieje Prus Wschodnich w czasach nowożytnych* [History of Eastern Prussia in the Early Modern Period], Gdańsk 1946; W. Konopczyński, *Kwestia bałtycka do XX wieku* [The Baltic Question to the 20th Century], Gdańsk 1946.
- ¹² For the historiography after the World War II, especially in the Recovered Lands, see J. Hackmann, *Ostpreußen und Westpreußen in deutscher und polnischer Sicht: Landeshistorie als beziehungsgeschichtliches Problem*, Wiesbaden 1996; M. Górny, *Przed wszystkim ma być naród: Marksistowskie historiografie w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej* [The Nation Shall Be Above All: Marxist Historiographies in East-Central Europe], Warsaw 2007; R. Stobiecki, *Historiografia PRL: ani dobra, ani mądra, ani piękna... ale skomplikowana: Studia i szkice* [Historiography in the People's Republic of Poland: Not good, not wise, not nice... but complicated: Studies and Sketches], Warsaw 2007.
- ¹³ See J. Sikorski, *Ośrodek Badań Naukowych im: Wojciecha Kętrzyńskiego i jego rola w olsztyńskim środowisku humanistycznym* [Wojciech-Kętrzyński-Institute of Research and Its Role in the Humanities' Centre at Olsztyn], Olsztyn 1986. See also W. Wrzesiński, *Olsztyńskie regionalne badania historyczne, 1945-1997* [Regional Historical Research at Olsztyn, 1945-1997], in "Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie", 1998, 1 (219), pp. 73-86.
- ¹⁴ E. Sukeertowa-Biedrawina, *Dawno i niedawno: Wspomnienia* [Long Ago And Not Long Ago: Memoirs], Olsztyn 1965.
- ¹⁵ Among the directors of the institute, leading Polish historians dealing with the Recovered Lands or the Polish-German relations have dominated: Zygmunt Wojciechowski 1945-1955 (the present-day Western Institute at Poznań is named after him), Kazimierz Piwarski 1956-1958, Gerard Labuda 1959-1961, Lech Trzeciakowski 1974-1978 and Antoni Czubiński 1978-1990.
- ¹⁶ Górny, *Przed wszystkim ma być naród* cit., p. 67.
- ¹⁷ See G. Labuda, *Zakład Historii Pomorza Instytutu Historii PAN* [The Centre of Pomeranian History of the Historical Institute of the Polish Science Academy], in "Kwartalnik Historyczny", 1953, 1, pp. 326-329.

- ¹⁸ P.O. Loew, *Danzig und seine Vergangenheit, 1793-1997: Die Geschichtskultur einer Stadt zwischen Deutschland und Polen*, Osnabrück 1997, p. 369.
- ¹⁹ J. Tyszkiewicz, *Sto wielkich dni Wrocławia: Wystawa Ziem Odkrzyszanych we Wrocławiu a propaganda polityczna ziem zachodnich i północnych w latach, 1945-1948* [Hundred Great Days of Wrocław: The Exhibition of the Recovered Lands at Wrocław and the Political Propaganda of the Western and Northern Lands, 1945-1948], Wrocław 1997.
- ²⁰ Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., p. 267.
- ²¹ In 1454 a conflict between the Prussian estates and the Teutonic Order began. The nobility and towns withdrew their allegiance to the Order and asked the King of Poland to assume authority in Prussia. After some hesitation, Casimir IV supported the Prussian estates. At the end of the following Polish-Teutonic war and according to the Treaty of Toruń (1466), western parts of the Teutonic state including Gdańsk, Toruń, Elbląg and Warmia became Polish, and the Polish King obtained sovereignty over Teutonic East Prussia as a seignorial lord.
- ²² See for example the representative publication *Grunwald: 550 lat chwały* [Grunwald: 550 years of honour], ed. by J. St. Kopczewski, M. Suchniński, Warsaw 1960. In the same year, the famous novel of H. Sienkiewicz, "The Crusaders" was made into a film by Aleksander Ford. See L. Jockheck, *Ein Nationalmythos in "Eastman Color": Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg 1410 im polnischen Monumentalfilm Die Kreuzritter von Aleksander Ford*, in D. Albrecht, M. Thoemmes (eds.), *Mare Balticum: Begegnungen zu Heimat, Geschichte, Kultur an der Ostsee*, Munich 2005, pp. 133-168.
- ²³ R. Blanke, *Polish-speaking Germans? Language and National Identity among the Masurians since 1871*, Cologne - Weimar - Vienna 2001.
- ²⁴ In Silesia, the town Reichenbach (Rychbach in the polonized version) was renamed Dzierżoniów after the Polish priest Jan Dzierżoń (1811-1905), who was one of the most important persons worldwide in the development of beekeeping.
- ²⁵ W. Gębik, *Pieśni ludowe Mazur i Warmii* [Folk Songs in Masuria and Warmia], Olsztyn 1956; E. Su-kertowa-Biedrawina, *Świadomość narodowa na Mazurach i Warmii w pieśni ludowej* [National Consciousness in Masuria and Warmia in Folk Songs], in "Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie", 1962, 1 (75), p. 11.
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- ²⁷ "Ziemie Staropolski", vol. 1-6. Poznań 1948-1959.
- ²⁸ E. Cieślak, *Miasto wierne Rzeczypospolitej (Szkice gdańskie, XVII - XVIII w.)* [A City True to the Commonwealth (Gdańsk Sketches, 17th - 18th cent.)], Warsaw 1959.
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- ³⁰ Wojciechowski, a law historian and medievalist, propagated the idea of the Polish border on the Oder already in his monographs about Silesia and Prussia at the beginning of the 1930s: Z. Wojciechowski, *Ustrój polityczny Śląska do końca XIV wieku* [The political constitution of Silesia to the end of the 14th century], 1932; *Rozwój terytorialny Prus w stosunku do Polski* [The territorial development of Prussia in relation to Poland], Toruń 1933. His nationalist orientation and his connexions with the national democrats in the inter-war period provoked communist attacks on him and on the Western Institute in the Stalinist period. See M. Krzoska, *Für ein Polen an der Oder und Ostsee. Zygmunt Wojciechowski (1900–1955) als Historiker und Publizist*, Osnabrück 2003.
- ³¹ Z. Wojciechowski, *Słowo wstępne* [Introduction], in “Ziemie Staropolski” [The Lands of Ancient Poland], vol. 1, *Dolny Śląsk* [Lower Silesia], part 1, 2nd ed., Poznań 1950, pp. 10-11.
- ³² J. Hackmann, *Gerarda Labudy koncepcja historii Pomorza*, in “Przegląd Zachodnio-Pomorski”, 1994, 2, pp. 7-36.
- ³³ C. Obracht-Prondzyński, *Kaszubi: Między dyskryminacją a regionalną podmiotowością* [The Kashubians: Between Discrimination and Regional Subjectivity], Gdańsk 2002, pp. 153-180.
- ³⁴ A. Paczoska, *Oskarżeni o separatyzm: Działania tajnych służb PRL wobec działaczy kaszubskich w latach, 1945-1970* [Accused of Separatism: Activities of the Security Police Towards the Kashubian Activists, 1945-1970], in “Pamięć i sprawiedliwość”, Pismo IPN, 2004, 2 (6), pp. 205-233.
- ³⁵ See “Życie i Myśl”, 1961, 3/4, pp. 75-119.
- ³⁶ Stobiecki, *Historiografia* cit., pp. 163-183; J. Topolski, *Polish Historians and Marxism after World War II*, in “Studies in East European Thought”, 1992, 2, pp. 169-183.
- ³⁷ S. Achremczyk, *Warmia i Mazury: Zarys dziejów* [Warmia and Masuria: Outline of History], Olsztyn 1985; W. Odyniec, *Dzieje Prus Królewskich, 1454-1772: zarys monograficzny* [History of the Royal Prussia, 1454-1772: A Monographical Outline], Warsaw 1972; W. Odyniec (ed.), *Dzieje Pomorza Nadwiślańskiego: Od VII wieku do 1945 roku* [History of the Vistule Pomerania: From the 7th Century to 1945], Gdańsk 1978.
- ³⁸ “*Historia Śląska*” [History of Silesia], 3 vols., Wrocław 1960-1985. For Gdańsk: E. Cieślak, C. Biernat, *History of Gdańsk: Gdańsk 1988*, in E. Cieślak (ed.), *Historia Gdańska* [History of Gdańsk], vols. 1-2, Gdańsk 1978-1982 (other parts of this voluminous work followed in the 1990s).
- ³⁹ S. Zajązkowski, *O periodyzacji dziejów Ziemi Odzyskanych* [On the Periodization of History of the Recovered Lands], in “Pamiętnik VII powszechnego zjazdu historyków polskich we Wrocławiu 19-20 września 1948” [Proceedings of the 7th Polish Historians’ Congress at Wrocław, 19th-20th September 1948], vol. 1, Warsaw 1948, p. 21.
- ⁴⁰ Since 2000/2001, the editorial and scientific coordination have been taken over by Stanisław Salmonowicz.
- ⁴¹ J. Hackmann, *Gerarda Labudy koncepcja historii Pomorza* [Gerard Labuda’s Concept of the History of Pomerania], in “Przegląd Zachodnio-Pomorski”, 1994, 2, pp. 7-36.
- ⁴² Id., *Ostpreußen* cit., pp. 285-290.
- ⁴³ J. Rutkowski, *Zadania nauk historycznych w procesie zespalania duchowego ziem odzyskanych z Polską* [The Tasks of Historical Sciences in the Process of Spiritual Integration of the Recovered Lands with Poland], in “IV sesja Rady Naukowej dla zagadnień ziem odzyskanych”, 18-21 XII 1946 [4th Session of the Scientific Council for the Problems of the Recovered Lands, 18th-21st Dec. 1946], Vol. 2, Kraków 1947, p. 68. See also Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., pp. 263f.
- ⁴⁴ Hackmann, *Ostpreußen* cit., pp. 290-304.
- ⁴⁵ G. Labuda, *Historia Kaszubów na tle historii Pomorza* [History of the Kashubians on the Background of the History of Pomerania], Gdańsk 1992 (a simultaneous edition in Polish, Kashubian, English and German).

- ⁴⁶ There were also significant developments at the institutional level. For example, since the 1990s several universities have been established, partly from the former high schools and pedagogical academies: the University of Opole in 1994, the University of Warmia and Masuria at Olsztyn in 1999, the University of Zielona Góra in 2001 and, most recently, the Casimir the Great University at Bydgoszcz in 2005.
- ⁴⁷ R. Rexheuser, *Deutsche Geschichte als polnisches Problem: Beobachtungen zum tausendjährigen Jubiläum in Danzig 1997*, in M. Weber (ed.), *Deutschlands Osten – Polens Westen: Vergleichende Studien zur geschichtlichen Landeskunde*, Frankfurt 2001, pp. 253-276; Loew, *Danzig* cit., pp. 516-522.
- ⁴⁸ In the 1989-90 cabinet of Tadeusz Mazowiecki.
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- ⁵⁰ E.g. M. Dymnicka, Z. Opacki (eds.), *Tożsamość miejsca i ludzi: Gdańszczanie i ich miasto w perspektywie historyczno-socjologicznej* [The Identity of Place and People: The Inhabitants of Gdańsk in the Historical-Sociological Perspective], Warsaw 2003, a volume published as a result of the First World Gdańsk Reunion, a great festivity which took place in May 2002.
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Rediscovering Ourselves. Frontiers and Identities in Polish Historiography of the 19th and 20th Century (1989-2005)

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Artykuł prezentuje główne nurty obecne w najnowszej historiografii polskiej (1989-2005) na polu badań związanych z problemami "tożsamości" w kontekście szeroko pojętych granic (państwowych, geograficznych, społecznych, mentalnych). "Tożsamość" jako pojęcie badawcze zdomowało się w polskiej historiografii dopiero w latach dziewięćdziesiątych dwudziestego wieku. Było to efektem szerszego otwarcia historiografii na pokrewne nauki społeczne, przede wszystkim socjologię, etnologię i antropologię kulturową. Badania historyczne ostatniego piętnastolecia związane z interesującą nas problematyką, w odróżnieniu od historii politycznej, były często kontynuacją wcześniejszych badań, w których posługiwano się, szczególnie w odniesieniu do problemów narodowościowych, pojęciem "świadomości". Kontynuacją ważnych dotychczasowych wątków były przede wszystkim studia dotyczące kształtowania się nowoczesnego narodu, które w latach dziewięćdziesiątych stanowiły główny nurt badawczy związany z tożsamością. Historycy i socjologowie dokonują swoistej reinterpretacji na innych polach, m.in. badań stereotypów i wyobrażeń. Począwszy od 1989 roku podejmują także nowe tematy związane z problemem tożsamości narodowej, kulturowej i religijnej na styku kultur (problem pogranicza). Charakterystycznym, godnym podkreślenia zjawiskiem jest w tym wypadku interdyscyplinarność i międzynarodowy charakter badań. Trwa debata na temat skuteczności metod badawczych na tym polu. Dominującymi ośrodkami w tym wypadku są: Szczecin, Poznań, Wrocław, Gdańsk, Olsztyn, Lublin i Białystok.

Pojęcia kluczowe: tożsamość, świadomość, naród, nacjonalizm, naród szlachecki, granica, pogranicze, kresy, ojczyzna, mała ojczyzna.

The decisiveness of the 1989 Transformation is visible above all in Polish political history of the 19th and 20th century. In this case the abolition of censorship and free access to the earlier unavailable archives undermined the officially obligatory knowledge. The problem of identity in the context of borders, whether national, geographical, social or mental belongs to the fields of social history and history of ideas. In these fields, during the last fifteen years Polish historians have been discovering new topics, reinterpreting the other ones but also effectively continuing some previous examinations.

Research on the formation of Polish national identity constitutes examples of the peculiar critical continuation, which resulted in interesting studies in the 1990s. The examinations of national and religious stereotypes belongs to the rediscovered historical research fields. Admittedly historians have been carrying out the researches on the topic since the 1970s but it concerned almost only the stereotype of German. This was the only topic considered as politically correct, but it existed in the emptiness, making wider comparative studies impossible. Thanks to the political transformation examinations of the national, ethnic and religious co-existence of cultures in the context of borderland could appear. This trend is very important also because it brought the attempt to overcome the dominating national paradigm in historiography.

FRONTIERS/BORDERS, IDENTITY AND NATION

The notion of 'identity' (*tożsamość*) had rarely been used by Polish historians until the end of the 1990s. 'Identity' has appeared in the field of history as a result of the developing openness of Polish historiography, as yet hermetic, for other social sciences. Thanks to cooperation with sociologists and ethnologists, historians have slowly absorbed the concept of 'identity' and more often find that it is indispensable to contemporary studies (unfortunately usually the usage of this word does not involve deep theoretical reflection). However identity has not displaced the notion of 'consciousness' (*świadomość*). This is a concept still spread the most amongst researchers, especially in the context of national identity studies, even though 'consciousness' does not, as strongly as *identity*, automatically imply the sense of unity and separateness. According to Ireneusz Ichnatowicz 'national consciousness' means the strong feeling of being a part of nation, a part of the language community, which inhabits the closed territory.

The most widespread studies of identity have concerned so far the idea of national identity in searching for a reply to the leading question about ways of forming the Polish nation in the context of the essential modern theories of nation, nationhood and nationalism (Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson). The most significant text of this trend, by Tomasz Kizwalter, *O nowoczesności narodu. Przypadek Polski* [On Nation's Modernity. The Polish case], focuses on the evolution of 'nobility identity' (*tożsamość szlachecka*) and *nobility nation* (*naród szlachecki*) into 'national identity'. The bounds linking together the nobility nation in The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (16th-18th century) were citizen, political, ideological rather than ethnic. According to Janusz Tazbir 'nation' had political meaning and was reserved for a gentry-group with political privileges, no matter what was their ethnic origin or their religion¹. During the 19th century the meaning of the notion of 'nation' was changing into an ethnic sense (nation without state), but historians observe the co-existence of the ethnic idea of national identity and the historical/old idea of national identity.

In the 19th century in the Polish case, or rather in the case of the partitioned Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth we are dealing with the multiethnic, multireligious and

multicultural areas, where the group identity was spread between 'local identity' (*tutejszość*) and strong 'national identity' through the different kinds of regional and ethnic identities. Moreover, a double national identity was still existing (e.g. *gente Rutheni/Lithuani, natione Poloni*) as a heritage of the non-existing Commonwealth. During the last fifteen years historians analyzed their transformations, especially focusing on the frontiers and interactions between different ideas of national identity (Polish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Jewish etc.) visible among others through the created images of the others. Historians have been interested in significant factors shaping the collective identity: ethos, values, symbols, customs, rituals and religion. For a few years studies of collective memory have also been very popular.

In the context of the 19th century the coexistence of autochthones and invaders has appeared as a more and more fascinating topic. A question arose regarding the real borders between them and about the meaning of betrayal, collaboration².

BORDERLANDS AND IDENTITY: ABOUT MENTAL BORDERS IN/OUT OF CONTEXT OF STATE FRONTIERS

State frontiers imply almost automatically a relationship of centre-periphery. Centre means power. Periphery – a second rate area. Its economic and cultural development usually led to the formation of a region and regional identity³. According to ethnologic theories the periphery (or frontier area) does not automatically become a 'borderland' (*pogranicze*). It has to be an area inhabited by two or more ethnic groups, characterized by their own culture or type of co-existence of two or more ethnic groups (harmonic, separated co-existence, *ethnic melting pot - tygiel kulturowy*) and implies a type of collective identity: identity of a borderland or a cross-border identity connected with the concept of interarea (*Zwischenraume, międzyprzestrzeń*). Polish historians use also the common word *kresy*. This word, which stresses distance from a centre, could be translated into English literally as 'limits', but in a Polish historiographical context it means borderlands, mainly – but not only – the eastern borderlands of the Second Polish Republic. The notion *kresy* which dominated the Polish emigration sociopolitical journalism and memories after the second world war, was saturated with nostalgia for the lost 'homeland' (*mała ojczyzna*). At the same time it was almost absent in the Polish People's Republic historiography. This has changed thanks to the French historian Daniel Beauvois, whose works: *Polacy na Ukrainie 1831-1863. Szlachta polska na Wołyniu, Podolu i Kijowszczyźnie* [Poles in Ukraine 1831 - 1863. Polish Nobility in Volyn, Podole and Kyivshchyna] and *Walka o ziemię. Szlachta polska na Ukrainie prawobrzeżnej. Pomiędzy caratem a ludem ukraińskim 1863-1914* [Battle for Lands. Polish Nobility in Right - Bank Ukraine. Between Tsar and Ukrainian People 1863 - 1914] renewed historians' interest in this topic and simultaneously contributed to the demythologization of *kresy*. He devoted a lot of publications to this problem⁴. The interest in the subject resulted in many works on the history of ideas field of study. Polish

historians have studied the function of eastern borderlands (*kresy wschodnie*) and western borderlands (*kresy zachodnie*) in political thought and political parties' programs, among others The National Democracy.

The problem of the borderland in Polish historiography is connected with the issue of so-called 'wandering frontier/borders' (*wędrującej granicy*). The moving of state frontiers in this part of Europe caused the mixing of culture and ethnos (historians have studied geographical transformation of frontiers and borders through the ages for several dozen years) but also the confusion of notions. Talking about borderlands in the Polish context we could mean the borderlands of the former Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth (*Rzeczpospolita szlachecka*) after the Partition of the country (19th century), the borderlands of the Second Polish Republic (1918-1939) or the borderlands of contemporary Poland (1945-2006).

Researches of a borderland are the most distinct trend in the field of frontier/borders and identities' studies in contemporary Polish historiography. In this case historians undoubtedly follow the sociological and linguistic studies⁵. At the beginning historians used rather traditional, positivistic methods focusing on history of institutions (schools, organizations etc.). However the modern interdisciplinary and international groups of researchers have just created new projects combining history and ethnology or history and sociology, very often using the alternative sources: iconography or oral sources. The dying down of the macrohistorical discussion on definition of nation in the end of 90s has given an impulse to developing studies focusing on the self-identification of the concrete human being. This attitude enabled giving up the ethnocentric (ideological) approach. The microhistorical case studies are the methodological foundations of new projects. The main research questions concern the existence, construction and disappearing of borders between social, ethnic, religious groups: problems of assimilation or enculturation or conflicts, stereotypes. Notions such as 'cultural assimilation' and 'national assimilation' dominate over 'enculturation'. Witold Molik, the researcher of the German-Polish contacts, is an adherent of using the notion of enculturation. According to his ethnohistorical approach this notion, taken over from the workshop of ethnologists, means the process of cultural changes which are caused by flowing of content between comparatively autonomous communities differing culturally⁶. Other groups of studies concern:

- the role of mental borders (studies of customs, religion, social classes) as factors forming processes of assimilation;
- identity and the city on the borderland: e.g. Gdańsk, Lwów, Poznań;
- problem of so-called 'fake identity';
- problem of homeland (*haimat, mała ojczyzna*).

University centres specialized in such research are situated on formerly multicultural borderlands or present day border areas: Szczecin, Olsztyn, Poznań, Wrocław, Białystok and Rzeszów.

POLITICAL CONTEXT

The awareness of the fact that various notions connected with borderlands (as the Reunited Lands, the Western Lands, *Kresy*) are not semantically neutral resulted in examinations involving political history and history of ideas. It concerns the topic of 'frontiers' and 'frontiers areas' as the important element of different political parties' programs, as the element of the ideas about the future of Polish Republic. Historians have studied the argumentation for including the different areas to revive Republic and the usage of this topic in the propaganda during the interwar period, the second world war and post-war times⁷. More and more monographs are devoted to the interesting subject of 'The Western Lands' as the important component constructing the identity of power of the communist authorities⁸. On the other hand, settlement policy and generally the Polish policy towards national minorities arouse historians' vivid interest, among others on the problems of displacement, emigration, and the issue of families' reunification⁹.

BORDERLAND IN POLISH SOCIOLOGY

The roots of sociology of borderland are various and date back to the second half of the 19th century. Its origins due not only to the development of social sciences but also to the processes taking place in Europe and in Poland at that time. Evident traits of borderland sociology can be noticed in the sociology of Ludwik Gumplowicz (1838-1909). His works, published mainly in German, included such topics as war of races, social conflict, conflict between religions and nations, function of the state as a category of domination of one group over other as well as other issues that form elements of sociology of borderland. Also Józef Supiński (1804-1893) paid his tribute to sociology of borderland. His concepts on nation and state as well as typology of social groups are a clear sign that from the sociology of state and nation emerges slowly sociology of borderland. However it was Florian Znaniński (1882-1958) and his students who gave the most to the beginning of sociology of borderland.

Znaniński used his theoretical system also to analyze such issues as conflicts between aliens and the borderland of Pomerania. It was from his initiative that Józef Chałasiński prepared a thorough case study based on empirical materials of Polish-German conflict in these lands. Znaniński expressed new research problems, set up a thesis and developed precise language in reference to his studies on Pomerania borderland.

His work is continued by different University teams. Poznań University continues the research on the Polish-German borderland with interesting works of Władysław Markiewicz, Zygmunt Dulczewski, Andrzej Kwilecki, Andrzej Sakson¹⁰. Among many works that study borderland and ethnic minorities the works of Antonina Kłosowska are also worth noticing¹¹. They investigate the neighbourhood of nations and ethnic minorities, identity issues, national identification as well national attitudes in case of borderland; a periodical *Pogranicze. Studia Społeczne* [Borderland, Social Studies] is published. A good example of what is in the center of interests of borderland studies are

two volumes *Transgarniczność w perspektywie socjologicznej* [Transborders-sociological perspective] published in Zielona Góra.

Grzegorz Babiński from the Jagiellonian University notices the revival of the topic of borderland in the early 90s¹². The conclusions he draws are closely connected with the character of the studies and the main problem they deal with. Changes of the very concept of the borderland and changing divisions and typology of the borderlands lead to a conclusion that most of contemporary borderlands have lost their status as a contact point between different, often competing centres. The border has now a symbolic significance allowing for a free flow of ideas, individuals and social groups. The Polish studies of borderland describe and explain the social and cultural aspects of borderlands, the processes of changes they undergo, new institutions that emerge and changing dynamics of conflict and cooperation.

An interesting phenomenon where borderland is involved is the development of different associations and non profit organizations that cultivate the borderland dialogue and spirit. A good example here is the Borderland Foundation that was established in May 1990. It is an independent non-governmental organization, and does not conduct any political or economic activity. The Foundation's program activity is devoted exclusively to propagating the ethos of the borderland, and to building bridges between the peoples of different religions, ethnicities, nationalities, and cultures¹³.

THE IMAGES OF OTHERS

The deepened historical researches on stereotypes were undertaken in the 1970s¹⁴. Nowadays numerous studies concerning the different nationalities as well as Polish auto-stereotype accompany the former studies of the idea of German in Polish society (resulting in Wojciech Wrzesiński and Edmunda Dmitrov's books). The conference *Poland and the Neighbours. How we have seen each other in 20th century*, which took place in 1993 and resulted in the collection of articles concerning the stereotypes of Poles in Germany, Russia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Belarus and Lithuania and the image of these nations in Polish society, gave the impulse to new studies. According to the organizers this conference was the starting point rather than the summary¹⁵. The next decade has brought numerous important monographs, among them works of Antoni Giza on Russia and Russians and the complex studies of Ryszard Michalski deserve special attention¹⁶. I would like to mention also the crucial studies of Alina Cała on the stereotype of the Jew¹⁷ and equally essential research on the stereotypical images of the Western World and Western Civilization run by Jerzy Jedlicki¹⁸. Moreover a collective study of the image of Europe was published in 2000 edited by Alicja Barszczewska-Krupya¹⁹.

NOTES

¹ S. Sowiński, *Europe of nation – but which ones?*, "Yearbook of Polish European Studies", 6, 2002, p. 29.

² E.g. A. Chwalba, *Polacy w służbie Moskal* [Poles at the service of Moscals (Russians)], Warsaw 1999; M.

- Micińska, *Zdrada, córka Nocy. Pojęcie zdrady narodowej w świadomości Polaków w latach 1861-1914* [The Betrayal, Daughter of the Night. The National Betrayal in the Consciousness of Poles 1861-1914], Warsaw 1998.
- ³ E. Włodarczyk, *Pogranicze polsko-niemieckie w perspektywie historycznej* [The Polish-German Borderland in Historical Perspective], in Id. (ed.), *Pogranicze polsko-niemieckie. Przeszłość. Terażniejszość. Przyszłość*, Szczecin 2001.
- ⁴ E.g. D. Beauvois, *Mit "kresów wschodnich" czyli jak położyć mu kres* [The Myth of Eastern Borderlands: how to Bring it to an End] in *Polska myśl polityczna XIX i XX wieku*, vol. 9; W. Wrzesiński (ed.), *Polskie mity polityczne XIX i XX wieku*, Wrocław 1994.
- ⁵ E.g. E. Rzewuska (ed.), *Pogranicza – granice – ograniczenia. Konferencje kodeńskie* [Borderlands – Boundary – Limitation], Lublin 1996; Z. Kłodnicki, H. Rusek (eds.), *Pogranicza kulturowe i etniczne w Polsce* [The Ethnic and Cultural Borderlands in Poland], Wrocław 2003; Z. Kurcz (ed.), *Pogranicze z Niemcami a inne pogranicza Polski* [The Polish-German Borderland in Comparison with the Other Polish Borderlands], Wrocław 1999; M. Latoszek, *Pomorze-zagadnienia etniczno-regionalne* [The Ethnic and Regional Problems of Vistula Pomerania], Gdańsk 1996.
- ⁶ E.g. W. Molik - R. Traba (eds.), *Procesy akulturacji/asymilacji na pograniczu polsko-niemieckim w XIX i XX wieku* [Processes of Enculturation and Assimilation in the Polish-German Borderland in the 19th and 20th century], Poznań 1999; R. Traba (ed.), *Tematy polsko-ukraińskie: historia, literatura, edukacja* [Polish-Ukrainian Themes: History, Literature, Education], Olsztyn 2001; Id., *Kraina tysięcy granic: szkice o historii i pamięci* [The Country of a Thousands Borders: Sketches on History and Memory], Olsztyn 2003; Id., *Niemcy – Warmiacy – Polacy 1871-1914. Z dziejów niemieckiego ruchu katolickiego i stosunków polsko-niemieckich w Prusach* [Germans – Warmians – Poles 1871-1914. From the History of the German Roman Catholic Movement and the Polish German Relationships in Prussia], Olsztyn 1994.
- ⁷ E.g. M. Dymarski, *Ziemie postulowane (ziemie nowe) w programach i działaniach polskiego ruchu oporu 1939-1945* [The Demanded (New) Lands in the Polish Underground Movement's Declarations 1939-1945], Wrocław 1997; T. Marczak, *Granice zachodnie w polskiej polityce zagranicznej w latach 1944-1950* [The Western Frontiers in Polish Foreign Policy 1944-1950], Wrocław 1995.
- ⁸ E.g. C. Osękowski (ed.), *Ziemie Zachodnie i Północne Polski w okresie stalinowskim* [The Western Lands and the Northern Lands during Stalinism], Zielona Góra 1996; S. Łach (ed.), *Władza komunistyczna wobec ziem odzyskanych po II wojnie światowej. Materiały z konferencji* [The Communist Authorities towards "the Reunited Lands" after the Second World War. Conference Materials], Słupsk 1997.
- ⁹ W. Borodziej, *Historiografia polska o "wypędzeniu" Niemców* [Polish Historiography on "the Expulsion" of Germans], in "Polska 1944/45-1989", 1996, pp. 249-269; S. Jankowiak, *Łączenie rodzin między Polską a NRD w latach 1955-1959* [Poland-Eastern Germany Family Reunification 1955-1959], "Przegląd Zachodni", 1995, 4, 85-106; Id., *Wysiedlenie i emigracja ludności niemieckiej w polityce władz polskich w latach 1945-1970* [Displacement and Emigration of the German Population in the Policy of Polish Authorities 1945-1970], Warsaw 2005; B.K. Cholewa, *Łączenie rodzin niemieckich mieszkających na Dolnym Śląsku 1950-1958* [The Process of Uniting German Families Living in Lower Silesia], "Sobótka", 1990, 3, pp. 89-102; Id., *Migracja Niemców z Dolnego Śląska po II wojnie światowej* [The Migration of Germans from Lower Silesia after the Second World War], "Przegląd Zachodni", 1990, 2, pp. 89-108; Id., *Problem obywatelstwa Niemców mieszkających na Ziemiach Odzyskanych po II wojnie światowej* [The Problem of the Citizenship of Germans living in the "Reunited Lands"], "Sobótka", 1990, 1, pp. 91-106; L. Olejnik, *Polityka narodowościowa Polski w latach 1944-1960* [The Polish National Policy 1944-1960], Łódź 2003; A. Wolff-Powęska (ed.), *Polacy wobec Niemców. Z dziejów kultury politycznej Polski 1945-1989* [Poles towards Germans. The Examinations of the Polish Political Culture 1945-1989], Poznań 1993.
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- ¹¹ A. Kłoskowska, *Kultury narodowe u korzeni* [The Roots of National Cultures], Warsaw 1996; Id., *Stereotypy a rzeczywistość narodowej identyfikacji i przyswajanie kultury* [Stereotypes and National Identification and Assimilation of Culture], "Kultura i Społeczeństwo", 1993, 4, pp. 35-51; Id., *Tożsamość i identyfikacja narodowa w perspektywie historycznej i psychospołecznej* [Identity and National Identification in the Historical and Psychosociological Perspective], "Kultura i Społeczeństwo", 1992, 1, pp. 131-143.
- ¹² G. Babiński, *Pogranicze polsko-ukraińskie: etniczność, zróżnicowanie religijne, tożsamość* [The Polish-Ukrainian Borderland: ethnicity, religious diversities, identity], Kraków 1997; Id., *Metodologia a rzeczywistość społeczna: dylematy badań etnicznych* [Methodology and Social Reality; dilemmas of ethnic studies], Kraków 2004.
- ¹³ www.pogranicze.sejny.pl.
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The Russian State and the Interpretation of History during the Second World War: the Impact of B. I. Syromyatnikov's *The 'Regulated' State of Peter the Great and its Ideology*

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ABSTRACT

This chapter considers the interaction between the Russian state and the interpretation of history during the Second World War. This period is vital to understanding the development of Soviet historiography but, unfortunately, little research has focused on this area to date. Studies into Soviet historiography during the war are ongoing.

Сквозь призму полемики по поводу книги Б.И. Сыромятникова "Регулярное государство Петра Великого и его идеология" в статье рассматривается историографическая ситуация, сложившаяся в течение Великой Отечественной Войны.

В развитии советской исторической науки изучаемого периода необходимо отметить несколько основных тенденций. В первую очередь очевидна тесная связь истории и идеологии, а также использование Коммунистической партией истории как обоснования собственного политико-идеологического господства. Следствием такого положения вещей являлось частое изменение интерпретации прошлого в угоду сложившейся политической ситуации. В данном случае мы можем проследить изменение трактовки русского прошлого с ультрареволюционных позиций в 20 – е годы к державно-патриотическому освещению отечественной истории с 30 - х.

Немаловажной чертой советской историографии, так же как и культуры советского периода в целом, является сосуществование и борьба традиций царской России и послереволюционной эпохи.

В условиях «плавающей» государственно-идеологической концепции неизбежна борьба различных направлений в попытке повлиять на власть. 30 – е годы и годы мировой войны прошли под знаком борьбу школы Покровского и историков, сложившихся в дореволюционное время. Пиком противостояния явилось совещание историков в ЦК ВКП (б) в мае – июле 1944 года. Следствием совещания было

установление дальнейшего (впрочем, отнюдь не всеобъемлющего) контроля партийно-властной структуры над историческими исследованиями в СССР.

The interpretation of Russian history during the Soviet period is a complex matter. Soviet historiography and Soviet society evolved through struggles between the existing heritage of the Russian past and the new Soviet outlook. On the one hand, Soviet historians kept the traditions of pre-revolutionary historiography; on the other hand, many of the old school's achievements were lost. The works of many pre-revolutionary scholars were repressed, and Soviet history was closely connected to the official Soviet ideology. This connection was especially strong in Stalin's time. His primary aim for history was for it to provide a basis to legitimate his own political supremacy.

The tradition of treating history as a kind of policy began with M. N. Pokrovsky (1874–1936). He was a key figure in the first generation of Marxist historians and his ideas became the foundation of 20th-century historiography. He interpreted Russian history as demonstrating the evolution of “merchant capital”, which he presented as the main force of historical progress. One of the distinguishing features of both his works and the works of his followers was the negative view of history before the Revolution. Pokrovsky created a new generation of historians (M.V. Nechkina, A.M. Pankratova, A.L. Sidorov and others) who made truth and honesty subservient to the proletarian revolution and the party line. Their works were characterized by a desire to interpret the historical past in ways that suited the state power.

The situation changed in the next decade. Stalin advanced the theory of constructing socialism in “a single country” and official ideology became increasingly patriotic. This view of history corresponded more to the international situation when hopes of a ‘world revolution’ were lost. It also aided Stalin's position and he soon became a supporter of the idea of a strong state. The position taken by Pokrovsky's school was now unacceptable to the state. Consequently, at the beginning of the 1930s, Pokrovsky was officially blamed for the current state of historical writing. There were demands for a new type of historical work. However Pokrovsky's main followers still played an important role in the academic life of the country.

In 1934, a competition for new school textbooks was organized. The judges were Stalin, Kirov and Zhdanov – the main figures in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. No work received the first prize, but after the competition, the commission's decisions were published, and they demonstrated to historians how they should now write history¹. Historians had to present the history of the Russian people and the pre-revolutionary state in a positive way, but not so positively that they diminished the achievements of the Soviet period. Such a formula was too vague: it was “often unclear, which ways were Marxist, and which views supported the ‘enemies of the working class and Communism’”².

Such circumstances created a paradox: on the one hand, there was forcible state control of history; on the other hand, historians of the pre-revolution generation were able to return to the profession because Pokrovsky's school had lost its supremacy. As a result, many 'old historians' took up key positions in Soviet academia: B.D. Grekov, S.V. Bukhrushin, E.V. Tarle and others. The Second World War brought disruption. History became a key type of patriotic propaganda. Historians gave lectures to troops about the heroic events in Russian history. This period saw the publication of many history books with a patriotic military content. Typical titles included "The Russian people's struggle against foreign invaders in the 17th century" and "Napoleon's invasion and its collapse".

Against this backdrop one work in particular stood out. This was B.I. Syromyatnikov's *The 'regulated' state of Peter the Great and its ideology*, part I, published in 1943. Boris Ivanovich Syromyatnikov (1874-1947) became a professional historian in the pre-revolutionary period³. He was a follower of the Moscow school, especially the ideas of Kluchevskii, and applied scientific principles to the history of law. Syromyatnikov was well known as an active manager of the Moscow Society of People's Universities. After the revolution, he remained in Russia working at Kazan University, Moscow University and eventually at the Institution of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. His interest in the period of Peter the Great was apparent before the revolution. In 1911, he published an article on *Absolute monarchy in Russia in the 18th century*⁴. After several years he returned to this topic. With his friend, N. A. Voznesensky, Syromyatnikov prepared the legislative documents of Peter the Great for publication⁵. This was an important event in Soviet academic life⁶.

Syromyatnikov's new research on *The 'regulated' state of Peter the Great and its ideology* actually repeated the ideas of his pre-revolutionary work about the development of the absolute state in Russia. The first chapter was dedicated to an analysis of the historiography of Peter's rule. Syromyatnikov came to the conclusion that neither tsarist nor Soviet historians had developed an adequate interpretation of Peter's time. The main arguments of the second chapter were as follows:

1. Historians have identified three periods in the history of the feudal state: feudal separation; limited monarchy; absolute monarchy. Following this idea, the state of Peter the Great was an evolutionary stage of the feudal state.
2. The absolute (regulated) state appeared as a result of the balance between classes of feudal lords and the rising bourgeoisie. This situation meant that the state was able to dominate society. On the surface, Syromyatnikov accepted the opinions of classic Marxists. He also complied with Stalin's view as reported from a conversation with E. Ludwig⁷. However, in reality he repeated the conclusions expressed in his earlier work (*Absolute monarchy in Russia in the 18th century*).
3. Syromyatnikov showed how the ideology of Peter's regulated state was influenced by the ideas of western Enlightenment philosophers (including Hobbes, Puffendorf, Leibniz, Wolf).

4. Anti-feudal tendencies can be found in the legislation of Peter the Great.

The research was not really very original. Essentially, Syromyatnikov reiterated the main arguments contained in pre-revolution historiography⁸. However, in the context of the time, his interpretation became a topic for debate. There were scientific and political aspects to his analysis of Peter's state. The demarcation of these aspects had proved difficult: a scientific problem could conversely become a political one.

The book caused controversy. The first review was positive, although the author did not agree with Syromyatnikov's ideas about anti-feudal traits in Peter's rule⁹. Subsequent reviews were extremely condemnatory. V. Lebedev and S. Yushkov's review of the work was especially negative and harsh¹⁰. They accused Syromyatnikov of representing Peter the First as a follower of the German philosophers, Puffendorf, Leibniz, and Wolf (although in fact, Syromyatnikov also showed the influence of English and French thinkers on Peter and not just that of German philosophers):

So, Peter the First, the pupil of German publicists Pufendorf, Leibniz, and Wolf, transplanted in Russia, a 'police state'. Thus Syromyatnikov's thesis throws back Russian historical thought to the time of supremacy of German historians in the Academy of Sciences – Müller and Schlözer [Schlözer]¹¹.

As the Soviet Union was waging war against Nazi Germany during this time, it was a very dangerous accusation. One of the reasons why the review was so negative was because of the personal animosity between Syromyatnikov and Lebedev and Ushkov. Syromyatnikov had provided a critical evaluation of Lebedev and Ushkov's books on the history of Peter the Great's time¹².

A more objective review was given by B.B. Kafengause¹³. He noted how pre-revolution historians such as M.M. Bogoslovsky and N.P. Pavlov-Sil'vansky, who had described Peter's state as the realization of Enlightenment ideas, had influenced Syromyatnikov. Kafengause also rejected the opinion that the foundation of Peter's state was a balance between classes of feudal lords and the rising bourgeoisie. He viewed Peter's state as a typical feudal formation. Kafengause also noted elements of Pokrovsky's ideas, in particular, the suggestion of the coming era of noble reaction after Peter's death. S.V. Bukhrushin's review made similar points¹⁴.

At the time, being accused of holding similar views to Pokrovsky was very serious. After the rout of Pokrovsky's school and the discrediting of his interpretation of history, the slur of holding similar views to Pokrovsky could ruin a historian's career. Critiques of Syromyatnikov were published in sanctioned historical journals which was especially damaging. Syromyatnikov tried to protect himself. He wrote a response to his critics which was kept in the archives¹⁵. This response argued that his work was founded on classic Marxist ideas. He rejected the accusation of being influenced by Pokrovsky and tried to prove that reviewers had misinterpreted his book. However, his response was not published.

The situation in which Syromyatnikov found himself reflected the circumstances of Soviet historiography during the first years of the war more widely. The entire system of Soviet ideological control was focused on the war. Of course, officially historians became a part of the propaganda machine too; they gave stirring patriotic lectures, and wrote books on patriotic subject matter. However, in reality it was impossible to maintain control on all spheres of life, especially during the war. This led to greater freedom for scholars than had been the case previously. There was a short period of relaxation from ideological oppression¹⁶. Historians who had trained during the period before the revolution were increasingly able to express more independent opinions. Their new works were not patriotic in an official sense. After many years of repression and accusations of national roots, they tried to return to the national view on history (with some elements of nationalism). For example, in a speech, E.V. Tarle stated that

we do not need to blame the expansion of the Russian Empire and say that it was a type of colonialism which brought only slavery, because a more developed culture was also imported, and Central Asia and the Caucasus were protected from British aggression.

The “old formation” of historians tried to revive the methodology, traditions and interpretations of individual events of pre-revolution history. However, Pokrovsky’s pupils still remained influential. They were trained in the revolutionary tradition and to them, the history of the Russian state was a history of class enemies and class struggle. They could not accept these other interpretations of Russian history. The clash of historical interpretations was irresolvable and the growing conflict was expressed in negative internal and external reviews of historical works.

The Revolution and Stalin’s repressions had created a generation of historians who followed the party line. The relaxation brought about by the war made them uncomfortable. When the conflict over interpretations of history developed, they sought the help of the Communist Party. The Deputy Director of the Institution of History, A.N. Pankratova, took the lead role and wrote several letters to the Central Committee of the Party with a request for help to settle the contradictions in the interpretation of historical problems. A Central Committee conference was held from 29 May to 8 July 1944. All historians of note attended, such as: B.I. Grekov, A.V. Efimov, and G.S. Fridljand. Others attendees included Bukhrushin, V.I. Lebedev, A.N. Pankratova, E.N. Gorodetsky, M.V. Nechkina, V.P. Volgin, S.K. Booshuev, I.I. Mints, E.N. Genkina, A.L. Sidorov, K.V. Basilevich, N.L. Rubenstein, B.I. Syromyatnikov, E.V. Tarle, V.I. Picheter, and A.I. Yakovlev¹⁷. Representatives of the state authorities included G.F. Alexandrov, the Chief of the administration of propaganda and agitation. The Chairman of the conference was A.S. Scherbakov, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Other secretaries such as A.A. Andreev and G.M. Malenkov were also present. The conference was mainly dedicated to historians researching topical historical questions. When Pankratova wrote to the Central Committee, she probably thought that she would be the main judge and that the conference would be a trial of her opponents,

but the state leaders had other ideas¹⁸. Pankratova herself became one of historians who were subjected to criticism.

When the Institution of History was in exile in Kazakhstan, it participated in the work of local historians on the “History of Kazakhstan SSR”. Pankratova was one of the main editors. This book depicted the annexation of Kazakhstan territory by the Russian Empire in negative light and, conversely, presented all the uprisings against Russian rule in a positive one¹⁹. Academics S. K. Booshuev and H. G. Adjemjan disagreed. Booshuev said that historians should reject too critical a view of the Russian conquerors as they brought many benefits to people who lived in primitive conditions. Booshuev termed the book on the history of Kazakhstan an “anti-Russian work” which should be discredited. He also criticized the work of Institution of History as being a closed and non-effective system. Adgemjan’s report made similar points²⁰. They referred to Stalin’s work which criticized Friedrich Engels for calling the Russian Empire a “gendarme of Europe” that brought enslavement instead of freedom.

Pankratova was the next to report. She argued against the idealization of the Russian past, particularly the aggressive external policy of the Russian Empire. She rejected the opinion that the people’s uprisings were less progressive than Soviet scholars thought. She was especially critical of E.V. Tarle’s attitude to certain classic Marxist-Leninist ideas (such as Engels’s reference to “the gendarme of Europe”), which he claimed were out of date. Pankratova accused her opponents of undermining Marxist–Leninism, citing Syromyatnikov’s book on *The ‘regulated’ state of Peter the Great and its ideology* as an example. In her opinion, Syromyatnikov described Peter’s state as a classless superstructure over society leading to the revival of bourgeoisie historiography²¹. Her opinion was supported by Pokrovsky’s other pupils (Nechkina, Volgin, Genkina and Sidorov). This group of historians took an aggressive stance against opponents at the conference. Rubenstein took a similar, but more restrained, position.

When Syromyatnikov had the opportunity to speak, he tried to defend himself. He said that his research was based on classic Marxist-Leninist conceptions, and Stalin’s works in particular, but that malevolent persons had misrepresented his book. He then criticized the Institution of History as an establishment which impeded the progress of historical writing in the Soviet Union. However, his main focus was an argument with B.I. Grekov’s conception of the feudal condition of Kiev Rus’: in his opinion it was a typical slaveowning society²².

Grekov was less radical than Booshuev, but also had a ‘patriotic’ viewpoint. He argued that the Russian state should not simply be described as an instrument of class oppression. People had to remember that the state operated in the interests of everyone²³. Stalin’s favourite historian, Tarle, made similar arguments. Historians including Mints and Efimov took an intermediate position. They supported the idea that historians need not occupy polarized positions. Soviet historians must look at the problems from a dialectic point of view: they did not need to condemn the entire pre-revolutionary history of Russia, but remember about the class position²⁴.

It is possible to identify certain groups at the conference:

1. The new generation of historians, essentially Pokrovsky's pupils who maintained Marxist views of history (in Pokrovsky's tradition) and were swayed by the ideals of the October revolution;
2. Historians trained before the Revolution who were not committed to Marxism and objected to attempts to depict the Russian past in a negative manner;
3. A group of "dialecticians" (as Kaganovich termed them), such as Mints, Efimov, and Bukhrushin. They tried to unite both groups and foresee official viewpoints²⁵.

The group of Pokrovsky's pupils was more unified and aggressive, while the historians of the 'old school' were more disparate and disjointed. This did not matter as the judge in these debates was the state. Therefore the representatives of the Communist Party had to decide what was right and what was wrong. This situation strengthened the case for returning to the strong control of history and historical interpretation that had weakened during first years of the war.

The resolution of the dispute was complex²⁶. It was not just a decision about historical questions: it concerned important ideological problems. The main reason for the uncertainty of the Department of Ideology and Propaganda was the lack of a clear ideological state position. The ideas of national patriotism, which had prevailed in the previous decade especially in war time, were an effective ideology. However, after the war, it should have been possible to spread Communism more widely than before, and an agreed international state position would have been useful²⁷. Accordingly, the resolution took a "middle position", including both elements of national patriotism and class internationalism.

The written conclusion of the conference was divided into several parts. The first was entitled "The influence of the reactionary views of German historians on modern Russian historiography". This included a criticism of the opinion of historians such as Pankratova, Rubenstein, Yakovlev, Bukhrushin, Lebedev, and Grekov, who claimed that the word "rus" had a Scandinavian origin, and that prince Ruric, the founder of the ancient Russian state, was a Viking. They were blamed for the influence of the ideas of German historians, such as Bayer, Schlözer and Müller, who proposed the Norman theory of the origin of the Russian state. This attitude was viewed as antipatriotic²⁸. The second part was entitled "The negligent attitude of certain Soviet historians to our country's history". Many scholars were criticized for presenting too negative a view of pre-revolutionary Russia. This was called the 'reincarnation of Pokrovsky's school'. In the same way, the inevitably positive interpretations of national uprisings in the Russian Empire were also condemned²⁹.

The next section, entitled "The viewpoint of great power chauvinism among some historians", accused Tarle, Yakovlev, and Grekov of Russian nationalism. As a manifestation of the great power chauvinism it considered the use of ideas of bourgeois historiography too: especially, the conception of 'the state school'. Syromyatnikov was also

accused of this error. However, the next part of the document states: “Some resurgence of nationalist ideology is very dangerous, because it is connected to the idealization of the bourgeois-democratic state and hopes for the evolution of the Soviet state into an ordinary bourgeois republic”³⁰. State officials concluded that the main charge against Syromyatnikov’s book was that he showed too close a connection between the development of Peter’s regulated state and the influence of Western ideology. To the representatives of the Communist party, the work appeared too much like propaganda in favour of the western way of life.

The resolution was not published, but after the conference many historians were genuinely afraid for their position and probably even for their lives. Syromyatnikov even wrote a letter to Stalin in hope of protection³¹. However, the actual consequences were not as dramatic as had been the case seven years earlier. Officially, the Institution of History and the main historical journal of the Soviet Union, “Historical Journal”, were reviewed. No individual historian was commended. After the official accusation of Syromyatnikov’s *The ‘regulated’ state of Peter the Great and its ideology* there was a resurgence of Pokrovsky’s conception³².

CONCLUSION

The problems of historical interpretation during war-time were a consequence of the changes at the beginning of the 1930s, when the ‘old school’ historians were able to return to academia. They inevitably conflicted with the pupils of Pokrovsky as a result of the obvious differences in their interpretations of historical questions, methodology, and political attitudes. The last years of Stalin’s cultural repressions established that the main judge of historical interpretations was the state. History became a privileged science, because in history, the Communist Party saw a legitimization of its own political supremacy. State control of history was very strong as was demonstrated by the conference held by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The state used the willingness of some old historians to change existing historiography and revive a nationalist view of the past. It assisted the stabilization and establishment of Soviet ideological and social systems. But it preserved many revolutionary traditions that still played the most important role in ideology at the same time.

The development of Soviet historiography shows the evolution of Soviet society from an extreme revolutionary position to more a conservative one during the 1920s and 1930s. The conflict between new revolutionary tendencies and old traditional ones led to the incorporation of pre-revolutionary Russian virtues (such as great-power patriotism and the historical continuity of traditions of the Russian Empire) into the Soviet ideological system. By the end of the war, the Communist Party was at a crossroads. The Communist statesmen had no certainty about the future ideology. We can see the efforts of historians to influence it. Old historians tried to revive pre-revolutionary virtues, while a new generation tried to maintain the ideals of Pokrovsky’s school. The state eventually chose a middle way, a combination of both schools of thought.

NOTES

- ¹ *K izucheniu istorii*. [Towards a study of history], Moscow 1946.
- ² I. D'jakonov, *Kniga vospominanii* [The book of memories], Saint Petersburg 1995, p. 275.
- ³ V. Muraviev, B.I. Syromjatnikov, in *Istoriki Rossii* [Historians of Russia], Moscow 2001, p. 524.
- ⁴ B. Syromjatnikov, *Absoljutnaja monarhija v Rossii v XVIII v.* [The absolute monarchy in Russia in the XVIII century], in *Kniga dlja chtenija po istorii novogo vremeni* [The history of the modern period], vol. II, Moscow 1911, pp. 511 - 548.
- ⁵ N. Voznesenskii, *Zakonodatel'nye akty Petra I* [The legislation of Peter I], Moscow - Leningrad 1945.
- ⁶ C. Black, *The reforms of Peter the Great in Rewriting Russian history*, New York 1962, p. 250.
- ⁷ I. Stalin, *Besedy s Emilem Lyudvigom* [Conversations with Emil Ludwig], Moscow 1933, p. 3.
- ⁸ B. Kafengause, *Epoha Petra Velikogo v ocvesenii sovetskoj istoricheskoj nauki* [The epoch of Peter the Great in the review of Soviet historical science], in *Petr Velikii* [Peter the Great], Moscow - Leningrad 1947, p. 378.
- ⁹ Review by S. Pokrovskii in "Istoricheskii jurnal" [The historical journal], 1943, 8 - 9, pp. 94 - 97.
- ¹⁰ In "Istoricheskii jurnal" [The historical journal], 1944, 10 -11, pp. 120-128.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 126.
- ¹² OR RGB. f. 366, k. 28, e.h. 17.
- ¹³ B. Kafengause, *Voprosy istoriografii epohi Petra Velikogo* [Questions of historiography in the epoch of Peter the Great], in "Istoricheskii jurnal" [The historical journal], 1944, 9, pp. 24 - 42.
- ¹⁴ S. Bukhrushin, *Kniga B.I. Syromjatnikova "Reguljarnoe gosudarstvo Petra Velikogo i ego ideologija* [B.I. Syromjatnikov's book "The 'regulated' state of Peter the Great and its ideology"], in "Bolshevik" [The Bolshevik], 1944, 22, pp. 54-59.
- ¹⁵ OR RGB, f. 366, k. 4, e. h. 2.
- ¹⁶ C. Black, *The reforms of Peter the Great in Rewriting Russian history*. New York 1962, p. 245.
- ¹⁷ *Stenogramma soveschjanija po voprosam istorii v TsK VKP (b) v 1944 godu* [The shorthand record report of the conference on questions of history held by the Central Committee of the All-Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1944], in "Voprosy istorii" [Questions of history], 1996, 2, pp. 83 - 84.
- ¹⁸ S. Konstantinov, *Nesostojavshajasja rasprava (O soveschjanii istorikov v TsK VKP (b) v mae - iune 1944 goda* [violence (About the conference of historians held by the Central Committee of the All-Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in May-June 1944)], in *Vlast' i obshchestvennye organizatsii v pervoi treti XX stoletija* [The State and social organizations in the first third of the XX century], Moscow 1995, p. 257.
- ¹⁹ *Istorija Kazakhskoi SSR s drevneishih vremen i do nashih dnei* [A history of Kazakhstan SSR from ancient times to the present day], Alma-Ata 1943.
- ²⁰ *Stenogramma soveschjanija po voprosam istorii v TsK VKP (b) v 1944 godu* [The shorthand record report of the conference on questions of history held by the Central Committee of the All-Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1944], in "Voprosy istorii" [Questions of history], 1996, 2, pp.55 - 65.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 67-76.
- ²² *Stenogramma soveschjanija po voprosam istorii v TsK VKP (b) v 1944 godu* [The shorthand record report of the conference on questions of history held by the Central Committee of the All-Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1944] in "Voprosy istorii" [Questions of history], 1996, 3, pp. 99 - 105.
- ²³ *Stenogramma soveschjanija po voprosam istorii v TsK VKP (b) v 1944 godu* [The shorthand record report of the conference on questions of history held by the Central Committee of the All-Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1944], in "Voprosy istorii" [Questions of history], 1996, 4, p. 87.

- ²⁴ *Stenogramma soveschjania po voprosam istorii v TsK VKP (b) v 1944 godu* [The shorthand record report of the conference on questions of history held by the Central Committee of the All-Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1944], in *Voprosy istorii* [Questions of history], 1996, 3, pp.105 - 110; *Stenogramma soveschjania po voprosam istorii v TsK VKP (b) v 1944 godu* [The shorthand record report of the conference on questions of history held by the Central Committee of the All-Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1944], in "Voprosy istorii" [Questions of history], 1996, 4, pp. 69-78.
- ²⁵ B. Kaganovich, E.V. *Tarle i peterburgskaja scola istorikov* [E.V. Tarle and the Saint-Petersburg school of historians], Saint Petersburg 1995, p. 81.
- ²⁶ For the history of the creation of the text of the document see: D.Brandenberg, A. Dubrovsky, *Itogovyj partiinyj dokument soveschjanija istorikov v TsK VKP (b) v 1944 g.* [The concluding party document of the conference of historians held by the Central Committee of the All-Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1944], in *Arheographicheskii ezegodnik 1998* [Archeographical annual 1998], Moscow 1999, pp. 148 - 163.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 160.
- ²⁸ *Novie dokumenty o soveschjanii istorikov v TsK VKP (b) v 1944 g.* [New documents about the conference of historians held by the Central Committee of the All-Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1944], in "Voprosy istorii" [Questions of history], 1991, 1, pp. 191 - 194.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 199 - 200.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 203.
- ³¹ OR RGB f. 366, k. 37, e. h. 5.
- ³² *Očerky istorii istoricheskoi nauki v SSSR. T. V.* [Outline of history and historical science in the USSR, Vol. 5.], Moscow 1985, p. 221; *Istoriographija istorii SSSR. Epoha sotsializma* [The historiography of the USSR. The epoch of socialism], Moscow 1982, p.128.

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SOURCES

Syromjatnikov's letter to Stalin

Глубокоуважаемый Иосиф Виссарионович,
Я отлично понимаю, что моё обращение к Вам в тот момент, когда Вы, как великий вождь нашей страны, всецело поглощены решением грандиозных мировых задач, являлось бы непростительным дерзостью, если бы в настоящем письме к Вам я позволили бы себе руководствоваться только личными интересами, как автор специального исследования о государстве Петра Великого, первой в русской научной литературе попытке научного анализа «регулярного» государства начала XVIII века. Но положение с моей книгой, которая сделалась предметом организованной травли в печати, в ответ на мою критику основных установок сотрудников Института истории АН, заставило меня обратиться к Вашему авторитету, так как в данном случае речь идёт о правильном понимании и оценке одного из поворотных этапов в развитии русского государства, этапа привлекающего к себе в наши дни широкое внимание. В моём исследовании, разумеется, как и во всякой научной работе, могут быть те или иные недочёты, но в данном случае вопрос идёт о том, как следует понимать учение марксизма – ленинизма.

[...] У меня нет уверенности, что мои возражения и разъяснения по поводу выступления моих критиков, могут появиться в печати (в чём мне не раз приходилось убеждаться), так как многие издания, где заготовленные мною ответы могли бы найти мес-

то, находясь в исключительном обладании моих противников на фронте исторической науки.

ОР РГБ ф. 366. к. 37. е. х. 5.

Dearest Josef Vissarionovich,

I perfectly understand that my addressing You while, as great leader of our country, You are completely absorbed by great world problems, would be an unpardonable impudence, if in this letter to You, I concerned myself only with my private interests as the author of special research on the state of Peter the Great, the first attempt in Russian literature of a scientific analysis of the “regulated” state at the beginning of the 18th century. However, the situation with my book, which has become a subject of organized press-persecution, in response to my criticism of the basic directions of researchers at the Institution of History of the Academy of Sciences, forced me to address to You, because this is a case of the question of the correct interpretation and estimation of one of the turning-points in the development of the Russian state, a stage which attracts wide attention in our days. In my research, of course, as in every scientific work, different defects could surely be present, but in this case it is a question of the correct understanding of the teaching of Marxist-Leninism.

[...] I have no assurance that my objectives and explanations of the performance of my critics will appear in the press, because many journals where my responses could be published, are possessed exclusively by my enemies at the front of historical science.

The American Revolution in Hungarian Historiography during the Socialist Regime

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A tanulmány azt vizsgálja, hogy milyen történetírói vélemények fogalmazódtak meg Magyarországon az 1949 és 1989 közötti időszakban az amerikai forradalom értékelésére vonatkozóan. 1949-re teljessé vált a kommunista párt (Magyar Dolgozók Pártja) hatalomátvétele az országban. Ezt követően csakis olyan műveket lehetett publikálni, amelyek az amerikai forradalmat a hivatalos marxista-leninista forradalom-felfogásnak megfelelően értelmezték. A problémát csak az jelentette a marxista történészek számára, hogy az amerikai forradalmat nehezen lehetett beilleszteni a marxista-leninista forradalom-elmélet sémái közé. Ezt végül úgy igyekeztek megoldani, hogy a polgári forradalomként értelmezett nagy francia forradalom fejlődési logikáját vetítették rá az amerikai forradalomra. Eszerint, az utóbbi egy „korai polgári forradalom” volt, amelyben – a jakobinus diktatúra franciaországi megbuktatásához hasonlóan – a mérsékelt burzsoázia reakciós fordulata vezetett a kapitalista rend konszolidálódásához. Ezt a reakciós fordulatot a marxista történészek az úgynevezett Shays felkelés leverésében, valamint az 1787-ben kidolgozott új szövetségi alkotmány elfogadásában látták megtestesülni. Lényegében ez a felfogás maradt az amerikai forradalom „hivatalos” értelmezése egészen a szocialista rendszer összeomlásáig. Ez azonban nem jelenti azt, hogy e negyven év alatt ne történtek volna bizonyos hangsúlyváltások az amerikai forradalom magyarországi értelmezésében. A Kádár rendszer 1956 utáni konszolidálódásával, a Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárton belül jelentkező reform-törekvésekkel, a „békés egymásmellett élés” politikájának meghirdetésével, valamint a Magyarország és az Egyesült Államok közötti diplomáciai kapcsolatok rendeződésével összefüggésben, az amerikai forradalommal foglalkozó magyar historikusok számára is lehetővé vált, hogy az 1960-as évek végétől, valamelyest tágtítsanak az amerikai forradalom marxista-leninista értelmezésének dogmatikus korlátain. Ez elsősorban a gyarmatok forradalom előtti életének és a függetlenségi háború történetének színesebb, „emberközelibb” bemutatásában, az amerikai események magyar résztvevőinek hangsúlyosabb méltatásában, s a forradalommal foglalkozó amerikai történetírás néhány olyan klasszikus művének magyarországi megjelenésében mutatkozhatott meg, amelyek felfogása rokonítható volt a forradalom marxista értékelésével.

I started my university studies in the fall of 1983, after a year of military service, which was compulsory for every male at that time. I had two majors: history and literary history. In the training of historians and history teachers the emphasis traditionally was laid on the history of Europe and Hungary in my country. The continents outside Europe were rarely mentioned, if at all, in connection for example with European colonization. And all of this was true mainly for the modern periods. Generally it was also true for the history of the United States. It was mainly mentioned in connection with the 20th century when it became one of the most important players in great power politics. The number of works concerning American history in Hungarian was extremely limited. The colonial era was practically unmentioned, and the American Revolution was only briefly touched. Naturally it was interpreted according to the official Marxist-Leninist ideology. This means that it was called an “early bourgeois revolution”.

By the year of 1949 the Communist Party took over power in Hungary and from the beginning of the 1950s it was forbidden to publish evaluations of the American Revolution, which did not strictly follow the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the great event. The problem of Marxist historians was that it was not easy to fit the American Revolution in the framework of the official Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution. Was it, like the French Revolution, a “bourgeois revolution” which destroyed feudalism and created the preconditions for capitalist development, or was it the “first anti-colonialist uprising”? But there was no feudalism in North America in the European sense of the word, so there was no *ancien régime* [old regime] to bring down. And if it was fundamentally a movement for independence led by colonial bourgeoisie to make them free from the patronage of the British capitalists, what kind of role did the mass of working people play in it? Nevertheless, Marxist historians could find a solution to these dilemmas, mainly thanks to the Marxist interpretation of the French Revolution. According to this, the Jacobins represented the most progressive political movement, since they endeavored to destroy the structure of feudalism the most consistently. But the moderate bourgeoisie became terrified of the active political role of the working people and they brought down the Jacobin regime, and because of this reactionary turn they were able to consolidate capitalist rule. In the case of the American Revolution, Marxist historians considered the Shays rebellion in Massachusetts in 1786-1787 as the culmination of the revolutionary political activity of the masses, which terrified the moderate bourgeoisie. Their counter revolutionary reaction was to force the new federal constitution on the masses, with the help of which they could consolidate their rule.

This opinion was represented by a two-volume history of the United States written by Soviet authors in the late 1950s, published in Hungarian in 1964. According to it

the Shays rebellion indicated the height of the democratic movement after the war. It showed to the ruling classes how dissatisfied the masses were with the results of the war, in which victory was secured by the heroic efforts and self-sacrifice of the latter. The war and the follow-up setback of the economy resulted in misery and pauperization of the farmers, artisans and the

working class people on the one hand, and favored the economic strengthening of the bourgeoisie and the planter class on the other¹.

The Soviet authors described the federal constitution of 1787 as “a great step backward as compared to the *Declaration Independence* and several state constitutions especially those of Pennsylvania”. The approach of Soviet Marxist historians to the American Revolution was essentially positive, since they considered it fundamentally a progressive event in the history of mankind, which after all established a pure capitalist economy and society in the United States, and in this sense, created the preconditions for the socialist revolution. This is the reason why they added, with respect to the federal constitution, that “in the context of the period, and especially after the adoption of the *Bill of Rights*, we could consider it a progressive document... America showed the world in those days how to wage a revolutionary war, as it was pointed out by Lenin, and here lies the real importance of the war for independence from the point of view of the progress of history”². To sum up, the American Revolution had a great impact on the revolutionary events in France and on the wars for independence in Latin America, and in this way contributed to the great struggle against feudalism and the consolidation of a capitalist society and economy, led by the progressive bourgeoisie.

A long summary of American historiography was also attached to this history of the United States written by Soviet Marxist scholars. From the different schools of American historiography the approach of the progressive historians and especially of Charles A. Beard proved to be the closest to the Marxist interpretation. No wonder Soviet historians applauded Beard’s approach and that of the other “economic historians”. Nevertheless they also heavily criticized the interpretation of progressive scholars who “use such terms as class struggle, property, etc. in a wrong way, and their interpretation of these terms is not in coincidence with the correct, scientific Marxist definition of these concepts”. According to the Soviet authors the progressive historians

could call the attention to the economic conflicts which provided the economic basis of the struggle between the colonies and the mother country at the end of the 18th century, and they pointed out the restrictions which were imposed upon the colonies concerning the functioning of manufacture, commerce etc... But one should also take into account that according to the representatives of the economic school, the political behavior of the social classes had been determined not by class interests, but by the selfish and narrow-minded interests of individuals, which characteristics are the eternal features of human nature.

Not to mention the fact that Beard had given up his progressive ideas by the end of the Second World War³.

This means that the Soviet authors applauded unequivocally the works only of those American historians who were the members of the Communist Party, or who openly declared themselves as Marxists. Although not a historian an example of such a person is William Z. Foster (1881-1961) who was the leader of the Communist Party of the United States of America in the 1920s and again after 1945, and who was the presidential candidate of the party in 1924, 1928, and 1932. Foster was a loyal supporter of the leadership of the Soviet Union during the 1950s and he died in Moscow. He wrote a

history of the American communist party which was also published in Hungarian in 1953. According to the evaluation of the Soviet authors of the two volume history of the United States, in his work Foster “exposed the forms and methods of the exploitation of the masses. He pointed out that the state serves the interest of monopolies, and expounded the development of state monopolistic capitalism, analyzing the real characteristics of the economic crises”⁴.

The Soviet historians also praised the works of Anna Rochester (1880-1966) who was also a member of the Communist Party of the United States of America from 1927 to the end of her life. As a consequence of the racial discrimination of the African Americans in contemporary United States, some prominent African American historians also joined the Communist Party. Such a figure was W.E.B. DuBois (1868-1963) who became a member of the communist party at the very end of his long life. He was one of the most influential African American intellectuals of his age, and in 1895 became the first African American to receive a Ph.D. from Harvard University. DuBois started to develop a Marxist interpretation of race relations in the 1930s and he was indicted as an agent of the Soviet Union in 1951. Although he was acquitted of the charge, the State Department denied him a passport until 1958. After such antecedents, he joined the communist party in 1961 and went to Ghana where he died two years later⁵.

From the point of view of the historiography of the American Revolution the works of Herbert Aptheker (1915-2003) played an even more important role. Like many young intellectuals of his generation he joined the communist party at the end of the 1930s, in 1939. He served in the United States Army in the Second World War and reached the rank of major by 1945. However, Aptheker suffered from the effects of McCarthyism in the 1950s. Although he had a Ph.D. from Columbia University, he was unable to obtain a full-time appointment as a university lecturer in this period. Aptheker fought against Cold War anticommunism, testifying on behalf of Communist Party officials facing persecution in these years. Nevertheless, he was able to publish such pioneering works as the *American Negro Slave Revolts*, which was the first scholarly effort to summarize the history of the resistance of African Americans against slavery. He remained loyal to the communist movement even after Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalinism in 1956. In his *The Truth about Hungary* he publicly defended the Soviet Union’s subsequent suppression of the Hungarian anti-communist uprising in the same year. And Aptheker also defended the intervention of the armies of the socialist countries in Czechoslovakia in 1968 in a pamphlet entitled *Czechoslovakia and Counterrevolution: Why the Socialist Countries Intervened?* As one of his critics pointed out “The historian who celebrated slave revolts in the Americas opposed freedom for the peoples of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe”. However, the Soviet authors applauded Aptheker’s work, which “describes the struggle of the Negro slaves for their liberation”, and “unmasked the reactionary feature of present day concepts of bourgeois historiography”. Aptheker also authored a booklet entitled *The Negro in the American Revolution*, which was praised by the authors of the Soviet history of the United States, and which was one of the first efforts to explore the role that African Americans played in the American Revolution⁶.

Textbooks for university students also reflected the official Marxist-Leninist interpretation, of course. The *World History, 1500-1789* of Tibor Wittman written in the 1960s is a good example. In this work Wittman, the excellent pioneer historian of Latin-America in Hungary, declared that at the beginning of the American Revolution the “revolutionary class alliance of revolutionary democrats (Jefferson, Samuel Adams, etc.), the liberal bourgeoisie (Franklin etc.), and the planters (Washington etc.) supported by the people, introduced terror against the English and the counter-revolutionary loyalist forces. This alliance was transitional, of course”. The “liberal, profit seeking bourgeoisie and the planter class, who were afraid of the people” started to monopolize power in the second half of the revolutionary struggle. The people tried to defend “their lands and liberty” under the leadership of Captain Shays, and this uprising forced the “bourgeoisie and the planter class to realize the commonness of their class interests”. And they came to the conclusion that “for the sake of the subordination of the people and the defence of the interests of the capitalists, a stronger state administration was needed”. As a result, the new federal constitution of 1787 defended the “economic rights only of the businessmen, the speculators, and the slave holders”. The evaluation of Wittman was also very similar to those of Soviet authors. In his view

despite its anti-democratic features, the victory of the United States, its social and political structure had a great influence on the progressive forces of Europe, especially in France, and it supported the bourgeoisie in its struggle against feudal absolutism... It also made clear that social progress is not the exclusive monopoly of European capitalist nations. Besides its impact on world economy, here lies the historical importance of the event⁷.

Wittman’s textbook went through sixteen printings up to the late 1980s when it was still in use.

The approach of Géza Kis was similar to that of Wittman. In his textbook written for the students of teachers’ training colleges, he stated that “political power was in the hands of the local merchant-planter oligarchy” in the British colonies in the late colonial era. According to him, the main cause behind the outbreak of the American Revolution was that after the peace treaty of Paris “the English bourgeoisie decided to drown its more and more dangerous rival, the American bourgeoisie”. Under the inspiration of the bourgeoisie, the English parliament imposed economic restrictions upon the American colonies. But these restrictions had negative effects on all segments of colonial society, which united the different classes against the British. The most important result of this development was the outbreak of the armed conflict between the two parts and the declaration of American independence. Kis highly applauded the *Declaration of Independence*, which was “the first state paper in history which declared popular sovereignty the basis of state authority”. In his judgement, American victory in the war for independence was “the victory of American bourgeoisie in the first place”, which restricted the rights of the people especially in regard to the purchase of new Western lands. And in order to be able to control the emerging movements of the “landless masses, the rebellious slaves, and the Indians, defending their lands”, the bourgeoisie decided to stabilize its power. The result was the federal constitution of

1787, which “strengthened the bourgeois democratic republic, which was historically a progressive development in an age when most of Europe was still under the rule of feudal absolutism”⁸. Kis’s textbook was written in the 1980s and was still in use at the end of the decade.

These summaries clearly reflected the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the American Revolution as did the more ambitious project of László Solti, who published a work about the historiography of the birth of the federal constitution of 1787. His aim clearly was to adapt the history of the American Revolution to the requirements of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory through the critical analyses of American historiography. As he stated in the preface, with his book he wished to investigate to what extent the process and the internal dynamics of the American Revolution had something in common with the dynamics of the other great bourgeois revolutions. And he came to the conclusion of course that there was a common dynamics in all bourgeois revolutions described by the founding theorists of Marxism-Leninism, and the American Revolution was not at all an exception. What were the main characteristics of this common dynamism? According to Solti the

radical movements of the people without property and of the petit bourgeoisie played significant role in the American Revolution, although the intensity and the political results of these movements were not as spectacular as in the French Revolution... As a result of the one-sided economic policy of the ruling classes, the enormous tax burden, the extensive indebtedness, the confiscation of property, the imprisonment of the farmers etc., a clear decline in the economic position of small property owners was observable.

The masses responded with the Shays rebellion, which was followed by movements of the workers and the farmers in other states. “No wonder that according to the interests of the bourgeoisie and the large landowners, the rapid and urgent political consolidation became the number one aspiration of the ruling classes”. This reactionary goal had been achieved by the ratification of the new federal constitution. In Solti’s view a similar scenario could be observed in the French Revolution, since Jacobin rule was followed by the reactionary regime of the Thermidor Convent and Napoleon Bonaparte. The ruling classes in both countries did “what the historical and social conditions allowed to them to do, which was their actual historical task: to consolidate the rule of the bourgeoisie, endangered by the overflowing of revolutionary activity”. This meant that the reactionary setback which was observable in both bourgeois revolutions was the result of the very nature and the internal logic of all bourgeois revolutions, including the American one. Solti did not deny that there were clear differences between the two events. The most important difference is that in France the bourgeoisie was forced to apply “sadistic and bloody methods” to restore capitalist order, while in the United States it was enough to use methods of constitutional lawmaking. But according to Solti the essential dynamics of the two revolutions were the very same⁹.

Solti analyzed the works of the different schools of American historiography from this point of view. No wonder he preferred the economic interpretation of the progressive historians, especially that of Charles A. Beard, but he also praised the works of such

scholars as John Franklin Jameson or Elisha P. Douglass. He noted that the works of the progressive historians are not perfect. Nevertheless, “they made a significant step towards the integration of the analysis of the American Revolution into the general framework of the investigation of all bourgeois revolutions, and called attention to the fact that the American Revolution is not excepted from some general tendencies of the internal dynamics of all bourgeois revolutions.” Solti heavily criticized such schools of American historiography as the “consensus school” of the 1950s, or the representatives of the “republican synthesis” in the 1960s and 1970s. However, through his criticism of the American studies of the 1950s and 1960s, Hungarian audiences could at least obtain information about the work of such well-known American historians of the revolutionary era as Louis Hartz, Daniel Boorstin, Edmund S. Morgan, Carl N. Degler, Bernard Bailyn, Gordon S. Wood or Jack P. Greene¹⁰.

There is no doubt that the Marxist-Leninist approach remained the official interpretation of the American Revolution in Hungary up to the collapse of the socialist regime at the end of the 1980s. Nevertheless, a gradual change within this interpretative framework was observable, mainly from the second half of the 1960s on. There were several factors behind this development: first, the appearance of a “real” image of the United States behind communist propaganda among Hungarians during the 1950s and 1960s, and second the changing policies of the Communist Party from the middle of the 1960s.

During the years of the Cold War the American republic became the leading power of the “free world”, and as a result, it gradually reached the position of a positive example and the symbol of those values which were inaccessible for the Hungarians under communist rule. Due to the oppression of the people and the serious lack of information, Hungarians started to develop a fundamentally positive and highly idealized picture of the United States, which was in sharp contrast with the official communist propaganda of the 1950s according to which, Coca Cola for example was a dangerous drug through which bourgeois imperialists kept the American youth under control. The model of the American Revolution did not play a significant role during the anti-communist insurrection in 1956, since the rebels considered the Hungarian Revolution of 1848-49 as their prime example. The United States did not help the Hungarian freedom fighters and the defeat of the revolt was followed by disappointment with the United States. But by the end of the 1960s America became the embodiment of the free world for many of the Hungarians again, despite the official anti-American propaganda in connection with the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement. Communist propagandists argued that the crisis of American capitalism had come and underlined the anti-democratic nature of the American political system. But for many Hungarians under communist rule the protest against the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement were not the signs of the final crisis of American capitalism, but the expressions of a democratic society in which one can protest legally with the hope of success for his or her rights. And from the Hungarian perspective, the social and material welfare enjoyed by the “oppressed and exploited” average white Americans was almost unthinkable. Let

us illustrate this paradoxical situation with the help of an interesting story. According to the Organization of the Communist Youth the organization held a demonstration in front of the building of the American Embassy in Budapest sometime at the end of the 1960s to protest against “American intervention in Vietnam”. When the young people began to shout communist propaganda slogans, some American officials started to drop out of one of the embassy windows hundreds of pieces of chewing gum, which was not available in Hungarian shops at that time. And the mob of “aware” young communists started to pick up the packages of chewing gum from the pavement. No wonder the demonstration practically collapsed in a few minutes. It is highly probable that many of the participants of this “spontaneous demonstration of the people” really opposed the Vietnam War and the American intervention. But on the other hand, they were also eager to own at least some pieces of the material welfare which was inaccessible for them in a socialist country. Similarly, in Western Europe Coca-Cola and McDonald’s became the symbols of American imperialism and political and military hegemony. But in Hungary they were considered to be small pieces of the free world. From this perspective, the arrival of Coca Cola in Hungary at the end of the 1960s and the opening of the first McDonald’s fast food restaurant in Budapest in 1986 were very important events. Some Hungarian young people may have been disappointed that to find that Coca-Cola is not a serious drug, but it was very good for them to know that they had the opportunity to drink what Elvis Presley drank, for example. The same was true of American pop and rock music. Hungarian bands imitated them partly as an effort to establish an alternative culture to the official socialist entertainment industry.

Coca-Cola, blue jeans, some American literary products and movies became available by the second half of the 1960s in Hungary, which was a clear sign of the change of the policy of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, as the communist party was renamed after 1956. The 1956 revolt was a great lesson for the communist leaders of Hungary too. They wanted to avoid a second uprising at almost any price and fundamentally this was also in the interest of the Soviet Union. János Kádár (1912-1989), who became the leader of the communist party as a result of the Soviet intervention in 1956, was imposed upon Hungary by the Soviets. The retribution after the defeat of the uprising was cruel and brutal and Kádár was considered by most ordinary Hungarians “the butcher of the nation” in the second half of the 1950s. But he also realized that the communist party had to change its policy in order to gain the support at least of some segments of Hungarian society. The communist party started to lay much greater emphasis on the standard of living of the people, and there was a real and significant improvement in this respect in the second half of the 1960s and in the 1970s. As a result of some economic reforms there was also an increase in the productivity of the economy, and Hungary became the food supplier of the other socialist countries. Many Hungarians accepted and supported this new policy because they compared it to the dogmatic Stalinism of the 1950s and also to the situation in some other socialist countries where shortage of food was still the part of everyday life. By the end of the 1960s Kádár had evolved to the position of the beneficial “uncle or father of the nation”. A somewhat

more liberal cultural policy was an integral part of this new line. It was allowed to publish works of American authors who criticized contemporary American society, as well as works that were indifferent from an ideological point of view. And this was also true for the products of the American film industry. In the eyes of many Hungarians this was a radical change, in sharp contrast with the almost complete ban of the 1950s. All these developments culminated in the restoration of the diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level between the two nations in 1966, and the conclusion of an agreement on compensation for American property nationalized in Hungary after World War II in 1973. The Holy Crown of Saint Stephen, the symbol of Hungarian sovereignty had been captured by the American troops as war booty at the end of World War II, but the Carter administration decided to restore it to Hungary in 1978. One year later an Institute of Hungarian Studies was established at Indiana University (Bloomington), which was sponsored partly by the Hungarian government¹¹.

All these changes had been also observed by the few historians who still had an interest in the history of the American republic. As a side-effect of this new policy they were permitted to put greater emphasis on the drama of the American colonists' experiences and the sensational campaigns of the War for Independence, provided the studies remained within a more broadly interpreted Marxist framework. The three thin volumes by Ervin Szuhay-Havas were the results of this new policy. The title of his first book for example was the *Heroic Age of America* and it was about the history of the mainland British colonies in North America, but he also included a brief survey of the American Revolution in his work. Szuhay-Havas followed the Marxist-Leninist interpretation, but in a more sophisticated manner. In his opinion the American Revolution was a war for independence, a colonial revolt, and a social revolution at the same time. It was a war for independence which led to the founding of an independent new state. But it was undoubtedly the first "successful colonial revolt of a small nation", which set an example to such modern political developments as the movement of the "non-aligned nations" of the Third World. "But, was it also a revolution? Yes, of course. The Founding Fathers, the members of the Continental Congress inflamed the torch of the revolution in the New World, and they could rise to power by the help of an effusive popular movement. But after victory they were ready to restrain the movement of the tens and thousands of armed ordinary people". The leaders of the young American republic reacted with violence to the claims of the participants of the Shays rebellion. It is clear that for Szuhay-Havas the Shays rebellion represented the embodiment of the revolutionary nature of the event. "It was a struggle for independence, a colonial war, and a revolution, the result of which was not a popular government". This means that the dynamics of the American Revolution were similar to that of the French Revolution according to Szuhay-Havas. The only difference was that in America the popular movement was not strong enough to come to power, and the "bourgeoisie of the 'Thermidor Directory' was able to keep the power firmly in its hands throughout the revolution". Accordingly, quoting the evaluation of Karl Marx, Szuhay-Havas declared the federal constitution a "typical bourgeois-patrician" document¹².

Szuhay-Havas' book was written for a wider audience. Consequently it was full of interesting details concerning the daily life of the colonist, or the relations between the white settlers and the Native Americans. It is curious to note that in spite of its clear commitment to Marxism, the book also included many elements in common with the interpretation of the American historians of the 1950s. The members of the highly anti-communist consensus school argued that the historical development of the United States was exceptional. Paradoxically, this interpretation in many respects was in agreement with the Marxist approach in the sense that Marxist scholars also emphasized some differences between American and European history in order to be able to explain the special features of their "early bourgeois revolution". Szuhay-Havas also published a small volume about the American Civil War and in 1976 for the bicentenary of American independence a short book about the history of the American Revolution¹³.

As compared to the other Marxist scholars mentioned above, in this book Szuhay-Havas emphasized the complexity of the American Revolution. He wanted to explain to his readers, for example, such problems as why some rich bourgeois decided to support independence and why some others remained loyal to the British Crown. He called the attention of the Hungarian public for the first time to the fact that the American Revolution was also a civil war. However, his final conclusion was pretty much the same as in his earlier book: The reactionary bourgeoisie decided to strengthen the federal government after the destruction of the Shays rebellion, and they imposed the new federal constitution on the people. For Szuhay-Havas the American Revolution represented the "third level in the history of bourgeois revolutions, after the rebellion of the Netherlands, and the English Revolution. This was the first in which religious issues did not play significant role... The classics of Marxism-Leninism were fully aware of the fact that the American Revolution was an early bourgeois revolution". But, quoting Lenin he also added that it was a progressive event of human history, since "this was one of the rare really revolutionary wars in the history of mankind"¹⁴. The volumes of Ervin Szuhay-Havas clearly had become outdated. Not only did they reflect official Marxist ideology but the author was rarely aware of the important changes that occurred in the historical interpretation of the colonial era and the revolution in the 1960s and 1970s. Of course this was not simply the author's fault.

When I was in my first and second year at the beginning of the 1980s my English was still quite poor so I could not read books in English. At that time of course, I was not aware of the deficiencies of Szuhay-Havas's books. I read them and as a consequence of the features mentioned above they attracted me strongly. From them, it was clear that the birth of the United States was a heroic human experiment and we cannot understand great power of the 20th century without knowledge of its historical roots. It became also evident for me that the story is much more complicated than its official Marxist version.

When I was in my third year we had a guest professor named. Mihály Mózes. He was history teacher in the best high school in my town. He had a PhD and he also held classes at the university. He had relatives in Australia and he became interested in the history of the territories outside Europe, mainly Australia and the United States. He

announced an introductory course in 19th century U.S. history, which was the first class of this kind at my University in Hungarian. There were great difficulties because of the lack of literature. This is why the publication of a collection of fundamental texts of American history in Hungarian was such an important development in 1981. The editor, Aladár Urbán, professor of history at the University of Budapest, published for the first time in the Hungarian language such important documents of the American Revolution as the *Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms*, or *The Treaty of Alliance with France* and many others¹⁵.

The relatively relaxed policy of the Communist Party continued into the 1980s and two classic works of early American historiography were published in Hungarian. The first was the first volume of Henry Adams' *The History of the United States during the Administration of Jefferson and Madison* (published in 1986), and the second was Charles A. Beard's *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (published in 1988). As mentioned before, Beard's approach was relatively close to the official Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the American Revolution and was fundamentally applauded by Marxist historians. Nevertheless, it was also clear that his evaluation of the ratification of the federal constitution was not totally identical with that of the Marxist scholars. Consequently, the publication of Beard's original text was a very important development from the point of view of the emergence of a more sophisticated picture of the American Revolution in Hungary. Not to mention that the introduction, written by Forrest McDonald, one of the greatest living experts of the topic, had also been translated. Aladár Urbán also attached an afterword, and with the help of these two explanatory writings, Hungarian readers received very good information about the historiographical debates on Beard's work. The Hungarian historical journal *Világtörténet* [World History], dedicated to the history of the world outside Hungary, also published a special issue for the bicentennial of the federal constitution in 1987, which included a study by Forrest McDonald and Aladár Urbán about the ratification of the constitution and the *Bill of Rights*¹⁶.

The collapse of the socialist regime at the end of the 1980s reopened the way for the publication of non-Marxist interpretations of the American Revolution. In addition, the American Revolution came to be seen as representing a moderate change of regime in contrast with the violence of the French and the Russian Revolutions. In Hungary the reformist wing of the communist party as well as the opposition strove for a peaceful constitutional transformation. Consequently, the example of the birth of the United States – and especially the processes through which its constitution had been made – was compelling. Hungarians had to face the same problem the American Founding fathers had confronted two centuries earlier: how to establish a functioning democracy? The Declaration of Independence, the Federal Constitution of 1787 and various other documents had already been translated into Hungarian, and these were now joined by several essential texts of early American political thought including the Articles of Confederation and the Federalist Papers, as well as key writings by leading figures of the American Revolution such as Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton¹⁷.

Three general histories of the United States were published in four years during the first half of the 1990s. It is very interesting on the other hand that two of these works represented the strongly anti-Marxist American consensus historiography of the 1950s, and only one of them could be regarded as a contemporary approach. The publication of the two former books was probably an effort on the part of the Hungarian editors to counterbalance the ruling Marxist interpretation of the former decades. Not to mention the fact that both of them had been originally written for a wider audience, and Hungarian publishers might have thought that the publication of such works could be attractive for the Hungarian public after the collapse of the socialist regime¹⁸.

In 1994 Aladár Urbán published the first detailed account of the political history of the American Revolution written by a Hungarian historian. As a political history the book was accurate, and filled a definite need. But the social, economic and intellectual history of the American Revolution was hardly mentioned by the author. And as a Marxist historian, Urbán's approach in this book was not fundamentally different from the official opinion of the former decades. He annexed a brief chapter about the historiography of the revolution to his book. No wonder he applauded the approach of the progressive historians whose interpretation was closest to his own. Urbán concluded that "a significant part of the American historical profession shares the opinion that the revolution was a *bourgeois revolution*, with all the political, social and economic consequences of this fact"¹⁹.

Nevertheless, the collapse of the socialist regime made possible the pluralistic interpretation of the American Revolution and the latest university textbooks also reflect this change. The author of one of these textbooks, Péter Hahner, who also published a short, popular biography of George Washington at the end of the 1980s, clearly wanted to distance himself from the Marxist interpretation of the socialist era. He intended to avoid even describing the event as a revolution, since he mentioned that "it is called by the Americans a revolution, although there were no radical inventions, social upheaval, terror or dictatorship". He argue for the distinctiveness of the American events in contrast to the French and the Russian Revolutions. In his eyes the "remarkable political changes", such as the establishment of the new federal government, represented the real magnitude of the American events. But he also added that there were "significant social consequences of the political transformation as well", for example the abolition of primogeniture and the introduction of "republican simplicity" in the manners of the people. Hahner concluded that the "American War for Independence was a political revolution with some social consequences, which resulted the further strengthening of the democratic tendencies of the political and social system, inherited from England"²⁰.

There is no doubt that the collapse of the socialist regime has created vastly improved conditions for the study of the American Revolution in Hungary. More and more sources and databases are available on the net. More and more Eastern and Central European students can speak English and more and more of them will be able to do research in the United States and complete their dissertations there. Hungarian scholars of the American Revolution have much better opportunities to participate in inter-

national research networks and projects. On the other hand, financial sources are still limited, and fifteen years after the collapse of the communist regime the enthusiasm of the early 1990s has faded; most history students consider the American Revolution as an important but not especially relevant event. The younger generation have grown up in, and thus do not find remarkable, a democratic and pluralist society and culture.

NOTES

- ¹ *Az Egyesült Államok története*, I. kötet, Budapest 1964, p. 80.
- ² *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.
- ³ *Az Egyesült Államok története* cit., II. kötet, pp. 390, 393.
- ⁴ W.Z. Foster, *Az Egyesült Államok Kommunista pártjának története*, Budapest 1953; *Az Egyesült Államok története* cit., II. kötet, p. 399.
- ⁵ *Az Egyesült Államok története* cit., II. kötet, pp. 399-400.
- ⁶ H. Aptheker, *American Negro Slave Revolts*, New York 1943; S. Armeny, *Letter to the editor*, "Journal of American History", 87, 2000 December, p. 1176; *Az Egyesült Államok története* cit., II. kötet, pp. 404-405; H. Aptheker, *The Negro in the American Revolution*, New York 1940. This booklet was only 47 pages long and was surpassed by Benjamin Quarles' book with the same title (Chapel Hill 1961) pp. 231.
- ⁷ T. Wittman, *Egyetemes történet, 1500-1789*, Budapest 1989, pp. 162-167.
- ⁸ G. Kis, *Egyetemes történet, 1640-1789*, Budapest 1987, pp. 70-78.
- ⁹ L. Solti, *1787. Az amerikai történetírás évszázados vitájának újabb állomásai*, Budapest 1985, pp. 7-9.
- ¹⁰ Solti, *Az amerikai történetírás* cit., pp. 21, 31.
- ¹¹ On the policy of the communist party in this period see: L. Kontler, *Millennium in Central Europe. A History of Hungary*, Budapest 1999, pp. 430-468.
- ¹² E. Szuhay-Havas, *Amerika hőskora*, Budapest 1969, pp. 320-21, p. 324.
- ¹³ On American historiography in the 1950s see for example J. Higham, *The Cult of the 'American Consensus': Homogenizing Our History*, "Commentary", February 1959; C. Lévai, *American historiography in the 1950s: the case of Daniel J. Boorstin*, Proceedings of the 2003 Biennial Conference of the Hungarian Association of American Studies, Budapest 2005, pp. 183-189.
- ¹⁴ E. Szuhay Havas, *Tizenhárom csillag*, Budapest 1976, p. 265.
- ¹⁵ A. Urbán (ed.), *Dokumentumok az Egyesült Államok történetéhez 1774-1918*, Budapest 1981.
- ¹⁶ H. Adams, *Thomas Jefferson első elnöksége, 1801-1805*, Budapest 1986; Ch.A. Beard, *Az Egyesült Államok alkotmányának gazdasági értelmezése*, Budapest 1988; A. Urbán, *Az Egyesült Államok alkotmányának életbe léptetése és első kiegészítései (1789-1791)*, "Világtörténet", 1, 1988, pp. 20-26; F. McDonald, *Mi az Egyesült Államok népe...*, "Világtörténet", 1, 1988, pp. 3-20.
- ¹⁷ Cs. Lévai (ed.), *Új rend egy új világban. Dokumentumok az amerikai politikai gondolkodás korai történetéhez*, Debrecen 1997; P. Bódy - A. Urbán (eds.), *Szöveggyűjtemény az Amerikai Egyesült Államok történetéhez 1620-1980*, Budapest-Pécs 2001; A. Hamilton - J. Madison - J. Jay, *A föderalista. Értekezések az amerikai alkotmányról*, Budapest 1998.
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- ¹⁹ A. Urbán, *Köztársaság az Újvilágban. Az Egyesült Államok születése, 1763-1789*, Budapest 1994, p. 323. On this book see C. Lévai's review in "BOOKS-Budapest Review of Books", 1, 1995, pp. 40-42.

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SOURCE

Mi az tehát amit a polgári történetírás nem ért, mi viszont világosan látunk? Nem érti sokszor a tudós burzsoá sem, hogyan állhatott az ingékony tömeg élére annyi száz, annyi ezer dúsgazdag John Hancock, annyi száz, annyi ezer dzsenti neveltetésű George Washington. Megfordítva, még kevésbé értik, miért bukkannak elénk a pellengérré állított amerikai toryk között boltosok, cipészek, kovácsok, molnárok, sőt szolgák és bérmunkások. Pedig a magyarázat kézenfekvő. Az amerikai polgári forradalom folyamatában, az első tisztán "világi" forradalom folyamatában azért szerepelnek nagy számban gazdagok, mert a saját törvényhozáisra büszke, a brit kereskedelmi törvényeket és vámintézkedéseket sérelmező uralkodó osztályok, saját érdekeik védelmében, összefognak egyetlen szövetségesükkel, a néptömeggel. Önmaguk nem vívhatnak meg a harcot a siker reményében egy világbirodalom ellen. Közöttük és a kizsákmányolt tömegek között természet szabta osztályharc feszül.

What bourgeois historiography could not understand, and what is clear for us? Even the scholarly bourgeois cannot understand how could it happen that so many extremely rich people like John Hancock, and so many educated gentry like Gorge Washington, led the

unsteady mob. It is even more obscure for them why there were so many shopkeepers, shoemakers, forgers, millers and even servants and wage workers among the disdained American Tories. In turn the explanation is clear and simple. There were so many rich people in leading roles in the process of American *bourgeois* revolution, in the course of the first “secular” revolution, because the ruling classes, so proud of their legislations, and which so vehemently opposed the commercial and tariff regulations of the British, in order to protect their own interests, joined forces with the masses. There was no hope to defeat a world power alone. But there was also a natural class struggle between them and the exploited masses.

From: E. Szuhay-Havas, *A tizenhárom csillag*, Budapest 1976, pp. 237-38.

Serbian Historiography and the Modern State

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Osnovni zaključak studije Srpska istoriografija i država je, da postoji tesna korelacija između transformacija srpske države i srpske istoriografije. Njihova međusobna povezanost se može pratiti od nastanka srpske države i zametaka srpske istoriografije u srednjem veku, do današnjeg dana.

Obećavajući počeci srpske istoriografije u srednjem veku prekinuti su osmanskim osvajanjima, i tokom sledeća gotovo tri veka njen razvoj je stagnirao. Podsticaj nastanku moderne srpske istoriografije je dala seoba Srba u Habsburšku monarhiju 1690. godine. Srbi su se u novoj domovini našli u kulturnim, društvenim i političkim okolnostima koji su, za razliku od Osmanske imperije, podsticajno delovali na njihovu političku i kulturnu aktivnost. U tom kontekstu razvijala se i svesna delatnost Srpske pravoslavne crkve i srpske inteligencije usmerena na uzdizanje opšteg obrazovnog nivoa stanovništva kao i na očuvanje verskih, kulturnih i nacionalnih osobenosti srpskog naroda.

U vezi sa tim javili su se i počeci moderne srpske istoriografije. Njenu osnovu čine s jedne strane dela srpskih istoriografa (P.Julinac, Đ.Branković i J.Rajić), a s druge strane nesrpskih autora koji su se bavili istorijom Srba i čiji su radovi inkorporirani u tkivo novovekovne srpske istoriografije.

U vremenim od početaka moderne srpske istoriografije do stabilizovanja srpske države u poslednjim decenijama 19. veka, centralni problem srpske nacionalne politike, ali i istoriografije bila je široka problematika nacionalnog oslobođenja i ujedinjenja. U skladu sa tim, za srpsku istoriografiju je bila karakteristična nacionalno-romantičarska obojenost. Tek posle 1878. godine srpska istoriografija je ušla u period mirnijeg razvitka tokom kojeg su čvrsto položeni temelji kritičkoj analizi istorijskih izvora i naučom pristupu u istoriografiji.

Period napretka i stasavanja srpske moderne istoriografije je prekinut dubokim istorijskim previranjima. Balkanski ratovi, Prvi i Drugi svetski rat, socijalistički period, a kasnije Miloševićeva era su produkovali toliko složene, višeslojne i duboke političke, ekonomske, društvene i demografske promene, da to srpska istoriografija nije bila u stanju u adekvatnoj meri istražiti, interpretirati i prezentovati. Uz to, tokom spomenutih decenija posao istoričara zagorčavala su teška ideološka ograničenja i političke presije.

Uprkos svim nedaćama tokom 20. veka srpska istoriografija je ipak zabeležila razvoj i lepe naučne rezultate i u slučaju dužeg perioda političke i društvene stabilnosti mogla bi doživeti novu fazu poleta.

The intention of this chapter is to try to point out the connections between the changes of the Serbian state and Serbian historiography and to clarify whether there are connections between those changes and the shifts in the focal points of historical research. In addition, I also wish to trace the development of Serbian historiography in its general lines.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that Serbian historiography is young and that, as such, it has certain deficiencies. One of them is a lack of works dedicated to the history of Serbian historiography itself, although for the last fifteen years the interest in this field has noticeably intensified. There has been a very small number of papers dealing with the period up to World War II: in all two papers and an article in an *Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia*¹. Accordingly, this chapter will be a kind of a review of the issue or, perhaps, a rough sketch for a later study. For an adequate analysis of the topic 'Serbian historiography and the state', broader and more detailed research requiring quite a bit of time must be carried out, for Serbian history itself has been only partly explored and explained, and it is rather complex.

Serbian history is a real challenge for historical research, since it is very rich in events and is like the history of the entire Balkan area on a smaller scale: with frequent changes of the state borders, migrations, a mixture of influences of various civilizations and ethnically, religiously and culturally different communities that live together – such a situation has given rise to various problems of determination of identity, multiple identities and the almost permanent presence of inter-ethnic relationship issues. The reciprocal cultural influences have been accompanied by questions of discrimination and tolerance. At the same time, patriarchal Serbian and Balkan society up until the last centuries has been a real treasure for the study of unique gender roles. Frequent changes of the borders and within the political system and a long-term discontinuity in Serbian statehood have resulted in insufficient development and differentiation of the governmental, educational and cultural institutions, and in the wide-spread belief that constant large-scale social changes and dilemmas, in connection with affiliation with or orientation toward different civilisations, are unavoidable.

THE EARLY PERIOD OF SERBIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

At its beginning, Serbian statehood was bipolar: one centre of organization was in Zeta (where there was a kingdom from 1014), and the other in Raška, under the authority of the Nemanjićs family (1167-1371). During the reign of Stefan Dušan (1335-1355) Serbia was at the height of its power: it was an empire that extended from the rivers Danube and Sava to the Peloponnesian Peninsula. However, the death of the emperor Dušan coincided with the beginning of the Turkish conquests on the Balkan Peninsula, and the disappearance of his dynasty from the historical scene coincided with the battle of Marica, which was crucial for the history of the Balkans. During the reign of the Hrebeljanović (1371-1427) and Branković dynasties, the borders of Serbia became considerably smaller and shifted towards the northwest, while the state itself came under the Turkish and Hungarian protectorate.

The rise and fall of early Serbian historiography follows the dynamics of the Serbian state and has some similarities to developments in other parts of Europe. As in other European countries, the first historiography works emerged at the medieval courts: in the Serbian case it is at the Nemanjićs' court that such accomplishments appear for the first time. These first works were of hagiographic character and their authors were the first Serbian king Stefan Prvovenčani and his brother, the founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church, archbishop Sava. They both, separately, described the life and acts of their father Stefan Nemanja, the founder of the Nemanjićs dynasty. In the following decades members of the royal family and prominent political and ecclesiastical people created similar hagiographic works. These works were biographies of Serbian rulers and were composed under the strong influence of Byzantine literature and models from the west, as well. Although they are strongly marked by their own political interests and are quite biased, they still represent a relatively rich source for the history of the first decades and the later life of a Serbian state. To the great regret of historians, there is not the slightest reference to earlier Serbian history and previous attempts at forming a Serbian state. We must add that from the second half of the 14th century on, hagiographic texts very rarely supply us with information on historiography. Some historical information can be found on the margins of the books.

After more than a quarter of a century of political crisis following the death of czar Dušan, there was a period of consolidation of a Serbian state under Stefan Lazarević (1389-1427). There was cultural progress, including new developments in historiography. The biographies which had been popular in Nemanjićs' time now acquired new subject matter, and some new literary forms appeared. Byzantine chronicles were gladly translated and native chronicles and genealogies appeared. There were annotations and observations on current events as well as praises of important personalities: to an extent these works can serve as a historical sources.

DISCONTINUITY OF THE SERBIAN STATE AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

The fall of Serbia in 1459, among other consequences, resulted in a long-term interruption in the progress of Serbian historiography – it seems almost as if time stopped for two centuries. For Serbian historiography and for Serbs, as well as for other Balkan people, Turkish rule meant the beginning of the “dark Middle Ages”. Until the restoration of a Serbian state at the beginning of the 19th century and thanks to migrations and changes in state borders, the Serbian people lived in the territory of several states: the Turkish and the Habsburg Empires, the Kingdom of Hungary, the Principality of Transylvania and the Venetian state.

This discontinuity in statehood, lasting 371 years, has been of defining importance for Serbian historiography. The disappearance of the Serbian state caused the loss of almost all the social and institutional conditions for the development of a historiography until the beginning of the 18th century. By that time it had lost the possibility of going through the phases of development that characterized central and western Euro-

pean historiography from the age of humanism until the Enlightenment. It is true that chronicles continued to be produced in the monasteries of Serbia and Bosnia, but they were without significance for the development of historiography at the time. Aside from them, up until the end of the 17th century, only one biography worth mentioning appeared; it was the work of the Patriarch Pajsije and was entitled *A Hagiography of Czar Uroš*. However, it is more legendary than historical in character.

On the other hand, the importance of statehood for Serbian history has always attracted the attention of Serbian politicians and historians primarily to the periods when the Serbian state existed, in the Middle Ages, and to the events of the 19th and 20th centuries or to problems connected to the restoration of statehood and the transformations of the Serbian state. These fundamental traits of Serbian historiography determined the fact that numerous economical, religious, social, social-demographic, legal, methodological and other historical issues of great importance remained outside the perspective of Serbian historians until the 20th century. The largest lacuna in Serbian historiography has certainly been the period of almost four hundred years of Turkish rule, which has been the object of an unpardonably small number of historiographical contributions, and there is also very little documentation from that period. Research on that period has been carried out to a somewhat greater extent only after World War II. The topics most frequently dealt with are those connected with the character of Turkish rule, the role and position of the Serbs in that empire, the survival of Serbian Orthodox Church and aspects of resistance to Turkish authority.

The Middle Ages attract the attention of numerous Serbian historians due to the Nemanjićs family's very successful state-building policies and their great success in the extension of medieval Serbian borders. Thus the main research themes are the process of creation of the State, relations within the ruler's house, relations with the neighbouring countries, successes in foreign relation, the social structure and the legal system of Nemanjićs Serbia. The successes of medieval Serbia have stimulated historians to investigate the economic history of that age, particularly the history of trade, handicrafts and mining.

The consequences of Serbian migrations and the survival of the Serbian Orthodox Church were of great importance for the survival of the idea of Serbian statehood – along with the statehood of Montenegro that until the second half of the 18th century was still of less importance for the entire Serbian people.

Serbian migrations were caused by the Turkish penetration in the Balkans. Beginning with the battle of Kosovo (1389), Serbian migrations continued, with varied dynamics and intensity, one could say up to the present. For our present purpose it is of great interest that the migrations expanded the borders of Serbian ethnic territories far beyond the medieval state, reaching southern Hungary, Slavonia, the eastern parts of Croatia, western Bosnia, etc., and this too, and not only the formation of the modern Serbian state, was of crucial importance.

The survival of the Serbian Orthodox Church as the only element of the Nemanjićs state after the Turkish conquests has a huge historical significance and multiple con-

sequences for the history of Serbs. During the centuries in which the Serbian state did not exist, the main factor that preserved Serbian ethnic consciousness was the Serbian Orthodox Church with its broad organisation and its almost continuous and deliberate activity toward preserving cohesion and the memory of Nemanjić's state. It had a legally regulated position within the Turkish Empire with substantial autonomous jurisdictions that extended to secular as well as to religious and educational issues – to a certain point. As the bearer of an idea of Serbian statehood and a tradition of king–saints, the Serbian Orthodox Church persistently maintained awareness of the national identity and the glorious past and systematically developed a sense of religious solidarity among Serbs. To be of Serbian nationality meant to be of the Orthodox religion and to regard the Serbian state tradition as identical to belonging to the Serbian Orthodox Church². Within the Turkish Empire, the Serbian Orthodox Church performed its role as it did in the Habsburg monarchy (with the patriarchate of Peć, 1557-1767; with a diocese of a metropolitan in Sremski Karlovci, 1695-1920) thanks to its organization and privileges, constantly following Serbian migrations.

We must indicate one more very important element of ethnic cohesion and self-consciousness: Serbian folk poems. There were many poems dedicated to the saintly Nemanjić king, to the Nemanjić state, to Serbian heroes and heroines who died in the struggle with Turks. Most of them were dedicated to the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. It was a very rich, very beautiful and also a very effective means of maintaining ethnic self-consciousness.

In a general sense, and particularly for the Serbian national renaissance and self-consciousness, migrations to Hungary, above all the Great Migrations in 1690, constituted a decisive moment. The Serbs found themselves within political, social and cultural conditions that stimulated their cultural and political activity and enabled them to accept the influences especially of central European culture, and Russian culture as well. For these reasons, the Serbs from Hungary became the main creators and bearers of Serbian culture, and of Serbian historiography as well, and they played a significant role in the formation and stabilization of modern Serbian culture and in Serbia's cultural and educational life until the second half of the 19th century. Migration to Hungary had two more important historical consequences: the Serbs, along with their ethnic links and economic and religious activity, formed a special bond between central Europe and the Balkans; and, what is of great importance, in time, the Serbs from southern Hungary formed a third centre of Serbian nation building. Furthermore, after the First Serbian Uprising, the Serbs from the Habsburg monarchy played an irreplaceable role in the formation of the Serbian state of modern times, by formulating the first Serbian laws, the first Serbian constitution, organizing the armed forces and the state administration, initiating the revitalization of Serbian culture; and by transferring contemporary European technical, political, cultural and educational ideas and achievements to Serbia. All this had major impact on reshaping the Serbian oriental mentality and lifestyle according to European parameters.

After 1690, it seems as if the wheels of time started to roll again for Serbian history and historiography. Because of that impression, numerous Serbian historians have con-

sidered 1690 the starting point of the history of their nation in modern times. Events from the early modern period are rarely examined and even then largely in connection with the migration of Serbs to Hungary and Croatia at the turn of the 15th century, and their existence in the framework of the Habsburg state. From the point of view of Serbian historiography, the history of the Serbs under Ottoman rule is mainly considered for a limited part of the period: from the second half of the 18th century in connection with the Austro-Turkish wars (1716-1718, 1737-1739, and 1787-1791) and their consequences.

The new social and political environment stimulated Serbian intellectuals to take into consideration not only their legal and social status in the new homeland, but also the real possibilities for national liberation from Turkish rule of their brothers on the Balkan Peninsula. Historiography testifies that there were a considerable number of plans for the restoration of the Serbian state. In the second half of the 18th century, in accordance with the historical tradition and balance of power at that time in the Balkans, the Serbs considered that statehood could be restored with the help of the Habsburgs within the scope of a victorious campaign against Turkey, during which a restored Serbia would be a vassal of the Habsburg monarchy. After the peace of Svištov in 1791, the expectations of the Serbs turned towards Russia and a series of projects emerged that foresaw the liberation of the Serbs under the leadership of the Russian Empire and the creation of a Serbian state, the head of which would be a member of the ruling Russian dynasty. During the Russian-Turkish War 1806-1808, the possibility of creating a Russian-Slovenian-Serbian state was considered. Some also thought that France or Montenegro could have a leading role. According to these hypotheses, the territory of a restored Serbia should include former Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Albania, and then, according to even more ambitious plans, Bulgaria, Macedonia and some parts of Hungary.

However, historical development went in other directions. The restoration of Serbia came about as a result of two Serbian uprisings, the military and diplomatic pressure of Russia on Turkey and Miloš Obrenović's intelligent politics. After the restoration of Serbian statehood in 1804-1830, Serbian history was revitalised. Serbia's borders were expanded in 1833 and 1878 when, according to the decisions made by Congress of Berlin, it acquired independence, as did Montenegro. Territorial expansion during the Balkan Wars ensured Serbia the status of a regional power, and when the Serbian-Croat-Slovenian Kingdom was formed after World War I, it appeared that she had further growth before her.

FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN SERBIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

However, the foundations of modern Serbian historiography were laid down decades before the Serbian state was restored. As migration towards the Habsburg monarchy represented a crossroads in Serbian history, it also represented a turning point in the development of Serbian historiography. It was marked by the emergence of the first

modern Serbian historical works, under the fertile influence of Enlightenment ideas; works of foreign authors also stimulated the Serbian historical thought.

Until the beginning of the 18th century Serbian historiography did not have the conditions necessary for its development. For that reason, some foreign historiographical works that dealt with the history of the Serbian people were incorporated to create the background. As historical circumstances turned out, the context of those works was in accordance with the deepest Serbian wishes connected to the necessity of liberation from the Turkish reign and the restoration of the Serbian state. However, those works brought even broader views and new thoughts: the first common history of southern Slavs is the famous book by Mavro Orbini, *Il Regno degli Slavi* (1601) who promoted the idea of Slovenian unity. The significance of Orbini's work was augmented by the fact that it was translated into Russian in 1722, and it had a certain influence on Russian policy towards the Balkans after that. As it turned out later, the dilemma of deciding between the engaging perspective of the unification of southern Slavs lands and the tradition of the Serbian statehood affixed a seal to Serbian political thought, and even to Serbian historiography up to the present.

The historical works of foreign authors, partly or entirely dedicated to the history of the Serbian people, represented a precious contribution to filling in the gaps in Serbian historiography during the 18th century. However, foreign works were used even later, when modern Serbian historiography had already given its first results. We have in mind, above all, the works of Pavle Riter Vitezović, Hristofor Žefarović, Jovan Tomka Saski, Christian Engel, F. Ks Pejačević, Leopold von Ranke, L.A. Gebhardi, Kállay Béni, Konstantin Jireček and others. Apart from filling in the gaps, those works served as an example for Serbian politicians, as a repertory of facts and as stimulus for reflecting upon their own history, as well as being important for historiography.

The enlightened ideas of educators that were spreading in Russia and in Vienna emphasized the importance of education, strengthening the knowledge of their own history and the affirmation of science, scientific work, and the importance of national culture. Thus, even the first Serbian educator, Zaharije Orfelin, in his *Magazin*, in 1768, invited the Serbs to examine and write their own history. In reality, the first Serbian historiographical works appeared in the 18th century. At the beginning and at the end of the century, two major works of Serbian historiography were written. They consisted of several volumes: a book by Count Đorđe Branković (*Chronicles*, written in 1690-1711, which remained in manuscript form) and a famous work by the father of Serbian historiography Jovan Rajić (*Istorija raznyh Slavenskih narodov, najpače Bolgar, Horvatov i Serbov* [The History of different Slav nations, particularly of Bulgarians, Croats and Serbs], I-IV, 1794-1795). Among the few Serbian books published in Venice during the 18th century there was the first real Serbian history, written by the diplomat and army officer Pavle Julinac (1765).

The book of the previously mentioned three Serbs from the Habsburg monarchy and the historiographical works of non-Serbian authors formed the foundation of mod-

ern Serbian historiography. In addition, all three authors enriched their topics by including them in broader historical and geographical frameworks: Count Branković's work places Serbian history in the south-eastern European framework, while Rajić and Julinac places it in the South Slovenian one. However, these works are characterized by the same basic guiding thought: that the Serbs must free themselves from foreign rule and restore their state. Branković's and Rajić's histories have also been significant because they published both excerpts from valuable historical sources and complete documents.

SERBIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY UNTIL THE BALKAN WARS

In practice, after the publication of Rajić's *History*, we begin to see the rise of a modern Serbian historiography. The starting point for development was very modest (the above mentioned small number of foreign and Serbian historiographical works from previous centuries, in the absence of collections of published sources, and without educational and cultural institutions to support the development of historiography effectively) and, in parallel with the rise of the Serbian state, without firm support, and with a lot of dilemmas and doubts. In addition, the progress of Serbian historiography has in many points been associated with the process of restoration of the Serbian state: both have been marked by a strong presence of western European ideas and cultural influences, there were many points of direct correspondence between Serbian historiography and national politics, and at the same time, historians have often been the most passionate and the most efficient promoters of the national ideas. Historians have often been diplomats and even statesmen.

Until the second half of the 19th century, historiographical works were written mainly by Serbs from Hungary. These works were characterised first by Enlightenment and later by Romantic ideas, but most of all by the atmosphere of the national renaissance and the echo of Serbian uprisings. History was then considered one of the most important and the most powerful means of strengthening the national consciousness, so the national spirit represented the strongest motivation for writing such works. The public did not prize history books for their subject matter and objectivity, but according to how much they were imbued with the national spirit and how much they emphasized the national unity of the Serbian people. The aims of the Serbian press, theatrical arts and literature at the time were the same.

From very beginnings, one of the main characteristics of Serbian historiography was its emphasis on the history of the Serbian state – from the point of view of the possibility of restoring the state and of contributing to the goals of national politics. In this regard, for the first Serbian historians, re-establishing the Serbian state had the highest priority – as we have mentioned above – with the help of Austria or Russia, by means of revolution and the force of arms. Aware of the political, cultural and economical weakness of the Serbian nation, Branković, Rajić and other early Serbian historians were thinking in terms of south-Slav cooperation and a south-Slav multiethnic and multi-confessional

state (as an independent state or under Habsburg or Russian sovereignty). Because of this orientation and also because of that of the Enlightenment, the idea that religious affiliation is not the essential factor for the formation of a modern nation arose. In the next decades this idea was to be both criticized and supported by historians and other intellectuals – but most of all, it was to be manipulated by politicians. After the defeat of the Serbian uprisings, the Serbian intellectual elite realized that national liberation could not be achieved by force, but only through diplomacy under the auspices of Austria and Russia and to a much lesser extent than had been imagined before. Accordingly, both in politics and in historiographical texts, there was a shift from planning a large scale south-Slav state to thinking, more realistically, of a smaller Serbian state.

The needs of national politics, romanticism and the lack of sufficient sources for studying the recent past resulted in an orientation towards medieval history that, furthermore, offered excellent material for national inspiration. To some extent, the choice of sources was subordinated to the national renaissance, so it took a long time for Serbian historiography to reject the medieval and later on the national tradition as a historical theme. It goes without saying that the romantic approach had negative consequences for the development of a critical attitude. Although Jovan Rajić himself and, until the 1840s, even T.A. Popović and others emphasized the necessity of a critical use of the sources, and that the one should not exaggerate with the praise of one's own history, the national-romantic approach to historiography lasted well into the second half of the 19th century.

After the 1830s, it became clear that the further development of Serbian historiography would be impossible unless Serbian historical sources were published. Strong stimulus in this direction came from the example of the Hungarian Academy of Science in 1837 through its large-scale publication of historical sources. In his newspapers, an influential liberal journalist, Teodor Pavlović, invited the Serbian National Parliament to initiate, by its authority, the gathering of the very vast documentary material with the aim of composing a synthesis of the entire national history and that of the Serbian Orthodox Church. A decade later the minister Kosta Nikolajević issued a proclamation on gathering materials on Serbian history. Thanks to those initiatives historical sources were gradually published, especially in magazines and newspapers; the first collections of documents were published as well.

In the second half of the 19th century, Serbian historiography was characterized by the publication of monographs and collections of historical sources and by the affirmation of Serbian critics. The ascent of Serbian historiography was linked to the appearance of the first heralds of historical criticism: Jovan Sterija Popović and Aleksandar Stojacković became the first to write substantial historical papers provided with scientific apparatus. Nevertheless, in the progress of Serbian historical criticism an essential role was that of the growing number of published sources and monographs, along with the activity of Ilarion Ruvarac, known as the father of Serbian historical criticism. He established the principle that a historical fact can be considered such only if it appears in a thoroughly checked and reliable historical source. From his time on, proper histori-

cal criticism became a criterion for distinguishing serious historical papers; however, the path towards full acceptance of a scientific attitude was not easy. Long and bitter discussions were common, during which historical criticism and scientific standards competed with national and patriotic feelings as well as with the romantic ideas of amateur historians, politicians, authors and the public. The result of this process was a situation in which, around the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, historical monographs were judged critically by a more expert public, so that authoring historiographical works became linked to a growing sense of responsibility. For this reason, dilettantes' works or those of authors supporting extreme political tendencies were greeted by almost unanimous protest.

At the same time, Serb historians educated in Vienna and in other foreign universities went one step further, and began the study of fields that until then had been largely neglected: history from the 15th to the 18th century, the history of Turkey, the Republic of Dubrovnik and Mediterranean. The rich Austrian historical material was beginning to be investigated as well. Syntheses of Serbian history were written; the history of the Serbs was put into the broader context of European history. There were a few historians who studied methodological questions. A step towards broader views and the application of modern European methodological principles was taken through the works of Jovan Skerlić, Jovan Cvijić and Milan Đ. Miličević. In the 19th and 20th centuries the main foreign influences came from Germany and France. In the beginning the strongest influence was that of the philological school of Vienna. At the turn of the century the main attribute of Serbian historiography was positivism; afterwards, Serbian historiography experienced a significant influence from the French school of the *Annales* and from Marxism.

The more relaxed and objective tone of Serbian historiography in the last decades of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century was in part due to the circumstance that Serbia was then already an independent kingdom, a political, national and even cultural centre around which the Serbian people could gather. It was also a regional force. Therefore, the political and governmental tools of national policy already existed, so there was no need for historiography to perform the function of fighting for those any longer. A further important circumstance was that Serbia – and, along with it, Serbian historiography – was going through one of its more peaceful periods, without any deep political and economic upheavals. This situation provided the background for ever greater success in the scientific treatment of the past⁴.

Serbian historiography devoted considerable intellectual energy to explaining the rise of the modern Serbian state and it did not have any special difficulties in doing so. At first, both Serbian uprisings were considered justifiable revolts against Turkish oppression, which had intensified at the beginning of the 19th century. Thanks to the greater knowledge of the sources and more thorough analysis, the conclusion was drawn that those events could be considered a revolution (a Serbian one, 1804-1830), resulting not only in the restoration of the Serbian state but also in deep social, demographic and economic changes, including the abolition of the feudal system. The history of Ser-

bia was observed through the perspective of the Eastern Question and some historians even claimed that the history of Serbia was actually the history of the Eastern Question on a small-scale.

Just as the restoration of the Serbian state represented a joyous event for the Serbian nation, it also caused at least the same amount of reason for concern. While a state organization and an educational system could be built and cultural institutions formed relying on native forces – in which the Serbs from Hungary had a significant role – relations towards other countries and nations presented a more complex and serious issue.

The problem of state borders and that of the political and ethnical character of Serbian state determined the main fields of interests and the nature of Serbian historiography through the 19th and 20th centuries. Roughly, we can conclude that the question of Serbian state frontiers has been a question of current interest for Serbian state politics and historiography from Karađorđe Petrović's time until the present day. One of the consequences of this orientation was the emphasis on political and diplomatic history. Moreover, historians, until today, mainly discussed the political problems of the birth and transformation of the Serbian state, rather than the problems of its structure, or the economic, legal, ideological and cultural bases and elements of its existence and development. Also, they did not dedicate enough energy to clarifying the multiple cultural, economical, legislative and historical differences between its components. From the formation of the Principality of Serbia in 1830, under the impression of the actual strengthening and growth of Serbia, and in connection to Serbian state politics, historians gradually abandoned the concept of a south-Slav state (especially the possibility of such a state in the frame of the Habsburg state as preferred by Illyrian Movement), or the concept of a small Serbian state in favour of an idea of a strong, centralized Serbian national state, as big as possible. Contemporary and later historians agreed that the mission of Serbia was to emancipate and unify Serbs regardless of where they lived. Of course, the first step had to be the liberation of the Serbs under Ottoman rule – which triggered difficult diplomatic, cultural and political problems.

In the 19th century, it was a common belief that Serbia as a small state would not be able to maintain its position among the great powers such as Turkey, Austria and Russia, and that territorial expansion was necessary for this reason. At the same time, the Greeks and the Bulgarians also intended to rebuild their medieval empires, so the Serbs had to face the challenges of other competing national aspirations. This, automatically, put the question of the character of a state and its territorial pretensions on the agenda: alluding to medieval statehood and its historical rights or to the current ethnic principle and the acceptance of the concept of a cultural nation upon the German model. The first variant was linked to expansion towards the south accompanied by a desirable but uncertain cooperation with the Bulgarians and the Greeks. Of course, the question that arose was which medieval frontiers should be considered real: those of Nemanjić's original state, of Dušan's Empire or those of Branković's Serbia? If expansion towards the south alone were to be considered, the Serbian people that during the Middle Age and at the beginning of the Modern Age inhabited the south of Hungary, *Srem*, Slavo-

nia and Croatia would be left out: hence it would be advantageous to expand into both directions, if possible. However, this was against the vital interests of the two neighbouring empires and it involved the very complicated question of the mutual relations of all the Yugoslav nations.

The balance of power of the time allowed only expansion to the detriment of the Turkish Empire. Accordingly, a long-term plan was formulated for Serbian national and governmental politics. *Načertanije*, authored by Ilija Garašanin, served as the foundation of Serbian policies until 1918. This extraordinarily important secret document of the Serbian ruling elite – that remained unknown to Serbian historiography until the end of the 19th century – assumed that the Serbs are one nation, regardless of state borders. Later historiography and politicians have often blamed the thesis presented in the *Načertanije* for causing World War I, for the conception of the idea of Great Serbia and also for the development of the idea of a strongly centralized unitary Yugoslavia with one Yugoslav nation.

Ilija Garašanin formulated the national Serbian aims much more rationally and realistically than his critics held. Alluding to a historical right, based on the former Serbian Empire and the glorious past of the Serbian nation, Garašanin's main goal was a creation of a great and strong Serbian state by unification of the Serbs then under the Turkish Empire. As he pointed out, forming such a state would be in conformity with the interests of England and France, maintaining the stability of south-eastern Europe by positioning a respectful state between Austria and Russia.

Garašanin did not link the realization of those goals to either one of the Serbian dynasties nor did he foresee a timeframe for the realization of his plans; however, it was considered that the preparations should be started immediately and proceed continuously towards the creation of favourable military-political and diplomatic conditions. So Garašanin sent emissaries into the south Slavic – above all, Serbian – areas soon afterwards, so that they could clear the way towards the fulfilment of the aims prescribed in his *Načertanije*. He intended to carry out the programme gradually, and not through a revolution: “To state it briefly: Serbia must strive to take stone by stone from the old building of the Turkish state, so as to build a new and great Serbian state out of such good material, on the good old foundation of the medieval Serbian Empire³”.

Basically the *Načertanije* foresees the liberation of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Albania. Although it does not state this explicitly, the content of the text implies that the future state should arise in several stages: first, the Serbian states under Turkish authority would unite; after that, the Serbs from the southern Hungary would be annexed. During this stage the state would continue to have a Serbian character. With further unification with Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia it would acquire a south Slavic character. If Bulgaria should enter, a real south Slavic state would be formed. It is important to emphasise that according to the Serbian intellectual and political elite even this broadest version of a southern Slav state was to be formed by means of Serbian state politics and according to Serbian national and dynastic interests.

A unification of all the Serbs within one state opened a much broader range of questions: relations with the Croats and Montenegro, the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina; the foundation of the union with the Slavs and a number of other questions that would be understood by the politicians and historiographers in their full seriousness only after the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians (SCS), and the realisation of the differences between the legal systems, mentalities, cultures, economic development and so forth.

The initial dilemmas were made more acute by the appearance of the 'Illyrian Movement' in the political and cultural life of southern Slavs. Proceeding from the assumption that its position towards the Vienna court and the Hungarians should be reinforced, leading figures of the national renaissance, from the 1830s on, expressed their willingness to implement a broad cooperation with the Serbs – in the Habsburg Monarchy, as well as outside it. The Illyrian Movement spread propaganda about the common origin of the Yugoslav nations and the need for achieving cultural unity with the final aim of political and state unity of southern Slavs. It was not a new idea, as a similar concept it was present in political thought ever since Orbini and the development of Pan-Slavism; however, at that moment it offered excellent possibilities for cultural and political cooperation. An idea was formulated positing a single nation of three "tribes": Croatians, Serbians and Slavs had different alphabets, belonged to different religions, but had the same origin and interests: the protection of the nation and the alphabet against Hungarians, Italians, Turks and Germans. Even the common standard Serbian and Croatian language was accepted. It was to become the foundation of cultural and later even political unity.

Both nations considered the realization of a common state possible only under favourable international conditions in a distant future. Thinking in tactical terms, the Croats considered that having a common state within the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy, separate from the Hungarian independent unit, and retaining the attributes of Croatian statehood was a real achievement. For Serbian politicians, however, no solution was acceptable if it would endanger the statehood of Serbia, nor they did they want to dissolve their newly restored state into a common state formation where they would not have a dominant political role. On the other hand, they considered the cultural cooperation and coming together of other Yugoslav nations acceptable just because of the long-range aims as formulated in *Načertanije*. Leading Serbian figures considered cooperation acceptable on the cultural level and within certain segments of political activity, until a deeper political cooperation – depending upon broader regional, political events and the balance of power – could be achieved.

TOO MUCH HISTORY

For a while it looked like the answers to all questions presented above had been given by the Balkan Wars and World War I. In the Balkan Wars, Serbia extended her territory over all the Serbs under Ottoman authority. In World War I Serbia succeeded in unifying not only all the Serbs of the Balkan peninsula but almost all Yugoslav nations (ex-

cept the Bulgarians) in the framework of a centralized state – this is essential – through Serbian politics, the Serbian army and Serbian diplomacy. As would become clear later, problems had increased in number instead of diminishing. Nevertheless, at the time of the unification of the Yugoslav countries and the creation of a new beautiful and rich country and a respectable regional force, political, constitutional, legal and national dilemmas were muted for a certain period, leaving some space for the concrete tasks of integration of diverse Yugoslav regions. We have to say that unification had its best effects not on politics but on the progress of culture – including historiography.

Unification stimulated historians to broaden their fields of interest significantly and above all to recognize their research interests within the context of southern Slav history and to expand them to include the historical relations and cooperation between Yugoslav nations in the past. Examples of community, tolerant relations and ancient ideas about the community and unification were emphasized – often with the ultimate intention of demonstrating that the liberation and unification of the Yugoslav people was a historical necessity. To explain the contrasts between the centralized political system and the multiethnic, multi-confessional character of its population, it was emphasized that Serbs, Croats and Slovenians were “one nation of three tribes”, regardless of the fact that their numerous differences were many-layered. Even though that concept, in final analysis, was contradictory and inadequate, it was considered to be the inevitable ideological cornerstone of the tripartite community⁴.

The joy of unification, however, was soured by unsolved political questions and numerous differences between the unified regions. Based on political and not on scientific foundations, the conception of a tri-tribal nation was in many respects on a collision course with the previous main directions of development of the history of the Yugoslav nation and the representatives of other nations that lived in Yugoslavia. For survival, a strong foundation based on life in common should have been found, though it appeared to be a very difficult or even insoluble problem. Political tensions were increased by the fact that neither the Serbs nor the Croats were satisfied with the newly created political system. The Serbs considered that their state, with the creation of Yugoslavia, had been diluted and brought into question, and the Croats were dissatisfied because they were convinced that they had lost something that, within the state community with Hungary, they had timidly managed to preserve for the last eight hundred years – their statehood. Some Montenegrins reacted in the same way. Then there was the question of the political system, which was difficult to disentangle: would the new country be unitary or would it be federal? The problems of Macedonian and Montenegrin nationhood were smouldering, as were those of the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that of national minorities. Above all, there was the question of Albanians, Hungarians, Germans and other nations as well. Yugoslavia was supposed to represent a solution for the Yugoslav nation’s national problems and to allow further affirmation. However, that was impossible in the absence of a consistent adherence to democratic principles within inter-ethnic relations and within the political system – which was the reason that Yugoslavia almost instantly disintegrated in World War II.

The speed of change in the historical scene during the 20th century was amazing. Serbian historians have not succeeded in exploring the events of the Balkans and World War I, nor the processes that led to the unification of the southern Slavs, the disintegration of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the grave and complex events and processes of World War II. Thus there remain almost countless new challenges for future Serbian historians. The war era was quickly followed by the process of rebuilding the old and establishing new Yugoslav states (Macedonia, Slovenia), and their reunification under entirely new conditions. The political and social systems were radically changed; the region suffered heavy human and material losses; the system of alliances was changed. Serbian historians had to deal with ancient and unsolved as well as new historical and methodological problems in a new political and social environment, with a decimated scientific and professional staff, restrained by numerous limits of political origin.

Yugoslavia became a socialist and federal republic. The Karadžević dynasty was expelled. Nevertheless, the federal organization was an attempt to correct the negative experiences of the past decades, with regard to national problems, and to give a frame to the aspirations of the Yugoslav nations, so far as possible. Six federal republics with state attributes and two autonomous regions (Kosovo, and Metohija and Vojvodina) with broad attributes of self-government were supposed to temper the nationalist passions of the past decades.

After World War II a phase of almost fifty years of peace came, along with remarkable social and economic progress. Throughout this period Serbian historiography could finally begin serious scientific research on the turbulent events of Serbian/Yugoslav history – with a broader human and material base, but also with appreciable ideological and political restrictions. The venerated Serbian historian Sima Ćirković once said that history is the cultural form through which each nation can reconcile itself with its past. Judging from Yugoslav historians' activities in this period, it seems that they finally decided to put this idea into practice. Support for historical research was notably increased by founding new universities and institutes of historical research, by promoting scientific publications and improving historians' education and training. The publication of historical documents was entrusted to scientific institutions – although their achievements in this field are still insufficient, even today.

The historiography of this era had several main characteristics. The subject matter considered important was the history of the Yugoslav nations (Macedonians, Muslims were treated as young nations) and national minorities, regarded as the creators of a common history of the Yugoslav region. The other fundamental topics were the history of labour and the socialist movement alongside the history of the national liberation movement and socialist revolution in the period 1914-1945. Both topics were considered to form the ideological base of the post-war Yugoslav socialist regime. Around those points, politics and historiography interfaced with each other on several levels, from lower school education to the creation of future policy and ideological premises among the highest ranks of the party and the state. The decades from the Balkan Wars until World War II received close attention from historians. Even though these matters

were observed from the perspective of socialist ideology, the research yielded notable scientific results.

In addition to these highlights, historians retained their interest for topics of medieval Serbian history (now with broader attention for Yugoslav relations) and for the 19th century. Moreover research expanded to the areas and historical periods that had been covered less in the past: the ancient history of the Yugoslav territories, archaeology, numismatics, economic and demographic history, methodology of history, the cultural history of Yugoslav nations, etc. Many bibliographical publications were issued; in this era there appeared studies and books dedicated to the history of churches, but still in insufficient number. The horizons of Serbian historiography expanded significantly to include the history of the USA, the USSR and the European states, mostly through translations of well known foreign historiographical works.

A valuable historiographical work and, we could say, a historical achievement of this era was the publication of the *History of Yugoslav Nations*, written by the most respected Yugoslav historians (about 40 of them)⁵. This was the first detailed, well structured, history of Yugoslav nations with multiple viewpoints and scientific ambitions that furnished the history of Yugoslav territories from the very beginnings of historical times to 1945, stressing both individual histories of the five Yugoslav nations and their relations throughout the past. The aim of “correcting the idealistic and chauvinistic miscarriages” of previous historiography was emphasized by editors. More attention than in previous historiography was dedicated to cultural and economic history and to historical sources and literature. According to the plans of the editors, the entire series should have been published by 1956. But once again, politics and national had their impact on historiography, and the second (and the last) book, covering the period from the 16th to the 18th century, was published only in 1960. In the last days of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia Milorad Ekmečić published the book *The Formation of Yugoslavia 1790-1918*⁶. That book could be considered as a kind of resumption of the former project, but written following a different concept. There has been only one other serious attempt at giving an overview of Yugoslav history from ancient times to 1945, published in 1973⁷. Along with the short but informative content comes the socialist ideological perspective, particularly in the chapters related to the 19th and the 20th century.

The most far-reaching achievement of Serbian historiography up to the present is *The History of the Serbian Nation* (I-VI, 10 volumes) written by highly esteemed Serbian historians in the 1980s. With respect to these results, even today, there are certain unexpected deficiencies in Serbian historiography – which perhaps can be explained by the excess of turbulent events in recent and earlier history, as well as with the political implications that might be triggered by historical research. For instance, Serbian historiography has dealt to an inadequate degree with the history of states where the Serbs lived for centuries, as well as with the history of nations with whom the Serbs had lively relations over a long historical period. These remarks take on their full significance if we realise that there are no histories of the Ottoman or Habsburg Empire written by Serbian historians, that we do not have histories of Austria, Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechs,

Italy, Greece, Albanians, Croats or Slovenians; and a history of Hungary was, for the first time, published three years ago. Events, processes or historical characters related to histories of these nations or states come within the range of Serbian historiography in connection with medieval and contemporary Serbian history and they are mostly explained from the Serbian point of view.

Moreover, until few years ago Serbian readers could not find a single book about the history of the Balkans in their own language. The first reviews of Balkan history in the Serbian language are translations of books written by historians living abroad and published in English: professors Trajan Stojanović and Stevan Pavlović.

Alongside the mentioned lacunae, we must stress that even now the history of Serbs under Ottoman rule (especially from 1459 to 1790) is not very amply examined and that there is really a very small number of published historical documents from that period and from Turkish archives. In addition to all of this, let us point out that generally there are not enough historical handbooks for scholars, students or researchers for example; nor is there is a chronology of Serbian history or that of other South-Slav nations. In these circumstances, the general level of knowledge concerning the history of the Balkans and the history of Middle Europe is lower than we could expect, even among the educated.

The disintegration of former Yugoslavia and the fall of Tito's socialist regime, with its multiple political, cultural and social effects, caused a crisis of Serbian historiography in the last fifteen years of the 20th century. In reality, as it had now been relieved of the burden of Tito's regime one would have expected it to flourish, but under the pressure of the complex and violent events of war, Serbian historiography suffered from the harmful influence of the nationalist political and cultural objectives of Milošević's era and fell into a crisis.

In that period, while the previous scientific, ethnic and social criteria were fading, for a while there was a bit of uncertainty and confusion among Serbian historians when they came to interpret present events, as well as when they wished to revalorise the historical past and previous results of historiography. Once again the nation and the national history became the main measure of value, so historical research and interpretation of the past events drifted away from the South Slav context and back to the national one, from a common past to a specific past, from an international to a national context. Those changes caused a revalorisation of the politics of South Slav unification in the second half of the 19th and the first decades of the 20th centuries. Serbian historians mostly supported the idea that it was harmful for the Serbian nation and they preferred the vision of a broadened Serbian national-state.

With the calming of the tensions between the Balkan states involved in the events of the last fifteen years, historians are becoming more reasonable too. Recently the number of historically inadequate studies and books has decreased. It seems that Serbian historiography is slowly finding its way out of its crisis (in this process the financial, educational and scientific programs provided by European Union and the United States of America have an important role, as do the activities of non-governmental organizations).

The variety of research subjects is getting broader; the topics are becoming more specific and focused on the 'missing' areas of Serbian historiography; the number of books written from the regional or European viewpoint has increased and emancipation from ideology is notable too. Supported by a relatively large number of universities, historical institutes and periodical publications, by record offices, museums and a considerable number of trained historians – one has the impression that with better organization and secure financing, Serbian historiography could enter one of its brighter periods – supposing that the present transformations of the state, in the healing process which has just begun, will not end in collapse.

EPILOGUE

In the end, we may conclude with several considerations. First, there is a firm correlation between the transformations of the Serbian state and Serbian historiography from its very beginning until today. During the relatively short existence of a medieval Serbian state the first works of historiographical character or that used historiographical data – such as hagiographies, chronicles, annals and eulogies – appeared. Parallel to the fall of Serbian state and the coming of Turkish rule Serbian historiography vanished for almost three centuries.

The rebirth of Serbian historiography is connected with the Great Migration of Serbs into Hungary, i.e. the Habsburg monarchy in 1690. In their new homeland Serbs found themselves in a political, social and cultural environment that stimulated their cultural and political activity.

According to the tradition of Austro-Turkish conflict, in this early phase of development Serbian historians considered possible the creation of some sort of Southern Slavic state in connection with the Habsburg monarchy. After the Serbian uprisings they abandoned that idea and gradually accepted the concept of trying to free the Serbs under foreign authorities and forming a strong, centralized national state with broadly extended borders by means of Serbian state politics. This plan partly coincides with the concept of the Illyrian Movement promoted by Croat liberal politicians from the 1830s. Yet, for the Serbian political and intellectual elite the main goal was to unify the Serbs and strengthen their own state, not to create a Southern Slav state in the framework of Serbian-Croatian political collaboration.

In this era, national emancipation and liberation had the highest priority for all Serbs irrespective of the state to which they belonged. Accordingly, Serbian historiography, until the last decades of the 19th century, was dedicated first and foremost to the goals of a national renaissance and the formation of a Serbian state – so Serbian historiography was characterized by national romanticism, not by a scientific approach. Only after Serbian independence was obtained in 1878, and the Serbian state consolidated, could Serbian historiography enter an era of steady progress in which the bases of scientific historiography research were laid down.

That period was ended not for professional historiographical reasons, but under the pressure of state politics and the transformation of Serbian state to a Yugoslav state after Balkan Wars and World War I. The turbulent events of the 20th century, the uncertainties of Yugoslav relations and Yugoslav unification, as well as the contradictions of the socialist era, halted the straightforward development of Serbian historiography for decades. Its goals, methods, interpretations and fields of interest were seriously influenced by actual state transformations and ideologies. In addition it seems that the events of the 20th century acquired such dynamics and intensity that they were beyond what Serbian historiography was able to investigate, process and interpret. For these reasons Serbian historiography has several serious lacunae: above all a lack of published historical sources and adequate research on the Turkish period; the history of the 20th century is insufficiently explained, especially the period after World War II.

Yet, as we have seen above, even under the difficult circumstances we have mentioned, Serbian historiography has experienced significant progress – and if it is to enjoy a longer period of in a stable political environment it will be able to enjoy a new phase of progress.

NOTES

- ¹ Those works are: N. Radojčić, *Moderna srpska istoriografija*, "Letopis Matice srpske", 313, 1929, 14, pp. 39-53 and E. Niederhauser, *A szerb történetírás*, in *A történetírás története Kelet-Európában*, Budapest 1995, pp. 422-490.
- ² M. Mirković, *Pravoslavna crkva u Srbia na njihovom putu od naroda do nacije*, in *Postanak i razvoj srpske nacije (Neki metodološko-teorijski problemi u izučavanju nastanka i razvitka srpske nacije)*, Belgrade 1979.
- ³ *Л. Радоиц, Историја српске државности*, II volume: *Србија у Црна Гора*, Novi Sad 2001, pp. 119-120.
- ⁴ In political thought of that period precisely the word 'tribe' (in Serbo-Croat language: *pleme*) was used. The essence of this idea was that Serbs, Croats and Slovenians are three south Slav tribes that – on the basis of the similarity of their language, origin and culture – compose one nation regardless of their different political histories.
- ⁵ B. Grafenauer - D. Perović - J. Šidak (eds.), *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije*, Belgrade 1953.
- ⁶ M. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918*, 1-2, Belgrade 1989.
- ⁷ I. Božić - S. Ćirković - M. Ekmečić - V. Dedijer, *Istorija Jugoslavije*, Belgrade 1973.
- ⁸ *Istorija srpskog naroda*, I-VI, Belgrade 1981-1993.

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Identities in Conflict: Russian Imperial Responses to Finnish History and Geography Textbooks around 1900¹

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ABSTRACT

This chapter examines the themes of political socialization and Russification, taking Tsarist Finland as a case study. In modern politics the process of political socialization was seen as an important tool with which to redefine the political sphere. By comparing textual analysis of Russian textbooks with the results of the work of the Committee for the Revision of Finnish History and Geography Textbooks, I seek to draw more general conclusions relating to questions of the transmission of political culture within educational systems, and the role of certain school subjects in the formation of identity. In this case the Russian members of the Committee represent Russian imperialism; and the phenomenon of Russification is evident in the Committee's findings on the treatment of new political abstractions (especially the fatherland/homeland and the nation), and the conceptions of political authorities (particularly the ruler and state) in school textbooks. Such a specific historical source predicates the political socialization strategy of the Russian bureaucratic elite within the educational system of autonomous Finland, as well as having wider implications for the process of political socialization.

Tato studie se zaměřuje na problematiku politické socializace a rusifikace na příkladě carského Finska. Na základě komparace textové analýzy ruských učebnic a výsledků práce komise pro revizi finských učebnic dějepisu a zeměpisu se snaží dojít k obecnějším závěrům, jež se dotýkají otázek přenosu politické kultury v rámci vzdělávacího systému a identitovnosti některých studijních předmětů. Hlavním objektem studie je ruská imperiální identita v kontextu rusifikace doposud autonomního Finska a v kontrastu s finskou národní identitou. Zvláštní důraz klade studie na oblast politična a na přenos politických hodnot a postojů, které považuje za významnou součást moderních národních identit. Studie chtěla poukázat na roli vzdělávacího procesu pro formování některých významných jevů, spojených s moderní politikou. Dále se chtěla pokusit postavit problematiku rusifikace/i do jiného světla s důrazem na kulturní přenos politických hodnot. Předměty jako dějepis nebo zeměpis (ale i další předměty) přitom neměly (a nemají) jen roli pouhých zdrojů vědomostí a informací, ale přenášely také diskurzy, jejichž funkce byla jiná než jen čistě vzdělávací. Pomocí vzdělávacího procesu docházelo pozvolna k stále širší

integraci obyvatelstva do politické sféry. Vstěpování základních postojů k političnu bylo spojeno s vlastní dějepisnou narací a naračními strategiemi tohoto vyprávění. Nakonec politické instituce a nebo abstraktní politické pojmy (jako občanství, vlast, říše, stát) musely být zakotveny v konkrétní kultuře a v konkrétním národním jazyce. Ruský imperiální stát se pomocí rusifikací v rámci vzdělávacího systému snažil o zformování zevšeobecněného kulturního standardu, jak o něm hovoří A. Gellner. Takový kulturní standard se samozřejmě dotýkal rovněž oblasti politična a monoliticky vybudovaný vzdělávací systém měl napomoci k dosažení tohoto cíle. Vzrůstající akcent na oblast kultury dále poukazuje na další významnou transformaci v oblasti politické moci, která se od užití represivního násilí v podobě policie nebo armády odchýlila, a začala využívat monopolu nad myšlenkovou oblastí jako dominantní nástroj sociální kontroly.

INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF RUSSIFICATION AND THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

The concept of Russification has recently been the subject of quite substantial revision. Although Thaden's² distinction between the voluntary Russification of elites, administrative Russification and forced Russification is still in a certain sense the starting point for revisionist treatment of the whole phenomenon, new approaches recommend that we speak of Russifications in the plural, and pay greater attention to their specific contexts³. The new revisionist works look particularly at attempts at Russification on the one hand at the Western Region (part of the Baltics and Lithuania) or the Ukraine⁴, and on the other at the eastern parts of Russia, such as the Volga Basin. Methodologically, new light has been thrown on Russification by discursive analysis or *Begriffsgeschichte*, and by addressing areas such as education, as well as by new analysis of the official political discourses of imperial elites⁵. Revisionist historians argue that Russification was an ambivalent policy, and stress the general lack of clarity of the strategies. The debate was initiated by the work of Raymond Pearson, who rejected the earlier conception of Russification as a "centrally planned, demonically imperial strategy", bent on the mindless persecution of non-Russian peoples⁶. In Pearson's view it is more accurate to speak of 'Russianisation' in the sense of the growing hegemony of the Russian language, culture and institutions. Other authors such as T.R. Weeks, for example, have pointed out that Russian imperial power did not have the capacity to bring about Russification in the sense of a national assimilation policy because it lacked a genuinely national character, which in his view means that one cannot speak of true Russification⁷. R. Geraci and A. Miller have stressed that Russifications can only be understood if we first deconstruct the category of 'Russianness' itself. In other words, comprehending the way in which Russians saw themselves provides the key to understanding the assimilation strategies which they adopted towards non-Russian ethnic groups⁸. This is an argument that I consider to be important for this study. Finally it is vital not to forget the broader, European context of the question of Russification. Assimilation and forced or voluntary integration were phenomena that accompanied the rise of modern national states in many areas of Europe. The examples of France, Great Britain and Spain should not be

ignored when we speak about attempts at Russification, despite the fact that the political-social context was in many respects very different.

Russification is an important part of this study, not in the sense of the overall problem of Russification, but narrowed down to the process of the transmission of political values - attitudes towards politics, as well as the authorities and models of behaviour, in the political (public) sphere. In this study the problem of Russification will be understood as one of political socialization in the framework of the educational process. Political socialization is directly connected with the notion of political culture, defined as the actual product of the political-socialization process⁹. My aim here is to see Russification, using the Finnish case, as a process of cultural transmission within the framework of the educational process.

The educational process is still often considered primarily as a path to progress, enlightenment and social mobility. Nevertheless, education must also be viewed from the perspective of its social and political functions, for example, as a process of the reinforcement of the social and political order, the selection of knowledge and as a form of the standardisation of knowledge, language and of the individual¹⁰. Historical analysis of political socialization in the school system may be based on two general principles. In the first place, it may include textual analysis of textbooks and didactic texts, curricula and some legal texts. In the second place it may involve analysis of teaching practice, hidden curricula, the school environment and its bureaucratic organisation¹¹. Each case requires the use of a different kind of source. While for textual analysis the texts themselves are enough, for teaching practice the historian must turn to personal sources (diaries, private records of teachers, memoirs) and official sources such as inspectors' reports or official ministry documents. The historical analysis of political socialization cannot then be based on the classic questionnaire methods with which modern political science has tried to address the theme in the contemporary world.

This study employs textual analysis of Russian teaching texts¹², for the subjects of history and geography, in order to reconstruct the official discourses circulating in the Russian school system, and relating to politics and political values. An additional – and exceptional – source is a memorandum on the revision of the Finnish history and geography textbooks of 1904. The memorandum contains the official Russian response to the Finnish textbooks and the values and discourses transmitted and communicated by these textbooks. By comparing these sources I aim to come to more general conclusions on the problem of the Russification of Finland as an effort to transmit attitudes, values, narratives and more universal discourses concerned with the political sphere. It follows that I am primarily interested in reconstructing Russian political values and attitudes (as a part of the more general Russian imperial identity), and not in the study of the Finnish textbooks themselves. In the texts I attempt to identify the messages that implicitly rather than explicitly relate to politics in general, and in particular to the perception and interpretation of the Russian Empire as a unified state or political homeland.

RUSSIFICATION POLICY IN FINLAND FROM 1898 - 1904

From the 1870s to the 1890s conservative nationalism emerged in Russia, based on the adoration of native traditions, and on the principles of autocracy ('authentically Russian' values) and Russian Orthodoxy. This conservative nationalism related more to what we might call folk character, with greater emphasis on the rural population and its relationship to the tsar, than to the ethnically and politically conceived notion of nation or people¹³. Ideas of modern nationalism and demands for the democratization of politics were spreading into Russia at the same time, and of course it was these that the autocratic regime most feared. On the other hand, efforts to become truly competitive as a great European power forced Russian political elites to focus more on questions of internal integration and homogenization of the empire.

These efforts were more a question of groping and fumbling than a systematic and practical search for viable solutions, and it was in the course of this fumbling that the autocracy in the later 19th century allied itself with conservative nationalism¹⁴, including the latter's Slavophile and Pan-Slavic ideas. R. Wortman has characterised this process of the merging of Russian Slavophile nationalism and autocracy as an "anti-historical and anti-traditional endeavour" that undermined the foundations of modern (Peterian) Russia¹⁵. This trend can, however, be understood in a different light: as an attempt to create an 'official nationalism' including both efforts to 'naturalise' what had hitherto been cosmopolitan dynasties in the sense used by B. Anderson¹⁶, and bringing about the "invention of traditions" as defined by E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger¹⁷.

In the context of this 'new' policy, autonomous Finland, situated a bit too close for comfort to the capital of the empire, became a problem that had to be solved. In the 1880s and early 1890s, however, Alexander III's governments concentrated much more on the Russification of the Baltic areas and Poland. Nonetheless, the first signs of an imminent change in policy towards the Finns were apparent. In 1891 Tsar Alexander III wrote in a rescript for the general governor of Finland that he wished "...the Grand Duchy to be brought into closer union with other parts of the Russian Empire..." On the privileges and special laws enjoyed by the Grand Duchy he remarked:

These rights and privileges, the ecclesiastical structure and the laws of the land are not only still in force, but have also been further developed to meet the needs of the Finnish people. Thus, the fortunes of the Grand Duchy under the Sceptre of Russia have demonstrated that union with Russia has not prevented the free development of its local institutions, and the prosperity attained by Finland irrefutably proves that this union is in accord with Finland's own interests. However, the lack of uniformity between certain of Finland's statutes and the general state laws, as well as the lack of sufficient clarity in those decrees that relate to the Grand Duchy's position in regard to the Empire, have regrettably given rise to misunderstandings and the real significance of the measures that are being taken to achieve the common aims of all parts of the Russian Empire¹⁸.

In this case the rhetoric employed was mild. The general assertion was that the autonomous position of Finland was founded on the goodwill of the Russian tsar, who in

1809 confirmed Finland's special position and guaranteed in 1816 that the rights and privileges of the Grand Duchy would be maintained. The political freedoms of Finland, and its special status in general, were conceived as the direct result of the actions of a single political actor¹⁹.

At this point, at least a brief outline of the Russification policies adopted by the government of Nicholas II in Finland is needed. There were several spheres of political life in Finland that the Russian government considered necessary to change. First, there was the legislative sphere, in which the Russians believed that it was crucial to subordinate the Finnish legislature to the Russian. In addition, there was the control and regulation of military service in Finland, which had hitherto fallen within the jurisdiction of Finnish autonomy. The Russians also, however, attacked the Finnish customs barriers and the autonomous postal system, and urged that the Russian language be introduced into the Finnish government and educational system. This new policy is usually associated with the governor general of Finland in 1898-1904, Nikolai Ivanovich Bobrikov, but we should probably see Bobrikov's appointment as the expression of an increasing will for Russification rather than consider Bobrikov as the personal initiator of the policy. As a loyal professional soldier, Bobrikov considered it a matter of course that he should share and identify with the views of the tsar and his government. The programme that he drew up for Finland, after his appointment, clearly showed Bobrikov as the exponent of precisely this 'new' Russification policy of the centre:

Finland, having been conquered by Russian arms, came into Russian possession in accordance with the rights of conquest [...] as from 1809 the country has belonged to the Russian Empire and [...] is forever united with it. Its inhabitants are irrefutably Russian citizens and subjects of the Tsar of All the Russias [...]. The Finnish frontier country is today as foreign to us as it was during the time before its conquest. Under such circumstances it is not easy for the representative of Russian authority in Finland [...] to find common ground with present experts of the country in this field and to get to work on these matters²⁰.

Bobrikov proposed a set of practical remedies. His ten-point programme for the country included 1) the unification of the Finnish army with the Russian one, and the reform of the Finnish Cadet School in a Russian vein; 2) the abolition of the position of state secretary for Finland (or reduction of the latter's powers) and the transfer of this jurisdiction to the governor general; 3) the codification of Finnish laws, in line with all-Russian interests; 4) the introduction of the Russian language into the senate, administration and school system; 5) permission for Russian citizens to serve in Finnish government; 6) strengthening of control of the university and the revision of all textbooks in Finland; 7) the abolition of the Finnish autonomous customs and financial administration; 8) the establishment of Russian newspapers with Finnish newspapers to be published in Russian or the local language; 9) the abandonment of the existing ceremony of opening sessions of the Finnish Assembly; and finally, 10) the revival of the law of the governor general of 1812²¹. It is clear that if Bobrikov had succeeded in pushing through even half the programme with which he arrived in Finland in 1898, a

fairly relentless and systematic Russification campaign would have entirely deprived the Grand Duchy of its autonomous status. From the Russian point of view, all these measures were entirely logical and consistent with the aims and experience of Russification of the Western Region and Poland. The difficulty was that the Finns were not rebels and had not even once destabilised the situation in the empire in the ninety years that they had belonged to it. In this context, it is clear that the policies were less the result of local problems than the atmosphere of official political circles in St. Petersburg, who, like the governor's aide General Borodkin, considered it necessary "for Finland to be united with the centre" since in Finland "the only link between us is the person of the monarch. The Finns do indeed recognise him, but it is not possible for us to be satisfied with this meagre sort of link..."²². These circles, although continuing to be imperial, allowed themselves to be influenced by the nationalist rhetoric of the Slavophiles around the newspaper *Moskovskie vedomosti*, which had campaigned against the autonomous status of the Grand Duchy since the 1860s.

The most comprehensive account of the development of Russian attitudes towards autonomous Finland is given by Keijo Korhonen. He has shown that a basic change in Russian attitudes occurred over the period 1809-1917. In the immediate years after the conquest Finland was of no particular interest to Russians. In the 1820s and the 1830s, with the development of romantic tourism, Finland became popular in aristocratic circles, but its peculiar situation did not bother the aristocrats²³. The situation changed only later, in the 1830s, 40s and 60s, as Hegelian nationalism spread to Russian intellectual and aristocratic circles. Finland gradually ceased to be just a romantic holiday destination or an uninteresting part of Russia, with its own rights and privileges interpreted as a gift of the Russian tsar. Eventually, in the 1860s, the so-called 'Finnish Question' (*finlandskij vopros*) was born in Russian political thought. It originated among Russian Slavophiles and nationalists who articulated ideals of Russification and unification in more or less extreme forms. Apart from Katkov and Hilferding, it was above all Yuri Samarin who formulated the intellectual foundation of a 'new' policy towards this western part of Russia. Samarin's rhetoric was directed against any kind of separatism – whether related to the Baltics, Poland or Finland. All these authors had quite a substantial influence on public opinion, but above all they managed to get through to official circles, which adopted their Russifying rhetoric and implemented it according to need and practicality. While Katkov, Hilferding and Samarin articulated Russian national interests in the Russian western 'margins' on the basis of intellectual discussions and arguments, the political powers adopted their arguments as an ideological instrument intended to serve entirely pragmatic interests.

One of the first aggressive Russifying moves at the end of the 1890s concerned the Finnish army and military service. In his opening speech of the Diet in January 1899 Nicholas II stated that:

Indissolubly united to the Empire and under the protection of the state of Russia, Finland has no need of an army separate from the Russian Army. The law on military service in this country must therefore be brought into the line with the law that obtains in the Empire²⁴.

The ensuing measures, however, still did not directly relate to reform of military service in the Grand Duchy, but to legislative questions. On 3 (15) February 1899 the so-called February Manifest was issued, which opened up the possibility for future change in the law on military service. It followed from the February Manifest that any legislative matters relating to “state-wide needs” would no longer be within the competence of autonomous Finnish government apparatus, and that a “rigorous order” would be introduced to secure the acceptance of such laws “in accordance with drafts and issues of state-wide laws”²⁵. This meant that not only were Finnish laws to be brought into line with Russian laws, but above all that Finnish autonomy in the field of legislation was to be substantially curtailed.

It was not until 1901 that real action was taken to ‘solve’ the military question, for example, the abolition of the Finnish army and the introduction of military service for all citizens of Finland. Apart from Bobrikov, the prime movers of the policy were principally the minister of defence Kuropatkin and the Finnish state secretary von Pleve. In Kuropatkin’s view, a separate Finnish army was essentially pointless. It was small and therefore unimportant for Russia, and moreover dominated by a spirit that did not correspond to Russian interests, since Finnish soldiers identified to a dangerous extent with their ‘Finnish homeland’ and were not in fact prepared to do anything other than defend it²⁶. However, the passage of these reforms was not easy. While the law of 1901 on military service did not provoke a revolution, it goaded the Finnish people into passive resistance when it came to enforcement. Civil disobedience, demonstrations and a petition signed by more than half a million people evidenced not only that the Russification of Finland would not be easy, but that it had come too late²⁷.

Bobrikov was nonetheless determined not to give up. Apart from the issues of the army, government and legislature, he believed in the necessity of creating spiritual links between the centre and Finland. Like other Russifiers Bobrikov saw the introduction of the Russian language and ‘Russian spirit’ into all areas of the country as the guarantee of the unification of Finland with Russia²⁸. Of course this task was also much harder than he originally imagined. Russification in the Western regions, which was relatively the most successful, had started in the 1870s and culminated over the course of the 1880s in a completely different context. Bobrikov was trying to implement an assimilatory policy in an autonomous, democratized society, where a relatively clearly defined idea of a modern nation and conception of national culture had already emerged²⁹.

RUSSIAN TEXTBOOKS AND THEIR POLITICO-SOCIALIZATION STRATEGIES³⁰

Russian teaching texts for history were informed by a relatively fixed quotient of interpretation. The key discourse of the Russian history textbooks was one of expansion, which was essentially driven by the idea of Russia as the empire of a single governing nation (or people) – for example, the Great Russians. The overall grand narrative of Russian history was the building of the empire through expansion. Conquest as the main motor of the historical development of Russia erased all the other nations and state

formations that had become part of the nation. Finland, Georgia, Siberia, the Caucasus and Turkmenistan thus were denied a history of their own both before and after their integration into Russia. This removal of the local or national historical framework and its replacement with a Russo-centric model was highly typical of the educational books. The textbooks thus offered pictures built on a Russian national narrative of history, in which the main actors were exclusively Russian rulers and generals. The account of Russian history began in a classic style, with the founding of the Kievan state and the Christianization of Rus³¹. Here the authors emphasised the contacts between Kievan Rus and the civilized West and Byzantium. If the Kievan state was interpreted as culturally advanced, the later period of Mongol supremacy was interpreted as a time of ‘coarsening of morals’ and the adoption of the uncivilized elements of Asiatic culture (above all despotism)³². The teaching texts created an image of the enemy that suited Russian expansionist interests – first, it was the Mongols, then the Poles and Lithuanians, and subsequently the Turks, Germans and Swedes. Russian history culminated with the reign of Peter the Great and his grand project for the modernization of Russia. The authors lauded Peter the Great³³. Some books included anecdotes designed to help children understand Peter’s exceptional position in the overall narrative of Russian history. In modern history, special attention was devoted to the Patriotic War and the role of Tsar Alexander I in the creation of a new European order after the Napoleonic Wars. A great deal of space was then devoted to the conquest of the Caucasus, and later the Central Asian khanates of Turkmenistan and Kirghizstan. In terms of foreign policy, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 was highlighted and interpreted as a war for the liberation of the Slavs. Autocracy was promoted as an important Russian political value, and its status continued to be unshakeable in the textbooks of history and geography. According to these texts autocracy guaranteed the integrity, power and prosperity of Russia³⁴. The authors underscored the role of autocracy in the unification process in the 16th and 17th centuries (Ivan III was accorded a particularly elevated role), and stressed the elimination of the city republics in the northern areas of Russia (Pskov, Novgorod) and the anarchy reigning in republican Poland³⁵.

Implicit in this discourse of expansion was the idea of a territorial hierarchy within Russia, which naturally also involved Finland. The different parts of Russia were not equal but were subject to the evaluative criteria of Russian conservative nationalism. This rhetoric distinguished between Russia *gosudarstvo-jadro* [the state core] and the Russian *okrainy* [the borderlands], set in a hierarchy according to their importance to the state core. The Russian history textbooks told the story of how the state core (basically Russia) had built up the Great Russian Empire. The meaning of state core, entailed the so-called ‘real Russian lands’, corresponding roughly to today’s central Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine³⁶. Corresponding to this territorial hierarchy was an ethnic hierarchy communicated by the Russian geography textbooks. Both hierarchies served as instruments for the supremacy and dominance of the Russian or Great Russian nation in the empire, but at the same time precluded any view of Russia as a united state or political fatherland³⁷.

The pictures of the individual ethnic groups were constructed on the basis of religion and the degree of civilization. The peoples of the western parts of the empire thus had a relatively positive image, while Russian orientalism, their feelings of superiority and cultural mission, played a role in their view of the eastern populations as ‘primitive’³⁸. It should be said that among the western peoples of Russia, the Finns stood particularly high in the hierarchy. The Russians respected Finnish education and general economic advance, but they also considered Finns to be at the basis of Russian culture, since the history textbooks interpreted the earliest history of Russia as a process of the mixing of Slav and Finnish elements in the wide areas of central and northern Russia. Nonetheless the Russian historical narrative saw the Russian element as the stronger, which explained why most of the Finns had become assimilated:

The Slavs were much stronger and more capable than the Finns, and so pushed them further and further to the north-east or subjected them, settled down among them, taught them their language and customs, and in this way slowly turned them into Slavs³⁹.

A geography textbook spoke of the Finns in the following way:

The majority of them are very sedate and slow in their movements, often they are dry and forbidding, but notably hard-working and tough. The constant struggle with raw nature has made them a people extremely patient and calm, aloof and distrustful. Towards others they are unsociable and closed, often even ungracious and abrupt, but always hospitable and honourable⁴⁰.

In Russian eyes, then, Finns had a character associated with such typical northern attributes as coolness, distrust, reserve and unsociability; but their industry, perseverance, patience and calm, hospitality and sense of honour was also appreciated.

The Russian history textbooks did not, of course, teach any Finnish history, and spoke of Finland only very fleetingly as a new part of Russia conquered in 1809. Later there was occasional anti-Finnish rhetoric, for example, in comments on the abuse of Finnish political rights and privileges. This type of criticism is evidence of the way Russian nationalism was spreading into textbooks, and can be found only in texts published after 1900. One example of this rhetoric can be found, for example, in a civics textbook in which the author claims that “the Finns began to abuse their liberty and the Finnish estates passed resolutions that were not in the interests of Russia as a whole”, having stressed beforehand that Finland had been annexed to Russia as a result of the success of Russian arms⁴¹. As I shall show later, the interests of the whole of Russia became the main anti-Finnish argument. Some textbooks tended to support the attempts of Russification at the end of the 1880s and during the 1890s, such as that of Platonov:

It is no wonder that all these signs of internal independence and peculiarities necessarily awoke in Finns a view of their homeland as a special state finding itself in union with Russia [...] being averse to Finnish separatism, the Gosudar declared (1890) that the Grand Duchy of Finland was under the inherent and *derzhavna* power of the Russian Empire and that it was necessary to return it to a tighter bond with the other parts of the Russian state⁴².

Russian autocracy, and the political values associated with it, was naturally supposed to be suitable for Finland too, since ultimately Finland was part of Russia. The Finnish relationship to the autocracy was based on the autonomous position of the Duchy. The Russian ruler was not autocratic in relation to Finland. Russian conservative nationalism saw the unity of the whole empire as guaranteed only by autocracy, from which it followed that autocracy, as the 'real Russian value' and guarantee of the integrity of the empire, simply had to be accepted in all parts of the Russian state. The Russians were also convinced that autocracy, like other Russian political values, had to be accepted even in the non-Russian areas of the empire. Therefore the issue was not simply one of the normative expositions of autocracy as a certain political slogan, but of the practical inculcation of autocracy as a political value.

The rhetoric and strategy of the Russian textbooks also shows that the educational process was considered a space for cultural assimilation. The history textbooks were constructed as a narrative of Russian history, Russian culture and Russian politics, and were designed for use not strictly in the schools but also by the ethnic Russian population as a whole. It was not only Russians that were supposed to accept autocracy, the cult of Peter the Great or Russian expansionist rhetoric, but also Poles and Ukrainians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Georgians and Moldavians – who were all educated in schools under the control of the Ministry of Education in St. Petersburg or the Holy Synod. Finland, on the other hand, had not previously been affected, because the school system there, like the political system, was entirely autonomous. It was this situation that was supposed to change in accordance with the wishes of the Russifiers.

DISCOURSES IN CONFLICT: THE BOBRIKOV COMMISSION FOR THE REVISION OF SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS

At Bobrikov's instigation, a Commission for the Revision of History and Geography Textbooks and also Readers for School Reading Used in Finnish Educational Establishments, was established on 12 (25) April 1903. In 1904 (just a few days before N. Bobrikov's death, which was a main reason as to why no measure of the Commission was realized later), it completed and presented its memorandum to the Finnish parliament. The establishment of the Commission was the fruit of the governor's long-term pressure on the Finnish educational system. As part of this policy Bobrikov had directed his attention to the entire context and environment of Finnish schools, which according to his vision ought to express, and even become the direct embodiment, of Finnish integration into the Russian Empire. Pictures and portraits of local figures were to be removed and replaced by portraits of the Russian tsars and members of the tsar's family⁴³. In every classroom there were to be maps of the Russian empire, and special effort was to be placed on obligatory knowledge of the Russian state anthem, which according to the governor was lamentably poor to the point of being negligible⁴⁴. The Commission for the Revision of Textbooks was thus the result of the governor's wide-ranging policy and the realization of one of the points of his programme for Finland.

The commission was composed, on the one hand, of exponents of the policy of the governor general, and on the other hand, of Finns, which meant that there would never be a chance of more than a cosmetic final agreement. The state councillor and rector of the Helsinki Russian Gymnasium, V.A. Semenov; the colonel of the general staff, P.A. Nive; the clerk of the office of the governor general, R.F. Jeleniev; and the professor of Russian at the normal lyceum, V.K. Kanninen, represented the Russian or pro-Russian members of the committee. The director in chief of the administration of schools, Baron Y.K. Yrjö-Koskinen (son of the leader of the Young Finns Y.S. Yrjö-Koskinen); his assistant W.N. Tawaststjerna; and the senior inspector of history, A.G. Snellman, represented Finnish interests on the commission. The commission aimed its sights at books that were widely used in Finnish schools, for example, the *Book about Our Country* by Zacharius Topelius and *Stories of the Officer Cadet Stål* by the poet Johan L. Runeberg. It also sought to revise a total of six Finnish history textbooks (five in Swedish and one in Finnish, which paradoxically had been written by Y.K. Yrjö-Koskinen, who was himself sitting on the commission), and two geography textbooks written in Swedish⁴⁵.

The lengthy memorandum of the commission first considered the history textbooks, which it subjected to relentless criticism. The basic objection according to the memorandum was the excess of facts pertaining to Swedish history, and the insufficient space devoted to Russian history. The commission took exception, for example to chapter headings such as the “Gustavian Era”, “The Epoch of the Greatness of Sweden” and “The Time of Liberty and Freedom”, and criticised the amount of detail provided about the Swedish kings. In its view the teaching texts did not give enough space to history after 1809: “All this implicitly instils the idea that the current position of Finland in relation to Russia is not what it was in relation to the Swedish Kingdom”, argued the commission. It also complained that, for example, the chapter entitled, “Finland United with Russia”, in Yrjö-Koskinen’s textbook, did not contain such ‘capital facts’ as the Patriotic War, the march of the Russians to France and the subsequent conquest of Paris, the role of Alexander I in European affairs, the Hungarian campaign of 1848 or the Turkish War of 1877-1878⁴⁶. The comment in one book that “The Turkish War of 1877 did not affect our country” aroused great disapproval. In terms of Russian logic it would have been appropriate to emphasise the participation of a Finnish regiment in this successful Russian campaign. Far greater annoyance was expressed, however, at the way the Russians themselves were presented in the textbooks:

If the name Russian appears at all on the pages of textbooks relating to the period up to 1809, it is only as the name of the centuries-old and single enemy of Finland, causing the latter many of the most terrible woes and injuries. Let alone the fact that according to the ideas of these textbooks the brave Swedes and no less doughty Finns almost always defeated the Russians in numerous conflicts⁴⁷.

In the eyes of the Russian members of the commission such interpretations did not belong in the textbooks of Russian Finland, and could lead to “insufficient respect for Russia and its government” among students. What most bothered the Russians, however, was something else:

The whole history of the life and development of Finland after its annexation to Russia is presented as if this region were an independent state drawing all its strength and means for prosperity in various fields from within. The fact that it was only thanks to Russia that a happy period of uninterrupted progress began, a period that cannot be compared with any period of Swedish supremacy ... this fact remains entirely ignored⁴⁸.

Quite obviously, it appeared to the Russians that the Finnish textbooks did not pay them enough attention or show enough gratitude. In their view a Russocentric interpretation ought to be imparted through history lessons sufficiently clearly and explicitly; it should be made clear, for instance that with the start of Russian government an entirely new era of Finnish history had begun, incomparably better than the previous era. In other words, everything the Finns had, they owed not to Sweden but to Russia and its generosity. The key anti-Finnish argument for revision was the following:

Finally, at the end of all the textbooks there are chapters that speak about the foundations of the social order and government of Finland which appear *in a form that does not correspond to the real position of things* [author's emphasis], [and which] cannot be permitted in textbooks accepted in schools of the Russian state⁴⁹.

This argument was essentially the reason why the commission had been set up. Governor General Bobrikov claimed that the teaching texts of Finnish schools contained information that was not in line with reality. The commission's assessment agreed with this view, and at some points underlined the reality with quite harsh words regarding the unsuitability of such forms of interpretation in schools of the Russian state, to which Finland belonged.

Pallin-Schybergson's general history textbook was also widely criticised. The commission calculated that of its 362 pages, only 500 lines were devoted to Russia, and that the book was guilty of a whole range of unacceptable errors. For example, it ignored such important facts as the struggle between Muscovy and the Tartars, Lithuania and Poland, the conquest of Siberia, Russia's expansion into the east in general and the diffusion of Christianity in this area. The author had dared to devote only a page and a half to Peter the Great, all but failed to mention Catherine the Great, and had generally classified Russia into sections relating only to Poland, Hungary and even the Ottoman Empire. The Russian members of the commission were even more aghast to find the names of the Russian tsars presented immediately next to the names of the sultans Mahmud II, Abdul Medzhid or Abdul-Hamid in the chronological tables. On the basis of all these faults, the commission came to the conclusion that the textbook not only created the impression that for the Finns, Russia was a 'foreign state' and an uninteresting state at that, but that it spoke of Russia in the sort of terms that were "unseemly for textbooks permitted for teaching in the schools of the Russian state".

The commission obviously attributed a special importance to the teaching of history: it was not enough that the student of history should be a Lutheran and citizen loving his country or region, but he should also:

...be brought up with feelings of love, honour and loyalty to the state with which his homeland has lived a common life for now almost 100 years and which now appears to him with all Russian subjects as a common fatherland⁵⁰.

The commission reached a very straightforward conclusion when it came to the means of ensuring that in future education would instil the desired feelings: "The only way to achieve such an aim seems to be the introduction of a notably broad course in Russian history in the local schools with a special textbook..."⁵¹ This opinion rested on the commission's belief that a knowledge of Russian history would necessarily lead to trust in, and loyalty towards, the Russian people and its government. It was entirely obvious that the Russian members of the commission completely failed to realise that in Finland they were dealing with a wholly different context, and they were unable to accept even the basic differences of the history of Finland as a former part of Sweden. The concept of Finnish history did not meet their ideas of what ought to be found in history textbooks.

The geography textbooks that the commission examined for revision were naturally a problem as well. The picture that they offered of the Russian people was of great offence to the Russian members. Members of the commission were probably most enraged by the following quotes from Sohlberg's geography textbook:

The Russian people [are] very uneducated: Most do not know how to read or write. In the upper class education is good. Some nations accept various different religions, but all Russians belong to the Greek Church, which no one can leave to join another church [...]. The great mass of the Russian people lives in generally wretched conditions. But the people do not have excessive demands and are content with little... In the course of the long winter the peasants do not have much work, and so they spend most of the time sitting on the stove [...] in Russia the people find their main entertainment in drunkenness⁵².

Naturally, the commission came to the conclusion that such a picture of the ruling nation was unacceptable. The Finnish geography textbooks contained other surprises for the Russian members of the commission, however. One of the greatest was certainly the fact that phrases appeared creating the impression that Finland bordered on Russia, which according to the members of the commission was misleading in that it again suggested that Finland was an independent state.

The recommendations of the commission were very tough and had they been implemented (which ultimately they were not), it would have meant the total Russification of both school subjects. In sum, these recommendations included the abolition of the special course in the history of Finland with its textbooks, the introduction of a course in the history of Russia into all Finnish educational institutions, the compilation of textbooks of Russian history that would contain chapters on Finland, the description of historical events since 1809 in a Russian spirit. Important events in Finnish history up to 1809 were to be described in the textbook on general history. Finally, the commission was of the opinion that the special textbook on Finnish geography should be abolished, and a course in Russian geography should be introduced instead.

For the compilation of textbooks, the commission recommended specific steps designed to guarantee that in the future, history and geography would be taught in Finland in accordance with Russian interests. According to these recommendations, historical events should be explained from the Russian state point of view, and the position of Finland should be described within a Russian context. Specifically, the commission recommended that in the context of the Russo-Swedish wars, Finnish participation should not be mentioned, and that events between Russia and Finland that might arouse unpleasant feelings towards Russia among Finnish students should be omitted. History before 1809 should be dealt with only when it had a direct relationship to Finnish history; for the period after 1809 special emphasis should be placed on the concern and care of Russian monarchs for the material prosperity and success of Finland. These recommendations were not just a guide for the systematic falsification of history, but were also an expression of the political endeavours of Russian ruling circles, as represented by the Russian members of the commission. All the members of the commission signed the memorandum, although presented on the next page was the “Opinion of Three Members of the Commission (Yrjö-Koskinen, Tawaststjerna and Snellman)”⁵³, in which the three Finnish members (who were in the minority), expressed their view of the criticisms and recommendations of the commission:

Considering ourselves unable to add our voices to the opinions expressed by the majority of the members of the commission for the revision of history and geography textbooks used in Finnish schools, we the undersigned have the honour to present our own view⁵⁴.

Naturally the Finns did not agree with the interpretative strategy of the memorandum, which in most cases undeniably sought to show the Finnish textbooks in an anti-Russian light. The Finns saw their own history in different terms:

...the history of Finland in the centuries when it was a part of the Swedish state may be described without loss of continuity only against the background of the general state of affairs and course of development of the Swedish state⁵⁵.

This is a key aspect of conflict between the Russians and Finns in the commission. While the Russians expected Finnish history to be rewritten according to Russian models, the Finns insisted that the history of Finland was connected with the history of Sweden to the extent that Finnish history could not be properly explained without an explanation of the history of Sweden. They continued in a similar spirit:

As far as the external policy of the Swedish state is concerned, it is immediately apparent that the Finnish nation never had a decisive voice in it, and so in this sense, (Swedish) involvement in general European events does not relate to the history of Finland. The relationship of Finland to this area of activity of the Swedish government was limited, as the commission has quite rightly noticed, simply to participation in the armed forces of the Swedish nation⁵⁶.

This then was the reason why the Finnish history textbooks devoted space to the military history of Sweden: it was a history that had affected the majority of Finns. In other

cases the Finns conceded to the Russians, agreeing for example that too much attention was devoted to Swedish history in Professor Sjubergson's book, and that the chapter entitled "The Epoch of the Greatness of Sweden", for instance, was not a title suitable for a Finnish history textbook.

The perception of Finno-Russian relations before 1809 was also a problem. While the Russian members proposed that textbooks avoid conflict situations and even suppress the fact that Finns fought against Russians in the wars with Sweden, as this might encourage Finns to have negative feelings towards Russians, the Finns disagreed. In their view, anyone with a knowledge of Finnish history had to concede that up to 1809 the relations between Finland and Russia had been military in character, given the relations between Sweden and Russia. They emphasised that in this conflict Finland had played the role of a battlefield and that Finnish participation in the Swedish army reflected the logic of the Finnish position. However, they agreed that in some textbooks the treatment of Russians was inappropriate and they recommended alterations:

It is possible that in the textbooks of Finland there are some episodes relating to Russian history that are not accorded appropriate importance. Nor do we wish to deny that Finnish textbooks sometimes speak of Russians in inappropriate terms⁵⁷.

However, the Finnish members of the commission clearly rejected the notion that such inappropriate terms, or candid accounts of Finnish-Russian relations before 1809, were meant to encourage anti-Russian sentiments.

Naturally all three Finnish members of the commission took a different view to the Russians on the position of Finland in the Russian Empire. A fundamental point of reference was Tsar Alexander I's address at the Diet in Porvoo to the faithful Finnish people, which Finns continued to consider themselves to be. The Finnish textbooks thus depicted events at the Diet in Porvoo correctly and entirely in a spirit of historical truth. Nonetheless, the Finnish members were willing to concede that the textbooks did not devote enough space to the era following 1809, and should therefore be adjusted, including alluding to the current prosperity of Finland under Russian rule. On the other hand, they reiterated their opinion that Finnish history up to 1809 could not be taught in relation to Russia, and that the division of the history of the nation into two parts (general history and Russian history) was extremely objectionable. In this context, all three members took up a position counter to the commission's recommendation that Finnish history be abolished as a separate subject.

In the case of the geography textbooks, the Finnish members of the commission even went so far as to say that they did not understand some of the criticism from the Russian members. For example, it seemed to them that Russia had been given enough focus in the geography textbooks – after all, it was accorded the most mention of any country. While it was possible to change the arrangement of the textbooks in accordance with administrative units, as the commission recommended, the Finns did not understand what was wrong with the existing arrangement. They conceded that the depiction of the national character and life of the Russian people involved the use of

unsuitable expressions, and should be changed, but on the question of borders they were once again in disagreement with their Russian colleagues. The Finnish-Swedish border was the external frontier of the Russian Empire, but on the other hand the borders of the Grand Duchy of Finland were still the borders of a special territorial unit, and the Finns believed that this fact should be stressed in the textbooks. They yielded to the Russians only in allowing that there should be more emphasis on the fact that Finland was a part of Russia. Ultimately, the conclusion drawn by Yrjö-Koskinen, Tawastsjerna and Snellman clearly shows the extent of the difference in opinion with the Russians:

Love of homeland is natural to Finns, as with all other peoples. No measures can change its character and object. For Finns that object is Finland. The entire history of Finland serves as proof that this feeling in the form that it expresses itself among us has not prevented the Finnish nation from fulfilling the duties incumbent on it in view of the political position of the country. This feeling will continue to represent no obstacle to Finns in the fulfilment of obligations arising from their subject status to the Russian state, and on the contrary will help to ensure that fulfilment⁵⁸.

Thus, the Finns did not see Finnish patriotism as something in conflict with the interests of the Russian state. They saw it as fully compatible with their obligations to Russia as Russian subjects. From this point of view, all the criticism from the Russian centre was felt to be essentially absurd.

CONCLUSION

The memorandum of the Commission for the Revision of Finnish Textbooks demonstrates the fact that at the beginning of the 20th century, Russian and Finnish opinions, as well as political values, were in many respects diametrically opposed. The Finnish history textbooks worked more or less on the basis of the national narrative of the history of Finland, which in this case could not be compatible with the Russian imperial discourse (above all a discourse of expansion), in which local histories had no place. The problem of historical narratives, however, concealed the more serious problem of the definition of the concept of homeland and the creation of a range of political identification symbols contributing to the construction of political or national identities. This was implicit in the motives behind the very policy of revision of textbooks. In my view, the history textbooks communicated and mediated much more than a mere historical narrative. Ultimately, this is evident in the fact that the Russian members of the commission were clearly seeking, and failing, to find entirely specific episodes and people, or indeed interpretative strategies, in the Finnish texts. To put it more accurately, they were looking for an answer to the question of *how Russia ought to be seen* in the Finnish texts, when these texts offered no such answer. While the Russian history textbooks tried to answer this question using the imperial discourse of expansion, the construction of symbols of identification (such as Peter the Great, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Pozharskij and Minin), or by expounding and interpreting certain historical events (the Mongol yoke and its overthrow, the conquest of Siberia, Peter's modernization, the Patriotic

War, the wars against the Turks), the Finnish textbooks were addressing the question of how to understand Finland, not Russia. The Finnish reader, *A Book about Our Country* by Zacharius Topelius, published in 1875, is an excellent illustration of this point. The writer defined Finland as a fatherland (*isänmaa*), as a place inherited from forebears and without any account being taken of the wider Russia. It is very typical that Topelius failed to associate the fatherland with any political institutions or rights and laws, but preferred a religious vision and the biblical rhetoric of the promised land⁵⁹. As Topelius conceived it, the fatherland was an integrating element between two peoples – Finns and Swedes. Topelius's fundamental definition of fatherland related purely and simply to Finland, but at least in the historical part of the reader he did not fail to reflect on the existence of Russia and on the fact that Finland was a part of it. In relation to early history, the writer speaks of the rise of the Russian Empire⁶⁰, and later of the Swedish wars against Russia⁶¹ and the incorporation of Finland into Russia⁶². The wars against Sweden in the time of Peter the Great, for example, are interpreted from the Finnish perspective, which meant that the modernizing tsar is associated with the Finnish period of 'darkness', with the devastation of the country by Russian forces in 1714⁶³. Topelius's text also confirms the point made earlier, that the Finnish relationship to Russia was built on the figure of the tsar.

Finnish historiography was clearly dominated by a national narrative, including the construction of national heroes, the use of a national mythology (Kalevala) as part of teaching in and outside history, and, of course, constructions based on the schemata 'us' and 'them' (in this case 'them' being the Russians). This fully reflects the unifying function of a common view of history in the formation of the modern nation⁶⁴. Topelius's reader clearly indicated that in the case of Finland, the homeland was defined in more or less apolitical terms, and did not relate to political institutions or the Russian monarchy, but instead to the Finnish past and culture. The Russian definition of homeland, or Russia as a homeland, was based on imperial and political concepts, naturally centring on the Russian ruler, but also on Russian history, culture and religion, which was gradually undergoing reinterpretation in ethnic terms. These concepts either did not appear in the Finnish textbooks or else they were not interpreted in the same way. If it upset the commission that the Finnish teaching texts spoke of Swedish history but were silent about the Tartar yoke, this illustrates that the members of the commission implicitly attributed a certain political importance to the Tartar yoke. Implicit political motives were also present in the background of criticism of the lack of emphasis on the role of Russia in the prosperity of Finland. This criticism evidently derived from the idea that history teaching should not only involve the narration of Russian history and convey Russian political values and attitudes, but should also create a positive image of Russian rule in Finland.

From the point of view of political socialization, geography textbooks had a special importance because they contributed to the creation of a picture of Russia as a unified state and fatherland, and at the same time worked with the ethnic hierarchy already mentioned. In addition, Russian geography textbooks depicted the political order and

organization of the Russian state, and so had a significant place in the definition of the political sphere, and more generally in the formation of attitudes towards the political system. Since Russia was *a priori* an imperial state, the textbooks worked with the image of a unified Russia and its administrative components. Finland was considered to be just one of these, and in the framework of such a discourse it was unthinkable to speak explicitly of the existence of a border between Finland and Russia, or between other 'regions' of Russia. The features that the committee found in the Finnish geography textbooks were entirely at odds with the official Russian conception of the ethnic hierarchy in which the Russians or 'Great Russians' were the sacrosanct and highest 'ruling nation', and the touchstone of the entire hierarchy. What disturbed the Russian members was not just the fact that the Finnish textbooks spoke about the ruling nation in inappropriate terms, but that implicitly the Finnish authors did not accept their view of the world, and even separated themselves from it. The central argument of the whole revision exercise, based on the claim that the Finnish textbooks, or information contained in them, did not reflect the real state of affairs actually meant that they did not correspond to Russian ideas.

All this suggests the extent to which the subjects history and geography were involved in the formation of identity. In 1904 Finnish national identity was relatively clearly defined and widely accepted by the population⁶⁵. The Russian state was aware of the political function of the teaching of both subjects⁶⁶, and considered Finnish national identity to be something that was in conflict with greater Russian identity. In the Russian context loyalty was a central part of identity. The Russian members of the committee believed that a course of Russian history in Finnish schools would lead the Finns to love, honour and loyally serve the Russian fatherland. They conceded that Finland was the homeland for Finns, but saw this more in terms of mere place of birth, and preferred to emphasise the concept of Russia as a common fatherland. The Finns, on the other hand, saw their homeland in a more narrow sense. Finland was defined by predominantly non-political concepts, while Russia was a relatively distant, political framework within which the Finnish homeland existed. The construction of the homeland as a symbol of mass identification was important in the process of the formation of the modern nation, and in the case of the smaller European nations (nations at the time of national formation existing within imperial, multi-ethnic states), the imperial power itself, by action and reaction, contributed to the process of definition.

The projected Russian revision was based on a previously defined model of Russian political values, and a historical narrative that was the embodiment of these values and intrinsic to the self-image of Russia as an empire. In the eyes of Russian bureaucrats this fixed and established narrative of Russian history had, as we have seen, a function in terms of political socialization. The negative attitude of the Russian members of the commission towards the existence of Finnish history as a school subject shows that they were aware of the role played by Finnish history for the Finnish people. In a spirit of Russification they believed that the Finns should adopt the Russian historical narrative, hand-in-hand with Russian political values, especially their autocracy. It should,

however, be pointed out that compared with the Russification strategies in the Western Regions or in the Volga Basin, for example, the approach in Finland was mild. In the Finnish context there was no religious Russification. Conversion to Orthodoxy, which was so important in the Volga case, and also existed in the Baltic regions, was not employed as an instrument of assimilation in Finland. The text of the revision proposals did not mention orthodoxy or religious questions in general, and the commissioners clearly did not regard the religious question as important in Finland.

This specific example of the revision of Finnish textbooks is also an expression of macro-social phenomena. First and foremost it shows that at the turn of the 20th century Russia was in the grip of fundamental political and social change. One aspect of this change was the stronger emphasis on education as an instrument of social control and the extension of the integrity of the state. The Russian imperial state and its governing elites no longer saw education as simply a way of regulating social mobility, and maintaining the privileged status of the imperial elites; they increasingly considered it a means of achieving internal integration and standardization through the inculcation of values, norms and ideologies that would essentially guarantee loyalty to Russia and identification with Russia as an empire, and thereby make it easier to exercise power over the population. This policy, however, had unintended consequences, such as the ever-wider integration of the population into the political sphere, and the diffusion of ideas of democracy. The intensification of assimilation policies, and their projected application in Finland, indicates the increasing emphasis on a redefinition of Russia as a modern nation state as opposed to a traditional empire-state. The national concept of Russia started, one might argue, to undermine Russia as an empire. What is certain, however, is that demands for the homogenization of culture in this universal sense became an important part of Russia's political strategy at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century.

This study has attempted to indicate the role of the educational process for the formation of a number of important phenomena associated with modern politics. I have also endeavoured to portray the theme of Russification in a different light, with the emphasis being on the cultural transmission of political values. Subjects including history and geography did not (and do not) fulfil the role simply as sources of knowledge and information, but are also transmitted discourses with functions other than purely educational. Through the educational process, ever-wider sections of the population were integrated into the political sphere. The inculcation of basic attitudes to the political sphere was linked to a particular historical narrative and its narrative strategies. Ultimately, political institutions and abstract political concepts (such as citizenship, homeland, empire and state) had to be grounded in a solid culture and national language. Through the Russification of the educational system, the Russian imperial state tried to form a generalized cultural standard, as defined by E. Gellner⁶⁷. A cultural standard of this kind naturally affected the political realm, and a monolithically constructed educational system was expected to assist in the attainment of this goal. The growing stress on the field of culture also draws attention to another important transformation in the

character of political power – abandoning the exploitation of repressive violence in the form of the police or army, and instead attempting to control the field of ideas as the dominant instrument of social control.

NOTES

- ¹ This study was written as part of the Research Project of the Czech Ministry of Education 0021620827: *České země uprostřed Evropy v minulosti a dnes* [The Czech Lands in the Heart of Europe in the Past and Today] and was supported by the Finnish Centre for International Mobility (CIMO). I would like to thank Prof. Marjatta Hietala for help with my dissertation project, and Markku Salminen for assistance with the translation of the Finnish text.
- ² E.C. Thaden (ed.), *Russification in Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914*, Princeton 1981.
- ³ A. Miller, *Russifikacii: Klassifikirovat i ponjat*, in “Ab Imperio. Studies in New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space”, 2002, 2, pp. 133-148, here p. 135.
- ⁴ M. Dolbilov, *Russification and the Bureaucratic Mind in the Russian Empire’s Northwestern Region in the 1860s*, in “Kritika. Explorations in Russian and Euroasian History”, 2004, 5, 2, pp. 245-271; D. Stalinuas, *Did the Government Seek to Russify Lithuanians and Poles in the Northwest Region after the Uprising of 1863-64?*, in “Kritika. Explorations in Russian and Euroasian History”, 2004, 5, 2, pp. 274-289; A. Miller, “*Ukrainskij vopros v politike vlastej i russkom obschestvennom mnenii (vtoraja polovina XIX v.)*”, St. Petersburg 2000.
- ⁵ In addition to the work of M. Dolbilov, already cited, it is worth mentioning for example W. Dowler, *The Politics of Language in Non-Russian Elementary Schools in the Eastern Empire, 1865-1914*, in “The Russian Review”, 1995, 54, pp.516-538.
- ⁶ R. Pearson, *Privileges, Rights, and Russification*, in O. Crisp, L. Edmondson (eds.), *Civil Rights in Imperial Russia*, Oxford 1989, p. 88.
- ⁷ Weeks’s dissertation is cited in: W. Rodkiewicz, *Russian Nationality Politics in the Western Province of the Empire (1863-1905)*, Lublin 1998, p. 10.
- ⁸ R.P. Geraci, *Windows on the East. National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia*, Ithaca - London 2001, p. 12 and Miller, *Russifikacii* cit., p. 135.
- ⁹ H. Hyman, *Political Socialization. A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior*, New York 1969; U. Herrmann, *Historische Sozialisationsforschung*, in K. Hurrelmann, D. Ulich (eds.), *Neues Handbuch der Sozialisationsforschung*, Weinheim - Basel 1991, pp. 231-250; A. Gestrich, *Vergesellschaftungen des Menschen. Einführung in die Historische Sozialisationsforschung*, Tübingen 1999; W.F. Stone, P.E. Schaffner, *The Psychology of Politics*, New York - Berlin - Heidelberg - London - Paris - Tokyo 1988, especially pp. 6-7.
- ¹⁰ A particularly interesting approach to Russia can be found in B. Eklof, *Russian Peasant Schools. Officialdom, Village Culture and Popular Pedagogy, 1861-1914*, Berkeley - Los Angeles - London 1986. This work focuses on the study of the mental and social impact of education in rural Russian culture from the point of view of social and educational history.
- ¹¹ R. Meighan, *A Sociology of Education*, London - Sydney - Toronto 1981, especially p. 58.
- ¹² Modern methods of textbook research summarises for example: F. Pingel, *UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook Research and Textbook Revision*, Hannover 1999. More particular historically based methodology is offered in J. Nicholls, *Methods in School Books Research*, in <http://www.ex.ac.uk/historyresource/journal6/nichollsrev.pdf> (22 October 2005).
- ¹³ N. Rjazanovskij, *Nicholas I. and Official Nationality in Russia 1825-1855*, Berkeley - Los Angeles 1959, p. 124.
- ¹⁴ For conservative nationalism see E.C. Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism in 19th Century Russia*, Seattle 1964.

- ¹⁵ R. Wortman, *Nikolai II i obraz samoderzhavija*, in "Istoria SSSR" 1991, 2, p. 122.
- ¹⁶ B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nations*, London - New York 1991, especially p. 86.
- ¹⁷ E. Hobsbawm, T. Ranger, *Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge 1983.
- ¹⁸ D.G. Kirby, *Finland and Russia 1808-1920. From Autonomy to Independency. A Selection of Documents*, London 1975, p. 72.
- ¹⁹ More on Finland's position in Tsarist Russia can be found in M. Klinge, *Imperskaja Finlandia*, St. Petersburg 2005.
- ²⁰ Kirby, *Finland* cit., p. 77.
- ²¹ T. Polvinen, *Derzhava i okraina. N. I. Bobrikov – general-gubernator Finlandii 1898-1904 gg.*, St. Petersburg 1997, p. 65.
- ²² Kirby, *Finland* cit., p. 78.
- ²³ K. Korhonen, *Autonomous Finland in the Political Thought of 19th Century Russia*, Turku 1969, p. 25.
- ²⁴ Kirby, *Finland* cit., p. 79.
- ²⁵ *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossijskoj Imperii*, XIX, 1899, St. Petersburg 1902, p. 92.
- ²⁶ Polvinen, *Derzhava i okraina* cit., p. 114.
- ²⁷ E. Jutikkala, K. Pirinen, *Dějiny Finska*, Prague 2001, pp. 208-212; (available also in English: E. Jutikkala, K. Pirinen, *A History of Finland*, Helsinki 2003).
- ²⁸ For more detail see B. Szordykowska, *Finlandia w polityce caratu w latach 1899-1914. Problemy rusyfikacji i unifikacji*, Gdańsk 1994, especially pp. 61-71.
- ²⁹ For example: A. Paasi, *Geographical Perspectives on Finnish National Identity*, in "GeoJournal", 1997, 43, pp. 41-50, especially pp. 43-46.
- ³⁰ The following section is based on my doctoral research on 40 Russian textbooks of history, geography, civic education, Russian language, Russian reading books and other study materials published in the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. This article uses only the most influential examples of discourse in Russian textbooks. Nevertheless, Russian textbooks were typically very uniform and their discourses were very standardised; therefore I believe that this sample is quite representative.
- ³¹ For further comparisons, see, for example, S. Rozhdestvenskij, *Kratkaja otechestvennaja istoria v razskazach. Dlja nachalnykh narodnykh uchilishch i voobshche dlja naroda*, St. Petersburg 1875, p. 3 or D. Illovskij, *Kratkie ocherki russkoj istorii. Kurs starshago vozrasta*, Moscow 1879, p. 9.
- ³² A. Trachevskij, *Uchebnik russkoj istorii*, St. Petersburg 1900, p. 133.
- ³³ For example: Rozhdestvenski, *Kratkaja otechestvennaja istoria v razskazach* cit., p. 119.
- ³⁴ *Obozrenie russkoj istorii. Ot nachala Rusi do nashich vremen*, Riga - Derpt 1877, p. 25 or M. Ostrogoskij, *Uchebnik russkoj istorii s risunkami, kartami, tablicami i voprosami dlja povtorenia. Elementarnyj kurs dlja srednykh zavedenij i gorodskikh uchilishch*, St. Petersburg 1916, p. 46.
- ³⁵ See, for example, Rozhdestvenski, *Kratkaja otechestvennaja istoria v razskazach* cit., p. 57 (for Muscovy's expansion in northern areas) or K. Jelpatevskij, *Uchebnik russkoj istorii s prilozheniem rodoslovij i khronologicheskoj tablici i ukazatelja lichnykh imen*, St. Petersburg 1901, p. 369 (for the Polish example).
- ³⁶ This hierarchy can be found most explicitly in: E. Lesgaf, *Otechestvovedenie. Kurs srednykh uchhebnykh zavedenij*. St. Petersburg 1910, pp. 189-202.
- ³⁷ S. Mech, *Rossija. Uchebnik otechestvennoj geografii*, Moscow 1889, p. 96.
- ³⁸ See for example I. Janchin, *Geografija Rossijskoj imperii dlja uchenikov IV. klassa sredneuchebnykh zavedenij*, Moscow 1905, p. 119 (Caucasus people).
- ³⁹ Rozhdestvenski, *Kratkaja otechestvennaja istoria v razskazach* cit., p. 2.

- ⁴⁰ A.E. Spiridonov, *Učebnik geografii Rossiji*, St. Petersburg 1910, p. 70.
- ⁴¹ K.I. Gololobov, *Zakonovedenie. Kurs srednykh uchebnykh zavedenij*, Saratov 1914, p. 39.
- ⁴² S.F. Platonov, *Sokrashennyj kurs russoj istorii dlja srednej shkoly*, Petrograd 1915, p. 422.
- ⁴³ Polvinen, *Derzhava i okraina* cit., p. 144.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 143.
- ⁴⁵ *Memorandum komissii po peresmotru prinjatykh v finlandskikh uchebnykh zavedenijakh uchebnikov istorii i geografii a takze knig dlja sbkolnago chtenija*, Finnish National Archives, Helsinki, KKK, Hd 46.
- ⁴⁶ In Russian history textbooks, it was precisely these events, on the contrary, that formed the basic backbone of the historical narrative.
- ⁴⁷ *Memorandum komissii po peresmotru prinjatykh v finlandskikh uchebnykh zavedenijakh uchebnikov istorii i geografii a takze knig dlja sbkolnago chtenija*, Finnish National Archives, Helsinki, KKK, Hd 46.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁵² *Ibid.*
- ⁵³ *Osoboe mnenije trekh chlenov Komissii (Irje-Koskinena, Tavastberna i Snellmana)*, Finnish National Archives, Helsinki, KKK, Hd 46.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁹ S. Topelius, *Maamme Kirja. Lukukirja Suomen Alimmille Oppilaitoksille*, Porvoo - Helsinki 1951 (53rd edition), pp. 10-11. Topelius cites the Bible, 4th Book of Moses, 34,2.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 229.
- ⁶¹ *Ibid.*, e.g. pp. 317-318.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 360.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 317-318.
- ⁶⁴ M. Hroch, *In the National Interest: Demands and Goals of National Movements of the 19th Century: A Comparative Perspective*, Prague 2000, pp. 197-198.
- ⁶⁵ Paasi, *Geographical Perspectives on Finnish National Identity* cit, p. 46.
- ⁶⁶ Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism* cit., p. 189 and for further comparison see a particular example of teaching practice: *Pravila i programmy dlja cerkevno-prochodskikh sbkol i sbkol gramoty*, St. Petersburg 1894, p. 110.
- ⁶⁷ E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford 1983, p. 140.

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Defining the Enemy: the Profile of the Bourgeoisie in Romanian Communist Textbooks

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ABSTRACT

During the Romanian communist regime, school, and especially school textbooks, became one of the most efficient means for conferring legitimacy on communist ideology and crystallising new social identities. History was particularly useful, as it influenced the formation of strong stereotypes pertaining to national, social and religious identity, as well as preconceptions about other nations and peoples. This is exemplified by the image of the bourgeoisie contained in Romanian history textbooks. The communist textbooks adjusted the image of the bourgeoisie to fit with their ideology and their national and international political aims. Nevertheless, the treatment of the bourgeoisie was not uniform. In 1952 the bourgeoisie was the ‘retrograde class’, no matter what period or historical context was discussed. However, this changed in the 1960s, when certain aspects of the bourgeoisie were portrayed as advancing the Romanian cause (for instance during the 1848 revolution). From 1970 the interpretation tended towards the reintegration of the bourgeoisie into the nation. The bourgeoisie of the 19th century became evaluated positively, and its role in the construction of the modern Romanian state was acknowledged. The reason for these changed attitudes lay in part in the attempts to construct a Romanian tradition of industrialization, originating before the communist period, as well as to legitimate the current regime by reverting to history. Furthermore, the revival of certain bourgeoisie personalities was supposed to contribute to the building of Ceausescu’s personality cult.

Lucrarea de față își propune să identifice posibilele continuități și discontinuități ale imaginii burgheziei din manualele de istoria Românilor din perioada comunistă. Am pornit de la tipologia propusă de Vlad Georgescu și am considerat relevante pentru analiza noastră manualele ediate de Mihail Roller (1952), Dumitru Almaș (1960), Constantin Daicoviciu, Miron Constantinescu (1970), precum și manualul de istorie modernă din 1985 și cel de istorie contemporană din 1989.

Din punct de vedere metodologic am preferat analiza cantitativă menită să identifice frecvența unor cuvinte sau expresii considerate relevante: burghezie/burghes capitalism/capi-

taliști, capital, trust, imperialism, industrie/industrializare, muncitori/clasă muncitoare, proletariat. Partea cea mai dificilă a studiului a constituit-o atribuirea unei valori (negativ, neutru, pozitiv) fiecărei categorii. Am întocmit grila de evaluare a cuvintelor relevante pentru studiu având în vedere atât ideologia și valorile sociale promovate în perioadă, contextul politic existent în momentul apariției manualelor, cât și de plasarea în frază, paragraf, capitol a fiecărui cuvânt.

Prima premisă de la care am pornit a fost aceea că școala a fost unul din elementele primordiale în cristalizarea unui anumit tip de identitate (în cazul nostru socială, dar și națională), iar un mijloc, o modalitate prin care se realizează acest lucru îl reprezintă manualele școlare. În special, istoria, ca și disciplină didactică, a jucat un rol esențial în crearea, re-crearea și definirea identității naționale, sociale sau profesionale.

Cea de a doua premisă este aceea că imaginea construită burgheziei de autorii manualelor nu este una monolitică, diferențele de la un manual la altul fiind semnificative. Explicațiile sunt legate de recuperarea parțială a burgheziei și "reintegrarea" ei în națiune. Procesul evoluează de la negarea oricărui rol pozitiv (în 1952 burghezia era o „clasă retrogradă” indiferent de perioadă și context) spre recunoașterea parțială a unui rol limitat („unele părți ale burgheziei” au acționat în sens pozitiv în „anumite” perioade). Incepând cu 1970 se observă un proces de "reintegrare" a burgheziei în națiune, burghezia secolului al XIX-lea fiind "recuperată" aproape în întregime. Cu toate acestea, burghezia rămâne un actor colectiv negativ (în majoritatea situațiilor) în comparație cu clasa muncitoare (actor pozitiv în toate contextele, uneori naiv, dar scuzabil datorită lipsei de experiență politică). Burghezia acționează întodeauna în mod interesat, iar dacă interesele sale se nimeresc a fi sinonime cu cele ale națiunii, imaginea sa poate să devină una pozitivă în context.

O altă explicație pentru încercarea de remodelare a imaginii burgheziei este dată de necesitatea legitimării procesului de industrializare și de creare a unei tradiții acestui proces, tradiție care să poată fi utilizată în conflictul ideologic avut cu URSS pe această temă. Pe de altă parte, nu trebuie uitată nici recuperarea unor personaje istorice precum Nicolae Bălcescu, Mihail Kogălniceanu sau Alexandru Ioan Cuza și introducerea lor în Panteonul național. Cu toată originea lor burgheză aceștia au fost folosiți de către regim inclusiv pentru crearea cultului personalității lui Ceaușescu.

In the ideological confrontation between East and West, communist regimes attempted to promote positive or negative perceptions of collective identities in order to justify their ideology. In these endeavours, they regularly used education as a means of inculcating certain ideas, concepts, prejudices, images and stereotypes. This chapter identifies continuity and change in the portrayal of the bourgeoisie in Romanian communist history textbooks. Using the typological analysis devised by Vlad Georgescu, who analysed the historical writings of the communist period¹, the present study focuses on several history textbooks, including those of Mihail Roller (1952), Dumitru Almaș (1960), Constantin Daicoviciu, and Miron Constantinescu (1970). For the last stage of communism in Romania the modern history textbooks of 1985 and contemporary

Romanian history textbooks from 1988 are examined. The selected works show, to greater or lesser extents, changes in the interpretations of historical events, people, and collective identities and classes, especially the bourgeoisie. Therefore, the structure of this chapter is to examine each book in order of its appearance in print. It is also necessary, however, to sketch the teaching of history in Romanian schools, in order to understand the context in which the books operated.

History textbooks constitute a useful source for the study of communist identity creation, because they are the most palpable expression of the 'official history' and they easily permit us to identify and interpret the specific ideology which the authorities wished to impose. As Katherine Verdery has pointed out, there was intense competition among scholars for resources and state patronage², although it is not quite correct to view the communist regime's editorial machinery as being entirely monolithic³.

In order to chart the efforts of the communist authorities to establish and reinforce certain corporate identities, the frequency of the following terms and concepts were measured: *bourgeoisie*, *capitalism/capitalist*, *capital*, *trust*, *imperialism*, *industry/industrialization*, *the working class*, and *the proletariat*. Each category was assigned a positive, negative or neutral value. An interpretive scheme was applied which took into account the prevailing ideology, social values, and political context; the manner in which each concept was used was also scrutinized, including the terms' positions in the paragraph, page and chapter. Therefore, one of the limitations of this research is that, even if a quantitative approach lends more objectivity to the research, the choice of concepts, and the values assigned, imply a certain degree of subjectivity specific to any social science research.

Our guiding thesis is that education was one of the most important channels used to inculcate a specific social and national identity. History has always played a key role in this endeavour, as it influenced the emergence of some strong stereotypes pertaining to national, social and religious identities. Before the communist regime, education and history had been harnessed by the political elite in order to mould a collective Romanian identity. In the 19th century, national ideology replaced the general solidarity based on shared Christian values. A main instrument for this was the history textbook. The Romanian elite insisted that "apart from the book that taught us to say 'I am a Christian', another book, the modern Bible of every people, that is the history of Romania's past and present", should also be used in schools⁴. This process intensified in the inter-war period. Romanian universities became associated with a specific and extreme nationalism, which was endorsed not only by a significant portion of students, but also by part of the national political elite⁵. It is almost redundant to assert that school textbooks were not objective. Textbooks reflected the values and ideology of the author, the educational authority, and ultimately the government⁶. The memory of the past had a special importance within the intellectual fabric of totalitarian regimes. It enabled the social, political and cultural elite to select and order historical events and arguments, the purpose being to maximise the potential of the young generation to maintain and promote the general interests of the society and of the elite. The selection process could

not be avoided because, of course, it was and is impossible to entirely recover the past. Instead, the past was 'arranged'; and events and personalities that generate emotions such as pride, and correspond with the ideas and values required in a certain period, were accordingly emphasised.

During the communist regime, the school and the textbook became one of the most efficient means for implementing communist ideology. Notwithstanding the fact that the short-term efficiency is difficult to quantify, the survival of some stereotypes after 1989 is proof that the process was rather successful. For instance, the majority of Romanians perceived negatively all possible investment by Western 'capitalists' at the beginning of the 1990s. One of the explanations for the survival of such preconceptions may lie in the efforts of the authorities to implement a negative image of the bourgeoisie, through teachers' lessons and textbooks. The process of recreating the identity of the bourgeoisie was influenced by many factors. Therefore, this essay's second guiding principle is that the image of the bourgeoisie was shaped by both internal and external political aims, and by the emerging imperative to legitimise the regime.

HISTORY IN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS DURING THE COMMUNIST PERIOD

During the initial period of the communist regime (1948-51), Romanian history was taught as an independent discipline in primary schools. In 5th grade ancient and medieval world history was taught, and in 6th grade, modern and contemporary world history. Finally, in the 7th grade, a final exam was taken before graduation. In secondary schools, the first two years were dedicated to world history while the final year was dedicated to the study of Romanian history.

Starting with the academic year 1951-52 Romanian history was integrated within world history for 5th to 7th grades. A similar process occurred in secondary schools, where the history of the Romanian People's Republic (RPR) was studied in 1951-59 as a part of courses in world history. In all three secondary grades the RPR's history was allocated three hours weekly. One of the explanations for this unusual educational plan is that the communist authorities wanted to emphasise the "historical close friendship relations between the Romanian and Russian peoples"⁷. The textbook used for secondary school history was written by Mihail Roller and published in 1952. In 1959-60 there was a return to the older system: Romanian history was taught in 7th grade at elementary school, and in 11th grade at secondary school⁸. When elementary education until 8th grade became compulsory, Romanian history was taught in that year also. This reform of history teaching generated the publication of new textbooks both for elementary and secondary schools, by Dumitru Almaş, Gheorghe Georgescu-Buzău, and Aron Petric⁹.

The new textbooks produced after 1960 re-evaluated and reinterpreted certain historical events and processes from the perspective of the Romanian Workers' Party programme of 1955 and in accordance with "new discoveries of historical science". This situation remained unchanged until 1975, when the programme of the Romanian Communist

Party altered history as a science and teaching discipline. Although the so-called ‘politechnization’ of the educational system¹⁰ was maintained, 1978 education legislation lent a fresh impetus to social disciplines and to teachers of these disciplines. The Act of 1978 stated that: “teaching social sciences is based on the Romanian Communist Party’s programme, on its ideology and policy, on dialectic and historical materialism, on the principles of scientific socialism, of the newest discoveries of revolutionary practice and human knowledge”¹¹.

Social sciences received a new, clear purpose, and the educational process was not able to deviate from the aim desired and imposed by the communist authorities. Thus the same Act of 1978 read:

the study of social sciences is intended to guarantee the appropriation of the Party’s ideology and policy by the young generation; to contribute to the fostering of the socialist consciousness, the communist ideals and convictions; to contribute to the young generation’s development as active militants for the progress and prosperity of the homeland; help towards the triumph of the ideals of peace, freedom and social justice in the world¹².

In the late 1970s and 1980s Romanian history received a highly privileged position in the country’s educational hierarchy¹³. In comparison with the period 1951-1960, the place of world history had diminished significantly, while Romanian was taught in every grade in secondary school. Once the High School system of four years in two levels became generalized, and the first two years became mandatory, Romanian history was taught from 7th to 10th grades, starting with ancient Romanian history in 7th grade and ending with contemporary history in 10th grade¹⁴. In conclusion, one might say that the changes in teaching history were sometimes only formal, but at other times were quite substantial, modifications which reflect the importance the communists gave to the teaching of history. History needed to legitimise, first, the new communist regime in Romania, and later, during the era of “national communism”¹⁵, history was used to legitimize the country’s detachment from the Soviet Union.

ROLLERIAN HISTORY

Although Mihail Roller was at the centre of much discussion following the fall of communism in Romania, not much has been written about him, or why the task of writing communist-era national history was committed to him rather than a prominent Marxist-trained historian such as Andrei Oțetea¹⁶. One might simply conclude that Roller was the Soviets’ candidate. Yet the issue is much more complex. Mihail Roller entered the public scene at the appropriate time. In 1945 he published a plea for the study of the history of Romanian workers¹⁷. In 1946-47 Roller produced theoretical essays explaining “the necessity of approaching history from the perspective of the only scientific method, dialectic materialism”¹⁸. However, except for one single noticeable case¹⁹, a Marxist approach to history did not become manifest in Romania during the communist period. Vladimir Tismaneanu considered that in Romania:

Marxism became an instrument for the legitimation of a power-thirsty, usurping clan whose only allegiance was to its privileges and power. The ruling power did its best to encourage and reward the most hackneyed, the most trite, and the most opportunistic exercises in vulgar interpretations of historical materialism²⁰.

This assertion is valid both for the first stage of communism in Romania and for the Ceaușescu era. Immediately after the communists took power, the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) embarked on an overall Sovietization of Romanian cultural and scientific life. In the Ceaușescu epoch “scientific socialism” limited itself to exalting the tremendous victories of Romanian communists and to echoing Ceaușescu’s primitive, extremely anachronistic sermons on revolution, party, nation and state²¹.

Roller’s *Istoria R.P.R. Manual pentru învățământul mediu* [The History of the RPR: Textbook edited for Secondary Schools] was published in 1952, during the most rigid period of Stalinism in Romania. The new political regime and the satellite status of the Romanian state had to be justified. In order to achieve this, it helped to identify enemies. Internally, the bourgeoisie and the landowners were cast as enemies, while ‘the Anglo-American imperialists’ were the external enemies. Conversely, the civilizing and benevolent influence of Russia on the history of Romania, and the constant struggle of the proletariat, are the main themes of the textbook; the positive image of the Russian people is constructed in tandem with the negative one of the ‘Anglo-American imperialists’. Likewise, the construction of the bourgeoisie as a collective enemy was part of the casting of the political identity of the working class²². The communist narrative described the working class as a homogenous entity, evolving in a linear manner, within a homogenous space, as “the working class from Romania”. The road to socialism was therefore a way from ‘then’ to ‘now’, as well as from ‘outside’ to ‘inside’; from political incompetence (then) to competence (now)²³. In the case of the bourgeoisie, the transition is from competence – but not political legitimacy²⁴ – to incompetence. Unlike the bourgeoisie, which according to Roller was totally reactionary, the working class always acted for the best interests of the people. However, for a long period their actions were disorganised, like an amorphous group without its own consciousness²⁵: “The Bolshevization of the communist parties occurred in the context of the continuous struggle against the bourgeoisie, the social-democrats and Trotskyites, agents of the bourgeoisie within the ranks of the working class”²⁶.

In Roller’s textbook, the bourgeoisie are mentioned 237 times with a neutral connotation and 248 times with a negative one; the term completely lacks any positive value²⁷. (Capitalism was reiterated 203 times, 123 times with a neutral connotation and 80 times with a negative value; but condemning capitalism was less novel than condemning the middle classes.) Roller introduced an interpretation of the bourgeoisie which was adopted by later authors. He deployed expressions and statements such as “the savage bourgeois exploitation”²⁸, “the traitor bourgeois government”²⁹, “the bourgeoisie left our country at the disposal of German, French, English and American imperialists”³⁰ and “betrayed the people’s interests”³¹. The author does not appeal to historical events in order to support his claims. These expressions were presented by the author

as axioms belonging to “true, scientific, Marxist” history, and were therefore in need of no further substantiation. Furthermore, in order to reinforce the negative image, Roller condemned the bourgeoisie as the natural enemies of the Communist Party and the Romanian proletariat: “In order to exploit the richness of our country and to exhaust the vigour of the workers, the Anglo-American imperialists motivated the local bourgeoisie, who received a cut of the loot in exchange for betraying the Romanian people’s interest”³².

To conclude, we can well appreciate that Roller’s goal to rewrite entirely Romanian history was accomplished. Russian innovations were emphatically proclaimed as the most advanced in the world; Romania’s past was rewritten to fit this new mythology³³. The political identity of the bourgeoisie (until then associated with the emergence of the modern nation) had been completely redefined. The bourgeoisie became a collective actor that always acted against the people’s interests. When Roller could not explicitly deny the positive role of the bourgeoisie, for example, during the 1848 revolution, he denied it by omitting it or by substituting the facts with a different set. Therefore, the main force of the 1848 revolution became the working class, whose influence was, in actuality, null in mid-19th century Romania.

THE 1960 TEXTBOOK – “REINTERPRETING THE PREVIOUSLY INTERPRETED TRUTHS”

In order to demonstrate continuity and change in the perception of the bourgeoisie in Romanian history textbooks, Roller’s History of the RPR can be compared to the next major volume – *Istoria României. Manual pentru clasa a XI-a* [Romania’s History. Textbook for 11th Grade] by Dumitru Almaş, G. Georgescu-Buzău, and Aron Petric (1960). This publication, appearing at the beginning of the process of “reinterpreting the already interpreted truths”³⁴, marked the passing of the Rollerian period in Romanian historiography – and in fact the book was intended expressly to replace Roller’s volume. In 1960 the authors, Almaş, Georgescu-Buzău and Petric were associate professors at Bucharest University³⁵. Their careers began in 1948-49, part of the new generation of historians brought in to replace luminaries such as Constantin Giurescu or Gheorghe Brătianu³⁶, who had been purged. From 1959-60 Romanian history was taught again in the 11th grade, the final grade of secondary school. Therefore, a new textbook was needed as Roller’s volume (both the 1952 and 1956 editions) had been conceived for the whole secondary system.

The word *bourgeois*, or *bourgeoisie*, appears 447 times in the 1960 textbook. On 240 occasions the term has a neutral value, and a negative 186 times. It is surprising, however, to note that the authors give a positive connotation to this word in 21 contexts. Nevertheless, in most of the cases, the tone is quite preponderantly negative. The volume adopts the same temporal framework as Roller – contrasting the situation for Romanians ‘then’ and ‘now’. Thus, the process of remodelling the image of the bourgeoisie was strongly connected to the construction of working class identity. The working class,

and in particular the proletariat, vainly strove for the promotion of the commonwealth, separately from the bourgeoisie, whose main target was to fulfil their own interests. While the idea of the commonwealth may have attracted the interest of the bourgeoisie on occasion, the class still remained a reactionary force: “The industrial bourgeoisie was also for independence; it wanted to create a secure, large and advantageous market, something that Turkish domination prevented”³⁷.

It is not surprising that concepts of modernization and industrialization loomed large in the history textbooks of the 1960s; contemporary policies on industrialization were an important facet of Soviet-Romanian relations, and sometimes the subject of conflict with Moscow³⁸. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the Romanian elite, of various ideological orientations, had defined themselves as champions of modernization, which included the reforming of Romanian society and institutions according to the examples of other more “advanced” nations³⁹. In the 1960s, the Romanian communists defined modernization simply: industrialization. Therefore, it became desirable to link the history of the Romanian state with industrialization. School textbooks had to legitimise the government’s industrialization policies, and even to fabricate a tradition of Romanian industrialization which would dispel the preconception of the economy as dependent on agriculture. Thus, there is no surprise that the word *industrialization* appears 17 times with positive connotations. In certain cases when the bourgeoisie is positively evaluated, it is in connection with the industrialization process. The image of the bourgeoisie is therefore ambivalent; at once regressive and opposed to modernization, yet also a promoter of industrialization – synonymous in the 1960s with modernization.

However, in the *Istoria României*, the image of the bourgeoisie is overwhelmingly negative, and the indirect association of the bourgeoisie with modernisation offers only the most partial rehabilitation. In cases when the bourgeoisie is evaluated in a positive light, it is not treated as monolithic. For example: “A part of the bourgeoisie opted for re-establishing contacts with the Soviet Union, including the Foreign Minister, Nicolae Titulescu, who assessed more lucidly the international context and the defensive interests of the Romanian state in the face of Nazi aggression”⁴⁰. And:

The Romanian Communist Party appeal had a large response, not only among the workers, but as well among the poor inhabitants of the capital, especially in the working-class neighbourhood Grivița, among the unemployed, students, civil servants and even among a part of the small bourgeoisie, itself affected by the policies of domestic and foreign monopolies⁴¹.

Meanwhile, condemnatory remarks encompassed the whole class.

In contrast to Roller, the authors employed legends, embellished with metaphoric language, in order to personify the bourgeoisie. These techniques and devices attributed negative human characteristics to the class, such as malice, hypocrisy and cowardliness. Often, the language contained emotive and archaic expressions, which reinforced the negative image⁴². For example: “Keeping the popular masses in the darkness of igno-

rance, the bourgeois-landowners' regime could more easily crush them and mutilate their consciousness by means of mysticism, nationalism and chauvinism"⁴³; while: "The bloody annihilation of the striking fights, on 13 December did not mean the 'beheading' of the working class, as the bourgeoisie hoped"⁴⁴.

Generally, the textbook published in 1960 did not differ radically from the one published in 1952. However, quantitatively, we can distinguish a noticeably improved image of the bourgeoisie, an image primarily owing to the need to legitimize the industrialisation process (manifested by the theme of an industrial inheritance left by the bourgeoisie regime), but also state's use of historical figures from the "progressive bourgeoisie" (Nicolae Bălcescu⁴⁵, Mihail Kogălniceanu⁴⁶, Alexandru Ioan Cuza⁴⁷). This process was also validated in other ways during the 1970s and 1980s.

THE HISTORY TEXTBOOK DURING THE PERIOD OF IDEOLOGICAL RELAXATION

The period between 1965 and 1971, representing the ascent of Ceaușescu to the position of General Secretary of the PCR, and the so called "cultural mini-revolution", started in 1971⁴⁸, is very complex, its main feature being an ambiguous nature of foreign and internal politics. Thus, although Ceaușescu won the position without any apparent fight, in reality, his programme remained unknown until 1971, suggesting that he needed time in order to eliminate opposition⁴⁹. Regarding cultural politics, one may notice a kind of relaxed atmosphere, sustained by material advantages, in contrast to the previous period, when it was more coercive⁵⁰. In this more liberal climate, the 1970 textbook written by Miron Constantinescu⁵¹, Constantin Daicoviciu⁵², and Hadrian Daicoviciu is surprising mainly due to a series of "protochronistic"⁵³ expressions that were heavily utilised from 1971 on. Although it was written before July 1971, the thesis of the textbook subtly introduces some expressions that became famous during the period of 'national communism': namely "the creative genius of Romanian people", and the characterization of a series of Romanian scientists as 'pathfinders'.

Concerning the bourgeoisie, the tone of the authors became much more considered. In 20 cases the bourgeoisie was positively evaluated, in 104 neutrally, and 45 negatively. Therefore, the value assigned to the bourgeoisie, though still negative in many instances, was more nuanced. This represented the reintegration of the bourgeoisie into the nation. When considering the issue of national consensus, the authors avoided emphasizing class differences. Therefore, one can see in the textbook that "the national movement was a target of the entire Romanian nation, of every social class"⁵⁴. Furthermore, in the historical contexts of the 19th century, the "leading role of the fight belonged to the Romanian Transylvanian bourgeoisie"⁵⁵. The explanation for the altering view of the bourgeoisie is to be found in the political aims of the authorities. Ceaușescu's denial of support for the invasion of Czechoslovakia produced significant changes in foreign and domestic policies. He was considered by Western leaders as a communist reformer, and many of them visited Romania⁵⁶. Regarding internal policy, the controlling tools used by the regime were becoming more sophisticated; moving from a coercive system

to a remunerative and symbolic-ideological one⁵⁷. The national ideology became a tool for creating legitimacy, and the party strove to incorporate, to recognize and control the idea of the nation⁵⁸.

The discourse of the Romanian political elite during the first stage of the communist period revealed a diminishing use of the term *nation*. In the official communist discourse of the period the 'nation' was the population that lived in the territory of a state⁵⁹. Moreover, the term was also presented in the context of fighting racism or imperialism, or in the decolonization of the Third World. At the beginning of the 1970s the situation changed, and the term 'socialist nation' became very often used. 'Socialist nations' were new, due to their chronological emergence (as a phenomenon following the October Revolution), and because of their contrast to the old bourgeois nations. On the other hand, the socialist nation was dialectically defined, as the 'transformed bourgeois nation'. This incompatibility, clearly engendered by the two genres of nation, became in this way, identity. Subsequently, the nation was an actor, endowed with an essence, capable of defining negatively the bourgeois nations, and positively socialist nations⁶⁰. As Ceaușescu defined it from 1968, the 'socialist nation' may fully prosper only under the socialist governments. Thus, he stressed that the socialist nation represents a progressive force, unlike the other bourgeois nations. Moreover, he considered that the socialist nation represents the main target in the progress of humanity, not the proletariat⁶¹. The Communist Party identified itself with the nation, and not only with the proletariat. The emerging new national definition developed by the Romanian Communists presented an opportunity to make fresh links between past and present, to recover historical personalities, or redefine certain social entities, such as the bourgeoisie. Therefore, the reinsertion of the bourgeoisie in the nation must be analysed in connection with redefinition of the nation.

The rehabilitation of the bourgeoisie was limited in ethnic and temporal terms. Therefore there was a difference in the treatments of the Romanian, Hungarian and German bourgeoisie: while it was possible for the native bourgeoisie to be approved of, members of the class from other ethnic groups were perceived as internal enemies⁶². Positive remarks about the bourgeoisie were confined to the 19th century. However there was still ambivalence surrounding the 19th-century Romanian bourgeoisie. The progressive bourgeoisie may have played an important role, such as the one acting in Transylvania, where

In Transylvania, the Romanian bourgeoisie encountered a specific situation: it was at the beginning of its formation, paltry, coming from the superior and middle strata of the peasantry, close to the people, and for this particular reason sustained the people's claims and received the support from the masses from towns and villages, who formed the main force of the 1848 revolution⁶³.

However sometimes the same 19th-century bourgeoisie is perceived as a retrograde class acting against the people:

Bălcescu saw the issue of the full accomplishment of the revolution as being linked to a call to fight the masses, "the rule of the people through the people", the elimination

of all despots and the accomplishment of the state unity. Still the inner forces, of the landowners and bourgeoisie, were strong⁶⁴.

Another explanation for the improving image of the Romanian bourgeoisie is the industrialization process. According to the authors, the people became aware of the benefits of industrialization, and consequently, all efforts had to be concentrated on the continuation of this phenomenon. Thus, the needs of the subject mattered less; his efforts had to focus on the great aim of industrialization – which itself was equated with national independence. The manner of legitimizing industrialization turned to Marxist-Leninist teachings, to the Party (perceived as an entity with a civilizing role) and to the Romanian people (“the creative forces of the Romanian people” being one of the expressions consecrated by Romanian National Communism).

Following the Marxist/Leninist teachings, starting from the concrete realities of our country and supporting itself on the creative effort of the Romanian people and on the use of the natural richness of the country, the Romanian Communist Party put at the centre of its entire economic activity the policy of industrialization as fundament of the entire economic and cultural progress, in order to raise the living standard of the population, and to secure independence and national sovereignty⁶⁵.

In the textbook of 1970, the intention of restoring the place of the bourgeoisie in Romanian history began to take shape; and the class’s role in the construction of modern Romania was also redefined. At some points (for example, the 1848 revolution and the national movement in Transylvania), the bourgeoisie was even granted the title of “leader of the masses”⁶⁶.

THE HISTORY TEXTBOOKS DURING THE “PROTOCHRONIST” PERIOD

For the last stage of communism in Romania we may examine the textbook edited by Elisabeta Hurezeanu, Maria Totu, and Gheorghe Smarandache, *Istoria Moderna a României. Manual pt clasa a IX-a* [Modern Romanian History. Textbook for 9th Grade] (1985), and Aron Petric and Gheorghe Ioniță’s *Istoria contemporană a României* [Contemporary Romanian History. Textbook for the 10th Grade] (1988). The analysis of the two textbooks should be conducted together because of the new history teaching structure of Romania, which planned for the teaching of Modern and Contemporary History over a two-year period.

The first textbook deals with the 1821-1918 era, while the second one discusses 1918-1989. The Modern history textbook contains a high frequency of the positive value of the word *bourgeoisie*. There are 112 examples of the word, in which 24 have positive connotations, while only 10 have negative ones. The explanation is that, on the one hand, there was an effort to legitimize the regime by appealing to history. The myth of Romania as a ‘besieged fortress’ during the 1980s had to be inculcated⁶⁷, and history was used to provide both examples and solutions. The solution proposed by history was to reduce class differences, and to launch a common defence of national values by uniting the bourgeoisie, the workers, the peasants, and the intellectuals. With all

interests directed towards the greater good, individual or class interests subsequently diminished. From the textbook, one may conclude that up until 1918, Romanians of all social backgrounds shared a common ideal:

Unification was the objective of the struggle of the entire nation. Consequently, every social class, including the landowners, took part in this movement. [...] Led by the bourgeoisie, the emerging class, the unionist movement drew its forces from the total and unconditioned participation of popular masses from countryside and towns⁶⁸.

A second explanation for the high percentage of positive descriptions is suggested, once again, by the attempt to legitimize industrialization, and to create a tradition for it. Industrialization did not coincide only with modernization (the terms were considered synonymous since the 1960s), but also with the independence of the state, and eventually, with the existence of the nation, as suggested in the following quotation:

Since the last century – comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu said – numerous patriots driven by progressive ideals and by concern for the fate of the country, preoccupied themselves with finding solutions to change the economic situation, then extremely difficult for Romania. They drew the attention to the impossibility of accomplishing this without strong development of the industry⁶⁹.

The third explanation for the high percentage of positive values is connected with the personality cult of Ceaușescu. Some historical personages from the 19th and early 20th centuries were inserted into the ‘national pantheon’, though their bourgeois origin was scarcely mentioned. The model offered by these personalities accorded perfectly with the regime’s interests. Thus, Nicolae Bălcescu, a person without social identity, without personal ambitions⁷⁰, and serving the interests of the country, represented a kind of model for the ‘ideal activist’ ready to sacrifice himself on the altar of the country. Mihai Kogălniceanu represented the model of the political man dedicated to the nation. His involvement as prime minister during the process of Romanian state building granted him this quality. Alexandru Ioan Cuza represented the enlightened despot, ever-ready to bring justice to the persecuted and oppressed, sometimes bypassing the legislative norms, solely for the sake of the social justice. Consequently, some protagonists belonging to the 19th-century bourgeoisie could be employed without difficulty by the regime, their image being manipulated in order to confer legitimacy on the communist regime and on Ceaușescu himself. The unity among Romanians was broken, according to the *Istoria Moderna* at the beginning of the 20th century, when the bourgeoisie became reactionary. For instance, the peasant revolt of 1907 was “bloodily put down by the governors of the country, who colluded for the salvation of the bourgeois and landowners’ positions”⁷¹. And:

The landowners and bourgeois circles, eager to export as much and as advantageously as possible, did not falter when contracting for important quantities of cereals and other produce with the German and Austro-Hungarian companies, this standing once again as proof of their narrow class interests⁷².

Why this sudden change of position? As shown above, some members of the historical Romanian bourgeoisie could easily be co-opted by the Communist regime. The same did not apply to the leaders of the National Liberal Party and the National Peasant Party. The communists executed the elite of these parties. Moreover, until the end of the 1960s the legitimization of the Communist Party was realised in part by opposition to the National Liberal Party and National Peasant Party. Consequently, it was impossible for National Communism to recover the whole past because the reconsideration of these two parties by the Communist Party signified not only a formal disapproval of the methods used in the 1950s, but also a denial of the legitimacy of the communist regime in Romania. On the other hand, we may consider that the new attitude concerning the 20th century bourgeoisie was connected to the Marxist theory of social evolution. As mentioned above, there was no orthodox Marxist discourse in Romanian Communism. The authorities, quite often, used parts of Marxist ideology for legitimating its power. In this context, the thesis according to which the bourgeoisie ended its historical mission during the last phase of capitalism – and became thereafter a retrograde class – could be used as an instrument for justifying the taking of power by the proletariat. For this reason, it was impossible to transform the 20th century bourgeoisie into a progressive class.

The volume on contemporary Romanian history, Petric and Ioniță's *Istoria contemporană*⁷³, is again preponderantly negative. Indeed, out of 121 references to the bourgeoisie, only two of them were positive. As we mentioned above it was impossible from the National Communist perspective to incorporate the bourgeoisie of the interwar years and the Second World War. In this period, it was argued, the bourgeoisie became a retrograde force, alienated from the people and the nation:

Isolated by the masses by a fundamental change of the balance of power in favour of the democrats, the bourgeois parties, The National Peasant Party, and The National Liberal Party, being in a parliamentary minority and governmental opposition, gave up the political fight, resorting to actions of espionage and anti-state plotting⁷⁴.

Just as in the textbooks analysed above, the bourgeoisie was also perceived as a collective actor. However, when the connotation was a positive one, the bourgeoisie subdivided into: “some parts” of the bourgeoisie (it automatically implied that there were other groups acting differently), or, more generously, “large circles” of the bourgeoisie: “Gradually, after being hit in their economic interests by monopolising the entire foreign trade of Romania by Nazi Germany and by cutting the traditional economic connections, some circles of the bourgeoisie resorted to a certain resistance in front of the fascist intentions and claims”⁷⁵.

The textbooks from the last phase of communism in Romania continued and amplified the recurrent themes of communist discourse regarding the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, reintegrating the bourgeoisie back into the nation required essential changes from the stereotype of the 1950s had to be made. Therefore, the motif of the bourgeoisie as internal traitors was abandoned. On the contrary, the textbooks needed to give examples

portraying the fact that a consensus always existed when supreme values like country, nation, independence, and unity were concerned. Still, the bourgeoisie were not neutral actors in all contexts, even when the above stated values were at stake (in the textbooks written during national communism this was the main difference between the bourgeoisie and the working class, who always worked towards the best interest of the nation).

CONCLUSION

One may notice that the image created of the bourgeoisie during the fifty years of communism was not static, but quite the contrary, in continuing transformation. The transforming process of the bourgeoisie oscillated between total denial and partial approval of their actions. In the textbook written by Roller, we can identify the intention behind his damning of the entire class. The bourgeoisie was, in 1952, a 'retrograde class' no matter what period or historical context was being discussed. This, however, changed in the 1960s when some parts of the bourgeoisie were portrayed as acting towards the advancement of the Romanian national interest (for instance, during the 1848 revolution). The bourgeoisie remained a collective actor, especially when it was being subjected to criticism. From 1970 the interpretation tended towards the reintegration of the bourgeoisie into the nation. Therefore, the bourgeoisie of the 19th century was more positively evaluated, and its role in the construction of the modern Romanian State was noted.

The explanations for the existing differences between the textbooks are manifold. On the one side the re-evaluation of the bourgeoisie occurred in the new context of promoting a national-communist ideology. The nation became a more important concept, its existence transcending individual and class interests. History had to supply examples for the national consensus regarding important issues such as Romanian national independence. Another explanation for this approach lies in the attempt to build a tradition of industrialization, and, furthermore, to legitimate the communist regime. Finally, the communist authorities and the authors of the textbooks also hoped to co-opt certain historical personalities, who could contribute to the building of Ceausescu's personality cult.

NOTES

- ¹ Vlad Georgescu identifies "four general lines which follow the general patterns of contemporary world history": 1944-60 ("The Historical Front, establishing the Truth"); 1960-65 ("the beginning of reinterpreting the just reinterpreted historical truth"); 1965-71 ("the ideological relaxation"); 1971-1977, ("the so-called *culturnici* and the new myths"). Vlad Georgescu's research ends in 1977, but one can assume that, with small variations, Romanian culture in the period between 1971 and 1989 can be characterized as "protochronist". See V. Georgescu, *Politică și istorie. Cazul comuniștilor români. 1944-1977* [Politics and History. The Case of the Romanian Communists. 1944-1977], Bucharest 1991, pp. 6-30.
- ² The authors needed to draw the attention of the authorities – who financed their projects – and they were less interested in the public. Consequently, there was an acute competition among the researchers

and institutions, in order to receive supplementary funding for their projects. Thus, very often strategies and political directions were introduced by scholars, and were enthusiastically accepted by the political leaders, because they fit with the Party's political, cultural and ideological strategies. See K. Verdery, *National Ideology Under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaușescu's Romania*, Berkeley - Los Angeles - London 1991.

- ³ For example, in 1978 the modern and contemporary universal history textbook used the term "Cold War" for the first time, introduced by the authors from their own initiative. The leaders of the Party accepted this nomenclature because it corresponded with Romanian foreign policy.
- ⁴ G.I. Ionescu-Gion, *Studiul istoriei naționale în școlile noastre* [The Study of National History in Our Schools], in M.L. Murgescu, *Între bunul creștin și bravul român. Rolul școlii primare în construirea identității naționale românești. 1831-1878* [Between Good Christian and Brave Romanian. The Role of the Primary School in Building National Identity], Iași 1999, p.16.
- ⁵ Most of the political, and some parts of the cultural elite, promoted a populist nationalism considered by some researchers as both a sub-product of and an agent for nation building. I. Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930*, Ithaca - New York 1995 (Romanian edition: *Cultura și nationalism în România Mare. 1918-1930*, Bucharest 1998, p. 17).
- ⁶ The textbook is considered "the basis of educational content, the depository of knowledge, the deformed, incomplete and unsynchronised reflection of the state of the knowledge of an epoch, the reflection of the main aspects and stereotypes of a society. It is the transportation mechanism of a value system, of an ideology and a culture. It participates in the socialisation process of the young generation to whom its addresses". A. Choppin, *L'Histoire des manuels scolaires: une approche globale*, in "Histoire de l'education", 1980, 9, p. 1, apud Murgescu, *Între bunul* cit, p. 95.
- ⁷ *Istorie. Programă școlară pentru clasele V-VII, aprobată de Ministerul Învățământului Public cu nr. 25826/1952* [History. The School Program approved by Public Education Ministry with 25826/1952 Decision], Bucharest 1952, p. 6. This system introduced in 1951-1959 was based on a repetition of some themes and the complete disregarding of others. For instance, of the Romanians' history from 1821 to 1917, 8 hours were allocated, which meant that events like the creation of the Romanian State or the 1848 revolutions needed to be discussed in less than 8 hours.
- ⁸ A. Petrencu, *Învățământul istoric în România* [Historical Education in Romania], Chișinău 1990, p. 40.
- ⁹ D. Almaș, G. Georgescu-Buzău, A. Petric, *Istoria României. Manual pentru clasa a XI-a* [History of Romania. Textbook for the 11th Grade], Bucharest 1960; D. Almaș, G. Georgescu-Buzău, A. Petric, *Istoria României. Manual pentru clasa a VIII-a* [Romania's History. Textbook for the 8th Grade], Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, Bucharest 1964.
- ¹⁰ The first mention of this process can be found in *Hotărârea CC al P.M.R. și a Consiliului de Miniștri al R.P.R. cu privire la îmbunătățirea învățământului de cultură generală din R. P.R., 13 iulie 1956* [The Decision of the Central Committee of PMR and the Ministry Council of RPR regarding the improvement of general culture in the RPR, 13 July 1956], Bucharest 1956, p. 16. The 'politechnisation' of education in the communist period was consistent as it was endorsed legally, including in the 1978 law.
- ¹¹ Article 118 of "Legea educației și învățământului nr. 28 din 21 decembrie 1978" [The Education Law], in *Buletinul Oficial* [The Official Bulletin], no 113 from 26 December 1978.
- ¹² Article 119 of "Legea educației și învățământului nr. 28 din 21 decembrie 1978" [The Education Law] in *Buletinul Oficial* [The Official Bulletin], no 113 from 26 December 1978.
- ¹³ G. Smeu, *Metodica predării istoriei României* [The Methodology of Teaching Romanian History], Bucharest 1983, p. 5.
- ¹⁴ The authors of the Romanian history textbooks were no longer compelled to present the role of Russia in Romania's war of independence from the Ottomans, while the teachers needed to underline for each

theme the “revolutionary struggles of the working class.” “The Nicolae Ceaușescu Epoch, the epoch of the greatest accomplishments of the whole Romanian history” was the focus of 22 hours out of 59 hours for Romanian contemporary history.

- 15 The principles of what came to be known as Romanian ‘national communism’ were laid down in a public declaration of autonomy, entitled “Statement on the Stand of the Romanian Workers’ Party Concerning the Problems of the World Communist and Working Class Movement” which was published on 23 April 1964. In it the Party rejected Khrushchev’s plans to give Comecon a supranational economic planning role and it is to this rejection that the beginnings of a distinct Romanian line in economic and foreign may be traced. For details see D. Deletant, *Communist Terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State, 1948-1965*, New York 1999, and *Ceaușescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989*, New York 1995.
- 16 Andrei Oțetea was the only historian of Marxist inspiration in inter-war years that benefited from scientific recognition of theoretical problems in order to challenge Roller’s position, but Oțetea preferred not to get involved during the first communist year.
- 17 M. Roller, *Probleme de istorie. Contribuții la lupta pentru o istorie științifică în R.P.R.* [Issues of History. Contribution to the Struggle for a Scientific History in the Romanian People’s Republic], 3rd edition, Bucharest 1951, pp. 16-27.
- 18 Id., *Despre științele istorice în U.R.S.S.* [On the science of History in the USSR], Bucharest 1945; Id., *Periodizarea istoriei României* [The Division into Periods of Romania History], Bucharest 1946; Id., *Probleme actuale în istoria României* [Contemporary Issues in Romania History], Bucharest 1946; Id., *Cu privire la studiul istoriei României* [On the Study of Romania History], Bucharest 1947; Id., *Știința istoriei și terminologia ei* [The science of History and its Terminology], Bucharest 1947; Id., *Probleme de istorie* [Issues of History], Bucharest 1947. For more see A. Petrencu, *Mihail Roller și stalinizarea istoriografiei române în anii postbelici* [Mihail Roller and the Stalinization of the Romanian Historiography After the Second World War], in *Anul 1948-instituționalizarea comunismului. Comunicării prezentate la Simpozionul de la Sighetu Marmăției (19-21 iunie 1998)* [1948- The year of Institutionalisation of Communism. The Papers Presented at Sighetu-Marmăției Conference], Bucharest 1999, pp. 588-602.
- 19 Vlad Georgescu considers that the treatment of Romanian history, edited in 1960-64 represents “the first and the last attempt to write a history of Romania by Marxist historians, or in accordance with its fundamentals, without falling into the temptation of faking dogmatism, as occurred until 1960, or in chauvinism – sometimes conscious, other times enhanced by incompetence – as happened after 1971”. See Georgescu, *Politică* cit., p. 54.
- 20 V. Tismăneanu, *From Arrogance to Irrelevance Avatars of Marxism in Romania*, in R. Taras (ed.), *The Road to Disillusion: From Critical Marxism to Post-Communism in Eastern Europe*, New York 1992, pp. 135-150.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 140.
- 22 In Roller’s textbook, the working class, and the workers, are mentioned 287 times with a positive connotation, and 592 with a neutral connotation. Only four times was this variable assigned a negative value.
- 23 C. Morar-Vulcu, *Construcția identităților politice în discursul oficial în România* [The Construction of Political Identities in the Official Discourse in Romania, 1948-1965], unpublished PhD thesis, Cluj-Napoca 2004, p. 163.
- 24 According to the official communist discourse.
- 25 From the end of the 19th century until the consolidation of the Communist power in Romania.
- 26 M. Roller, *Istoria R. P. R. Manual pentru învățământul mediu* [The History of the Popular Republic of Romania. The Textbook for Secondary School], Bucharest 1952, p. 564.
- 27 The bourgeoisie was mentioned for the first time in relation to the 1785 events. The craftsmen and miners in Apuseni Mountains, most of them being Romanians, sustained “Horea’s riot,” while the “bour-

- geoisie from towns,” mostly Germans and Hungarians, “did not support [the peasants’ fight]”. Roller, *Istoria R.P.R.* cit., p. 285.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 489.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 514.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 526. Roller introduced these notions in the first edition of the textbook issued in 1947, but they became much more frequent. In 1947 the communists did not entirely control political power, and their alliance with the “bourgeois parties” determined a more balanced discourse.
- ³¹ For more details regarding the used of the term “the people” during the communist period see Morar-Vulcu, *The construction* cit., pp. 188-190.
- ³² Roller, *Istoria* cit., p. 652.
- ³³ Tismaneanu, *From Arrogance* cit., p. 144.
- ³⁴ Georgescu, *Politică* cit., p. 32.
- ³⁵ Ş. Ştefănescu, *Enciclopedia istoriografiei româneşti* [The Encyclopaedia of Romanian Historiography], Bucharest 1978, pp. 33, 152, 262.
- ³⁶ Gheorghe Brătianu was a historian and politician during the interwar period. He was arrested in 1950 by the Communist authorities without being judged or condemned and he died in 1953 in prison. His works have won admiration among European academics. See *Recherches sur le commerce génois dans la Mer Noire au XIIIème siècle*, 1929; *Un mister şi un miracol istoric: poporul roman* [A Mystery and a Miracle: the Romanian People], Bucharest 1940; and *Marea Neagră. De la origini până la cucerirea otomană* [The Black Sea, from its origins until the Ottoman conquest].
- ³⁷ Almaş, Georgescu-Buzău, Petric, *Istoria* cit., p. 218.
- ³⁸ Michael Shafir considered that is also a paradox regarding this dispute. Therefore, Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej’s commitment to the Leninist-Stalinist values of industrialisation “turned him into a national communist”. M. Shafir, *Romania: Politics, Economics and Society. Political Stagnation and Simulated Change*, London 1985, p. 48.
- ³⁹ S. Tănase, *Elite şi societate. Guvernarea Gheorghiu-Dej. 1948-1965* [Elites and Society. Gheorghiu-Dej Regime. 1948-1965], Bucharest 1998, pp. 7-32.
- ⁴⁰ Almaş, Georgescu-Buzău, Petric, *Istoria* cit., p. 330.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 321.
- ⁴² For more details see P. Cernat, I. Manolescu, A. Mitchievici, I. Stanomir, *Explorări în comunismul românesc* [Investigation of Romanian Communism], Vol. II., Iaşi 2005, pp. 335-373.
- ⁴³ Almaş, Georgescu-Buzău, Petric, *Istoria* cit., p. 400.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 293.
- ⁴⁵ Nicolae Bălcescu was one of leaders of the 1848 Revolution in Wallachia. His opinions, radical for 19th-century Romania, were perceived by some leaders of the Revolution as being too extreme. He died during in exile in Palermo.
- ⁴⁶ Mihail Kogălniceanu was a Romanian statesman, historian and publicist, one of the leaders of the 1848 revolution in Moldavia. Under Alexandru Ioan Cuza rule he became the Prime Minister of Romania (1863-1866).
- ⁴⁷ Alexandru Ioan Cuza was the first ‘Principe’ of United Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. Cuza initiated a series of reforms that contributed to the modernisation of Romanian society and of state structures: the secularization of monastic property (1863), land reform (1864), law regarding the compulsory public education at primary level (1864). Cuza’s reforms also included the adoption of the *Criminal Code* and the *Civil Code* based on the Napoleonic code (1864).
- ⁴⁸ The July 1971 thesis generally sustained the enforcement of the party’s control over cultural activity and education.

- ⁴⁹ Verdery, *National Ideology* cit., p. 106.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108.
- ⁵¹ He was an important figure of the Romanian Communist Party until 1957, when he was excluded and transformed into the director of the Institute of Social Studies. His reappearance into the public space as a textbook coordinator and author of numerous books on sociology was due to the “revealing of Gheorghie Gheorghiu Dej’s methods” by Ceausescu in 1968.
- ⁵² Professor at the University of Cluj, and an excellent specialist, though excluded during the first phase of the communist regime, Constantin Daicoviciu continues to create controversies due to his collaboration with the regime.
- ⁵³ The term ‘protochronism’ first appeared in a article of literary critic Edgar Papu in 1974. His article, “Romanian Protochronism”, argued that contrary to views widespread in Romania, the literary tradition was not largely inspired by western forms but was highly original. Romanian literary creations had often anticipated creative developments in the west (such as surrealism, dadaism), even though these anticipations had often not been acknowledged as such. Katherine Verdery considers that at a certain point protochronism, a plausible idea invented within the cultural sphere, came to be perceived as useful to the Party leadership and to people with political ambition. As the leadership’s mode of control became more resolutely symbolic-ideological, with increasing reliance on national ideology in particular, the incorporation of national cultural values became an even more important adjunct to political goals that before. For more details see Verdery, *National Ideology* cit., pp. 166-209.
- ⁵⁴ C. Daicoviciu, M. Constantinescu, H. Daicoviciu, *Istoria României. Manual pentru clasa a XII-a* [Romanian History. Textbook for 12th Grade], Bucharest 1970, p. 268.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁶ For instance, Charles de Gaulle visited Romania in 1968, and Richard Nixon in 1969.
- ⁵⁷ Verdery, *National Ideology* cit., pp. 107-108.
- ⁵⁸ K. Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944-1965*, Berkeley - Los Angeles 1971, p. 273.
- ⁵⁹ Morar-Vulcu, *The construction* cit., p. 187.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 240-241.
- ⁶¹ Verdery, *National Identity* cit., pp. 117-121.
- ⁶² Sometimes, the internal enemy joins with the external one.
- ⁶³ Daicoviciu, Constantinescu, Daicoviciu, *Istoria* cit, p. 205.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 212.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 386.
- ⁶⁶ Therefore, by giving the bourgeoisie the role of mass leader, the authors reintegrate them with the “people”. Starting with this volume, the word “people” became increasingly to mean as simply, the “Romanian” people.
- ⁶⁷ See L. Boia, *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească* [History and Myths in the Romanian Conscience], Bucharest 1998.
- ⁶⁸ E. Hurezeanu, G. Smarandache, M. Totu, *Istoria Modernă a României. Manual pt clasa a IX-a* [Modern Romania’s History. Textbook for the 9th Grade], Bucharest 1985, p. 98.
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 136.
- ⁷⁰ This is an image constructed by the authors of the textbook. This image is not singular in the Communist Romanian environment. In a book published Ion Lăncrăjan, *A Word about Transylvania*, Bălcescu was considered “to put above everything, above satisfaction and glory, his love for his people and his country, where he would have wanted to die but where he did not manage to return, dying

instead in the loneliness of strangers and entering thus into eternity". K. Verdery, *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?*, Princeton 1996, p. 74.

⁷¹ Hurezeanu, Smarandache, Totu, *Istoria Modernă* cit., p. 157.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁷³ A. Petric, G. Ioniță, *Istoria contemporană a României* [Contemporary Romania's History. Textbook for the 10th Grade], Bucharest 1989.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.106.

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History Wars: Questioning Tolerance

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ABSTRACT

The experience of *history wars* is a laboratory for studying how history is embedded in mass experience. Greece has experienced, recently, such a history war over a new history textbook. The core of the debate centred on whether the nation-state and its ideology should be defended against globalization and the spirit of cosmopolitanism. “History” and “globalization” were set in contrast in a matrix where pastness, particularity, and nationality are pitted against presentism, modernism and cosmopolitanism. This book was written in the historical and pedagogical *Koinè*, the common language of internationalized historical scholarship, history didactics and the spirit of tolerance promoted by the UN, Council of Europe and EU. Studying the war that developed over it also helps us understand, on the one hand, how politics “from above”, promoting human rights, diversity and tolerance in history, encounters political, ideological and cultural reactions in the course of implementation. On the other, its purpose is to observe what happens when the standard language of contemporary history scholarship comes up against national audiences.

Η εξερεύνηση των πολέμων της ιστορίας μπορεί να μας μάθει πολλά για το πώς σκέπτεται την ιστορία μεγάλο μέρος του πληθυσμού στις σύγχρονες κοινωνίες, και τους τρόπους μέσα από τους οποίους αναδύεται η έννοια και η εμπειρία του παρελθόντος. Στην Ελλάδα υπήρξε πρόσφατα ένας παρόμοιος πόλεμος για το σχολικό εγχειρίδιο ιστορίας της Στ' δημοτικού, όπου η «ιστορία» και η «παγκοσμιοποίηση» τέθηκαν σε ένα πεδίο αντιπαράθεσης, στο οποίο από τη μια πλευρά συντάχθηκαν οι έννοιες της «παρελθοντικότητας», της «ιδιαιτερότητας» και της «εθνικότητας» και από την άλλη οι έννοιες του «παροντισμού», του «εκσυγχρονισμού» και του «κοσμοπολιτισμού».

Celebrating the 50th anniversary of their foundation, the United Nations and UNESCO adopted a *Declaration of the Principles on Tolerance* and decided to proclaim 1995 the “International Year for Tolerance”¹. According to the declaration:

tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication, and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in difference. It is not only a moral duty; it is also a political and legal requirement. Tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace.

The reason behind this decision was the preoccupation with the ethnic wars that followed the dissolution and the fragmentation of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the mass killing in Rwanda, racial assaults in Western Europe, and nationalist or religious extremism diffused around the world. Intolerance is increasingly being seen by international organizations as a major threat to democracy, peace and security.

TOLERANCE DISCOURSE SINCE 1948

Fostering tolerance in international relations and promoting a culture of peace through education so as to prevent the outbreak of another world war has been a permanent preoccupation of the UN and UNESCO since they came into existence, after the end of World War II and the defeat of Nazism. The connection between education and tolerance was solemnly declared in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, which affirmed that education: "should promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups" (Article 26)².

Historians and history teachers were called upon to educate young people in tolerance. History books and teaching should be freed from nationalist interpretations and prejudice, and history should no longer be a weapon to achieve national aspirations and ambitions, but become rather a means to knowledge and a way to encourage dialogue between countries. In 1954, the *European Cultural Convention*³, which called on signatory states to encourage study of the history and civilisation of the other contracting parties and to promote such studies in the territory of the other contracting parties, was signed in Paris. In addition, the Council of Europe, from the 1950s, urged its member states to revise their textbooks and to present the events of the past in less conflictual terms. Several bodies in UNESCO, the Council of Europe and the European Union, as well as independent entities like the Georg Eckert Institute in Braunschweig, undertook the task of promoting collaboration among scholars and education authorities from many countries in order to revise history textbooks. To these goals were added the elimination of clichés or incorrect interpretations that tainted the way neighbouring states were presented as well as the removal of discriminating stereotypes against other peoples, religious and ethnic groups. Also encouraged were the reshaping of traditional curricula of history teaching and the planning of new educational programmes against racism, intolerance and gender inequality. For the Council of Europe, the European Union and the constellation of institutes involved, the teaching of history was consid-

ered enormously important for the formation of the future citizens of democratic societies. One of the stronger initiatives was *Recommendation (2001) 15* on history teaching in 21st-century Europe, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of Education with the aim “to make appreciable progress in developing a pluralist and tolerant concept of history teaching”⁴. The EU and the Council of Europe have been involved in helping the states of Eastern Europe to reform their history curricula, publish new textbooks and train history teachers. New concepts such as multi-perspectivity, the cross-border nature of heritage and diversity were added to the inspiring values of history teaching, as were new methods based on multi-media and cyberspace.

How these principles and recommendations on tolerance education were conceived in different countries and what degree of influence they had are issues that are still to be researched. Seen from the day-by-day evening-news perspective, the world seems not to have improved much despite the various activities to promote tolerance. Since the Year for Tolerance in 1995, we have seen new outbursts of ethnic conflict and slaughter, as well as religious, racial and xenophobic extremism. As always, the interpretation of human rights and tolerance has not been uniform. In societies where democracy and citizenship had a working meaning, tolerance was already part of the political culture. For this reason, some intellectuals have often taken a critical distance from the discourse on tolerance and human rights, disapproving of its abstractness which permits selective use to be made of it. They argue that the human-rights discourse, as it has developed, is itself part of the problem. Tolerance is the privatization of the difference, and a substitute for equality, it has been argued⁵. On the other hand, tolerance and human rights have been invoked by societies hitherto lacking tolerance and civil freedom. For people living under religious law or arbitrary regimes, in societies divided by ethnic or civil war, for oppressed minorities, for immigrant groups living without rights, the appeal to the principles of tolerance and human rights is a strategy for empowering the weak. Tolerance is here invoked by those experiencing intolerance. But how have historians viewed this crusade for tolerance?

HISTORY AND TOLERANCE

“History” is a word much older than “tolerance” (an attitude) or “toleration” (an institutional and political practice). While history in its diversity of meanings is a secular term, tolerance emerged as a religious term during the century of religious wars (as a response to them), and retained its religious connotations into the 18th century. John Locke, the 17th-century English philosopher, in his famous *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (1689)⁶, argued that the state should not interfere in defining religious belief or imposing one on its subjects. The meaning of the concept was defined and enlarged during the Enlightenment by Voltaire in his *Treatise on Tolerance* (1763), Kant, mainly in his *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793), and Thomas Paine in his *Rights of Man* (1791). In the 19th century tolerance moved away from the religious context,

acquiring a more political meaning and became part of the liberal attitude (John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, 1859), although the spread of European colonialism across the world was sustained by intolerance. The 20th century did not represent the triumph of tolerance, but the opposite. During this century, the literature on tolerance and intolerance was no longer preoccupied with the intolerant state, but mainly with mass politics and intolerant ideologies and mentalities. World War Two was the absolute triumph of intolerance. Since the end of the War, the literature on tolerance has been supplanted by the language of rights. In this way the “other” is not so much tolerated as allowed to be “other”, and even more, his right to respect is protected. Diversity is not “tolerated” but encouraged to be visible. The expanding literature on the politics of difference has gone beyond the concepts of tolerance and intolerance⁷. For this reason, in 2007 UNESCO adopted the *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions* and this year declared a World Day for Cultural Diversity⁸.

What does history have to do with tolerance, diversity and human rights? The entanglement of history with the nation has transformed history into a cultural practice of reshaping consciousness, identities and mentalities, which was part of the crafting of nation-states⁹. Nationalization of historical consciousness created an “us”-and-“them” dichotomy on the past and intolerance was enforced by its justification through history. National history was cultivated as a “science”¹⁰ but, at the same time and under certain political regimes, it could not avoid engaging in what the Council of Europe’s 2001 Recommendation considered the “misuse of history”. Under this definition were included ideological manipulation, the falsification or creation of false evidence, doctored statistics, faked images, fixation on events to justify or conceal others, distortions of the past for propaganda purposes, abuse of the historical record, and the denial or ignoring of historical fact¹¹.

Parallel to the rise of national history one has seen the process of internationalizing historical studies, theories, debates and communities, which has produced a thick network of conferences, societies, joint projects and journals. Some of the more conspicuous turns in the social sciences and humanities have reverberated internationally across these networks¹². Since the last quarter of the 20th century, the national and international itineraries of historical studies have experienced ongoing divergence. The cultural fashion of constructionism, the criticism of nationalism, and the engendering of historical discourse were the main trends through which the new route towards the globalization of historical studies was paved. The influence of theories coming from Social Anthropology, Michel Foucault and Edward Said (Orientalism) on historical studies has strengthened the focus on the “other” and the idea of “otherness” as an epistemological concept in the humanities and social sciences, parallel with the the new readiness by international organizations to praise diversity.

But the reality of international meetings hardly corresponds to reality at a national level. Although the former are significant in expanding academic milieus, they are much

less visible locally. National audiences are still dominated strongly by national history, which is informed by nostalgia, affection, pride, or antipathy. As a consequence, any attempt to disassociate history from the nation often results in history wars. Sometimes history wars break out after attempts are made to adapt historical teaching in school to the main trends of historiography and educational science. The cause of others is a desire to hang on to national values in education and to prevent the national consciousness from being aligned with new global experiences. Some of these assaults have resulted from a neo-conservative reevaluation of national history as a repository of perennial values. They have also stemmed from particular memory groups contesting the authority of the state to define the content of historical consciousness and demanding the right to see their past experience depicted in the official version of history.

Cultural wars centring on history have broken out in many countries around the world since the 1990s, following what has been described as the crisis of the nation-state, globalization, and the rise of new constituencies of history¹³. The idea that this chapter proposes is that the experience of history wars is a laboratory for studying how history is embedded in mass experience. I think that the battlegrounds over history open new frontiers of research for learning what history and historical culture are and how they have been re-conceptualised as social and cultural practices in contemporary societies. More recently, Greece has experienced such a history war over the new history textbook for the final year of primary school¹⁴. This chapter refers to (and draws on) my experience as an observer of and participant in the unprecedented intellectual and ideological war that followed the publication of this book, lasting for more than a year. The book was written in the historical and pedagogical *Koinè*, the common language of internationalized historical scholarship, adopting the history didactics and spirit of tolerance promoted by the UN, Council of Europe and EU. The study of the war that developed over it is also a contribution to understanding, on the one hand, how politics “from above”, promoting human rights, diversity and tolerance in history, encounters political, ideological and cultural reactions in the process of implementation. On the other, its purpose is to observe what happens when the standard language of contemporary history scholarship encounters national audiences.

THE STORY

The textbook was part of a series of new books issued as part of an overhaul of the school syllabus. The subject matter dealt with the history of the modern world since the Renaissance. In Greek primary and secondary education there are separate textbooks, published by the state, for each class. The authors of these textbooks are obliged to follow the official analytical curriculum set for all the country’s schools. The Greek Constitution lays down that education should promote national consciousness and Christian sentiment among students. It is no surprise then that despite its title, *The*

Modern and Contemporary Period, the new book focused overwhelmingly on Greek history. Nevertheless, it avoided references to the common myths of Greek national ideology, used a more neutral and detached language in referring to the sufferings or the heroic deeds of the Greeks, and avoided hostile language in referring to the country's traditional national enemies.

When this book was published in March 2006, few expected the unprecedented intellectual and ideological war that followed for more than an entire year. The accusation was that the book undermined the foundations of Greek identity, tried to loosen the bonds between the Orthodox Church and the nation, cultivated historical oblivion regarding Turkey, introduced political correctness into Greek education, and put into practice the supposed imperatives of globalization to eradicate patriotism and national consciousness and to flatten world cultures. According to a more diffused conspiracy theory, a school of Greek historians, in the service of the USA or the EU, has as its purpose the deconstruction of national history and identity. (Note the particular use of the term *deconstruction*). The Church of Greece participated in the debate; its Archbishop condemned the authors as traitors. The book was condemned in churches during Sunday masses and the Holy Synod asked that it be recalled. Cyprus, where Greek textbooks are also in use, did not miss out on the controversy, and the Greek-Cypriot Ministry of Education also requested the book be recalled. Far-right groups burnt the book in front of the Greek Parliament during the National Day parade (25 March 2007). Greek Education Minister Marietta Giannakou refused to recall the book but asked the Academy of Athens to evaluate it. The Academy, a very conservative institute staffed by retired professors, responded (on 22 March 2006) with a text containing almost 80 points of correction, maintaining that the book did not serve the national spirit of education or the cultivation of national memory. The Academy's report was given to the authors' panel, headed by Prof. Maria Repoussi, in order that the book be "corrected". At the same time, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) requested withdrawal of the book on the grounds that it was written in the spirit of European integration, celebrating the free market and the European Union.

Television news shows (with their impassioned debates), the press (with a barrage of opinion pieces), and the internet, where dozens of bloggers and discussion forums created a vast virtual controversy, formed the battleground where this war over the rewriting of Greek history was fought. The controversy over the book became the most popular topic in everyday conversations among common people and one of the hottest issues in the elections debates. Historians who defended the book entered the field by means of a press conference, where five university professors, representing the editorial boards of five history and the social science reviews, explained to the assembled media why the accusations against the book were unfounded and unjustified¹⁵. They also participated in numerous television and newspaper debates.

HISTORY VS. GLOBALIZATION

The core of the debate centred on whether the nation-state and its ideology should be defended against globalization and the spirit of cosmopolitanism. This idea that there is a battle between globalization and cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and the nation-state and history, on the other, is the common denominator of all (left and right) opposition to the book. “History” and “globalization” were set in contrast in a matrix where pastness, particularity, and nationality are pitted against presentism, modernism and cosmopolitanism.

The concept of history and memory as a moral duty vis-à-vis authority came to the fore in the form of the resistance of people against the new cosmopolitan history, reactivating older ideas about memory as resistance. “Memory as resistance” became a commonplace, giving meaning to the cultural practices of history. In the Greek context, this meaning came from the post-war period when the Greek state suppressed the memory of the resistance against the German occupation. The slogan “Lest I forget” was used as a national emblem for remembering the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and the motto “The people don’t forget what the Right means” was used for the rise of socialists to power and delegitimization of their opponents. The conceptualization of memory as resistance was central to Greek politics. But the link between commemoration and resistance also came from dissident Eastern European intellectuals, who used the appeal to memory against Soviet rule in the aftermath of the Prague Spring in 1968. Milan Kundera’s opening phrase in his novel *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting* (1979) became famous: “The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting”¹⁶. The genealogy of this link also features George Orwell’s dystopian novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, where the struggle against totalitarianism means the preservation of memory. The theoretic investment in this romanticized role of history came, paradoxically, from very different philosophical approaches, like Walter Benjamin’s fragment on “history in peril” and Michel Foucault’s references to counter-memory and counter-history as resistance practices against the dominant ideology¹⁷.

But why has globalization been set in contrast with history and how are both concepts related? Globalization is effected by forces standing above and across economies and societies. The intellectual equivalent of this operation is a high level of abstraction, which is at odds with particularities, proveniences and contexts. It resembles the network of superhighways and skyscrapers above the urban texture of old cities. Such a superimposed construction entails a mental break between the old and the new. The forces which unify the world (capitalism, science, technology) are superimposed structures which contrast the future with the past, the global with the local, the abstract with the concrete, and modernization with history. This unhistorical world of shining surfaces contrasts with a revival of nostalgia for oldness, and it is in this context that history as a means of conceiving the world in its diversity is juxtaposed with globalization¹⁸.

The activation of historical feelings in the face of coming modernity is older than the conception of globalization. History has long been considered as an expression of loss for a world fast disappearing under the emergence of mass industrial society in the 19th century¹⁹. According to Svetlana Boym, “nostalgia is rebellion against the modern idea of time, the time of history and progress”²⁰. In the context of globalization what turns people to the past is the lack of futurity, or the impossibility of conceiving an ideal future different from the all-consuming and fast-consumed real future. As a consequence, nostalgia seems a defence of the old and familiar context against the threat from the superimposed forces of globalization, which are beyond any public control. From this perspective, globalization is considered to be the kingdom of amnesia²¹. This anxiety is not unjustified. Futurist representations of supermodernity include contempt for history, something common to most utopian thinking²².

HISTORY AND NATIONAL HISTORY

There were three main points of criticism for the new book: 1) The way in which it described the four centuries of Turkish rule, known as the *Turkish Yoke* (an official term, still in use for the centuries of Ottoman rule in Greek lands, from the 15th to the 19th centuries); 2) The role of the Orthodox Church in the national awakening, and the tradition of church-run secret schools; and 3) the expulsion of the Greek population from Asia Minor in 1922 after the Greek-Turkish War, in which the Greek Army invaded the Asia Minor territories of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I.²³ These topics form the main pillars of Greek national ideology, the outline of which is that the Greek nation stems from antiquity and has retained its unity despite foreign domination, preserving the dual legacy of Hellenism and Christianity. The book’s authors were condemned by their critics not only because of their “cold” and unsentimental description of Greek suffering and achievement, but also because of their ambiguity about the issue of the continuity of the Greek nation from ancient to modern times. These charges found a large receptive audience because they correspond to the version of history embedded in national ideology. As a consequence, the new book was presented as endangering patriotism; opposition to it, despite initiating from quite marginal groups, thus managed to garner massive support.

The historians who entered the debate explained the fictiveness and inaccuracy, not to mention misinformation, behind most of the charges against the book. Their main argument was that national ideology has created a fictional reality considered to be the history of Greece, which is in sharp contrast with the common acceptances of the scholarly community in historical studies. The historical community in Greece was formed during the post-dictatorship period, and one of the main ideas commonly accepted by its protagonists was rejection of the “ideological use of history”. Historians understood their historiographical task to weed out “ideological myths” from history. This idea, which

contrasted “historical reality” with the “ideological view” of this reality, and “scientific” history with “ideological” history, was the common strategy of historians adopted in the controversy over the book²⁴. Looking back now at the debates on the book, from the distance of time, it is easy to understand that what was at stake was not the supremacy of truth over falsehood, or scientific knowledge over ideologically biased beliefs²⁵.

The hot topics of the debate had less to do with history in general than with the history, or more precisely the *biography*, of the nation. The debate had nothing to do with a disinterested, intellectual curiosity over an “historical past”, but with the passion for “our” “practical past”, which we want to use in our collective and public life. The idea of a distinction between two pasts belongs to the British philosopher of history Michael Oakeshott and has been re-elaborated in a recent controversy by Hayden White²⁶. It does not have to do with different pasts, but with different approaches to the past which end up in different pasts. As a consequence national history becomes the “practical past”, while global history is a matter of the “historical past”, because the former corresponds to a lived experience through a nation state, national language, education system, etc., while there is no such a thing as global experience (or it does not yet exist). The “practical past” depends on the “community of experience”, a term employed by Otto Bauer to explain the formation of nations²⁷. Many communities of experience, such as religious communities or the socialist movement, have experienced bitter quarrels over their respective “practical pasts”.

History as the nation’s “biography” refers to the definition of history as the “natural and moral biology of the nation”, provided by the Greek romantic historian Spyridon Zambelios, and as the genealogy of grandfathers, fathers and sons, by which the “national” historian Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos presented the history of the Greek nation from antiquity to its present. Both wrote their books in the period following Greek independence, during which the construction of a national tradition of historiography, tailored to the needs of the new-born state, was begun²⁸. This conceptual transformation of history into national biography proposed an affective approach to describing the sufferings and achievements of the nation. Biography views the nation in the changing roles of victim and hero, fostering compassion and pride. In this way, history acquires affective aspects and becomes “national memory and heritage”, something precious worth preserving. “It is unthinkable that our children could learn a different history from what we learned and from what our fathers learned”, a politician proclaimed during the recent debate. As a consequence, the book incurred disapproval for mutilating or erasing the national memory. History matters not as a cognitive realm, but as an elaboration of experience. Whose experience? The nation, as a construction of emotion and knowledge, claims the right to define history as the description of its own experience and to enjoy the intimacy of its own past. History is identified with identity, and apart from cultivating identity, history has no other relevance in society. History as national biog-

raphy becomes a place of enjoyment. Even mourning past sufferings offers enjoyment. National feastdays and heritage are moments and places for enjoying history²⁹.

PERFORMING HISTORY

The vast interest of the media and also of the general public in this debate on a history book is the consequence of preoccupation with the identity issue. Preoccupation with identity has been the common denominator of several ideological and political cleavages in Greece over the last fifteen years, including the Macedonia naming dispute, and the controversy over whether the religious affiliation of citizens should be stated on identity cards, which locked the government and the Church in a bitter conflict in 2001. The preoccupation with identity was also the driving force behind the proliferation of history supplements in the press, and of historical books and leaflets in general.

In the public debate, those historians who supported the book spoke in terms of history, scholarship and truth, while their rivals did so in terms of identity, emotion and pride. In the debate two incommensurable discourses confronted each other. Staging the debate in the mass media gave the confrontation the form of a performance. Viewer ratings for television and radio programmes on the history controversy surpassed those covering the hottest political issues of the period. Declaring the book anathema became a ritual gesture for press and television stars, bishops and politicians. In viewing nationalism as performance, it is understandable why historical debates concerning the nation turn out to be more performative than argumentative³⁰. As a result, historians entering the performance were expected to correspond to the audience's perception of historians as people who relate the "truth" by presenting documents. According to this view, historians should enact history, because in the semiotics of television, the historian is not someone who interprets documents, but someone who stands for documents, who is the visible and speaking exponent of documents. From this perspective, the confrontation was also about traditional, embedded, widely diffused ideas on what history is and what its methodology should be. In the popular imagination history and the past are overlapping concepts, and hence there is no room for multiple interpretations. The role of the historian should be to reveal the truth of the past through documents, to preserve this truth, and to be impartial to the political cleavages of past and present. But such impartiality, in the popular image of the historian, does not extend to national things. With rare exceptions, historical and national truth is felt to be identical. This identification is a crucial point and has a long history, since the use of history for nation building in 19th century. From this point of view, although the question was not about history, but rather identity, the language dealing with identity should have been legitimized by a modicum of scientificity.

WHO IS ENTITLED TO TALK ABOUT HISTORY?

The claim to scientificity did not mean that history should have been left to scientists; indeed, the opposite. The debate raised the question on “*Who owns history?*”³¹ The same question has been central to the confrontation over the name of Macedonia since 1992/93. The claim by the *altera pars* to the name was considered by the Greek part to be a “usurpation of our history”, and the Republic of Macedonia was accused of falsifying history. “Don’t let them steal our history” was one of the most popular slogans of the period³². The same attitudes surfaced in the debate on our history textbook, one demand being: “Don’t let them fabricate our history”. But if Greece was the owner of Greek history in the previous confrontation, who is the owner of history in an internal confrontation with historians? Who owns history? The question was transformed into “*Who is entitled to talk about history?*” Historians claimed this right for themselves, arguing that they are armed with better knowledge on controversial issues. But this view, considered elitist, was disputed by their opponents: The right to history belongs to the people and to everyone, including the Church. According to this response, history acquires a body, is materialized, owned, defended, and safeguarded against usurpation and alienation. The body of history should be left intact. History materialized as a body was transformed into public property. Defending this public good became a patriotic and democratic task. The dispute over the question “Who is entitled to talk about history?” was a constituent part of this history war. In the same orbit were the demands by several groups that their particular history should be included in the textbook. Pontic (Black Sea) Greeks were the largest group, but regional authorities and veterans’ associations also petitioned that their histories find a place in the textbook.

The demands of particular groups to have their history depicted in the “national” history are remarkable. History is no longer considered the domain of the elite and the state, as it once was³³. This broadening of the historical domain is neither a version of the social history of common people, nor is it the unconventional history of excluded groups; rather, it is a compartmentalization of historical discourse. The particular stories that seek representation in the national story have been forged from the same dialectic pattern of victim and hero. The petitions of minor groups for representation in the national discourse involve broadening the national image-store towards a particularization of identities. In a public debate on the history book, I encountered someone who complained that it failed to make any reference to his home village of Distomo, the entire male population of which was killed by the Nazis during the Second World War³⁴. He was adamant that it should be included, despite the response that a book covering five hundred years of world history could not contain all events of that scale. For him, it was impossible to conceive a history that failed to mention an experience on which he had based his identity and personal pride. Thus, the question of “*Who is entitled to talk for history?*” proves how experience matters in things relating to past time and how history is conceived as a collective and personal construction of identity. But whose experience?

The thirst for memory and the desire to commemorate have emerged as some of the powerful cultural concerns of our contemporary societies, where the word ‘memory’ has almost substituted the word ‘history’ and has invaded historical studies in the form of expanding memory studies. The traumas of the 20th century are the prime cause for the rise of commemorations, but not all of those who demand recognition for their memories have experiences corresponding to those memories. Eelco Runia argues that the thirst for memory not only comes from an ‘excess’ of memory, but also from a ‘scarcity’ of memory: “Commemorating from ‘scarcity of memory’ springs from ontological homesickness and is a manifestation of a desire to get into contact with the numinosity of history”³⁵. The “ontological homesickness” coincides with the lodging of history as nostalgia and its contraposition to modernization and the futurist premises of globalization. But the controversy over the school textbook (a formal and state-sponsored historical narrative) also indicates just how powerful the need is for institutionalization of memories in a mass and non-hierarchical society. History wars are conflicts not just over memories but also over the *institutionalization of memory*. This is the reason why the politics of recognizing genocide, legislation on denial, and petitioning for forgiveness acquire such force and impetus in the contemporary world, and why historical controversies have to do with school textbooks, museums or monuments.

SYMPTOMATOLOGY

At the same time, the rise of memory and identity has led to a reconceptualization of history for mass audiences. Memory furnishes the material for the construction of identities and invests them with the power of emotion. History becomes a discontinuous and out-of-context collection of symptoms denoting violence and sacrifice. In the public debate history has become a discourse on *symptomatology*.

The thrust of the polemic against the book was not directed against its overall interpretation of Greek history, but at the points dealing with suffering and catastrophes. The most outstanding event of suffering in Greek historical culture took place in August 1922 in Smyrna/Ýzmir, where the Greek population of Anatolia had massed in the harbour of the city after the collapse of the Greek Army. As these people tried to board boats, the outskirts of the city were set on fire and armed bands assaulted the refugees. The scene was filmed and the pictures of the city in flames became a powerful symbol for the event, which became known as the “Catastrophe of Smyrna”³⁶. This symbol epitomized the refugees’ agony and also their future pains and misery in Greece, the land of their destination. It later became a symbol of national destiny. The events, symbolized in shorthand by the number “1922”, became the “lieu du mémoire” par excellence for 20th-century Greece³⁷. In describing the event, the authors of the history textbook used the quite neutral phrase “waterfront crowding” (*synostismos*). In the debate that followed, the word “*synostismos*” became a symbol for *softening*

the dramatic aspects of history and writing a *light* narrative for the purposes of making national consciousness more and more flexible and compliant. The word became the main target of the book's opponents, and served to rally most of the population descending from the 1922 refugees behind them. The writers were forced to replace the word with "evacuation under dramatic conditions", the Prime Minister visited the Refugees Museum (a minor museum in the Athens suburbs) in a gesture of respect to the refugee experience, and the authorities decided to give school pupils, as a companion to the textbook, Dido Sotiriou's novel *Farewell Anatolia* (the original Greek title is *Matomena Chomata*, literally "Bloodied Earth"), the literary expression of the 1922 "lieu du mémoire", in order to balance the emotional deficit and pacify criticism of the textbook³⁸. Nothing pacified the reactions, however, because this sublime event, a central place of memory around which Greek historical knowledge is structured, was turned into a historical symptom of inner pain. And how can a symptom be described without referring to death, blood and atrocities?

The concept of symptom is synonymous with sign in Hippocratic medicine, the method by which an illness was diagnosed from its symptoms. In looking for the pathology of his polis, Thucydides used this method of deciphering signs in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*³⁹. But the modern relationship between symptom and history comes from the use of psychoanalysis in confronting the great historical traumas of the 20th century, the Holocaust in particular. The key argument is that exploration of such traumatic events as symptoms of modern society, rather than the usual historical method, can lead to a deeper understanding of its pathology. But what has happened is the opposite: turning the focus from conventional history to symptoms has produced a series of unrelated and out-of-context traumatic events. In this serialized symptomatology all coherence of explanation has been lost, considered irrelevant and unimportant. What happened in social studies has also happened in historical culture. The sublime events which structure the popular perception of history have replaced the catastrophic events. In this context history has become the description of unrelated symptoms.

Similar entanglements with the past, with strong emotional dimensions, have been described by the term *postmemory*. *Postmemory* refers to traumatic events, like wars, genocides, civil wars and other human catastrophes and it is formed neither by living participation in the events, nor by the transmission of the testimonies of participants, but by circulating rumours, anxieties, and diffused myths. *Postmemory* describes the relationship of the second and the third generation to the traumatic events.⁴⁰ *Postmemory* dominates the public consciousness and under certain conditions of re-activation is associated with *moral panic*. In this case the anxiety of un-remembering the "Catastrophe of Smyrna" was a sign of the perilous amnesia of the mourning for the "lost fatherlands" which lays at the roots of affection to Modern Greek national identity.

HISTORICAL CYBERCULTURE

The use of the internet and the virtualization of historical resources have enormously facilitated the thirst for memory, the need for recognition of suffering and forgiveness of perpetrators. The internet has made it possible for anyone to write about history, to collect historical data, to gather people around particular historical themes, and to write their own personal, family, or collective history. The recent history war in Greece began on the internet; here petitions were started in protest against the book and where everything written and spoken about the book was stockpiled⁴¹. This use of the internet in debating history should be studied from the point of view of transforming historical culture, because when internet sources outbalance books in providing historical information, then non-academic history outbalances academic history in the formation of historical consciousness. With the massive production of historical images, everyone now enjoys the possibility of producing and diffusing their own historical images, of creating private channels of information and discussion lists, which in turn create online communities. Universities and historical institutions cannot exercise any authority over the massive production of these images. Online communities construct their own historical worlds, which follow their own norms, ways of reference and interpretations of the past. The past has acquired a new cyberface, which includes all possible kinds of distorting mirrors⁴². For example, anyone can contribute to Wikipedia, now one of the most read websites in the world. An Irish historian friend whom I talked to about how the book controversy developed on the internet told me that he has noticed how marginal and clearly partisan positions now feature in articles on Irish history in far greater proportion than their actual acceptance in the academic community warrants. Passing straight onto Wikipedia, these ideas gain popularity though their mirroring on other websites and from being read, of course⁴³.

In the case of the history book, being deposited in cyberspace and reflected from mirror to mirror ultimately led it to acquire unimaginable deformations. These deformations, empowered through repetition from site to site and from blog to blog, have come to form new certainties, which have little or nothing to do with the real textbook, but which in turn feed the virtual and non-virtual historical culture with a new reality. Historical culture, in passing through cyberspace, is no longer a place of interaction between institutional history and public memory, nor is it a passive receiver of ideas about the past, elaborated by the academic or the state elites and “high culture”. Rather, it is an active agent in determining how historical images are to be constructed. The entry of history into the realm of “*popular cyberculture*” has changed historical culture⁴⁴. The result of this retrospective impact on the historical discipline is that discursive practices of historians have undergone changes too.

HISTORIANS AND THEIR AUDIENCES

Mass participation in the controversy also had another consequence. Historians did not find themselves in their accustomed position of talking to other historians or to academic audiences of students and colleagues in an environment protected by academic institutions and their culture. On the contrary, they were forced to address a hostile audience. Moreover, this audience disputed the historians' authority on the past; it claimed its own capacity, and indeed its right, to talk about history and defend its own version of it. At the culmination of historicism the audience to which historians appealed was limited to literate people, and political history was the main concern of both sides. Now the audience interested in history has expanded considerably and includes not only the readers of historical books, but also the viewers of historical film and television productions, as well as internet users. The concerns of historians no longer correspond to those of the new multifarious mass audiences. The rise of social, cultural and gender history, as well as deconstruction and the linguistic approach, has broadened the gap between mass-consumed national history, and the world of academic historians. Historical consciousness is still constructed around sublime events and presents the past in the form of grand national narratives. That historical studies have turned to social, cultural and gender history and to the history of everyday life has not yet had any impact on the mass audiences of history, nor does it meet their expectations of history. To some extent, history wars have been the result of a new history attempting to enter the public domain, the realm of education specifically. Divergences between scholarship and public history are acceptable as long as the two camps remain apart.

What was the experience of the historians who participated in the history battle? I mentioned earlier the incommensurability of discourses and the media pressure on historians to perform a traditional positivistic role, a consequence of the fact that the structure of the public domain is still patterned on essentialist history. For historians to intervene and change the image of the historian and history would be a legitimate goal as long as they could control the terms of the debate, which they do not. Given the prevalent essentialism in the public debate on history, they can either refrain from interfering in any way in the debate or they can adapt themselves to the required role and resort to a "strategic essentialism". This term, employed by Spivac, refers to the "strategic use of a positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest"⁴⁵. Strategic essentialism, in this case, entails denouncing a rival opinion as a falsification of history, as a myth without any factual basis, or as a fictitious event, by presenting documents that supposedly tell the truth. The war over the book was fought on the grounds of factual history, even by historians critical of historical positivism. But the dispute was one over meaning, not fact! This double level where facts were the visible signifiers of meaning and discussion of the facts was the signifier of the debate on meaning enabled historians to argue efficiently at a factual level, but left them totally unable to respond at the level of meaning, because meaning was connected with emotionalism and identity. While

their opponents could rely on an efficient narrative founded in identity, nation and history, historians could not count on any such thing. Arguing, as they did, about history as a science, they could indicate the connection between exact historical science and an open society, but they could not present a persuasive alternative history to the nation which could attract the attention of the mass audience. Neither could they present an alternative history of the nation, related to an alternative concept of identity which would in turn cover affect and emotion. Historians did not manage to bridge the gap between themselves and the audience. In order to persuade the latter not to doubt their veracity, they need to convince it, at the same time, of the value and effectiveness of their theory and method. But the debate on theory of history did not become a public issue and even historians hardly understand the social potential of theory.

POSTSCRIPT

The history textbook was withdrawn by the government immediately after the 16 September 2007 general election, in which the education minister who supported the book failed in her bid for re-election, and in which, for the first time, the ultra-right Popular Orthodox Rally party entered parliament, having proscription of the history textbook written on its banner. The history war was lost. But the whole issue has posed the problem of understanding how history, as a cultural practice, is embedded in the fabric of our societies, and why it has become one of the central arenas of contemporary social and cultural conflicts. Each case of course has its specificities, but the frequency and the passion of history wars around the globe are signs of something new we need to explore. Older theories on the public use and abuse of history came down in favour of the history produced by scholars as an inquiry into the past and viewed other uses of history as degenerate forms of historical knowledge. In history wars the apple of discord is use of the past as a constitutive element of the self and the culture we live in. History wars happen not in cognitive, but in cultural fields. We need a new methodology to study this everyday aspect of historical mentalities and practices. The sense of the past in literature and art is, when considered from certain aspects, closer to mass historical culture than historical scholarship. The aforementioned issue concerning Dido Sotiriou's novel, which was to be given to pupils in order to compensate for the emotional deficit of the history book, is indicative of the fact that literature and art are closer to the popular experience of the past than scientific history. Art is related more to emotionality, and, for this reason, it plays a greater role in the shaping of such experience. This is a conclusion that has a significance for the creation of a tolerant society by reforming historical teaching. Intolerance has a stronger veil of sentiment and a more solid basis in mass experience. The two-century reign of national history has not been in vain.

NOTES

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Between Urban and Rural Culture: Public Use of History and Cultural Heritage in Building Collective Identities (1990-2007)

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ABSTRACT

This chapter will assess the strategies of revival used by small provincial and rural towns and their results, as well as their motivation and context. It explores these strategies on the basis of three case studies: Gers in Gascony in the south west of France, Třebíčsko in Vysočina in the Czech Republic, and Dukla in Šariš in Slovakia, bringing Western and East Central Europe into comparative perspective. These towns, which are mostly a significant distance from capital cities, large urban centres, motorways and railway corridors, have focused on marketing their natural environment and historical heritage. As part of a strategy of revival, the small towns have attempted to construct an identity supported by historical examples that locate them within larger – regional, national and supranational – identities. They have discovered the power of history to brand them and, with the help of national and international lists of cultural heritage (UNESCO), they have attempted to display their historical and cultural heritage as a marketable value. In this context, the chapter contributes to the discussion of interconnections between local (urban), regional and national (and supranational) identities.

Kapitola studuje strategie obnovy vypracované malými provinčními venkovskými městy a jejich výsledky. Na třech příkladech – Gers v Gaskoňsku v jihozápadní Francii, Třebíčsku na Vysočině v České republice a Poddukelském regionu v Šariši na Slovensku sleduje v komparativní perspektivě revitalizaci vnitřní periferie v západní a východní střední Evropě. Současně se snahou oživit města a jejich venkovské regiony posilují vytváření kolektivní identity, kterou podporují příklady z historie a poukazují na příslušnost k větším regionálním, národním i nadnárodním identitám. Objevují moc historie při etiketizaci a marketingu a s pomocí národních a mezinárodních seznamů památek a kulturního dědictví (UNESCO) se pokoušejí těchto hodnot ekonomicky využít. Stat' zkoumá strategie, které vybrané regiony použily, a klade si otázku, jaká byla jejich motivace a v jakých souvislostech

se tak stávalo. Tato problematika obsahuje také otázky vnímání našeho a cizího prostoru, kdy sledovaná hranice prochází mezi městským a venkovským prostředím, mezi centrem a periferiemi. Autorka se opírá o koncept renesance venkova ve formulaci B. Kaysera. Kapitola nejprve definuje a představuje vybrané regiony a města, která je reprezentují, následně porovnává jejich revitalizační strategie a způsob využívání historie. Periferní regiony a malá města využívají výhod informační společnosti a inovativně vytvářejí revitalizační strategie, které nemusí nutně vznikat jako kopie vzoru hlavního města. Nicméně jejich využití historie, památek i umění v marketingu nese společné dobové rysy, na něž v této knize upozornila také Ruth Wallach. Potřeba identifikace s větším regionem, s národní komunitou, případně s nadnárodní, e.i. evropskou kulturou je v těchto procesech zjevná, ale není novým rysem, jak vyplývá z kapitoly Jaroslava Iry. Přičemž potřeba identifikace nemá jen kulturní, ale rovněž sociální obsah a nemůže stavět na stereotypu neschopnosti a bezmoci. Naopak přestože jsou periferní a venkovské, tyto komunity vstupují do procesu revitalizace jako aktivní občanské iniciativy, které přispívají k rozvoji společenského života a mají dobré znalosti své kultury a historie.

This chapter can be read in various ways. It can be seen as a contribution to the analysis of how regions are constructed, and consequently marketed for tourism¹. Alternatively, it can be read as an analysis of the way in which communities perceive what is 'theirs' and what is 'alien' and also of the use of borders in public discourse. The chapter will focus on a type of border which has been discussed with great interest by historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and geographers; that which divides urban and rural space. This form of border was once physical and visible, but in recent times it is more likely to be symbolic, expressed by cultural values, modes of life and expansion of technologies and new amenities. It is, however, still possible to locate the border between urban and rural areas. This chapter will analyse such borders in small towns on the peripheries of large cities, and in geographically peripheral regions that are at a considerable distance from any significant urban area. During the last twenty years there has been quite a bit of research into the strategies used to revive rural villages and towns². These strategies have enhanced their social and economic life and also increased their identification with their local region. These processes were first analysed in Western Europe; however quite similar tendencies can also be detected in other parts of the continent.

The use of history in strategies of revival raises the question of whether there is an interaction between the historical importance of places and public evaluation of their historical value. It also encourages us to assess the role and power of memory embodied in historical monuments, particularly those registered on the List of World Cultural Heritage of UNESCO, in the self-presentation of cities, places and regions. This chapter will make use of case studies to assess these questions in comparative perspective. Three historically and culturally defined regions, comparable in size, location and geographic conditions, were chosen for analysis: Gascony in the south-west of France, concentrat-

ing on its core department of Gers; Moravia, in the eastern part of the Czech Republic, particularly Vysočina in the Czech-Moravian Highlands; and Šariš in the north-east of Slovakia, focusing on the recently defined Dukla region on the Polish-Slovak-Ukrainian border. These regions faced a variety of shared and unique problems and employed comparable strategies to overcome them.

Administrative regions in France, the Czech Republic and Slovakia mostly do not follow the borders of historical provinces or cultural regions. Moravia is approximately the size of historical Gascony. Both regions split into many geographic and cultural (folkloric) regions and micro regions. One of the administrative districts of Moravia is Vysočina, which is mostly identified with the folkloric region Horácko and is about the same size as the department of Gers in Gascony. Vysočina and Gers can both be divided into several *pays*, which have specific folkloric features. Similarly, the administrative region of Prešovský kraj in the north east of Slovakia stretches across the historical districts (*župa*) of Spiš, Šariš and Zemplín. When traditional culture and regions are discussed, the names of these historical districts, from the times of Hungarian rule, are used. Also, the names of these regions are invariably used in literature designed to promote the area to tourists³. New Prešovský kraj is larger than Gers, but old Šariš is comparable in size. The label “Dukla region” has recently appeared as part of the revival strategy of the town and district of Svidník, which is historically part of Šariš⁴. This region would be comparable with one of the *cantons* of Gers, or with associations of *communes* like Porte de Gascogne⁵. While in Gers we may perceive the chief city, Auch, as the prime keeper of Gascon identity, we may identify several areas that perform that role in Vysočina and Šariš.

Gascony, the Czech-Moravian Highlands and, to an even greater extent, Šariš in north-eastern Slovakia can be defined as internal peripheries of their countries, as border regions which are dependent on distant cores. All three, in an attempt to improve their social and economic situation, have chosen to use their history, the beauty of the landscape, and the absence of industry in the countryside as a magnet to attract the new industry of mass tourism. All three regions contain local monuments listed on the UNESCO list of world cultural heritage. By observing and analysing local attitudes to these monuments and the memories they represent, we can assess how these regions make use of local memory and history. All three regions struggled with problems which they tried to turn to their advantage. The chapter is based on longitudinal observation, repeated visits and analysis of regional historiography and regional journals, all of which motivated the application of a comparative perspective. Local media, regional administration and self-government, as well as regional and national academic communities participated in the debate over which strategies should be used to make small towns and regions attractive. These strategies influenced the dynamics of collective memory and aspects of local and regional identity. The chapter will first describe the

three chosen regions and their small towns, and then discuss and compare their strategies for revival.




Fig. 1
Gers, Vysočina, and Šariš on the map of Europe

WHAT REGIONAL BORDERS?

Today, Gascony is a culturally defined region in the south-west of France. It has no officially or administratively defined borders. The idea of Gascony relies on the memory of its past as one of the historical provinces of France⁶. In several departments north of the Pyrenees, roughly between Bordeaux and Toulouse, we can find various indications of a sense of belonging to this entity. One of these departments, Gers, identifies itself as the very heart of Gascony, as its true modern descendant. Being Gascon is perceived as a very positive attribute and a significant emphasis is placed on the Gascon character of the region. The current positive nature of Gascon identity is especially interesting, because, since early modernity being a Gascon, behaving like a Gascon, or producing *Gasconnade*, had a slightly negative, or at least not a serious, connotation. Indeed when, in 1978, Robert Escarpit, professor of the sociology of literature and president of the University Bordeaux III, suggested changing the University's name to *Université de Gas-*

cogne, his proposal was rejected by the academic council, because such a name would not sound serious enough⁷. In 1990 this university finally was named after Michel de Montaigne, who, born in Périgord, identified himself as Gascon.

Gascony is not an administrative unit; it does not function or exist in the same sense as an official region, which has defined borders and regional government. Nor does it function as one of various euro-regions or micro-regions, created by and sustained by governmental projects.



Fig. 2
The location of Gascony and Gers on the map of France

Instead, Gascony is defined by the historical influence of its language. Although it has practically disappeared from usage and is today only visible in toponymy, the history of the language, as with all Occitan languages (dialects), has not been forgotten. Despite the dominance of the *langue d'oïl* over the whole territory of the *langue d'oc*, there are still discernible regional accents and spoken dialects, as well as deep cultural differences⁸. The region is further defined by the local styles of rural and urban settlement; being dominated by the remnants of medieval fortified villages and small towns. The origins of these towns are often preserved in their names, which contain words like *sauveté*, *castelnau*, *bastide*, *villefranche*. Gascony is a hilly country, which is bordered in the south by the Pyrenees and in the north by the Massif-Central, in the west it reaches the Atlantic and in the east it is delimited by the flow of the river Garonne. Historically, Gascony existed as an entity only for a brief period in the middle ages. Since this time it has been part of the *grand-gouvernement de Guyenne-et-Gascogne*, which borders Languedoc and Foix in the east, Spain in the south, and Guyenne in the north⁹. It

has always been part of several administrative units, but the idea of creating a Greater Gascony as an administrative entity, with its centre in Auch, proved to be a failure¹⁰.

After the revolutionary reorganisation, which dissolved the borders of the old provinces and created new departments, Auch became the centre of the department of Gers, which took its name from the local river. The departments of Hautes-Pyrénées, Landes, Pyrénées-Atlantiques, Haute-Garonne, Lot-et-Garonne, and Tarn-et-Garonne were also created in the region. These departments, with geographically descriptive names, hid, and began to dissolve, the old *Gascogne*. Two hundred years later, however, due to the 1982 law of decentralisation, it appears that we can observe the revival of regionalism, and the rebirth of Gascony and Gascon identity.



Fig. 3
Vysočina and Třebíčsko on the map of Czech Republic

Today, Moravia is culturally defined as part of the Czech Republic. Several administrative units, called *kraj* in both Czech and Slovak, are identified as Moravian. Those within the heartland of the region, are considered to be more Moravian than the others, especially by outsiders. Moravia is currently split into several administrative units, and does not function as a single body, although in the past it did. Unlike Gascony, Moravia has always had recognised borders and official administrative status; in the middle ages it was a markgrate, ruled by the son of the king of Bohemia. During Habsburg rule it became administratively linked directly to Vienna and its autonomy

gradually vanished. In historical terms it can be said that it was a land with a certain autonomy lying between the Bohemia, Silesia, Upper Hungary and Lower Austria. Today, northern Moravia has practically integrated the residual part of Silesia. There is also a strong Moravian identity, although it is based almost entirely on culture. As is the case in Gascony, Moravia can be seen as a linguistic region, defined by spoken dialects and accent. Today, however, the dominant language is Czech. Toponymy demonstrates regional belonging, especially to strangers, by the addition of the adjective 'Moravian' to local place names: Moravský Krumlov, Moravské Budějovice, Moravská Třebová. Other adjectives perform a similar function but are less obvious to outsiders: *Uherský* (Hungarian) and *Slezský* (Silesian). The mountainous parts of the region and its plains and valleys exhibit differing forms of rural and urban settlement, especially in the south-eastern part of Moravia. There is nothing in Moravia as unique as the region of the *bastides* in France. The medieval colonisation towns, which are common in Moravia, also appear in most of central and east-central Europe. In a similar manner to Gascony, Moravia is split into numerous folkloric regions and micro-regions. For example, Vysočina, Horácko and Třebíčsko all signify ethnographically defined *pays*. Geographically, Moravia is made up of two huge valleys bordered by mountains in the north (Jeseníky), east (Beskydy, Bílé Karpaty) and west (Českomoravská Vysočina), and delimited by the Dyje and Morava rivers in the south.



Fig. 4
Prešovský kraj, Šariš and Dukla region on the map of Slovakia

Along the north east of the Slovak border with Poland lies the second largest administrative region in Slovakia – Prešovský kraj, which comprises several cultural or ethno-

graphic regions¹¹. These regions are often named after territorial units, or *župa*, from the period of Hungarian rule, such as Spiš (Zips), Šariš (Saros) and Zemplín. All these labels are also linked to particular cultures, dialects, ethnicities, and histories. Šariš, which is the central region, is rather mountainous and not evenly developed. It is situated in the eastern part of the Carpathian belt. The provincial capital, Prešov, is eccentrically located in its south. The discourse that presents Dukla as a region is a new phenomenon¹². It is the result of the effort to build a collective identity for the inhabitants of Svidník and the surrounding region and to give that region a more attractive name. This, in effect, loosens its borders. It does not, however, weaken the influence of the culture of Šariš.

The general setting of these three regions is similar – they are mountainous border regions, which in the case of Gers and Dukla, has led to meetings and exchanges with many ‘Others’. In the case of Gers or Gascony this interaction stems from the inflow of Iberic or Spanish influences and inspirations across Pyrenees and the acceptance of sizeable economic and political immigration from Spain. There was also considerable Italian immigration after the First World War, as well as the *Pieds noirs – les rapatriés* – from Algiers and other former French African colonies, who settled mainly in the south. Traces of Huguenot, and Sephardic influences also remain, as the legacy of a difficult past. The area is also influenced by the Roman tradition of written law, and northern French efforts to integrate the south into French culture¹³. The Dukla region is a crossroads and a melting pot with a variety of influences. These include Polish, Ukrainian, Ruthenian (Trans Carpathian), Hungarian and German ethnic influences. The north east of Slovakia is also on the border of Catholicism and Orthodoxy, which motivated the emergence of the Greek-Catholic confession. There were also some Protestant and Jewish communities. The strongest influences are Roman-Catholic, Greek-Catholic, Orthodox, Slovak and Ruthenian. The influence of the border in both compared cases – north east Slovakia and Gascony – thus creates a particularly interesting and diverse culture, displayed in language, music and cuisine. The Moravian example is less complicated. The hills and forests of the Czech-Moravian Highlands separated Bohemia from Moravia in middle ages. In modern times it became a region of interaction, which was not perceived, especially on the Czech side, to be culturally part of deep Moravia, and as a matter of fact it is not so folkloric and picturesque as southern or eastern Moravia. All three regions were also affected by emigration of the local population, heading either to their capital cities, or further away, often to America. As has been discussed in the case of Gascony, all these regions suffered from negative connotations associated with their regional identities, and particularly with rural identity.

PERCEIVING PERIPHERALITY

The three regions are on the periphery geographically and also metaphorically. Gascony was always very far from Paris, it was also on the border, and neighbours were often enemies. A region is created by the definition of its borders and centres. Gascony is a region of small towns, which balance between the dominance of two provincial capitals – Toulouse and Bordeaux. The departmental city, which presents itself as the chief city of Gascons, Auch, is a small town by French standards. Gers has one of the lowest densities of population and settlement in France; it also has a comparatively ageing population¹⁴. Even today there are no large motorways or railway corridors crossing the region. The area did not experience modern industrialisation; agriculture was the dominant economic sector throughout the 20th century and food production remains the only industry¹⁵.

The Dukla region has remained a geographical periphery until this day. It was one of the forgotten and backward corners of Austria-Hungary, which suffered during the wars of the nineteenth century, and was extremely damaged by the First and even more so by the Second World War. Until the mid-20th century it was totally rural. Although post-war reconstruction brought in some industries, schools, hospitals and other social and cultural amenities, the region lacked infrastructure, and the social and economic conditions here were worse than in the rest of the country until the mid-1970s. In the mid-1990s it was classified as a deprived region, with below average levels of education, and high unemployment¹⁶. Regional building industries broke down and agriculture declined. The local administrative centres, Svidník and Bardejov, lacked entrepreneurial motivation and foreign investment. The provincial centre, Prešov, fared only slightly better. However, Bardejov had the best prospects thanks to the wealth of its historical heritage and the proximity of the spa town of Bardejovské kúpele¹⁷. The economic transformation after the political and economic structural changes in 1990 had a visible impact on settlement, the countryside, and demography. It led to economic migration to the larger cities (Prešov, Košice, Bratislava), and abroad, especially the Czech Republic (Prague and Brno). Before and between the wars, migration overseas was the typical reaction to the economic problems of families in this region, and it reappeared in the 1990s¹⁸.

The Czech-Moravian border was thoroughly isolated from the centre until modern times, when the imperial road network and later railways connected it with Prague and Vienna, the Bohemian and imperial capital cities. Vienna was, however, easier to access, and the labour market there was larger and more attractive for labour migration than that of Prague, until the end of the Austro-Hungarian empire. The Czech-Moravian border was always a friendly one. The region is divided into several administrative districts and in the recent administrative reframing of the republic, an administrative region (*kraj*), Vysočina, was created and Jihlava was made its chief city. This was due

to Jihlava's role as the regional centre during the 18th and 19th centuries. In social and economic terms the Czech-Moravian border was a social periphery which attracted industrialisation before the Second World War and particularly during the communist regime. Although the region does not touch the Austrian border, it is close enough to be influenced by its proximity. Thus the region profited from the opening of borders after 1989. However, the economic changes of the last decade of the 20th century led to difficulties in the region, including the collapse of traditional enterprises and unemployment¹⁹. This explains the high expectations and the effort put into the development of UNESCO and festival tourism²⁰.

PUBLIC USE OF HISTORY

The three regions have developed strategies for the improvement of similar situations, within a comparable space of time. Changes began in Gascony after the 1982 law of decentralisation created the present day regions in France as *collectivités territoriales*. The transformations in the present regions of east central Europe started in the 1990s. All three regions attempted to turn weakness to their advantage. The lack of industry or the process of de-industrialisation in these regions created the chance to take advantage of a new economic opportunity, tourism. To get on the tourist map a region needs a good strategy. History has an important role in the strategies of these three regions, which is to brand them, in order to give the region a particular image. This is quite common, as the historicity of places is highly valued not only by occidental culture, but also by global tourism, and therefore a place without a known history is handicapped in the market for investments or any other kind of economic activities, and even more so for tourism. This, of course, is not particularly revealing. What is more interesting is the question of the agents in this process. Who are the carriers of the idea of regionalism and who invents these strategies? What kind of history and memory was, and is, used in order to encode the identity of the town and its region, and how was this done?

One commonly used and very prestigious way of profiting from a rich cultural history, which needs a large investment of time, and professional preparation, is inclusion on the UNESCO world list of cultural heritage. Visits to UNESCO sites have proven to be quite fashionable amongst tourists. The three regions that this chapter is studying in comparative perspective have made use of this strategy.

In the heart of Gascony, in the department of Gers we can identify four sites which have proven their particular qualities and have been registered on the UNESCO list. The first is the pilgrim's road to Compostela; the second, the Roman bridge in Artigue. The other two locations are, in fact, stopping points on the route, namely the cathedral in Auch, and the Collegiate Church in La Romieu²¹.

In Moravia, there are seven monuments registered by UNESCO, and three of them are on the Czech-Moravian border: the city and castle of Telč on the Czech side, and Ze-

lená hora (church) near Žďár, and Třebíč (the church and the Jewish city and cemetery) on the Moravian side²².

In the case of north-eastern Slovakia, the historical centre of the town of Bardejov, with its Jewish historical heritage, has been listed by UNESCO²³. In 2002 the wooden churches of the Carpathian regions of Slovakia were proposed for evaluation, these include a number of important Greek-Catholic and Orthodox churches²⁴. Last to be registered was the Primeval Beech Forest which stretches across the borders of Ukraine and Slovakia²⁵. Also, in the Dukla region, there is a very important *lieu de mémoire*, which has not been put forward to be registered on this prestigious list. However, it may have an even greater influence on regional identity: this is the mountain pass, the site of battles during the First and Second World War and, today, the location of large Second World War cemeteries and memorials on both the Polish and Slovak sides of the border. It is the place that gives the region its name, and contributes greatly to its identity.

This leads us to the question of the impact of these official UNESCO sites on regional identity, and the nature of other historically, culturally or geographically defined components of that identity. How is this choice made? Who is behind it and how does it happen? We can search for answers predominantly in the regional press, in self-presentations and in guides produced by authors who are interested in the region, write with empathy, but are often outsiders. The author, in her analysis, also relies on 'observation' which provided her with closer insight and comparable evidence²⁶.

THE CASE OF GERS IN GASCONY

The most intensive declarative identification with the Gascon culture and mode of life is present in Auch, the departmental town of Gers, which has declared itself the capital and heart of Gascony. The *Maison de Gascogne* hosts exhibitions and sales of regional products, which are all labelled with 'stickers' confirming that they are really, truly and only *gascon*. History is a very strong component of this image, it is cumulative, and everything is included, even difficult and bloody conflicts. The presentation of history is factual and consensual. However it has several highlights, and some very positively presented heroes: *le bon roi Henry*, *le brave d'Artagnan* and all the cohorts of *cadets de Gascogne* in his shadow, and the *intendant* Etigny, who is particularly present in Auch. Both d'Artagnan and Etigny have statues in the town. The two sites of architectural heritage – the cathedral in Auch and the collegiate church in La Romieu are objects of pride and care. Both are also stops on the *Route Jacquaire* which crosses the department, and has many stops here. The pilgrim route to Santiago de Compostela is publicised with an effort to present the pilgrimage as the lived experience of history, and as the opportunity for healthy hiking in well preserved landscapes²⁷. The role of history as part of identity is accompanied by the image of nature unspoiled by industry and the

defects of modern civilisation, and by openness to new technologies (cyberspace). Last, but not least, we discover the image of the region as a place where it is a pleasure to live and settle down, and not only to visit²⁸. During the summer months the principal journal of the French South, *La Dépêche du Midi*, publishes a special issue highlighting all places of interest and all events in the region, and distributes this offprint free of charge. This last argument, “the region, where it is a pleasure to live” is heavily publicised in the journal, on the regional websites and supported by the programme of events. These events are the main public effort to display how to live in the region and how to share the experience of regional identity. Bernard Kayser, quoting Alain Lefebvre, called this trend a ‘*festivalomanie*’, which is the symbiosis between culture and economic interests through tourism. The cultural events are meant to attract the visiting public as well as local elites, who wish to present their locality and region as interesting enough to justify their decision to settle there. The festivals come in various shapes and sizes, and experience varying degrees of success. The festivals of Gers are thought to be especially successful; four of them are particularly effective in attracting paying visitors. These events have a contemporary content and, as they have already been running for several years, the organizers believe that they have founded a new tradition. The most successful festivals in Gers include the festival of Jazz in Marciac, that of Country Music in Mirande and the races for trucks and motorcars in Nogaro. Only Pentecôtavic – a fiesta held on Pentecost – and corridas in Vic-Fézensac and in several other communities stem from regional culture. The same town also hosts a new tradition, the Tempo Latino, a festival of music of Latin and Afro-American origin, like salsa. In Gers, and Gascony as a whole, the role of the local initiatives of the villages and small towns in the regeneration of the region through tourism, has been of interest to researchers for about twenty years²⁹. These small towns, full of remarkable architecture and rich in history, are charming *bastides*, but they attract far more visitors during a festival, which, although commercial, offers an opportunity for visitors to learn more about the history and culture of the region³⁰. In Gers it is believed that these festivals prove the potential of *tourisme événementiel*. The festivals are no longer limited to the capital city or large important towns, such as Prague, Cannes, Avignon or Karlovy Vary. By holding them in an unknown locality, the events become effective tools in the local economy, and put the whole region on the map. The success of the Jazz festival in Marciac prompted the creation of a Country festival in Mirande in 1993. In consequence the neighbouring communities decided to create a consortium, *Coeur d’Astarac en Gascogne*, situated in the *département* of Gers, which aims to encourage cooperation and increase the regional benefit of festival tourism³¹. In the consortium there are only two communities which have more than thousand inhabitants and so the character of a small town, Mirande and Miélan. The Mayor of Mirande is the head of the consortium and the two towns have the strongest vote. Together they collect a special regional tax, and both have profited from the effect of festival tourism, which is clear from the growing numbers of paying visitors. Mirande is essential to these activities, and has benefited greatly from festival

related events. In this context it would be interesting to compare Mirandé's role in Gascon festival strategies with that of Třebíč, Bardejov and Svidník in their regions.

Festival tourism is only one part of the complex regional tourist policies of Gers. The other initiatives of this economic sector include: spas, agrotourism, family tourism, arts and historical monuments, sports and gastronomy. Although Gers has no direct access to the seashore, it offers a variety of landscapes, and tourist activities. The national network of *gîtes de France* has responded to the need for a sufficient number of beds for tourists. Although studies of this region do highlight an insufficient infrastructure, this does not appear to be as urgent when compared with insufficiencies of non-western regions.

THE CASE OF TŘEBÍČ IN THE CZECH-MORAVIAN HIGHLANDS

Although three sites in the Czech-Moravian Highlands (Českomoravská Vysočina) have been registered by UNESCO – Zelená Hora, Telč and Třebíč, each of which individually offers a particular image of the region – this chapter will focus on the last one. The cemetery in Zelená Hora, near the town of Žďár nad Sázavou, is decorated by an exquisite church in a Baroque/gothic style. Žďár is largely known as the site of old engineering industries, which does not particularly improve the image of the town. It is, however, surrounded by beautiful landscapes, which are protected and registered as a natural park – reservation Žďárské vrchy. The second monument, the town of Telč, is on the edge of Vysočina and opens onto the pond region of South Bohemia. Telč is a protected urban complex and castle, which was already registered on the list of urban reservations of the former Czechoslovak state³². The third, Třebíč, in the heart of the region, is a town with a long history. Although the town was once home to many drapers, Třebíč has been labelled as a town of cobblers due to its important leather and shoe production, which emerged in the mid-18th century, and made Třebíč the largest producer of leather in Moravia³³. In 1931, Tomáš Baťa bought the shoe manufacturers from the local tanner and shoemaker Budishowsky and built a modern factory in Borovina, where he also constructed one of his famous settlements for workers. The descendant of the factory finally closed in 1999³⁴. There was also a large engineering plant, which still exists; industries that used sophisticated textile knitting machines, which have disappeared; and a nuclear power station in Dukovany, which is not far from Třebíč. The role of this industrial heritage in the public image of the town is now overshadowed by the town's successful entry into the UNESCO club.

Třebíč has discovered that there is evidence of a historical coexistence of Christian and Jewish communities in the town and that the town was actually multi-cultural. This was not a forgotten past, but it was not fully known. The town has an old centre around the market square, and a castle with a remarkable church on the hill above the river Jihlava. There were also quite a few 20th century constructions, although these are no

longer perceived to be aesthetically pleasing. There are many such towns in the country, some better preserved, with more refined architecture or nicer castles. Třebíč, however, is quite original, because the town adopted an unexpected strategy, and competed for registration in the UNESCO list with a part of its past which was rediscovered, reconstructed and reintegrated into the town's identity as its unique and most marketable quality. Surprisingly, this rediscovered past has contributed significantly to a stronger local identity.

As in many Moravian towns, Jewish merchants and artisans have settled in the town of Třebíč since the middle ages³⁵. The Jewish community resided in a rural settlement below the castle, separated from the Christian town by the river. This area became a Ghetto between 1723 and 1849, until the full emancipation of the Jewish community in 1850 transformed the settlement into an urban district. From this time Jews could move out of the Ghetto into other parts of the town, which they did, and some bought houses in the best places around the square. The old Jewish town was left to the town's poor. The holocaust and Nazi persecution, however, resulted in a total disappearance of the Třebíč Jews. The Jewish district slowly became dilapidated, and in the last decade of the 20th century it was inhabited by the Roma community. The old Jewish town consisted of small houses, around two streets which followed the river. Across the hill, not visible from the town's square, was the Jewish cemetery. As the cemetery was the property of the Jewish Community, and there were no more Jews in town, it was no longer used. It deteriorated so much that its total reconstruction and removal was planned by the town authorities. However, a former grammar school professor, Bohumír Pavlík, who grew up near this cemetery, found it extremely regrettable that this cultural treasure, and the memories it evoked, would soon disappear, and so he initiated its historical renovation. He began his work alone, but then he sought the assistance of the grammar school students and volunteers in the town; later help arrived from across the republic and eventually from all over the world. Gradually the cemetery wall was restored, the tombs recovered and cleaned. This public initiative, carried out by volunteers, changed the destiny of the cemetery. Some funding was received from the ministry of culture, and step by step the heritage was rediscovered, restored and re-appreciated³⁶. This also helped the revalorisation of the former Jewish town and its reconstruction became a town priority. The function of the district was changed: it is now primarily residential, with developing tertiary functions. There are also small offices, small businesses, galleries and restaurants. The large local factory, the Subak tannery, was refurbished as a town social housing project; in one of the former synagogues a museum and cultural centre was established, which organises various events; the area is also home to a festival of Jewish culture. The Jewish town, cemetery and the Roman Catholic Church, which is architecturally influenced by French Burgundy, obtained registration on the UNESCO list. The main agent of this successful story was the old professor, who had begun its successful reconstruction in 1983. Without him and the student volunteers,

the acceptance of Třebíč onto this prestigious list in 2003 would not have been possible. This success story has had a very positive effect on Třebíč, and it also influences the town's neighbourhood. The reconstruction of the old Jewish town was facilitated by a creative and innovative approach and the support of various civic initiatives. In quite a short time it became acknowledged as the major component of the town's identity, overshadowing all others.

THE CASE OF BARDEJOV, SVIDNÍK AND THE DUKLA REGION

The two towns of Bardejov and Svidník are located in north-eastern Slovakia, not far from one another. The story of Bardejov is a variation on that of Třebíč combined with that of Telč. Bardejov has one of the best preserved historical centres among the medieval towns of Slovakia, largely due to the fact that the region was not touched by the first wave of industrialisation in the 19th century. Near to the town are spas that take advantage of the mineral springs which have long attracted many important visitors. The heritage site that led to the town's inclusion on the UNESCO list is a recently discovered suburban Jewish settlement, where the *mikve* [ritual bath] was found and reconstructed. Thus Bardejov, which already enjoyed the charm typical of old merchant towns, obtained the extra advantage of membership in the UNESCO club, which is generally perceived to be of great benefit to the region. However, the identity of the region near the Dukla pass has been influenced by a totally different story. It is a story of poverty, war, destruction, painful losses, and post-war reconstruction. These are the memories that influence the identity of Svidník, which, although its known history goes back almost seven hundred years, has no built heritage. Svidník is a completely new, modern town; nevertheless its history is creating its identity. The town and its surrounding area is a *lieu de mémoire par excellence*. It is not only that the area is replete with war memorials and cemeteries; the act of repeated commemoration sustains the memory, and unites the town community. The agents of this memory are the local government, the town hall, history museums and the schools. The community preserves the memory of war, and the stories of reconstruction. It has its favourite heroes, and it keeps their stories alive. The division of Czechoslovakia into the Czech and Slovak states, raised a very contentious question: to whom will the memory of Dukla now belong? Will it be nationalized, and become only Slovak, or will it also remain a Czech *lieu de mémoire*? Some actors were indifferent: however, for some it was a politically problematic continuity of the previous regime. The representatives and inhabitants of the town and region of Svidník, believed that this place of memory could be reinterpreted. By a coincidence of interests the town hall representatives on the Polish side of the border, in the town of Dukla and the Consulate general of the Czech Republic in Polish Katowice, both began to develop the image of the war memorials as places of interaction between four or even five memories – Slovak, Polish, Czech, Ukrainian and Russian. After fourteen years of systematic work, this form of commemoration is

accepted as a tradition. It is built on the common interpretation of the battle of Dukla, as the most important mountain battle of the Second World War. All victorious powers have their great battles; in this part of Europe, we have Dukla. The commemoration has an established ritual which starts on the Polish side, in the war cemetery in Dukla, where Czechoslovak, Soviet and Polish combatants are buried. It continues at the memorial cross, which was donated by Pope John Paul II, and then at two other war graves of Czechoslovak soldiers. The commemoration at Dukla is opened by a military ritual in which military units and individuals are called to stand to order, to which it is replied that those who were called fell on the field of honour. This ceremony, performed by a regional regiment dressed in a special uniform, is a very emotional act, intended to invoke empathy and patriotic feeling amongst local students, who participate with veterans and other guests in the commemoration. The ceremonies honouring the dead that take place here, at the cross and the other two graves, are accompanied by the prayers of Catholic, Orthodox, and Greek Catholic clergymen. The next day the commemorations continue on the Slovak side of the border, where the presence of the president of the republic provides the gravity of an official state act. This memorial helps to maintain the historical consciousness of a border town that is losing population through economic migration, and trying to find new forms of economic development, due to the decline of the farming and textile industries. The area also benefits from the varied ideas and values that have been created by its place on a cultural crossroad. A similar situation prevails on the Polish side of the border, which is one of the most peripheral and remote regions in the country. Poland has few highland regions, due to this the mountainous landscape of the south is a popular attraction for urban tourists. This has led to the emergence of a better infrastructure for tourism, and the appearance of the region in popular tourist guidebooks. Due to the fact that Slovakia is mostly mountainous, and has many traditional resorts, Svidník has to make much more effort to get onto the tourist map. It has beautiful landscapes, interesting rural wooden architecture and excellent local cuisine, but it lacks infrastructure, marketable beds and hotels.

STRATEGIES FOR THE REVIVAL OF THE REGION

When Bernard Kayser analysed the situation in the rural regions of Western Europe, particularly in France, and questioned who was behind the strategies for *renaissance rurale*, he defined its preconditions and the framework in which it functioned. First, he concluded that the process of rebirth in rural regions varies from place to place, and takes the form of a social movement. It is driven by the will of those who live in the region, and the willingness of decision makers at various social levels to take this movement into account. Kayser argues that *renaissance* is not the usual process in every rural region. On the contrary we find all phases from rebirth to decline: from *renaissance* through *décadence* to *désertification*. The social movement of regional rebirth appears only in regions having favourable conditions, and it has been encouraged by the reversal

of the values of urban society. Rural culture, which was formerly despised by modern urban society, came to be admired. Similarly, an idealised image of rural landscapes emerged, comprised of idealised villages embellished with flowers and free of the noises and smells of everyday life. This image of the rural world also integrates the small provincial burghs and towns and their societies. The flight from the towns and the rejuvenation of rural landscapes are two sides of the same coin. In this context, some authors use a newly created term, rurbanisation. This concept, however, is more associated with urban-rural peripheries, while the study of the renaissance of the rural landscape focuses more on regions that are distant from urban centres, in the *campagne profonde*³⁷.



Fig. 5 Initiatives of valorisation of the historical heritage: Lombez in Gers.

The renaissance of agricultural regions, according to Kayser, is the result of various initiatives and releases the hidden potential of the rural world, which is based on social structures, on monuments, buildings of historical importance and institutional networks at a regional and local level. He highlights the inventive new capacities of rural societies and positive approaches to the implementation of innovations, be they economic, social, technological or cultural. Kayser, himself based in Toulouse in provincial France, believes this innovative rural movement has an important influence on society,

as it deconstructs the border between the dominant, urban world, and the dependent rural periphery. It may seem to some (like Yves Lacoste) to be an overuse of the term periphery, which is also an important concept describing the organisational trends of both modern and post-modern society: however, in this context it seems hardly imaginable that one could find a more pertinent term³⁸.

Furthermore, the innovative spirit in rural and small urban societies was facilitated by their reframing or restructuring. B. Kayser points to a synergy of indigenous rural settlement and new social groups which settled or resettled in the rural environment. These social groups include a variety of professions from artisans, workers, and employees up to managers, entrepreneurs, intellectuals or artists.

What has been presented in these case studies, confirms the conclusion previously made by B. Kayser: *'la symbiose entre la culture et l'économie passe essentiellement par le tourisme. L'action culturelle est destinée a constituer un pôle d'attraction pour un public extérieur tout en satisfaisant les aspirations des élites locales'*³⁹. The innovations that are successful are those that animate the place and its society, propose the residents and visitors to live through the experience and do not only promote the individual locality, but its entire region.

The project to revive rural regions in France was supported by the *politique culturelle* of the French republic and of regional governments as an answer to the critical conditions of deeply rural regions. We have to bear in mind that these policies emerged after the law of decentralisation introduced by the Mitterand government in 1982. In Slovakia (and Poland) and in the Czech Republic efforts to regenerate rural regions appeared as a reaction to economic changes after 1990. The projects were stimulated by unemployment and economic migration from such regions on one hand, and by various projects offered to the regions by the EU and consequently by the state governments on the other.

In both Western and East-Central Europe, rural regions have recently become more appreciated by urban societies. There has been a renaissance in their cultural life and more activities have been developed. In Gers, in Gascony, and in the Czech-Moravian Highlands it is pertinent to speak of a tendency to return to the countryside, or to flee the town for the sake of the *périurbain*, or rurban, small towns and villages. All these regions have seen extensive cooperation between all interested parties, including the original inhabitants, those who returned and resettled, those who chose to move from the city to the rural region and those who organized public life in that region. Together they have discovered the principles of creativity and an appreciation of innovation. They have rejuvenated regional cultural life, a process which has been concentrated in small towns and burghs.

In France, the process has been more the result of redistribution and diffusion of surplus, rather than the result of crisis. Social geographers evaluate the situation as part of the continual growth of state revenue, although slow and with problems, which permits at-

tempts to reach spatial balance in support of regional culture. Gers is a successful example, although the picture is far from ideal. France is, of course, a special case. It is large and has a significant number of regions with distinct cultural identities, but the rebirth of regionalism is not exclusive to France, or to the 'old' countries of the European Union.

The three case studies that have been presented in this chapter, demonstrate that we have to reconsider the relationship between urban and rural space and the character of the frontier between them. In modern society this frontier had negative connotations. These are now dissolving, as the infrastructure permitting comfortable life in rural conditions seems more developed.

Regional identity is very important for the self-esteem of local societies. It has been demonstrated in the case studies that it is the result of the systematic efforts of local elites and volunteers from elsewhere, who may or may not be professional historians or art historians. The local, the regional, and the national cannot be separated. Local identity loses much of its importance without the regional perspective and the importance of a region is justified through its role within a national or supranational context.

There also appears to be a crisis in the perception of novelty and in the presentation of innovation. There is a belief that the repeated, the old and the traditional have a better chance of being accepted. Urban society increasingly values historicity and many are questioning, contesting and even rejecting the aesthetic and technical value of most recent (20th century) investments. In the information age, when increased travel opportunities and internet communication have transformed access to information, it is no longer easy to trace how the ideas that inspired the renewal of rural space emerged. On the other hand it is very interesting to analyse how these changes were produced, who decided to implement them and how the structures of civic society were involved.

Although sociologists and historians have recognised the contribution of smaller towns towards various innovations, in public discourse small towns were, until recently, perceived as the home of conservative societies fond of traditions and resistant to change. Bernard Kayser has pointed to a new paradigm of *renaissance rurale*, which he characterises as a revolution in values. Kayser mainly draws on sociological research and appreciates the new inventive capacity of the *monde rural*, which is not only the village and hamlet, but also the small town. He emphasises the novelty of its ability to *valoriser les innovations*, whether economic, social, technological or cultural⁴⁰. Kayser has also analysed the changes in the nature of the border between urban and rural spaces and societies. He believes that, at the end of the 20th century, it can be characterised more as a cultural frontier than as a physical border; fluid and more permeable. Rural and urban landscapes intertwine, and rural and urban settlements are often difficult to discern, especially in western countries. In Western Europe we can see a simultaneous convergence and penetration of rural and urban regions; this process, however, does not occur with the same intensity and dynamics in East Central-Europe.

CONCLUSION

The border between the urban and rural in East-Central Europe can be explained more often in terms of culture, than in terms of economics, finances, or technologies. The difference between urban and rural was, and perhaps still is, most clearly perceived by the absence of urban comfort and amenities, like sidewalks and street lights, let alone various urban services. The lack of these symbols of urban settlement in rural areas is largely the result of the decisions of local government. During the 1990s, the redefinition of urban space in East-Central Europe created new internal borders between districts. Following the attempted gentrification of dilapidated quarters, significant changes were made to urban areas. Over the last fifteen years, the rediscovery of urban spaces and their redefinition has had a significant impact on large cities, especially capitals. The policies and choices of small towns were partially inspired by those of the capitals. These ideas were swiftly adopted due to the advantages of modern communications technology. Memory and historical heritage helped to intensify a feeling of collective memory central to the strategies of regional revival used by planners and investors, as well as by civic bodies. Ruth Wallach has demonstrated in the preceding chapter that art in a city is important business in contemporary societies⁴¹. This exploration of the strategies of small towns and provincial regions suggests that, in small towns, history has a marketable value, and can become part of business. Artistic monuments and historical heritage are used as instruments to motivate identification and consequently for labelling urban space to facilitate its usage and understanding⁴². The strategies of small towns and provincial regions also demonstrate a need to identify with larger units, which may be imagined national or even supranational communities. This is testified by street names, museums and monuments commemorating not local, but national history. This is an important factor in the struggle for a collective identity which has both a cultural and a social content. This tendency is not a novelty, as is demonstrated by the analysis carried out by Jaroslav Ira⁴³.



Fig. 6 Square next to the war memorial in Barran, Gers, named after patriotic association *Le Souvenir français* created in 1887 in Alsace Lorraine during German occupation. Members are supposed to care for war graves and memorials. (Photograph by the author, 2007)

Creating a collective identity for a region requires a good knowledge of the regional history and culture. As we have seen in the examples presented, rather than proclaiming that as peripheries they are helpless victims of modernisation, strong, active civic bodies can elaborate appropriate strategies to contribute to the social and economic life of their region.

Only thus are they able to find support from national and international bodies, and succeed in putting themselves 'on the map', according to their desires and those of their citizens.

NOTES

- ¹ This chapter was written with the support of the research scheme of the Ministry of Education of the Czech Republic MSM 0021620827 *České země uprostřed Evropy v minulosti a dnes* [Czech Lands in the Middle of Europe, Past and Present], held by the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts of Charles University in Prague. Maps used in the article were compiled by the autor; the map of urban cores in Fig. 1 is based on P. Hohenbergh - L. Hollen Lees, *The Making of Urban Europe, 1000-1994*, Cambridge 1996, p. 371.
- ² B. Kayser, *La renaissance rurale. Sociologie des campagnes du monde occidental*, Paris 1990, p. 316.
- ³ Z. Beňušková (ed.), *Tradičná kultúra regionov Slovenska. Prehľad charakteristických znakov* [Traditional culture of regions of Slovakia. An overview of characteristic features], Bratislava 2005, p. 241.
- ⁴ Basic statistics of the chosen regions: Gers - 6291 km², 174,587 inhabitants; Auch - 21838 inhabitants (1999); Vysočina - 6795 km², 511,645 inhabitants; Třebíč - 38882 inhabitants (2007); Prešovský kraj - 8993 km², 789968 inhabitants; Svidník - 12384 inhabitants (2005); Bardejov - 33374 inhabitants (2005).
- ⁵ http://www.paysportesdegascogne.com/pays/t_present.php (visited on 1 January 2008).
- ⁶ G. Sourbadère, *La Terre et les Hommes en Gascogne*, Auch 2001, pp. 9-19.
- ⁷ R. Escarpit, *Comment peut-on être gascon?* in R. Escarpit (ed): *La Gascogne. Pays, nation, région?*, Paris 1982, pp. 9-10.
- ⁸ E. Le Roy Ladurie, *Histoire de France des régions. La périphérie française, des origines à nos jours*, Paris 2001, p. 272 ff.
- ⁹ *Novempopulanie* or *Aquitania IIIe* of the Gallo-Roman period took its name from the *Vascons*, the peoples that crossed the Pyrenées from the south, seeking refuge from the Visigoths. It became the duchy of Gascony in 768, in 1036 it came under the control of the family of Poitiers-et-Aquitaine. In 1137 it was united to the French crown through the marriage of Aliénor d'Aquitaine to Louis VII, but through her second marriage with Henry II Plantagenet (1152) Gascony was under English rule until 1453, when it was re-united with France by Charles VII.
- ¹⁰ The idea of creating a province, which would integrate all regions of Gascony was a project of the *intendant* Mégrét d'Etigny. Auch used to be the seat of a *generalité* and *intendant* between 1716-1789.
- ¹¹ *Regióny Slovenska. Regions of Slovakia*, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava 2004, pp. 46-49.
- ¹² P. Gojdič, *Svidník*, Svidník 1996 (multilingual booklet); regional journal published since 2001, "*Podduklianske Novinky*" has also its website www.ke.telecom.sk/podduklianskeinovinky.
- ¹³ F. Braudel, *The Identity of France I. History and Environment*, New York 1990, esp. p. 85 ff.

- ¹⁴ It is estimated that about 30% of the population is over 60 years of age, which explains the relatively low level of unemployment. According to the *Dictionnaire national des communes de France*, Edition conforme au recensement de 1990, Albin Michel/Berger-Levrault 1991, Gers had 174 587 inhabitants, at a density of 27.75 per km². The situation was similar in Ariège (27.84), Lot (29.88) and Aveyron (30.88).
- ¹⁵ P. Deboffe, P. L. Feral, *Le Gers a deux cents ans (1790-1990). 200ème anniversaire de la création du département*, Auch 1990; P. L. Feral (ed.), *Pays du Gers. Coeur de la Gascogne I- II*, Pau 1988-1990.
- ¹⁶ 18.5%, while the average for Slovakia was 13.1%, according to V. Krivý, V. Feglová, D. Balko, *Slovensko a jeho regióny: sociokultúrne súvislosti volebného správania* [Slovakia and its regions: social and cultural context of electoral behaviour], Bratislava 1996, p. 318.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 317-320.
- ¹⁸ It was estimated that from 45 000 inhabitants of Dukla region (Svidník and its district) 7.7% migrated to work abroad, i.e. Czech republic, USA and UK., *ibid.*, p. 324.
- ¹⁹ According to the Czech statistic office by 1995 average unemployment was 13.1%; by the end of 2004 unemployment in the Vysočina region varied from 5.01 - 14.0%, while in the district of Třebíč it was 11-14.0%. [http://www.czso.cz/xj/edicniplan.nsf/t/C3004347E5/\\$File/k38.jpg](http://www.czso.cz/xj/edicniplan.nsf/t/C3004347E5/$File/k38.jpg) (2 January 2008).
- ²⁰ R. Zejda, *Třebíčsko. Turisticko-vlastivědný průvodce obcemi a jejich okolím* [Třebíč- region. Tourist and educational guide through communities and their surroundings], Tišnov 2001, esp. pp. 144-159.
- ²¹ The route to Santiago de Compostella in France was registered in 1998; this included the Cathedral St. Marie in Auch and the Colegiate church in La Romieu; http://whc.UNESCO.org/en/list/868/multiple=1&unique_number=1019 (9 January 2008).
- ²² The historic centre of Telč was registered in 1992; the Pilgrimage Church of St. John of Nepomuk at Zelená Hora (Žďár) in 1994; the Jewish quarter and St. Procopius basilica in Třebíč were registered in 2003. <http://whc.UNESCO.org/en/statesparties/cz> (9 December 2007).
- ²³ Bardejov was registered in 2000. <http://whc.UNESCO.org/en/statesparties/sk> (8 December 2007).
- ²⁴ <http://whc.UNESCO.org/en/tentativelists/1730/> (8 December 2007).
- ²⁵ <http://whc.UNESCO.org/en/list/1133> (8 December 2007).
- ²⁶ The author has visited the compared regions many times in various ways, but her observations were not carried out using an ethnological method.
- ²⁷ P. Huchet, Y. Boëlle, *Sur les chemins de Compostelle*, Rennes 1999.
- ²⁸ J.-F. Aramendy, T. Casel, C. David, P. Labaume, L. Laffitte, M. Larribe, P. Pieux, *Paysages de Midi-Pyrénées*, Toulouse 2000.
- ²⁹ See Kayser, *La renaissance rurale* cit., p. 255-6; G. Alirol, *Preface* to G. Tautil (ed.), *Chemins d'Occitanie. Espace, territoire, identité, démocratie (politique occitane, 1974-2000)* Paris/Montréal (Canada) 1997, p. 11-14; these efforts are also documented in the recent work of A. Theulle. *Les manifestations culturelles, facteur de développement local? L'exemple du festival de country de la ville de Mirande (Gers) et son incidence pour la communauté de communes du 'Coeur d'Astarac en Gascogne'*, Mémoire de maîtrise d'aménagement du territoire, Université Paul Valéry, Montpellier, Juin 2004, p. 124.
- ³⁰ B. Cursente, G. Loubès, *Villages gersois, II - Les bastides*, Collection 'Gascogne Insolite', Publication Chambre d'Agriculture du Gers, Auch 1991; J. Dubourg: *Histoire des bastides de Midi-Pyrénées*, Luçon 1997.
- ³¹ Communauté de communes 'Coeur d'Astarac en Gascogne' - 16 communities, 7110 inhabitants. The consortium was created in 1999 by 5 communities: Mirande, Miélan, Laas, Monclar sur l'Osse, Saint-Maur. Later it grew: by 1 January 2004 it had accepted a further six, and by 2004 it had 16 members : Armous, Cau, Bars, Bassoues, Castelnau d'Angles, Laas, Lamazère; Marseillan; Mascaras; Miélan,

Mirande; Monclar sur l'Osse, Montesaquiou, Mouches, Pouylebon, St Christaud and St Maur Soules. <http://www.coeur-dastarac.fr/coeur-dastarac/coeur-dastarac/accueil.htm> (11 January 2008)

- ³² *Paměť měst. Městské památkové rezervace v českých zemích* [Memory of cities. Urban heritage reservations in the Czech Lands], Prague 1975, p. 336.
- ³³ J. Janák, *Třebíč. Dějiny města II* [Třebíč. History of the town, II], Brno 1981, passim.
- ³⁴ The former factory is now waiting to be turned into a residential district. http://www.trebicky-zpravodaj.cz/borovinska-tovarna-z-pohledu-blizke-budoucnosti_85.html (1 September 2007).
- ³⁵ J. Klenovský, *Jewish monuments of Třebíč*, Brno 2004, passim; R. Fišer, *Třebíč. Osudy židovských domů* [Třebíč. The destinies of Jewish houses], Třebíč 2005, pp. 21-29.
- ³⁶ The cemetery was registered on the national list of historical monuments and landmarks in 2002 (Klenovský, *Jewish monuments* cit., p. 66.)
- ³⁷ Kayser, *La renaissance rurale* cit., pp. 28-30.
- ³⁸ Y. Lacoste, *De la géopolitique aux paysages. Dictionnaire de la géographie*, Paris 2003, pp. 293-294.
- ³⁹ Kayser, *La renaissance rurale* cit., pp. 255-6, citing A. Lefebvre in *Aujourd'hui, la culture du monde rural*, Toulouse 1987.
- ⁴⁰ B. Kayser, *La renaissance rurale* cit., passim.
- ⁴¹ R. Wallach, *Marking the City. Place-making and the Aesthetics of Urban Spaces*, in this volume, pp. 281-298.
- ⁴² K. Lynch, *The Image of the City*, New York 1960; on the contribution of the UNESCO list to the instrumentalisation of heritage see T. Vahtikari, *Urban Interpretations of World Heritage. Re-defining the City* in M. Niemi, V. Vuolanto (eds.), *Reclaiming the City. Innovation, Culture, Experience*, Helsinki 2003, pp. 63 - 79; This issue is explored in this volume by J. Tancer, *The Image of the City as a Site of Memory: Bratislava in Modern Travel Literature*, pp. 267-280.
- ⁴³ J. Ira, *Creating Local and Broader Identities: Historical Monographs on Bohemian, Moravian, and Galician Towns, 1860-1900*, in this volume, pp. 251-266.

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Professionalization of Women's Studies Graduates. Transfer of New Knowledge

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Dit hoofdstuk geeft een antwoord op de vraag naar de professionalisering van afgestudeerden in Vrouwenstudies in Nederland. De volgende aspecten van professionalisering worden onderscheiden: 1) werk dat afgestudeerden hebben na hun Vrouwenstudies-onderwijs; 2) kennis en vaardigheden die studenten verwerven tijdens hun studie en hoe ze die toepassen in hun werk; en 3) de professionele identiteit van vrouwenstudica's en hun visie op werk en carrière. Afgestudeerden in Vrouwenstudies worden gezien als dragers van kennis, die in hun werk Vrouwenstudies-kennis van de universiteit naar de maatschappij overdragen. Via interviews met afgestudeerden in Vrouwenstudies wordt op een vernieuwende manier gekeken naar de relatie tussen wetenschap en maatschappij en de rol van Vrouwenstudies-kennis in de zogenaamde kennismaatschappij. Het theoretisch kader waarin het onderzoek gepositioneerd is, is het kader van 'Mode 2' of 'The new production of knowledge', dat uitgaat van een complex netwerk van verbindingen en interacties tussen wetenschap en maatschappij (Gibbons et al. 1994, Nowotny et al. 2001). Wat betekent professionalisering voor een jong, interdisciplinair en maatschappelijk betrokken vakgebied als Vrouwenstudies? De resultaten van het onderzoek laten zien dat kennis en expertise op het gebied van gender een cruciaal onderdeel van de professionele identiteit van vrouwenstudica's vormt. De overdracht van deze academische kennis naar de maatschappij kent echter verschillende barrières, waardoor de afgestudeerden strategieën moeten inzetten om hun kennis op een succesvolle manier toe te passen. Met name het kritische en politieke karakter van Vrouwenstudies speelt hierin een rol. De brede toepasbaarheid en sociale relevantie van Vrouwenstudies, geschetst door de geïnterviewden, is dus geen garantie voor acceptatie van deze kennis. De overdracht van kennis van Vrouwenstudies kan gekarakteriseerd worden als overdracht van nieuwe kennis. Enerzijds vanwege het feit dat Vrouwenstudies een relatief jong vakgebied is. Anderzijds kan gesproken worden van nieuw in de zin van 'the new production of knowledge': Vrouwenstudies-kennis is interdisciplinair van aard, is probleemgericht en benadrukt de bijdrage van kennis aan sociale verbetering.

In this chapter, I address the issue of professionalization of Women's Studies graduates in the Netherlands. I will do this by focussing on the knowledge and competences students acquire during their studies and how they subsequently use this in their professional lives.

In the traditional understanding, the term 'professional' refers to a member of a disciplined group who adheres to established standards and a code of ethics, in particular in

relation to the working practices of professions like doctors and lawyers. The focus on such male dominated professions and their practitioners was the object of the sociology of professions in the traditional paradigm. However, professionalization theories in sociology have been criticised by feminist scholars for not incorporating gender, despite the fact of women entering the professions¹. Moreover, a whole body of research has been carried out on women in male professions and on female dominated professions. Feminist critique and research results have demonstrated that gender is a key factor in both the concept of 'profession' and the process of professionalization.

What does professionalization mean in the context of Women's Studies? Does this young scholarly field of study result in new forms of professionalization? Women's Studies is an interdisciplinary field that, according to a recent definition, studies "power mechanisms that impact on the positions of men and women in society"². I adopt an open definition of Women's Studies, using it to include Women's Studies, Gender Studies, and Feminist Studies, as the distinctions have no bearing on the subject of this chapter. Gender is the constitutive concept in Women's Studies. This concept "refers to the many and complex ways in which social differences between the sexes acquire a meaning and become structural factors in the organization of social life"³.

On the one hand, studying Women's Studies does not lead to one sort of profession because of its non-vocational and interdisciplinary character. This would entail that professionalization in this field is not self-evident. Moreover, the interrelation between gender and power means that Women's Studies not only produces knowledge and expertise, but is at the same time always political. Women's Studies is "about a transformative analysis, about the need for change"⁴. This may complicate professionalization matters even further.

On the other hand, the interdisciplinary and "socially robust" character of knowledge is part of the current mode of science that Nowotny et al.⁵ call 'Mode 2'. This concept refers to science in a complex network of links between science and society. It can be seen as opposite to the concept of academy as an ivory tower, characterised by a separation between the two spheres. According to Nowotny et al.⁶ Women's Studies is a strongly contextualised field that produces "socially robust knowledge", knowledge that engages the social world. Since knowledge is considered an important aspect of professional identity⁷ it is interesting to scrutinize what Women's Studies knowledge means for the professionalization of graduates in the field.

My focus on Women's Studies graduates as human transporters of knowledge also contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of knowledge transfer as it is used in discussions about the so-called 'Knowledge Society'. In these discussions the heterogeneous and reciprocal interactions between science/scholarship and society⁸ and the contribution of knowledge to socio-economic and cultural developments is crucial. What is important is that knowledge is not only about theories or results of academic research, but also incorporates academically trained people⁹. Graduates of Women's Studies working in civil society, business organisations, and policy are thus considered experts

that transfer the knowledge of this study into society. Focussing on the whereabouts of this particular group of graduates via interview analysis will shed new light on issues of knowledge transfer. The multitude of relations that Women's Studies has with the women's movement, civil society, politics, media, and government policy¹⁰ makes this field suitable to investigate the interchange of knowledge between academia and society.

Despite its relatively young history, Women's Studies in the Netherlands has become a well-established field of education and research in the academy¹¹. To give an indication of the size of Dutch Women's Studies, some data are given here. There are thirteen Women's Studies units and 177 graduate courses (covering all universities except the Technical University of Delft) were offered in 1999-2000¹². The majority of the courses are provided in Social Sciences, Arts, and Theology. Between 1990 and 1996 at least 361 students took a specialisation, major, or minor in Women's Studies at graduate level¹³. At Utrecht University, a university with a large number of Women's Studies students, fifty students were enrolled in the Women's Studies Arts programme in 2001. At the Netherlands Research School of Women's Studies (NOV) in the same year fifty PhD students were registered, and more than thirty had successfully completed their dissertation since 1995. Information collected by the Dutch Women's Studies Association¹⁴ shows that there were 309 Women's Studies experts working in and outside universities. Approximately half of the group had a PhD degree. In 2001 within universities thirty-eight professors, twenty-three senior lecturers, sixty-two lecturers, and more than 100 PhD students were counted working within Women's Studies or related fields. Of the professors twenty are especially appointed in Women's Studies, and eighteen have an appointment in another discipline, but they also have expertise in Women's Studies¹⁵. Some 200 women teach Women's Studies courses at universities and some 300 do research, with an overlap of almost 200 who both teach and carry out research.

The data on which this chapter is based were collected as part of the research project 'Employment and Women's Studies: The impact of Women's Studies training on women's employment in Europe' (EWSI), funded by the European Commission under the Fifth Framework Programme (contract number HPSE-CT2001-00082, 2001-2003). Partners from nine countries (Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom) were involved in the EWSI project. The main aim of the project was to analyse how training in Women's Studies influences women's opportunities in the labour market.

In particular, this chapter is based on thirty face-to-face interviews with Women's Studies students and graduates from the Netherlands. The interviews were undertaken with ten students and twenty former students in Women's Studies in 2002 by the author of this chapter. They varied in age from twenty-four to sixty-four, and had taken the courses between 1980 and 2001 in diverse disciplines: Economy, Law, General Arts, English, Dutch, International Relations, General Social Sciences, Anthropology, Sociology, Political Sciences, History, Philosophy, and Theology. The interviewees studied Women's Studies in various ways: from arranging their own lectures (in the beginning period of Women's Studies), taking one or more (optional

or obligatory) modules within their own study programme, to following complete Women's Studies specialisation programmes (in the Arts, Political and Socio-cultural Sciences, or Social Sciences). A diverse group of Women's Studies students was therefore interviewed; representing the different ways that Women's Studies is institutionalised in Dutch universities.

The interviewees talked openly about their experiences with Women's Studies, the impact it had on their employment, and the impact on their lives in general. Interviewees had been selected from women who had indicated that they were willing to participate in the interviews through questionnaires. The questionnaires were from a non-random sample of fifty-one students and eighty former Women's Studies students, both at MA and PhD level. The majority of the respondents studied at Utrecht University, the University of Amsterdam, the University of Nijmegen (today called the Radboud University Nijmegen), and the Netherlands Research School of Women's Studies. Due to the purpose of the EWSI project, all respondents were women.

The project's results concerning the experiences of Dutch students with Women's Studies training and the impact of it on their employment were described by Van der Sanden¹⁶. These results focused on the expectations and outcomes of the students' employment.

For addressing the issue of professionalization of Women's Studies graduates, the corpus of interviews with the Dutch graduates has been re-examined with a close look on the transfer of Women's Studies knowledge, the operation of graduates in the work place, and the (re)presentation of their professionalization. The methodology used for this is qualitative text analysis¹⁷. The graduates' accounts of their experiences are the basis for my analysis of their professionalization and a new way of looking at the process of the transfer of Women's Studies knowledge. When relevant I will refer to background information concerning the participation of women in the labour market, the institutionalisation of equal opportunities, and the development of Women's Studies in the Netherlands¹⁸.

I will study three aspects of the professionalization of graduates from Women's Studies. Firstly, I define professionalization as jobs that graduates occupy after their Women's Studies training. Their employment trajectories are analysed to list fields in which this knowledge finds its way. Secondly, I look at professionalism. Professionalism is understood here as the knowledge and competences that students acquire through Women's Studies training and (how this impacts on) how they perform their work. Questions that will be answered are: What do graduates define as Women's Studies knowledge, can they apply their knowledge in their work, and is this knowledge accepted? Thirdly, I look at the professional identity of these graduates, in particular at the knowledge and attitudes that are part of their professional identity. In addition, I will look at what they find important in their professional working lives by analysing how they talk about their work and careers.

At the end of my chapter, I will examine what the professionalization of Women's Studies graduates means for the process of knowledge transfer, by pointing out factors that

can be identified as either hindering or enhancing the transfer of Women's Studies knowledge. I will subsequently go back to the title of my chapter, and comment on this knowledge as a form of new knowledge.

PROFESSIONALIZATION

Employment expectations

Before discussing the actual employment outcomes of Women's Studies graduates, I will discuss their employment expectations. These will be compared to the employment outcomes. This comparison can point out hindrances for professionalization. A discrepancy between ideals and outcomes may point out missed possibilities for the professionalization of Women's Studies knowledge and expertise.

Looking at the employment expectations of students, the first choice of the majority of Dutch Women's Studies students is to do something with gender, women or Women's Studies, but they did not always have clear ideas about their future occupations. In addition, many interviewees wanted to do research or continue doing research after they completed their MA studies or their PhD dissertation. In relation to this, they sometimes explicitly mentioned academia or doing a PhD. A second choice or alternative is working in social organisations or a combination of research and practice. Other employment expectations that students had were in advisory or policy functions, consultancy or communication, working in a pedagogical setting with women, and doing something with Women's Studies and medicine.

The desire to work in academia or in women's organisations is however accompanied by students' awareness that there are only few vacancies and a small budget inside Women's Studies in academia, as well as limited possibilities outside academia for specific emancipation functions or women's organisations, since many such organisations are being abolished or need to work on tighter budgets. The small budget for working in Women's Studies at a university is related to the disciplinary organisation of universities and of research funding structures, whereas Women's Studies is an interdisciplinary research area¹⁹.

The fact that the Women's Studies students have no articulate ideas about their future work may be related to the motivation for taking this training. Looking at their motivations, it is striking that labour market reasons are not important in the choice for Women's Studies. This non-labour market related attitude of university students is not uncommon in the Netherlands. University education is seen as opposed to vocational education that, unlike university training, does lead to specific jobs. On a parallel line, Women's Studies programmes in the Netherlands do not directly focus on a certain niche in the labour market either. It is rather a general and critical academic education that prepares students for a wide range of jobs and careers.

Of course it is very vague and it doesn't lead anywhere according to people and you will not be able to earn money with it regarding employment perspectives. You start when you are eighteen

and you do not become a lawyer or physician. You choose the insecure regarding money and prospects. But with Women's Studies and in my studies I have always done what I enjoyed. I always followed my intuition and thought this is interesting and this is interesting. I always had a big mouth saying 'When I like it, when I am motivated, then I will get there.' I was bluffing, but I turned out to be right"²⁰.

The way of talking about the relation between Women's Studies and work displayed in the above citation has been called 'typical' of the European situation²¹.

Employment related motivations are thus not important in the decision to take a Women's Studies course. Factors that turned out to be central to students' motivation are personal and academic interest and the awareness of gender inequalities or discrimination against women. Connected to the awareness of inequality between men and women is the wish to change that inequality. Women want to act against gender injustice and want to be of significance socially or politically. All interviewees made it clear that, contrary to the popular general belief in the Netherlands, women's emancipation is not yet completed.

Jobs following Women's Studies training

In this section I will look at the professionalization of Women's Studies graduates, by analysing their employment following their training. Their employment trajectories give an overview of the jobs in which Women's Studies knowledge finds its way.

The jobs in which Dutch Women's Studies students end up are diverse. A number of women end up in research, both at university and in other organisations. Research professions include jobs such as researcher, junior policy researcher, senior lecturer at university, and PhD student. A number of women end up in professions on the edge of research, such as teacher, advisor, consultant, journalist, policy maker, and expert in (women's) NGOs. Other jobs that women come to occupy are project coordinator, project manager, trainer, office manager, secretary, clerk, student assistant, editor, writer, assistant publisher, account executive, lawyer, radio reporter, civil servant, social and educational worker.

Looking at the employment sectors, the majority of Women's Studies graduates end up working in the public sector. This corresponds to the high representation of women working in the public sector in the EU²². Apart from the private sector, women also work in associations, church institutions, as freelancers or are self-employed.

Combining jobs and sectors leads to the conclusion that most students after Women's Studies training come to occupy jobs as professionals in the public sector. However, it is clear that the general academic training from this study results in students being very versatile, which is reflected in the wide range of professions they come to occupy.

It is striking that many women alongside their paid labour are actively engaged in voluntary work, often related to Women's Studies, emancipation, or feminism. Voluntary jobs of graduates are for instance editorial work for a feminist magazine or working in a meeting project with black, migrant, and refugee women.

A distinction can be made between 'specific Women's Studies jobs', i.e. jobs that graduates could not have done if they had not studied Women's Studies, and 'other jobs', i.e. jobs that content-wise are not directly related to Women's Studies. Specific Women's Studies jobs are on the one hand positions to promote equal opportunities or women's emancipation and on the other hand teaching and research positions in Women's Studies. Of the graduates interviewed, five out of twenty ended up in specific Women's Studies jobs.

On the questionnaires the graduates indicated that around two third of their jobs after Women's Studies training were related to emancipation. Most of these jobs are teaching or researching at university, including a junior researcher and a senior lecturer who are working in Women's Studies, teaching at an institution for Higher Vocational Education, and jobs as policy makers or advisors.

It is interesting to take a closer look at equal opportunities jobs and Women's Studies jobs in academia, because the Netherlands has a high level of institutionalisation of both equal opportunities and Women's Studies, which means that here is a possible labour market for its graduates²³.

Equal opportunities jobs

Two graduates that were interviewed came to work in jobs that can be characterised as an equal opportunities job: one of them works as a staff member for an organisation specialising in gender and ethnicity that advises the government on emancipation and the other works as a staff member of a (former regional) emancipation bureau.

This low number of Women's Studies graduates working in the field of equal opportunities seems to be in contrast with the high level of institutionalisation of equal opportunities in the Netherlands²⁴ and the distribution of equal opportunities jobs in various organisations. However, it correlates with findings that indicate the loosening of the connection between Women's Studies and the emancipation policy in the Netherlands²⁵ and in North West Europe²⁶. Despite this, the majority of Women's Studies students have become more involved in equal opportunities issues as a consequence of taking Women's Studies courses.

Another aspect to take into account is that the possibility of working in equal opportunities jobs depends largely on the availability of (government) money for emancipation. During the time of the interviews, the elections for the Lower House in the Netherlands took place, Pim Fortuyn was murdered, and a new coalition of Christian Democrats, Liberals and Fortuyn's Party was formed. Several interviewees thought that the new political constellation would be unfavourable for women's emancipation and expected less equal opportunities policies. One woman, working in a subsidised equal opportunities institution, was afraid that she might lose her job and that the institution would be abolished.

Moreover, despite the obvious link of Women's Studies with the field of equal opportunities, the interviewees did not mention equal opportunities jobs among the jobs they expect or want to do (see section above on employment expectations).

The academic profession

The academy is clearly a desired field of employment for Women's Studies students. Not only in the Netherlands but in most countries in the EWSI study, the academy is among the most wanted work places²⁷. This interest in academic work was clearly expressed in the Dutch interviews. Women's Studies seems ultimately to prepare students for scholarship. On the one hand, this may be related to the emphasis that Women's Studies training puts on theory and research. It corresponds, on the other hand, with the intellectual challenge that many Women's Studies students are seeking. Remarkably many of the students want to continue their education and would like to acquire a PhD in Women's Studies.

The employment outcomes show that three of the former students interviewed ended up working in Women's Studies at a university, as project manager, junior-researcher, and senior lecturer, respectively. Two other former students work in the academy in other disciplines. Among the students, four are PhD students in Women's Studies. Being a PhD student is also a paid job in the Dutch university system, but within the EWSI research project Women's Studies PhD students were not grouped under former students, but under students.

Women with a PhD in Women's Studies predominantly find employment in academia²⁸. Achieving a much-wanted academic career can be difficult however, because there is more demand than supply of posts so it is difficult to find a position. Working in academic Women's Studies can thus be complicated because of smaller budgets and consequently fewer vacancies. For the next researcher (thirty-four years old) this led to irritation:

Women's Studies trains you for scholarship, which is a good thing, you can't lower your standards, but the result is that you want to be a scholar and then it turns out there is no place. ... I remember having been angry about that. It is a very thorough academic training that doesn't leave many options outside the university, and then you can't get going²⁹.

Moreover, some interviewees thought that working in the academy could lead to a diminishing of their chances to get a job outside the academy. In the labour market, the academy occupies a particular place, because of the low participation of women in (high) university positions. In 2002 only 8.1% of all Dutch professors and 13.7% of the senior lecturers were female³⁰. The culture and structure of the universities can be characterised as a 'male bulwark'³¹. Despite the severe under-representation of female academic staff in the Netherlands and the tight university labour market, Women's Studies students are still attracted to an academic career. This may be related to the fact that a relative high proportion of female professors are working in Women's Studies. In 2001, thirty-eight professors were counted working within Women's Studies or related fields³². These professors can function as role models for their students. Within the academy, Women's Studies is an almost all women's discipline. Also, the institutionalisation of postgraduate education in Women's Studies in the Netherlands Research School of Women's Studies could account for the interest in academic work.

PROFESSIONALISM

Expertise in Women's Studies

This paragraph outlines what students describe as the knowledge and attitudes that they acquired as a result of taking Women's Studies courses. Their expertise can be divided into gender specific expertise and generic or transferable skills. Additionally, women also acquire competences on a personal level that they use in their professional lives.

Through Women's Studies, graduates gain knowledge about women's issues, social problems of women, discussions within the women's movement, the position of women in society, and gender inequality in society. The interviewees see their expertise in understanding the complexity of gender, the relation between gender and ethnicity, the relation between sexism and racism, gaining insight into the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, having a sound grasp of social relations and power relations, having tools to scrutinize representation, and the ability to make social inequality visible.

When asked about the expertise students gained from Women's Studies, many interviewees talked about a 'Women's Studies perspective' or 'gender glasses' with which they looked at reality. Talking about the gender glasses, the interviewees often mentioned having a critical view, a certain way of analysing, and looking at something from different angles. The latter may be related to the interdisciplinarity of Women's Studies training. A senior lecturer, age thirty-five, values this highly:

You can only gain from Women's Studies in your curriculum, because the best insights come from the cross points of disciplines, and Women's Studies is always a cross point of disciplines³³.

Apart from the gender expertise, students also acquire competences that at first sight are not directly related to the content of Women's Studies courses, but that they for the most part have obtained in this training. Significant competences are critical analysis, looking at something from different perspectives, and debating and founding their arguments (and not just collecting the facts). They learn not to take things for granted and to think independently to come to insights. Moreover, Women's Studies students do not so much learn to answer questions nor to find answers to questions they had; rather they learn to ask new and better questions.

As a result of Women's Studies training, students also gain personal qualities, which – as I will point out – can be considered professional qualities. Women speak about being more self-confident and having more self-knowledge, being more assertive, and respecting their own position. According to the questionnaires 73% of the former and 63% of the present students said that taking a Women's Studies course improved their self-confidence. As regards self-knowledge, several women said that Women's Studies helped them to position or understand themselves better in terms of gender, ethnicity and sexual identity. The following interviewee describes both academic and personal aspects of Women's Studies:

Women's Studies was a tough study, but I also found it intellectually the most challenging study. It is also a sort of special study because it gives you knowledge that most other people don't have,

so you get extraordinary knowledge. And because the study was very personal, it is not always easy. Yes, I often compare Women's Studies with the apple of knowledge. It really is a special study, because it is not part of the canon. On the one hand it is very personal and on the other hand it is intellectually so fundamentally philosophical of scholarship and so critical of the social structure³⁴.

Despite the fact that self-confidence is one of the determining factors for a successful career, only a few of the respondents explicitly mentioned this as a professional quality. For example this twenty-five year-old student:

Women's Studies for me has contributed to who I am for a large part, so it has made me more aware of myself and I will get something out of that in my search for an employer and a nice place to work³⁵.

Empowerment is also something women experience. On the one hand, this is because they get more knowledge of social relations, gender relations, ethnicity, and power structures and become more aware what their position is. On the other hand, the ability to discuss and exchange ideas and experiences with kindred spirits is a factor in gaining self-confidence and empowerment. The pedagogical project of Women's Studies teachers to empower students professionally, personally, and otherwise³⁶ thus seems to be fruitful.

Women's Studies strengthened me in my beliefs concerning the position of women, that I was not alone in that and that it is an important issue to discuss. Having a platform to discuss and analyse that. [...] Before Women's Studies I had this vague feeling that I could not place, a feeling of powerlessness, so in that sense Women's Studies brought me empowerment³⁷.

Many women say that they have been given words or a language to talk about issues of injustice, inequality, and discrimination of women.

The first course of Women's Studies I did was really terrific, I thought this is exactly what I always wanted to say, but I never had the words or means to do so. It was a real revelation, that this study existed which was in my line of thought, and I immediately felt at home. Yes, doing Women's Studies is the best choice I ever made in my life³⁸.

Also students talk about Women's Studies impacting on their work, even when they are still studying. These women are for instance students who have jobs next to their (part-time) studies, or PhD students who have done jobs between their MA and their PhD studies.

Dutch Women's Studies students and graduates that reported an improvement in gender awareness, critical thinking, and self-confidence as a result of taking a Women's Studies course

	Former students	Students
Gender awareness	96%	98%
Critical thinking	95%	96%
Self-confidence	73%	63%
Source: J. Hanmer - D. Wigglesworth, Summary report Netherlands, past students / Summary report Netherlands, current students, EWSI project 2003.		

The increase in gender awareness, critical thinking, and self-confidence are evidently positive effects of taking Women's Studies training in all countries involved in the EWSI research project, principally in those countries with a high degree of institutionalisation of Women's Studies. Alongside the Netherlands, these are the UK, Finland, and Germany. All three qualities are important instruments both for getting access to employment and for being able to determine everyday working practices³⁹.

Research of Dever and Day⁴⁰ shows that self-confidence is a quality specifically resulting from Women's Studies training and not from university education in general. In their research students from the UK and Australia often mentioned increased self-confidence as a quality that is the outcome of Women's Studies training, whereas the control group with students from the Arts and Social Sciences do not mention this quality. General knowledge, discipline specific knowledge and competences like critical analysis, researching, and writing were qualities that students from Women's Studies, as well as from the control group, mentioned.

Though it is plausible that critical thinking can be learnt in other studies, in the EWSI research project students mark out this feature as something that is characteristic for Women's Studies. When comparing with other studies such as General Arts, English, Economy, Law, Sociology, Psychology, and Management Sciences they find Women's Studies more intellectually challenging. The intellectual demands that women experience in Women's Studies can be found in critically scrutinizing issues, learning to make logical connections, and being stimulated to think independently and to come to one's own insights. In the next quotation a Women's Studies graduate compares Women's Studies with Sociology:

In Women's Studies, discussion has a central role in the courses, and everyone's viewpoints may and can be heard, there is not one generally received opinion. Everything is possible and everything can be discussed. ... You are very much stimulated to think critically. So, not take something for granted, what is more often the case in Sociology. There you are taught something and later you have to reproduce that. Whereas in Women's Studies it is more that you focus your thoughts and come to your own standpoints by reasoning and having a discussion with each other. It is appreciated if you try to think independently and originally, and that is great⁴¹.

Students also associate the intellectually inspiring atmosphere with the encouraging attitude of Women's Studies teachers, the high motivation of the students, and the smaller groups of students in classes that gives more opportunity for discussion.

Application of knowledge in work

Almost all former students can apply their Women's Studies knowledge in their jobs. For those working within Women's Studies at a university this is evident. A senior lecturer summarises this by saying: "I have made my job from it." Other women formulate the applicability of their knowledge in a more general sense, for instance regarding critical assessment of certain debates, fathoming complex issues, and being on the alert for issues that are relevant to women. Also more than half of the students can apply their Women's Studies knowledge in work, i.e. in real jobs next to their studies, in jobs-on-the-side, in voluntary work or in practical training. A student who organises a cultural programme in a neighbourhood project for instance makes use of the analysis of target groups to involve the different groups of residents in the neighbourhood in the cultural activities.

Looking at the application in different sorts of jobs, it is clear that for graduates ending up in research, the critical view and interdisciplinarity resulting from Women's Studies are very important. The following junior-researcher working outside Women's Studies (age twenty-nine) explains the impact of Women's Studies on her work in a methodological sense and even says that through Women's Studies, you can become a better researcher:

In my work I detect [the impact of Women's Studies] in my way of thinking, in my way of setting up research, and in the way of interpreting research results. ... I always notice that I propose research designs and explanations that are different from those of most researchers. ... I mean this broader outlook, being able to put things in perspective, I just think that by doing Women's Studies you become a better researcher, maybe this is a bold thing to say, but I really think that that is the case. Especially for researchers I think Women's Studies is very beneficial, you acquire better competencies, better qualities as a researcher, because of that broad perspective, the crossing of boundaries and not thinking in stereotypes ...⁴².

As expected, graduates can also apply their Women's Studies knowledge in the field of equal opportunities. A policy worker in an organisation specialised in gender and ethnicity that advises the government on emancipation translates the theories from her Women's Studies in the Arts training in the practice of policy making. For instance in a research project about the representation of gender in ethnicity in governmental policy documents, she explains to civil servants how power works and how that is related to gender and ethnicity.

Also in jobs that are not directly related to Women's Studies, graduates can apply their knowledge. An example is the interviewee that took Women's Studies courses within Political and Socio-cultural Studies. In her work as an advisor/researcher at a research bureau in the field of safety, quality of life and social integration, she uses her knowledge about gender in working on themes such as abortion, sexual violence, and violence in the home. Another example is a public relations worker who makes use of her knowledge about the analysis of representation in the association for which she works.

The insights that women gain in power structures are relevant for their work. Because of these insights, some Dutch interviewees said that they could hold their own better in a male dominated surrounding. The labour market being a male dominated field in many cases. A thirty-year-old former student says:

The training that I got from Women's Studies gives you ammunition that other people don't have, because I have been engaged with myself pretty thoroughly during my studies. Yes, it is knowledge; self-knowledge and security that helped me hold my own in male surroundings, because you see through certain patterns⁴³.

As demonstrated, personal qualities acquired through Women's Studies, for instance self-knowledge, are regarded as an asset for employment. In the last quotation, the interviewee referred to self-knowledge as helpful in her work. This self-knowledge is not limited to gender. A few women said that Women's Studies helped them better understand themselves better in terms of ethnicity. This is the case for white as well as for some non-white women. The following interviewee from the former Dutch East Indies mentions that the fact that she can position herself in terms of ethnicity was useful in her work.

Because of Women's Studies, ...it became very clear how gender is connected to ethnicity, sexuality, class, and age. Maybe this list sounds obligatory, but partly from my research and partly in daily life I found that it is not possible to say that gender is the most important structuring principle. Maybe in one case, but in another case it can be subordinate to something that in that situation is far more important. It is that whole knit..., and for me that has become very clear. [...] That knowledge gives you tools to position yourself, which is very pleasant because it gives you some sort of steady basis in the first place. And when you know something inside out, you also can make use of it for others, for instance when I hold a lecture for people who are not familiar with it, for instance for people from the former Dutch East Indies, you can explain things in a simple way, things that you usually talk about in jargon. And being able to pass on such abstract information in an understandable way is a real merit⁴⁴.

Interdisciplinarity is another aspect of Women's Studies that some interviewees found applicable in their work, as one researcher points out:

Because of Women's Studies interdisciplinarity, you learn to scrutinize your own and other people's ideas, to question your stereotypical ideas, to put into perspective your scientific ideas. [...] And I notice that it is easier for me to discuss things with researchers from other disciplines⁴⁵.

Many women say that, independent from where they end up in the labour market or what they do, they cannot let go of their Women's Studies expertise. A twenty-eight year old policy worker:

That perspective, no one can ever take that away from you. The perspective, the analytical model, the attitude you have regarding power relations, is something that you have been given, and that is a big gift. Of course you did develop it yourself too, but it is also given to you⁴⁶.

Apart from work, graduates also make use of their knowledge in other areas. One of the marked areas is voluntary work. In activities like writing articles for feminist magazines, setting up debates about globalisation, and giving lectures for organisations ranging from Christianity and Feminism to a professional association for speech therapists,

Women's Studies graduates can apply what they have learnt. But also in discussions with friends and relatives they can use their know-how.

Several interviewees stressed that it is important to disseminate Women's Studies knowledge to a large audience. There are for instance women working in research who are at the same time involved in women's organisations, or who want to combine their theoretical work with (feminist) practice. Some consciously aim to transfer their knowledge to these larger audiences.

Also in the organisation of their personal lives, Women's Studies knowledge plays a role. This may not be surprising given the pervasiveness of the 'gender glasses' and the characterisation of Women's Studies as both academic and personal. It is not uncommon for these graduates in Europe to describe that doing Women's Studies is a life changing experience⁴⁷. Due to their gender awareness, women carefully consider the choices they make in their lives and the options for the future. This may be the case, for instance, in their choice of partner and in the choice whether or not to have children. Many women try to live non-traditional lives in the sense that they value (economic) independency and a balanced division of work and household/care tasks. This intention might be reinforced by their feminist way of thinking. What is essential in this is that women, supported by their knowledge, are capable of substantiating their positions and choices. Having the words to do this is relevant here. The next interviewee showed how Women's Studies is incorporated in her living arrangements:

I had already lived together with my boyfriend for a long time, and when he moved to another city to work there, I stayed living here for my studies and for me that was a self-evident thing to do. ...And everyone in my surroundings found it stupid that I should keep on living here... But through Women's Studies and other discussions I found the arguments and language to defend myself better against that and account for my own choices... I learnt from Women's Studies research how things go when people are in a relationship where one partner, in most cases the man, is older and starts working earlier, and how this affects career paths, and that as a woman your career will be very different when you keep on moving. Those things I know from Women's Studies research⁴⁸.

How graduates perform their work

The knowledge women gain in Women's Studies has an impact on how the majority of women do their jobs. This is one of the outcomes of the EWSI research project that goes for all countries involved in the project⁴⁹. No less than 90% of the former Dutch students said in the questionnaires that Women's Studies had an impact on how they operated at the workplace and how they conducted their work.

Women's Studies graduates, as the interviews illustrate, are alert to discrimination or injustice, put women's issues on the agenda, handle gender and diversity matters, and stand up for themselves. It is evident that the acquired competences, in particular gender awareness, critical thinking, and self-confidence, are tightly related to this way of working.

Due to their gender expertise, Women's Studies graduates have the competence to re-

veal how power relationships work in the labour market and in many cases they try to improve the position of women in companies. For instance by raising the issue of representation of women and ethnic minorities in commissions. Regarding contacts with colleagues, women react against sexist remarks. By operating this way they thus act as agents of change in the work place.

Asked how Women's Studies had influenced how she carries out her work, a former student answered that she works hard. This is her clarification:

Women's Studies were always the subjects that you liked to do, and for which you had to do a lot of work, thus you had to put in a lot of effort, always, and you did not think about the time it cost, there were so many texts to read, and of course you also read the footnotes and then you came across another interesting article, so you read that too. Women's Studies is not about getting course credits, it is all about the content. And that's why it is a typical Women's Studies thing to work hard⁵⁰.

The engagement that is visible from this quote is an engagement that quite a few graduates pointed out in the interviews. They find it important that their job or the organisation they work for is in some way connected to social relations or the position of women.

How Women's Studies graduates perform their work is to a large extent linked with the perspective with which they look at reality. Several interviewees even called it a sort of 'second nature'. That the 'gender glasses' are omnipresent, was put in words by the following interviewee:

Women's Studies is for me a way of looking, or a way of life, you can't let that perspective go. When I am somewhere, for instance at a lecture, I always see whether there are only men, or only women, ... or who is speaking, so it is, well, you can say, internalized⁵¹.

The insights graduates gain from Women's Studies and the 'gender glasses' they have means that women notice how things work in organisations, including aspects such as the 'glass ceiling'. Women are critical towards the under representation of women in high positions in the Dutch labour market. Reflecting on this, they stress the importance of female role models and some say they are some kind of role model themselves. One woman consciously presented herself as a female entrepreneur and tries to break through stereotypical ideas. A thirty-five-year old senior lecturer who found it important to prove herself at the male dominated university, said:

The very fact that by being there yourself you already do something about it, because the students anyway see a woman teaching in the lecture room sometime⁵².

Acceptance of Women's Studies knowledge

Given the relative short existence of Women's Studies in the academy, its graduates are newcomers in the labour market. The employment experiences of Women's Studies graduates show that they can apply their knowledge and insights in jobs. Their employment trajectories as such indicate an acceptance of Women's Studies. However, the short existence of Women's Studies means that not many people are familiar with the field. Students and former students must often explain what it is and justify why they choose to study it.

Moreover, despite the applicability and relevance of Women's Studies, graduates observe the low status that is assigned to the field outside and inside the academy. Applying Women's Studies knowledge is therefore not a straightforward process.

The general observation that Women's Studies students and graduates make as regards the acceptance of Women's Studies, is that Women's Studies often has a negative image, because employers lack knowledge about its content, do not take it serious, or connect it to stereotypical ideas about feminism. Women's organisations are the exception; these organisations are mentioned as the ones that recognise the importance of gender expertise.

I think that there still are prejudices, when you apply for a job people don't know about Women's Studies and when you say that you have studied Political Sciences they nod in agreement when actually they don't know what it is either, well, Political Sciences sounds good. ...In that sense I think it has pros and cons... But it also depends on the organisation. If you want to work for a feminist magazine then it is fantastic if you have done Women's Studies. Of course it is so broad; you can go in all directions. But it gives you a certain mark and that is appreciated in some places and in other places it is less appreciated⁵³.

The close link that Women's Studies had to the women's movement in its early years, still affects the way Women's Studies is received nowadays, despite the fact that it has become a full-fledged field of study in universities. The association with feminism leads employers and colleagues to suspect that Women's Studies has less to do with scholarship than with politics. A thirty-two-year old PhD student:

I think Women's Studies is in any case beneficial for your own baggage. It can be hampering, but that is more related to the image of Women's Studies, that people think of you as a radical feminist or so [...]. It surprises me that people still think that. ...If people read in your CV that you graduated in Women's Studies, they will not all acclaim⁵⁴.

On the other hand, the more thorough involvement of Women's Studies in theoretical debates since the 1990s⁵⁵ may also cause social organisations to question the practical relevance of Women's Studies for their cause, as colleague PhD students in Women's Studies pointed out⁵⁶.

Another complicating factor for the acceptance of Women's Studies knowledge is that throughout society there is a growing myth that feminism and Women's Studies are no longer necessary⁵⁷. Moreover, the governmental emancipation policy has become more focussed on black, migrant, and refugee women, implying that the position of autochthonous women in the Netherlands is not an issue anymore⁵⁸. Graduates thus have to fight the general opinion of women's emancipation as a completed process.

The critical stance of Women's Studies has positive as well as negative aspects in relation to work. Graduates in their interviews referred to ample occasions in which they were asked to bring a Women's Studies perspective into courses, are invited to give lectures in civil society, or successfully functioned as supervisors for students. The interviews also provided examples of the negative spectrum. In job interviews people made jokes about Women's Studies, teachers colleagues were not supportive, or the results of the inter-

viewees' research was discredited. The latter is illustrated in the example of a Women's Studies graduate who did research on young mothers:

So it is my opinion, and that goes against the opinion of many others who are working on the topic of young mothers, that it is a conscious choice, and though it may be tough in the beginning, they can learn a lot in a short time and because of the difficulties they face they become powerful. So I would not say that on average they perform worse than other mothers. And with that judgment all social workers come out against you. My critical position is very much related to my personal vision on the topic, because social workers do not all agree. They claimed that if my results show that young mothers are doing all right, well, than I certainly had not succeeded in including the other half of the young mothers!⁵⁹

Women's Studies expertise is thus positively received in some contexts and sometimes it is contested. Several women spoke about this ambiguity as regards the acceptance of Women's Studies:

I think Women's Studies has shaped me in such a way that it is a large element of my character, of who you are, and also that I did not avoid that political game. But in general people tend to think in a mean way about Women's Studies, they don't see it as a field of expertise. [...] Women's Studies was critical, being tolerated as you might say, and I had made very clear what my position was, and yet I was asked in the centre of power. That is something that happened to more women, from an anti-establishment position they were asked for the dominant culture. So I thought this critical attitude proves to be valuable after all⁶⁰.

From the interviews it also became clear that the acceptance of Women's Studies knowledge is not only related to the fact that the knowledge stems from Women's Studies, but also to the undervaluation of women as a topic that is worth studying. Though Women's Studies is about femininity as well as masculinity, the idea of it as being about women only has negative consequences for the status of the field and its knowledge. Some interviewees mentioned that if they worked too long on topics related to women it might diminish their chances of getting a job outside that sector. A policy worker for a former emancipation bureau illustrated this point:

Maybe I don't want to continue working in this women's area you know, it does not have such a good name. If I can make a difference and set up projects in this sector, I could do that in other sectors as well. I have the impression that I could still do that in other sectors. But if I stay too long in this branch, than I may lose my standing, because I have been around in that women's area too much. Unfortunately, it is not perceived as something positive. I don't agree, but that is how things still work⁶¹.

Despite the fact that interviewees acknowledged that Women's Studies knowledge is not accepted or valued everywhere, it is striking that they consider their expertise to be useful or necessary 'everywhere' in the labour market, even when a job does not specifically focus on gender. Areas that they mention most are policy/politics, government, education/university/scholarship/ research, and businesses (the last one is often mentioned in combination with the 'glass ceiling'). Other areas are journalism/media, childcare/healthcare/medicine, and women's organisations/equal opportunities organisations. Many respondents in the EWSI research project spread over all countries represented in the project have talked about the relevance of gender expertise in all employment situations⁶².

Of the many areas that according to the interviewees would benefit from Women's Studies expertise, graduates with this knowledge mainly end up in research and education and to a lesser extent in policy and women's organisations. The business sector is the one big sector where Women's Studies graduates hardly find employment. This may be caused by the preference of the graduates for the public sector or by the business sector not seeing the value of Women's Studies knowledge. The discrepancy does point towards further possibilities for the professionalization of Women's Studies knowledge.

Knowledge transfer strategies

As shown in the sections above, Women's Studies knowledge is not the sort of knowledge that is easily accepted. But because students find their expertise relevant, they find ways to try to get their knowledge accepted and integrated in to their work. In this section, I will discuss different strategies that Women's Studies graduates use in their work in order to be able to apply their knowledge.

The first step to use Women's Studies knowledge in work is of course to get a job in which you are able to do that. Given the lack of familiarity with Women's Studies on the side of employers and the negative image of the field, strategic actions already begin in the application procedures. To enlarge the chances of being selected for a job interview, the following Women's Studies graduate made sure that she put her study management sciences first in her curriculum vitae:

If I would apply for a job, and the selection committee mainly consists of males, I don't think that [Women's Studies] would be an incentive to invite me for a job interview. ... Until now, I have always put it in my CV, because I find it important that have I have done that [training] and it has to a large extent formed me at personal and definitely at academic level. And I didn't want to involve myself in ridiculing Women's Studies. So I put it on my CV, but from a strategic point of view I always put Management Sciences first and I place Women's Studies second. Well, this is because I assume that they at least will take the first half serious⁶³.

One of the obvious ways to get Women's Studies knowledge accepted is to explain the relevance of the knowledge and to found arguments with facts and figures. A teacher at an Institute for Higher Vocational Education who is a member of an advisory task force on gender and ethnicity for instance described how she tried to strengthen advice to the Board of the Institute with results from academic research.

Trying to convince others of their viewpoints is a strategy that Women's Studies graduates use when they decide that their efforts are worth it. When they expect that someone is not receptive of their arguments, they will not start a discussion, or they will for instance make a joke about it to avoid a bitter dispute. An advisor made the following case of using her knowledge where it really matters:

Looking at the organisation internally, I sometimes refrain from saying something about it, I don't feel like always nagging about it. I see it as an expertise that is relevant for part of the policy area... When it concerns the coaching of managers, then the situation for female managers is

very different. Other issues are at stake and you may need another approach. And then I do find it important that people are aware of that⁶⁴.

Another strategy is to use Women's Studies knowledge, but not explicitly reveal the specific character of that knowledge. A feminist theologian gives the example in relation to the sermons she gives:

Where five or ten years ago I would be clear in passing on a feminist theological account as such, now I convey it in a politically more neutral way, but I use the same sources. So for a sermon I do use work of feminist theologians... But I don't add that a certain feminist theologian said it⁶⁵.

A common strategy is to hide a feminist perspective under a different theme, for instance under multiculturalism. Or to speak about 'violence at home' instead of 'wife beating'. This strategy is similar to the strategy in which one switches, in any case in terminology, from a feminist perspective to a gender perspective. However, because the term gender is not well known in the Dutch language, this always entails some explanation, but it appears more neutral than calling something feminist. A teacher for instance talks about 'Women's Studies philosophy' instead of 'feminist scholarship'. Although hiding gender issues under a different theme can be a successful strategy to get attention for these issues, it could also make it more difficult to convince others of the necessity of applying a gender perspective. The interviewees however had not raised this issue.

Renaming as a strategy is related to, and can occur at the same time with, the strategy of adjusting your statements to the target group. A teacher for instance fills in the Women's Studies course for students trained to be speech therapists with gender linguistics and not with political debates and emancipation. Her predecessor had done the latter and this was not welcomed by the students.

Broadening a topic or generalising the advantages of a certain plan are successful strategies that Women's Studies graduates make use of in their work. An advisor working at the university explains how she managed to do this:

I am currently working on a project to improve the recruitment and selection procedures at the university. For me that starts with the question of how to achieve that women are assessed in a fair way in these procedures and that they become more inclined to apply for jobs. In the project I have broadened this to the general recruitment and selection procedures, ...but it is in fact about men and women⁶⁶.

What can be derived from the strategies of the Women's Studies experts, is that they estimate their chances for a successful use of knowledge, that they try to generate a bearing surface for their ideas, and if necessary create the conditions to put their knowledge to practice.

Position as women

Graduates of Women's Studies are a predominately female group. Only a small number of male students are involved in Women's Studies. Among the 309 experts in Women's

Studies that are listed in 2000⁶⁷ thirteen are men. How is their position as women in the labour market related to the acceptance of their knowledge?

Half of the interviewees, both students and former students, refer to the unfavourable position of women in the labour market in the Netherlands, they talk about issues such as unequal pay, the under representation of women in higher positions and the different ideas that employers have about men and women. Women are either aware of these issues or have seen it in their surroundings, and some women have experienced difficulties themselves. A twenty-six-year-old advisor said:

In the present project I succeeded in keeping myself going [between men]. In the beginning it really bothered me, because I, well, I was approached as a young beautiful woman, and then you must show that you have a lot going for you, but you will get jokes anyway, so you must learn to handle that, and I can handle it, but it costs more energy⁶⁸.

With the small sample of interviewees it is difficult to draw conclusions about the acceptance of women and their knowledge, however examples showed that it is not self-evident that women are seen as professionals. Whereas one interviewee mentions that she did not have to put in too much effort to get recognition as a woman, the experience of another interviewee is that as a woman you have to really prove yourself in order to get respect for your work. A thirty-two-year-old staff member commented on a strategy to get authority in her work:

When I go to work, I can dress casual, but sometimes I just need to power dress. Well, I will not refrain from doing that when I need to discuss with top people, also because I notice that by doing that I do get a certain authority which I otherwise would not get, apparently you must play that game⁶⁹.

Related to the position of women in the labour market, is the position of Women's Studies students/women students at university. The overrepresentation of female students in the Humanities and Social Sciences (where much of Women's Studies is located) goes together with a fall in the value of these disciplines in the view of authorities and policymakers in higher education⁷⁰. The institutional base of feminist research is thus located in depreciated disciplines, with negative consequences for the estimation of women's knowledge and Women's Studies knowledge.

PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY

Knowledge and attitudes as part of professional identity

As is made clear in previous parts of this chapter, Women's Studies graduates end up in a variety of professions. Given that university education does not prepare for a profession and given that Women's Studies, because of its interdisciplinarity, is always taught in connection with another discipline, this may not be surprising. The consequence of this is however that it is difficult to tie the professional identity of Women's Studies graduates to a certain occupation, as would be the case in traditional sociology of professions. The professional identity of Women's Studies graduates is thus not located in

their shared profession. Taking into account the low status that is assigned to Women's Studies, it may be clear that prestige, which usually goes together with professionalization, is also not part of the professional identity of Women's Studies graduates. I would rather put forward that their professional identity is located in their knowledge and perspective.

That the knowledge the students gain from Women's Studies, notably gender expertise, critical analysis, and independent thinking, can shape their professional identities, can be derived from the commonness of these competences. Many interviewees mentioned for instance the 'gender glasses', reflecting the existence of a community of Women's Studies scholars. This can be seen as a result of the successful institutionalisation of Women's Studies. The competences of Women's Studies graduates are not individual ones but are shared with other Women's Studies scholars. Moreover, the pervasiveness of their Women's Studies perspective in professional as well as personal practices firms their professional identity.

The interdisciplinarity of Women's Studies is also not a hindrance to the formation of professional identity among the graduates. The training may not result in disciplinary knowledge, but the general gender expertise that results from it is a key part of their knowledge. The characterisation that Gibbons et al.⁷¹ use for the organisation of disciplines in the Humanities as being "professional micro cultures held together by intellectual affinity", is also suitable for the field of Women's Studies. Scrutinising the professional identity of interdisciplinary programmes, Caughie⁷² however suggests that this identity is rather based on the personal and political character of 'studies' programmes, than on an intellectual affinity.

This personal and political character is an important part of the professional identity of Women's Studies graduates. This political character is what makes these studies distinct from other disciplines such as History or Politicology. The knowledge that Women's Studies students gain from their study is not self-evident. An importance difference with other disciplines is that feminist methodology has foregrounded the links between power and knowledge, by specifically pointing to the power relations between the sexes. As Mohanty⁷³ says: "Feminist scholarship [...] is not the mere production of knowledge about a certain subject. It is a directly political and discursive *practice* in that it is purposeful and ideological. It is best seen as a mode of intervention into particular hegemonic discourses [...]"

The professional identity of Women's Studies students is further developed by participating in Women's Studies networks, attending lectures, and by participating in Women's Studies conferences. These activities provide ample opportunity for further learning, intellectual challenge with one's peers, and the exchanging of information. Moreover, they work to strengthen the identification with and the feeling of belonging to the Women's Studies community⁷⁴. One interviewee, who was no longer working in the field of Women's Studies, still read articles and attended lectures to keep up with developments in the field. She was still attracted by Women's Studies topics and even

said that she missed it. This shows how professional identity can be a thing that “runs deep”⁷⁵.

The characterisation of Women’s Studies graduates that can be derived from the accounts of the interviewees is that they are engaged students with a critical view towards society and scholarship. This is closely related with the change women want to achieve as is described in the section on the conduct of Women’s Studies graduates in the workplace. Students are aware that with this critical view they contest established meanings and norms. With a Women’s Studies background you are seen as someone who “swims upstream,” as one graduate put it.

Career orientation

In their professional working lives, Women’s Studies graduates find it important to have an interesting job, that they can put their heart and soul into, and to achieve well in their jobs. The interviews with graduates showed that the choice for a certain job is largely determined by interest in the content. This is especially manifest in the motivation of PhD students⁷⁶. They are eager to explore further certain topics in depth. A thirty-six-year-old economist said:

Doing PhD research was a golden opportunity to work on something I liked for four years⁷⁷.

Their ambitions are not career oriented in the sense of aiming for a certain position, moving up on the career ladder or making money. The rather vague ideas that students displayed about their future work also demonstrates this non-career orientation. The following interviewee commented on her ambitions as follows:

Well, making a career in the sense of making a lot of money is just not an issue, then I shouldn’t have become a PhD student, money has never been an important motive. [...] And talking about ambitions, that is something that I consider to be an issue, but more in the sense of wanting to be heard, because I think I have something to say, in that sense you could say I have ambitions. Some people say that I am ambitious, but I do not recognise myself in making money. What I do find important is to notice that there is an audience for the things I am engaged in. In that sense you can call me ambitious⁷⁸.

As in the above quotation, graduates often express a form of social or political engagement when they talk about what is important in their work. This engagement is sometimes connected to the position of women in society, but it can also be connected to social relations in a broader sense. The way graduates conduct their work was also influenced by this ideological stance. Several teachers for instance want to teach their students to think critically and not to take something for granted.

I am very ambitious, but not that I want a full-time job or want to make a career or become manager or so. But rather, I would like to write or work for an interesting magazine, so I am ambitious, but in the sense of wanting to achieve something good or helping other people⁷⁹.

Not many interviewees talk out loud about their ambition. There was (only) one young researcher who formulated her (former) ambitions explicitly. She wanted to become

a professor as soon as possible. The fact that women do not talk out loud about their ambitions does not mean that they are not ambitious. On the one hand it is a cultural phenomenon not to do so and it even seems 'not done' for women. On the other hand it is important to take into account that ambition is not a personal characteristic, but a feature that is determined by several factors: the subjective value people add to a career, self-efficacy, and the expectation that moving up on the career ladder is possible⁸⁰. Given the unfavourable position of women in the Dutch labour market⁸¹ it is not uncommon that women do not express their ambitions.

Yet, this non-career orientation may also be interpreted as a reaction to the masculine professional culture in which competition is an essential element. The ambitions of achieving self-realisation, intellectual fulfilment, and meeting social relevant goals could entail a change in professional working culture⁸².

It is striking however that some former students had the aspiration to prove themselves in a masculine environment: for instance a radio reporter (age thirty) wanted to report about political issues (political reporting is seen as a masculine subject) and a senior lecturer (age thirty-five) wanted to show that women can hold their own at university. And they succeeded:

I worked for several divisions of that corporation. But finally, and I am proud of that, I managed to work myself up to operational manager of an engineering company. Well, who would have thought that? I proved myself amongst the men⁸³.

With these aspirations and achievements women at the same time however work towards changing the balance between the sexes in certain professions.

In general, the graduates seem to be happy with where they are and with what they have accomplished. However, they seem to be disinclined to talk about this in terms of achievement. Only a few women explicitly said that they are proud of what they have accomplished.

TRANSFER OF WOMEN'S STUDIES KNOWLEDGE

Hindering and enhancing factors for knowledge transfer

To conclude, I want to give an overview of factors that can be identified as either hindering or enhancing the transfer of Women's Studies knowledge, by looking at the experiences of graduates as transporters of knowledge from the academy to society. A main barrier for knowledge transfer is the unfamiliarity with Women's Studies, due to the fact that the study is a relative newcomer in the labour market. Moreover, the association with feminism leads people to dispose of Women's Studies as politics and not proper scholarship. Its graduates are also confronted with the low status that is assigned to the field of Women's Studies and the undervaluation of women as topic of study. In combination with the misconception that Women's Studies is only about women and femininity, graduates need to explain the importance of their viewpoints and the broader scope of their studies.

The female dominated group of Women's Studies professionals also has to deal with the unfavourable labour market position of women in the Netherlands in general. Women are not easily seen as professionals, sometimes having to double prove themselves in the work place.

Political and economic constraints are formed by less specific governmental emancipation policy and subsidy cuts resulting in little money for women's organisations and even the closing down of some organisations. The public opinion that emancipation is completed complicates knowledge transfer even further.

The last but not the smallest difficulty for the transfer of Women's Studies knowledge that can be identified through the interviews is the critical character of Women's Studies, with which it contests established meanings and norms.

Factors enhancing Women's Studies knowledge transfer are familiarity with Women's Studies (in Women's Studies in universities, but also in women's organisations) and the relevance or usefulness that the study has in many sectors in the labour market. However, for knowledge transfer to be successful, graduates often have to argue their case. If organisations or co-workers specifically require Women's Studies knowledge, they know the way and ask experts to bring in a Women's Studies perspective in courses, lectures, policy or otherwise. And finally, the firm professional identity of Women's Studies graduates in combination with their social or political engagement means that they never lose their Women's Studies perspective and are always keen to use their knowledge and to make a difference.

Transfer of new knowledge

The transfer of Women's Studies knowledge, as illustrated by the analysis of the interviews, can be characterised as the transfer of new knowledge, as stated in the title of this chapter. On the one hand, it is new in the sense that Women's Studies is a relatively young field and the knowledge that this field produces can be called 'new' knowledge. On the other hand, the knowledge is new in the sense of 'the new production of knowledge': Women's Studies is interdisciplinary, is problem oriented, and emphasises the contribution knowledge can make to social improvement. Unfortunately, this social robustness of Women's Studies knowledge is not a guarantee for its acceptability⁸⁴. As demonstrated in this chapter, the commitment of Women's Studies to achieve social change and the political character of its knowledge are hampering the acceptance of Women's Studies knowledge in society.

NOTES

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- ³⁴ See UE040.
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- ³⁸ See UE032.
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- ⁴² See NE008.
- ⁴³ See UE040.
- ⁴⁴ See VT011.
- ⁴⁵ See NE008.
- ⁴⁶ See UE028.
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- ⁴⁸ See NE008.
- ⁴⁹ Griffin, *Employment and Women's Studies* cit.
- ⁵⁰ See OE026.
- ⁵¹ See AE011.
- ⁵² See VE001.
- ⁵³ See AE011.
- ⁵⁴ See VT011.
- ⁵⁵ Griffin, *Introduction to 'The State of Gender Studies'* cit.
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- ⁶¹ See OE011.
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